DOCSLIB.ORG

1 ESHET Conference 7-9 June 2018-05-08 Complutense University of Madrid John Stuart Mill and the Concept of Externality: What Co

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 ESHET Conference 7-9 June 2018-05-08 Complutense University of Madrid John Stuart Mill and the Concept of Externality: What Co ESHET Conference 7-9 June 2018-05-08 Complutense University of Madrid John Stuart Mill and the concept of externality: what counts as a harm Elodie BERTRAND1 Draft version The history of the concept of externalities is necessarily also a history of the ethics of externalities. In this perspective, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill is inescapable. His principle limiting private liberty to what does not harm others is regularly referred to in the analyses of externalities (e.g., Chauvier 2013). Even more, this principle is sometimes interpreted as pointing at externalities (e.g., Medema 2009). The present paper aims at assessing the role of Mill’s harm principle in the definition of the concept of externality. It will interpret On Liberty (Mill 1859) and The Principles of Political Economy (1871, V.11) with the lens of the modern definition of externalities. Mill’s principle does not aim at involuntary harm, hence does not aim at externalities. However, it is true that On Liberty is crucial to the economists’ modern definition of externalities, but for another reason, insufficiently explored. Other types of externalities can be found in Mill: indirect harms that, in his view, do not justify public interference, and that correspond to external effects that are excluded from the standard definition of externalities. These are “moral” externalities, these effects of our actions that harm others by injuring their morality. I conclude that Mill does not refer to externalities as market failures, but that he gave welfare economists the philosophical background that justifies them in excluding moral externalities while their view of welfare as preferences satisfaction should lead to this concept. What counts as an externality rests on the liberal harm principle. The economists’ concept of externalities is grounded in Mill, but not in the sense Mill would write about externalities, rather because economists exclude from externalities the same moral effects that Mill excludes from the harm principle. 1 CNRS, Institut des Sciences Juridique et Philosophique de la Sorbonne, UMR 8103 (CNRS & University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), [email protected] I thank Sophie Jallais, Nathalie Sigot and Regis Servant for their comments and suggestions. 1 1. Introduction Externalities pose specific problems to ethics. Moral philosophers agree that there is a duty not to harm, a principle that John Stuart Mill developed particularly in On Liberty (1859). Externalities, however, cause a peculiar harm, which is involuntary and indirect: it arises from the conjunction between an otherwise legitimate action and a specific state of the world that makes this action cause this harm to others. Does this harm become legitimate from the moment it is involuntary? Or does the harm to others taint the action that causes it with its illegitimacy? In his Ethique sans visage (Ethics without Face, 2013), the philosopher Stéphane Chauvier poses the problem in these terms, which bring to light two elements. First, the history of the concept of externalities is necessarily also a history of the ethics of externalities: thinking about externalities necessarily leads to think about its legitimacy or about the legitimacy of forbidding the action that causes it. Second, when reflecting about externalities, and therefore about their ethics, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill is inescapable. It so happens that his principle limiting private liberty to what does not harm others is regularly referred to in the analyses of externalities. Chauvier (2013) applies some parts of On Liberty to build his ethics of externalities. The jurist Michael Trebilcock parallels the delineation of Mill’s harm to others and the delineation of externalities: “What should count as an externality in welfare terms, or what should count as a harm to others in liberal terms?” (1993, 58-59). As for economics, Kenneth Arrow (1969) and Ezra Mishan (1971a; 1974), two important authors for the definition of the concept of externalities, made passing references to Mill. Regarding now the historical and philosophical analyses of the concept, the link between Mill and the concept of externalities is rarely developed. Donald Herzog (2000), professor in political theory and public law, suggested in a book review the important intuition that the borders of the externalities that economists take into account – technological but not moral – were grounded in Mill’s liberalism. Moreover, the sociologist James Coleman interprets Mill’s principle as applying to externalities (1990, 343). In his Hesitant Hand (2009), Steven Medema asserts that Mill’s harm principle directly aims at externalities: they would be included into the “harm to others” that public interference is legitimate in interfering with. Medema adds that Mill would also discuss a list of positive and negative externalities in the chapter of his Principles that delineates a legitimate sphere of economic intervention for the State.2 The present paper therefore aims at assessing the role of Mill’s harm principle (as expanded in On Liberty, 1859) in the definition of the concept of externality. This will lead to challenge a part of Medema’s interpretation and develop Herzog’s intuition. Analysing this role also contributes to the history of the concept (both in philosophy and in economics), and to the analysis of some philosophical presuppositions of the economic concept. In On Liberty (I, 9), Mill states from the start that the object of his book is to establish what will be later known as the “harm principle” (or “liberal principle”), which allows limiting liberty in case of harm to others (and only in this case): 2 In what follows, that public intervention is legitimate does not necessarily implies that it is necessary or that it is the only solution. Mill’s harm principle is not a sufficient principle; and when Mill opens a domain for public intervention in the Principles, he also adds that in each case, one has to prove that it is more efficient (see references below and Medema 2009, chapter 2). 2 The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. In accordance with the modern and standard definition of technological externalities, the New Palgrave defines them as “the indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production activity on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production function of a producer. By indirect, we mean that the effect concerns an agent other than the one exerting this economic activity and that this effect does not work through the price system” (Laffont 1987, 263). The modern definition excludes pecuniary externalities and other utility interdependences (like envy). To proceed, this paper interprets Mill’s On Liberty (1859, OL herein) and book V (precisely ch. 11) of The Principles of Political Economy (1871 for the 7th edition, PPE herein) with the lens of the modern definition of externalities. On the one hand, Mill’s harm principle does not aim at involuntary harm, hence does not aim at externalities. Examining other passages from his works that are sometimes interpreted as referring to externalities, I will argue that once put in their contexts, it must be recognized that they do not aim at externalities. On the other hand, however, it is true that On Liberty is crucial to the economists’ modern definition of externalities, but for another reason, insufficiently explored. Other types of externalities can be found in Mill: indirect harms that, in his view, do not justify public interference, and that correspond to external effects that are excluded from the standard definition of externalities. These are “moral” externalities, these effects of our actions that harm others by injuring their morality. They were excluded while welfare economists restrained the concept of externalities to technological externalities. But if economists were consistent in their view of welfare as satisfaction of preferences, they should take into account these moral externalities (which diminish utility). The implicit (and sometimes explicit) reason for excluding moral externalities from the analysis was, precisely, that, in chapter IV of On Liberty, Mill eliminates them from the domain of legitimate intervention. Consequently, there is no evidence that On Liberty concerns phenomena denoted today by “technological externalities”. But the economists’ exclusion of moral externalities from the domain of externalities relevant to welfare originates from their liberalism, anchored in Mill’s discussion of the harm principle. What counts as an externality rests on the liberal harm principle. Mill is important for the construction of the concept, but not (or not only) for the reasons invoked by Medema; it is rather for what he excludes from harms to others legitimating liberty limitations than by what he includes in these harms. 3 2. Externalities are not included in Mill’s harm to others The domain of externalities relevant to welfare economics The discussion on externalities took off in the 1950s and focused on the disparity between general equilibrium and Pareto-optimum that they cause, with Meade 1952, Scitovsky 1954, and Bator 1958 (see Mishan 1971b, Medema 2017, Berta 2017). Economists first considered this concept theoretically, as a source of suboptimality, then they realized that the concept had a real counterpart, namely pollution. The history of the concept of externality from the 1950s to the 1970s is thus a story of its restriction, under a double constraint.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 2013 Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle Michele Lombardi University of Glasgow Kaname Miyagishima Waseda University Roberto Veneziani University of Massachusetts - Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Lombardi, Michele; Miyagishima, Kaname; and Veneziani, Roberto, "Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle" (2013). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 158. https://doi.org/10.7275/4273869 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Working Paper Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle By Michele Lombardi K name M yagishima Roberto Veneziani a i Working Paper 2013-07 UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle Michele Lombardi,1 Kaname Miyagishima,2 Roberto Veneziani3 May 22, 2013 1Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]. 2JSPS Research Fellow, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-104 Totsukamachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8050, Japan. E-mail: [email protected] 3(Corresponding author) School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, United Kingdom, and Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. Abstract This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for dis- tributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly
    Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC Honors Theses University Honors Program 5-2002 The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses Recommended Citation Daly, Chris, "The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill" (2002). Honors Theses. Paper 131. This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact [email protected]. r The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly May 8, 2002 r ABSTRACT The following study exanunes three works of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Three Essays on Religion, and their subsequent effects on liberalism. Comparing the notion on individual freedom espoused in On Liberty to the notion of the social welfare in Utilitarianism, this analysis posits that it is impossible for a political philosophy to have two ultimate ends. Thus, Mill's liberalism is inherently flawed. As this philosophy was the foundation of Mill's progressive vision for humanity that he discusses in his Three Essays on Religion, this vision becomes paradoxical as well. Contending that the neo-liberalist global economic order is the contemporary parallel for Mill's religion of humanity, this work further demonstrates how these philosophical flaws have spread to infect the core of globalization in the 21 st century as well as their implications for future international relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Justice Be Based on Consent?*
    The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 12, Number 1, 2004, pp. 79–101 Can Justice Be Based on Consent?* Frank Lovett Political Science, Columbia University HIS article will discuss a general class of theories that attempt to base a Tnormative account of justice on consent-giving procedures. Contemporary political philosophers offer many different accounts of justice, but at present consent-based theories are probably the most popular. Notwithstanding their (often understandable) appeal, I will argue they cannot possibly succeed. All consent-based theories trade on a crucial ambiguity as to whether they are supposed to be understood as voluntarist accounts of justice on the one hand, or as rationalist accounts on the other. In the former case, consent-based theories fail because they are at best indeterminate and at worst incoherent; in the latter case, they fail because they are superfluous. I will refer to this fatal ambiguity as “Cassirer’s Dilemma.” Interestingly, Cassirer’s Dilemma is not at all new (although its relevance for contemporary consent-based theories does not seem to have been noticed previously): on the contrary, it may be among the oldest problems plaguing western moral and political philosophy. Faced with this insurmountable difficulty, I believe we ought to abandon proceduralism and focus instead on developing substantive accounts of justice. These admittedly bold claims will be explained and defended in due course. Before going much further, however, it will be useful to clarify a few concepts as they will be employed in this article. Although the terms “just” and “unjust” can be applied to a wide range of political institutions, legal regimes, public policies, individual conduct, and so on, contemporary political philosophers tend to abstract from such particular applications so as to focus in a general manner on what are often called the principles of justice.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberty, Property and Rationality
    Liberty, Property and Rationality Concept of Freedom in Murray Rothbard’s Anarcho-capitalism Master’s Thesis Hannu Hästbacka 13.11.2018 University of Helsinki Faculty of Arts General History Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty Laitos – Institution – Department Humanistinen tiedekunta Filosofian, historian, kulttuurin ja taiteiden tutkimuksen laitos Tekijä – Författare – Author Hannu Hästbacka Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title Liberty, Property and Rationality. Concept of Freedom in Murray Rothbard’s Anarcho-capitalism Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject Yleinen historia Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level Aika – Datum – Month and Sivumäärä– Sidoantal – Number of pages Pro gradu -tutkielma year 100 13.11.2018 Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract Murray Rothbard (1926–1995) on yksi keskeisimmistä modernin libertarismin taustalla olevista ajattelijoista. Rothbard pitää yksilöllistä vapautta keskeisimpänä periaatteenaan, ja yhdistää filosofiassaan klassisen liberalismin perinnettä itävaltalaiseen taloustieteeseen, teleologiseen luonnonoikeusajatteluun sekä individualistiseen anarkismiin. Hänen tavoitteenaan on kehittää puhtaaseen järkeen pohjautuva oikeusoppi, jonka pohjalta voidaan perustaa vapaiden markkinoiden ihanneyhteiskunta. Valtiota ei täten Rothbardin ihanneyhteiskunnassa ole, vaan vastuu yksilöllisten luonnonoikeuksien toteutumisesta on kokonaan yksilöllä itsellään. Tutkin työssäni vapauden käsitettä Rothbardin anarko-kapitalistisessa filosofiassa. Selvitän ja analysoin Rothbardin ajattelun keskeisimpiä elementtejä niiden filosofisissa,
    [Show full text]
  • Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-Faire Richard A
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Economics 1997 Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-Faire Richard A. Epstein Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Epstein, "Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-Faire" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 49, 1997). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-Faire by Richard A. Epstein* Introduction: A Fallen Theory? Laissez-faire capitalism, and its associated doctrine of freedom of contract, had many stalwart defenders during the nineteenth century. But it has received a rocky reception from many legal and philosophical commentators in the twentieth century. Freedom of contract often been pronounced "dead on arrival" as an organizing principle for complex contemporary societies. That principle has been said to be insensitive to differences in wealth, status, position and power that make the exercise of contractual choice a myth for the weak and dispossessed. Within the legal literature, it has been attacked as ignoring the large concentrations of wealth that distort market processes and that trample down the rights of consumers and workers.
    [Show full text]
  • Principle of Liberty Or Harm Principle?
    Principle of Liberty or Harm Principle? Paola Cavalieri Etica & Animali Milan .----.~'~ /---.:'"\........ \ yet, the class also includes nonsexual offenses. One of these is cruelty to animals. The view that the rationale of the law could be, in addition to the protection ofone individual from another, also the punishment of "moral wickedness", has been called "legal moralism."2 Henceforth, I shall use the term "morality" to refer to the corpus of beliefs and customs that are allegedly impaired by the "victimless crimes" and that legal moralism aims to defend; and the term "morals" to mean what is covered by the laws intended to protect one individual from another. In this sense, rape can be defined as a crime against morals, In the framework of Western democracies, the while homosexual relations between consenting adults movement for the prevention of cruelty to animals has can be-and often is-considered a crime against been seen, ever since it dawned, as a lobby-a pressure morality. Legal moralism, usually endorsed by group born to defend some spiritual inclinations, or conservatives, is criticized by liberals. The view that it subsidiary preferences, of some members of the political may be possible to defend by legal, or else social, community. In the first case, the most suitable sanctions the conformity to a particular code ofbehavior comparison is with a religious sect, or with a moralizing that is shared by the majority at a certain time seems organization; in the second one, with some association unacceptable to those for whom the memory of the of a more or less corporate nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Political Science Theses Department of Political Science Fall 11-16-2012 Beyond Libertarianism: Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein Matthew A. Towery Georgia State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses Recommended Citation Towery, Matthew A., "Beyond Libertarianism: Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/45 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BEYOND LIBERTARIANISM: INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL’S HARM PRINCIPLE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS THEREIN by MATTHEW TOWERY Under the Direction of Mario Feit ABSTRACT The thesis will examine the harm principle, as originally described by John Stuart Mill. In doing so, it will defend that, though unintended, the harm principle may justify several principles of distributive justice. To augment this analysis, the paper will examine several secondary au- thors’ interpretations of the harm principle, including potential critiques of the thesis itself. INDEX WORDS: Mill, Harm principle, Libertarianism, Redistribution,
    [Show full text]
  • A Ripstein Beyond the Harm Principle Revised
    Beyond the Harm Principle* Arthur Ripstein University of Toronto Draft: do not quote or circulate without permission. In On Liberty, just a few sentences after he introduces his famous “harm principle,” John Stuart Mill writes "The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which is he is answerable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign." My aim is to argue that a commitment to individual sovereignty and a sphere of action in which you are answerable only to yourself requires that we abandon the harm principle. This may seem surprising. The harm principle is often thought to be the centerpiece of liberal thinking about the criminal law. Non-liberal régimes regard the criminal law as an instrument to be used for broader moral purposes, whenever it can be used to make (some) people's lives go better; liberal defenders of the harm principle insist that the only legitimate occasion for using the criminal law to limit liberty is to protect people from each other. The liberal commitments of the harm principle go even deeper, because the presumption in favour of liberty and the idea of protecting people from each other combine to generate a presumption in favour of responsibility – aside from narrow exceptions for incitement to crime, one person cannot be prohibited from doing something just because it will lead her or someone else to do something prohibited. So even if it could be shown that the avoidance of vice will lead to a reduction in other crime, that would not be sufficient reason for criminalizing it.
    [Show full text]
  • JS Mill's Political Thought
    P1: JZZ 0521860202pre CUFX079B/Urbinati 0 521 86020 2 cupusbw December 26, 2006 7:38 This page intentionally left blank ii P1: JZZ 0521860202pre CUFX079B/Urbinati 0 521 86020 2 cupusbw December 26, 2006 7:38 J. S. MILL’S POLITICAL THOUGHT The year 2006 marked the two hundredth anniversary of John Stuart Mill’s birth. Although his philosophical reputation has varied greatly in the interven- ing years, it is now clear that Mill ranks among the most influential modern political thinkers. Yet despite his enduring influence, and perhaps also because of it, the breadth and complexity of Mill’s political thought is often under- appreciated. Although his writings remain a touchstone for debates over liberty and liberalism, many other important dimensions of his political philosophy have until recently been mostly ignored or neglected. This volume aims, first, to correct such neglect by illustrating the breadth and depth of Mill’s political writings. It does so by drawing togetheracollection of essays whose authors explore underappreciated elements of Mill’s political philosophy, including his democratic theory, his writings on international relations and military inter- ventions, and his treatments of socialism and despotism. Second, the volume shows how Mill’s thinking remains pertinent to our own political life in three broad areas – democratic institutions and culture, liberalism, and international politics – and offers a critical reassessment of Mill’s political philosophy in light of recent political developments and transformations. Nadia Urbinati
    [Show full text]
  • A Pluralist Case for the Harm Principle
    RIBEIRO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 4:05 PM A Pluralist Case for the Harm Principle GONÇALO ALMEIDA RIBEIRO* I. Should the law interfere with individual choices and actions that cause no harm to others but that are regarded as wrong? Is it permissible for the law to restrain individual freedom not for the sake of preventing harm to others but in order to prevent people from performing immoral deeds or from debasing or harming themselves? Doubtless that is the purpose of some laws, although it is not always easy to tell which and to what extent, since most laws pursue, or can be interpreted to pursue, a variety of goals. Standard examples of moralist legislation, such as the criminalization of bigamy, and of paternalist legislation, such as bans on the sale of body parts, may with more or less ingenuity be construed as measures taken to prevent harm to others. It seems indeed that it is not so easy to isolate obvious cases of laws uniquely infused with moralist or paternalist concerns.1 But neither is it impossible. In two of its most famous decisions—Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas—the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether laws in Georgia and in Texas punishing acts of sodomy or “deviant sexual intercourse” taken in private by consenting adults, particularly in the case of Texas by adults of the same sex, are * © 2017 Conçalo Almeida Ribeiro. Católica Global School of Law and Católica Research Centre for the Future of Law (Lisbon). LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard Law School.
    [Show full text]
  • The Collapse of the Harm Principle
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 90 Article 3 Issue 1 Fall Fall 1999 The olC lapse of the Harm Principle Bernard E. Harcourt Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Bernard E. Harcourt, The oC llapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109 (1999-2000) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/99/9001-0109 THE JOURNALOF CRIMINALLAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 90, No. I Cop)right 0 1999 by Northwestern University, School of Law Piinted in USA. THE COLLAPSE OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE BERNARD E. HARCOURT I. INTRODUCTION In November 1998, fourteen neighborhoods in Chicago voted to shut down their liquor stores, bars, and lounges, and four more neighborhoods voted to close down specific taverns. Three additional liquor establishments were voted shut in Feb- ruary 1999. Along with the fourteen other neighborhoods that passed dry votes in 1996 and those that went dry right after Pro- hibition, to date more than 15% of Chicago has voted itself dry. The closures affect alcohol-related businesses, like liquor stores and bars, but do not restrict drinking in the privacy of one's hoifie. The legal mechanism is an arcane 1933 "vote yourself dry" law, enacted at the time of the repeal of Prohibition, and amended by the state legislature in 1995.' Chicago's temperance movement reflects a fascinating de- velopment in the legal enforcement of morality.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright by Robert Allen Garmong 2002
    Copyright by Robert Allen Garmong 2002 This Dissertation Committee for Robert Allen Garmong certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: J.S. Mill’s Re-Conceptualization of Liberty Committee: ________________________ Daniel Bonevac, Supervisor ________________________ David Braybrooke ________________________ Robert Solomon ________________________ Robert Kane ________________________ Richard Cherwitz J.S. MILL’S RE-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LIBERTY by Robert Allen Garmong, B.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin December, 2002 To my parents: To John R. Garmong, without whose moral and material support this dissertation could not have been completed, and To Janis R. Garmong, who taught me to ask questions J.S. MILL’S RE-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LIBERTY Publication No. _________________ Robert Allen Garmong, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2002 Supervisor: Daniel Bonevac In this dissertation, I argue that John Stuart Mill does not defend a classical liberal, Lockean idea of liberty as freedom from coercion, especially governmental coercion. Rather, I argue that Mill has something much more radical in mind: for Mill, liberty requires freedom from the much broader idea of “the moral coercion of public opinion.” Mill’s so-called “harm principle,” which is at the root of his defense of liberty, is often common-sensically interpreted according to what I term the political interpretation of the harm principle. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to restrict the use of coercion, especially governmental coercion.
    [Show full text]