A Critical Examination of Critical Realism
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BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY A Critical Examination of Critical Realism Sander Klaasse Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Divinity The University of Edinburgh 2018 DECLARATION I declare that this thesis was composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own. ABSTRACT Methodological issues lie at the heart of the current science-theology exchange and it has been in particular the concept of critical realism that has been widely adopted as providing the rationale for an enriching dialogue between science and theology. Introduced by Ian G. Barbour and further developed by, among others, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, critical realism has become the default position for many within the field of science and religion and it has made possible the developments of the past six decades in this field. Despite its prominent position, an in-depth and critical examination of critical realism from philosophical perspectives is currently lacking in the science and theology literature. Aware of this need, the aim of this project is twofold. First, this research intends to define and clarify what is actually meant with critical realism. In doing so, I introduce the notion of ‘family resemblance’ as a helpful metaphor for understanding the many nuances of various critical realisms in science-theology scholarship. Furthermore, a taxonomy of the various philosophical and methodological commitments is offered, which forms the backbone of subsequent chapters (Chapter 2 on metaphysics, Chapter 3 on epistemology, Chapter 4 on semantics, and Chapters 5, 6, and 7 on methodology). Second, this study aims to reveal certain weaknesses in the rationale underpinning and informing the critical realist stance. Hefner’s critical diagnosis of critical realism runs as a leitmotif through this doctoral thesis: This now widely used term, ‘critical realism’, is beginning to appear in the writings of several authors in a somewhat doctrinaire sense, as if it were an established theory of explanation, when in fact it is a suggestive hypothesis that is struggling for credibility in the marketplace of ideas (Hefner, 1985: 32). In addition to various chapter-specific challenges, we will turn to Hefner’s diagnosis in particular in Chapter 8. Here I introduce Pelikan’s distinction between ‘apologetics’ and ‘presupposition’ as a helpful way to understand the aims of critical realism and to show that critical realism is indeed a suggestive hypothesis. Furthermore, with the chapter-specific weaknesses and two more general criticisms, I hope to argue that critical realism should be understood as mostly a suggestive hypothesis that has become critical for those who take a positive stance towards the epistemological capabilities of theology and a critical stance for those considering science as the only valid way of acquiring knowledge. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS More people than I can name here have contributed to the shaping of this PhD. First and foremost, I owe a significant debt to my doctoral supervisors, Mark Harris and Michela Massimi, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the PhD thesis, our enriching discussions on science and religion, philosophy of science and many more, and for fostering an academic culture to study critical realism. Many hours of discussing and exploring numerous debates in philosophy, science and religion, and theology have been a tremendous privilege. Furthermore, I wish to thank The University of Edinburgh’s School of Divinity, and in particular David Fergusson, Michael Fuller, and Jamie Collins for our constructive dialogues. Furthermore, I received valuable inspiration from the conversations with Paul Allen, Andreas Losch, and Gijsbert van den Brink on critical realism. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Andrew Moore and Michael Fuller for engaging with the doctoral thesis on such a comprehensive level and for providing very helpful comments to improve the overall argument and various chapter-specific issues. I am also grateful to the members of the John J. Reilly Center of the University of Notre Dame. It was such a wonderful experience being part of this community of academics, and I would like to thank in particular Anjan Chakravartty for his helpful comments on the present study in general and the chapter ‘The Mind-Independence of What?’ in particular. Furthermore, the face-to-face meetings with Celia Deane- Drummond, Christian Smith, Katherine Brading, and Michael Rea have helped me a lot in articulating my ideas on critical realism. I also wish to thank those who have offered financial support for this PhD research. I gratefully acknowledge the support of The University of Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Sciences Studentship, the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, and the Dr. Hendruk Muller Vaderlandschfonds. Last but not least, I would also like to express gratitude to my family and friends for always supporting and encouraging me in my adventures. They have – somehow – always been kind to the philosopher in their midst. In a most profound way, I would like to thank my wonderful family, my wife Marieke and our daughters Lenthe and Vera, for all their patience, sacrifices, love and support. Our adventures in Edinburgh, USA, and Canada have been such a blast and I look forward to many more adventures to come. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 1 The Evolution of Critical Realism 19 1.1 The Historical Origins of Critical Realism in Science-Theology Scholarship 19 1.1.1 Critical About the Attempts to Unravel the Historical Origins of Critical Realism 23 1.2 Critical Realism and Family Resemblance: Similarities and Differences 25 1.2.1 Barbour on Critical Realism 26 1.2.2 Peacocke and Polkinghorne Join the Family 28 1.2.3 Why should we consider Barbour, Peacocke, and Polkinghorne as Resembling a Family? 32 1.2.4 Recent Developments in the Literature on Critical Realism 36 1.2.5 The Outer Circle of the Family 39 1.3 A Preliminary Formulation of Critical Realism 45 2 The Mind-Independence of What? 49 2.1 Metaphysical Realism and the Problem of Knowing the External World 50 2.2 Reality as Mental Construct: Ontological Idealism 54 2.2.1 Rejecting Ontological Idealism: A Critical Realist Response 55 2.3 Mental Appearance of a Mind-Independent Reality: Epistemological Idealism 58 2.3.1 Mind-Independence and the Kantian Tradition 58 2.3.2 A Recent Interpretation of Kant’s Solution: Conceptual Relativism 63 2.4 Critical Realism and its Metaphysical Commitments 66 2.4.1 Unpacking Metaphysical Package 1: Scheme-Dependent Knowledge Claims 68 2.4.2 Unpacking Metaphysical Package 2: Scheme-Independent Reality 70 2.5 Critical Realist Metaphysics: A Definition 74 3 Critical Realism and Epistemology 77 3.1 Critical Realism and its Epistemological Considerations 77 3.2 Infallibilism, Scepticism, and Fallibilism 79 3.2.1 Infallibilism and its Epistemological Commitments 81 3.2.2 Opposing Infallibilism: Scepticism 82 3.2.3 Fallibilism as the Via Media between Infallibilism and Scepticism 83 3.3 Critical Realism and the Fallibilist Stance 85 3.4 Criterion of Withstanding Serious Criticism 87 3.5 Theological Fallibilism and the Problem of Necessary Truths 90 3.5.1 Durrant’s Argument against Theological Fallibilism 92 3.5.2 First Argument: Agent Fallibilism and Proposition (In)fallibilism 95 3.5.3 Second Argument: Argument of Plurality 98 3.6 Concluding Remarks: Epistemological Humility 102 4 Models, Symbols, and Analogies 105 4.1 Critical Realism and Semantics 106 4.2 Critical Realism and its Foes: Literalism and Instrumentalism 108 4.3 Critical Realism and its Semantic Via Media 112 4.3.1 Analogies: Making the Unfamiliar Familiar 114 4.3.2 Models: Devoid of Ontology? 116 4.3.3 Metaphors: Conflating with Models? 118 4.3.4 Theories: Collections of Models? 122 4.3.5 Understanding the Differences amongst Critical Realists 124 4.4 Referring but not Defining 126 4.4.1 Durrant’s Critical Response to Soskice’s ‘Referring but not defining’-principle 129 4.5 Concluding Remarks 131 5 The Humanisation of Science: The Scientist as Experiencing Being 135 5.1 Critical Realism and Philosophy of Science 136 5.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Scientific Practice according to Critical Realism 137 5.2 Logical Empiricism and its Remnants of a Dehumanised Science in the Work of Science Popularisers 139 5.2.1 Remnants of Logical Empiricism in Popular Literature 142 5.3 Critical Realism and the ‘New Philosophy of Science’ 145 5.3.1 Norwood Hanson and his Influence on Critical Realists 146 5.3.2 Michael Polanyi’s Reinstatement