SPECIAL FEATURE: PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE SPECIAL FEATURE: Theories of ethnicity and the dynamics of ethnic change in multiethnic societies Richard E. Blanton1 Department of Anthropology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907

Edited by Linda R. Manzanilla, Universidad Nacional Autonóma de México, Mexico, D.F., Mexico, and approved February 13, 2015 (received for review November 7, 2014)

I modify Fredrik Barth’s approach, which sees ethnic group building as a signaling system, to place it within a framework that draws from collective action and costly signaling theories. From these perspectives, ethnic signaling, although representing a costly penalty to group members, is one effective form of communication that facilitates collective management of resources. I then identify three contexts in which the benefits of ethnic group building are likely to outweigh its signaling costs: in politically chaotic refuge and periphery zones; in the context of long-distance specialist trading groups; and within the territorial scope of failed states. I point to selected data from the Mughal and Aztec polities to illustrate how a combination of effective public goods management, in highly collective states, and the growth of highly integrated commercial economies will render ethnic group building superfluous.

ethnicity | collective action | costly signaling

Early in the 20th century, anthropologists tures or regions are understood to reflect to such evolution” (ref.8,p.108).Thekey turned to a focus on culture as a challenge to the distribution of a people and thus are problem, Geertz argues, is found in the fact thebiologicallyreductionistracethinkingof ethnically labeled, for example, as “Sumerian” that, within the boundaries of the new states, 19th century evolutionists. This strong cul- and “Akkadian” in early Mesopotamia, or there are groups in which attachment to tural program, promoted by Franz Boas and “Zapotec” or “Mixtec” in the pre-Hispanic one’s culture can be understood to constitute his followers, was influenced by a German Valley of Oaxaca, despite evidence for im- a “natural” or “primordial” state of human tradition tracing its origins to Romanticists, migration and ethnic pluralism [early Mes- experience. Local attachments persist de- such as Johann Gottfried Herder, and their opotamian city-states were demonstrably spite nation-building projects, he argues, “Aufklärer” followers of the 19th century (1). pluralistic according to Yoffee (ref. 3, p. 49); because such attachments are more natural This group opposed ideas of British Enlight- Blanton et al. (ref. 4, p. 41) and Flannery and than national-scale attachments owing to enment authors, such as John Locke, who Marcus (5) point to the possibility for im- the “great extent to which a peoples’ sense of argued that a society, as a commonwealth, migration and pluralism in the Valley of self remains bound up in the gross actualities ideally is the product of socially purposed Oaxaca]. In this regard, it is also worth men- of blood, race, language, locality, religion, institution building. In the Romantic re- tioning how episodes of social and cultural or tradition.... To subordinate these specific action, society is understood less in terms change have been understood as the result of and familiar identifications in favor of a of rational social action and institution large-scale invasions of new dominant cul- generalized commitment to an overarching building and more in terms of a people’s tural groups. For example, we see this device and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a shared origins and history, and an emo- in the Mesopotamian historical and archae- loss of definition as an autonomous person, tional attachment to their culture, language, ological literatures when change episodes are either through absorption into a culturally and local territory (2). Boasians drew inspi- attributed to invasions by various groups, undifferentiated mass or, what is even worse, ration from Romanticism to make the argu- including Amorites, Canaanites, and Hyksos, through domination by some other rival ment that even though there might some an approach critiqued by Kamp and Yoffee ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is diffusion of culture traits across societal (ref. 6, p. 97). And Cohen (ref. 7, p. 381) able to imbue that order with the temper of boundaries, still, each cultural unit or “tribe” finds, in other branches of anthropology, its own personality” (ref.8,pp.108–109). (in the case of smaller scale societies) was a tendency toward overly simplistic ethnic There are instances in which belonging is understood to develop a distinct social, lin- labeling that ignores ethnic plurality. couched in the language of blood and kin guistic, and cultural configuration shared by The strong cultural program is on full (e.g., ref. 9, p. 27). However, does a primor- its members. What I call a strong cultural view in the theory of state dynamics de- dial sensibility preclude rational social action? program proved to be a source of disciplinary veloped by Clifford Geertz (8). Here, he In the case of Geertz’s sense of primordialism, unity for decades but eventually proved to be addresses the role played by local tribal cul- theanswerseemstobeyes,buthisviewis problematic in the way it ignored the role of tures in the dynamics of postcolonial states problematic in identifying distinct categories human agency in social group building. inAfricaandinSouthandSoutheastAsia. of persons I roughly label as “rational” and As he argues, a tension between cultural “tribal.” On the rational side, the goal of The Strong Cultural Program in heterogeneity, counted as regionalism, re- Archaeology and in Theories of State- ligion, language, or tribe, on the one hand, Building and the need for a civil order, on the other, is Author contributions: R.E.B. wrote the paper. We can see the impact of the strong cultural “one of the central driving forces in the na- The author declares no conflict of interest. program on 20th century archaeological prac- tional evolution of the new states; as it is, at This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. tice, for example, when archaeological cul- thesametime,oneofthegreatestobstacles 1Email: [email protected].

www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1421406112 PNAS Early Edition | 1of6 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 social actors is to construct civil order but behavior that illustrates a selfish disre- signaling is productively understood as one based on notions of democratic modernity. gard for collective benefit is also rational. As form of “costly signaling” (e.g., ref. 21) or The tribal peoples, by contrast, mired in Mancur Olson (14) pointed out, humans “reputational signaling,” notions that pro- primordial emotional attachments to “the have difficulty cooperating because rational vide us with one way to understand how gross actualities of blood, race, language, individuals may not act in the common in- signals may be evaluated in terms of their locality religion, or tradition” seem to be terest (15) and, as a result, to construct a probable validity and thus enhance trust. lacking in rational social agency. I also socially purposed cooperative group entails This idea, first proposed by Zahavi (22), suggest that Geertz’sschemeerrsinviewing problem-solving strategies of institution points out that signals that are costly to the postcolonial state building in terms of a sin- building with the goal to foster cooperative signaler (i.e., that are a handicap) will be gular notion of political modernity, when, in behavior. perceived as having more reliability and reality, state building, whether modern or From this perspective, ethnic construction thus are more likely to enhance trust than premodern, exhibits a wide range of varia- can be considered as one possible institutional lower cost signals. Ethnic signaling also is tion in form, function, political goals, and the strategy suited to the establishment of a so- an ideal form of intragroup communication ability to enact goals (10). I return to that cially purposed cooperative group. Accord- and trust building because ethnically based point below in Ethnicity Within the Fabric ing to collective action theory, organizing signals, especially when considering such of a Complex Society. for common defense and for the cooperative factors as language competency, are difficult management of resources will be the most to fake. A person who obviously has made Fredrik Barth and the Critique of the pressing problems requiring institution the kind of deep commitment to a way of Strong Cultural Program building. Resource management might in- living is likely to be understood as a person The key turning point in anthropological clude the goal to maintain control over and who also embraces those moral values of thinking about culture and ethnicity came sustainably manage finite “common pool” a group that undergird cooperation. from Fredrik Barth’s brief but very useful resources, as in the case of the nomadic An approach that emphasizes signaling introduction to “Ethnic Groups and Bound- pastoralist Pathan tribes Barth studied (16), and, especially, the cost of signaling has two aries” (11). Barth proposed that we rethink or to manage a “public goods” system where advantages for understanding ethnic group culture from the vantage point of how social the cooperative goal is to gain mutual benefit building. First, there is a material dimension action drives the formation of ethnic groups from jointly produced resources. In both to signaling (Wobst’s stylistic messaging), that are aimed to “organize interaction” for cases, because mutual benefits are gained which is suited to archaeological methodol- a social purpose (ref. 11, p. 10). Typically, in from the devoted efforts of other group ogy (ref. 23, pp. 173–195). Second, to evalu- ethnic groups, a sense of belonging is created members in tandem with one’s own efforts, ate cost raises an important question for through the symbolism of blood relations a group’s members will make mutual claims consideration: Under what social conditions andsharedhistory.However,toBarth,sym- of accountability with respect to each other. is it likely that the benefits of ethnic signaling bolic meaning is less important than the fact However, how is it possible to understand will outweigh its costs? In the following, I that ethnically specific behaviors constitute that the intentions and actions of others will identify several social contexts in which eth- a system of signals with the dual purpose to be consistent with collective benefit, given nic signaling likely will be a solution to the establish intergroup boundaries and, intra- that the conditionally cooperative human problem of building and sustaining collective group, to confirm group members’ commit- has the capacity to find individual gain as a action groups: in zones of weak periphery ment to the “basic value orientations” of the rational but egotistical agent? incorporation along the boundary zones or collectivity (ref. 11, p. 14). Agroup’s system of visual signaling pro- frontiersofpolitiesorworldsystems;inthe vides one clue as to the manner in which trust context of intercultural trade; and in contexts Barth and Collective Action Theory is generated among members of a collectively internal to poorly functioning or failed states. Barth’s ideas have been influential (12), but organized group. For example, as the collec- the bulk of research using his instrumentalist tive action theorist Michael Hechter put it, to Periphery Incorporation and approach has emphasized signaling that de- produce cooperative groups, “...individuals Ethnogenesis notes ethnic boundaries and thus manifests must be highly visible to one another in order Hall (24) provides a useful scheme of varying difference (e.g., ref. 13, p. 128), but here I take to reduce the severity of the free-rider and degrees and forms of periphery incorpo- a different direction, with the goal to bring assurance problems” (ref. 17, p. 21; cf. ref. ration, referring to situations in which au- Barth’s ideas into the light of collective action 18). Although intervisibility is one solution to tonomous boundary or frontier zones are theory.Todothat,IemphasizeBarth’ssug- the trust problem, especially in very small impacted by forces of economic and political gestion that intragroup signaling allows a groups, ethnicity provides another form of change emanating from multicultural eco- group’s members to demonstrate they are, in trust-building signaling. To communicate nomic systems (world systems) or expanding Barth’sterms“playing the same game” (ref. reliable ethnic signals mandates that one will polities. Across a continuum from weak to 11,p.15). make an overt commitment to a whole way strong incorporation, Hall finds that ethno- In collective action theory, as in Barth’s of life, including the consumption of ethni- genesis is expressed most strongly in areas of theory, the human subject is regarded as a cally specified material culture [what Wobst weaker incorporation, his “refuge” and “con- rational social actor. As a result, with only (ref. 19, p. 12) calls “stylistic messaging”]and tact” zones, where there is little direct political minor modification, Barth’s formulation can the display of proper public etiquette and control from a polity or a world-system core be productively incorporated into a collective language competency, and often will include zone. In refuge and contact zones, collective action perspective by recasting the rational other commitments, such as participation in action at the local level emerges as a strategy self as a “conditional cooperator.” This no- public ritual or other public behaviors; as for mutual defense and control of resources tion of the rational self identifies cooperation Cohen (ref. 20, p. xiii) observed, to join an in socially chaotic environments plagued as a rational course of action, when the goal ethnic group, one must “pay the price of by demographic collapse, forced migration, is to realize both collective and self-benefit, membership” (cf. ref. 11, p. 23). Thus, ethnic social disruption, pressure from slavers,

2of6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1421406112 Blanton Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 and competition for resources. Examples of trader groups. Ethnic signaling is used in the based on shared clan membership or places PERSPECTIVE ethnogenesis in refuge zones are discussed context of this kind of intercultural long- of geographical origin. Within the close-knit SPECIAL FEATURE: comparatively by Kowalewski (ref. 25; cf. distance trading for two reasons. First, ethnic networks, “credit is extended, capital pooled, ref. 26). He found that refugee groups from boundary marking defines sets of specific and authority delegated without fear of de- diverse cultural backgrounds overcome het- actors who are able to maintain monopoly fault or deceit.” Jean Ensminger’s (33) study erogeneity to build coalescent social for- control over the profit-making potential of sub-Saharan African trading, during the mations through the creation of new modes inherent in long-distance trading. And, 11th to 19th centuries CE sub-Saharan Africa, of community integration. Ethnic group given that intercultural commerce pres- points to religious conversion as a form of building in these cases emphasized, among ents many cooperation problems, intragroup costly signaling. Islam brought a shared other features, “universalizing ideologies signaling is a source of trust building be- language of trade and “a monetary system, and cults” that transcend cultural variabil- tween traders. Cooperation problems in an accounting system, and a legal code to ity and the implementation of forms of long-distance trading are difficult to over- adjudicate financial contracts and dis- collective leadership that downplay the role come owing to the possibility for opportu- putes...making outsiders, insiders” (p. 7) of centralized hierarchical authority (ref. nistic self-interest–seeking behavior when and thus restricting access to the profits of 25, p. 117). marketplace transactions consist of fleeting the long-distance trade to a successful and Populations in contact periphery zones of encounters with strangers, and when trans- privileged few. At the same time, to com- world systems may inhabit a chaotic envi- actors from different cultural or social municate reliable signals of conversion ronment while, at the same time, they face backgrounds fail to mutually agree on the entailed personal costs, including giving up cooperation problems exacerbated by eco- relative value of goods and services. In ad- alcohol, devotion to fasting, costly pil- nomic change as they are incorporated into dition, market transactors may not share grimages, and the building of mosques. an expanding economy as suppliers of raw the same moral concepts and so may un- materials or labor destined for core zone derestimate or overestimate the likelihood of Ethnicity Within the Fabric of a Complex consumption. In these situations, ethno- market cooperation by others. Long-distance Society genesis may be a strategy to manage an in- trading over great distances and across cul- Although ethnic group construction often tensifying competition for valuable resources: tural boundaries also is challenging because provides positive benefits for group builders forexample,asisclearinthecaseofthe it requires special expertise in social instru- in chaotic zones or as a strategy to facilitate North American plains region, during the ments for arranging credit and contracting long-distance trading of minority “alien” 18th and 19th centuries, when fur became an at a distance. traders who connect cores with peripheries, it important trade good (summarized in ref. 27, In what Curtin (29) terms “trade dias- has a more complex and varied role within pp. 176–182). This growing periphery econ- poras,” the trust basis for market trans- thefabricofcomplexsocieties.Forthisrea- omy spawned a phase of ethnogenesis as local actions in these challenging situations often is son, Barth’s instrumentalist theory of in- groups faced the dilemma that cooperation to be found in some combination of shared group and between-group ethnic signaling was sorely needed for mutual defense and to ethnic affiliation (“ethnically homogeneous applies only in certain situations. For exam- maintain control over important hunting middleman groups”)(30)andnetworkcap- ple, McKay (ref. 34, pp. 401–402) pointed out territories at the same time that social co- ital (a personal social network), such as that some expressions of ethnicity may be hesion was threatened when wealth and glory among Chinese diaspora groups in South- primarily ideational or affective (his “pseudo came to those who were individually suc- east Asia, but many other examples can be ethnics” and “symbolic ethnics”): for exam- cessful in hunting, trading, and warfare. The cited, including Jews and Italians in Medi- ple, when persons gain personal satisfaction Cheyenne, described by Hoebel (28), exem- eval Europe, Parsees in India, and Sikhs, from carrying forward traditional elements plify how the development of a new socio- Orma, Hausa, and Julas in Africa, as well as of a threatened culture or when ethnicity is cultural program and ethnic identity were the Putun and Itzá merchant groups of late used in a person’s search for self-realization designed to enhance intragroup cohesion pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica. of identity. In these contexts, however, there while overcoming the growing force of I propose that trade diasporas are one re- maybelittleinterestingroupbuildingto individualism. An important dimension flection of periphery incorporation and a achieve a social purpose in the Barthian sense. of their strategy is evident in how the tribal source of core-periphery inequality because I suggest that, to explain variation in forms leadership, the “Council of Forty-Four,” the commercial success of trading groups of ethnic expression, we consider the costs confirmed their devotion to Cheyenne value reflects the differential development of in- and benefits of ethnic signaling in the context orientations through a costly signaling strat- stitutional capital for market cooperation in of state-building processes, but also in the egy. Upon assuming office, council members core and periphery zones (31). In this sce- context of economic processes, the latter to were obligated to cease participation in war- nario, trading groups are able to make use of understand the costs and benefits of ethnic fare, normally an important source of male social instruments for trading at a distance construction within the framework of a mar- status, and they were obligated to display a that have a long history of institutional de- ket economy. pattern of generosity that was likely to di- velopment in their home region. Social in- Comaroff and Comaroff (35) have pointed minish a chief’s wealth over the mandated struments, in conjunction with their ethnic to how social inequality within contemporary 10-y term of office (ref. 28, pp. 43 and 51). signaling and network capital, allow them to states may prompt ethnogenesis among dis- realize their goal to monopolize long-distance enfranchised subaltern populations, who “Alien Traders,” Ethnic Signaling, Trust, trading with periphery groups where there then use their organizational capacity to op- and Economic Monopoly has been less social development along these pose state power or to make claims on the The alien-trader phenomenon is one in lines. For example, as Granovetter (ref. 32, state (see also ref. 36, p. 343). Brumfiel (ref. which an existing system of ethnic signaling is p. 32) points out, expatriate Chinese trading 37, p. 94) identifies a similar process in pre- manipulated as a way to enhance the func- groups in Southeast Asia are successful be- modern states, when ethnic group formation tionality of special-purposed long-distance cause they form small close-knit communities was a strategy to maintain local autonomy in

Blanton PNAS Early Edition | 3of6 Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 thefaceofpressurefromanexploitativeelite. inthesample(24of30),irrespectiveofde- in terms of class position, religion, ethnicity, I propose a more general approach that sees gree of collective action, were coded as ex- or rural/urban (in the less collective policies, ethnic group building as a way to realize local hibiting multiethnicity. The question is, how- a subaltern class is often viewed by the elite as organizational capacity in the context of state ever, to what degree was ethnicity mobilized being cognitively and morally challenged). failure. Failure may accompany phases when for group building within the territorial do- This uniformitarian sense of the mind was state authority is weakened or when a state main of a state? I predict that collective action not an attempt to deny ethnic heterogeneity collapses, or in the context of poorly func- would render ethnic group building within to promote an ideology of cultural homoge- tioning and exploitative states. All of these the state’s arena of control superfluous, for neity in the sense of Anderson (42) because, situations create conditions in which ethnic- three reasons. (i) To the degree that a state is in the cases I studied, ethnic difference was ity is used to mobilize local-scale organiza- able to extend public goods such as military not ignored. To illustrate a pattern of ethnic tion, either in defensive reaction to chaotic defense, effective judiciary, and the mainte- recognition, I refer again to the interesting conditions, or as a strategy to gain access to nance of public order across its realm, the Mughal polity, which was ethnically plural- astate’s public goods (e.g., ref. 38, p. 24). By functional purposes of ethnic group for- istic but where a cosmopolitan religious poorly functioning or exploitative, I refer to mations would be seen to duplicate state- ecumenism was promoted by the state situations in which a state is either lacking provided services. As an example, I refer to termed the “universal peace” (sulh-I kull). the will to provide, or is lacking the in- how the provisioning of public goods influ- The goals here were to make possible open stitutional capacity to provide, collective enced local-level ethnic groups in Mughal recruitment into positions of governing au- benefit: for example, the more autocratic or cities. Here, a tradition of highly closed and thority (which depends on a uniformitarian segmentary states identified by Blanton and self-governed neighborhood units (mahallah), theory of mind) and also to valorize public Fargher (10) from their comparative study a residue of pre-Mughal periods, repre- reasoning to enhance intermingling and co- of premodern states. sented local-level adaptations to urban chal- operation among ethnically distinct sectors. In the comparative study, we demon- lenges, including the maintenance of public According to Amartya Sen (ref. 43, p. 16), strated that a major cause of poor state order, and often they were organized on these policies supported “dialogues between functioning is revenue regimes in which the basis of shared caste affiliation or reli- adherents of different faiths...[and argued governing principals maintained direct con- gion. The Mughal system emphasized that]...‘the pursuit of reason’ rather than trol over spot resources, such as export urban administrative organization and public ‘reliance on tradition’ is the way to address economies, or when they controlled other goods, so that, as Chaudhuri (ref. 40, p. 84) difficult problems of social harmony.” kinds of revenue sources, such as private reports, increasingly during the Mughal pe- Although uniformitarian policies ac- estates or state-owned land. These resources riod neighborhood-scale social formations knowledged the reality of ethnic pluralism, I could be mobilized to maintain the control- were weakened. As a result, people increas- suggest that they did establish conditions that ling position of a governing faction while ingly purchased house lots where they could would tend to diminish the importance of making it possible to resist pressure to in- get them, and Muslims began to mix with local collective-action groups by effectively crease accountability and improve governing Hindus and rich with poor [more examples incorporating persons, as citizens, into a capacity. However, there were costs incurred of neighborhood decline under conditions of larger civic unit that is the source of public by states that brought few collective benefits collective action are provided in Blanton and goods. And, collective state building is asso- across social sectors. By comparison with the Fargher (41)]. (ii) In the more collective ciated with uniformitarian notions of the better organized states in our sample, these states, the costly signaling aspect of ethnic human that are key to building judicial in- segmentary polities display a statistically sig- group formation may be seen to be burden- stitutions that offer legal rights across social nificantly greater tendency to exhibit episodes some because, in the fiscal system of more sectors. Such policies are also the conceptual of internal conflict, wars between ethnic collectively organized states, revenues typi- foundation for policies of open recruitment groups, and various forms of oppositional cally are derived from the broad population of persons of different ethnic backgrounds movements (ref. 39, p. 48), perhaps analo- of taxpayers (ref. 10, pp. 253–256). In fact, that afforded meaningful participation in of- gous to the problems faced by the post- this kind of “internal” revenue system, as we ficial capacities, so the state itself has the ca- colonial states Geertz referred to. called it, is a basic element of collective action pacity to become ethnically pluralistic. I found little evidence for comparable process because governing principals who problems in the context of those states pos- depend on taxpayers will be more inclined to Ethnicity and Commercial Development sessing the institutional capacity to realize provide public goods and other services as Lane Fargher and I discovered a strong collective benefits (39). These polities imple- a means to enhance confidence in govern- positive statistical correlation between our mented equitable tax-collection policies, ment and, in turn, taxpayer compliance. measures of collective action in state building provided public goods such as public security Ethnic group members will thus face the and our measure of degree of commercial and effective judicial systems across the growing costs of participating in the state’s development (44). I turn to a consideration realm, accommodated taxpayer voice, and economy, as they are drawn into it as tax- of commercialization because, I suggest, in maintained effective institutional controls payers,atthesametimetheyfacethecostly tandem with collective state building, it is also over the agency of governing principals and entailments of ethnic group signaling. a process that may have relevance for un- administrative cadre. In Blanton and Fargher (iii) Although the anthropologist Geertz may derstanding the role of ethnicity in the dy- (ref.10,pp.280–289), we demonstrate that view a tribal “other” as a person mired in “the namics of states. Specifically, I suggest that collective action was achieved, in part, by gross actualities of blood, race, language, lo- commercialization is a process that will extending administrative capacity deep cality religion, or tradition,” from my com- operate side-by-side with political collective intothesocialfabrictoreorganizebasalso- parative work I note that, in the more col- action to diminish the importance of ethnic cial units. However, this organizational pro- lective polities, theories of the human mind group formation and maintenance. To cess did not have a notable influence on were formulated that highlight the potential investigate this possibility, I refer to the multiethnicity; the great majority of polities for rational thought that is not differentiated Late Postclassic period of Central Mexico

4of6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1421406112 Blanton Downloaded by guest on September 28, 2021 (1350–1521 CE), which is an interesting case can see how neutrality was expressed in ment is chaotic, especially in zones of refuge PERSPECTIVE in which ethnic plurality is well represented, the marketplaces, where a socially pur- and world-system incorporation. Ethnicity is SPECIAL FEATURE: as we know from ethnohistoric documents posed organization, the Pochteca, served also seen as a productive path to enhancing (vanZantwijk,ref.45),butsharpethnic as a largely autonomous paragovernmental cooperation in the challenging contexts group boundary making is not evident, and, market-management system within the of long-distance trading between core and instead, diversity took the form of what Stark larger authority structure of the Late Post- periphery zones of a world system. Chaotic (ref. 46, p. 44) refers to as an “ethnic mosaic” classic Aztec empire (ref. 52, chap. 7). The conditions also provide a fertile ground for in which ethnicity was a cultural fact but purpose of the Pochteca organization was local-scale ethnic group building within the migration rendered particular localities eth- to manage Central Mexican marketplaces boundaries of failed states that are unable or nically pluralistic. and to maintain monopoly control over unwilling to provide adequate public goods, The Late Postclassic mosaic pattern is long-distance trading; however, they did and whose dominating and inefficient con- consistent with the meager evidence for eth- that without any reference to a particular trol of economy leads to the impoverishment nic signaling, at least insofar as it can be ethnic identity. This nonethnic strategy, I of subaltern classes. From my comparative inferred from the distribution of the material suggest, was crucial to establishing trust work, I found that, where collective action culture recovered from archaeological inves- among marketers that, in their commer- was a framework for state building, a goal tigations. Elizabeth Brumfiel et al. (47) ten- cial transactions and judicial actions, the was to enhance consensus and intermin- tatively identified lip plugs as an ethnic signal Pochteca will maintain a high level of ju- gling of the population in the face of ethnic of Otomí speakers, at the site of Xaltocan, dicial neutrality in the face of ethnic plu- or other sources of heterogeneity. In these but, apart from this single example, the ma- rality and variable social standing (ref. 52, cases, public goods disseminated by the terial culture of the period (known mostly p. 171). state and the reorganizing of basal social from the study of ceramic vessels) shows little units, alongside a growing commercial evidence for stylistic ethnic signaling. Begin- Conclusion economy, very likely diminished the impor- ning perhaps as early as the Early or Middle Collective action theory allows me to expand tance of local self-organization, including Postclassic periods (950–1350 CE), and fully on Fredrick Barth’s social and cultural con- ethnic group building with its costly sig- in evidence by the Late Postclassic (1350– structivist theory of ethnicity. From this naling strategy. 1521 CE), regional ceramics were highly perspective, I am able to identify those con- stylistically uniform and what ceramic vari- ditions most conducive to varying forms of ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. I thank Linda Manzanilla for requesting this paper, and I am grateful for useful com- ability can be identified is understood to ethnic construction. One is a local-scale self- ments from two anonymous reviewers. My research, represent the commercial distribution sys- organizing strategy intended to provide mu- with Lane Fargher, on collective action theory has been funded by the cultural anthropology panel of the US tems of the major centers of Tenochtitlan tual defense and to maintain control over National Science Foundation and by the College of Liberal and Texcoco rather than ethnic affiliation resources when the larger political environ- Arts, Purdue University. (48,49).Isuggestthatthisevidenceof decline in ethnic groups can be related to i commercialization in two ways. ( ) By the 1 Reill PH (1975) The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 14 Olson M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Late Postclassic period, the Basin of Mexico Historicism (Univ of California Press, Berkeley, CA). the Theory of Groups (Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, MA). and adjacent areas of the Central Highlands 2 Kuper A (2002) Culture. Proc Br Acad 112:87–102. 15 Hechter M (1988) Principles of Group Solidarity (Univ of 3 Yoffee N (2005) Myths of the Archaic State: Evolution of the California Press, Berkeley, CA). were economically integrated by a vast and Earliest Cities, States, and Civilizations (Cambridge Univ Press, 16 Barth F (1969) Pathan identity and its maintenance. Ethnic interlocking periodic market system (50). Cambridge). 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