GEO-4
Chapter 8: Challenges and Opportunities
Draft 1.0 (compiled by Jill Jäger)
6 January 2006
Co-ordinating Lead Authors: Jill Jäger (SERI) Marcel Kok (MNP) Vishal Narain (TERI)
Contributing Authors:
Dhari Naser Al-Ajmi; Geoffrey Dabelko; Thierry de Oliveira; Indra De Soysa; Richard Filcak; Des Gasper; Silvia Giada; Henk Hilderink; Jill Jäger; Sylvia Karlsson; Marcel Kok; Liza Koshy; Matthias Lüdeke; Marybeth Long Martello; Jennifer Mohamed-Katerere; Vikrom Mathur; Ana Rosa Moreno; Annet Nakyeyune; Vishal Narain; Alvaro Ponce; Sophie Strasser; Frank Thomalla; Steven Wonink.
This is a preliminary draft. Please do not cite or use material from it.
1 Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ...... 4 8.1 Introduction ...... 5 8.2 Human Well-Being and Vulnerability ...... 10 8.2.1 The character of human well-being...... 10 Broad concept...... 10 Multi-dimensionality...... 12 Three different areas of focus...... 13 8.2.3 The specific conception of human well-being in this chapter...... 16 A focus on quality of life, including on freedoms and security ...... 16 Components of well-being and their relationship to the environment ...... 16 Materials for a good life ...... 17 Health ...... 18 Personal and environmental security...... 19 Good social relations...... 20 Freedoms and opportunities ...... 21 8.2.4 Indicators and measures of well-being and the environment/well-being interface..... 21 Concepts, theories and indicators of well-being ...... 21 The income-based approach...... 22 Issues in the measurement of well-being ...... 24 Indicators classified according to components of well-being and three broad approaches ...... 25 8.3 The Global Context of Vulnerability ...... 30 8.3.1 The economic context: Globalization, trade, poverty and aid...... 30 8.3.2 The governance context ...... 33 From global to local ...... 33 Environmental governance: changing scope, actors and processes ...... 33 8.3.3 The people context: population, perceptions, health and security ...... 35 8.3.4 Changes in technology ...... 40 8.4 Patterns of Vulnerability ...... 42 8.4.1 Common pool resources...... 43 8.4.2 Contaminated sites – legacies of the past...... 46 8.4.3 Desertification in drylands ...... 49 8.4.4 A growing consumers’ class and the export of vulnerability...... 52 8.4.5 Global markets, local opportunities; land use change and livelihood insecurity [New title?]...... 55 8.4.6 Post-conflict vulnerabilities and human well-being...... 58 8.4.7 The resource paradox and vulnerability ...... 61 8.4.8 Small Island Developing States (SIDS): Environment for development nexus...... 64 8.4.9 Technological fixes of water problems ...... 67 8.4.10 Urbanisation of the coastal fringe: balancing environmental risks and economic opportunities...... 70 8.4.11 Vulnerability of energy production and consumption systems in industrialised countries: the next energy crises?...... 73 8.5 Policy Opportunities...... 76 8.5.1 Governance and institutions...... 76 Opportunities for mainstreaming the environment in governance and institutions ...... 76 Effective governance...... 79 8.5.2 Poverty ...... 81 Policy responses ...... 82 2 Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into development ...... 82 8.5.3 Health ...... 87 Policy responses ...... 88 Options for mainstreaming environment into health policies ...... 88 8.5.4 Trade...... 91 Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into trade policy...... 92 8.5.5 Conflict and Cooperation ...... 94 Conflict...... 94 Cooperation ...... 95 Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into peacemaking...... 95 8.5.6 Science and Technology...... 98 Science and technology contributions to reducing vulnerability ...... 99 Avenues for policy development...... 100 References Section 1, 2 and 4 ...... 102 References Section 3 ...... 111 References Section 5 ...... 113
3 Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the input from our colleagues who attended preparatory meetings in Nicoya, Costa Rica and Scheveningen, The Netherlands. We are most grateful to Munyaradzi Chenje, UNEP for his friendly guidance and Marion Cheatle for getting us started. We deeply miss Gerhard Petschel-Held, whose scientific insights helped us to develop and implement the “archetypes approach” and whose spirit remains with us as we work on the chapter.
4 8.1 Introduction This chapter identifies challenges to and opportunities for improving human-well-being and quality of life through analyses of human-environment systems and their vulnerability to certain forms of environmental change. We show the importance of environment for human well-being and sustainable development by addressing the following main questions:
How do the environmental state, variability, hazards and trends described in the chapter(s) on the state of the environment affect human well-being? What factors shape the vulnerability of human-environment systems to multiple and interacting stresses? What are the response options within and beyond the environmental policy domain?
In 1987 the World Commission on Sustainable Development (WCED) concluded that “sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life.” While pointing out that sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs, the Commission underlined that the process is neither easy nor straightforward and must rest on political will.
In the 20 years since the publication of the report, progress has been made along the rocky path charted by the WCED at local, national and global levels. This chapter looks more closely at some of the challenges and opportunities along the way to meeting the basic/material needs for all and fulfilling aspirations for a better life. It shifts the focus from looking at the state of the environment to considering what we refer to as the “human-environment system”. The material needs of humans are satisfied to a large extent by services provided by the bio-physical environment. At the same time, as Chapters 2-7 of GEO-4 illustrate, human activities are leading to major environmental changes that impact human well-being. By considering humans and the environment together, it is possible to explore the linkages and draw conclusions about how human well-being can be improved and the environment can be protected within the context of sustainable development.
Thus the main focus of the chapter is on the challenges to and the opportunities for improving human well-being while also protecting the environment. Human well-being of the current and future generations is the core of sustainable development, as emphasized by the WCED and much subsequent work.
We do this by looking at the vulnerability of the human-environment system to multiple stresses resulting from both environmental and socio-economic changes. In general terms, vulnerability refers to the potential of a system to be harmed by external stresses. Vulnerability can be seen as the potential for negative outcomes or consequences for well-being and can be characterized by the probability of a sharp decline in, for example, access to various resources such as food and drinking water or consumption levels going below minimum needs for health or survival. It is a result of both exposure to risk factors such as drought, conflict or extreme price fluctuations, and also of underlying socio-economic and institutional conditions that reduce people’s and/or the environment’s ability to cope with the negative impacts of exposure. These impacts not only depend on the exposure but also on the sensitivity of the unit (such as a watershed, island, household, village, city or country) that is exposed. Vulnerability can thus be seen as the combination of exposure and sensitivity to risk and the (in)ability to cope or adapt. An underlying premise here is that if the vulnerability of a particular human-environment system, be it a village, city, river basin, country or region, to environmental and/or socio-economic change increases, the human well-being in that system decreases both directly through the reduced security and potentially through the risk of actual losses. In many, but not all, cases, improving capacity to adapt to multiple stresses in a particular place can also contribute to increasing human well-being.
5 The concept of vulnerability Vulnerability research has largely evolved from three academic communities - development and food security (Chambers 1989, Watts and Bohle 1993, Bohle et al. 1994, Ellis 2000, FAO 2001, Dilley and Boudreau 2001), natural hazards (Wisner 1993, Hilhorst and Bankoff 2003, Pelling 2003; Wisner et al. 2004), and climate change (Burton 1997, Handmer et al. 1999, Klein and Nicholls 1999, Leichenko and O’Brien 2002, IPCC 2001, and Downing and Patwardhan 2003) - and is now widely used in the work of many international organisations and research programmes concerned with poverty reduction and sustainable development, such as IPCC, UNEP, UNDP, FAO and the Red Cross. Vulnerability analysis is an important extension of traditional risk analysis as it delineates the places, people, and ecosystems at risk from environmental and/or human induced variability and change, identifies the underlying causes of this vulnerability, and develops policy relevant recommendations for decision-makers on how to reduce vulnerability and adapt to change (Clark et al. 1998, Kasperson et al. 2005). Vulnerability analysis focuses on the perspectives and experiences of vulnerable and marginalised groups to understand in particular the role of poverty, institutional weaknesses, globalisation, environmental factors and marginality in creating vulnerability (e.g. Hewitt 1997, Adger 2003, Adger et al. 2005). By identifying people and places particularly at risk, capturing trends that may lead to unsustainable situations, and improving our understanding of the socially-differentiated nature of the impacts of change, opportunities and priorities for development interventions and early warning can be determined. Efforts in current vulnerability research aim to move away from traditional cross sectional snapshot analysis and recognise historical, long-term transitional vulnerability focussing on thresholds and changes over time. It is analysed as the dynamic interaction of multiple stresses within a complex and changing environment. The spatial and temporal aspects of risk as well as non-linear pathways are also important. GEO-3 made a start towards analyzing vulnerability, noting that vulnerability, not a new phenomenon, is shaped by a mix of social, ecological and economic forces and has both spatial and temporal dimensions. Spatially, some locations such as high altitudes, flood plains, river banks, small islands, and coastal areas may be more exposed to environmental risks than others. The temporal dimension of vulnerability is illustrated by the fact that in many countries coping capacity that was strong in the past has not kept pace with environmental change. GEO-3 identified some of the causes: when traditional options are reduced or eliminated, when new hazards emerge for which no coping mechanism exists, and when resources are lacking or technology and skills are not available. At the same time, vulnerability varies across groups: men and women, poor and rich, rural and urban, and so on. Refugees, migrants, displaced groups, the very young and old, women and children are often the most vulnerable groups, subject to multiple stresses (UNEP 2002a). GEO-3 identified three critical areas as being closely related to vulnerability: human health, food security and economic losses. Two types of policy responses were identified: reducing the hazards through prevention and preparedness initiatives, and improving the coping capacity of vulnerable groups to enable them to deal with them. A case was also made for assessing and measuring vulnerability and developing systems of early warning.
The framework used here for examining vulnerability is illustrated in Figure 8.1. It is based on the framework developed by Turner et al. (2003). On the left side, we consider the stress complex – the drivers and pressures also considered in the overall GEO-4 assessment framework
The right-hand side of the box looks at the impacts of the stresses, but highlights the fact that the impact depends on the sensitivity of the system and, importantly, on the capacity to adapt to change. Responses (mitigation and adaptation) are embodied by the arrows between boxes. Well-being, in its multiple dimensions, is used to “take the temperature of” the human-environment system. So this chapter is trying to bring together conceptual frameworks for vulnerability analysis with measures of well-being. Despite a long history of theory-building and research on vulnerability – measures of
6 vulnerability remain elusive. Well-being, however, has long been the focus of indicator development and measurement. This chapter is, in part, using measures of well-being as a proxy for measuring vulnerability when we ask in Section 4 of this chapter how indicators of well-being change when human-environment systems are subjected to environmental and socio-economic stresses. Thus, all elements of the GEO-4 assessment framework are also considered here, but with an emphasis on: • multiple and interacting stresses on the human-environment system; and • the roles of sensitivity and adaptive capacity in determining the impacts.
Figure 8.1 Framework for the analysis of vulnerability though the archetypes
Based on the analysis of vulnerable situations and places, possibilities for overcoming challenges and leveraging opportunities to improve human well-being and the environment are identified. We do this for six policy themes: governance and institutions, poverty in a broad conceptualisation; human health; trade; conflict and cooperation; and science and technology. These themes were selected on the basis of regional and global consultations with a wide range of actors as important policy themes for sustainable development. Note that there are significant overlaps and interactions between them. Several of them represent stresses on the human-environment system, but can also shape the response of a particular system to stress.
To provide the basis for analysing the relation between vulnerability and human well-being Section 2 of this chapter looks in depth at the concept of well-being, defining the concept, showing how it is linked to environmental change, how it is measured and how it is influenced by the six policy themes highlighted in this chapter.
As a background to the analysis of vulnerability in specific situations and places (as illustrated by the grey box in Figure 8.1), Section 3 presents global political, social and economic trends and summarizes the consequences of environmental changes for human well-being identified in previous chapters
7 particular human-environment system, whose vulnerability to climatic change depends not only on local factors but amongst others also on access to global markets, levels of investment in infrastructure and the extent of mangrove destruction in a country.
Challenges to improving human well-being and the environment are identified in Section 4 by an examination of “archetypes” of vulnerability, which are defined as specific, representative patterns of the interactions between environmental change and human well-being. The archetypes allow detailed and elaborate analysis of the way in which issues such as poverty, human health, institutions and governance, science and technology, trade and globalization, and conflict and co-operation influence or interact with environmental changes and determine specific vulnerabilities. The fact that these issues play out differently in different contexts is one of the major motivations for choosing the archetype approach. It sensitizes us to the complexity and diversity of possible interactions, including to the scope for both unpleasant and pleasant surprises.
The archetypes included in this chapter have been formulated within the context of GEO-4, taking into account the most important outcomes of the chapters 2-5 with respect to environmental change, regional priorities as identified in chapter 6 and relevant global trends shaping vulnerability as analyzed in section 4. The analysis of the archetypes is based on the building blocks of the framework for vulnerability analysis developed by Turner et al. (2003) that are relevant for the “place-based” assessment of archetypical vulnerabilities, as illustrated in Figure 8.1.
In all cases the aim is to show the vulnerability of human and/or social systems to natural and human- induced stresses, to understand what determines this vulnerability, to link that vulnerability to changes in human well-being and to explore policy options for reducing vulnerability of the human- environment system to environmental and socio-economic changes. The roles of the six selected policy themes as stresses on the human-environment system or as determinants of increased/decreased vulnerability are examined and case studies of successful environmental policy interventions to reduce vulnerability and increase human well-being are given. These broad patterns of vulnerability illustrate that vulnerability to environmental change is an issue of grave concern worldwide – in developed and developing countries and countries with economies in transition.
Archetypes of vulnerability are defined as a specific, representative pattern of the interactions between environmental change and human well-being. This approach is very much inspired by the “syndrome approach” which looks at non-sustainable patterns of human – environment interaction, and analyzes the dynamics behind them, but is broader in the sense that also included in the analysis are opportunities offered by the environment to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being are included in the analysis (Lüdeke et al., 2004; Wonink, Kok, Hilderink, 2005).
The approach is used to assess the context-specificity of environmental change, multiple stresses and human vulnerability. By looking at the diversity of human-environment systems (as the major unit of analysis for assessing vulnerability) throughout the world, it is evident that some situations share certain vulnerability-creating conditions. In this sense, the archetypes presented in this chapter are simplifications of real cases, which should help to understand the basic processes whereby vulnerability is produced within a context of multiple stressors. This may allow policymakers to recognize their particular situations within a broader context – providing regional perspectives and important connections between regions and the global context (i.e. a ‘dryland archetype’ taking place in West-China, the Sahel, Western USA and NE-Brazil). An overview and description of the archetypes analysed in this chapter is provided in Table 8.1
Section 5 of the chapter looks at the policy themes (poverty, health, science and technology, trade, institutions and governance, and conflict/cooperation) and, based on the analysis in the previous sections, discusses what policies are in place to address the mitigation, coping, and adaptation capacity needs of groups vulnerable to environmental change. This section also analyses the extent to which
8 our existing institutions and science and technology are capable of changing current trends in sustainability.
The six policy themes are linked to well-being and the vulnerability of human-environment systems, as shown in Sections 2 and 4. This leads to some key policy messages offering opportunities to deal with the challenges to improve human well-being and the environment [include the most important messages here, emphasise the opportunities from a development perspective, emphasise the opportunities for reducing vulnerability and increasing well-being].
Table 8.1 Overview and description of archetypes analysed in this chapter
11 Archetypes of vulnerability Short Description Common Pool Resources Vulnerabilities that result from the over-use of Common Pool Resources (CPRs), which happens because CPRs are difficult to protect and susceptible for overuse that diminishes resource availability for all users Contaminated sites - Legacies of the past Potentially harmful situations that are not eliminated and where especially the poorer sections of society are vulnerable to the negative consequences of this situation. Desertification in Drylands The vulnerability of rural populations who depend directly on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods to environmental and social change within dryland areas. Exporting vulnerability The consequences of increasing global consumption and its harmful effects on natural systems that makes it harder for the poorest on the planet to meet their basic needs. Global markets, local opportunities Export-crop driven land use change undermining the livelihood of ecosystem dependent communities, without sufficient alternatives for them to overcome the loss of livelihood base and little sharing of the benefits from the resource exploitation. (Post) Conflict induced Vulnerability The vulnerabilities to human well-being presented in the post-conflict period. The breakdown of infrastructure, social order, and the rule of law in many post-conflict settings increases the vulnerability of human-environment systems. Resource Paradox Availability of easy money for governments from resource rents drives unsustainable use of resources without commensurate welfare gains for society. Resource wealthy states tend to generate human vulnerability and ill-being through the perpetuation of poverty and bad governance Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Vulnerability of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to climate change impacts in a broader context in which a suite of geographic, economic and social factors interplay to create disproportionate vulnerabilities for all SIDS. Technological fixes of water problems Vulnerability induced by the bad management or failure of centrally planned, large- scale projects (like dams) involving deliberate reshaping of the natural environment. Ambivalence: providing additional resources but having severe impacts on the environment and society. Urbanisation of the coastal fringe: balancing Rapid coastal urbanisation in the context of increasing environmental risks and economic vulnerabilities to climate and weather-related hazards and climate opportunities change in coastal areas that are often ecologically sensitive.
Vulnerability of Energy Production and The ability (or lack thereof) of the energy production and consumption systems in Consumption systems in Industrialised industrialised countries to fulfil (increasing) energy demand in a changing context of countries: the next energy crises? security of energy supply, liberalisation and privatisation of the sector, impacts of climate change and requirements to contribute to mitigation.
9 8.2 Human Well-Being and Vulnerability Achieving and safeguarding human well-being is a condition for a flourishing and sustainable society. The state of the environment is a critical determinant of the state of human well-being, particularly in places where people depend more directly on environmental goods and services for their basic needs, but ultimately all people depend on these goods and services. Human well-being is affected by environmental, social, economic and political changes, for example through droughts and floods, spread of infectious diseases, armed conflict, and economic collapse. Social, economic, political and environmental changes can also have positive impacts on human well-being, for example from various types of technological change, better information systems, appropriate education, equitable trade, and reductions in inequity or the control of vector diseases like malaria.
This section considers the broad concept of human well-being, how it has been conceptualised elsewhere and its inherent multi-dimensionality. This is followed by a detailed discussion of how well- being is conceptualised in this chapter and the links between components of well-being and the vulnerability of human-environment systems. Finally, the section discusses well-being indicators.
8.2.1 The character of human well-being
Broad concept ‘Well-being’ is understood here as good quality of life. Determinations of well-being require analysis of how people actually live and the quality of their lives. There are different understandings of the detailed contents of well-being; but each understanding of human well-being involves a selection and weighting of some aspects of living (‘being’) which are judged to be valuable. For example, some people or communities stress fulfilment of material needs, others stress happiness, some stress achievements, others give freedoms more weight, while yet others stress the fulfilment of duties.
Judgements of well-being vary according to which components of living are highlighted and how they are valued. Two central questions are: which components, and who selects and values them?
In terms of components of living, the most important distinction is between measures of ‘subjective well-being’, which focus on how people experience or value the quality of their lives, in measures of satisfaction or happiness, and measures of ‘objective well-being’, which look not at what people feel about their lives, but directly at the content of their lives and uses observations of how people live. This chapter considers both of these approaches to well-being: how people feel, and how they live. As in most work on quality-of-life, our main emphasis is on objective well-being measures, since these are in general more consensual and more reliable.
Who are the judges? Firstly, for both subjective and objective well-being there can be self-reporting measures, where measurement is by the person (or group) whose life is evaluated; or external measures, where measures are by others. Typically highlighted are (i) self-report measures of feelings about some aspect of a person’s life or the person’s life overall, and (ii) external measures of objective well-being; but these are not the only cases. People can report on the content of their lives, and third parties can observe and measure how someone feels.
Secondly, detailed specifications of human-well being can come from: − Different philosophies and cultures, which may make different judgements about what is valuable; for example, the difference between groups who are more oriented to material production and accumulation and those who are less so. − Different schools of analysis, for these highlight different aspects of living, or describe the aspects of living in different ways. For example, economics has typically highlighted income and expenditure, while psychologists typically study mental states. − Different persons in a society, including men and women, or people at different stages in their life. − Different types of society, since these contain different types of life situation. For example, definitions of well-being may be different in a pastoral society than in an urban industrial society.
10 Major studies of variation in values between societies include the regular World Values Surveys (refs.) and research by for example Hofstede (2001) and Prescott-Alan (2001).
Clark (2002, 2003) for example, suggests from a study in some areas in South Africa that several aspects that are valued there are closely linked to the history of political and social struggle in South Africa. These include civil and political rights, personal safety, and opportunities for affiliation and participation. People there also highly value ‘safe work’ whereas studies in industrialized Western countries tend to focus more on a value of ‘work satisfaction’. This warns us against thinking that the meaning of well-being can be completely covered by one specific static list of goals or targets. The Millennium Development Goals, for example, are targets for improving well-being rather than a statement of what constitutes well-being. Human well-being is a continuum – from extreme deprivation, or poverty, to a high attainment or experience of well-being (MA 2005, 50). In developing countries, work safety in both industry and agriculture is a major issue, often directly linked to environmental concerns (e.g. use of chemicals). The debates also around biosafety and acceptable levels of risk, in all countries, are linked closely to issues of human well-being and in particular the aspect of personal security.
There is broad academic consensus about the core contents of human well-being, but some variations exist around the core areas. All concepts of well-being value life itself and health, for example. Ends such as being respected, feeling proud and achieving status are also important to many. A substantial degree of consensus – around some specifics, and around what are relevant general categories in several other areas -- is indicated both by social science research (e.g., World Values Survey (refs.); Kung (refs.); Alkire, Qizilbash (refs.)) and by products of global policy processes which have had universal or near-universal approval: such as the United Nations Millennium Declaration , and the UNDP concept of ‘human development’ which is the foundation of the human development report, and the major statements on sustainable development (e.g., Brundtland Report, WSSD and the Vienna Declaration on Development), as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights law and the constitutions of particular countries, as well as demands for revising, extending and giving effect to them, give insights into variations as well as commonalities in what is valued and how human well-being is understood. Box 8.1 illustrates how human well-being has been conceptualized in a number of international processes.
11 Box 8.1 Human Well-Being in International Processes Kommentar [JJ1]: Need to add human rights process A number of international organizations and institutions have used the concept of human-well-being to beginning in 1948 – Conventions assess, describe and compare the quality of human life throughout the world. Perhaps the most well- and institutions –also important re known measure of human well-being is found at the core of the United Nations Development components of HEW eg freed0m, Programme’s Human Development Report (UNDP 2005). This report, published annually since 1990, basic needs includes the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), a comparative measure of well-being based on indicators of literacy, life expectancy, school enrolment, and GDP per capita. It is complemented by measures for poverty in developing (HPI-1) and developed countries (HPI-2) as well as measures for gender inequality, in the gender related development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM). The scope of the HDR has widened considerably to cover public commitments to health and education, water and sanitation, nutrition, the structure of trade, aid and debt, energy and the environment, refugees and armaments, crime and human rights. This widening of understanding of human well-being is also evident in recent analysis, which point to facets of well- being often overlooked in conventional studies: for example, ways in which well-being depends upon human rights and on the environment and its natural resources (Dasgupta 2001). The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) notes that while many Arctic residents would not receive high HDI scores, they do not see themselves as possessing an inferior quality of life when compared with people throughout the world. The AHDR addresses this disparity by applying its own definition of well- being. This definition accounts for a range of well-being factors, important to Arctic residents, but not reflected in the HDI. In particular, the AHDR considers maintenance of traditional hunting and herding practices; knowledge held by Arctic peoples, but not easily measured by school enrolment and literacy; lives lived close to nature; and the minimization of natural resource use (AHDR 2004).
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005) focuses on environment-related aspects of human well-being, by examining ways in which changes in ecosystem services influence human well-being. The MA defines well-being as comprised of a number of constituents including basic material for a good life, health, good social relations, security, and freedom of choice and action. The MA further considers links between ecosystem services (e.g, provisioning, regulating and cultural) and the varied components of well-being. Provisioning refers to food, water, food and fiber and fuel; regulating functions regulate climate, flood, disease and water purification, and cultural services concern aesthetics, spirituality, education and recreation.
Like the MA, the United Nation’s Millennium Project addresses relationships linking environment and human well-being. The report entitled Environment and Human-Well-being: A Practical Strategy (UNMP 2005) identifies six key elements affecting human health and economic well-being: agricultural production systems, forests, freshwater resources and ecosystems, fisheries and marine ecosystems, air and water pollution, and global climate change.
Multi-dimensionality Well-being is multi-dimensional. There are many important aspects of being--for example: access to material goods to support livelihoods; power and independence, or their lack; voice; fun; physical health and mental health--and these are not reducible to a single thing. This is vividly and amply illustrated in the Voices of the Poor studies ((Narayan and others 1999, 2000 and 2002, Brock 1999), which present the views of sixty thousand individuals from 60 countries, both from new surveys and a synthesis of some earlier surveys. The same finding emerges in studies in high-income countries, and is reflected in the adoption nowadays of a multi-dimensional approach in nearly all studies of quality of life. The different dimensions of well-being are closely related to each other, with changes in one affecting another. To operationalise the term well-being, we focus on the common components of multi-dimensional definitions.
Ill-being or the lack of well-being is closely associated with poverty. Multidimensionality is increasingly seen in interpretations of poverty. Concepts of poverty have steadily widened, to take into account not only a person’s private consumption, but also his/her use of common property resources and societally provided goods, and his/her assets (for these reduce vulnerability), insecurity and
12 powerlessness, dignity, autonomy and health. These various aspects of poverty tend to be reinforcing making it difficult for individuals to move out of poverty (WRI and others 2005). The diagram below (Figure 8.2) from Voices of the Poor study (Narayan, 1999) shows how critical aspects of ill and well-being define the subjective experience of being.
Figure 8.2 (Narayan et al 1999, page 4)
For different archetypes of vulnerability discussed in this chapter, some well-being impacts are more relevant than others. For example, in archetype X physical security impacts are important, while in archetype Y health impacts play a significant role. In general ‘good social relations’ will receive less emphasis, because they constitute a facet that is more difficult to conceptualise and measure. It must however be kept in mind, as an important factor in determining resilience to stresses.
Three different areas of focus To make sense of the wide range of interpretations of well-being, we can distinguish three broad categories (see e.g. Gasper 2004, Robeyns 2004): Inputs, some of which can be measured in monetary terms; Subjective Well-being, measured in terms of how people feel about how they live; and Objective Well-being, measured in terms of the various objective aspects of living that are deemed important. In other words, what people have, how they live, and how they feel.
The first family of approaches takes inputs and resources as the main aspect relevant for well-being. Inputs include not only financial resources, but also a broad spectrum of means which can be used to promote well-being. People determine how to use these resources to achieve well-being. Disciplines such as environmental studies and economics have mostly concentrated on inputs to well-being. Economic theories, for example, focus on income or expenditure as measures of control over other relevant resources. However, national income/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a proxy for well- being has been convincingly criticized, since it excludes many relevant sources of well-being and includes various expenditures that reflect ill-being rather well-being, such as over-consumption and medication. Nevertheless, GDP remains a relevant measure of economic activity, and of economic power, including power to acquire more resources, distribute information, influence decisions, and acquire means of coercion. These forms of economic power while in some cases very important do not necessarily contribute to well-being. Livelihood approaches have helpfully extended the range of inputs looked at, well beyond the range that has been conventional in economics.
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A second family of approaches – Subjective Well-Being approaches - focuses on how people experience or value the quality of their lives, in measures of satisfaction or happiness (see e.g. Veenhoven 2004). Utilitarianism is an example of such an approach. This family of approaches presents difficulties for obtaining aggregate measures of well-being because well-being depends on criteria which can be defined differently by every person. Further, some persons whose lives have very many valuable features declare themselves dissatisfied, while some persons who have little in their lives, not through their own choice, declare themselves more satisfied, perhaps because they cannot afford to not have a positive attitude in dealing with their difficult situation. A person’s subjective well-being can also reflect not only her/his own quality of life but also that of other people, as well as concerns with her relative position. Evidence on subjective well-being remains very important; but cannot give the main basis for most public policy exercises. In contrast, however, participatory approaches can be appropriate in specifying relevant aspects of well-being for public policy purposes, or in interpreting and applying any general framework (like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
It is not enough to look at only inputs or at only subjective well-being, because the relationships between the three domains are complex and sometimes unreliable or even zero, as is seen in the table of recent subjective well-being indexes for 82 countries. The highest ranking countries were in Latin America; and many of the lowest rankings were middle-income countries that have experienced relative decline. Economic inputs in particular may bring little or even sometimes no sustained increase in subjective well-being beyond high middle-income levels (around US $10-12000 per annum per capita). This is part of the so-called ‘Easterlin paradox’ (Easterlin ed. 2002). It could be because further increase in economic inputs does not contribute to satisfying some key needs for well-being, and/or can undermine inputs (for example, various environmental services, or in close personal relations) that are required for sustained or increased well-being.
The third family of approaches – Objective Well-Being approaches -- looks, therefore, not at what people feel about their lives, but directly at the content of their lives. Health sciences, social indicators research, and a major part of quality-of-life research look especially at how people live; at aspects of objective well- and ill-being. These include, for example, the sometimes neglected aspects of physical security and time use. How much time people must spend to sustain themselves can depend heavily on environmental systems that affect the availability of water and fuel, the patterns of commuting, and so on. Improvements in forest cover have been shown, in some areas, to lessen the time that women and girls spend collecting wood and thus increase the opportunity for girls to go to school (WRI and others, 2005).
One version of this third family is the capability approach (Sen 1999), which has been adopted in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports and, subsequently, in much related development work, including that of the World Bank and other United Nations agencies such as UNEP. It focuses on the real possibilities that a person has, to do or be valuable things. This approach usefully combines a more objective-oriented perspective (evidence on how people actually live, and on their freedom to achieve well-being) with a more subjective-oriented dimension (a highlighting of the role of valuation in judgements about well-being). The objective aspects of a person’s life that it considers are, first, valuable ‘functionings’, by which it means valued parts of a person’s life; and second, ‘capability’, meaning the range of alternative valued lives that a person could achieve. People face choices between these alternative lives. The capability approach calls for people to have a better valued set of alternative life-paths from which to choose their life. Among the basic capabilities are the ability to lead a long life in good health, be well nourished, educated, housed, adequately clothed and integrated into the community.
A recent approach to wellbeing is Sen’s Capability Approach that focuses on the different “states of beings” rather than on material attributes (although Sen recognizes that these are important and cannot be discarded wholesale). The analysis attempts to explore the relationships between personal characteristics, goods, and social factors in achieving wellbeing. The separation of these states of beings into “doings” and ‘beings” (termed achieved functionings) range from basic ones such being
14 adequately nourished, being healthy and well-clothed and sheltered to more complex ones such as being part of the community, participate and being active in political life etc.
Capability is closely related to functionings, it is basically a set of vectors reflecting a range of possible beings and doings that a person can achieve based on her choice to lead one type of life or another. The difference (which has a bearing in how to measure/operationalize the capability approach) between functionings and capability is the actual achievements for the former as opposed to the ability to achieve for the latter. Therefore capabilities reflect the notion of freedom, “what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead” (Sen 1987b: 36). Conversely, functioning relates more directly to the living conditions of individuals.
For Sen, the well-being of individuals depends on the command over what he terms “commodities” (these are goods and services, assets, non-market and market productions etc.) and the ability of these individuals to achieve functionings. A person’s ability to translate the access of goods and services into functionings are influenced by factors such as personal characteristics such as for instance age, job status, physical condition), social and environmental factors including traditions, availability of social services, climate change, the presence of infrastructures etc.
In measuring the constituents of human well-being, the mere fact of knowing how much assets/resources a person owns, or goods and services being available, are not considered as potential indicators for the level of well-being she can achieve. As Sen puts it, “the pervasive diversity of human beings intensifies the need to address the diversity of focus in the assessment of equality” (1992: 3). Income inequality between individuals or groups in this regard, would take the form of both the individuals’ earning-income abilities as well as their income-using ability (Sen 1999: 119).
The focus on human diversity and freedoms as advocated by Sen, presupposes a move away from the linear relationship between quantity of goods and level of utility achieved as found in welfare economics, to a wider informative space where goods are just a means to achieve certain freedoms.
The first and second approaches are relatively less reliable bases around which to build policy. The third type of focus, on objective well-being, is well-suited for use in global assessments and policymaking because it looks directly at the content of people’s lives and because it presents a notion of well-being that can be evaluated in all situations and countries. In it the judgements about priority aspects are made through public processes and public agencies to guide policy decisions. This sort of approach is used not only for UNDP’s Human Development Reports (HDRs), but indirectly for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as for the conceptual framework of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). The MDGs are themselves not a definition of well-being but a set of Kommentar [JJ2]: Make link interim targets for the period up to 2015, a list for the medium-term of accepted priority public here also to Human Rights Framework responsibilities. The HDRs understand human development as the expansion of valued opportunities in ordinary people’s lives. The MA highlights that such freedoms and choices contain, and rest on: basic material opportunities, health, environmental and personal security, and stable good social relations. These four underlying components are linked to each other and reinforce each other (MA 2003, 74). Improvements in health, for example may, require expanding livelihood options through more secure access to resources as well as achieve security from disaster. These five areas in the MA emerged from the findings in the ‘Voices of the Poor’ study and are adopted here as well. Overall then the conception of well-being adopted in this report mainly reflects a focus on objective well-being, with elements from the other two approaches.
In practice, measures of human well-being often include some mixture of the three domains described above, as is shown later in the chapter. This can be appropriate, provided the different character and role of each is understood. For example, the Human Development Index includes measures of education and physical health, and the input indicator per capita GDP. Quality of life studies often include subjective well-being measures as well as various objective measures of valued aspects of well-being. Especially in more inclusive governance frameworks, self-perceptions are important and are critical for successful policy interventions.
15 8.2.3 The specific conception of human well-being in this chapter
A focus on quality of life, including on freedoms and security Following the Human Development Reports, we focus on both the priority areas in people’s lives and on the real options that people have (thus on both ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ in Amartya Sen’s terminology). “Real options” means the things that a person could choose and attain. This brings attention to the critical aspect of choices (or their absence) in people’s lives. It means that we look not only at outcomes, but also at how much freedom, and what freedoms, people have. Freedoms are hard but not impossible to satisfactorily measure. First, basic capabilities, in areas such as education and health, provide the basis to be free and to make valued choices; this is a large part of why the HDI highlights education and health. Second, for each valued outcome we can also consider how it was chosen: whether this was in a way that respected people’s freedoms.
Outside of her own choices, a person may be exposed to risks and harms that fundamentally affect her well-being by way of insecurity and vulnerability: for example through war, environmental disasters or negative trends, disease and epidemics. The concept of human security complements the HDR concept of human development (2003 Sen-Ogata commission report Human Security Now). It represents, first, a concern with prioritization within the broad canvas of human development concerns, such as done in the MDGs; (i.e. a focus on basic human needs, which includes concerns for physical security, but as just one of the concerns in human development), and for environmental security; and second, a concern for stability of fulfilment of basic needs (Gasper 2005b).
Choice and security are affected by many social relations. These include gender, age, disability, location, poverty, unemployment, group affiliation and conflict. Gender inequalities, for example, are reflected in male and female differences in life expectancy, nutrition and participation in social choice. These disparities make it essential to include gender inequalities in an assessment of well-being. One can measure men’s and women’s well-being separately, and/or adjust the aggregate figures to take into account the inequality in distribution of well-being between men and women. UNDP’s Gender Development Index adjusts the HDI for a country or region on the basis of how unequally distributed are the aspects of wellbeing between the genders. It is sensible to at the same time to separately present the disaggregated figures, for example for life expectancy and literacy.
Well-being, or the lack of it, also has intergenerational aspects. Poorer children start out at a disadvantage with poverty and ill-being inherited from one generation to the next (Brock 1999, Chronic Poverty Research Centre 2005). Social, political, economic and environmental change and the responses to it affect opportunities available for development and future promotion human well-being.
Components of well-being and their relationship to the environment We build on the selection and grouping of the components of well-being in the Voices of the Poor studies for the World Bank and in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA): (1) Material basis for a good life, (2) Health, (3) Good social relations, (4) Physical and environmental security, (5) Freedom and choice. The MA embeds the discussion of well-being in an analysis of the interaction of eco- systems and human societies. The aspects of well-being are considered as intermediate or final ends while ecosystems services represent means. These components of well-being are discussed in more detail in subsequent sub-sections.
The five components can be related to the three broad approaches discussed above: − Health, good social relations, security and freedom are aspects of objective well-being. − The material basis refers to some of the inputs to well-being; for example the basis of livelihood that makes various valued options attainable. While it concerns only inputs it deserves focused attention, as a key part of the causal chains that generate well- or ill-being. − ‘Good social relations’ includes attention also to basic social cohesion as opposed to damaging and violent conflict (although not all conflict is violent or damaging).
16 − ‘Security’ in the MA framework refers mainly to environmental and personal security. The wider set of human security concerns (the basic needs of all, stability and reliability of access to resources, and the ability to mitigate and respond to shocks and stresses) must also be taken into account under the other components. − ‘Freedom and choice’ refers to both the space provided for people to arrange their lives in valued ways, on the basis provided by the other components, and to the ways in which each of those components are realized.
The following subsections expand on the MA definitions, with links to literature, and relate each of the components to environment, to vulnerability, and to examples from the archetypes in Section 4.
Materials for a good life The MA identifies the following materials as essential for a good life – secure and adequate livelihoods, income and assets, enough food and water at all times, shelter, furniture, clothing, ability to have energy to keep warm and cool, and access to goods (MA 2003, MA 2005). The ability to have secure and adequate livelihoods requires access to a wider range of goods and services than identified in the MA. For example, many people identify infrastructure and services to support their livelihoods as essential material assets (Brock 1999). Additionally, access to education takes on particular importance in poor communities, where it is often highly valued, as a potential route to a better situation (Brock 1999 54). The MDGs also draw attention to the need for improved access to such materials: MDG 1 emphasis the need to eradicate extreme poverty through increased income and hunger and MDG 2 focuses on universal primary education.
The relationship between environment, material assets and human well-being varies from setting to setting as can been seen in the material presented in Section 4 of this chapter. In developing countries, as well as for poor or marginalized people in developed countries, productive assets, such as land, are particularly valued – in rural areas as the basis for food security and in urban areas for safe shelter free from environmental hazards and risks. Changes in supporting, provisioning and regulating services have direct and often strong impacts on well-being. [detail from an Archetype] The wealthy are usually more able to cushion themselves from these negative impacts [detail from either archetype on water scarcity and its technological fixes or exporting vulnerabilities and consumption patterns].
The Voices of the Poor study found that respondents in rural areas placed a strong emphasis on food security as well as on the lack of work, money and assets as critical material needs to support well- being (Brock 1999). Emphasis was placed on both productive and non productive assets as the basis for this; the asset most frequently cited as lacking was land and specifically, secure access to good quality land for agriculture and livestock rearing. [detail from archetype on Palm oil or drylands or water scarcity]. Other productive assets, which are essential for sustainable livelihoods and food security, such as oxen, ploughs, forests and water are also highly valued. Access to land and other productive assets is affected by a range of different factors, including caste and political context [for example as shown in resource curse]. Additionally, rural people emphasized the vulnerability of particular groups within the community: the old, the disabled, female-headed households and those living alone, as isolated from social networks. [Reference to drylands box Detail about Women from other Archetype?] In urban settings much more emphasis is placed on land in the context of the immediate living environment: crowded and insanitary housing, lack of access to water, dirty and dangerous streets, and violence both within and outside the household (Brock 1999). The importance of this is seen in the archetype on ‘contaminated sites’ and ‘unequal exposure to environmental risk [add details in a box]
Secure entitlements are necessary as requirements for ensuring real access. Where people live close to and depend directly on environmental goods and services, such entitlement to natural assets may be essential to ensure sustainable livelihoods. Both physical and social threats to common property resources may affect vulnerability [SIDS or CP archetype]. Poor access to material assets is part of a cycle of impoverishment and vulnerability, as one element of a sequence of becoming poor and staying poor (Brock 1999, 17, WRI and others 2005). 17
Health Health, defined by the WHO as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, is a central aspect of human well-being. It includes being strong, feeling well and having a healthy physical environment (MA 2003 74) as well as sufficient supporting services to remain well, such as access to energy to keep cool or warm (MA 2005), and to adequate goods, such as water and clean air, (MA 2005) to remain well. Access to sufficient rest is crucial to being healthy. The importance attached to improved health as essential for human well- being by the global community is emphasized in three of the MDGs, which focus on reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other major diseases.
Health indicators include life expectancy at birth, mortality rates, child mortality and survival, occurrence of malaria and tuberculosis etc. Health is closely interlinked to patterns of poverty and consumption. Poor people have, in general, considerably lower levels of health; while people suffering from diseases are less productive and have less possibilities to escape from poverty. In addition, health inequalities are influenced by the degree of equity in the distribution of income. Gains in life expectancy, infant and child mortality and survival, and per capita health expenditure, for example, have been systematically greater in those countries with more equitable income distribution and associated access to treatment. Thus, healthier societies are not necessarily those that are wealthier, but especially those which are the most equitable in the distribution of their income (PAHO 2002). Costa Rica, for example, has higher average life expectancy than the USA. In many developed countries high levels of consumption are associated with diseases partially related to opulence including obesity, heart disease and diabetes.
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY) is a measure which takes both mortality and morbidity levels into account. Figure 8.3 shows the most important health risk factors that contribute to the loss of DALYs. Especially in developing countries under-nutrition ranks high, while in developed countries diet-related risk factors and physical inactivity dominate (WHO 2002).
18
Figure 8.4: Environmental risk factors for different regions(WHO 2002)
Figure 8.4 shows how the environmental risk factors relating to health vary for different regions.
Since the 1980s the dynamics of the environment and health have been changed by worldwide integration of the worlds economy, politics and culture. Globalization can have an impact on health in various ways (add from shrimp archetype). Increasing global interconnectedness contributes to the spreading of infectious diseases (such as SARS and avian flu), through the movement of people, and to increased access to medical technology and research. Given the potential global impacts, risk assessment and preparedness are important areas for global cooperation. The role and impact of HIV/AIDS, not only on health outcomes but also on society as a whole is of particular concern as a result of its demographic and economic effects.[May be this needs to be addressed more directly in one of the archetypes – either CP or drylands] Urbanization too is becoming more and more relevant in relation to poverty and health issues (add information from coastal areas archetype).
Changes to provisioning and regulating services may have a direct impact on health. Human health has begun to feel the effects of even larger scale global changes, including environmental and socio- economic changes simultaneously and often interactively. International assessments show that changes in the climate system, the ozone layer, biodiversity, land use and degradation have impaired human health (McMichael 2003).
Personal and environmental security This component includes secure access to natural and other resources, safety of person and possessions, and living in a predictable and secure environment with security from natural and human made disasters (MA 2003, 74). Personal safety also includes being free from threats of bodily harm from violence, crime and war (Brock 1999). In many developing countries, poor people see security as peace of mind or confidence in survival not just in terms of livelihood, but also in terms of sheer physical survival in the face of crime, violence, corruption, lack of protection from the police and absence of recourse to justice, wars between ethnic groups, tribes and clans, frequency of natural disasters, and uncertainties of season and climate (Narayan 1999).These aspects of insecurity are closely linked to problems associated with decreasing social cohesion.
19 Insecurity, although an objective aspect of well-being, is closely linked to subjective feelings. How people feel impacts on their ability to participate socially and make valued choices (Brock 1999; other references).
Insecurity is affected by a multiplicity of environmental, political, social and economic factors and is also closely related to issues of material access and social relations. Inefficient and poor governance and managerial systems as well as inadequate or inefficient response systems might exacerbate vulnerability and the risks associated with environmental change and natural disasters. [add detail from resource curse on governance, or conflict from post conflict, or environmental/social change from CP or sids].
Seasonal changes, in climatic conditions such as floods, droughts, increased likelihood of insect invasions, extreme heat or cold and their related impacts of social systems including food production in much of the developing world have significant impacts on human vulnerability and well-being, and may undermine resilience. It has an impact on food security, water supply, health, income (Brock 1999) and shelter. [add detail from SIDS, may be coastal areas archetype] EXPAND TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF NATURAL HAZARDS
Living in remote areas, poorly served by roads and with inadequate facilities, may exacerbate personal insecurity and compound local peoples’ sense of being abandoned and ostracized (McGee 1998:127). At the same time isolation undercuts trade and marketing opportunities as well as access to technology, which in turn limits the ability to use natural resources in an efficient and productive manner.
Some groups, such as women, may face added problems related to security, in situations of poverty, conflict and highly divided societies, where they often become targets of violent crimes, including rape. In many developing countries, particularly in Africa and South Asia rules, norms and attitudes surrounding widowhood and the inheritance of assets affects livelihood security of women and the choices and opportunities available to them (Braidotti and others 1994, Mies and Shiva 1993). They may also be more vulnerable to risks associated with chemical pollution from contaminated sites [add detail from archetype].
Good social relations The MA describes good social relations as including social cohesion, mutual respect, good gender and family relations, and the ability to help others and provide for children (MA 2003 74). Other studies, such as the Voices of the Poor, demonstrate that a broader set of social relations are also important. Society creates the immediate social and institutional setting for the exercise of choice and the opportunities people have for responding effectively to environmental change – social relations are thus a key aspect of well-being and poverty. In particular, ethnicity, caste, gender, financial status or geographical location underlie problems of marginalization and disempowerment. The MDGs specifically draw attention to the need to promote gender equality and empowerment of women.
Although poor or good social relations and their relationship to environmental change are difficult to measure, some bad social relations are easily quantifiable – such as domestic violence, divorce rates, alcohol use and crime – and some trends and relationships to the environment are evident (examples? Arctic, SIDS?). Where livelihoods are closely related to environmental goods and services, changes in provisioning and regulating services can effect social relations. This is primarily as a result of their direct impact on material well-being, health and security (MA, 2005, 53). There is evidence that declining ecosystem services result in conflicts [CP archetype? Ref World Bank work led by Collier]. Additionally, where cultural identities are closely associated with resources, such as in the Arctic and many SIDS, social conflict and breakdown may be directly linked to habitat destruction or decreasing availability of environmental services. For many people, spiritual life and religious observance are intimately interwoven with other aspects of well-being: the importance to poor people of the church, mosque, temple and sacred place was repeatedly evident from their comparisons of institutions, in which these frequently ranked high, if not highest, as key supports in their lives (Narayan 1999).
20 Violent conflict, domestic violence, crime and alcohol use are relevant indicators of social breakdown [add details from either CP in Arctic or SIDS, aboriginal/ first people in Australia/ Canada/USA].
In SIDS, where livelihoods and cultures revolve around the ocean and its resources, environmental change may directly impact on social organization and cohesion. In some developing countries the loss of biodiversity may result in the loss of traditional medicines and other plants on which poor people rely (examples). The loss of biodiversity may also be associated with the loss of indigenous knowledge which forms the basis for some cultural systems. The loss of cultural identity may be associated with the loss of and contribute to increasing sense of powerlessness.
Freedoms and opportunities Freedom and choice, as an aspect of well-being, includes having control over what happens and being able to achieve what a person values doing or being (MA 2003, 74). Relationships of power are often crucial in the extent of agency and how it is exercised. It is influenced by a range of social relations including those around gender, caste, race, and poverty. Choice-making at group levels, as well as participation in higher level decision making, are both affected. [Add supporting detail from the archetypes – drylands, contaminated sites; others? ]
Democratic freedoms are crucial in shaping the ability to participate in the life of the community (Deneulin 2003). However, in addition to freedoms such as the right to participate in elections and access to justice, various studies show the importance of freedoms which enhance the day-to-day capacity of individuals, especially in relation to environment management (reference). Increasingly, social rights are recognized as equally important to support the exercise of choice (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Turner 1999). These rights may be products of social struggles (Stammers 1999) and thus a good indication of what people themselves value. Such rights include rights to health and education, to be treated with dignity, access to information, to be consulted and to prior informed consent where one’s livelihood or assets are affected. [Supporting detail from archetypes]. Increasingly development agencies, and the global community for example in the Vienna Declaration, have recognized the indivisibility of human rights and their close connection to human well-being (UNDP 2000). [Provide link to Rio principle 10 – see Governance in Section 5)
Dignity is often seen as a fundamental aspect of well-being (including Clark 2003, Universal Declaration on HR). Its lack affects agency and opportunity for making choices. Its relevance in the human well-being-environmental nexus is evident in the archetypes dealing with conflict, rapid urbanisation & breakdown of infrastructure, and in unequal exposure to environmental hazards. [details]. It is important for all people in both rich and poor countries.
Fear, insecurity, dependency, depression, anxiety, intranquility, shame, hopelessness, isolation and powerlessness are all feelings named by the less well off as being associated with poverty; these feelings are not quantifiable phenomena, but poor people place a strong emphasis on how such experiential elements of a bad life impact on their agency and well-being (Narayan et al. 1999). In addition, free–time, relaxation & recreation, rest and sleep, are important for people to be able to exercise choice (e.g. Nussbaum (refs.)).
8.2.4 Indicators and measures of well-being and the environment/well-being interface
Concepts, theories and indicators of well-being
Standard income and expenditure indicators have been the most widely used and accepted measures of well-being. This now standardized and somewhat accepted form of measurement has also been criticized for its one-dimensional nature and its inability to capture non-economic dimensions of well- being. Given the multi-dimensional nature of well-being (See Section 2.1), it is generally accepted that there is a need to widen the informational space of indicators in order to allow for the diversity and
21 heterogeneity of the different components and constituents of well-being. The difficulty however lies in the very nature of the diversity and multi-dimensionality, which in turn has an impact on the conceptual foundation of building indicators, which in turn has an impact on how the different dimensions/constituents of well-being are measured, as well as accepted methods to aggregate these non-income based measurements that are of some use in empirical analyses and as reference points to policy making, evaluations and prescription in lieu of or complementary to income measurements.
Issues such as distributive aspects, power and inequality (essential in the analysis of poverty), access and participation, people’s feeling and happiness (found in work on subjective well-being), sustainability, health and education, vulnerability etc. cannot be discussed within a neo-classical economic framework which focuses mainly on consumption, choices and income.
The income-based approach Economists have commonly focused on certain attributes such as wealth, earnings and income- i.e. access to economic resources- as a way to quantify access to specific components of wellbeing (e.g. education, public goods and services, health, natural resources) and have measured aspects such as inequality within the distribution of income framework. This type of approach and analysis “portrays the outcomes of the economic process for the production and disposal of resources” (Cappa, 2004). The analysis further “looks at the different privately-owned assets, such as land, and reproducible tangible assets, like buildings and various financial assets” (Cappa 2004), where wealth constitutes the primary source of economic inequality (S.D Tendulkar 1983: 73).
Wealth and income constitute the so-called purchasing power that individuals and households enjoy whereby the command over present and future resources and services (including assets, access to education and health care, consumption and savings) is converted into a “comprehensive index of a person’s economic well-being at a given moment (Cowell F.A. 1977:5). An example of a summary measure of economic well-being measured in terms of inequality is the Gini coefficient that indicates the “spread” of income distribution within a given population sample. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfectly even distribution of income) to 1 (high concentration of income and high inequality). This coefficient is criticized for not being able to disclose full information on the trends (direction) of the distribution because of a high level of aggregation condensing several data into one number.
Additional measures of inequality include the ratio based and economic distance ratio (EDR). The first one compares the income shares of the richest households quintiles (q1=x=10 percent or 20 percent richest) relative to the lower or poorer households quintiles (q5=x=10 percent or 20 percent poorest). This type of measurement can be seen as a complement to the Gini coefficient as it provides information about the internal structure of distribution. This particular distributive aspect of economic wellbeing is not covered by the Gini coefficient that is less sensitive to disparities between the top and the bottom of income distribution and how population groups fare compare to each other. The EDR on the other hand provides measures of the degree of inequality between different income distributions such as for instance urban centres versus rural dwellings.
Other oft-used economic sub-indexes are: Per capita Gross National Product in Dollars, Real Gross Domestic Product per Head, GNP per Capita Annual Growth Rate; Average Annual Rate of Inflation, Per Capita Food Production index, External Public Debt as percent of GDP.
Critics of the income-based approach to well-being point to the fact that despite the claim of economic indicators being more ”rigorous” and data readily available and frequently upgraded, this should not hide the point that money is only a means to an end (e.g. Diener et al. 2004).
When applying the income-based approach to assessing vulnerability and inequality it should be noted that income stocks are subject to variations and fluctuate, particularly in the poorest countries where the population is vulnerable to economic shocks. Therefore, some of the data used might not be
22 accurate enough to reflect these changes and the impact they have in certain section of population (Heitzmann K. et al. 2002; Pritchett L.A et al. 2000).
K.D George and J. Shorey (1978:75) observe: Even the best income indicator found in practice is incomplete and may lead to imprecise estimations as standard statistics on income distribution are unable to capture all the income components, like, for instance, the whole range of goods and services which are not valued through the market such as subsistence production, items provided by the State and, in principle, public goods.
In terms of policy implications, focus on income or consumption tends to bring about a simplistic view of the nature and causes of inequality (and in this case ill-being) as well as on the use of policy instruments to reduce it. The economist Jean Dreze (1998: 1-2) points out that many public policies have effects on the distribution that flow through education and social policies as well as through other channels. However public policies that are based on information stemming from economic indicators (some already mentioned in earlier paragraphs) tend to overlook the importance of the formation and extent of economic disparities and well-being. Maasoumi (1999) notes “policy makers and others interested in optimal decision making often compare welfare situations and uncertain outcomes that involve many inherent characteristics”. It is therefore required to find criteria and measurements suitable for the assessment of these inherent characteristics.
List of some main indicators of economic well-being using income/consumption as surrogate measurements
Types of indicators Description GDP Based on quarterly National Income Accounts. Measure total economic outputs and growth against a base –year at constant dollar price and percent. Within a given country.
GDP per capita in PPP terms Based on purchasing power parity (PPP) which measures the number of units of country’s X currency that are needed in country X to purchase the same quantity of an individual good or service as one unit of country Y’s currency will purchase in country Y. GNP also known as Gross It is GDP plus net receipts of primary income from National Income (GNI) abroad. Calculated in national currency and usually converted in U.S dollars GNP per capita It is gross national income converted in U.S dollars, divided by the midyear population Consumer Price index (CPI) Measures changes over time in the cost of a typical basket of goods and services purchased by different groups of consumers. Data are collected by means of household expenditure surveys. Gini Coefficient Measures the degree to which an economy’s income distribution diverges from perfect equal distribution. A value of zero means perfect equality while a value of one means perfect inequality. Income ratio of highest 20 Income share that accrues to the richest 20 percent of percent to lowest 20 percent the population divided by the share of the lowest 20 percent of the population Population below $1 a day Is the percentage of the population whose income/consumption falls below U.S.$1.08 per person 23 per day measured at a base year purchasing power parity
Population in poverty Is the percentage of the population whose income/ consumption falls below the national poverty line Economic distance ratio Provides measures of the degree of inequality between different income distributions such as for instance urban centres versus rural dwellings.
Measure of Economic Welfare Uses personal consumption expenditures as starting point to derive a measure of total consumption deemed to generate economic welfare. Actual variables include Total consumption, sustainability (i.e. Net reproducible capital, non-reproducible capital, education capital, health) Genuine Progress Indicator Consists of the combination of a measure of current economic welfare (e.g. consumer spending, government spending) and sustainable economic development (depletion of natural resources, long-term environmental damage etc.) Index of Economic Well- Depends on the level of average consumption flows, Being aggregate accumulation of productive stocks, inequality in the distribution of individual incomes and insecurity
Issues in the measurement of well-being Some of the multi-dimensional aspects and approaches (notably the notions of capability and freedom) to well-being alluded in the paragraphs above do come with some problems at the conceptual and practical levels (Comim F. 2001, 2005). Indeed, few empirical applications have been able to capture the wide spectrum of perspectives offered by these approaches. In terms of measuring/evaluating capabilities and freedom for instance will necessitate a “multiplicity of variables and a plurality of relevant spaces that are more often than not heterogeneous” (Sen 2001: 4).
Therefore, a number of issues need to be sorted out when assessing well-being: • choose what dimensions of well-being should be included in the analysis. • establish the ways one will assess the causal relations linking the different dimensions and how to measure these dimensions • decide whether and how a single indicator could capture all the relevant information stemming from these different dimensions.
Prescott-Allen (2001) put it very well when he noted:
A typical set of indicators is a mess of incompatible measurements: land condition in hectares, water pollution in milligrams per liter, carbon dioxide emissions in metric tons of carbon, species diversity in percentage of threatened species, health in years of life expectancy and death rates, income in money, education in school enrollment rates, freedom in the observation of rights, and so on. Combining such different indicators mixes apples and oranges.
Below are some specific types of measurements that have been used to capture the multidimensional aspects of well-being.
24 Human Development Indices Categories of Well-being Long and Knowledge Standard of living Social Healthy Life Exclusion Human Life Adult Population Development expectancy at literacy birth rate Human Prob of not Adult Poverty index surviving to literacy I age 40 rate
Human Prob. Of not Adults percent below Long-term Poverty Index surviving to lacking poverty unemployment II age 60 functional rate literacy
Gender- Female and Female Female and related male life and male male gross development expectancy adult enrollment Female- earned Male earned index literacy rate income income Gender Political Economic Participation Power over economic empowerment participation and Decision-making Resources measure and decision- making Female and Female Female and male shares and male male shares of shares of of Female Male parliamentary position as professional seatsµµ legislators, and earned income earned and senior technical officials positions income and managers Source: Human Development Report, 2003
Indicators classified according to components of well-being and three broad approaches
Earlier in this section we discussed three broad approaches to well-being and five components of indicators. We now discuss indicators in terms of these characterizations, as outlined in the Table below. Note, however, that an additional row has been added in order to allow for the possibility of other indicators at the interface between environment and well-being that could be identified through Chapters 2-6.
BASIC HEALTH SECURITY GOOD FREEDOMS MATERIAL SOCIAL AND CONDITIONS RELATIONS OPPORTUNITIES Other Indicators for Env-HWB Interface INPUT INDICATORS OBJECTIVE
25 WELL- BEING INDICATORS a) Achievements b) Opportunities SUBJECTIVE WELL- BEING INDICATORS
For well-being assessment, our main focus is the domain of objective well-being (third row in the table). For some purposes, however, both for understanding processes and connections and for assessment, it is important to have indicators from the domains of inputs (row 2) or subjective well- being (row 4). Sometimes only input indicators are available, for example, and must function as proxies for the well-being outcomes. Inputs are of course also an essential focus as policy instruments. Many indicators relevant to the interface between physical environment and human well-being occur in the category of Inputs to well-being: for example quantity and quality of water availability per person. There is some correlation between the ‘Basic Material Conditions’ category from the Millennium Assessment and the Inputs category. However, this is far from complete. This is seen in the table earlier on some indicators of economic well-being.
Security aspects apply to each of the other four component areas also, not only to physical and environmental security. This is not a problem for the classification: in the other four columns we consider levels, and in the security column we consider questions of stability and security of the levels. Similarly, freedom/opportunity aspects apply in each of the other four areas also, not only to civil rights and participation; e.g. the real opportunities one has for good health (whether or not one uses those opportunities well and converts them into good health). Each area of objective well-being can be looked at in terms of achieved functionings or of capabilities (attainable functionings, or in other words real opportunities to attain). Within the freedoms and opportunities column we highlight not every type of opportunity (e.g. the opportunity to live a long life), but specifically the freedoms to learn, express, and participate.
The following overview of indicators gives a classification that shows types and roles, and examples of good relevant indicators for the respective role-type combinations. It is not a definitive specification of the only acceptable indicators in each of the cases. The particular indicators which are relevant and feasible in particular studies can be drawn from the set of indicators surveyed here, or will be sometimes new variants. Possible additional indicators can be judged by reference to this overview, checking on whether they are input/OWB/SWB indicators and how they compare to more standard indicators. Kommentar [JJ3]: Review of the archetypes etc. may generate additional relevant indicators, In some cases the table below identifies important gaps, where required data appears to be not yet some of which can perhaps be sufficiently available. added to the overview here – to strengthen intra-chapter connections, and convey the link between general indicator types and indicators relevant to specific (even idiosyncratic) situations. Kommentar [JJ4]: −Important issues concern the choice of scale/geographic level. There are considerable dangers of overgeneralisation, but feasibility of obtaining data and connection to relevant decision-makers’ needs must also be considered.
26 BASIC MATERIAL HEALTH SECURITY GOOD CONDITIONS RELATIO INPUTS Income: Access to resources: Resilience to shocks Good gove . Real gross national . Per capita food and stress . Inequ domestic product per head production index. . percent of people equality . Gini coefficient Average calories intake under certain poverty (well-being . Ration based and per capita (FAO) line and susceptible to Sharoe) economic distance ratio (?) Health expenditure: monetary shocks . percent of population . Government (expressed in PPP below one and two dollars expenditures on: health dollars) a day - Government . Proportion of expenditure on preventive government Consumption: health (WHO) expenditure allocated . Per capita consumption Inputs of social services: to cope with extreme of energy (kilojoules) in percent of people having events (measured as constant dollars. access to health care and percent of GDP) *Please note that this is an education based on (Reference?) illustration and it is valid availability of physicians for most of the and teachers per 1000 provisioning services a.i. inhabitants (WHO, land, water, fire wood, UNESCO) fiber, energy, medicines, Access to services: . Annual rate of and minerals. . percent of population inflation. . Effective per capita with access to health consumption flow in services and health care External public debt constant dollars in per and social program as percent of GDP capita bases (A. Sharpe) coverage -Clean air: NOx, SO2, emission per capita and per unit of economic output - Fresh Water: Annual fresh water consumption per capita Annual internal renewable water resources per capita OBJECTIVE Adequate and safe Access to resource RESULTS Safe shelter: water: (Reference?) Equity ind . percent of households Morbidity due to water- Crime indexes based (Prescott – with permanent materials borne diseases on lack of access to used for walls for homes . Population with water resources [To clarify] Kommentar [I5]: and electrical supply stress (percentage) Kommentar [I6]: (based on PPP dollars?) . Per capita actual Safe shelter: Kommentar [I7]: (Sumner A, 2004 renewable water . percent of population (Economic wellbeing and resources + per capita living in high risk Kommentar [I8]: [ non…) annual withdraws areas (reference?) (m3/person/year, WRI) Objective results . percent of population Resilience to shocks (cont.) with access to safe and stress potable water . percent of people Sanitation: with high . percent of population vulnerability to with access to sanitation extreme events (e.g. (WHO) flooding, landslides) . percent of population
27 with improved sanitation . Violations of (WRI, MDG7) political rights index . percent of population and civil liberties living close to dumps and index (A. Sharpe) waste sites (OECD, social indicators)- Clean air (PM, SO2, O3) (emissions per/capita) . Mortality and morbidity rates due to respiratory infections
Adequate nourishment . Malnutrition in children less than 5 years of age . Stunting prevalence
Health & Ability to be free from avoidable disease: Perinatal mortality Short tem disability\ Long term disability (OECD, social indicators) SUBJECTIVE Felt increase or decline in Subjective health Subjective security Good gove RESULTS economic power index Corruption index
28 Subjective well-being rankings of 82 societies Kommentar [I9]: To specify (based on combined Happiness and Life Satisfaction scores) source. We need also to comment more on this list. Could we make a HIGH MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW list with the top 10, middle 10, and Puerto Rico 4.67 Croatia 1.55 Poland 0.84 Estonia 0.24 lowest 10 for different indicators (SWB, Genuine saving, GDP etc.) Mexico 4.32 Greece 1.45 Turkey 0.84 Serbia 0.21 – also to show the difference - MK Denmark 4.24 Peru 1.32 Bosnia 0.82 Tanzania 0.13 Ireland 4.16 China 1.2 Morocco 0.74 Azerbaijan 0.13 Iceland 4.15 S. Korea 1.12 Uganda 0.67 Montenegro 0.06 Switzerland 4 Algeria 0.57 India 0.03 N. Ireland 3.97 Iran 0.93 Bangladesh 0.54 Lithuania -0.07 Colombia 3.94 Egypt 0.52 Macedonia -0.14 Netherlands 3.86 Hungary 0.41 Pakistan -0.3 Canada 3.76 Slovakia 0.4 Latvia -0.7 Austria 3.69 Jordan 0.39 Albania -0.86 El Salvador 3.67 Bulgaria -0.87 Venezuela 3.58 Belarus -0.92 Luxembourg 3.52 Georgia -1.11 U.S. 3.47 Romania -1.3 Australia 3.46 Moldova -1.63 New Zealand 3.39 Russia -1.75 Sweden 3.36 Armenia -1.8 Nigeria 3.32 Norway 3.25 High-income countries are shown in bold face type. All Belgium 3.23 28 high-income countries (in bold type) rank high or Finland 3.23 medium-high on subjective well-being; and all 10 Latin American countries (in italics) except Peru also rank Saudi Arabia 3.01 high or medium-high. All 25 ex-communist countries Singapore 3 (names underlined) except Vietnam, Slovenia and Britain 2.92 Czech Republic are low or medium-low (the median ex- W. Germany 2.67 communist country has a negative score); and all ten ex- France 2.61 Soviet countries are Low (eight of the ten have negative Argentina 2.61 scores).
Vietnam 2.59 Chile 2.53 Philippines 2.32 Taiwan 2.25 Domin.Rep. 2.25 Brazil 2.23 Spain 2.13 Israel 2.08 Italy 2.06 E. Germany 2.02 Slovenia 2.02 Uruguay 2.02 Portugal 1.99 Japan 1.96 Czech Rep 1.94 S. Africa 1.86
29 8.3 The Global Context of Vulnerability
As a basis for the discussion of patterns of vulnerability, this section provides the broad global context that shapes local vulnerabilities.
8.3.1 The economic context: Globalization, trade, poverty and aid
The economic sphere is characterized by growing globalization, or interdependence, the outcomes of which are contested. Some suggest that increasing democracy and interdependence bodes well for cooperation, peace, and for solving common problems (Bhagwati 2004; Birdsall and Lawrence 1999; Russett and Oneal 2000). Others see growing economic interdependence as exploitative, and therefore see a murkier future for global cooperation and justice (Falk 1999; Korten 2001; Mittelman 2000). They point to the fact that the gulf between have and have-nots is increasing and that instead of multilateral solutions, states are giving increasing precedence to nationalistic, short-term, profit-driven priorities. Moreover, states are supposedly hampered from taxing a ‘footloose’ tax base, undermining their ability to provide public goods that strengthen communities (Rodrik 1997). The economic growth rates of the poor countries have increased in recent years after the “lost decade” of the 1980s, but they do not match the rich countries, nor compare well against the dynamic economies of East Asia (see Figure 8.5).
The era of globalization is characterized by the rise of global corporations that are influential economic actors. As such, giant corporations cannot be ignored in a global governance context traditionally dominated by states. For example, important outcomes such as health, environmental protection or decisions about the quantity and quality of consumption have more to do with corporate decisions and market outcomes than do state-level, political factors that are conducive to legislation. Moreover, corporations are in possession of a large proportion of technology and knowledge that individual states and communities do not have access to, and have become important drivers of agricultural policy (see references in section 5 of this chapter). While states still ‘rule the world,’ recently global corporations have begun to publicly seek the global political stage, particularly at gatherings such as the World Economic Summit and multilateral negotiations, such as the ill-fated Multilateral Agreement on Investment (De Grauwe and Camerman 2003; Graham 2000; Wolf 2004).
International trade has developed within the context of the World Trade Organization (Insert Box on the history of the WTO negotiations – or just the Doha Round). However, as the Millennium Goals Report points out, if developing countries are to take advantage of the potential of international trade to enhance economic growth, the main barriers to their exports must be removed – tariffs imposed by developed countries on imports and subsidies that developed countries provide to domestic agricultural producers. Developed countries’ tariffs remain high on goods that are strategically important to developing economies (UN, 2005). It is estimated that free trade in farm products alone would benefit developing countries by $20 billion per year.
The UN Millennium Declaration embodies an agreement that developing countries will work to maintain sound economies, to ensure their own development and to address human and social needs. At the same time, developed countries agreed to support poorer countries through aid, trade and debt relief. With the growing interest in markets, the aid agenda has changed. Poor countries have been beset with debt, particularly after borrowing heavily through the 1970s in private banks eager to recycle the so-called petro dollars (Spero and Hart 2003). Inward looking industrialization and large project mentalities drove many of the economic policies, in some cases resulting in waste of resources since the expected development never took place. Aid policies of the multilateral lending agencies also reflected this big-project bias. This thinking has changed with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the move to the market, the donor agencies and banks concentrate on raising human capital and alleviating poverty, with economic development left up to liberalizing markets rather than states. While for many, this may seem a kindlier, more gentler approach to economic development, others are more skeptical as to whether the retreat of the state is going to accelerate development at all (Sen 1999; Wade 2003).
30
As the Millennium Development Goals Report (UN, 2005) points out, most of the recent increases in aid have been used to cancel debts and meet humanitarian and reconstruction needs after emergencies. Debt relief often goes to countries that have ceased debt repayments and does not necessarily provide new finance for social services or poverty reduction. Emergency and disaster relief usually does not address long-term development needs. The share of total official aid going to basic human needs has doubled since the mid-1990s but the share going to agriculture and physical infrastructure has diminished – two sectors that need support if countries are to feed their own people and build their economies (UN, 2005) and increase their adaptive capacity in the face of multiple stresses. A debt relief programme for the most heavily indebted countries has reduced future debt payments for 27 nations by $54 billion (UN, 2005). However, external debt is still an obstacle to development.
“Even though Africa has only 5 percent of the developing world’s income, it carries about two thirds of the Global South’s debt burden – over USD 300 billion. Despite extreme poverty, the continent transfers almost USD 15 billion a year to rich nations in external debt repayments. This effectively means that the average African country spends three times more on repaying debt than it does on providing basic services to its people. By the end of 2004, Africa will spend about 70 percent of its export earnings on external debt servicing (Africa Recovery 2004). Debt repayments continue to be a major impediment to growth.” Katerere, Y. and Mohamed-Katerere, J.C. (2005).
The end of the Cold War has also led to changes in development aid. Poor countries are now moving to market solutions and pragmatic arrangements for increasing trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) for generating employment and alleviating poverty (Dollar and Kraay 2000; Krasner 1985; UNCTAD 2005; Ward and Gleditsch 2003; World Bank 1996). Africa is, however, still a marginal recipient of FDI, receiving only about 2 percent of the global tota1 (ADB 2004). Countries in sub- Saharan Africa share less than one percent, of which half goes to South Africa (Oxfam 2003). Although FDI increased in the 1990s (FAO 2003a) it has now taken a dramatic downward swing. In 2002 FDI inflows declined from USD19 billion in 2001 to USD10.9 billion, which is a staggering 41 percent reduction, which affected 23 countries (ADB 2004). Most FDI goes into oil and gas projects in Angola, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria and Gabon and into gold mining in Tanzania and South Africa. Africa’s share of FDI to developing countries is only around 4 percent compared to 45 to 50 percent for Asia and 30 percent for Latin America (ADB 2004). A large percentage of FDI earnings are externalised.
Poverty remains a major problem for development, improving human well-being and sustainable environmental management despite gains made in health, education, water sanitation and economic development. Globally policy makers have reconfirmed their commitment to reducing poverty in the Millennium Development Goals. While 1 billion people still subsist on less than $1 per day, there have been improvements in some regions (Figure 8.6). In Asia the number living with less than $1 per day dropped by nearly a quarter of a billion between 1990 and 2001 due to sustained growth in China and acceleration of the economy in India. China’s accomplishments alone accounted for most of the global progress against poverty in the last 20 years (Dollar, 2004; Chen and Ravallion, 2004). On the other hand, numbers show that the very poor are getting poorer. The average income of the extremely poor in sub-Saharan Africa declined between 1990 and 2001 (UN, 2005) and reversing this trend will require economic growth that reaches the poor, which is a challenge especially because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and armed conflicts. Dramatic increases in the proportion of people living on less than $1 per day are found in the transition countries of south-eastern Europe and the CIS countries (see Figure 8.6). Figure 8.6 also shows the difference between the present situation and the Millennium Development Goal of halving between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living on less than $1 per day.
Between 1981 and 2001, the number of people living on less than $1 per day in Sub-Saharan Africa doubled from 164 million to 313 million people. In Latin America and the Caribbean it climbed from 36 million to 50 million. The percentage of people living on less than $2 per day in Eastern Europe and Central Asia rose from 2 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2001. (WRI, 2005) 31
Figure 8.6: Proportion of people living on less than $1 per day (UN, 2005)
Even where there is economic growth, many poor people are left behind. In Latin America, for example, the number of people in poverty increased in the last decade at the same time as the GDP per capita increased (WRI, 2005). In China economic growth has led to a widening income gap between urban and rural areas over the last two decades. In the developed world, poverty persists in spite of the general affluence of the population. In the United States, the number of poor has risen steadily since 2000, reaching almost 36 million people in 2003, which is 1.3 million more than in 2002 (WRI, 2005). Historically marginalized groups, such as Native Americans, African Americans and Hispanics continue to suffer significantly higher rates of poverty. For example, in 2003 24.4 percent African Americans were below the poverty line compared to the national rate of 12.5 percent (WRI, 2005).
At the country level, global initiatives have changed course slightly, by giving greater credence to the role of government and civil society in addressing poverty reduction and acknowledging that poverty alleviation needs to go beyond economic growth. The World Bank’s poverty reduction strategies (PRSP), initiated in 1999, stress poverty reduction through a participatory, long-term, and result- oriented strategy that seeks to bring together both government and civil society in finding solutions. More than 50 countries are in various stages of preparation and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies (Bojo and Reddy, 2003). The mainstreaming of environmental issues remains weak, although there has been improvement in this area since 1999 (Bojo and Reddy).
However, despite this increased focus on partnerships, a similar shift has not taken place in the overall paradigms for trade, aid and investment. These continue to be shaped by a global system of inequity and in which there has been increasing concentration of economic and political power. The fact that the very poor are getting poorer and that poverty remains a problem in many world regions provides a very important context for analysis of broad patterns of vulnerability, in particular since it strongly influences the capacity to adapt to multiple stresses.
Overall, the global context with regard to globalization, trade, aid and poverty suggests that major progress in reducing poverty and thus increasing adaptive capacity in the face of multiple stresses has yet to be achieved. The trade and development agendas have not been reconciled and the gulf between the rich and the very poor is still growing, leading to large differences in adaptive capacity.
32 8.3.2 The governance context
From global to local The changing political context also includes changes in the approach to multilateralism on the part of countries and regions. The early years after the end of the cold war, coinciding with the 1992 Earth Summit, witnessed a renewed optimism in multilateralism and global governance. There were a number of other Summits in the 1990s which covered, for example, children (1990), human rights (1994), population (1994), Small Island Development States (1994), social development (1995), human settlements (1996). The Millennium Summit in 2000 also reflected that kind of aspiration for global cooperation formulating detailed bold but necessary goals for the first 15 years of the new millennium. Global governance in the form of normative declarations and ambitious action plans from all these Summits have illustrated an emerging unity in how governments and the international community understand the increasingly complex and globalized problems and how they must be addressed. Global governance was strengthened also through new bodies with considerable authority in the areas of trade through the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994 and in crimes against humanity through the establishment International Criminal Court in 2002. Other reforms of the UN System itself have been slower in coming even if some steps were made at the 60th anniversary of the United Nations in 2005.
In parallel, regional cooperation made significant progress around the world even if its forms and intensity vary considerably. Regional political cooperation reached new peaks in the European Union but other regions have also created agreements on trade and other types of cooperation such as NAFTA, ASEAN and the African Union. Regional actors have even become involved in peace- keeping which had previously been considered an exclusive task for the global level. Regions have also become more visible in the global deliberations, for example through the emphasis on regional preparation meetings for international Summits including the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The national level remains the central one in governance despite the continuing discussions on the erosion of sovereignty. However, the capacity of national governments to exercise effective governance varies considerably. Many of the least developed countries are still struggling to create the basic elements of governance and services. Within some countries there has also been a trend towards both political and fiscal decentralization of governance to sub-national levels over the past decades, in OECD countries (Stegarescu 2004), as well as in developing countries in Africa and Latin America which inherited very centralized governance structures from the colonial period (Stein 1999; Brosio 2000). This may not necessarily mean that local authorities have been empowered as decentralisation without devolution of power can be a way to strengthen the presence of the central authority (Stohr 2001). Local governments have also engaged much more widely in international cooperation in various arenas and their role has been strengthened at the global level through the establishment in 2000 of the United Nations Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA).
Environmental governance: changing scope, actors and processes Environmental governance has evolved extensively in the past 20 years both in real terms and in the norms and criteria after which its process and outcome is evaluated and judged, sometimes leading and in other cases following the development of governance in other areas. There are four trends which seem most prominent.
Firstly, the scope of the issues considered relevant has broadened. The marriage of environment and development in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 ‘gave birth’ to the integrated and unifying concept of sustainable development (World Commission on Sustainable Development 1987). At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the unification had reached the point where poverty reduction was integrated in all parts of the implementation plan, particularly through the adoption and expansion of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, the issues of trade, economic development, good governance, transfer of technology, science and education policies and the globalization processes that link them together are all seen as intrinsically relevant from the perspective of the sustainable development governance process. There is hardly any sector issue which is left outside. The integration of the global environment and development agendas is an important step but, it has been a continuing struggle to 33 operationalise this normative goal into real policy and practice. Action has been fragmented overall (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2001). Nevertheless, despite the challenges to make this marriage work a divorce has been unthinkable.
Secondly, there have been shifts over time in which levels of government are active and which are called upon to get engaged. The post-UNCED period saw a strong increase in subnational, including local, government action, for example through local Agenda 21 processes which was one of the few success stories in the 10 year review of Agenda 21 implementation (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2001). Another example is the Cities for Climate Protection, a campaign by ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) with 650 local governments integrating climate mitigation in their decision-making processes. The global intergovernmental action was also significant post- UNCED with a number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) being negotiated, ratified and entering into force. There was weaker performance from national and regional levels. For example, in the year 2000 less than half of the UN member countries had developed some kind of national strategy for sustainable development called for in Agenda 21 and many did not live up to financial commitments nationally or internationally to implement Agenda 21 (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2001). The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation stated that the role of national policies and development strategies “cannot be overemphasized” and it also strengthened the role of the regional level, e.g. through giving the regional UN Economic Commissions new tasks and establishing a regional preparation process for the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (United Nations 2002).
Thirdly, the type of actors — often called stakeholder groups — that are both bringing about change and seen as essential to bring about change has expanded. While environmental — often Northern- based — NGOs were often the prime movers and pushers on getting environmental issues on the agenda decades ago and governments the first major actors, the actor landscape has changed considerably. The nine major groups — local authorities, women, farmers, youth, indigenous peoples, trade unions, scientific and technological community, business — identified in Agenda 21 have an increasing presence and role in deliberations from the global to the local levels related to the UNCED and WSSD follow-up processes. At the local level many of these groups are also playing a big role in reducing vulnerability and improving wellbeing whether linked to national or global action plans or based on local needs and priorities. In the private sector there have been many initiatives for the environment. Individual firms have taken action (EXAMPLE FROM ARCHETYPES?). Firms or whole industry sectors chose to develop voluntary codes through self-regulation or follow codes developed by non-governmental organizations or governmental or intergovernmental regulators (Prakash 2000). While many of these actions have been taken by companies who produce goods and thus directly use natural resources and produce pollution, there are also new subgroups of the private sector that are taking action. Examples include insurance companies, investment (pension) funds, and groups of shareholders (Kasemir et al. 2005). There are also other groups, beyond the nine major groups, who are increasingly acting for sustainable development. Educators have contributed enormously to providing knowledge and inspiring to more ‘sustainable’ values, in both formal and informal educational settings, efforts which are now being pulled together and strengthened in the framework of the United Nations Decade on Education for Sustainable Development (UNESCO 2005). Groups of faith have also engaged directly in both deliberations on environment and development and direct implementation projects (Gardner 2003).
Fourthly, the forms of interaction between stakeholder groups have undergone change. They interact among themselves and with governments through for example dialogues, networks and partnerships. On the one hand this development reflects the need to drastically improve the effectiveness of governance which necessitates a broader coalition of actors and pooling of resources. On the other hand it relates to the fact that governance has increasingly become evaluated by criteria which relate to legitimacy. There should be good governance not only effective governance. Good governance relates to criteria such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy. It is not only governments who are expected to provide their governance process and outcomes with such qualitative criteria but also governments’ collective efforts in global governance as well as corporations, NGOs and the scientific community. Sometimes environmental governance and institutions have taken the lead in innovating
34 for increased legitimacy, and created learning opportunities for new modes of governance in a broad set of areas. Elements of interaction with major groups at local, national and global level were institutionalised in the action plans of UNCED and WSSD. Chapter 37 of Agenda 21 urged countries to involve all possible interest groups in building national consensus on Agenda 21 implementation (37.5), chapter 28 recommended local authorities to engage in dialogue with its citizens, local organizations and private enterprise for the formulation of a local Agenda 21 (28.3) (UNCED 1993). Multistakeholder dialogues entered the CSD meetings since 1998 and later became part of the WSSD process. Global public policy networks have emerged on a wide range of issues. These are usually initiatives limited in time, involving many different actors to cooperate with a minimum of formal organization (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2002). Multistakeholder cooperation in the formulation and implementation of projects has increased (Hemmati 2002). The WSSD Partnerships was just the latest step in supporting this approach of collaboration among IGOs, governments, business and non- governmental organisations.
8.3.3 The people context: population, perceptions, health and security The world’s population is currently growing by around 78 million persons per year, for the most part in Asia and Africa (UN 2004). On the other hand, developed regions such as Europe are facing a growth close to zero with mainly immigration resulting in a positive growth of the population. In the developed regions, ageing has become a primary focus point, both from an economic and an epidemiological perspective. Next to population size and age structure, place is an important aspect. The proportion of the population living in urban areas is expected to increase in the coming decades. The UN estimates that in 2007 half of the world population will be living in urban areas (UN 2003). This process of urbanization can result in worsening of living conditions, however where well planned it can improve opportunities for development (IOM 2005). The effect of crowding increases opportunities for easy transmittable diseases such as TB, and urban poverty is very often cause and effect of this urbanization see e.g. Gray (2001). In addition, the pressure on the environment increases with the increase of people concentrating in a particular place.
The large scale structural changes in economic and political contexts as well as population and migration patterns both influence and are influenced by changes in the values and priorities of people at large. Public opinion certainly influences what measures governments are willing to take to address short and long-term environmental issues but these values also show the deeper backdrop for vulnerability. There is quite limited global data available on such changing values but one example is the World Value Survey (Inglehart 1999). This survey is not universal (covers 61 countries, only two of which in Africa) but covers a substantial part of the world’s population and it has been carried out in four waves so far, 1981-82, 1990-91, 1995-98 and 2000. The first three waves identified in the most industralised countries, where people do not face basic survival issues, a pattern of systematic changes towards so called post-materialist values with more emphasis on need for belonging, self-expression and having a participating role in society (Inglehart 1999). A study of values in eight developed and developing countries carried out at the end of the 1990s showed that significant segments of the populations were concerned about the state of the environment and when asked about trade-offs consistently prioritized environmental concerns over economic interests (Ester et al. 2003). An indication of changing priorities is what issues influence people’s voting in elections and it has been shown that in most western countries the salience of new ecological and cultural issues, over economic issues, has increased significantly after 1945 (Achterberg forthcoming). Civic engagement is yet another indicator of people’s values. The number of international non-governmental organizations grew by nearly 20 per cent in the 1990s to reach 37000 in the year 2000, and 1170 of these focused on environmental issues (UNDP 2002). Membership in these international NGOs has increased faster in low- and middle income countries (Anheiner et al., 2001).
There has been a general improvement in health in the world in the last five decades, as a result of social, economic, environmental, and technological advances, as well as the increased availability of health care services and effectiveness of public health programs. However, the health gains have not been achieved to the same degree in all the countries of the world, nor have all groups within a population benefited equally from them; in some cases there have been marked deteriorations in the
35 past twenty years. The least favourable health situations are those in which the persistence of communicable diseases is associated with deficient living conditions, including poverty and progressive environmental degradation. While the death toll of several infectious diseases has decreased drastically, the toll due to chronic diseases has increased. But some new infectious pandemics appear possible, and at least one – HIV/AIDS – is already with us.
A very important global context for vulnerability is the risk faced by children. As Gordon et al. (2004) point out, over 10 million children under five die every year – 98 percent of them in developing countries. Widespread malnutrition hampers children’s growth and makes them vulnerable to other risks: perinatal diseases, pneumonia, diarrhoea, and malaria. In industrialised countries, in contrast, junk food and a sedentary lifestyle are leading to an unprecedented epidemic of obesity in children. Among the risks that children face, as documented by Gordon et al. (2004) are fluoride and arsenic in drinking water, and ingestion of lead. In certain areas of the world, there are dangerous levels of arsenic in children’s drinking water (see Figure 8.7). Lead is still found as an additive to gasoline, an ingredient of paint and pottery glaze, and in old water pipes. Children are at the greatest risk because lead is more readily absorbed by their growing bodies and their tissues are more sensitive to damage. The threshold above which irreparable damage occurs is still exceeded around the world, particularly for children in developing country cities. In industrialised countries, where progress has been made in phasing out lead in gasoline and banning its use in consumer goods, lead-based paint continues to by a problem (Gordon et al. 2004).
Figure 8.7 Arsenic contamination (Source: Gordon et al. 2004)
AIDS has become a leading cause of premature deaths in sub-Saharan Africa and the fourth largest killer worldwide (UN, 2005) By the end of 2004, an estimated 39 million people were living with HIV. The epidemic has reversed decades of development progress in the worst-affected countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, 7 out of 100 adults carry HIV. HIV is spreading fastest in the European countries of CIS and in parts of Asia (UN, 2005). In countries where the epidemic is still at an early stage, programmes targeted at the most vulnerable are effective. However, in many countries, inadequate resources and a lack of political leadership inhibit progress, especially where HIV has spread among marginalised and stigmatised groups. Globally, just under half of the people with HIV are female, but this share is growing. Also, as the epidemic spreads, the number of children who have lost both parents to AIDS is growing. In 2003 over 4 million children in sub-Saharan Africa had lost both
36 parents and 12 million had lost one or both parents. This points to an unprecedented social problem with large implication for vulnerability to multiple stresses.
Malaria is endemic in many of the world’s poorest regions, affecting an estimated 350 million – 500 million people per year. Ninety percent of the 1 million malaria deaths each year occur in sub-Saharan Africa (UN, 2005). The disease disturbs mental and physical development, and has debilitating effects on adults, often removing them from the workforce for days or even weeks at a time. In poor regions, therefore, malaria reduces the already low adaptive capacity and is at the same time one of the many stresses that humans have to deal with.
While strides have been made in some areas of public health, many other still warrant attention. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, malaria accounted for an estimated lost of 36 million disability adjusted life years (DALYs – see also Section 2) in 1999 out of a population of 616 million. If each DALY is valued very conservatively as equal to per capita income, the total cost of malaria would be valued at 5.8 percent (= 36 / 616) of the gross national product of the region. If each DALY is valued instead at three times the per capita income, the total cost would be 17.4 percent of GNP (5.8 percent x 3).
As demonstrated by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, there are strong interrelationships between ecosystem services, aspects of human well-being and human health. Over one billion people still lack access to safe water supplies, while 2.6 billion people lack adequate sanitation (MA, 2005). As a result, water-related infectious diseases claim up to 3.2 million lives each year, approximately 6 percent of all deaths globally. The burden of disease from inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene totals 1.8 million deaths and the loss of more than 75 million healthy life years.
While aggregate food production is currently sufficient to meet the needs of all, about 800 million people are underfed with protein and/or energy, while a similar number are overfed (MA, 2005). At least an additional billion people experience chronic micronutrient deficiency. In contrast, however, in some countries health problems related to lifestyles, urbanization, and population aging have increased (PAHO 2002). Cardio-vascular disease (CVD) now ranks as the world’s top cause of death, causing one third of all deaths globally (Mackay and Mensah 2004). However, heart disease is no longer just the problem of overworked, overweight men in the developed world. Women and children are also at risk and already 75 percent of all CVD deaths are in developing countries (Mackay and Mensah 2004). In many OECD countries, the growth in overweight and obesity rates among children and adults is rapidly becoming a major public health concern (OECD, 2005) and is clearly related to consumption levels as well as the nature of consumption in these countries. More than 50 percent of adults are now defined as being overweight or obese in ten OECD countries: the United States, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Slovak Republic, Greece, New Zealand, Hungary, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic (OECD, 2005). Obesity is a risk factor for a number of health problems and is linked to significant additional health care costs.
Indoor and outdoor pollution continue to have health impacts, in particular heart and lung disease. About 3 percent of the global burden of disease has been attributed to indoor air pollution from burning of biofuels. Woodfuel scarcity has a number of health effects, not only because of the long distances that have to be covered to search for and carry firewood, but also because lack of fuel reduces the possibilities to boil and thus sterilize water, cook food, or heat a home.
The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP 2004) established that the highest Arctic exposures to several persistent organic pollutants and mercury are faced by Inuit populations in Greenland and Canada. These exposures are linked mainly to consumption of marine species as part of traditional diets. Subtle health effects are occurring in certain areas of the Arctic due to exposure to contaminants in traditional food, with particular concern related to fetal and neonatal development.
As Figure 8.8 demonstrates, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and the Pacific were at similar levels of life expectancy in 1960, but the latter is now almost caught up with the rich while the former shows
37 declines in recent years despite some initial gains. The declines in life expectancy in SSA is likely the result of the ‘lost decade’ of development, the aids pandemic, and continuing civil war (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004; Mills and Shillcutt 2004).
90
80
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50 East Asia & PAC SSA 40 High Income
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64 72 80 88 96 9 9 9 9 9 000 1960 1 1968 1 1976 1 1984 1 1992 1 2
Figure 8.8 Life Expectance (Source: XXXX)
Globally, natural hazards claim about 100,000 lives per year, most of them in developing countries (DfID and others 2002). According to Munich Re (Munich Re 2005) there is an observable increase in great natural catastrophes. The frequency of these events more than doubled between 1960 and 2003. The 259 great natural catastrophes in this period are attributed in almost equal proportions to earthquake/volcanic eruption, windstorm, and flood. The most fatalities were caused by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions (49 percent). Economic losses have increased by a factor of 6.7, insured losses by a factor of 13.5, and the trend remains an upward one. As far as insured losses are concerned, windstorm losses are the highest, accounting for more than two-thirds of the US$ 187bn total. The trend is illustrated in Figure 8.9. This shows the increase in the increase in insured and economic losses. Further data from the Red Cross shows, in contrast, (loss of life, pattern)
Figure 8.9 Natural Catastrophes since 1950 (Source: Munich Re 2005)
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Since the end of the Cold War the incidence of civil and interstate conflicts has decreased dramatically (see Figure 8.10), while the growth of democracy has been unprecedented (see Figure 8.11). Almost all regions of the world have seen a decrease in civil war risk except Sub Saharan Africa (Uppsala- PRIO armed conflicts dataset). The current security scene is dominated by the War on Terror, at least since the September 11th attacks on the US. While terrorism is high on the global security agenda, there is no marked overall incidence of terrorism globally, and no indication that international terrorism is on the rise (de Soysa, 2005).
Figure 8.10 Armed conflicts 1946 – 2004 by region (Source: xxxxx)
40 30 20 10 0
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 year
(mean) comp (mean) part (mean) id
39 COMP=degree of political competition measured as the share of votes received by largest political party; PART=degree of political participation measures as the number of votes relative to total population; ID = degree of democracy (polyarchy), or product of COMP & PART
Figure 8.11 Global Democracy using Polyarchy data (Vanhanen 2000)
Efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger are frequently set back by both conflict and natural disasters. Out of 13 million deaths in large-scale conflicts from 1994 to 2003, over 12 million were in sub- Saharan Africa, Western Asia and Southern Asia. These regions are also home to three-quarters of the world’s 37 million refugees and displaced persons and the areas where the number of hungry people is growing. In two of these regions – sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia – poverty is also on the rise.
Over the same period of time 669,000 people died as a consequence of natural disasters. Nearly three quarters of these deaths were in Eastern and Southern Asia. In December 2004 the Asian tsunami killed hundreds of thousands more. While many of these deaths could have been avoided through early warning systems and other measures, the poorest countries and people continued to be most vulnerable.
8.3.4 Changes in technology During the twentieth century, telephone, radio, television, and the fax machine enhanced communication, allowing people to be better informed and to participate in decisionmaking, and influencing both peoples’ perceptions and priorities. In the 1980s the fax was a particularly important tool for popular mobilization at global to local levels (UNDP, 2001).
When Our Common Future was published, internet had still not reached the public. That only started in 1990. In 2003 it had 665 million users in the world although the significant regional differences, as well as differences within countries, are substantial, illustrating the so called digital divide (ITU 2004). Global figures for increase in access to other media are also impressive even if regional disparities prevail. In 1985, 35 per cent of the world’s population had access to radio, and 15 percent had access to TV and in 1997 the figures were 42 and 24 per cent respectively (UNESCO 2002). Between 1991 and 2003 the percentage of people with access to a landline increased with over 220 percent and in the same period the number of mobile phone subscribers increased by 8300 per cent to over 1300 million (ITU 2004) (insert figure showing the regional differences and discuss implications for development and vulnerability) This globalization of information flows has dramatically changed the information and images to which people are exposed on a daily basis. It contributes to the fact that there are much larger differences in value orientations between people living in the same country than among people from different countries (Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2002). The changing media scene is also likely have an impact, negative or positive, on our sense of vulnerability. In a very concrete sense it gives unprecedented opportunities for early warning for natural (and man made) immediate disasters such as hurricanes, tsunamis, and earthquakes and it enables, for example, farmers to access seasonal weather forecasts. Again however, it is the most vulnerable who tend to lack access to these media and other resources.
The information flow contributes to the formation of a ‘world public opinion’ which is emerging on many issue areas (reference). The media access allow those who are not immediately affected to almost instantly learn about disasters in distant places in painstaking detail, as exemplified by the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2005 flooding of New Orleans and this can spur concern and action e.g. through donations. From the horizon of the least income groups the information flow probably influence peoples ‘perceived’ poverty and well-being as the images of wealthy (luxury) consumption lifestyles reaches them. These information channels thus also serve as a vehicle for
40 globalizing the desire for and spread of specific types of consumption and often environmentally destructive behavior across the world. However, ultimately the media provides an often underutilized potential to educate populations on our dependence on ecosystem services and the impact of human actions on them.
Twentieth century technologies were central to many improvements in human well-being including increased life expectancy in Asia, Africa and Latin America and reductions in under-nutrition in South Asia (UNDP, 2001). Science and technology have clearly been an important part of the new industrialization in East Asia. However, this growth would not have been possible without institutional flexibility, export orientation, and collaboration between public and private sectors (UNMP, 2005). The pace of development related to science and technology and the levels at which different regions achieve progress vary widely. While some countries are having marked success in reducing under-five mortality, increasing water access and alleviating poverty, others are lagging far behind (UNDP, 2001).
Technological advances in agriculture, energy, medicine, communications, and manufacturing have been central to many development achievements. Technological change and the ability to acquire, adapt and develop technologies are associated with long-term economic growth rates. In the 1980s oral rehydration therapies and vaccines suitable for use in developing countries were critical in reducing child mortality. Beginning in 1960 new farming technologies and practices (related to water use, fertilizer, plant breeding, improved seeds and labor productivity) were part of transformations in agriculture that increased food production and decreased food prices, addressing under-nutrition and chronic famine in many regions. As evidenced by computing and communication technologies, biotechnology and nanotechnologies, contemporary technological growth rates have a faster pace then those of earlier decades. Biotechnology promises huge advances in agriculture and medicine. Genetics offers new horizons for pharmaceutical development and nanotechnology promises to transform multiple domains from medicine, to energy, to politics (UNDP, 2001).
Science and technology have undoubtedly added to the risks faced by the human-environment system in a number of cases, in particular through driving environmental change (e.g. stratospheric ozone depletion). The potential for science and technology to reduce vulnerability to multiple stresses remains very unevenly distributed world-wide.
41 8.4 Patterns of Vulnerability Vulnerability analysis offers a number of policy-relevant lessons that provide the starting point for the analysis in this section. These include the following: • Frequently vulnerability arises from multiple stressors which are also dynamic over time. The recognition of this in the policy arena is imperative for successful implementation of vulnerability research findings. If vulnerability assessment is reduced to a static indicator, the richness and complexity of the processes which create and maintain vulnerability over time are lost. • Environmental risks such as natural hazards and climate change affect a wide range of natural, economic, political and social activities and processes. Hence, vulnerability reduction needs to be integrated as a strategic goal into overall development planning across many sectors including education, health, economic development, and governance. • Human vulnerability and livelihood security are closely linked to biodiversity and ecosystem resilience (Holling 2001, Folke et al 2002, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Sustainable environmental and resource management is therefore an important component in poverty and vulnerability reduction. Extreme events like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami show that environmental degradation and poorly planned development activities increase communities’ vulnerability to shocks (Miller et al. 2005). • Vulnerability is to a large extent determined by a lack of options resulting from the unequal distribution of power and resources among actors in a given social system. Resilience increases with diversification of livelihood strategies and with access to these strategies, social support networks and other resources. • Poverty reduction is essential for reducing vulnerability to environmental risk since it is both a condition and determinant of vulnerability. Vulnerability therefore needs to be more strongly addressed in poverty reduction strategies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and development aid programmes.
By looking at the diversity of human-environment systems throughout the world, it is evident that some situations share certain vulnerability-creating conditions. In this sense, the archetypes presented in detail in this section should help to understand the basic processes whereby vulnerability is produced within a context of multiple stressors. This may also allow policymakers to recognize their particular situations within a broader context – providing regional perspectives and important connections between regions and the global context. The set of archetypes represents a number of important processes and contexts, including the most vulnerable population groups throughout the world, such as indigenous people, and the urban or rural poor, or economic sectors heavily dependent on environmental services. Also, the archetypes reflect vulnerabilities across the full range of geographic and economic contexts: developing countries, industrialized countries and countries in transition.
42 8.4.1 Common pool resources This archetype looks at the vulnerabilities that result from the over-use of Common Pool Resources (CPRs), which happens because CPRs are difficult to protect and susceptible for overuse that diminishes resource availability for all users. A common-pool resource (CPR) is a natural or (hu)man- made resource system that is sufficiently large so as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use (Ostrom 1990). Common-pool resources exist at local, regional and global scales and in developed and developing countries throughout the world. Grasslands in China and Mongolia, rangelands in Tanzania, lobster fisheries in Maine, irrigation systems in India and fisheries in Canada are examples of CPRs at local to regional scales. The global whale population, the global climate and stratospheric ozone are also example of common pool resources and are sometimes referred to as compromising part of the global commons.
Under favorable conditions beneficiaries extract resource units from a common-pool resource system without harming the integrity of the system and its ability to generate a maximum quantity of extractable units (McKean 2000). Overuse of the resource system compromises the system’s ability to produce extractable units, thereby leading to decreased benefits for resource users (Ostrom 1990). People dependent on CPRs are vulnerable to this degradation and ultimate loss of the resource. Learning over time and across resources is less possible today than it was in years past. Because social and environmental changes are occurring more rapidly today than previously it is more difficult to take lessons from past experiences and apply them to current and future challenges. Also, previously, people could migrate between resources when local CPR management failed. Today, however, there are fewer alternative resources available and there is only one global commons. At same time CPR management in local to regional contexts does provide a basis from which to develop strategies for addressing the global commons, through, for example, institutional innovations and technological advances (Ostrom et al. 1999).
Indigenous Arctic Peoples and Climate Change Climate change constitutes a form of common pool resource degradation that disproportionatly affects resource users. The roughly 400,000 indigenous peoples living in the Arctic contribute very little if anything to climate change, yet they are experiencing and are poised to experience its effects, perhaps more significantly than any other group on the planet. According to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 2005), the Arctic is experiencing climate change sooner and more rapidly than other regions, with much larger changes projected for the future. The significance and effects of climate change for Arctic peoples depend on multiple changes occuring in this region. The Arctic has witnessed many forms of social change over recent decades including transformations in arctic cultures, economies and governments. Satellites, television, the Internet, and telephones have significantly altered communication and help to deliver aspects of southern cultures into the region. Snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles and new types of small boats are part of important changes in transportation, recreation and in hunting, herding and fishing practices. Climate change also occurs amidst a number of other (interacting) environmental changes that potentially shape the consequences of climate change for arctic peoples. Some of these environmental changes, such as increases in UV radiation and pollution with serious possible health consequences (heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants (POPs)), stem from human activities outside the region (McCarthy et al. 2005).
Indigenous peoples are the Arctic inhabitants most directly affected by current and perhaps future manifestations of arctic climate change. Indigenous peoples constitute a small percentage of the region’s near four million residents. Yet, they stand to lose the most from climate change. For many indigenous arctic peoples, their livelihoods are based partly or wholly on subsistence activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering. These activities foster strong human-environment relationships that have endured through many generations. The spirituality, social ties, understandings and experience embedded in these relationships are central to indigenous arctic life and have been key to enabling indigenous peoples of the Arctic to cope with and adapt to harsh and changing climate conditions. The close ties linking indigenous Arctic ways of life with environment mean that environmental changes such as those brought about by climate change, affect not only indigenous diets, incomes and economies, but also rich indigenous cultures and knowledges.
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Figure 8.12: Observed and projected changes in sea ice (ACIA 2004).
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being CPRs can hold a number of implications for communities and their well-being. Well-managed, sustainable CPRs supply users with an ample resource flow. These resources may meet the users direct resource need (e.g., drinking water) or might serve as or contribute to goods that the users sells (e.g., fish, beef). In the former case, the CPR may indirectly contribute to the material needs of the user by freeing up monetary or other resources necessary for obtaining material goods. In the latter case, the CPR may directly contribute to the user’s material needs by generating cash that the user can use to purchase goods. In the case of unsustainable CPRs, an insufficient resource flow can indirectly detract from the user’s material needs, by causing the user to find and pay for alternative sources of what the CPR was to supply. The insufficient resource flow can directly affect the user’s material needs by decreasing the income that the user receives from selling a CPR-derived product.
CPRs can benefit from and contribute to good social relations. Well-managed CPRs require trust and reciprocity among resource users and decision makers. CPR users who know one another and have ways of interacting with relevant institutions are more likely to abide by common norms and rules and trust the institutions through which the CPR is governed. Similarly, the process of engaging in a CPR management regime can conceivably create familiarity and trust among associated parties. Well- managed CPRs that yield abundant resources can enhance the environmental security of resource users. CPRs that breed conflict or that are unsustainable can compromise the physical and environmental security of potential users.
The availability of viable CPRs is shrinking (Dietz et al. 2003). Users of former CPRs have fewer choices about what type of livelihood activities they wish to pursue. They also lose economic choices as their source of livelihood degrades. A CPR governance system may, in the short-term, limit a resource user’s freedom of choice as norms and regulations restrict user access to and use of the CPR. However, if CPR management is successful, the resource user could gain greater economic or resource independence.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being CPR issues present significant opportunities for human well-being. CPR management regimes at local to global scales have the opportunity to provide impoverished local people a voice in the management of resources on which they depend. By improving and maintaining the viability of CPRs, these regimes also help to protect social relationships, ways of life and livelihoods of the people dependent on these resources.
In 1968, Garret Hardin, in his famous paper, “The Tragedy of the Commons” argued that the destruction of common-pool resources in the long-run is inevitable. According to Hardin, rational users make demands on the resource until expected benefits from the resource equal expected costs (Hardin 1968; Ostrom et al. 1999). Conventional policy approaches following Hardin’s analysis focused on ownership and privatization. However, these approaches are not always effective and can, 44 in some cases, be detrimental (Ostrom et al. 1999). A comparative study of grasslands in China, Mongolia and southern Siberia revealed significantly less degradation (about one-tenth of the pastureland area) in Mongolia under pastoralists’ traditional group property institutions. In Russia and China, where state-owned agricultural collectives and permanent settlement strategies were in place, three quarters and one-third of the pastureland in these respective areas showed degradation (Sneath 1998; cited in Ostrom 1999).
Most of CPR management theory and successful management examples concern resources that involve groups of varied sizes living within a single country engaged with institutions at multiple scales. Increasingly important CPR challenges involve resources for which management cannot take place solely at the village, rangeland or national level. CPRs such as marine fisheries and global climate are open to an international community and their management requires the cooperation of transnational, regional, national and local institutions. The global commons are extremely large and complex. Some of this complexity stems from the enormous global population which complicates organization and the negotiation and enforcement of rules. Cultural diversity can enrich the perspectives and options that global commons users bring to the table. At the same time, this diversity can make it difficult to develop a shared understanding of relevant challenges and how they should be addressed. A number of other factors intensify the challenges of CPR problems at the global level. These include: accelerated rates of social and environmental change and the interlinked nature of global commons such as global climate and biodiversity and the specialized knowledges that have emerged to address these issues. Because the management of global resources depends on nation- states voluntarily agreeing to negotiated treaties, some national governments choose to hold out from the treaty for special treatment. These strategies affect the type of resource management schemes that are possible at the international level (Ostrom et al. 1999). At the same time, international treaty regimes to protect common pool resources such as climate, biodiversity, and drylands signal an unprecedented level of international cooperation and are giving rise to a number of policy innovations for global commons management.
Lessons in adaptation from the Arctic Because arctic indigenous peoples contribute little to global warming, there are not many mitigative actions they can take to directly and significantly offset climate change. Yet, there are a number of ways in which indigenous arctic peoples are contributing to climate change science and policymaking, and thereby helping to shape the protection of climate as a common pool resource. Indigenous arctic peoples are contributing their indigenous knowledge and long history of experience with adaptation to observe and document climate-related social and environmental changes, relay the meaning and importance of these changes for indigenous ways of life, and help scientists and others to understand how people have in the past and might in the future adapt to these changes. In general, indigneous ways of life in the Arctic tend to be flexible with mobile hunting groups and sharing practices. Hunters and fishers in some areas adapt to change by altering the type of species they take, and the location, timing, and intensity of hunting or fishing. To increase safety in the face of uncertain ice and weather conditions they might take greater precaution or choose not to hunt. Past forms of adaptation illustrate the importance of flexibility, mobility and social relationships in enabling people to cope with change. However, future forms of adaptation may be different. Environmental and social transformations are introducing new types of stress and altering the human-environment systems that will respond to them. Indigenous peoples face a wider range of opportunities for education and livelihood choices, but they are also less connected with indigenous knowledge and practices. Future adaptation will need support from national and regional governments. In order to facilitate successful adaptations, these governments will need to promote and enable adaptive measures. In addition, governments will potentially need to revise policies that hinder adaptation. Self-determination and self-government through ownership and mangement of land and natural resources are important for empowering indigenous arctic peoples to protect their self-reliance and to face climate change on their own terms (Huntington et al. 2005).
45 8.4.2 Contaminated sites – legacies of the past This archetype looks at contaminated sites where vulnerable human-environment systems exist, especially in poorer sections of society. Contaminated sites are a legacy of the past industrial and economic development. They are also a heritage of our present production and consumption patterns that will affect the next generations. Careless use of chemicals, wasteful technologies, improper waste disposal and mismanagement together with lack of responsibility and information in industrial production have resulted in contaminated areas, polluted water and air and present time bombs for the environment and people. Short term profit interests in developed or developing countries, oppression of critical opinions in centrally planned economies, lack of regulations or corruption and weak law enforcement have led and still lead to present and future environmental hazards.
Industrial sites abandoned in the past may impose serious risks for people and the environment. Hazardous materials were left behind by the companies and enterprises. Over the years original containments and supporting infrastructure depreciate, tanks or barrels start leaking, and buildings may fall down. Original owners and operators may go bankrupt or disappear and the general legal environment in a country allows polluters to avoid responsibility for the old liabilities. States are suddenly facing the problem of who will pay for the site remediation, or at least conservation. The remediation is an externality which is rarely internalized in the operational costs during the time the sites were profitable. Remediation costs are imposed on state budgets or on people from surrounding areas exposed to health risks and deteriorating environment.
Contaminated sites in Central Asia There are two main types of contaminated sites: (i) abandoned waste deposits/landfills; and (ii) industrial sites. Abandoned waste deposits/landfills may contain various chemical substances; they may be under control, or practically unknown and hidden. Industrial sites may represent abandoned places or they may still operate.
Source: http://www.envsec.org/maps.php The location of these sites is closely related to the stages of industrial and economic development. Sometimes they represent relatively isolated islands around former factories or mines, sometimes whole regions are affected by the problem (e.g., the Kola peninsula in the Russian Federation or the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia).
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Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being A study in the UK comparing large factory sites with average household incomes revealed that 662 of the largest factories are located in areas where the average household income is less than 15,000 British pounds (Friends of the Earth 2000). Only five of the UK’s largest factories are located in areas where the average household income is 30,000 or more British pounds. The communities with the lowest average incomes had the highest numbers of factories. The non-governmental organisation Friends of the Earth emphasized that whether or not this condition was the result of discrimination, the impact is clear (Agyeman 2002).
Abandoned factories and industrial sites are most likely to be left in poor communities and to attract marginalized underclass newcomers. This is case in less developed as well as in developed countries of the North. Contamination of air, water and land influences vegetation and agriculture, it decreases land productivity, and makes agricultural products not suitable for markets. Degradation of groundwater and drinking water sources may push people to collect water from distant sources (work mostly done by women and children). Contaminated land, polluted water and air mean endangered health for the people in various forms: from allergies to cancer - depending on the chemicals. Children and woman are especially endangered since they are less able to cope with the chemicals or spend most of the time in homes. The sites are places of physical danger. There are risks of injuries (falls into shafts, landslides) in cases where poverty leads people to collect materials from abandoned sites or where there is direct contact with the contaminated material.
Poverty brings people to the contaminated sites and poverty keeps them there. Besides the direct health impact, the environmental burden disproportionably imposed on the people has implications for their social situation and limits their range of opportunities. It imposes additional costs for these people. We can divide this cost into monetary and non-monetary.
Monetary costs include the direct expenditures for protection against the environmental conditions or for covering damages caused by exposure to the environmental threats. Significant are the cost of the health care, cost of reconstruction and material, and losses of property value. As the contamination or information about the problem spreads, properties lose value. People are “locked” in the places; lack of financial resources prevent them from moving and buying a new house somewhere else. Some of the costs associated with the contamination are difficult to estimate in monetary terms. Supply of potable water requires substantial efforts, time and energy. Women and children have to carry the water from distant wells. Protective measures against landslides take time.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? A key problem in addressing environmental conditions of people affected by contaminated sites is addressing their social situation. It is poverty and lack of employment opportunities that brings people to settle in their proximity. Strategies and measures for poverty alleviation are the basic policy option for addressing the problem. Poverty is driver, as well as outcome of this archetype. Contamination brings collapse of agriculture, tourism and other soft industries. It costs people money in terms of health care and protection. Prices of real estate go down and attract more poor people, while those who have a chance leave. This leads to creation of ghettoes with all of their social consequences. Longer term opportunities may be lost for short term profit. Cost-benefit analysis should precede any decision on a new industrial facility.
“Success stories” can illustrate few points: • Importance of the Precautionary principle – most of the contamination is due to insufficient information on the chemicals (e.g. DDT, PCB) effects in the past – now we face the impacts – we could use upcoming REACH legislation of the EU as an example and policy how to diminish risks for the future; • Short gains versus long term costs – some of these industrial productions brought short term profit (e.g., employment, taxes) but the remediation cost will be significant and will be borne by the states and/or foreign aid;
47 • Importance of global environmental and social standards – avoid transfer of the problematic technologies; [Role of governance and institutions, role of S&T, public awareness]
Porto Romano, Albania Porto Romano, on the outskirts of the Albanian port of Durres, on the Adriatic Coast, is an old leather tanning and pesticide-producing complex shut since 1990. Following the end of the Cold War, waves of rural migrants from northeast Albania looking for economic prosperity settled the area. More recently, refugees of the Kosovo conflict have also made their home here, bringing the population to an estimated 6,000 – 10,000. The abandoned chemical plants have provided the squatters with building materials for new homes, and access to water and electricity. What many of the new residents did not know is that the ground they built on, the bricks they used, and their water supply were all heavily contaminated with toxic chemicals, such as lindane, a banned nerve agent and carcinogen, and chromium, a chemical used in tanning known to cause kidney and liver damage and lung cancer. Additionally, according to tests taken by a UNEP team in 2000, a groundwater sample from a well in Porto Romano demonstrated 4.4 mg/liter of chlorobenzene, over 4000 times the acceptable level for drinking water in EU nations. Chlorobenzene is used as a solvent for some pesticide formulations, as a degreaser, and to make other chemicals. High levels of chlorobenzene can damage the liver and kidneys and affect the brain. In March 2004, the Albanian Geology Institute began remediation of the Porto Romano site. It is unclear what the extent of the cleanup will be. Previous efforts in 2002, led by the UNEP and the World Bank, were hampered by squatters who refused to vacate the area because they had no other place to go. It has been estimated that a complete cleanup could cost up to $10 million. However, relocating squatters living directly within the old factory complex—the most toxic inhabited area in Porto Romano—and sealing it off, are high priority in the remediation effort. [Is there any epidemiological monitoring programme focusing on the identification of environmental health problems as a result of exposure to these chemicals?]
48 8.4.3 Desertification in drylands Drylands are terrestrial areas of the world with very low rainfall and high rates of evaporation. Drylands areas and populations are however not heterogeneous and represent a wide distribution in terms of livelihoods and the human-environment system. For example, of the estimated 2.3 billion people living in dryland areas it is estimated that up to 900 million live in urban areas, including mega cities like New Delhi, Mexico City Beijing, Los Angeles, Teheran and Santiago. (Dobie 2001). Drylands occur in both developed and developing countries (see Figure 8.13). Dryland populations in countries like Australia and United States participate in diversified economies and are not directly dependent on agriculture for livelihoods and are as such less vulnerable to land degradation and water scarcity issues that characterize ecosystem challenges in drylands. There is also a broad spectrum of developing countries within the drylands, dryland populations in countries like India with strong manufacturing sectors and advances in land productivity are less vulnerable than say countries in the Sahel. While drylands can not be perceived as largely rural and agrarian, this archetype focuses on the rural populations who depend directly on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods, and are most vulnerable to environmental and social change within dryland areas.
Drylands experience the phenomenon of desertification, defined as land degradation in dryland areas (MEA 2005). Poverty and population growth leads to increased pressure on agricultural land, rangelands and woodland areas. Impoverished populations expand cultivation into woodland areas and fragile lands and reduce fallow periods, which diminishes land productivity. This leads to land degradation, soil erosion, salinization and eventually reduced ecosystem productivity. The cycle of land degradation is compounded by impacts of climate change and water scarcity. Human wellbeing (health, poverty, political and economic stability) is impacted and vulnerability of populations to future environmental change gets compounded and adaptive capacity greatly compromised.
Figure 8.13 Aridity zones on earth (UNEP/GRID, 1991)
Human factors like demographic changes, policy failures related to international food trade, lack of access to markets, low prices of dryland commodities, poorly defined land and water rights cumulate with environmental factors like land degradation, water scarcity, deforestation and droughts to cause a vicious cycle/pattern of vulnerability. Climate change is a much greater threat in dryland areas than non dryland areas, because of its impact of water availability for agriculture, livestock and human consumption (Dietz et al. 2003). Fragmented and overly centralised land and water management policies do not ensure the participation of local- and community-based institutions in land and water use decisions. Lack of access to technology, credit and capital for sustainable land use and generation of alternative livelihoods at the local level diminishes coping capacity. Sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists is a classic example of policy failure in which limiting the transboundary migration of
49 nomads leads them to cultivate rangelands more suited to use by mobile populations and to compromise their ability to cope with extreme shocks like droughts.
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being Regionally, Asia has the largest population living in drylands, both in terms of numbers and percentage of the total (1.4 billion people, or 42 percent of the region’s population). Africa has nearly the same percent of people living in drylands - 41 percent - although the total number is less than Asia’s: nearly 270 million. South America has 30 percent of its population in drylands or approximately 87 million people (WRI, 2000; MEA 2005; UNCCD 1997).
The level of human well-being and vulnerability varies according to both the degree of aridity/water scarcity and the level of overall development in the region. It is estimated that about one billion people are rural poor (Dobie, 2001). In developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, the issues of land degradation and water scarcity are further exasperated by lower standards of general development including health, education, infrastructure and other services. Dryland populations are often marginalized politically from decision and policy making processes. Droughts and loss of livelihood force people to migrate out of dryland areas into new areas, leading to urban sprawl and ethnic and political strife with new communities. Degraded land may cause downstream flooding, reduced water quality, sedimentation in rivers and lakes, and salination of reservoirs and navigation channels.
The limited access to and control over natural resources by women is caused by a series of interrelated social, economic and cultural factors that force rural women into a subordinated role and hamper their productivity and limit their participation in decision making processes and development initiatives. In developing countries, insecure land tenure reduces women’s and men’s incentives to maintain soil quality due to lack of permanent rights to the land. Women can be affected in several ways due to desertification process. For example, there is an increment in the amount of time that rural dwellers have to spend gathering fuel-wood and fodder and fetching water. On the other hand, women face loss of efficiency in cooking (fewer sources for fuel) and farming activities (an increased labour to combat desertification).
Drylands ecosystems often tend to have relatively low levels of human wellbeing. The basic material needs of poor rural households in dryland areas are frequently directly dependent on natural resources and ecosystems. There is little opportunity for other forms of economic and livelihood activities. Crop production for food and trade; livestock for meat and dairy and fuel-wood and timber for energy and building needs all depend directly on availability of water and the quality of land. Human well-being is highly dependent on the environment in dryland areas.
One clear example of the effects of drylands in the population is what happened in Sahel region. Once rainfall reverted to normal low levels after 1970, following favourable rainfall from the 1950s to the mid-1960s that had attracted people to the region, an estimated 250,000 people died, along with their cattle, sheep, and goats (http://www.greenfacts.org/es/ecosistemas/millennium-assessment-3/3-human- wellbeing-poverty.htm reference). Drought and water scarcity related malnutrition and low caloric intake are a major problem in the drylands. The MA Report shows infant mortality in drylands in developing countries averages about 54 children per 1,000 live births, 10 times that of industrial countries. Importantly, the rate in such drylands is twice as high as that of other, non-dryland regions in developing countries.
The process of desertification can cause dust storms and air pollution, resulting in damaged machinery, reduced visibility, unwanted sediment deposits, and mental stress. Wind-blown dust can also worsen health problems, including eye infections, respiratory illnesses, and allergies. It has been reported that remnants of swirling dust storms arising out of the Gobi Desert between northern China and southern Mongolia are crossing the Pacific Ocean and reducing air quality over North America. The problems in ecosystem degradation and the harm it causes for human wellbeing clearly help set the stage for the conflict that is found in many dryland regions in parts of central Asia and Africa. Poor people living in dryland regions are at the greatest risk of environmental collapse. Movement of
50 “dryland refugees” to new areas and into small urban sprawls has the potential for creating local and regional ethnic, social and political conflict.
In Africa, many people have become internally displaced or forced to migrate. People are forced to leave home in drylands areas because they would grow increasingly uninhabitable (Dietz et al. 2003)). The area people leave behind is not managed anymore, so that likely gets worse. Many times, environmental resources in and around the cities and camps where these people settle come under severe pressure. These populations can face another problem because there is a chance that area where they are going is probably under population stress these difficult living conditions and the loss of cultural identity further undermine social stability. Pastoral nomadic communities within dryland areas have often employed movement to new areas as a major coping strategy against droughts. Coerced settlement and restriction of movement across national boundaries can cause new vulnerabilities.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? On the one hand, enlarged global markets for products from drylands can lead to improved economic opportunity and create access to capital and technology on the other hand it can increase pressure for cash cropping and create increased dependency on regional and global drivers. Opportunities for products from dryland developing countries to have access to international markets are mediated through a range of protectionist tariffs and agricultural subsidies in Europe and US. Lack of financial benefits flowing to the local community from local resources - such as minerals mined, or wildlife that attracts tourists. [Other opportunities with community initiatives and changes in governance?]
The Machakos Story Long term social and ecological transformation in Machakos District in Kenya have been widely cited as a success story of how a combination of efforts in the interconnected domains of: ecosystem management (conservation of biodiversity, soil and water management); increasing land productivity (increased market access to agricultural products, improved crop yields, increased value/price of products); land investments and social welfare (investments in education, diversification of employment/income opportunities and stronger linkages to urban centers) can lead to improved well- being in dry land areas. Since the 1930’s to the 1990’s, despite a six fold increase in the population developed in the district has managed to demonstrate that long term social and ecological transformations can be achieved in the dry lands. The study found, however, that erosion had been largely brought under control on private farmlands. Small investments and extension support have helped control soil erosion. The value of agricultural production per capita increased six fold between 1930 and 1987 (Mortimore 2005). Development in agricultural technology occurred and an increased emphasis was placed on livestock production, intensive farming, and integration of crops with livestock production, and improved production and marketing of higher value commodities (such as fruit, vegetables, and coffee). In tandem investments were made in education and providing employment opportunities outside the district and in urban areas.
51 8.4.4 A growing consumers’ class and the export of vulnerability This archetype looks at the consequences of increasing global consumption and its harmful effects on natural systems that makes it harder for the poorest on the planet to meet their basic needs. As global figures show, mainly consumers in industrialized countries exceed since the 1970ies the ecological carrying capacity of the world (e.g. as illustrated by humanities total ecological Footprint, Venetoulis et. al 2004, WWF et al. 2005, WWF et al. 2004). Now consumers in newly-industrialised countries are catching up rapidly (Myers 2004). However, the poor that are not part of the consumer class are most vulnerable to negative environmental effects created, for example, by the relocation of resource extraction, the move of production sites to other countries and the recycling or dumping of hazardous waste to places with low environmental standards.
The current level of resource use that is predominant in developed countries cannot be sustained at the global level. Despite past efforts in industrialized countries to reduce material use, today 25 percent of the world population still uses 80 percent of the resources and generates 80 percent of waste (UNDP 1998, von Weizsäcker et al. 1997, WI 2005). While international trade can lead to increases in welfare and has helped millions of people out of poverty, it also plays an (increasing) role in sustaining such unequal patterns of consumption, as industrialised countries continue to outsource the extraction of natural resources, much of the production and manufacturing and also their hazardous waste into the rest of the world (Grether and de Melo 2003, Schütz et al. 2004).
The trade patterns between industrialised, newly-industrialised and developing countries reveal that the high resource consumption of industrialised countries depends increasingly on imports: products are imported from newly industrialized countries, and raw material and energy are imported from developing countries. In return, industrialized countries export some products to newly industrialised countries and waste to both groups of countries. Newly industrialised countries (like India, China or Brasil) have gained much wealth in restructuring their economy towards manufacturing and export, and they increasingly import raw material from developing countries. Developing countries rely on the extraction and export of primary commodities, which are the most resource intensive per unit of economic output and require large amounts of resources to be extracted for relatively little added value (Raffer and Singer 2005, Giljum and Eisenmenger 2004). The consequences for the local environmental are severe. The gap between countries “which have made it”, and other countries widens. Finally, export-driven economics in developing countries, often result in environmental degradation that could be avoided. The available data on income disparities between countries is ambiguous (WI 2005), however, on a global level the disparities between the richest and the poorest people can be seen clearly.
The “transnational consumer class” Approximately 1.7 billion people worldwide now belong to the "transnational consumer class", the group of people characterised by an income beyond U.S. $7,000 in purchasing power parities, diets rich in meat, transport by cars, and lifestyles devoted to the accumulation of non-essential goods. The affluent consumers’ lifestyle includes spending large proportions of their expanding disposable incomes on automobiles, meat, and electricity-demanding appliances. Such lifestyle choices are already placing huge demands on local ecosystems, and they increasingly threaten the global environment as well. Today, nearly half of global consumers reside in developing countries, including 240 million in China and 120 million in India - markets with a high potential for expansion (WRI 2004, WI, 2005). On the opposite side, nearly 1.1 billion people are living on one dollar (U.S.) a day (WRI 2002).
Per-capita consumption worldwide has increased by 3 percent per year during the past quarter century (Hawken et al. 1999, Brown et al. 1998). A recent study reveals that a large proportion of the environmental load of Dutch private consumption takes place abroad. For greenhouse gases this amounts to 49 percent; for pesticide use to 56 percent; for summer smog to 61 percent; for eutrophication to 64 percent; for acidification to 74 percent; and, for land use to 84 percent. The consumption domains of food, car use and room heating had highest environmental loads (Nijdam et
52 al. 2005). Figure 8.14 shows the balance for extraction, import, consumption and export of metal ores in Europe.
Figure 8.14 Metal ores: domestic extraction, imports, exports, and domestic consumption, EU-15 1970-2001
300 000
Imports 250 000
200 000 Domestic consumption
onnes 150 000 Exports 1000 t 100 000
50 000 Domestic extraction
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: Eurostat/IFF 2004
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being Decreasing the vulnerability of some is increasing vulnerability of others far away (Martinez-Alier, 2002). While most people in industrialized nations and the new consumers don’t feel most of the impacts on the environment they cause through their behaviour, negative effects on the environment, direct and indirect, are felt most strongly by the poor. They have to cope with polluted land, water and air, unsafe working conditions, environmental hazards and an increased risk for disasters, changing social ties and lack enforcement of their rights.
Newly-industrialized countries face social disparities, if the transition goes too fast for some, creating new differences within a consumer class and a poor working class. At the moment in those countries the ‘new consumers’ class lives off their countries’ social and natural capital. Issues like work safety, bio-safety, levels of acceptable risk and gender inequalities affect directly the well-being of the poorest part of the population. Through their increased freedom of choice and often better education possibilities, and also higher labour costs vulnerability related to extreme poverty and dependence on single products etc. is shifted to poorer countries.
Environmental stresses accumulate on the site of extraction of primary commodities or in dumping/recycling places of waste. In developing countries, those are often paired with a poor local population with low coping capacity, the effects result in ill-being. The negative effects are multiplied by global stresses such as global warming. The local and in most cases poor population living close to production, extraction or dumping sites is most vulnerable to environmental stresses leading to changes of the ecosystems they live in and depend on for their livelihoods (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Disasters, be it through the production itself (like the accidental spilling of 100 tons of benzene from a petrochemical site into the Songhua River, in north-eastern China in November 2005), or through worsened effects of natural disasters (e.g. of the tsunami 2004 in mangrove-depleted coastal areas) are felt worse by the poor. The health of local communities is particularly affected by pollution. Lack of income security is severe in countries where the local population relies on one particular resource or export product. The local population also faces limitations in the freedom of choice when free access to land (be it common grounds or private) is restricted, or when people are forced to relocate because of new extraction sites.
Opportunities the environment offers for reducing vulnerability and improving human well- being
53 Eco-efficient production, services and dematerialisation should allow material prosperity while being environmentally friendly. There are many eco-technologies on the market, to enjoy material well- being, while using less raw materials and energy and causing less pollution. The techniques are here, but a change in attitude is needed to shift consumers’ behaviour. Currently, the goal of decoupling material use from economic growth can hardly be seen in Europe (EEA, 2004).
While the main challenge remains the change of behaviour of consumers, meanwhile many opportunities are used on smaller scales and in shorter time frames. The long term goal for the developing countries will be to reduce dependence on primary commodity exports. This can be achieved by increasing efforts to diversify economic structures – a strategy that has been of vital importance for development in the industrialised countries. Similarly, encouraging processing of natural resources domestically (“vertical diversification”) is expected to increase the added value of exports (Bocoum-Kaberuka 1999). This would enable Southern economies to reduce extraction rates of natural resources and thus decrease pressures on the domestic environment. Simultaneously, “horizontal diversification” should be encouraged to build up other, less resource-intensive sectors (Behrens et al. 2004). Active investment in education and training to foster the acquisition of skills in the labour force is one central measure to shift comparative advantages away from unprocessed to processed primary production and later on from primary production to manufacturing, which on average is more skill-intensive than activities in the primary sectors (Wood 1999).
Greening the production and consumption chain
Education and information of local communities In artisanal gold mining the miners use mercury to extract gold, which pollutes nearby aquifers. For every gram of gold recovered, two to five gram of mercury are released into the environment. The lack of appropriate technology and proper health and safety procedures has led to severe environmental degradation and pollution. To immediately response to potential health dangers, trainers from local small-scale mining associations and provincial and municipal environment offices have been trained in cleaner production methods to reduce use and recycle mercury http://www.unido.org/doc/4199.
Technology transfer on a regional level As the aquaculture industry in still in its learning phases, the exchange of industry adopted best management practices (www.enaca.org) can reduce the pressure on the environment tremendously. Even small changes in practice can have a significant reduction of diseases (www.aims.gov.au).
Shifting consumer preferences to environmentally and socially sound production Consumption patterns might shift according to changing tastes. In recent years, the demand for environmentally friendly produced goods was steadily rising, leading to a need to seek certification. Certificates help in ensuring transparency of the production chain.
Policy mainstreaming UNEP issued in 2001 the strategic report “Consumption Opportunities”, addressing issues of sustainable consumption, including overconsumption and misconsumption, to raise awareness and sensitize policy makers for issues of sustainable consumption (Fuchs, Lorek 2005).
54 8.4.5 Global markets, local opportunities; land use change and livelihood insecurity [New title?]
This archetype takes a closer look at the cash-crop sector and the consequences for local communities as they often bear the brunt of agricultural expansion. This can result in a pattern of vulnerability where cash-crop driven agricultural land use change undermines the livelihood of natural ecosystem dependent communities, without sufficient alternatives to overcome the loss of livelihood base and little sharing of the benefits from the resource exploitation. In some cases this seriously affects the well-being of local communities. The impact on local communities is not always negative; cash cropping has also helped local development. Therefore, the pattern of vulnerability described above should not be regarded as intrinsic or an inevitable consequence of the cash-crop sector, but neither should it be ignored from the perspective of sustainability.
Food production has grown substantially in the last fifty years. This has helped secure food supply for many, even in the face of a rapidly growing world population. The world population doubled (from 3 to 6 billion) and food production increased around two-and-a-half times between 1960 and 2000 (MEA 2005). This was primarily achieved through the intensification of agricultural production. In developing countries the area under cultivation also grew rapidly (See Figure 8.15a). This expansion still continues, often at the expense of natural forests. A substantial part of this expansion is for agricultural export (See Figure 8.15b). Trade in agricultural and aqua-cultural products has grown even faster than the increase in production itself, growing fourfold between 1961 and 1999 (Millstone and Lang 2003). Agri-businesses have become powerful multinationals with a high degree of vertical integration between production and consumption. A small number of businesses increasingly control agricultural trade at the international level (FAO 2004).
Agricultural area Agricultural export 600 3,500
500
3,000 400
2,500 300
200 Area (Million Ha) 2,000 Value of export (Billion US$) 100
1,500 1961 1967 1973 1979 1985 1991 1997 Year 0 1961 1967 1973 1979 1985 1991 1997 2003 World Developed Countries Developing Countries and Countries in Transition Developed Countries Developing Countries Source: FAOSTAT data, 2005 Source: FAOSTAT data, 2005
Figure 8.15 Growth in agricultural area (a) and agricultural exports in developed and developing countries
Cash-crops generate substantial revenues for many developing countries. Often it is one of the primary export sectors, bringing in significant foreign revenues. For as many as 43 developing countries a single agricultural commodity accounted for more than 20 percent of their total revenues from foreign trade (FAO 2004). Products such as shrimps, soybean, palm oil or wood generate many jobs and large amounts of export revenues, but they are also associated with the loss of large areas of natural resources such as forests and mangroves. Short-term exploitation is often favoured over long-term management of natural resources and little concern is given to the long-term economic impact (Dewi, Belcher et al. 2005). Consequently, new areas for cash-crop production often cause problems with original users of the natural ecosystems.
55 Oil Palm in Indonesia Oil palm production has increased rapidly over the last 40 year. Currently it is the world second largest vegetable oil after soya oil, and the primary vegetable oil traded on the world market (Basiron, Balu et al. 2004). In Indonesia, the second largest producer after Malaysia, oil palm contributed 31 per cent of the agricultural export in 1997 and employed around 2 million people (Susila 2004). In 2000, 46 per cent of the oil palm area was held by private enterprises, the rest by small-holders and state-run plantations (Barber 2002).
Much of the growth in oil palm comes came at the expense of tropical forest. Expansion of oil palm plantations is currently among the most important forces driving deforestation in Indonesia (Barber 2002). Even if development of oil palm plantations is not taking place in natural forest areas, increased demand for land will inevitably lead to further deforestation. For Kalimantan (Curran, Trigg et al. 2004) found that the establishment of palm oil plantations outside lowland protected areas did increase the pressure on these protected areas.
The natural forests are important for the livelihood of forest-dependent people, including many indigenous forest-dwelling peoples with long-standing customary traditions of forest resource management (Barber 2002). The lack of clear land rights of local and indigenous people and government protection has given them little security against ongoing deforestation. Forest conversion have provide little direct benefits for forest dependent communities and threatens their traditional livelihood (Potter and Lee 1998). This has led to social tension and conflict over resources and land rights. These conflicts grew violent in Indonesia in the 1990s, when indigenous people protested against the development of new palm oil plantations. This has resulted in the consequent withdrawal and withholding of foreign investment (Casson 1999).
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being The most vulnerable group is the indigenous population which depends directly on ecosystem functions for a living. But other communities also retain a significant share of their livelihood base from natural ecosystems. Without the traditional way to sustain their livelihood, alternatives have to be sought. Tropical forests for example provide a host of ecosystem services, such as food, fire wood or the cleaning of water. Conversion of those ecosystems for agricultural, aqua-cultural or forestry use can have enormous consequences on the supply of these services. The impact on the well-being of a local community depends on how much they gain or lose from the conversion.
Human well-being is affected in all of the facets explored in this chapter. Basic material needs are under threat where loss of access to communal grounds deprives the local communities of the basic resources part of their livelihood. Human health suffers when basic material needs are not met, e.g. through malnutrition. Health is also affected by air and water pollution and unsafe production methods. The expansion of cash-crop production has led to many conflicts over land rights and the use of communal grounds. This threatens good social relations and increases insecurity, particularly when conflicts grow violent. Finally, this form of resource exploitation, with little stakeholder participation, also infringes on the freedom and entitlements of people.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? It is likely that the growth of the cash-crop in the agricultural sector will continue in the coming decades. This archetype focused on the consequences of this trend for ecosystem- dependent communities. However, marginalisation of local communities does not have to be the outcome of cash-crop expansion. It is the particular combination of factors that lead to this outcome. Avoiding this will bring great benefits, not only for local communities but also for national governments and the private sector. Avoidance does not have to hamper the growth of the export sector. On the contrary, it can create a broader basis of support for these developments, ensuring a more solid foundation for long-term economic development.
There are many opportinities to make the cash-crop sector more sustainable. Policy and action focused on reducing the impact on livelihoods can have many opportunities to improve human well-being,
56 either by reducing the negative consequences of land use change or through the development of an alternative livelihood base. Which approach is taken clearly depends on the local situation, but the recognition of local community rights in the exploitation and sharing of natural resources will be required. Opportunities include the internalization of negative effects on humans and the environment (e.g. through fair trade, certification and labels) or support of R & D for the development of more environmental and socially friendly alternatives.
Shrimp farming Commercial shrimp farming began in the late 1960s and early 1970s in line with growing global demand for cheap shrimp, which could not be entirely supplied by wild catch any more. As a result of technological advances, intensive forms of shrimp farming developed and farming expanded into many parts of the tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world, where farms can generally produce two to three crops per year. Today there are commercial shrimp farms in over 50 countries. About 75 percent of the world production of farmed shrimp comes from Asian countries, with China and Thailand in the lead. It is estimated that between 5 and 10 percent of the global mangrove forests have been converted for shrimp aquaculture. This has led to increased coastal erosion and a reduced protection against floods. Destruction of mangroves also affects local fisheries, because mangroves are critical spawning/nursery grounds for many commercially important fish species. Furthermore, prolonged use of a pond leads to an incremental build up of toxic sludge at the bottom of the pond. Flushing the pond never completely removes this sludge and eventually the pond is abandoned.
Comparison between countries shows that the impact on the environment and human well-being varies depending on the intensity of production. This offers the opportunity to learn from different areas the positive and negative effects of their form of production. For example in Thailand, farm produced shrimp are now most commonly raised in intensive, industrialised cultures, whereas in Vietnam, a late-starter in the business, the production methods still vary from hatcheries, to extensive, semi- intensive and intensive. In 2002 Vietnam had still a variety of locally diverse production modes. Until the mid-1990s expansion was bigger than intensification. The more extensive ponds cover a much larger area, require a larger workforce and possibly – if stocked with more than one species – a workforce that has more than one source of income, lowering the risk of failure. Extensive systems also allowed the farmers to work in other fields, for example rice paddies. The intensively used, industrialised ponds are single-use and also single-profit enterprises. The smaller the ponds, the more likely local former rice farmers can afford to invest to convert their production to shrimps, and contribute to local wealth. This is still a high-risk business, and many give up after one failure of their crop. Nevertheless the high and quick return on investments makes the intensification of the industry attractive.
57 8.4.6 Post-conflict vulnerabilities and human well-being The environment is a common casualty of conflict just as environment can be a cause for conflict (Westing 1991, Austin and Bruch 2000). Conflict and post-conflict conditions undercut the capacity to adapt or mitigate to global change (Barnett 2006). This archetype focuses on the last category, the post-conflict period and the vulnerabilities to human well-being presented in that period. The breakdown of infrastructure, social order, and the rule of law in many post-conflict settings increases the vulnerability of human-environment systems. Environmental cooperation to facilitate the distribution of environmental goods and services in this period addresses the first order vulnerabilities, but is also a means to improve the chances of avoiding relapse to conflict, a situation that would exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities and threats to human well-being.
Poverty reduces the capacity of populations in post-conflict settings to adapt to environmental vulnerabilities from conflict and post-conflict settings. At the same time, poor populations dependent on natural resources may gain increased access to those resources once conflict has ended (safer to farm, gather fuel wood, hunt etc.). Environmental cooperation may reduce poverty by supporting sustainable development that brings long term benefits for human well being. In some cases, informal and/or illegal trade in valuable natural resources was part of fueling and/or prolonging the conflict (Collier et al. 2003, de Soysa 2005, Ross 2001). These trade networks are often interrupted in the immediate post-conflict period. Conflict zones newly accessible in post-conflict periods also have increased natural resource exploitation (logging, bushmeat, hunting for export of traditional and medicinal items) (McNeely 2000, McNeely 2003, Shambaugh et. al 2001).
The availability of or access to science and technology are fundamental to reducing vulnerability of human populations in post-conflict situations. Rebuilding infrastructures and environmental clean-ups of contaminated sites are among the basic steps to a new prosperity of the affected population. Mortality from disease and starvation is much higher than from bullets or bombs in wartime: battle deaths made up only 11 percent of war deaths in Angola’s twenty-seven year old civil war or 6 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1998-2001 (Lascina and Gleditsch 2005, Human Security Centre 2005). These same human health threats often persist in immediate post-conflict settings, impeding efforts at reconstruction. Environmental damage due to the conflict itself deepens these vulnerabilities by directly impacting human health or limiting efforts to restart economic and agricultural activity that would improve health. Mental health problems, due to traumas experienced during the conflict, represent a major issue for the conflict-impacted population, at the individual level and at the community level, since it increases vulnerability and affects the human capacity to cope with or respond to environmental stress.
Institutions and governance around environmental issues in post-conflict settings are often weak. Weak in peace time, the capacity for formal environmental management has been non-existent in some conflict and post-conflict settings. In others, governmental and non-governmental officials have continued working at great peril to themselves to preserve precious biodiversity such as some wildlife officials have done to protect gorillas in Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Natural resource regimes have changed as part of the negotiated peace agreement where the potential for lucrative resource control is used as an incentive to end the conflict. Countries in conflict and post- conflict periods find it more difficult to participate actively in regional and international environmental cooperation or negotiations. Capacity to participate in international negotiations is a severe limitation for many developing countries in peace-time. Conflict and post-conflict periods place an added burden on that state.
Post-conflict vulnerability affects all post-conflict regions in the world. Figure 8.16 Selected conflict and ‘post-conflict’ zones 1994-2004 from “Small Arms Survey 2004”
58
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being Many vulnerable groups are affected in post-conflict settings: refugees, internally-displaced persons, women, and children. Their vulnerability often consists of threats to key dimensions of human well- being. Populations in post-conflict settings often have limited access to resources because of unsettled ownership rights, depleted or degraded resources or unsafe areas (such as mined agricultural fields). Populations in post-conflict settings suffer direct and indirect human health threats. Direct health effects stem from degraded or poisoned water sources. Indirect health affects stem from malnutrition or lack of purchasing power when natural resource intensive livelihoods are undercut or unavailable. Populations in post-conflict settings often suffer separation and destruction of family units and extended support networks. These break downs in good social relations undercut social safety nets and lower coping capacity and resilience. Populations in post-conflict settings face persistent personal security challenges, impeding access to livelihood activities.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? Characterizing environment as victim and environment as instigator misses a critical opportunity to utilize environment as a confidence-, cooperation-, and peace-builder. “Environmental peacemaking” pathways range all along a conflict continuum that begins with conflict prevention, runs through times of conflict, and ends with post-conflict reconstruction (Conca and Dabelko 2002, Conca et. al 2005). External environmental assessments in post-conflict settings bring objective and practical knowledge to the struggle to rebuild after conflict as the UN Environment Programme’s Post-Conflict Branch (formerly the Post-Conflict Assessment Unit) has done in Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories among others. Systematic steps to map, assess, and address environmental conditions in post-conflict settings have direct and measurable impacts on improving human well-being and reducing vulnerabilities for human populations. Environmental assessments have presented opportunities for collaboration among parties still in conflict and, not only brings a benefit to the environment and subsequently to human well-being, but also prevents resumption of conflict. Post-conflict rebuilding of environmental institutions paves the way to sustainable development. Environmental post-conflict rehabilitation offers short and long term benefits for human well-being. In the short term, water quality measurements help local populations determine which wells are poisoned and which ones safe. Assessments of depleted uranium or landmines left on the battlefields tell farmers whether their fields and groundwater are safe as PCAU assessments have done in Bosnia and Kosovo (UNEP 1999, UNEP 2001). Longer-term benefits from sustainable forestry management structures such as those being established in post-conflict Liberia, for
59 example, will help preserve the natural resource base for the populations highly dependent on forest products for their livelihoods (UNEP 2004).
The Mesopotamian marshlands In the wake of the 1990-91Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein systematically drained the Mesopotamian Marshlands of southern Iraq as retribution for Marsh Arab participation in the thwarted uprising that followed the war. Since 2003 the Mesopotamian Marshlands are being restored and this unique ecosystem is again receiving large quantities of water (see fig. 8.17),
This re-flooding is lowering a range of human vulnerabilities for the specific Marsh Arab population whose culture, economy, and health depend on this fragile ecosystem. The Mesopotamian Marshlands are transboundary, shared between Iraq and Iran. The process of restoration has been utilized by external facilitators such as the UNEP Post-Conflict Branch to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between Iraq and Iranian scientists and officials. This dialogue is a first in nearly three decades according to facilitator Pekka Haavisto (2005). The main beneficiaries of the marshland restoration project are the communities that participate in the pilot implementation of water, wastewater, and marshland management. The promotion of sustainable marshland management practices provides benefits of environmental protection and water management, with positive benefits for human health and sustainable livelihood of the Iraqi population. In addition, the Iraqi Ministry of Environment will receive institutional and capacity support to start addressing the marshland issues in a more integrated manner. Technical experts from line ministries and local universities will also receive technical training.
60 8.4.7 The resource paradox and vulnerability Recently, many have begun to acknowledge that there is in fact a ‘natural resource curse’ due to the relative abundance of resources. The dangers of resource wealth known as the ‘Dutch disease’ are however already known for a long time, as is the paradoxical situation. It was already stated several decades ago, that ‘to refer to a vast, valuable energy resource (which was the case with natural gas in the Netherlands) as the source of a “disease” sounds rather ungrateful’ (van Wijnbergen 1984). There is a remarkable consistency around the findings spanning several fields in the social sciences, suggesting that abundant natural wealth is a curse rather than a blessing (Auty 2001, Bulte, Damania and Deacon 2005, Collier et al. 2003, de Soysa 2005, Ross 2001).
This archetype looks at the problems related with lower economic, social, and political performance within resource rich countries that result in tremendous waste of natural assets without the commensurate human development and production of well-being to show for it. In fact, natural resource abundance may underlie the generation of vulnerability and ill-being, even resulting in violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003; de Soysa 2002). The empirical evidence for lower economic growth among resource-wealthy countries relative to resource-poor counterparts is quite numerous (Auty 2001, Lal and Mynt 1996, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Sachs and Warner 2001, Sala-I-Martin 1997) and includes both industrialised and developing countries. The ‘resource paradox’ is apparently correctable with policy, but political scientists are pessimistic about whether better policy will be forthcoming in resource wealthy countries, largely due to the fact that this situation tends to occur in authoritarian regimes (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Ross 2001). Political survival dictates profligacy and waste, rather than public goods provision, which runs down human and social capital (Bulte, Damania, and Deacon 2005, Smith 2004, Woolcock, Pritchett and Isham 2001). The empirical evidence supporting the view that the resource paradox works largely through state and political variables, particularly corruption, is quite robust, with severe consequences for human well-being and welfare (Dietz, Neumayer and de Soysa 2004, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Torvik 2002).
The resource paradox
61 The extent of the waste of natural resources can be observed by looking at the relative performance of resource wealthy countries with the resource scarce ones in terms of the accumulation of genuine savings over time. Genuine savings increase well-being because it measures the quality of growth, or the accumulation of wealth with minimum environmental degradation and maximum investment in human capital. As figure 8.18 demonstrates, resource wealthy countries seem to be the worst performers on genuine savings, a conclusion also reached by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005).
Figure 8.18 Period mean values of logged trade openness (horizontal) and genuine savings rates (vertical axis).
Developing & low resource intensity OECD Developing & high resource int ensit y
40
30
20
10
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Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being The resource paradox is a macro phenomenon because it depends much on national policies. However, the abundance of oil in such places as for example Angola has rarely benefited the local people living where oil is extracted. Local, disempowered people suffer the consequences of the break down of national politics, the violence of paramilitary groups that develop around extortion, such as in Colombia or Nigeria, and suffer the environmental harm caused by irresponsible resource extraction exemplified by such places as the Ogoniland. As many argue, local populations are ignored by national policies because resource wealth offers states income that is independent of human production. Since people are not valuable to rulers as taxpayers, state policies rarely provide public goods locally in an equitable manner, nor do they build institutions that provide public goods, particularly justice. Thus, both local and national society is bound to suffer the consequences of increasing poverty, lower levels of public goods, lower quality of government, higher risk of violence, and the overall quality of well-being.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? For example, the Chad pipeline project that allows the World Bank to manage the funds while expending certain portions of revenue on health and education minimizes the politicisation of oil rents and curbs corruption. The certification scheme that excludes ‘blood diamonds’ from the market is another measure that has helped curb the use of violence for controlling resource wealth in such places as Sierra Leone and Angola. Good institutions and governance matter most crucially. The international community may impose conditions on government that trade in commodities such as oil to increase transparency, conditions that multinational corporations already adhere to in terms of ‘publish what you pay’ schemes. Such governance mechanisms may control corruption. Resource wealth could also be earmarked for schemes that improve environmental conditions, since oil in particular is a major source of global CO2 pollution. There could be global schemes that earmark particular taxes on oil
62 extracting nations and corporations for helping develop cleaner technologies and social investment. In general, governance mechanisms, which promote greater public oversight over the deployment of resource rents, including democratisation within resource wealthy regions are desirable. Examples of where this has been done to be included in next text box.
63 8.4.8 Small Island Developing States (SIDS): Environment for development nexus This archetype looks at the vulnerability of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to climate change impacts in a broader context in which a suite of geographic, economic and social factors interplay to create disproportionate vulnerabilities for all SIDS. SIDS are dispersed in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean, Mediterranean and South China Seas and have a total population of approximately 56 million (UNEP/DEWA 2005). Small physical size and ocean-dominance, natural disaster proneness, a limited resource base, insularity and isolation, openness of economies, sensitivity to external and internal shocks, growing populations and over-exploitation of resources, less developed infrastructure and limited funds, institutional, human and technical capacity create intrinsic vulnerabilities for SIDS (FAO 2005a,b, UNEP 2005a,b,c, United Nations 2005, Pelling and Uitto 2001, IPCC 2001, Chaveriat 2000, UNEP 1999a,b,c, Briguglio 1995). SIDS
Reliance on a narrow range of climate-sensitive commodities and coastal tourism exposes island economies to the effects of natural hazards and disasters and climate change modifying temperature and rainfall regimes. SIDS are highly sensitive to the globalization and liberalization of trade, with erosion of more protectionist preferential market access for their export commodities like sugar and bananas and declines in commodity prices triggering economic volatility (FAO 1999, Josking 1998). International trading conditions are also becoming more demanding for SIDS (including bio-safety and bio-security requirements). Tourism incurs negative impacts on local ecosystems and construction in high risk areas, high extraction of water and energy and food and waste generation (McElroy 2003).
Many SIDS (especially in the Pacific region) are facing the erosion of customary resource tenure and security of land titles and the loss of traditional ecological knowledge that empowers indigenous communities in resource decision-making at the local village-level (Cinner et al. 2005, Graham and Idechong 1998; Lam 1998). Inappropriate use of hard engineering options for flood protection and coastal defence have in the past lead to mal-adaptation in various coastal locations in SIDS. SIDS need to act under a high degree of uncertainty whilst avoiding mal-adaptation. Lack of technological interventions or inappropriate use of technology may also increase the sensitivity to related risks such as high fossil fuel dependency, and low diversification in the energy sector, and less irrigation to buffer rainfall deficits for agriculture. Equity issues surround the potential displacement of people with anticipated sea level rise rendering some atoll and low-lying areas uninhabitable and limiting adaptation options within national boundaries. Some of the SIDS may lose their sovereignty if worst case scenarios of abandonment eventuate (‘environmental refugees’).
Island biodiversity is lucrative in the emerging bio-prospecting industry (Adey 2000), but indigenous peoples’ intellectual property (traditional ecological knowledge) and resource rights must be protected, in accessing and utilizing island biological resources for wisely harnessing the opportunities from bio- prospecting (Hay 2005).
Environmental Vulnerability Index for SIDS Human-induced climate variability and change coupled with existing island vulnerabilities, present an extreme scenario of the SIDS stress complex, for low-lying and micro-atoll states. SIDS like Tuvalu, have raised the profile of these vulnerabilities at the intergovernmental-level through the United Nations, questioning the moral legitimacy of industrialised nations to pollute the global commons through greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) linked to a suite of adverse impacts for SIDS. For Tuvalu, its national sovereignty and right to exist as a nation is undermined in the long-term should sea levels rise by as much as 9mm/yr (IPCC, 2001). Micro-atolls face impacts including saltwater intrusion, inundation, seawater seepages, damages to ecosystems, loss of traditional food crops & subsistence base to sustain livelihoods, repeated exposure to natural hazards like cyclones, dispossession and displacement, and malnutrition, leaving intra-island migration as the only long-term adaptation option. The limited resource base leaves few options for economic diversification and increased pressure on local resources. This presents challenges in forging a pathway towards sustainable development and improving human well-being (Hunter 2002, AusAID 2003).
64 The figure below shows the score on the Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) for SIDS.
Source: SOPAC, 2005 www.vulnerabilityindex.net/EVI_Scores_SIDS.htm The EVI was developed by the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission (SOPAC) in collaboration with UNEP and their partners (launched in 2005). See (SOPAC, 2002) for indicator related information.
Vulnerable Groups and impacts on Human Well-being SIDS are likely to incur disproportionate costs from climate variability and change (including extreme events). These costs are unequally distributed, affecting the poor and other vulnerable groups. The most vulnerable communties are in risk-prone coastal settlements with critical infrastructure and sub- standard housing and insufficient protection measures for risk reduction; people in areas with maladaptive development; atoll and low-lying island dwellers; subsistence-based communities with natural resource insecurities; climate-dependant subsistence and commercial farmers; communities reliant on risk-prone lucrative coastal tourism and public utilities (FAO 2004 and 2005a, UNICEF 2004, Nurse and Rawleston 2005, Pelling and Uitto 2001).
Adverse effects of hydrometeorologically-induced natural disasters, slow onset climate change and sea level rise, coastal inundation and erosion, land loss and subsidence, sanlinisation of the coastal groundwater lens via seawater encroachment, shifts in climatology (particularly rainfall and temperature regimes), shifts in species ranges (e.g. migratory tuna stocks in the Pacific), create risks and insecurities at various spatial and temporal scales for human well-being in vulnerable island communities and sectors (UNEPa,b,c 2005, IPCC 2001, Tompkins et al. 2005). For instance, the cumulative damage from natural disasters as a share of 1998 GDP was 43.3 percent (Charveriat 2000). In 2004 alone, in the Caribbean, around 2,000 people were killed due to hurricanes, with Haiti experiencing the most loss of life, mainly due to inadequate early warning systems (International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005). Emergency-type impacts such as loss of life, post disaster displacement and dispossession, loss of livelihoods, increased water/vector-borne disease potentials, increased damage potential to the built environment (Lewsey and Kruse 2004) and utilities and disruptions to basic services; through to cumulative effects on ecosystems, loss of access to traditional primary resources and declines in agricultural commodities/fisheries which trigger economic volatility and insecurity at the national-level are prevalent (UNEP a,b,c, 2005, Koshy, Lal and Mataki 2005, Hay et al. 2004, International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2005).
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? Policy responses include mitigation and adaptation to impacts of climate change. Mitigation measures such 1) cleaner fuels through fuel substitution and alternative/renewable energy harnessing, 3) Forestry mechanisms – tree planting including urban and village environments, as well as indigenous and exotic commercial forests. Clean Development Mechanisms in projects for renewable energy should be promoted, as part of the overall strategy for islands.
65 Planned anticipatory adaptation will be critical in enhancing the adaptive capacity of SIDS at all levels and scales. Indigenous and imported adaptation options are already being used in SIDS and national- level adaptation strategies will be needed to outline policy direction for appropriate options to be utilised in various sectors, communities and localities. Alternative livelihoods through education and training will potentially ease the pressure on over-exploitation of natural resources in some localities. Climate change adaptation oriented policy opportunities include Integrated Coastal Zone Management, coastal retreat, accommodation, bio-engineered systems, and traditional indigenous approaches to coastal protection in response to sea level rise; avoiding mal-adaptive developments in risk-prone coastal areas; improving epidemic preparedness and response in post-disaster situations; promotion of agro-forestry initiatives in coastal resilience-building; continued research for crop diversification and crop development. Water resource policy opportunities include the promotion of alternative water supply through expansion of rainwater harvesting and desalinisation, particularly on low islands, atoll and outlying areas without adequate freshwater; flood control through reforestation and soil conservation and channel diversion. Empowering community-based action for disaster preparedness and response and resource management/conservation, show indications of being more effective in protecting people and resources and should be promoted.
Re-instating the use of traditional food preservation and water collection techniques where appropriate will improve food security in rural and outlying areas (e.g. burying and smoking food for use in drought periods, and the use of resistant root crop species). Traditional building materials and designs to reduce infrastructure damage and loss through natural hazards and disasters; incorporating Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in conservation and resource management; and harnessing renewable resources like bio-fuels (e.g. bagasse), wind, solar, hydro potential for energy diversification in SIDS. Good practices must also be followed for the transfer and uptake of environmentally sound and appropriate technology to SIDS. Impact, Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessments need to be mainstreamed into development activities and national policy and planning- levels. Adaptation options will need to be developed to suit the environments and communities that they are targeted towards. (Hay et al., 2003; IPCC, 2001; Tompkins et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2000; Reilly and Schimmelpfennig, 2000; International Federation for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005).
Twinning Marine Protection & Resource Replenishment in Community-based Conservation Fiji The Fiji Locally Managed Marine Areas Network (FLMMA) launched an initiative that saw close to 10 percent of the local coastline in Verata, Fiji being strategically set aside as traditional ’no-take’ Qoliqoli (Customary Fishing Areas) for marine stock replenishment with local communities. In seven years, local clam populations increased 24-fold and fish catch has improved with a ten-year ban on gillnet fishing. This is an example of a planned adaptation response that is also a measure for the sustainable development coastal marine resources. Without such measures, stresses to ecosystems from selective over-exploitation of reef and inshore fishes along with cumulative changes to ecosystems through climate change related sea surface temperature changes and sea level rise, may exacerbate vulnerability of these ecosystems
66 8.4.9 Technological fixes of water problems This archetype refers to vulnerability induced by the bad management or failure of centrally planned, large-scale projects involving deliberate reshaping of the natural environment. Important examples are irrigation and drainage schemes, and the canalization and diversion of rivers, and dams. Such projects have two possible effects: on the one hand, they provide the additional resources that are needed (water for food security, renewable energy), or they protect existing resources (flood control); on the other, they have severe impacts on the environment and society. The inadequate consideration that is often given to social and ecological impacts results from the technical bias of many planners and their inability to assess and control the effects of a given project. This is further compounded by the frequently one-sided interests of decision-makers with respect to the prevailing technology-centred development paradigm.
In the course of the 20th century, major irrigation schemes and new, multifunctional megadams have been having severe impacts on water resources. The number of dams over 15 meters in height has risen to around 40,000 since 1950; each day, a new dam is put into operation (after ICOLD, 1998). The effects of these large-scale installations are rarely confined to the local or regional area, but can assume far reaching and even international proportions. The negative consequences include not only the direct interference with the water and sediment balance of the catchments and the resulting impacts on the natural systems to which they are coupled. The total area of reservoirs worldwide is around 400,000 km2. Dams are a major influence on the runoff regime: 77 percent of all runoff in North America, Europe and the former USSR is diverted by dams or other large-scale water resource development projects (Dynesius and Nilsson 1994).The scale of interference with the balance of nature is evident from the fact that the total volume stored in reservoirs (10,000 km3) is five times that found in all the world’s rivers. The cumulative influence of reservoirs due to the redistribution of mass has even become a measurable factor causing geodynamic changes in the Earth’s rotation and polar drift (Chao 1995). Consideration must also be given to the social consequences, which may range from resettlement of the local population, to intensification of economic disparities, to domestic and international conflicts (McCully 1996, Pearce 1992, Goldsmith and Hildyard 1984). According to estimates (WCD, 2000), around 40–80 million people have been forced to leave their homes since 1950 to date because of dam projects, and most of them are in a worse situation after forced resettlement than before, some catastrophically worse.
Areas prone to technological fixes for water problems This archetype occurs world-wide. Important examples for this archetype are the planned Ebro water scheme in Spain, large scale water management schemes in the SW of the USA, the Narmada river in India, the Nile river and the Three Gorges Dam project in China.
Figure 8.19 Spatial distribution of the Archetype for about 1990
67 qualitative measure for the degree of vulnerability (after WBGU, 1997). The triangles indicate borders between countries where the danger of international water conflicts is high. The circles indicate coastal ecosystems which are endangered by upstream water regulations.
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being Nowadays, mega-dams are typically built in remote areas of developing countries. The integration of such peripheral regions in the world market through dam projects leads to an extensive transformation in social conditions for the indigenous population, which in most cases exhibits traditional forms of social organization. In the eyes of the local population land, nature and the Earth have a completely different value from that perceived by planners, be they government representatives or employees of multinational corporations. Forced resettlement, the lack of participation in planning, decision-making and above all in the benefits of the projects are factors that may turn the local population into marginalized victims of development (as exemplified by many drastic cases in India and China). The distribution of the benefits gained from dam construction (power generation, irrigated agriculture) is very uneven and reinforces the trend towards the widening of social and economic disparities (poverty). Tensions may build up as a result, which can escalate into a national conflict (Bächler et al., 1996). Environmental consequences are health hazards in the form of water-based vectors (e.g. malaria, schistosomiasis).
The construction of technological fixes against water stress affects different groups in society through, for example, resettlement schemes, changed access to water or induced changes in lifestyle when external user rights are imposed on traditional societies. While in industrialised countries the overall burden of high investment costs is partly carried by society at large, the negative consequences are often disproportionately borne in developing countries. There, communities which are marginalised in political, economic or ecological terms, are most likely to be affected. These are often rural communities e.g. small-scale farmers, poor and indigenous people who are less integrated in decision making processes.Gender is an important factor in addressing water problems because women belong to less empowered social groups in many societies. For example, when large-scale extraction depletes ground-water, water purchase from open wells, mostly done by women, may become more time- consuming, especially when distance to viable wells increases. This potentially reduces other options to adapt to water stress.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? Well-planned water regulation may reduce poverty significantly as water is a limiting resource for, e.g., agricultural production - here mainly distributional aspects have to be given much more attention. The same holds for flood control, which is directly related to the health cross cutting issue: planned well, water regulation may save many lives - the opposite occurs if poorly planned (in technical and organizational terms, see the flooding of New Orleans 2005). Here the role of government and institutions comes in: governments have to correct their technology-centered development paradigm and consider a broader range of alternatives to conventional large scale solutions. Trade and globalization offer opportunities with respect to such alternatives: import of “virtual water” via food imports may substitute for irrigation water consumption in arid regions and thereby reduce the necessity to intervene massively in local natural water regimes. Science and technology may also contribute to water consumption savings and, on the other hand, provide a broader range of adapted water regulation technologies on all scales. With respect to conflict and cooperation international water regulations appeared as rather stable institutions - even under high international tensions. This is a hint that water regulation issues may foster international cooperation.
Substituting large scale water projects by using the environment To reduce vulnerability to water problems, the functions of large scale water projects such as (a) flood regulation, (b) water supply (mainly for irrigation) and (c) electric power generation can be fulfilled by alternative measures that avoid the negative ecological and socio-economic side-effects described so far. With respect to flood regulation, water retention by forests and flood plains are natural
68 mechanisms that can substitute - at least to a certain extent - the building of large dams and dikes. So the conservation (or even establishment) of forest areas on slopes and retention zones in flood plains keeps natural mechanisms of flood control operative and reduces thereby the vulnerability produced by centrally planned large scale schemes. To justify such adaptations of human activities to the natural conditions, the latter must be sufficiently stable. The anthropogenic greenhouse-effect, which will probably generate considerable shifts in rainfall regimes in short time scales of several decades (IPCC 2001), makes such a strategy much more difficult. So stabilizing the climate by reducing CO2- emisions conserves natural conditions, which reduces vulnerability to water shortages or floods. A further interesting alternative to large reservoirs with respect to irrigation is micro-catchment management. Here the principle idea is not to first highly concentrate the resource (in one reservoir) and then to redistribute it again, but to use the natural runoff regime directly in a decentralized way. A good example are the water harvesting techniques used in Tunisia, consisting of terraces, tabias, cisterns, gabions, recharge wells and mescats ("jessour"). These decentralized techniques allow for the cultivation of oil trees in arid zones while contributing to soil conservation and even amelioration. Furthermore the efficient control of sediment flow reduces the danger of flood events downstream (Schiettecatte 2005). In many cases where the large dam option was chosen such alternatives are technically possible and from the socio-economic perspective advantageous but they contradict the central planning paradigm. The latter is also the reason for the widespread ignorance against distributed power generation options - in particular with respect to renewable sources.
69 8.4.10 Urbanisation of the coastal fringe: balancing environmental risks and economic opportunities This archetype looks at the challenges for sustainable development that arise from rapid coastal urbanization in the context of increasing vulnerabilities to climate and weather-related hazards and climate change in often ecologically sensitive coastal areas. During the last few decades many of the world’s coastal areas have experienced significant, and in part, extremely rapid social, economic and environmental changes as a result of population growth, urbanisation, migration to the coast, and rapid economic growth. Whilst urbanisation is a global phenomenon, the general tendency for people to migrate towards the coast means that it is particularly coastal urban centres that contain an increasingly large proportion of the world’s population. The current average population density in coastal areas is 80 people per km2, twice the global average (UNEP 2005). 21 of the world’s 33 megacities are located in coastal zones and only six are not situated in developing countries (Klein et al. 2003). Of the 21 largest megacities, only four are not located at the coast.
The large concentrations of people, physical infrastructure and economic activities put a considerable burden on ecologically sensitive coastal environments. The deterioration of natural resources takes many forms: coastal ecosystems are damaged or destroyed through clearing, land reclamation, aquaculture, mining, dredging, rubbish dumping and pollution. Hydrological modifications and the construction of coastal infrastructure affect sedimentation patterns and frequently lead to land loss, which in turn may increase the risk of flooding to urban areas (e.g. New Orleans; Boesch et al., 1994). Land claim of inter-tidal areas and the deepening of navigation channels often increase extreme water levels and hence flood-risk (e.g., London; Kelly, 1991). Groundwater withdrawal has resulted in large- scale subsidence in many large coastal cities, particularly those in deltaic settings in Asia (Nicholls, 1995).
Urbanisation and coastal hazards A city’s geographical location and terrain are decisive factors for it’s exposure to natural hazards (Munich Re, 2004). Many large cities originated at coastal or riverine locations due to favourable transport and trade connections. Initial settlements were mostly confined to safe areas but a significant proportion of subsequent development has been ocurring in areas that are highly exposed to coastal hazards such as storms, hurricanes, erosion, flooding, and salinisation of surface waters (Klein et al., 2003).
The large populations in many coastal areas around the world are, to a greater or lesser extent, vulnerable to weather-related hazards. Some hazards can affect the entire terrestrial landscape, such as drought, river flooding, and poor air quality enhanced by stagnant air masses and inversion. Other weather-related hazards are more specific to coastal locations. Datasets on extreme events show that the impacts of climate-related natural hazards are increasing around the world (EM-DAT; Munich Re NatCat Service, 2004) and that the loss potential from natural hazards is increasingly dominated by megacities (Munich Re, 2004). Hydro-meteorological disasters, particularly floods, were the most frequent natural disasters between 1992 and 2001, killing nearly 100,000 and affecting more than 1.2 billion people. Annual economic losses from extreme events increased tenfold between the 1950s and 1990s (EM-DAT; Munich Re). The increasing socio-economic impacts of climate-related disasters on urban areas reflects two major global trends: one is the increasingly high concentration of people and material assets in highly exposed locations such as coastal areas and flood plains, the other is an increase in the frequency and intensity of climate and weather-related hazards (IPCC 2001). Other factors contributing to increased flood risk at the local level include land claim of intertidal areas, the deepening of channels for navigation, and large-scale groundwater withdrawal (Boesch et al., 1994; Nicholls, 1995). Human-induced climate change and sea-level rise are increasing the risk of weather- related hazards in coastal zones. Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate current vulnerabilities of coastal urban centres through increasing coastal erosion, more frequent and severe flooding, the inundation and displacment of wetlands and lowlands, and an increase in the salinity of estuaries and freshwater aquifers (Nicholls, 2002; Bijlsma et al., 1996). Whilst our understanding of global patterns and impacts of climate change is improving, the exact consequences of climate change at the local scale remain unclear. This uncertainty presents a challenge to urban planning and decision-making as
70 existing experience of weather-related hazards will cease to be a guide to future events (Klein et al., 2003).
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being The scale and speed of urbanisation presents significant challenges for sustainable development and human well-being as increasing requirements for energy, natural resources and food lead to pollution, land degradation and the loss of biodiversity.
In many large urban centres in developing countries the provision of essential resources and services such as clean drinking water, sanitation, transport, affordable housing and health care facilities is problematic because of the large and increasing influx of migrants and the severe constraints on financial and institutional capacities for integrated urban planning. Most of these migrants are poor and as a result of the lack of affordable housing options, people establish informal settlements on their own, often in areas that are highly exposed to natural and human-made hazards, such as unstable hillsides, flood plains, contaminated land sites and rubbish dumps, or in areas undesirable for other reasons, e.g. along major roads, highways and train lines. Housing standards are often extremely poor because, as illegal settlements, there are neither effective controls nor any incentive for people to improve their own housing conditions. It is estimated that of the almost one billion poor people in the world, over 750 million live in urban areas without adequate shelter and basic services (UN Habitat 2005).
As development continues to push further into previously rural areas, competition for land for different uses, such as infrastructure, commercial, residential development increases, pushing up land prices to such an extent that the poorer people have no choice but to give up their livelihood or migrate. In some cases people are forced to sell land and property by the authorities to make way for large-scale development. Property rights and regulations over access to natural resources and ecosystem services are frequently unclear and policies to maximise the economic benefits of natural resource exploitation are often designed in a way that benefits large industrial co-operations and disadvantages the poor.
In general there is a strong positive link between national urbanisation and national levels of human development (UNCHS, 2002). Urban areas tend to perform better than rural areas in most areas of economic development (e.g. innovation, demographic transition, education, health, life expectancy, infant mortality, and access to clean water and sanitation) (Hertzman and Siddiqi, 2000; Sachs, 2003).
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? Urban centres are the nexus of economic growth and the gateways to the world's economy. The World Bank (2002) estimated that in poor countries as much as 80 percent of future economic growth will occur in cities. In some countries, a single city generates a large percentage of the national GDP: Bangkok produces nearly 40 percent in Thailand, São Paulo 36 percent in Brazil, and Lima 43 percent in Peru (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al., 2005). The economic growth in turn drives population growth in cities through rural-urban migration.
Many of the challenges associated with urbanisation are the result of a lack of integrated environmental and urban planning. Because the per capita cost for infrastructure and service development is lower in urban areas with high population densities, large cities have the opportunity to develop holistic integrated approaches for environmental management, energy use, land use planning, infrastructure development, and economic growth in order to achieve greater sustainability. In many cases, policies for more sustainable patterns of urbanisation are either non-existent or not implemented. Short-sighted concessions for economic gain, weak institutions and corruption are major factors in the proliferation of planning “oversights”, “exceptions” and other forms of inappropriate development in urban areas all over the world. Policies governing property rights and access to natural
71 resources and ecosystem services are frequently biased to the disadvantage the poor. Institutions need to be created which represent and uphold the concerns and rights of the poor.
Major environmental concerns such as natural hazards and climate change will increasingly require the integration of appropriate risk reduction and adaptation strategies with existing sectoral policies in areas such as urban planning, disaster management, integrated coastal zone management and health care planning. Specific policy recommendations to reduce vulnerability to coastal disasters include the designation of coastal hazard zones, setback requirements and limited future development in high risk coastal areas, as well as education and awareness building and community-based risk management programmes.
Urbanisation in China China has the largest urban population in the world and continues to urbanise rapidly. The speed and scale of China’s urbanisation is unprecedented in the world. If the current trends continue, China will reach an urbanisation rate of 75 percent by mid-century, which translates to a 10 to 12 million annual rural-urban migration flow in the coming 45 years, and an urban population of about 1.1 billion in 2050 (CAS 2005).
There are many concerns about the environmental impact of China's rapid urbanization, particularly in the country’s coastal areas. China’s narrow and ecologically sensitive coastal zones are already far more densely populated and urbanised than those in most parts of the world, with serious adverse environmental consequences. The coastal zone accounts for 2.5 percent of China’s land area, and contains 14 percent of its 1.3 billion population. But what is truly exceptional is that an estimated 19 percent of the land in the coastal zone is already urban, with urban densities averaging 2,300 people per square kilometer, more than double of the world average (McGrananhan and Tacoli 2005). Even in rural areas population density is estimated at 400 people per square kilometre, reflecting what has been termed in situ urbanization or peri-urbanization (Webster and Muller 2002, Zhu 2004), or alternatively rural industrialization. In the foreseeable future, China’s coastal provinces will remain to be the main destination for inter-provincial migrants, as employment opportunities tend to concentrate in coastal centres well connected to external markets. China’s choice of urbanisation path will potentially have far-reaching domestic and global consequences. Unfortunately, long-term environmental considerations rarely play an important role in the economic success of different regions and urban locations (McGranahan and Tacoli 2005).
Source: China Council on International Cooperation on Environment and Development Task Force on Sustainable Urbanisation Strategies (CCICED SUSTF, 2005).
72 8.4.11 Vulnerability of energy production and consumption systems in industrialised countries: the next energy crises? Energy is a key factor for human and economic development. It is also the main cause of many environmental problems. Making energy production and consumption systems more sustainable, is therefore key in mitigating many environmental problems on different scales. The official focus of energy policy in most countries is to provide reliable, safe and affordable energy for everyone. Traditional risks are in general well taken care of in industrialised countries. However new risks are emerging and some already well-known risks (as experienced already during the oil crises in the 70s) are becoming relevant again.
The vulnerability of energy production and consumption systems in industrialised countries is determined by a combination of multiple stresses. These include increasing energy demand in industrialised countries, while their reserves are decreasing and dependency on energy imports have increased over the last 30 years. Furthermore the natural resource base for energy production (especially oil and gas) may increasingly become critical, although perhaps not to be felt over the coming 2-3 decades (IEA 2005). Security of energy supply is being threatened as a consequence of increasing competition for resources that are becoming scarcer, geo-political tensions and a current lack of production capacity. As a consequence of liberalisation processes and deregulation the energy sector is facing new uncertainties. The internal market in Europe had reportedly two opposing effects. First, it has improved the overall efficiency of the energy system. Second, however, it has made investments which require large capital input or which have long pay back times, less attractive (European Commission 2001a, b). The production of energy may furthermore become increasingly impacted by (extreme) weather events as a result of climate change (IPCC 2001 and text box on the impacts of the European heath wave 2003). The greenhouse gas emissions from energy production and consumption will need to be reduced over the coming years (if for instance EU long term climate targets of limiting temperature change to 2 degrees are to be achieved). Since about 80 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions in the EU are energy related (EU 15, in 2002), this will require a dramatic change towards low greenhouse gas emitting production and consumption systems (EEA 2005).
The focus of this archetype is on the ability (or lack thereof) of the energy production and consumption systems in industrialised countries to fulfil (increasing) energy demand in a changing context of energy supply security, liberalisation and privatisation of the sector, and impacts of climate change and requirements to contribute to mitigation. These problems require new answers. As a consequence of the long response times, inertia and lock-in effects in energy production and consumption systems, their adaptive capacity is limited and responses can at the end of the day be too little and/or too late. The robustness of the energy system to change and shocks implies both a good and bad thing in this archetype, as at the one hand robustness is a necessary requirement for a reliable energy provision, at the other hand it may hinder system changes that are necessary to deal with a changing context. In that sense this archetype is about institutional determinants of vulnerability. This type of problem is also applicable for transport and the water sector in industrialized countries or urban infrastructure, where system changes are required, because incremental/end-of-pipe solutions are not going to be enough (“the low hanging fruits have been picked”).
The European 2003 heat wave and impacts on energy production and consumption The summer of 2003 was one of the hottest in European history. It might be an exemplary situation that might occur more often under future climate changes (EEA 2005) and showed the vulnerability of the energy production sector in Europe (Boogert and Dupont 2005, ECN 2004, Steetskamp and van Wijk 1994). During the summer of 2003, as a consequence of increased energy demand for cooling (air conditioners, refrigerators etc.) in combination with problems on the supply side, energy supply was threatened. Electricity production was constrained by low water levels in rivers and high temperatures of river water that limited the intake of cooling water. Because environmental regulation sets limits on the temperature and temperature increase of the discharged water, power producers actually had to limit their production. As a consequence in France, Germany and the Netherlands, for example, public warnings were issued by the authorities responsible for the transmission of electricity
73 indicating critical situations with respect to the level of power reserves and the speed these can be brought into the grid. Power plants across Europe got permission to discharge water at higher levels than their permits allowed them to. Also hydropower plants experienced the consequences of droughts. Hydro makes up a significant percentage (ca. 20 percent) of the total installed capacity for electricity generation in Europe, especially in Scandinavia, Scotland and Southern and Eastern Europe.
Some other events also indicate that the vulnerability of the energy production and consumption system in Europe does not stand on its own. The starting point of the Californian Energy crises in 2001 is reported to be droughts in the Pacific North-West which reduced the imports of hydro electricity on which the state depends; Black Thursday in the US (August 14, 2003) had a number of causes including the high energy peak demand as a consequence of high temperatures; Hurricane Katrina hindered the production of oil in the Gulf of Mexico; Power shortages were a consequence of the combination of high temperatures and less rainfall in South and Eastern part of China and increased demand in 2003 (China Daily 120703).
Vulnerable groups and impacts on human well-being Lack of access to (modern) energy services hinders people from meeting their basic material needs, it limits enterprise development and results in lower productivity and hence less scope for economic development. Moreover the functioning of crucial public services, such as health care, education and transportation, are severely hampered by the lack of sufficient and reliable energy. A lack of access to affordable and clean energy hinders the possibilities to fulfil basic human needs, has a negative impact on human health and personal security and limits individual freedom choice and action.
Emissions from the use of fossil fuels, especially particulate matter coming from the transport sector, have a negative health impact on the population. Currently the use of fossil fuels in Europe is responsible for … percent of air pollution, causing a third of the environment related DALY losses. In the longer term also a number of health impacts can be expected from climate change (IPCC 2001).
Security of supply problems will be manifested by higher and volatile energy prices and the economic losses resulting from that. In OECD countries an increase of 10U$ per barrel will result in 0.4 percent GNP losses in the short term (IEA 2004). Although the share of costs for energy in household budgets has gone down in industrialised countries over the last 20 years, increased energy prices for households as a consequence of the rise in prices of fossil fuels on the world market and climate change mitigation, may increasingly become a problem for lower income groups in industrialised countries. For developing countries without fossil fuel reserves the security of supply is an even more pressing problem that often hits the poorer parts of the population (especially in rural areas). Macro- economic losses as a consequence of higher oil prices are considerable (WorldBank/IEA estimates are in the order of 1-2 percent GDP loss per 10 U$ rise per barrel), on the supply of energy for their economies makes large parts of the world population to a certain extent vulnerable if supply problems are to occur. Many of the risks in this archetype are also about risks for future generations. From a sustainable development perspective the needs of future generations have to be included. If industrialised countries are using up fossil fuel reserves without creating new and sustainable energy system in time, causing irreversible climate change and irreversible environmental change (e.g. melting of permafrost, sea-level rise, etc) life support system of the planet are not left intact for future generations.
Opportunities the environment offers to reduce vulnerability and improve human well-being? The health situation can be improved through options that are also beneficial from a climate change perspective and help to improve energy security of supply, such as fuel switch to low carbon, renewable energy and efficiency improvements (Bakker et al. 2004).
Although this archetype started with a focus on industrialised countries, it is useful to make the link to the energy situation in developing countries. By combining the interests of the industrialised countries and improving the energy situation in developing countries, new possibilities for global cooperation
74 may be found. Large new investments will be made in energy over the coming 20 years (IEA 2003) and it will be important to guide this in a more sustainable direction.
Regional energy integration is increasingly seen as an opportunity for economic and environmental benefits for individual countries and the region they are part of. The reason for this is that the geography of energy supply options does not necessarily correspond to political borders, the cleanest and cheapest energy source may lie across national borders; national markets may be too small to justify investments needed and cross-border supply often provides diversification of energy sources – needed from an energy security perspective. Regional energy integration can help to improve security of supply, improve economic efficiency, enhance environmental quality and to develop renewable resources. The first two factors have been the driving force between much of the interconnectedness and regional energy trading throughout the world. Increasingly the potential for improving the environment is realised as well. Currently a large number of potential projects and programmes for energy collaboration are in the pipeline throughout the countries in transition and the developing world (Dorian et al. 1998, Graeber et al. 2005, Yu et al. 2003; WEC 2005)
Benefits of regional energy cooperation The table below shows the possible benefits of South-Asia Regional Cooperation (cumulative for period 2010-30) (Shukla et al. 2003).
Graeber et al. (2005) find for Southern Africa that, from a financial perspective, optimizing generation and transmission investments in the region would result in savings of $2–4 billion over 20 years, or 5 percent of total system costs. Introducing a tax based on the external damage costs of carbon dioxide as part of the decision-making process would result in moderate increases in financial costs (15–20 percent), but would reduce regional carbon emissions by up to 55 percent at a mitigation cost of $11 per tonne of carbon dioxide. This raises the possibility of financing regional power projects with Clean Development Mechanism funding.
75 8.5 Policy Opportunities
This section examines opportunities for improving human well-being and reducing the vulnerability of human-environment systems to environmental and socio-economic change. We define the term policy to include any form of intervention or societal response. This includes not only statements of intent or policy statements and resolutions, but also other forms of intervention such as the use of economic instruments, market creation, subsidies, institutional reform, legal reform, and institutional development. When such an intervention is enforced from the state, it is taken to denote public policy. The realm of policy, thus, is wider than that of public policy.
Policy is analysed through six cross-cutting themes– institutions and governance, poverty, health, trade, environmental conflict and cooperation, and science and technology. Each of these is taken to be an area of policy formulation and/or implementation. These are seen as potential entry points for improving human well-being.
8.5.1 Governance and institutions Governance is increasingly used to describe the efforts societies make to ‘manage their common affairs’ including exercising control over natural resources and responding to environmental problems. A range of actors are or can be involved in governance, from local and national governments, intergovernmental organizations to civil society groups and corporations. Institutions are those regularized patterns of interaction by which society organizes itself. The term includes the rules, practices and conventions that structure human interaction, formal (explicit, written, often having the sanction of the state) or informal (unwritten, implied, tacit, mutually agreed and accepted).
Improving human well-being is often considered to be at the heart of societies’ aspirations and an explicit goal of governance. And yet it is existing institutions and governance that have also contributed to the current patterns of vulnerability of human-environment systems around the world. Examples from the archetypes include poorly defined water and land rights and international institutions that prevent farmers’ access to global markets in drylands, and the concentration of power and governance focused on private gain rather than public goods in resource rich countries. Sometimes appropriate institutions to protect the environment exist but are not enforced due to lack of will or capacity, such as in post-conflict situations.
These negative impacts of governance reflect the existence of a range of conflicting goals and trade- offs — intentional and unintentional — in governance and a multitude of institutions with widely diverging incentives for behavioural change. Incongruence of interests of the range of actors often contributes to institutional failure. The major challenge for governance is to address situations in which the pursuit of well-being for individuals or certain subgroups infringes on the well-being and vulnerability of other people alive today or in the future. Governments are the primary actors that make decisions on these trade-offs but all actors can cooperate in the search for turning trade-offs to mutual benefits. Certain aspects of well-being such as education, culture and better social relations can be pursued indefinitely without major concern for negative impacts on others and in many cases they should have positive impact on others’ wellbeing. However, other aspects of well-being, such as certain types of consumption of natural resources and other ecosystem services, quickly affect the ability of other people to achieve well-being and reduce vulnerability. It is in this context that governance becomes central to the mediation of societal concerns.
Opportunities for mainstreaming the environment in governance and institutions
Governance is increasingly a multi-stakeholder, multi-level and multi-sectoral process. This becomes clear from the four trends in governance discussed in Section 3. These trends in part reflect increasingly complex drivers, stressors and impacts of environmental degradation spanning across spatial and temporal scales. Together this results in new forms of complexity in human-environment interactions, which raise a set of new questions for policymaking and research. Central themes that 76 have emerged are the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and the role of institutions. These two themes are the focus here.
Legitimate governance in process and outcome There are many purely normative arguments raised for more legitimacy in governance and they are usually linked to aspects of democracy and justice, which in turn are intimately linked to human well- being, particularly to the components of good social relations and freedom and choice. The concept of legitimacy and related components of ‘good governance’ have been the subject of extensive political debate and academic analysis (Bodansky 1999; Scharpf 2001; Frickel and Davidson 2004; Howse and Nicolaidis 2003). Legitimacy concerns the degree to which governance is recognized and accepted, which often is closely linked to the process through which decisions are made (input legitimacy) and the impact they have (output legitimacy). These two dimensions of legitimacy are also composed of many elements. The focus here is on two of the central ones, for input legitimacy the role of participation in the process of governance and for output legitimacy the degree of equity in its outcome.
Increasing the participation of a set of stakeholder groups beyond government in the actual process of governance has been considered a key aspect of increasing legitimacy. At the global level the argument for this is linked to the particular character of governance without a world government, where many perceive a considerable democratic deficit compared to governance within nation states. But also at the national level there are many actors who feel their views are not channelled through political parties. At the local level participation becomes intimately linked to empowerment of citizens to be part of a democratic process for issues that concern their vulnerability and well-being. Participation can take place in various stages of the governance process; agenda-setting, deliberations, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Increased participation can sometimes be isolated experiments but in more and more cases it is made permanent by modifying those institutions that set the rules for the governance process. The Rio Conference (UNCED) provided the basic institutional change for this development of increasing participation in environment related decision-making through Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, now commonly called the ‘access principle’. This has been echoed, for example, in the Aarhus Convention (reference).
In the earlier phases of governance where agendas are formed, and deliberations on compromises made, the participation of stakeholder groups may allow a stronger voice to be raised from those groups who are most vulnerable in society and whose understanding, concerns and priorities seldom reach decision-makers. Having the opportunity to express one’s concerns is a part of the freedom component of well-being. More opportunities for face to face interactions contribute to improving social relations through cooperation and trust building. For example, in governance of local common pool resources research has shown how some mutual experience and communication can lead to a cooperative outcome rather than a mutually destructive one (McCay and Jentoft 1998). In these respects participation should be positive. However, this depends on the quality of participation. The examples of innovative efforts to increase participation in formal governance processes described in Section 3 have had considerable limitations. One limitation is that it is still primarily representatives of Northern — and sometimes Southern — elites who participate at the global level. Lack of capacity and resources pose obstacles. At national and local levels the same pattern of biased representation from certain groups with more access to resources is equally possible.
At all levels it is also an issue of which groups, if any, are invited to the table. While the nine major groups cover a broad spectrum of stakeholders, there are still those who feel excluded, such as educators, but efforts to add more major groups to the list in the WSSD negotiations were not successful. Another limitation is the extent to which the new voices are listened to by governments, which has been a recurring complaint for example in the multistakeholder dialogues at the global level (IISD 2002; Hiblin, Dodds, and Middleton 2002; Consensus Building Institute 2002). Having a voice without being listened to can lead to greater estrangement. In other cases there is nobody listening because of the distance between stakeholders who are linked together through the processes of globalisation, as illustrated in the global market archetype. A third and related limitation is the degree to which participation has an impact on actual outcome. This is very difficult to assess (Consensus
77 Building Institute 2002). Many NGOs ignore these official participation opportunities and there is a widening split between NGOs who engage with other stakeholders and those who do not (Hemmati 2002).
Participants have the potential to be more influential when they are part of direct decision-making and the shaping of response and are not simply following policies developed by others. This is less common but it occurs for example after the devolution of power over certain natural resources to local communities and user groups. Institutional reform through the building of local institutions has the potential for improving livelihoods, well-being and alleviating poverty by improving people’s control over natural resources. However, in many efforts at institutional reform, what has primarily happened is decentralization, in terms of creating management responsibility with users. Devolution, in terms of a change in control relationships between the state and the users, has been much more difficult to accomplish (Jeffrey and Sunder 2000; Narain 2003 Lele 2000). An important subject, for instance, in debates on irrigation management transfer is whether the formation of user groups for water leads to the creation of mutual accountability relationships between the state and the users, or whether user groups remain essentially arms of the bureaucracy (Narain 2000, Mollinga 2001). Participation in decision-making also happens at smaller scales at the project level when different types of actors take action together through various forms of partnerships.
The second aspect of legitimacy is the legitimacy in the outcome of governance, referred to by some as output legitimacy (van Kersbergen and Waarden 2004). There is very little equity or justice in who is vulnerable to environmental change. The archetypes of vulnerability show that it is those who are already marginalised in society that are most vulnerable and this includes particularly women and children, clearly illustrated in the contaminated sites and SIDS archetypes. While there are some aspects of environmental degradation that affect people indiscriminately, the extensive literature on environmental justice has shown that the poor and marginalised are hit hardest by the degrading environment.
Most governance efforts have obviously failed to address these inequities, most institutions tend to preserve status quo. Furthermore, environmental governance confronts perhaps the largest challenge of equity among all issue areas as it involves also providing equity for future generations. There are two major approaches that governance could take to improve output legitimacy in relation to vulnerability and environment. Firstly, it can aim to address certain components of vulnerability among the most vulnerable groups. This can include changing laws and regulations which reduce their exposure to environmental hazards, establishing early warning systems that work for these groups etc. Secondly, governance can aim to address the root causes of inequity. This can include a focus on poverty reduction strategies, education, health, employment etc. Such measures at the national level can be supported by appropriate use of the revenues from natural resources. The resource paradox archetype shows the wider negative consequences for society when wealth in the form of natural resources is concentrated in the hands of a few and not used for the welfare of the whole population. Many of the measures to devolve the management of natural resources to local communities and user groups aim to decrease inequity but this cannot be guaranteed. While the objectives of decentralization are to widen the net of civil society participation, it often has led to the strengthening of existing power structures and elite capture (Jeffrey and Sunder 2000; Mollinga, Doraiswamy, and Engbersen 2001; Narain 2003).
Institutional reform for poverty alleviation in the drylands Half the population of the world lives below the poverty line in dryland areas (MEA 2005). Addressing the issues of environmental change and poverty eradication in drylands is therefore central to the achievement of the MDGs. Enabling policies and institutions that reinforce and strengthen the capacity of local communities to cope with change are critical. A range of interventions including access to soft credit and capital, increased access to transport and market infrastructure are essential. At the same time perverse policy and governance interventions, like forced sedentrization of nomadic pastoral communities, who have traditionally used their migration to cope with ecological change need to be addressed.
78 Building institutions and providing know-how to promote alternative livelihood strategies offer new opportunities for dryland communities. For example, drylands often have sparsely inhabited pristine areas which can be promoted for tourism related activities. Broader economic policies and institutions that promote the development of new and well planned urban centres in drylands can also help relieve the pressure on dryland ecosystems and promote coping and adaptation. Fragmented and overly centralised land and water management policies do not support the participation of local and community based institutions in land and water use decisions.
Lack of access to technology, credit and capital for sustainable land use and generation of alternative livelihoods at the local level diminishes coping capacity.
Faulty land tenure policies and inadequate water rights create a disincentive for sustainable use of the resources and reduce the ability of communities and household to manage their resources and adapt to changes. Women are often discriminated against under land ownership regulations despite their important role in generating livelihoods. Opportunities for products from dryland developing countries to have access to international markets are required.
The institutional foundation for equity and justice in relation to the environment is relatively weak at global level and often at national levels. The Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration includes access to justice in environmental decision-making particularly but research on its implementation shows that access to justice was the least addressed of the three (information, decision-making and justice) by countries (Petkova et al. 2002). The increasing application of the rights-based approach to development puts further attention on the discussion of adding the ‘right’ to a healthy environment but the institutional basis is weak.
Effective governance There is one common criteria for an effective governance system: it should address the issue it is aimed to solve (Young and Demko 1996). There are numerous factors that have the potential to influence the effectiveness of governance. Integration is one such factor and one which emerges as a key challenge for the higher levels of complexity in governance described above. Integration implies the strengthening of linkages among different dimensions of governance and the merging of these into a more connected whole. The challenges come in four principle domains, the integration of: sectors, levels, actors and time. The first three of these domains relate to the three governance trends described in Section 3, while the fourth domain is one which largely remains to be addressed in governance.
The above discussion on participation can also be analysed in terms of efforts of integrating actors from different stakeholder groups in processes and action. There has been limited systematic research on whether the impact of increased participation in environmental governance has indeed had a positive impact on management and environmental outcomes (Bierele and Cayford 2002). There are some strong arguments in support of this, however, linked to different parts of the governance process. Public participation in decision-making particularly at local level, where communities have special knowledge on the issues, broadens the knowledge base and improves the legitimacy and quality of decisions (Bruch and Czebiniak 2002). This may also increase the commitment to implementation. The participation of as many stakeholder groups and individuals as possible in implementation aspects of governance, that is in the execution of strategies, policies and projects for mitigation and adaptation, is essential for governance to be effective. It is now often recognized that the involvement of the public in compliance and enforcement mechanisms of institutions can complement scarce government resources (Bruch and Czebiniak 2002). Furthermore, more integration and cooperation among different groups in society towards common goals in the field of environment can contribute to other governance processes and the community — local, national or global. One example is the building of institutional capital in city authorities involved in participatory Local Agenda 21 processes (Khakee 2002).
The importance of integrating the three pillars — economic, social and environmental — of sustainable development is underscored in many global policy processes. Much progress has been made in this regard, for example, in the global conferences of the 1990s and in the WSSD. Much 79 remains, however, to operationalise this in the practice of governance. One approach towards integration has been to ‘mainstream’ environment into other policy domains. Such mainstreaming has been tried at various governance levels including in the United Nations System itself with varying degree of success (Sohn, Nakhooda, and Baumert 2005; UNEP 2005). Similar efforts have been referred to as environmental policy integration which is justified for normative reasons, that the environment needs to be higher on the agenda, and rational reasons, that it makes sense to pay attention to environmental concerns in direct relation to the driving forces in other sectors (Persson 2004). There have been attempts to integrate the three pillars in the development of indicators (Moldan, Hak, and Bourdeau forthcoming). The movement from environmental to sustainable development impact assessments in the EU is another recent effort (Reference). There have been attempts to institutionalise integration in organisational terms, in how councils, task forces, even ministries are set up.
The importance of governance at all levels – global, regional, national and local — but also the need for a governance framework for sustainable development that is integrated across this vertical scale, is increasingly stressed. It is stressed in global policy (United Nations 2002) and in research (Folke et al. 2002; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom et al. 1999; Kaul and Le Goulven 2003; Héritier 2002; Karlsson 2004). What could constitute such a framework of multilevel or multilayered governance and how to design the institutions to build it is more difficult to establish (Hooghe and Marks 2003), as the understanding of vertical linkages is still rudimentary (Stern et al. 2002). For example, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) is full of references to governance and institutions being needed at various levels and mostly combinations of levels but the text is more silent on how linkages should be established between the different levels (Karlsson 2005). Nevertheless, a general direction for what vertically integrated governance needs to achieve is emerging, it would involve a nested hierarchy of mutually supportive policies and institutions initiated at all governance levels (Karlsson 2000). The MEAs needs to be supported by effective institutions at national and local levels. Local Agenda 21 processes need supportive measures from higher governance levels.
Vertical integration can take place in not only in the institutional domain but in the domains of knowledge and values, which need to underpin and support institutional design and compliance. In assessment processes such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and in the environmental advisory processes in the UN System, such as in the UNCCD (United Nations 2005) and the efforts of the global earth observation systems such as IGOS(IGOS 2004) measures have been taken to make indigenous and local knowledge acceptable. One example in the value domain is the continuing work to develop consensus around the basic principles for interaction between humans and humans and the environment through the Earth Charter process, see the Earth Charter Initiative (2000). Another example is the coming together of large coalitions of actors from different levels around common goals such as the MDGs set out in the Millennium Declaration (United Nations General Assembly 2000) or the WSSD Partnerships. Another example is the labelling schemes developed for fair trade and organic products. These formal but voluntary institutions allow the concern of consumers in one part of the world for both the environment and the health of themselves and health and well-being of the producers of the products to influence their consumption choices as illustrated in the global market archetype. In similar ways environmentally concerned tourists can stimulate stricter regulations for environmental preservation in heavily urbanised coastal areas. Likewise, as exemplified in the resource paradox archetype, diamond buyers can be assured of avoiding diamonds that finance blood shed through a certification scheme. Finally, in the institutional domain there are, for example, special organizational forms which facilitate cross- level interaction, such as co-management of natural resources where there is sharing of power between government and local resource users (Berkes 2002).
The discussions above have shown the significant challenges of integration in governance across levels and sectors. But the major challenge is to integrate the time dimensions, particularly the future, into governance. There seems to be a widespread even structural failure in governance to institutionalise more long-term thinking and concern for future generations. The clear policy message from the contaminated site archetype is the need for clear and enforced property and responsibility which are covering long time-spans. Mitigation and adaptation to climate change will pose enormous
80 challenges in this regard as discussed in the SIDS archetype. Otherwise those who are responsible for the contamination will evade all the cost for clean-up and environmental and health damages. Both political and economic structures and institutions invariably steer decision-making towards favouring short-term benefits over long term costs, even when the long term is as little as a few years to a decade, not to mention the impacts that are decades to a century in the future, such as those of climate change (see for example Meadows et al (2004)).
8.5.2 Poverty
Poverty levies heavy personal costs on the poor themselves. It robs families of security, opportunity and health. In so doing it robs nations of the potential contributions these families could make to economic growth, social well-being, and political stability. Poverty thus squanders a nation’s human capital.
Source: World Resources Institute and others 2005 Poverty remains a major challenge for development, improving human well-being and sustainable environmental management despite gains made in health, education, water sanitation and economic development. Globally policy makers have reconfirmed their commitment to reducing poverty in the Millennium Development Goals.
As demonstrated in the archetypes, the relationship between poverty and the environment is complex. Poverty is both a driver and a consequence of environmental change, with implications across spatial and temporal scales.
First, natural resource degradation and poverty are closely linked and have implications for livelihoods (and health). Most poverty is still rural and most rural people are directly dependent on the use of natural resources to secure a livelihood (Bojo and Reddy 2003). Environmental resource quality for the urban poor is also important where people depend directly on unprocessed water, and on neighbouring forests and agricultural land to supplement their incomes.
Second, livelihood opportunities are adversely affected by restrictive tenure which in turn impacts on the managerial capacity and priority of resource users. Resource tenure is widely acknowledged as affecting not only how resources are used but the opportunities and benefits available to local resource producers (Ribot 2004, Hulme and Murphree 2001). The lack of an asset base effectively reduces the capacity of poor people to use natural resources in an efficient, productive and sustainable manner (Pearce 2005, World Resource Institute and Others 2005). For example, unequal land ownership and insecure tenure can force poor people to cultivate marginal environments, and may deter long-term investments (DfID 2002).
Third, as much as one-fifth of the total burden of disease in the developing world, and close to a third in Sub-Saharan Africa, may be associated with environmental risk factors (Lvovsky 2001;Bojo and Reddy 2003). For many poor people having a strong body is essential from a livelihoods perspective (Narayan 2000). As the Archetypes show, waste dumping places a disproportional burden on poor people.
Fourth, climate variability and natural disasters such as droughts, floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes have disproportionate impacts on poor people. Richer people are better able to protect themselves against many of the effects of environmental degradation (Pearce 2005, Millennium Assessment 2005). Globally, natural hazards claim about 100,000 lives per year, most of them in developing countries (DfID and others 2002).
Fifth, policies relating to pricing, subsidies, taxes, restrictive trade practices, and the exchange rate can significantly influence the use of natural resources and the emission of pollutants into the environment as well as economic opportunities.
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Sixth, poor governance, social exclusion and powerlessness means that many poor people have inadequate opportunity to participate in the decision-making related to a country’s resources and environment which impact on their well-being.
Seventh, inequity and power affect the opportunities and environmental decisions of specific groups of poor people. Gender-related policies on the management of communal resources and the right to secure tenure affect the quality of life of women (Bojo and Reddy). Women and girls are particularly burdened by the degradation of the environment (DfID 2002).
Policy responses Policy responses, and resulting programmes and initiatives, over the thirty year period under review, have, despite some gains, not been able to adequately meet the challenges in the most vulnerable regions where poverty remains pervasive. Poverty is also growing in several of the industrialized countries.
Approaching the new millennium, and thereafter, there have been some important shifts with increasing policy commitments being made to addressing the multiple dimensions of poverty through partnerships, e.g. the Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI) (Hazelwood 2002). At the country level, governments and civil society are addressing poverty reduction for example through the World Bank’s poverty reduction strategies (PRSP). In 2000, the World Summit on Sustainable Development adopted the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, which seeks to address the issue of poverty in a comprehensive and integrated manner. The Millennium Development Goals address the multi- dimensional nature of poverty and well-being. Goal 7 explicitly recognizes the link to development, poverty reduction and improving human well-being: two of the three environmental targets (safe water and urban slum dwellers) relate specifically to poverty and well-being.
New measuring and poverty analysis approaches such as poverty mapping offer opportunities for breaking down national aggregated data, identifying where poor people actually are and the nature of their poverty, and addressing the connection between poverty, well-being and the environment.
Poverty mapping can be used across spatial and temporal scales. The maps are becoming an increasingly important instrument for investigating and discussing social, economic, and environmental problems. Poverty maps have been highly effective in identifying where development lags behind, promoting the development of assets that are the key to poverty reduction, such as agro- ecological resources and ownership, and road networks providing access to markets, schools, and health clinics. Additionally, they have been used to identify priority areas of action, such as for food aid and environmental health interventions. They may use different types of data, including both qualitative and quantitative data. They can also be used to indicate relationships between data in different sectors including the bio-physical, social and economic. Poverty mapping is being used by an increasing number of institutions and countries. They have been used to understand relationships between ethnicity and poverty (Vietnam), poverty and roads (Guatemala), poverty and cholera (South Africa) and are currently being developed in Madagascar to identify hotspots for risk and disaster management (Henninger and Spen 2002).
Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into development The challenge facing the global community is to make environmental and other policies more responsive to the needs of poor people. Global and regional policy responses need to start from the premise that the experience of poverty is local, complex and multi-dimensional and closely linked to the environment. However acknowledging and understanding the connection between all people and their actions – both within and across the local, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels - is essential in building effective policy responses (Chambers 2000, Colfer and Others 2001).
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The archetypes of vulnerability demonstrate the need for better links between local aspirations and the strategies and the policy responses adopted at the regional and global level, as well as the opportunities the environment holds for poverty eradication. Achieving this will require policy and institutional changes that cut across different sectors including those which lie outside the control of environmental institutions. Policy approaches that integrate poverty-environment issues into mainstream development planning and resource allocation processes are necessary (Hazelwood 2002). Additionally, responses will need to recognize the multiple scales of poverty and the implications of initiatives at one spatial level for another. Similarly, poverty today and responses to it have implications for future opportunities.
The archetypes corroborate the findings of other assessments and reports (DfID and others 2002, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, World Resources Institute and others 2005) that environmental goods and services can offer a route out of poverty.
For global policy to be more responsive to local needs, experiences and priorities, it will need to create an enabling environment for local, national and regional initiatives as well as for mitigation and adaptation strategies. The Voices of the Poor study found that in order to create new opportunities and potential for poor people policy responses directed at addressing the following were needed, (Narayan 2000): (1) from corruption to honesty and justice, (2) from violence to peace and equity, (3) from powerlessness to grassroots democracy, (4) from weakness to capacity for action and (5) from bare subsistence to assets and security. These areas correlate broadly to the aspects of well-being identified in Section 2. Each of these has a direct and important relationship to poverty reduction.
Five broad sets of policy responses to enhance opportunities have been identified (DfID and Others 2002): (1) enhancing the capabilities of poor people (2) protecting and expanding the material asset base, (3) improving governance, (4) focusing on the quality of growth and (5) improved collaboration focusing on trade, investment and aid.
Enhancing capabilities Empowerment is essential for enabling people to respond more effectively to environmental and other changes that affect their well-being.
Getting out of poverty requires improved wealth at the household level which is comprised of physical assets; skills, knowledge and good health (‘human capital’); environmental assets (‘natural capital’) and a functioning social environment – trust, freedom, fairness and voice (‘social capital’) (Pearce, 2005). For example, a livelihood cannot be sustained if its main asset is the body, and that is sick, damaged or disabled. In these circumstances health services for prevention as well as the prompt and effective treatment of accidents and sickness, and for rapid recovery, are basic capabilities needed to support sustainable livelihoods of poor people (Chambers 1995).
In developing responses it is important to be mindful of issues of power and to differentiate between poor people. Improved governance and tenure regimes may work against the poorest people if the opportunities for their participation are not specifically strengthened. Women, children, the elderly, ethnic minorities, and people of the lowest caste are often amongst the poorest of the poor (Chronic Poverty Research Centre 2005). Because women are often the primary resource managers their well- being has implications for environmental well-being. Women carry a disproportionate share of the disease burden (Gordon and others 2004; UNAIDS 2005). Making women a priority and adopting gendered approaches to development is essential to achieve the targets of MDG 3. Meeting the targets of MDG 2 (on universal primary education) and MDG 5 (maternal health) can help improve the overall capacity of women.
Access to information, technology and education amongst other things are also needed to enhance capabilities and to increase the range of options available to poor people.
83 Protecting and expanding the assets base Pearce makes several important observations about the value of assets in poverty alleviation, (1) improvements in any one of these stimulate others to increase as well and (2) poverty alleviation requires that the assets of poor people should increase faster than the average for the nation as a whole (3) inequality of assets appears to explain limited economic growth far more than income inequality (Pearce 2005). These findings are corroborated in a large number of local and country studies as well global studies (e.g. WRI and others 2005).
As the archetypes show, poor people rely on natural resources for an important part of their income. A recurring problem is that policy treats environmental services and goods as safety nets and the basis for subsistence rather than as productive assets. Given this, resource users often have weak tenure rights which effectively undermine their management capacity and opportunities. Improving tenure regimes can be a highly effective means of enhancing natural resource management. Specific attention needs to be given to the role of different groups. Women, for example, play key roles in managing natural resources and are particularly affected by environmental degradation thus strengthening their resource rights is a vital area for reform (e.g. Brown and Lapuyade 2001).
Secure rights of ownership, access and use are fundamental to the sustainability of livelihoods which rely on natural resources (Chambers 1995). This is particularly so in the case of common property resources as demonstrated in several archetypes. Secure rights to land, water and trees may encourage and support long-term investment by families (Chambers 1995). In addition to enhancing livelihoods, an asset approach may serve to diversify the options available to poor people. The lack of viable and alternative opportunities has been identified in several archetypes including the one on post-conflict as a driver of unsustainable use. The form tenure takes is crucial for livelihood security and needs to take account of local circumstances. At times the registration of property rights can marginalise poor people as found, for example, in Kenya (Mackenzie 1989). However, secure tenure regimes are necessary if investment and good management are to be encouraged (Katerere and Mohamed-Katerere 2005, Edmonds and Wollenberg 2003). Security of tenure is closely linked to the value placed on a resource and whether or not it is managed with future generations (bequest values) and future options in mind. Improved tenure can thus promote better conservation practices.
Poverty and Common Property Resources In Tanzania, as elsewhere in the world, poor people can be highly dependent on CPRs and can be adversely affected by the mismanagement and degradation of CPRs. Depletion of forests, marine resources, and pastureland in the long-term can harm the livelihoods of poor people.
At the same time, some observers argue that attempts to safeguard certain CPRs are at odds with efforts to alleviate poverty. Fisherfolk or hunters might contend that quotas limiting the animals they take will undermine their attempts to make a living. At the global level, policies to conserve biodiversity or mitigate climate change have been described as conflicting with or comprising poverty eradication programs (Sanderson and Redford, 2003; Connor, 2005). Measures to curb global warming have been criticized for potentially hindering the economic progress of developing countries. Similarly, the protection of ecosystems to safeguard biodiversity closes off future land use options with potentially adverse consequences for local people. It is often the poor who pay the cost of biodiversity conservation. Consequently, some conservation planners are now attempting to approach conservation and poverty alleviation goals in an integrated fashion (Adams et al., 2004).
Several opportunities exist for addressing MDG 1, target 1 and improving the income levels of poor people. The removal of restrictions which hamper and harm the productive and efficient use of assets is crucial. For example, the removal of restrictions on urban informal sector activities can reduce the insecurity, anxiety and humiliation of poor artisans, vendors and entrepreneurs, and the petty rents they otherwise have to pay to officials (DfID 2002). Similarly, abolishing restrictions on the cutting and transport of trees from private land increases farm-gate values for trees, encourages tree planting and protection and so enhances livelihood security by allowing trees to become savings banks for 84 small and poor farmers (Chambers 1995). Increasing earnings from natural products requires increasing opportunities for commercialization of natural resource products. Increased market opportunities through better market access and consumer orientated product development are important areas for policy reform (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). In particular, reaching agreement around farm subsidies and import tariffs is seen as important for development. A crucial challenge for policy makers is how technology and information can be used to improve the efficient use of productive assets. Infrastructure development is important for creating better access to markets and trade opportunities (UN Millennium Project 2005), access to social services and addressing the isolation many poor rural people experience.
Sustainable harvesting and the implementation of effective conservation measures are important for protecting this asset base. Secure tenure may increase the incentive to conserve and manage natural resources sustainably. Improved production methods through better access to technology can be an area for international cooperation.
Degraded ecosystems limit opportunities for development and the potential to move out of poverty. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, for example, found that three quarters of the world's poor live in rural areas, and are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation. It also reported that 15 of the 23 ecosystem services assessed were being degraded or used unsustainably. Similarly the archetypes in this chapter demonstrate the threat degraded ecosystems pose for livelihoods and well- being [archetype example]. However, both policies and programmes to reduce poverty often fail to account for the important link between environment and the livelihoods of the rural poor (World Resources Institute 2005). The links between vulnerability, and local conditions - such as food security, soil fertility and forest quality - and globally or externally driven trends - such as intensive agriculture, private sector led agricultural research and development, foreign exchange, global trade and low commodity prices, and resource conflicts with international dimensions - are often neglected in framing policy. The complex interactions between political, economic and social drivers of environmental change suggest a need for more inclusive and interactive policy making at all levels. For example, a global study illustrated the complex policy-making challenges of addressing issues of food security and biosafety (Seshia and Scoones 2003, Odame and others 2003, Mackenzie and Newell 2003, Glover 2003, Mohamed-Katerere 2003, Yamin 2003). The MDG 8 – with its focus on developing global partnerships and specifically targets 12, 13 and 18 offer one avenue for addressing the linkages between global and local processes.
Improving governance Understanding the complex and multi-dimensional ways in which natural resources are linked to social systems and institutions – at multiple levels - that govern inheritance, investment, management and use is crucial for developing effective policy responses.
Several of the archetypes (e.g. the resource paradox, post-conflict, contaminated sites and unequal exposure to environmental risk) demonstrate the need to move towards development frameworks based on honesty, fairness and justice. As shown in the archetype on the natural resource paradox, anti-corruption can play a major role in addressing the misuse of natural resources and weak enforcement of environmental regulations (DfID 2002).
Policy, legislative and regulatory processes need to be developed to ensure the effective participation of poor people. Increasing control by local people can support improved human well-being as people are better able to access the benefits associated with the environment management and use (World Resources Institute and others 2005, Ribot 2004). Pluralistic decision-making processes can improve opportunities for better information sharing and distribution of financial and other resources (Edmonds and Wollenberg 2003). Additionally, it supports the cultural and heritage rights of people which are often closely linked to resource management and use practices.
Despite a growing trend towards decentralisation and devolution from the 1980s, supporting policies required to improve livelihoods is often lacking. Devolution needs to be complemented by capacity building and empowerment initiatives, improved tenure, and better trade and value-adding options.
85
In many countries, particularly in developing countries, one of the legacies of colonialism is the existence of multiple legal and normative systems, and sometimes tenure rights at the local level are in conflict with rights held by the state. This is evident in conflicts around conservation areas (Borrini- Feyerabend 1996, Hulme and Murphree 2001), water (Bruns and Meizin-Dick 2000, Spiertz 2000, Wolf 2000, Mohamed-Katerere and van der Zaag 2003) and forests (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2003, Katerere and Mohamed-Katerere 2005) – such conflicts often have negative consequences for conservation and livelihoods. Conflicts between rights holders or resource users may be the result of growing resource stress due to environment change or new/increased human needs. Resolving such conflicts requires responses based on the acknowledgement of the complexity of the normative terrain. In recognising local law, caution around transposing laws from one area to another area needs to be exercised (Mohamed-Katerere and van der Zaag; Spiertz 1996). Changing values – around gender, traditional institutions, democracy and accountability - make the space in which environmental resources are managed extremely complex. One approach is to focus on processes in which local users become active ‘makers and shapers’ of the rights, management and use regimes on which their livelihoods are based (Cornwall xxxx). A large variety of studies emphasize the need for systems which give voice to local users and communities in defining rights (Mohamed-Katerere and van der Zaag 2003, Sengupta, Spiertz 1996). On the other hand research also shows that in some circumstances recognising local tenure rights explicitly within national law is necessary to protect local interest and promote human well-being.
Quality of Growth Growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty reduction (World Resource Institute and others 2005). This is particularly evident in industrial countries where, despite general affluence, pockets of poverty remain. Reducing inequality is thought to have a positive impact on poverty reduction. One challenge is how to ensure that the benefits of growth have positive implications for people. The archetype on the resource paradox illustrates the value of several social investment strategies.
The sustainability of growth is widely acknowledged to be closely linked to environmental management. Countries with very similar levels of income and growth can have quite different levels of environmental performance, depending on their economic and environmental policies (DfID 2002). Integrating strategies can have important opportunities for development.
Policies that focus on improving social relations through respect for and promotion of local cultural systems (CPR, SIDS), increased gender equity (drylands), social cohesion and peace (post conflict) can be important for more equitable growth.
Improving international cooperation Improving international cooperation and building equitable partnerships can be an important strategy for responding to challenges of poverty reduction. Reforming international policies on trade, investment, global public goods, and aid in order to better support developing country efforts to address poverty-environment concerns is an important area for global policy (DfID and others 2002, World Resources Institute and others 2005).
Freer and fairer trade can be a useful tool for promoting growth. It is important to bring environmental and equity issues to the centre of global trade systems. DfID and others (2002) identify four specific areas where action is needed. Information, technology and enhanced negotiation capacity can be important for improving participation in the market and also developing more equitable trade regimes.
Increasingly aid is given as budgetary support and not project based aid. However, a large amount of aid is conditional or tied (World Resources Institute and others 2005). Current levels of aid are inadequate to address existing global commitments. A key challenge for the global community will be to provide the resources committed to make globally agreed targets a reality. Meeting Goal 7 of the
86 MDGs is particularly challenging and here opportunities exist not only for financial assistance but technical collaboration.
The PRSPs are increasingly the basis for international aid. Using these strategies in an effective way that promotes environment sustainability and poverty reduction requires strengthening the linkage between these two aspects. This can be an important area of global cooperation through, for example, increased support to building technical capacity to optimize ecosystem management at low cost (World Resources Institute and others 2005).
8.5.3 Health Every culture teaches that “health is wealth” (CMH, 2001). “Health” is the basis for job productivity, the capacity to learn in school, and the capability to grow intellectually, physically, and emotionally. In economic terms, health and education are the two cornerstones of human capital, which is the basis of individual and community economic productivity (Dreze and Sen 1989; Sen 1999) and the opportunity individuals have to participate in society and make life choices consistent with their goals.
As with the economic well-being of individual households, good population health is a critical input into poverty reduction and economic growth, health status seems to explain an important part of the difference in economic growth rates, even after controlling for standard macroeconomic variables.
The channels of influence from disease to economic development are related to the direct loss of well- being to the individual (CMH 2001). Quantitative accounts of the loss of well-being, are usually calculated from three parts: (1) the reduction in market income caused by disease; (2) the reduction in longevity caused by disease; and (3) the reduction in psychological well-being caused by disease, often labeled “pain and suffering”, even when there is no reduction in market income or longevity. The least favorable health situations are those in which the persistence of communicable diseases is associated with deficient living conditions, including poverty and progressive environmental degradation.
Changes of ecosystem services can affect livelihoods, local migration, and income. The impacts on physical and economic security, choice of social relations, freedom have large impacts on well-being and health. For example, in Uganda, where mountain gorilla ecotourism provides over 50 percent of tourism revenues for the country, poor health of the people is compromising this important source of income for the local communities, jeopardizing the survival of these critically endangered ape species, and undermining national efforts to alleviate poverty.
In low-income countries, environmental exposures are mixed. Microbiological hazards, especially in drinking water, remain widespread in rural populations and in urban slums: approximately 40 percent of the world's population still lack safe drinking water and 60 percent lack sanitation. Domestic air pollution levels are often high, especially where biomass fuels or coal are used for heating and cooking. These exposures cause high rates of infant and child mortality from diarrhoeal diseases and acute respiratory infections. Meanwhile, as industries proliferate, as chemical-intensive agriculture spreads, and as cities fill with motor vehicles, various additional physical, airborne, water-borne and food-borne exposures occur. Further, the rapid pace of industrialisation in these countries and the lax environmental and occupational health standards have often resulted in hazardous practices and exposures. In some cases, Western industries have simply moved their discontinued manufacturing practices 'offshore', as described in the “exporting vulnerability” and “contaminated sites” archetypes.
Box: Health issues in urban areas
Overcrowding, poor housing, malnutrition, inadequate basic services, and other problems associated with poverty and inequity exacerbate the exposure of poor urban residents to health hazards such as vector- and water borne diseases and heat stress. The lack of mass transport systems leads to considerable air pollution which leads to respiratory diseases and allergies. Traffic accidents occur frequently and road deaths are common. Climate variability and climate change are expected to have
87 significant impacts on the health of urban populations in tropical regions as the threshold of vector- borne diseases such as malaria, dengue and yellow fever may expand, and the spread of diseases in already affected areas may be accelerated (Krafft et al. 2003, Epstein 1994, Patz and Balbus 1996, Tayanc et al. 1997). The spread of water borne diseases in urban areas is also expected to increase as a result of climate change affects on the supply, distribution, and quality of water resources. Increasing temperatures during the summer are expected to lead to increasing heat stress morbidity and mortality among the poor and the elderly.
Many infectious diseases, (e.g. tuberculosis, diarrhea, etc.) and vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria, dengue, yellow fever, chagas, etc.) account for the heavy death toll among rural populations. Many rural women use wood as fuel for cooking, which coupled with poor ventilation and bad housing conditions may be the cause for the prevalence of asthma and bronchitis. Large parts of the rural population in developing countries are below the international poverty line, which is the root cause of ignorance, poor sanitation, malnutrition and irregular treatment, the latter being also due to high cost of drugs. Environmental exposures due to the use of pesticides in rural areas, or arsenic in drinking water can lead to serious diseases (e.g. neurological disorders, cancer).
Several of the Millennium Development Goals relate to health, particularly the targets to reduce hunger and halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases. A significant improvement in the lives of slum dwellers, halving the proportion of people unable to reach or afford safe drinking water, reducing maternal and under-five child mortality, making drugs more widely available and affordable are further health-related targets agreed to in the Millennium Declaration.
Policy responses
As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has pointed out, measures to ensure ecological sustainability would safeguard ecosystem services and therefore benefit health in the long term. The report notes, further, that the ongoing degradation of ecosystem services is a significant barrier to achieving the Millennium Development Goals and that a precautionary approach to environmental protection is most likely to protect and enhance health.
The archetypes show a number of examples of health impacts resulting from environmental and socio- economic change. For example, the contaminated sites have major health effects, the health of the people living in small island developing states is over-proportionately threatened by natural and human-made risks, urbanisation has a number of health-related implications (see box above), health is at a higher risk in post-conflict situations, the Arctic is exposed to persistent organic pollutants that have significant health effects, intensive shrimp aquaculture leads to water pollution and health risks and dryland agricultural systems are prone to risks of hunger, malnutrition and water scarcity. Extreme events are also responsible for high morbidity and mortality in vulnerable areas due to lack of early warning systems, lack of medical care, population displacement. Morbidity and mortality are admittedly higher in communities with limited resources and compromised economic indices, less developed housing, water supplies, food storage, and communication links. In affected areas, desertification and drought have direct impacts on health. There are several pathways by which drought affects health. In the most extreme case, famine, the number of deaths associated with insufficient food consumption increases substantially. Famine often occurs when a pre-existing situation of malnutrition worsens. The health consequences of drought include diseases resulting from lack of water. Studies have shown that in times of shortage, water is used for cooking rather than hygiene. In particular, this increases the risk of disease. Malnutrition also increases susceptibility to infection.
Options for mainstreaming environment into health policies
The emphasis on environmental factors has been a strong part of the public health tradition, beginning with the Sanitarian movements and can be traced through ideas of health promotion and current work
88 on inequalities in health. Increasingly this tradition emphasizes the social and economic environment as having the greatest influence on health (Glouberman, 2001).
Enhancing capabilities
The complex interactions between environment and human health are very difficult to unravel, in particular because of a general lack of data in developing countries and fragmented, discipline- oriented data in developed countries. In addition, environmental causes, except for infectious diseases and acute poisonings, are often masked in health statistics, particularly in developing countries and for poor women. There is, however, agreement that environmentally-related ill-health is broadly underestimated (WHO, 1996; 1997; 1998). This suggests that improved monitoring and data storage and access are necessary steps in mainstreaming environment into health policy.
Furthermore, environmental health research methodologies tend to privilege pathogens and pollutants, while neglecting social determinants linked to poverty. As a result, it is difficult to provide scientifically acceptable causal connections in the areas of environment, poverty, and health (Sims and Butter, 2005). Any meaningful strategy to address environment and health issues must therefore take gender-sensitive poverty alleviation in both rural and urban settings as a central component (Sims and Butter, 2000).
A better understanding of the dynamic linkages between ecosystems and public health is leading to new and diverse opportunities for interventions earlier in processes that could become direct threats to public health (Aron et al., 2001).There are no simple answers to complex problems affecting ecosystem change and public health. However, other experiences in integrated assessment demonstrate that the establishment of an open and participatory process is essential (Pielke et al., 1999; Herrick and Jamieson, 1995; Shrader-Frechette 1991).
Methods for demonstrating the linkages between ecosystem change and public health must build upon the experience in the field of environmental health, which has a long tradition of using indicators as “an expression of the link between environment and health, targeted at an issue of specific policy or management concern and presented in a form which facilitates interpretation for effective decision making” (Corvalán et al., 1996). Indicators need to be evaluated in terms of scientific credibility and utility in the decision-making process for particular programs, following guidelines developed for more traditional environmental health indicators (Aron et al., 2001). Indicators for integrated assessment of ecosystem change and public health are necessary to support the management of integrated programs.
Heat Health Warning Systems
Although heat waves are rare events, they are associated with significant mortality impacts. A range of measures are available that potentially reduce the impact of extreme temperature episodes on mortality and morbidity, including health promotion, building design, urban planning, and heat wave early warning systems. Partly in response to heat waves in 1993 and 1994, the Philadelphia Hot Weather-Health Watch/Warning System (PWWS) was developed in 1995 to alert the city’s population when weather conditions pose risks to health (Kalkstein et al. 1996; Sheridan and Kalkstein 1998). This system is the basis for many other heat-health watch warning systems being instituted in cities worldwide (Kalkstein 2003; Sheridan and Kalkstein 1998). Once a heat-related warning is issued, the Philadelphia Department of Health implements emergency precautions and mitigation procedures to reduce mortality risk (Kalkstein et al. 1996).The number of lives saved and the economic benefit of this system were estimated using data from 1995-1998 (Ebi et al. 2004). As with many environmental health problems, the technology (air conditioning, natural ventilation, drinking fluids) is widely and ready available. However, many barriers to their effective use remain. 89 Heat health warning systems are an important strategy to reduce heat-related deaths, providing an active detection and care of vulnerable individuals (Kovats and Koppe, 2005).
Improving governance There are multiple policies originating in multiple ministries and government departments spanning the range of environmental health issues. Ministries of environment, natural resources, agriculture, mines and energy, construction, labor, and planning are all involved in different ways in health and environment issues. This pattern is mirrored in universities and research institutions that similarly fragment environmental health issues among different faculties and departments, hindering the acquisition of an integrated and synergistic understanding of the problem.
In recent years, several international policies and regulations make provisions for improved consideration of health. For example: • The Strategic Environmental Assessment Protocol that supplements the UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment places a special emphasis on consideration of human health • Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union calls for the EU to examine the possible impact of major policies on health • WHO (2005) recommends health impact assessment In general, environmental standards and regulations pertaining to air, water, food, vehicle emissions, and labour, are better enforced in developed countries; this is more difficult in the developing world where such standards often do not exist and if they do, enforcement mechanisms are lacking. Given the tendency for environmental issues to be dichotomized with economic growth and progress it is critical for health and environment planning to work in coordination with macroeconomic policy.
90 8.5.4 Trade
Trade policy is both domestic and international. Ever since David Ricardo expounded the idea of comparative advantage and the benefits of specialization, trade has been regarded as ‘an engine of growth,’ which increases income and reduces poverty. In fact, Jagdish Bhagwati argues that the idea of comparative advantage and social welfare can be traced back to Plato (Bhagwati 1997). By openness to trade, we mean ‘freer trade’ under multilateral rules. The trade regime, particularly when it comes to agriculture and textiles, is characterized largely by ‘preferential trade agreement (PTA),’ bilateral agreements, and quotas, which rich countries negotiate bilaterally with the poor, but such PTAs cause more harm than good (see the archetype on exporting vulnerability). Countries are better off exploiting their comparative advantage by trading abundant factors for scarce ones that may be abundant somewhere else rather than striving for self-sufficiency, or having special access to rich markets for particular products under PTAs (Hertel and Winters 2006; Krugman 2003).
Poor countries, whose abundant factor is labor, are expected to gain from access to richer, larger markets abroad. Since small countries have smaller internal markets, lower barriers allow countries the opportunities to exploit economies of scale, benefiting labor, which is generally disadvantaged relative to domestic capitalists. In other words, the poor can garner employment and better wages. As most models show, the liberalization of trade under the current Doha round in the WTO is expected to reduce poverty, particularly if developing countries also adjust their policies accordingly (Anderson, Martin, and Van der Mensbrugghe 2005).
Trade is seen by many as the most direct way for the rich to reduce poverty, thereby reducing a major share of those who most frequently experience vulnerability (Anderson 2004; Hertel and Winters 2006). Openness to trade allows economies to be linkage strong because trade forces diversification and facilitates learning by doing, which drives higher productivity and industrialization (Leamer et al. 1999). If poor countries, particularly primary commodity exporters, are vulnerable to exposure to rich markets through price shocks and other market failures, then diversification is a good option for reducing vulnerability (UNCTAD 2004). Empirical analyses, however, show that exposure to shock arguments are exaggerated (Calderon, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel 2005) Higher levels of income, sophisticated markets, and increased power of non-state actors may enhance the prospects for democracy and liberty, perhaps via better institutions of governance that trade necessitates (Anderson 2004; Henisz and Williamson 1999; Wei 2000). Since sophisticated markets, particularly ones which are dependent on trade, contain large amounts of arms-length transactions of many sorts, better institutions are required for its smooth functioning (Greif 1992; Hall and Jones 1999). Trade, thereby, may aid not only the level of income but indirectly and directly promote better international governance and societal welfare (Birdsall and Lawrence 1999), not to mention international and civil peace, which reinforces and is reinforced in turn by prosperity (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; de Soysa 2002; Russett and Oneal 2000; Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Weede 2004).
The proposition that trade reduces poverty is built on strong theoretical foundations and robust and consistent empirical realities (Bhagwati 2003; Burtless, Lawrence, and Shapiro 1998; Cline 2004). Several recent studies find that trade openness increases economic growth (Frankel and Romer 1999; Levine and Renelt 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995). Not only actual trade dependence, which is in turn dependent on such factors as population size and geography, but trade policy openness also boosts economic growth (Cline 2004). Economic growth supposedly benefits the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2000). However, data suggests that it is not benefiting the very poor (see Section 3) and that subsidies and tariffs still prevent economic benefits of trade. Trade also increases productivity of workers. Productivity increases allows people greater insulation from economic shocks. Growth is not everything but it allows the finances necessary for providing other public goods that society values above income, such as education and health, which also contributes to reducing poverty in the long- run. The spin-offs from trade are many, but one important aspect is that it provides governments the necessary incentives to provide public goods, such as education and health because such public goods raise productivity (Garrett 1999). Reducing poverty, naturally, helps to reduce vulnerability of people to economic, natural, and man-made shocks.
91 Critics of trade argue that trade dependence leads to a ‘race to the bottom.’ Governments eager to attract investment and compete in the global market place will allow standards to drop, so that competition will lead to ‘social dumping.’ Governments that are reliant on taxes to provide the public goods will increasingly find themselves faced with a ‘footloose’ tax base that erodes the bases of state finances. Apparently, internationalization of the economy lets in ‘fiscal termites’ (Tanzi 2000). On the other hand, the empirical reality is that trade openness is also commensurate with higher government spending. Paradoxically, as countries become more dependent on trade, the size of government increases, a result first discovered for the OECD countries, and later found to be true also for the entire world (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1997).
Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into trade policy
Protecting and expanding the assets base One of the biggest objections raised against free trade is the effects of trade on the environment (Daly 1993; Ekins, Folke, and Costanza 1994). The objections argue that countries open to competition lower environmental standards, and the poor countries become ‘havens’ for polluting industries forced out of richer markets (see the archetype on exporting vulnerability). Some highly popularized, anecdotal and journalistic arguments suggest that globalization leads to ‘global pillage’ (Brecher and Costello 1994; Zammit 2003). The latter argue that increased competition that drives down prices will result in unsustainable levels of consumption and waste and that trade will increase atmospheric pollution as poorer countries also begin to industrialize. More generally, critics of globalization argue that trade agreements bind countries to standardized laws and regulations that will reduce the ability for governments and societies to make autonomous decisions by addressing local problems with local solutions. Moreover, they argue that the systemic interdependence takes away agency from LDC governments. Greater integration of developing countries in market relations diminishes their capacity to act independently because they become locked in dependent relations with the rich. Countries more dependent on trade and investment are expected not to be able to follow sustainable paths of development because it would be against the interests of international capital (Grimes and Kentor 2003; Roberts and Grimes 1997; York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003).
The counter argument is that trade is good for sustainability because it drives efficient allocation of resources across the world. If a country specializes in those activities it has an advantage in, countries with an abundance of one resource can trade with those that are abundant in another. Such exchange will allow maximum output for a given input—in other words movement towards sustainability because waste is minimized (Brack 1995). Openness to trade is also associated with getting prices right and ending distortions, which enhances sustainability. Governments are likely to subsidize economic activity for political reasons, thereby increasing waste, a policy that is highly costly and becomes increasingly untenable the more exposed a country is to global markets (Birdsall and Wheeler 2001; Yu 1994). Consider that the German government spends billions of Euros subsidizing inefficient coal miners—not only is such policy socially wasteful, but it also harms the environment by keeping coal prices artificially low. Price supports are known to lead to resource waste. Price supports for fishermen, by countries such as Norway, for example leads to over-fishing and wasteful harvesting of a valuable resource. The Center for Global Development (reference) estimates yearly fishing subsidies at 36.42$ per person in Norway alone, which amounts to 182.1 million dollars.
Trade openness seems to be good for economic sustainability (or weak sustainability) when tested against the World Bank’s genuine savings measure (de Soysa and Neumayer 2005). Countries more open to trade and FDI and allow more economic freedoms tend to be higher genuine savers, a measure of well-being preferred also by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) and others who tie genuine savings to the quality of growth and higher human well-being (Dasgupta 2001).
Improving International Cooperation One of the strongest recommendations for trade is that the growth of commercial ties breed a culture of peace (Hirschman 1977). Peace researchers find that trade reduces conflict between and within 92 states (de Soysa 2002; Russett and Oneal 2000). Controlling for relevant factors, countries that trade more with each other tend to be involved in fewer militarized disputes. Several also find that trade determines the level of civil conflict (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; de Soysa 2002; Krause and Suzuki 2005). If trade drives deep integration of states, then international cooperation on many dimensions is likely to be achieved through higher levels of interstate cooperation. If trade is good for growth, poverty reduction, control of corruption, the increase of genuine savings, peace, and it has no observed general impacts on the environment, trade must reduce vulnerability and increase human well-being.
As many argue, the multilateral trading arrangement is the best platform for increasing free and fair trade and protecting the environment. It is widely recognized that multilateral cooperation through the negotiation of MEAs constitutes the best approach for resolving transboundary (regional and global) environmental concerns. MEAs provide a safeguard against unilateral attempts to address environmental problems, particularly led by powerful states and rich populations. Unilateral solutions are often discriminatory, and frequently involve the extraterritorial application of environmental standards, such as the US’s adoption of Dolphin-safe nets that unfairly targeted poor Mexican fishermen. UNCED clearly endorsed consensual and cooperative multilateral environmental solutions to global environmental problems so as to minimize the impact of special interests. Such solutions reduce the risks of arbitrary discrimination and disguised protectionism, and reflect the international community’s common concern and responsibility for global resources.
Improving Governance Global agreement that binds countries to similar rules that are easy to monitor seems the best option since the incentive of states to free-ride on others in terms of trade is massive, and since the incentives within countries for producers and politicians to rent-seek are also great. Institutions bind power by rules and collective monitoring, which increases cooperation and trust (Keohane and Nye 2000; Nye and Donahue 2000). Moreover, the rules that are set within these institutions for decreasing vulnerabilities and protecting the environment, in particular, are likelier to be arrived at in a consensual manner and monitored more effectively. National governments that ignore the rules of the game that are internationally sanctioned, such as trade in endangered species, can be more effectively sanctioned in multilateral settings because it raises the costs of asocial behavior. States will find it costly to evade risky trading activities that global consumers as well as trade rules deem harmful to society and environment because membership in WTO protocols are binding. In contrast, bilateral trading arrangement and ‘preferential trade agreements’ (PTAs) are hard to monitor and control (Baghwati, 2005). Such PTAs and bilateral treaties may contain trade agreements that allow governments to trade in hazardous materials that endanger local and global communities, but leaving little recourse for people to act.
93 8.5.5 Conflict and Cooperation Conflict and cooperation are both cause and consequence of environmental change and vulnerability. Conflict over resources is not a new phenomenon but one that has persisted since antiquity, as has cooperation. Conflict and cooperation have resulted from both the scarcity and the abundance of natural resources as well as from institutional interventions designed to manage them.
Conflict Conflict, whether related to the environment or not, has direct and indirect negative impacts on human health and vulnerability. There are a few exceptions. Some conflicts, particularly non-violent local disputes over resource control or mega-projects such as dams, can begin to define competing resource needs, address inequalities for vulnerable populations, and increase human well-being through social change (Desloges and Gauthia 1997).
Just as conflict typically holds negative consequences for human well-being and vulnerability, cooperation typically improves human well-being and lowers vulnerability. Like conflict, exceptions also persist when cooperation among sub-national elites - or even states engaged in resource capture - further limit access to livelihood resources and thereby increase vulnerability and undercut human well-being for at-risk populations. Environmental resource management is in many ways a form of conflict management, arbitrating among differing values and priorities around resources. Disputes can undermine the formal and informal institutions for resource use, resulting in environmental degradation and economic decline (Castro and Nielsen 2003).
The level of conflict over natural resources and environmental services ranges from non-violent disputes through organized violence and from local or community levels (farmer to farmer) to intrastate to international between states. It appears critical to distinguish between renewables and non-renewables when mapping out conflict dynamics and the prospects for cooperation. For example, non-renewables such as oil and minerals have been salient factors in violent conflict while there is less evidence of organized violence between states over renewables. Violent conflict over renewables such as water, forests and fish tends to remain civil or subnational in nature.
As indicated in the Resource Paradox archetype, the neo-Malthusian discourse of scarcity, so called grievance-based explanations, has dominated recent investigations of environment and conflict linkages. Resource abundances, or greed-based explanations for conflict, have drawn more of the field’s attention within the last six years, in part in reaction to some of the more ambitious claims on the scarcity side of the equation. The greed and grievance hypotheses are often set against one another as a dichotomous choice where only one can be correct. Such a characterization is a false choice given that both dynamics appear to be in play in different context-specific settings. Both hypotheses, but particularly the scarcity thesis, suffer from a paucity of reliable data covering place, time, and resource type. This shortfall in data necessarily limits the extensive use of quantitative analytical tools to uncover linkages. Scholars investigating the abundance hypothesis have the benefit of easier-to- determine economic valuations of natural resources that are traded in the international marketplace, as also seen in the Resource Paradox archetype.
Natural Resource Conflicts It is a common perception that environmental vulnerabilities or environmental governance are luxury items of secondary importance in times of post-conflict reconstruction. Human vulnerabilities stemming from environmental damage done in war-time often receive little attention or funding by local officials, peacekeeping forces, or external donors.
However there are no more immediate questions in post-conflict settings than is the local water supply contaminated, are the agricultural fields mined, or will generous natural resource concessions be the quid pro quo for rebel forces to lay down their arms, threatening vulnerable communities dependent on natural resources for basic livelihoods? (Haavisto 2005) The challenge for post-conflict vulnerabilities
94 pertaining to environmental conditions centers around firmly establishing the economic, health, and agricultural benefits derived from lowering these vulnerabilities. Managing shared resources or common pollution threats require long-term and regular interactions across the political lines that separate parties along respective political levels of aggregation. These necessary long-term, interdependent interactions present the foundation for turning the environment and conflict thesis on its head and devising opportunities for environmental cooperation as pathways to peace.
The UNEP Post Conflict Branch (PCoB) assessment process experience has revealed the prospect for confidence-building and cooperation through assessment and institutional design in post-conflict settings (Haavisto, 2005)
Cooperation The environment and conflict discourse has garnered significant attention of scholars and practitioners over the last twenty years since it was highlighted with an entire chapter of the Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future. In the rush to understand and then design policy interventions to sever the links between environment and conflict, analysts and practitioners alike have neglected the prospect for building upon the interdependence engendered by many environmental resources and services to achieve confidence-building, cooperation, and perhaps peace (Conca and Dabelko 2002; Conca et al. 2005). As highlighted also in the institutions and governance section above, the primary focus of environmental cooperation has been at the international level with special emphasis on multilateral treaties aimed at mitigating the effects of global change (Young). Since 1987 and the Brundtland Commission report there is clear trend in the number and reach of international environmental agreements signed and ratified.
Opportunities for mainstreaming environment into peacemaking
Yet exploring environmental pathways to confidence-building, or so-called “environmental peacemaking” ideas, seek to put principles of environmental interdependence and long-term iterated cooperation and utilize them within a conflict prevention frame. Environmental peacemaking is a strategy for using environmental cooperation in a way to transform insecurities by building trust and confidence between parties in dispute. Confidence based on environmental cooperation may then prove a foundation for spillover, cooperation in a wider set of issues between the parties.
Environmental issues typically create interdependencies among communities, groups, and states as the environmental phenomena ignore political boundaries. Managing shared resources or common pollution threats require long-term and regular interactions across the political lines that separate parties at local, national, regional, and global levels. These necessary long-term, interdependent interactions present the foundation for turning the environment and conflict thesis on its head and devising opportunities for environmental cooperation as pathways to peace. These environmental peacemaking pathways range all along a conflict continuum that begins with conflict prevention (preventive action), runs through times of conflict (peacemaking), and ends with post-conflict reconstruction (peace-building). At each juncture there are often opportunities for dialogue around environmental assessment or management that may build trust and confidence among the parties in conflict. While conflict continua are typically portrayed linearly, the three stages of conflict are often continually cycling and therefore can be better pictured as a continuous circle. Peace-building in post- conflict settings for example is quite explicitly preventive action given the high number of conflicts that restart after a period of peace [get specific stat from Collier/NPG].
Diplomacy between parties in conflict typically occurs at an official level, commonly state to state in the formal international system. Environmental diplomacy certainly has this primary feature of official interactions and negotiation among states. Yet environmental issues, given their decentralized nature, also hold opportunities and entry points for civil society, within and between states. It is these dual tracks, and the interactions among them, that gives environmental issues opportunities to play
95 these peacemaking roles, perhaps more so than in other issues areas. Negotiations over nuclear weapons or trade policy for example are tightly controlled by the government track with markedly less room for civil society intervention.
In principle environmental peacemaking strategies could be employed at all levels of political organization. Most analysis to date has focused on the bilateral or regional levels among states such as around regional seas (VanDeveer 2002; Blum 2002), along transboundary rivers (Weinthal 2002; Swain 2002; Lopez 2005), or across transboundary conservation areas, commonly known as “peace parks” (Ali 2005; Besançon and Sandwith 2005; Swatuk 2002). Analysis of dynamics and potentials at lower levels of political organization represent a ripe area for future research and policy attention.
At least four categories of environmental peacemaking opportunities are present at different stages along a conflict continuum (Dabelko 2005). Policy interventions, involving a wide range of environment, development, diplomatic, and security policy actors could have roles to play in these different stages. They are: 1) environmental cooperation and natural resource management as conflict prevention; 2) environment as lifeline in times of conflict; 3) environment as essential ingredient in achieving peace; and 4) environment as post-conflict confidence builder.
Environment issues and environmental management play different roles along these stages. Different resources (water, land and forests) appear to have different roles in peacemaking. Despite the “water wars” rhetoric favored by the press and some politicians, the history of water interactions between states is a story of cooperation rather than conflict. Water, as outlined in the water archetype and the research highlighted in figure 8.20, provides a basis for water as the most promising resource for environmental peacemaking potential.
1,700 State-to-State Water Interactions in Transboundary Basins, 1946-1999
International Water Treaty 157
Military Support 7
Non-military Agreement 436
Verbal Suppport 628
Neutral 96
Verbal Hostility 414
Hostile Acts 56
Military Acts 37
Formal War 0
Source: Adapted from Wolf et al. 2003 in Water Policy
The environmental component can also vary in terms of its level of political priority (low politics or high politics). In some cases environmental issues have low levels of political sensitivity and provide an easier avenue for dialogue in otherwise contentious relationships. Joint scientific assessment of threats from radioactive contamination in the Russian Northwest provided an opportunity for Russian, Norwegian, and American exchange as the Cold War ended and the superpowers began to develop links for confidence-building.
In other settings, it is the high political importance assigned to natural resources that give them their peacemaking potential. Shared water resources in South Asia or the Middle East are not the 96 fundamental causes of conflict between states. Yet achieving a negotiated settlement on water allocations is viewed as an essential step for reaching a negotiated and sustainable peace.
In all of these environmental peacemaking efforts there are both environmental and peace goals in play. The dialogue on environmental management is designed to improve human well-being and reduce vulnerabilities as first order goals. But environmental peacemaking efforts also have preventive action, peacemaking, and peace-building goals as well. In this way environmental peacemaking may be bringing additional vulnerability and human well-being benefits by heading off negative environmental consequences of conflict that was avoided.
Environmental peacemaking as a term or a frame is not without its shortcomings. Peacemaking per se is perhaps the most ambitious form of exploiting environmental dynamics to build trust, confidence, and cooperation. Many “environmental peacemaking” efforts will fall far short of achieving peace and any effort must be done in conjunction with other sectoral efforts. Second, practitioner experience in the Nile Basin and the Caucasus indicates that when parties are engaged in what is described here as environmental peacemaking, they may find the peacemaking label impedes rather than advances the efforts. The parties in negotiation are interested in pursuing the peacemaking opportunities presented by environmental dialogue but find it most efficacious for the negotiations to be framed publicly in terms of low politics environmental management or high priority development issues—not conflict prevention.
97 8.5.6 Science and Technology
As critical to local livelihoods and to broader forms of economic development, science and technology support the resources and products that comprise a material basis for a good life. In local contexts, systematic environmental knowledge and technology are often central to agricultural practices, water access and use, and to hunting, herding and gathering. In countries with advanced technical capabilities, science and technology are important for access and maintenance of safe water supplies, for good air quality, and for energy supplies and alternative energy developments. Science and technology are further central to transportation, housing, education materials, and infrastructures.
Science, technology and indigenous and traditional knowledges are important for managing resources (including water supplies, forests, and marine resources) and for addressing challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss that are important for physical and environmental security. Over time, economic growth buttressed by science and technology can enhance “national stability and international security by increasing social cohesion, stability and democratization.” Science and technology can also help to anticipate and respond to natural disasters (UNMP, 2005).
Science and technology are also part of transformations in the nature of conflict. Innovations in science and technology accompany changes in the intelligence, strategies, and tools of conflict. In addition, science and technology are likely to become increasingly the subject of conflict. International disputes have tended to center on access to land, commodities and natural resources, and these subjects of conflict will continue to be important. However, in a world where so much economic value rests on scientific and technical knowledge, conflict and threats to security will take different forms (UNMP, 2005)
Information technology can enhance freedom and choice through education and communication. Information technologies can promote education through distance learning and remote access to education materials. The internet, wireless telephones and other information technologies are enabling people to obtain information and participate in governance in unprecedented ways. With these new technologies citizens are voicing their views, accessing public resources, and holding authorities accountable. Democratic uses of S&T are vividly illustrated in global civil society and its international networks of NGOs who depend heavily on information technologies for communication, organization, and knowledge sharing. (UNMP, 2005). These technologies also increase the efficiency of markets (UNDP, 2001).
People living in developing countries and in poor local contexts often have a rich tradition of knowledge and knowledge-making. Oftentimes these local forms of knowledge center on human- environment relationships, the use of natural resources, and on activities such as hunting, herding, gathering, farming, water access, and natural medicines (Dahl, 1989). Western forms of science have the potential to add to local knowledge and to benefit people in developing countries. Yet, people living in poor areas generally lack access to scientific education, institutions, and knowledge, and to the technological and other benefits that science provides. In addition, because western science is rooted in developed countries, scientists often focus their attention on developed country challenges, and frame problems in ways that align with western perspectives (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma, 1999). This multi-dimensional knowledge divide presents a number of vulnerabilities for poor people. In part, because of science’s limited accessibility and reach, many of the world’s poor run the risk of remaining invisible (or at least underrepresented) in the eye of science and on governance agendas that rely on scientific information. The knowledge divide also hinders the participation of poor people and their representatives in governance processes (Karlsson, 2002).
Developing countries stand to derive many benefits from science and technology, but they also face the greatest challenges in managing S&T risks. Many of these countries lack, for example, the specialized knowledge, regulatory institutions and enforcement mechanisms that can help to identify and manage risks associated with science and technology (UNDP, 2001). There is also an ever- widening gap between have and have-nots throughout the world. This trend is likely to worsen as
98 developed countries continue to invest in technological innovation, and in some cases, attract the human resources of developing countries (IAC, 2003).
The importance of particular technologies often depends on specific (and often local) social, economic and environmental contexts (UNMP, 2005). Institutions comprise a critical feature of these contexts. Institutions and the governance decisions that put them in place can have a significant role in shaping knowledge production and dissemination, as well as technological development, diffusion and use. Institutions can create incentives and dis-incentives for particular types of technological innovation and their distribution. Tax policies, governmental budgets, subsidies and trade policies can shape the production and export of particular technologies. Informal institutions as embedded in gender-specific water collecting responsibilities, beliefs about acceptable farming practices, and reliance on traditional hunting tools can also shape the use, mis-use or rejection of particular technologies (add citations).
Science, technology and innovation are bedrocks of economic development. Twentieth century technologies were central to many improvements in human well-being including increased life expectancy in Asia, Africa and Latin America and reductions in under nutrition in South Asia (UNDP, 2001). Science and technology have clearly been an important part of the new industrialization in East Asia. However, this growth would not have been possible without institutional flexibility, export orientation, and collaboration between public and private sectors (UNMP, 2005). The pace of development related to science and technology and the levels at which different regions achieve progress vary widely.
As evidenced by computing and communication technologies, biotechnology and nanotechnologies, contemporary technological growth rates have a faster pace then those of earlier decades. Computer and information and communications technologies are increasing the quantity and diversity of information that people receive and the speed and audiences with which they are able to communicate. These advances are also bringing down the costs of these technologies. Yet, the internet and other computing and communication technologies remain unavailable to vast numbers of people in the developing world. Biotechnology promises huge advances in agriculture and medicine. Genetics offers new horizons for pharmaceutical development and nanotechnology promises to transform multiple domains from medicine, to energy, to politics (UNDP, 2001).
“Other” forms of knowledge such as local, indigenous and traditional knowledge are garnering attention and prominence in global forums. International institutions such as the World Bank, the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biological Diversity cite these local knowledges as important resources for addressing environment-development challenges. The knowledges are believed to reflect holistic, culturally embedded ways of understanding and interacting with particular social and ecological settings. Consequently, international institutions and treaty regimes are attempting to collect and disseminate local knowledges through databases and to encourage the sharing and incorporation of such knowledge expert advisory processes (Martello, 2001). Even the most extensive, international environmental assessment processes, are involving, not only disciplinary scientists and western forms of science, but also local and indigenous knowledge holders and their perspectives on changes in the natural world and their implications for human- environment interactions and for social life more broadly construed (ACIA, 2004; MEA, 2004). Similarly, the Science Forum at the World Summit on Sustainable Development included a session on traditional knowledge which was interesting for its dual approach. For the scientists, it explored the scientific validation of traditional knowledge. For local knowledge holders and users, it showed how the new tools and approaches of science could enrich their own knowledge framework and practice (Dahl, 2002).
Science and technology contributions to reducing vulnerability
The archetypes of vulnerability highlight numerous ways in which science and technology can contribute to reducing vulnerability. In the water sector, S&T plays an important role in reducing water consumption and increasing the capacity to adapt to changes in water availability. The increasing urbanisation of coastal areas underscores a need to develop sustainable sanitation systems
99 and sustainable energy resources. Contaminated sites require increased support for research on causes and effects of industrial production, chemicals (especially cumulative effects), life cycle analyses, and environmental impact assessments. These sites also call for technology transfer, the use of Best Available Technologies and improved decontamination and remediation alternatives. Small Island Developing States face a number of risks and challenges for which new innovations in and applications of science and technology could be beneficial. These developments include the technology and capacity to assess impacts and adaptation options, documentation of traditional coping mechanisms, shifts in thinking from controlling nature to working with nature, and the development of alternative energy solutions such as hydropower and biogas. The energy sector requires innovation covering the full menu of options (energy diversity) that needs to be deployed (renewables, fossil, efficiency improvement) and realize accelerated learning. S&T needs to include various sustainable development concerns, including security of energy supply, climate change, health concerns and energy poverty. Science, technology and local knowledge serve important functions in CPR regimes. These tools can be used to identify, develop, assess, use and monitor CPRs. Science and technology are essential, for example, for oil and gas development, irrigation system construction, whale and fish stock estimations, forest product use and tracking the quality and abundance of CPRs over time. In some cases, science and local knowledge can prove instrumental in identifying and characterizing changes to a resource such as global climate and the implications for these changes. In other cases, as with strip mining or deforestation, science and technology are the tools with which a resource is degraded.
Avenues for policy development
Scientific and technological disparties among developed and devloping countries call for new policies to build on rich forms of local knowledge and innovation in developing countries, enhance developing country capacities to build their own versions of western-style science and technology, and catalyze synergies among western and other forms of science and technology.
There are a number of options for bringing western forms of science into local contexts through scientific projects that focus on issues of sustainable development, institutions that make science education available to the poor, the communication of scientific information that is relevant and accessible to local peoples, and monitoring projects through which local people can observe environmental and social changes. Such monitoring processes could build local scientific capacity and provide information valuable in promoting environmental awareness and informed decisionmaking (IEF, 2002). In New Caledonia contemporary science is being used to enhance and validate traditional knowledge about the region’s biodiversity and about agricultural and irrigation practices (Dahl, 1989). Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is an activity through which local people can bring together scientific and local form of knowledge to better understand their environment and ecological processes. EIA tools also help to instill in local people a greater sense of responsibility for environmental resources and an enhanced understanding of how to manage these resources. Another similar initiative, the South Pacific Biodiversity Conservation Programme has successfully encouraged the establishment of local protected areas for biodiversity conservation owned and managed by the local communities, and incorporating their own local monitoring. (Dahl, 2002).
Policymakers can also improve knowledge production about developing coutries through building scientific capacity in these countries and encouraging scientists elsewhere to focus on their issues. Investors can direct money to environmental monitoring and data gathering initiatives, make long- term commitments to science education, and provide research grants to researchers in the developing world. Other support can focus on expanding the community of scientists from developed countries focused on issues from developing countries, and encouraging them to engage, learn from, and share knowledge and results with local people in their research. Capacity building can also take place through programs in which school children, non-governmental organizations, amateur volunteers, and other societal groups participate in data collection activities, the application of simple research methodologies, data analysis and the dissemination of research results. Other approaches to the knowledge divide rest in changes in decisionmaking. Decisionmakers could be educated and required to be more aware of developed country biases in the information on which they rely. These
100 decisionmakers could begin to demand more complete scientific representation from the developing countries and could allocate resources so as to see that this representation exists. Where knowledge about developing countries and from their perspectives is unavailable and where extrapolations from developed to developing countries are applied, scientists should communicate their assumptions and potential biases to decisionmakers. Decisionmakers could more actively seek out and use scientific knowledge generated in developing countries. Valuable knowledge developed in developing countries often does not circulate as widely as knowledge based on work from developed countries. Decisionmakers could devote resources to provide resources to help developing country scientists publicize their knowledge and bring it to the attention of governance institutions. Decisionmakers could also seek to broaden the disciplinary and alternative forms of knowledge represented in advisory processes (Karlsson, 2002).
New contributions to S&T for development require new linkages among government, universities and industry. This could include, for example, universities becoming more engaged with development and fostering development through, for example, business incubation centers, entrepreneurial training and internships, transferring university research to firms, Science education is also of utmost importance at the primary and secondary levels (UNMP, 2005). The transformation of knowledge to products and services is at the core of many businesses. A major challenge for many developing countries resides in linking knowledge production and business formation. The stimulation of the creation of small and medium-size businesses would be one approach to dealing with this challenge and these enterprises could then contribute to the development of new opportunities for and uses of technology. Banks and other financial institutions could also stimulate technological innovation. It has also been recommended that national governments in developing countries should increase their spending on research and development to between 1 and 1.5 percent or GDP (IAC, 2003). Government procurement could serve as a tool to stimulate technological development. Foreign direct investment is needed in developing countries in order to bolster technological capacity and promote regional markets (UNMP, 2005).
8.5.7 Conclusion
The six cross-cutting issues identified in this section provide opportunities for enhancing well-being. Environment and natural resource management can be potential areas for building cooperation and solidarity. The analysis of the dynamics and potential of environmental cooperation at lower levels of political organisation represent a ripe area for future research and policy formulation. Several institutional changes have a potential for improving livelihoods, and most importantly improving, protecting and strengthening tenurial regimes. There is a special role here for protecting and strengthening women’s rights. The international trade environment at present works to the disadvantage of developing countries and creates an imbalance that needs to be corrected. Policies that seek to build participatory institutions at the field level should focus on devolution of powers and control to user groups, rather than simply create management capacity at the field level. Health policy provides an entry point for improving well-being, and this can happen only in an environment where health policies are mainstreamed into development planning and macroeconomic policy.
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