Lex Loci Arbitri and Annulment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in U.S

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Lex Loci Arbitri and Annulment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in U.S American University International Law Review Volume 20 | Issue 5 Article 7 2005 Lex Loci Arbitri and Annulment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts Catherine A. Giambatiani Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Giambastiani, Catherine A. "Lex Loci Arbitri and Annulment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts." American University International Law Review 20, no. 5 (2005): 1101-1112. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: LEXLOCIARBITRI AND ANNULMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS IN U.S. COURTS CATHERINE A. GIAMBASTIANI* IN TR O D U C TIO N ......................................................................... 1101 I. BACKGROUND TO THE KARAHA BODAS DECISION ....... 1102 II. KARAHA BODAS v. PER TAMINA ........................................... 1103 III. KARAHA BODAS, CORTEZ BYRD, AND TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF LEXLOCIARBITRI ................................... 1105 C O N C LU SIO N ............................................................................. 1112 INTRODUCTION In a recent decision out of the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"),1 only courts in countries with primary jurisdiction may effectively vacate an arbitral award.2 Primary jurisdiction is limited to the country that serves as the situs of the arbitration and possibly the home of the applicable procedural law, if different than the situs of the arbitration.' Further, the Fifth Circuit held that courts with secondary jurisdiction may only decide whether arbitral awards B.A. University of Virginia (2002), J.D. American University, Washington College of Law (2005). The author served as the Senior Critical Essays Editor of the American University International Law Review from 2004-05. 1. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [hereinafter New York Convention], June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (mandating reciprocal enforcement for all signatory countries). 2. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004). 3. See discussion infra Part III (addressing the New York Convention's provisions regarding annulments and construction of such provisions). 1101 1102 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. [20:1101 will be enforced within that country.4 Secondary jurisdictions are countries subject to the New York Convention outside of those with primary jurisdiction.' Parties obtaining annulments in secondary jurisdictions may not attempt to use such annulments as a defense to enforcement in other jurisdictions pursuant to the New York Convention.6 Thus, annulment decisions by courts in countries with secondary jurisdiction should not prevent enforcement elsewhere. 7 I. BACKGROUND TO THE KARAHA BODAS DECISION Several years before the Fifth Circuit holding, the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., in which the Court held that the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act8 ("FAA") are permissive.' In Cortez Byrd, the Court held that the FAA allowed venues outside of the place of the award to effectively vacate arbitral awards as long as the jurisdiction was appropriate under the general venue statute. 10 Accordingly, a Mississippi court was permitted to vacate an Alabama arbitral award." 4. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 287. 5. See discussion infra Part III (describing the differences between primary and secondary jurisdictions). 6. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 287. 7. Id. 8. 9 U.S.C. § 201-208 (2000) (implementing the New York Convention as the Federal Arbitration Act). 9. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (resolving the split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals as to whether the FAA's venue provision are permissive or mandatory). 10. Id. at204. 11. See id. (overturning the Eleventh Circuit, which had held that venue was limited to the Northern District of Alabama). The arbitration arose pursuant to a contract dispute between Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. and Bill Harbert Construction Company regarding Harbert's construction of a wood chip mill for Cortez Byrd in Mississippi. Id. at 195. After the arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Harbert, Cortez Byrd filed a motion to vacate or modify the award in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. at 196. In response, Harbert filed a motion to confirm the award in the Northern District of Alabama. Id. Cortez Byrd then sought to dismiss, transfer, or stay the Alabama action. Id. The Alabama court denied the motion and held that Alabama was the 2005] ANNULMENT OF FOREIGNARBITRAL A WARDS 1103 Despite the potential benefits of allowing permissive construction of venue provisions for vacatur in the domestic context,1 2 the Cortez Byrd Court also inferred that similar reasoning should apply when considering foreign arbitral awards.13 Such reasoning should be analyzed and compared with the recent finding by the Fifth Circuit in Karaha Bodas and with traditional notions of lex loci arbitri. II. KARAHA BODAS V. PERTAMINA In 1994, Karaha Bodas Co. ("KBC") entered into two contracts with Indonesia's national gas and oil company, Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"), to build and operate a geothermal electricity development facility in Indonesia. 14 A contract dispute led to arbitration in Switzerland pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules.15 The contract stipulated Indonesian law as the applicable substantive law. 16 The arbitral tribunal held Pertamina liable and awarded KBC damages for expenses and lost profits.' only proper venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify the award. Id. The Alabama court thereafter entered judgment in favor of Harbert. Id. 12. See Karyn A. Doi, Recent Development, Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 409, 418 (2001) (discussing the positive arbitration policies reinforced by Cortez Byrd). 13. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing the Cortez Byrd decision and its discussion of international arbitration and concerns regarding actions to vacate or modify awards rendered in non-signatory states). 14. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the relevant contracts at issue, which gave KBC the right to develop energy sources in Indonesia with Pertamina's management and to sell electrical energy to an electric utility owned by the Indonesian government). 15. See id. at 282-83 (explaining the Indonesian government's suspension of the energy project due to the country's financial problems, which in turn led to the contract dispute between KBC and Pertamina). 16. See id. at 290-91 (referring to the relevant provisions in the contracts between KBC and Pertamina, which explicitly state that they are governed by the substantive laws of Indonesia). 17. See id. at 284-85 (awarding $261.1 million in damages to KBC). 1104 AM. U. INT'L L. RE V. [20:1101 After receiving the favorable award, KBC filed suit in federal district court in Texas to enforce the arbitral award.18 As the enforcement action in the U.S. court was pending, Pertamina sought and was denied annulment of the award in Swiss courts.19 The Texas district court enforced the arbitral award20 and Pertamina thereafter sought annulment in Indonesia.21 In 2002, Indonesian courts vacated the arbitral award and attempted to prevent its enforcement elsewhere. 2 In 2004, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the Indonesian annulment provided a defense to enforcement under the New York Convention and held that the Indonesian annulment did not prevent U.S. courts from enforcing the arbitral award.23 Noah Rubins has pointed out the failures of the Indonesian judiciary in denying enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and failing to promote the values of the New York Convention, most recently highlighted by its attempted annulment in Karaha Bodas.24 Despite the internal failings within Indonesia represented by the annulment in Karaha Bodas,25 the question raised by the case and its 18. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D. Tex. 2001), aff'd, 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004). 19. See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 285 (describing how the Texas district court slowed the proceedings to await the Swiss court's decision). 20. KarahaBodas Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 21. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara v. Karaha Bodas Co., Case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, Preliminary Award (Central Jakarta State Court 2002) (unofficial translation), available at http://www.lfip.org/lawe506/ documents/sessionl4/e506kbjakartadctprelim.doc (last visited July 12, 2005). 22. Id. 23. See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 310 ("Under the New York Convention, the parties' arbitration agreement, and this record, Switzerland had primary jurisdiction over the Award.") The court held that Indonesia did not have primary jurisdiction and the court therefore affirmed the district court's decision that the Indonesian annulment could not be used as a proper defense to enforcement in the United States under the New York Convention. Id. 24. See Noah Rubins, The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indonesia, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 359 (2005) (describing the Indonesian court's decision to annul the arbitration award). Mr. Rubins argues that the Indonesian annulment was based on "unpredictable and unprincipled grounds," contrary to the spirit and standards of the New York Convention.
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