Research Report

The Commission and the Security Council: From Cynicism to Synergy?

The PBC Chair Ambassador Cho Tae-yul (Republic of Korea) presided over a joint meeting this past June Security Council Report’s sixth report on the strengthen the PBC, many of which are cur- of the PBC and ECOSOC on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) looks at rently being developed among member states Sahel, one of the new regional and country situations on which the PBC developments in the PBC and its relationship and by the Secretariat. There have been internal has become involved during the with the Security Council since our last report improvements in the work of the PBC and signs last year. Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed is on the left, published in April 2013. It provides an overview of greater openness towards it from the Security and Ambassador Frederick Musiiwa Makamure Shava (Zimbabwe), of the recent activity of the PBC and evolution Council. The PBC has expanded the country President of ECOSOC, is on the right. of its work. This includes the 2015 peacebuild- situations it considers, and invigorated the role (UN Photo/Kim Haughton) ing architecture review and initiatives since of its Organizational Committee. The Council is then to advance proposals regarding the PBC looking to the PBC to support Liberia’s transi- 2017, No. 5 in the General Assembly and Security Council tion. The question remains whether such devel- 22 November 2017 resolutions adopted on the review. The report opments will translate into a greater perceived This report is available online at also considers challenges in fulfilling the objec- value for the Council and clearer benefits for securitycouncilreport.org. tives of the PBC while setting out options to countries that the PBC seeks to support.• For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter.

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 1 Introduction and Summary

For much of its existence, the Peacebuilding before they fall into conflict: institutions are 2 Introduction and Summary Commission (PBC)—which was created as an often already weak, groups of people are mar- 3 Background on the PBC advisory body to the Council and the Gener- ginalised, and economic opportunities are al Assembly—has been looked at cynically by limited. This broader notion of peacebuilding 4 Developments in the PBC in 2013-2014 some members of the Security Council, as not was reflected in the definition of “sustaining providing much added value to the Council’s peace” in the two resolutions, which has since 5 The Ten-Year Review of the work. Council members, but also the UN gen- become central to the UN reform agenda of Peacebuilding Architecture eral membership and many among the staff Secretary-General António Guterres. 7 Developments in the PBC since in the UN Secretariat, have viewed the PBC Changes in the PBC in recent years have 2015 as something of a disappointment. They have included expanding the country situations it 10 Security Council-PBC questioned its ability to advise about conflict- considers beyond the six countries that made Relationship since the Review affected situations and have found its meet- up its agenda over the first decade of its exis- 13 Improving PBC Support to the ings redundant, duplicating discussion and tence, while increasing its focus on the region- Security Council information provided by the Secretariat dur- al dimensions of peacebuilding and enhancing 14 UN Reform, Peacebuilding and ing Council sessions. The PBC’s supporters, in cooperation with regional and sub-regional Sustaining Peace turn, have criticised the Council for not being organisations. According to diplomats, PBC 15 Conclusion receptive to working with the PBC, thus limit- meetings have become more interesting and 16 UN Documents and Useful ing its ability over the years to demonstrate its substantive compared to just a few years ago. Additional Resources value. Tensions have existed since the PBC’s Among the P5, there have also been signs of creation in 2005, which occurred as Security increasing interest in and openness to the Council reform stalled, with the P5 seeing the PBC’s supporting the Council’s work. PBC as a forum created by member states to Moreover, under the Secretary-General’s discuss peace and security issues, encroaching proposed reform of the peace and security on the prerogatives of the Security Council. pillar of the Secretariat, the PBSO would be Reviews in 2010 and 2015 of the UN’s “bolstered” and assume a stronger cross-pillar peacebuilding architecture—comprising the bridging role in the future as part of a new PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Department of Political and Peacebuilding the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)— Affairs. The PBC seems poised to see its role found that the PBC had not fulfilled the enhanced as part of these reforms, which seek expectations envisioned when it was creat- to increase UN attention to conflict preven- ed to fill what then Secretary-General Kofi tion and “sustaining peace” by addressing the Annan called a “gaping hole” at the UN in its fragmentation of the UN departments, agen- support to post-conflict countries. cies, and intergovernmental bodies. Since the 2015 review, however, there has The reason for creating the PBC made been new momentum towards strengthening great sense conceptually: to ensure sustained the PBC and improving its relationship with attention to post-conflict countries—which the Council. The review culminated with the would often wane following the withdrawal of adoption in April 2016 by the Security Coun- a operation or reaching bench- cil and the General Assembly of substantively marks such as the holding of elections—and identical resolutions. To the surprise of many prevent their relapse into conflict. Likewise, at the UN, the resolutions incorporated most the concept of “sustaining peace” and the of the ideas of the Advisory Group of Experts PBC’s potential role as outlined by the AGE (AGE), which had prepared a report as part are generally viewed as well considered. How- of the review process. The eight-page resolu- ever, these ideas and the envisioned role for tions (S/RES/2282 and A/RES/70/262), the the PBC have not been easy to apply in prac- UN’s most comprehensive on peacebuilding, tice, for both practical and political reasons. expanded the understanding of peacebuild- While there is new momentum that has not ing as activities to be undertaken not only in existed for some time to enhance the PBC, post-conflict situations but also in order to the challenge remains to translate this energy prevent conflict in the first place, as well as and vision into a more effective UN body. during peacemaking and peacekeeping. The This is Security Council Report’s sixth same sort of interventions often required report on the PBC and the first following the in countries after armed conflict—rebuild- 2015 review. This report will look at develop- ing government institutions, promoting ments in the PBC and its relationship with reconciliation between different communi- the Security Council since our last report ties, restarting economic development—are published in April 2013. It covers not only the similar to the challenges many countries face 2015 peacebuilding architecture review but

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Introduction and Summary also initiatives to advance key ideas regarding system, which has been identified as hav- to situations that otherwise get overlooked the PBC in the Security Council and General ing hampered UN peacebuilding. because of multiple parallel crises or do Assembly resolutions. The report also seeks to • To carry out its role of advising the Coun- not necessarily require Council attention. consider challenges in fulfilling the objectives cil, the PBC should fulfil its intention to • The PBC’s convening ability and advisory of the PBC while setting out ideas, many of ensure that its activities, whether through role does not only entail organising meet- which are currently being developed among the Organizational Committee or existing ings or providing the Council with infor- member states and by the Secretariat, to country-specific configurations, are aligned mation. The engagement of PBC mem- enhance the PBC’s contribution to the Secu- with the Security Council’s calendar and bers in more informal activities geared rity Council and make a more meaningful relevant meetings. This would entail the towards supporting countries’ stability, impact on the countries it considers. PBC’s using its convening role to organ- such as connecting countries with part- The following are some of the main areas ise meetings with relevant actors during ners that can fill needs, is another way to of promise for the PBC to improve its rela- the months preceding Council sessions to fulfill the advisory function that can com- tionship with the Security Council and sup- gather diverse perspectives and develop its plement the Council’s work. This includes port to conflict-affected or fragile countries: recommendations. It would also be impor- supporting countries not on the Council’s • The PBC’s convening role and ability to tant that, to the extent possible, country vis- agenda, potentially preventing them from bring together diverse actors, including its by PBC representatives occur prior to becoming situations before the Council. member states, host governments, the Council meetings on that situation. • Advocating for and raising awareness of UN system, international financial insti- • The type of advice and context that countries’ needs, whether in meetings or tutions, regional organisations, and civil the PBC can focus on providing to the informally, is a way that the PBC may gen- society, is probably the PBC’s greatest Council includes socio-economic and erate resources for peacebuilding. strength and advantage compared to the longer-term development issues, as well • Informal engagement with Council Security Council. It has the potential to as regional dimensions that may impact penholders and its members in general better package the views of these actors countries’ stability. remains a useful means for the PBC to for consideration by the Security Council. • The PBC has the potential to play a par- support the Security Council’s consider- Its convening role is also a strength that ticularly important role during and follow- ation of issues. This may include organ- provides the PBC the opportunity to play ing peace operation transitions, especially ising informal interactive dialogues on the bridging function, as envisioned by in the transition from a peace operation to a country situations ahead of relevant the AGE, to bring together the UN’s main UN country team in a non-mission setting. Council meetings, in particular before intergovernmental organs and contribute • Related to this, the PBC continues to have mission mandate renewals. to addressing the fragmentation of the UN an important role in sustaining attention

Background on the PBC

The PBC, along with the PBF and PBSO, and Change in its December 2004 report They include seven Security Council mem- was established on 20 December 2005 reflected the wider understanding of peace- bers (the P5 plus two non-permanent mem- through Security Council resolution 1645 building now recommended by the recent bers); seven member states from each of the and General Assembly resolution A/60/180. peacebuilding architecture review, suggesting General Assembly and ECOSOC; and five The PBC was created as an intergovernmen- that the PBC support countries both at risk member states each from leading troop-con- tal advisory body to the Security Council, of descending into or emerging from conflict. tributing countries and UN financial con- the General Assembly, and the Economic However, in view of sensitivities of member tributors. PBC members serve for renew- and Social Council (ECOSOC), to maintain states to giving such a body a prevention man- able two-year terms. The Chair of the PBC is international attention to post-conflict coun- date, when Secretary-General elected for a one-year term. tries and prevent their relapse into conflict, submitted his proposals to establish the UN’s The founding resolutions set out that the an all-too-frequent problem for post-conflict peacebuilding architecture in his March 2005 PBC agenda would be based on requests states. The PBC’s founding resolutions man- report “In Larger Freedom”, he focused the for advice from the Council, the General dated the PBC to bring together all relevant PBC on supporting post-conflict countries. Assembly, ECOSOC, the Secretariat, or a actors to marshal resources and to advise on Nevertheless, Annan noted that “it would be member state at risk of lapsing or relapsing and propose strategies for post-conflict recov- valuable if Member States could at any stage into conflict. Today, four countries on the ery; focus attention on post-conflict recovery make use of the Peacebuilding Commission’s PBC agenda are also on the agenda of the efforts; and assist in coordinating the inter- advice and could request assistance from a Security Council: , the Central Afri- ventions of UN and non-UN actors in coun- standing fund for peacebuilding to build their can Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and tries emerging from armed conflict. domestic institutions for reducing conflict”. Liberia. The PBC’s fifth agenda situation is The original proposal to establish the PBC The PBC comprises 31 member states, , which came off the Council’s by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges which sit on its Organizational Committee. active agenda after the departure in March

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Background on the PBC

2014 of the UN’s last political mission to the The PBC has often been viewed cynically (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping country—the UN Integrated Peacebuilding by the Security Council, particularly its P5 Operations (DPKO), which over the years Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). These members. But scepticism and a lack of interest have not always been very supportive. situations were all referred to the PBC by the in its work have featured more broadly among While Council members, and the P5 in par- Security Council. Guinea, which was on the the attitudes of diplomats of other member ticular, have questioned the PBC’s usefulness, PBC agenda until earlier in 2017, was the one states and parts of the Secretariat, who find proponents of the PBC have found the Coun- situation placed on the agenda by the request its meetings too theoretical or redundant cil unreceptive to working with the PBC, thus of its government, made in 2011. regarding issues discussed in the Security limiting its ability over the years to demonstrate These country situations have been consid- Council. A common critique from the P5 its value. Power relations have seemingly lim- ered over the years through the PBC’s country- has been that the PBC has added little val- ited this relationship. In the eyes of many PBC specific configurations (CSCs), which are each ue to the Council’s work. Challenges for the members, the P5 do not like taking advice from chaired by a different permanent representative PBC include providing information that can anyone. Meanwhile, the P5 have perceived of a UN member state. CSC memberships are appear relevant compared to that presented PBC members as seeking to intervene in the broader than that of the PBC’s Organization- by a UN mission, when chairs of PBC coun- peace and security prerogatives of the Council. al Committee, being composed of interested try configurations are based in New York. The The PBC’s creation came as progress in Secu- member states and other relevant partners of PBC is supported by the PBSO, which totals rity Council reform stalled, so for some mem- the concerned country, such as, neighbouring approximately 35 staff. The PBSO’s analytical ber states seeking permanent membership, the states and major donors, including the interna- capability regarding country situations largely PBC could provide some opportunity to influ- tional financial institutions (IFIs). relies on the Department of Political Affairs ence issues of peace and security.

Developments in the PBC in 2013-2014

For years, a recurring contentious point in the Emerging in part from the initial stock- however, has often not generated much inter- PBC-Council relationship has been whether taking sessions in 2013 and 2014, efforts were est among Council members, represented at the CSC chairs should be able to participate made to increase cooperation at informal lev- times by more junior diplomats, and agen- in the Security Council’s consultations. This is els. CSC chairs of the Liberia, Sierra Leone da country representatives have themselves where, in principle, more frank and interactive and Burundi configurations held briefings sometimes not attended. The 2017 informal discussion takes place compared to the formal with Council experts ahead of Council meet- interactive dialogue in June on the Sahel and interventions in the Council’s public cham- ings and negotiations of mandate renewals on the Lake Chad Basin region marked the first ber. Admission to the consultations room has UN missions or, in the case of the Burundi time that the session centred around specific almost always been restricted to the Coun- configuration, before and after the chair’s countries and regions, whereas past discus- cil’s 15 members and Secretariat officials. country visits. There were another series of sions had been only on thematic issues and Some CSC chairs, as well as several Council informal briefings of Council experts by CSC the Council-PBC relationship. members, have argued that being able to join chairs and PBC chair Antonio de Aguiar In 2014, the PBC also began holding an consultations would be a way that they could Patriota () to discuss the terms of refer- annual session in June around the observance contribute to and advise the Council, more ence in advance of the 2015 peacebuilding of Peacebuilding Day on 23 June. The idea effectively than by reading a statement at the architecture review. While Council experts stemmed from one of the observations of the public session. But their arguments, rebuffed are the diplomats who negotiate Council 2010 peacebuilding architecture review that by some of the P5, have been to no avail. products and prepare statements, such meet- found that the PBC suffered from a lack of Given this resistance, some Council and ings, according to one diplomat, do not fully awareness in capitals. The annual session was PBC members in recent years began focusing substitute for participating in consultations thus envisioned as an event that could bring on other ways to improve interactions. In June since it still deprives Council ambassadors of to New York high-level officials to discuss pol- 2013, , at the time an elected Council the opportunity to hear from the CSC chairs. icy issues related to peacebuilding. member and a former chair of the PBC, started These informal briefings have never become a During 2014, the PBC under the chair- coordinating “stock-taking” sessions that bring regular practice. However, a number of CSC manship of Ambassador Patriota began plac- together, two to three times a year, Council chairs have developed regular informal con- ing greater focus on regional approaches to members that are members of the PBC, CSC sultations with Council penholders. peacebuilding. This was also when the PBC chairs and agenda country representatives to Since 2012, a mainstay of the PBC-Coun- started exhibiting signs of increasing the rel- examine PBC-Council relations and iden- cil relationship has been the Council’s yearly evance of the Organizational Committee. It tify opportunities and practices to strengthen informal interactive dialogue with the PBC seems this was prompted in large part by the the PBC advisory role. This format contin- and CSC chairs, as well as agenda country Ebola crisis, which by the summer of 2014 was ues today, with Malaysia replacing Rwanda as representatives, which follows the presenta- rapidly spreading through Guinea, Liberia and coordinator in 2015, followed by , which tion to the Council of the PBC annual report. Sierra Leone, all three countries on the agenda has served as coordinator since 2016. The annual informal interactive dialogue, of the PBC. On 6 August 2014, the chairs of

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Developments in the PBC 2013-2014 the Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone config- for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER). regional and subregional organisations. From urations—Ambassadors Sylvie Lucas (Lux- The Council’s consideration of the crisis, 24 to 26 November, Patriota led a delegation embourg), Mårten Grunditz (Sweden), and however, seems to have been carried out in comprising the chairs of the Burundi and CAR Guillermo Rishchynski (), respective- relative isolation from PBC efforts. Council configurations to Cairo and Addis Ababa—a ly—issued a joint letter to PBC members high- attention appeared prompted more by vio- rare trip abroad by the PBC chair. (The only lighting the need for sustained international lence that had broken out in Monrovia, reveal- previous comparable activity was a 2011 high- support to respond to the Ebola epidemic. ing the epidemic’s destabilising potential, and level meeting with the African Development This was followed by a rare joint meeting of by concerns about the health of peacekeepers Bank in Kigali on Rwanda’s post-conflict the three configurations on 18 August, which in Liberia. Council resolution 2177 contains peacebuilding experience, organised by Rwan- included a briefing from Mano River Union only preambular recognition of the role of the da during its PBC chairmanship.) In Cairo, a Secretary-General Hadja Saran Daraba Kaba. PBC “in supporting the national, regional and workshop was organised with, inter alia, repre- Daraba Kaba highlighted the importance of international efforts to respond to the Ebola sentatives of the AU and African subregional inter-country actions as the countries’ cross- outbreak”, with no mention of its activities organisations on the role of regional actors in border regions accounted for more than 70 during the preceding weeks. supporting political processes and institution- percent of Ebola cases. A subsequent PBC The PBC would remain engaged on the building, as well as the potential for the PBC to session on the crisis was held on 8 September. epidemic. In November, Patriota requested enhance its engagement with and support for The PBC was ahead of the Security Coun- the Secretary-General to conduct an assess- regional initiatives. Then, in Addis, the delega- cil and the UN leadership in focusing atten- ment on the crisis’ impact on peacebuilding tion held a policy dialogue with the AU Peace tion on the Ebola crisis. On 18 September, the efforts, and over the next two years, the PBC and Security Council (PSC), in addition to Council held an emergency open debate on would focus on promoting the three countries’ meetings with the AU Commission, the Eco- Ebola and adopted resolution 2177 on the post-Ebola recovery needs. nomic Commission for Africa, and the African epidemic, and the General Assembly followed In November 2014, the PBC took steps Development Bank. the next day by establishing the UN Mission to develop institutional collaboration with

The Ten-Year Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture

It was also during Patriota’s chairmanship review were recent relapses into conflict in the Peace” (S/2015/490). that the PBC undertook preparations for the CAR and South Sudan, along with a broader One of its key conclusions was the need 2015 UN peacebuilding architecture review rising trend in violent conflict. This created for a broader understanding of peacebuilding. (PBAR). The Council and General Assembly greater interest among member states in con- The AGE contended that peacebuilding takes resolutions on the first five-year review of the sidering ways to strengthen UN peacebuilding. place not only in post-conflict situations— UN’s peacebuilding architecture in 2010 (S/ Significantly, and in further contrast with 2010, as had become the common understand- RES/1947; A/RES/65/7) had called for a fur- the terms of reference for the 2015 review, set ing—but also to prevent conflict in the first ther comprehensive review in 2015. out in a joint letter from the presidents of the place, during peacemaking and in peace- The review in 2010, led by the ambassadors Security Council and General Assembly to the keeping. Occurring across the conflict cycle, of Ireland, and , included Secretary-General dated 15 December 2014, peacebuilding was thus a responsibility of the proposals (some of which were not so different enabled the ten-year review to look beyond entire UN system, not just of its peacebuild- from those that would be generated during the the UN peacebuilding architecture—the PBC, ing architecture. The narrower understanding 2015 review) to improve PBC-Council inter- PBF and PBSO—to consider how peacebuild- and a lack of commitment to peacebuilding action, the PBC’s links to the field and the flex- ing was dealt with by the UN system more had been manifested in the underfunding of ibility of its working methods. However, many broadly; they called for “recommendations peacebuilding activities and neglect of conflict of the recommendations put forward in their on the functioning, resources, and modes of prevention. Referring to this broader under- final report had either gone unimplemented or engagement of the peacebuilding architecture standing, the AGE proposed replacing the had not achieved their objective of reinvigorat- and on its links with the sys- term “peacebuilding” with “sustaining peace”. ing the peacebuilding architecture. tem that engages with it”. The report further identified shortcom- In the lead-up to the ten-year review, the ings in peacebuilding efforts as resulting from PBC undertook a lengthy consultative pro- The Advisory Group of Experts Report the fragmentation of the UN system among cess with member states that began in May A seven-person independent panel called the the UN’s intergovernmental organs, the Sec- 2014 to develop terms of reference. This Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), chaired retariat, and the UN’s agencies, funds and contrasted with the 2010 review, ahead of by former Permanent Representative of Gua- programmes. The AGE stressed the need to which there had been no such consultation temala Gert Rosenthal, carried out the first better integrate the UN’s peace and security, and which had generated little interest among phase of the 2015 review. On 29 June 2015, human rights, and development pillars to pro- the UN membership when it was completed. the AGE submitted a final report to member mote greater coherence of efforts and analysis Also significant in the lead-up to the 2015 states, titled “The Challenges of Sustaining for sustaining peace and peacebuilding.

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Ten-Year Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture

The AGE held that the PBC was well posi- In considering the PBC’s shortcom- contributions for programmatic dimensions tioned to address this fragmentation. It should ings, the AGE said that it should diversify of peace operations’ mandates, such as rule continue its functions of advocacy, support for its working methods and the country situa- of law and security sector reform, which cur- marshalling resources, assisting in improving tions that it considers. It recommended that rently rely on voluntary contributions. coordination within and outside the UN, and the PBC move away from its reliance on the The report made a number of other obser- formulating policy recommendations. But the CSCs, where most of its work and activities vations. Peacebuilding required more atten- AGE said that the PBC should focus more on have taken place, and invigorate the primacy tion to tackling the root causes of conflict and being an advisory “bridge” by taking advan- of the Organizational Committee. The AGE should be recognised as an inherently politi- tage of its diverse membership and convening highlighted that the PBC appeared to lack cal process. It should be based on “inclusive” power to get the Security Council, ECOSOC relevance to observers, demonstrated in part national ownership, since national ownership and General Assembly to work together bet- by the fact that its six-country agenda reflect- was not enough if it was based on just the views ter. Doing this would require PBC members ed only a small proportion of peacebuilding of domestic elites or authoritarian govern- to see themselves as representing and being contexts. By contrast, the PBF had disbursed ments. While noting that a peace operation’s accountable to the intergovernmental organ money to 32 countries over the past ten years. departure from a country often leads to a steep that elected or designated them. The AGE further recommended enhancing drop-off in financing to continue peacebuild- According to the AGE, a stronger PBC the PBC’s cooperation with regional and sub- ing activities, the AGE also pointed out that “will particularly depend on a deepened com- regional organisations and international finan- this is frequently accompanied by an abrupt mitment from the main intergovernmental cial institutions. reduction in UN political capacities. It thus peacebuilding actor, the Security Council”. Regarding what the AGE identified as sig- highlighted the need for UN resident coordina- The report recommended that the Council nificant underfunding for peacebuilding activi- tors, who lead the UN country teams, to have draw on the PBC’s advice regarding peace- ties, it proposed that one percent of the value of greater political acumen and to be able to play building aspects of peace operations’ mandates, total UN budgets for peace operations or $100 a strategic political role, which is still required and that an overstretched Council consider million (whichever was greater) be provided after the departure of a UN mission. passing situations where peace consolidation annually to the PBF from assessed contribu- has progressed sufficiently to the PBC. tions. It also recommended using assessed

The Peacebuilding Fund The PBF has been considered by most observ- review involving the UN’s Peacebuilding Con- the PBF contended that the AGE recommen- ers as the most successful of the three entities tact Group (comprised of UN agencies, funds, dation would create an oversight role of the in the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. It was programmes and the Secretariat). General Assembly’s Fifth Committee and set up to fund projects that target peacebuild- Member states generally praise the PBF, thus weaken the PBF’s nimbleness and flex- ing needs of conflict-affected countries which viewing it as an important, flexible and speedy ibility, which are among its strengths. Their tend not to receive traditional donor support, source of funding. The AGE confirmed these opposition to the proposal makes it unlikely since many types of peacebuilding activities observations, though it noted that the cata- that member states will agree to options in the are viewed as risky. The PBSO manages the lytic role envisioned for it when it was cre- Secretary-General’s forthcoming implementa- PBF, which has two mechanisms: an Imme- ated—to provide initial funds that then attract tion report on the peacebuilding architecture diate Response Facility used to fill urgent resources from other sources—had largely not review for applying assessed contributions to peacebuilding needs and a Peacebuilding and materialised. Early on, PBC agenda countries peacebuilding. In recent years, the UN has set Recovery Facility, which provides medium- made up the majority of the beneficiaries of its the goal for annual PBF investments of at least term financing to countries and which over financing. Over the last five years, this share $100 million. A September 2016 pledging the lifespan of PBF has made up the major- has progressively fallen to only 10 percent in conference that aimed to raise $300 million for ity of its funding. Decisions on projects that 2016 as the number of countries benefitting the three-year period 2017-2019 was seen as the PBF supports are kept independent of the from PBF support has expanded. disappointing, raising only $152 million. Still, PBC. Projects are approved by the Assistant During the negotiations on the resolutions as part of his reform proposals, the Secretary- Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support emerging from the 2015 review, member states General is seeking a “quantum” increase in the on behalf of the Secretary-General based on a that opposed using assessed contributions for capacity of the PBF.

The preparation of the AGE report coin- that central to sustaining peace and avoid- recommendations, the HIPPO said that mis- cided with two other major reviews—the ing relapses into conflict is the need to main- sion budgets should be provided with pro- review of peace operations and the review of tain and strengthen political momentum, to grammatic resources necessary for mandated the implementation of resolution 1325 on address the underlying causes of the con- tasks to support the sustaining of peace. women, peace and security. During these pro- flict, to deepen and broaden peace processes, cesses, the panels of the three reviews regu- and to advance reconciliation. According to General Assembly and Security Council larly consulted with each other and arrived at the HIPPO, “the challenge for peace opera- Resolutions a number of convergent findings. For exam- tions is to help sustain peace while a long- The submission of the AGE report triggered ple, the report of the High-Level Independent term, often generational effort to strengthen an intergovernmental process for member Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) said state institutions gets under way”. Among its states to consider the report’s analysis and

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Ten-Year Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture recommendations. This process, which was at preventing the outbreak, escalation, con- The General Assembly resolution included a co-chaired by Australia on behalf of the Gen- tinuation and recurrence of conflict”. The decision, which the Council version took note eral Assembly, and Angola, from the Security definition captured other critical aspects for of, to invite the Secretary-General to provide Council, culminated in April 2016 with the sustaining peace as outlined by the AGE: the during its 72nd session, which began in Sep- adoption of substantively identical resolu- importance of addressing root causes, pro- tember 2017, a report on the implementation tions: Security Council resolution 2282 and moting inclusivity by accounting for the needs of the resolution that should contain options General Assembly resolution 70/262. To the of all segments of society, and basing interven- for funding peacebuilding through assessed surprise of many at the UN, these incorporat- tions on all three pillars of the UN’s work in and voluntary contributions. Having such a ed many of the findings of the AGE, and the security, human rights and development. reference to assessed contributions proved eight-page resolutions were the UN’s most The resolutions further reaffirmed the contentious during negotiations on the text as comprehensive on peacebuilding. By com- PBC’s mandate: to sustain international large financial contributors made clear their parison, the follow-up Council and General attention to conflict-affected countries; to opposition to accepting the AGE’s proposals Assembly resolutions to the 2010 review had promote a strategic and coherent approach regarding assessed contributions. little content and each totalled six paragraphs, to peacebuilding; to serve an advisory “bridg- The resolutions also made strong appeals or about a single page in length. ing role” among the principal UN organs and for UN reforms, calling for strengthening A 23 February 2016 open debate on the entities; and to provide a forum for conven- operational and policy coherence within the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding archi- ing all relevant actors. The Council expressed UN system; improving internal UN leader- tecture, organised by Venezuela during its its intention to regularly request and draw ship, capability and accountability at head- Council presidency, was credited in part for upon the PBC’s “specific, strategic and tar- quarters and in the field; and strengthening facilitating what would ultimately be a chal- geted advice” in the formation, review and partnerships with international, regional and lenging negotiation on the resolutions. The drawdown of peacekeeping operations and subregional organisations, international finan- session revealed wide and diverse member special political missions. Specifying that the cial institutions, and civil society organisations. state support for the AGE report, which advice be “specific, strategic and targeted” Upon their adoption, the resolutions were seemed to reduce some members’ reluc- was an attempt by the P5 to address their hailed as landmark texts. Negotiations had tance to accept the AGE’s proposed broader complaints about the PBC’s added value. been conducted among the full UN mem- notion of peacebuilding. The debate repre- Moreover, the resolutions encouraged the bership through the General Assembly. When sented another contrast from 2010, when the PBC to diversify its working methods in sup- an agreement was reached and the text was Security Council never formally discussed port of sustaining peace, including to enable presented to Council members to consider the report of the first PBC review. consideration of more country situations, the technical changes required to make it a Taking on board the AGE’s argument upon the request of the country concerned; Council resolution, some Council delegates regarding the need to view peacebuilding regional and cross-cutting issues; and greater who had not participated in the negotiations more broadly, the Security Council and Gen- synergies with the PBF. commented that there was language, for eral Assembly resolutions included a defini- On the financing gap for peacebuilding example, related to development, which if tion of sustaining peace, described as “a goal activities, the resolutions acknowledged “the negotiated through the Council, was most and a process to build a common vision of a need for UN peacebuilding efforts to have ade- unlikely to have been agreed. society…which encompasses activities aimed quate, predictable and sustained financing”.

Developments in the PBC since 2015

The review and resolutions sparked new Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden) had already at a 10 October session. momentum to strengthen the PBC, which begun to test ideas in the AGE report while During Kamau’s chairmanship in 2016, some diplomats have described as a “window building on the work of Ambassador Patriota. the PBC placed further emphasis on looking of opportunity” to show that the PBC can be Skoog and his successor, Ambassador Mach- at peacebuilding challenges through a regional more relevant. Notable changes in the PBC aria Kamau (), both promoted Ebola perspective, focusing on West Africa. The PBC over the past two years include the revitalisa- recovery in 2015 and 2016, each undertak- met in January on peacebuilding threats and tion of the Organizational Committee, con- ing visits to Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and challenges in the subregion, followed by a ses- sideration of new country and regional situ- Senegal. In 2015, the PBC also held a number sion in April on the subregional dimensions ations beyond the PBC’s established agenda, of uncharacteristic meetings on non-agenda of peacebuilding in West Africa. The January and growing cooperation with regional and countries: on Burkina Faso regarding upcom- meeting looked at regional challenges, includ- subregional organisations. ing elections as part of the country’s political ing violent extremism and cross-border secu- transition, and on financing for peacebuilding rity, while the April session allowed discussion PBC Activities in 2015 and 2016 in Papua New Guinea and Somalia. In 2016, on potential support roles that the PBC could During 2015, before completion of the the PBC continued such initiatives, meeting provide to countries such as Burkina Faso, review, the PBC, under the chairmanship of on financing for peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, which had benefitted

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Developments in the PBC since 2015 from PBF funding and which Assistant Secre- PBC better informed of the progress made The Gambia, which is not on its formal agen- tary-General for Peacebuilding Support Oscar by countries that are supported by the PBF da, seemed to come to a sudden halt. Fernandez-Taranco had visited during a tour (which has included more than two dozen The PBC became involved as The Gam- of the region in March. countries that are not on the PBC’s agenda). bia’s UN permanent representative, Ambas- This two-year period thus saw the PBC Other recommendations are more aspiration- sador Mamadou Tangara, decided the body engaging with the Economic Community for al, such as PBC member states doing more to could be a way to sustain international atten- West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano represent the UN organs that elect them and tion and support for his country’s new gov- River Union, and the (especially fulfil the PBC’s bridging role to link the work ernment. The PBC Chair, Ambassador Cho, in the context of post-Ebola recovery). It fur- of the Security Council, General Assembly undertook an initial visit to The Gambia in ther increased its interaction with the UN’s and ECOSOC, and other relevant entities. March, accompanied by Tangara and Fernan- regional offices, in particular the UN Office A practice that the PBC has begun that was dez-Taranco. The Organizational Committee for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), also included among these recommendations then discussed the priorities of the new gov- but also with the UN Regional Centre for Pre- is having the outgoing PBC chair serve as one ernment and ways for the PBC to provide ventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRC- of the two Vice-Chairs. The purpose is to cre- support during a 19 April meeting. This was CA) during its discussion on Kyrgyzstan. ate greater continuity and to address the chal- followed up by a luncheon hosted by the ROK In October, Kamau led a mission of the lenge to the active leadership of the PBC cre- on 30 June during the PBC’s annual session PBC’s vice-chairs and Fernandez-Taranco ated by the chair only serving a one-year term. to discuss current programmes of support and to Addis Ababa to meet with the AU PSC. A continuing needs with The Gambia’s Attorney PSC communiqué following a meeting with PBC Activities in 2017 General and Minister of Justice Abubacarr the PBC delegation called for greater collabo- The first 10 months of 2017 have seen further Tambadou and representatives of the World ration and coordination between the two bod- evolution of the PBC under the chairman- Bank, African Development Bank, and UN ies, deciding, inter alia, to hold an annual meet- ship of Ambassador Cho Tae-yul (Republic Development Programme. At time of writing, ing with the PBC and to undertake joint visits of Korea or ROK). Notably, this has includ- the PBC was planning a session most likely to conflict and post-conflict areas in Africa. ed the PBC following up and supporting the in December to raise awareness for a donor work of the Security Council, in the context conference being organised on The Gambia. Working Methods Review of The Gambia and the UN Integrated Strat- Following the encouragement in the PBAR egy for the Sahel, in addition to the Liberia UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel resolutions for the PBC to review its provi- CSC’s increased role in supporting imple- Also earlier this year, the Council called for the sional rules of procedure and adopt more mentation of a peacebuilding plan that the PBC to support UNOWAS in implementat- flexible and efficient working methods, -dur Council requested for Liberia. ing the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel ing the second half of 2016, Kenya and Swit- (the Sahel strategy) in a 20 January presiden- zerland produced a non-paper on the PBC’s The Gambia tial statement on the activities of the regional working methods and rules of procedure. In December 2016 and January 2017, the office and developments in the subregion. The This led to a number of recommendations Security Council became seized with The statement, adopted the day after the Coun- that the PBC informally adopted, which Gambia crisis. It held seven meetings on cil’s much more widely noted resolution on were included in an annex to the PBC’s tenth the situation, as well as discussing the cri- the crisis in The Gambia, emphasised the annual report (S/2017/76). sis during its regularly scheduled session “importance of the convening role” of the PBC, Some of these recommendations are on UNOWAS. Resolution 2337, adopted charging it with supporting UNOWAS “in based on practices that the PBC had begun on 19 January moments before ECOWAS mobilizing deeper commitment and partner- developing over the previous two sessions: troops reportedly began entering the coun- ship between the UN system, the countries of having a more active Organizational Com- try, endorsed the decisions of ECOWAS and the Sahel and other international and regional mittee and using it more as a platform to con- the AU to recognise Adama Barrow as presi- partners” to advance the implementation of vene country-specific, regional and themat- dent. But after a 25 January meeting at which the UN Sahel strategy. The request marked ic discussions; adopting and publicising an Council members were updated on the agree- the Council’s first call for PBC support on a annual work plan of the PBC that is updated ment that led long-standing president Yahya new issue since it had requested the PBC’s over the course of the year; and keeping the Jammeh to cede power, Council attention to advice on Liberia in 2010.

The UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel The Council requested the Secretary-General presented the UN Sahel strategy to the Coun- sought to promote a coherent and regional to develop an integrated strategy for the Sahel cil in June 2013, which the Council welcomed approach among UN agencies operating in region in resolution 2056 on Mali in 2012. in a 16 July presidential statement. the region to tackle these problems, while also The Council was concerned that problems In many ways the Sahel strategy was a pre- coordinating with non-UN actors. that had led to the crisis in Mali were com- cursor of a “sustaining peace” approach. The According to a 2016 independent review, mon across the region, and that efforts to strategy identified the common structural which was not published but was shared defeat extremist groups in the country’s north root causes of instability in the region, i.e. with Council members, the implementation could simply push them into neighbouring poverty, underdevelopment and weak gover- of the Sahel strategy has so far been a “fail- countries of the Sahel. The Secretary-General nance, especially in border regions. It then ure”. Difficulties in implementing the strategy

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Developments in the PBC since 2015 likely reveal lessons and challenges ahead for proliferation of Sahel strategies among inter- national ownership in peacebuilding, as the advancing the sustaining peace agenda. One of governmental organisations and govern- Council-mandated strategy, developed by the difficulties has been getting UN agencies ments—roughly 18 as of this writing. The the UN in 2012 and 2013 has struggled to to overcome their traditional fragmentation independent review suggested the UN DPA generate interest from countries of the region. and to work together, since they are not used and UNOWAS place renewed focus on coor- During the Council’s October 2017 mission to being coordinated nor to working regionally. dinating these efforts. The PBC, through its to the Sahel to assess the progress of Sahel At a structural level, the administrative set-up bridging and convening role, could conceiv- countries in setting-up a joint counter-terror- of the agencies, which, for example, organ- ably provide a forum to bring more coher- ism force, members heard criticism that the ise their budgets at the country level, makes ence to the different interventions in the UN Sahel strategy lacks focus on infrastruc- regional and joint programming a challenge. region. The challenges of implementing the ture and energy projects that are vital to the Another shortcoming has been a strategy further highlight the importance of development of Sahel states.

Though the Sahel strategy, like The Gam- silos and fragmentation within the PBC itself. informal meetings in its role as the focal point bia, has not been added to the PBC’s for- The PBSO has also started regularly brief- for institution-building; these included sessions mal agenda, in 2017, the PBC held meetings ing members during PBC meetings on the on border management and extending state on the strategy on 6 March and during a activities of the PBF, to reduce the discon- authority in the Sahel, and on criminal justice 21 April Council-PBC stock-taking session. nect that has existed between the PBC and systems in Guinea and Nepal. and Ambassador Cho attended a 14 June meeting PBF and to follow up on the call in the resolu- organised a PBC session to consider of the Ministerial Coordination Platform of tions on the peacebuilding architecture review innovative financing for peacebuilding. Amidst Sahel Strategies in N’Djamena with Fernan- for increased synergies. In addition, creating long-standing criticism that the PBC often dez-Taranco, where he had the opportunity greater awareness among the membership of holds meetings without much impact, focal to meet with leaders of The Group of Five for the PBC about the PBF’s activities has been points could pursue less formal activities. In the Sahel and UNOWAS head Mohamed Ibn another way to engage the PBC on the broad- addition to ensuring consideration of their the- Chambas to further explore ways the PBC er array of countries that have peacebuilding matic issues during PBC meetings, they may could provide support. He then briefed on his needs. There are now plans to encourage attempt to engage bilaterally with different visit during the Council-PBC 19 June infor- countries that are declared eligible for PBF actors to explore opportunities to address rel- mal interactive dialogue on the Sahel and the money to brief the PBC on their peacebuild- evant needs of a country and then bring these Lake Chad Basin, the latter of which Cho ing strategies. The first such session was held discussions back to the PBC when useful. had also discussed during his meetings in with on 13 November, and a similar The creation of the focal points comes as N’Djamena. A joint PBC-ECOSOC meeting meeting was held on Sri Lanka on 20 Novem- the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned was held on 28 June to consider the develop- ber. During CSC meetings, PBSO represen- (WGLL), established in December 2006, has ment aspects of the Sahel and the UN strate- tatives are also more regularly briefing about stopped meeting this year. To some extent, gy, which represented an attempt by the PBC PBF programmes in agenda countries. the focal points on thematic issues replace to play its envisioned bridging role among the Another new initiative in 2017 was the the WGLL, which had been a format to dis- UN’s intergovernmental organs. agreement reached in April among PBC mem- cuss thematic issues. The Guinea CSC also The discussion of new country situations bers to create focal points on thematic aspects ended in 2017, which followed President in the PBC also included a 7 June meeting of peacebuilding. was designated the Alpha Condé’s General Assembly remarks on the Solomon Islands and its peacebuild- focal point on youth; and Cana- in September 2016 that the recent peace- ing challenges ahead of the withdrawal of da, on gender; , on national ownership; building architecture resolutions provided the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Indonesia and Norway, on financing for peace- an opportunity to consider more flexible Islands (RAMSI)—an Australian-led opera- building; and , on institution-building interaction for Guinea with the PBC. A sub- tion deployed to the archipelagic country with a focus on judicial reform, border control, sequent PBC review conducted during the since 2003 following internal conflict that and financial structures. The focal points are latter part of 2016 recommended terminat- began in the late 1990s. The country’s prime expected to ensure attention to these dimen- ing the CSC. Guinea sent a formal request minister, Manasseh Sogavare, addressed the sions of peacebuilding in the PBC’s consider- in early July 2017 to end the CSC, though it PBC, outlining some of the government’s ation of different situations. The initiative was has expressed interest in future engagement concerns and priorities over outstanding land not without controversy. A number of mem- through the Organizational Committee. tenure issues, corruption and climate change. bers, including the P5, initially objected to the During 2017, the PBC has sought to idea and remain sceptical that the focal points develop its partnerships with external actors. Changes in Working Methods simply replicate the CSCs, which the PBC has An agreement between the PBC and the Among other changes in 2017, CSC chairs been intending to move away from. World Bank to hold an annual dialogue was have started providing quarterly briefings to The way these focal points will function announced during the PBC’s annual session the Organizational Committee about each is still developing. The idea of creating focal in June. In early December, PBC Chair Cho configuration’s activities and upcoming work points was also seen as a way to encourage and other members will visit the AU and the plans. The practice, which was another recom- PBC members to become more engaged dur- African Development Bank to further build mendation resulting from the 2016 working ing PBC meetings. Some focal points have on the work of Ambassador Kamau in 2016. methods review, is meant to break down the organised side events. Japan has initiated several

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Developments in the PBC since 2015

Moving Away from Country-Specific Configurations The AGE had recommended that the PBC replace. With PBSO support being limited country, the question that arises is how to diversify its working methods to give it the by its staffing, this dependency on the chair ensure that the PBC remains engaged and flexibility to consider a larger and more has been described as a built-in vulnerability. meetings on new country situations do not diverse array of countries and regions. It also Moreover, with the CSC chairs playing simply become one-off discussions. So far, recommended that the PBC maximise the such a prominent leading role in the consider- the PBC chair has been leading the PBC’s work it conducts, including country-specific ation of specific country situations, it has been work on The Gambia and the Sahel strat- and region-specific discussions and engage- argued that this has reduced the incentive for egy, as well as possible follow-up regard- ment, through its Organizational Committee other PBC members to be more active, while ing the Solomon Islands and Guinea. But as opposed to the CSCs, which it noted had from the perspective of some agenda countries as more new situations come before it that taken on “a life of their own” and “crowded this has limited their ability to engage with a require follow-through, it seems unlikely the out” activities of the overall Commission. wider array of PBC members. Moving away chair would be able to sustain this role. The Since the review, there has been a concert- from this format and increasingly conducting Secretary-General’s 2017 reform propos- ed effort in the PBC to move away from the the PBC’s work through the Organizational als, which would appear to heighten the role CSC format and to develop other options for Committee is seen as a possible way to foster of the PBSO and the UN’s focus on peace- country-specific meetings. The CSCs have greater collective efforts. Getting away from building, may enable the Secretariat to play a been useful in some cases, which the AGE CSCs and the strictures of a formal agenda is greater role in this regard. Another possibility acknowledged, but their effectiveness has also seen as a way to get around another obsta- is increasing the number of the PBC vice- depended largely on the individual ambassa- cle facing the PBC, the stigma which some chairs from two to four, in line with the four dors chairing them, and the resources avail- countries associate with being on the PBC’s vice-chairs appointed to the committees of able to these ambassadors. Some configu- agenda. This has negative connotations from the General Assembly. How the PBC deals ration chairs over the years have been very the perspective of many countries, in a similar with the increasing country situations com- active, but others less so. Unlike the PBC way to being on the agenda of the Security ing before it is still evolving. Depending on chair, who changes after a one-year term, Council, as it seems to indicate that a country each situation and the seriousness of its needs, CSC chairs remain in their roles indefinite- has serious problems. there are likely to be different forms in which ly and for political reasons are difficult to But without CSCs or a designated lead the PBC exercises follow-up.

Security Council-PBC Relationship since the Review

As noted, the AGE wrote that a more effec- agenda title from “post-conflict peacebuilding” Burundi tive PBC would particularly depend on a to “peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. When discussing positive experiences with deeper commitment from the UN’s “main At a formal level, CSC chairs have contin- the PBC, Council members frequently intergovernmental peacebuilding actor, the ued to brief the Council during public sessions. refer to the Burundi configuration. Mem- Security Council”. Despite the completion of Participation by PBC chairs at Council meet- bers, including the P5, have often cited the the review and unfolding changes in the PBC, ings has increased, reflecting the more active importance of Ambassadors Paul Seger and scepticism remains about whether the PBC role of the chair and the Organizational Com- Jürg Lauber of Switzerland—the former and can become a reliable resource to support mittee. In 2016, in addition to participating in current chairs, respectively, of the configura- the Council’s work. At the same time, there specific Council meetings on peacebuilding, tion—maintaining a channel of communica- have been clear signs of increasing Council the PBC chair briefed the Council at the 28 tion with the Burundian government when engagement with the PBC and openness on March open debate on “Women, peace and the UN’s relationship with the government the part of P5 members. security: the role of women in conflict pre- soured in 2014 and 2015. More recently, A symbolic, though still meaningful, change vention and resolution in Africa” and at a 24 the configuration’s focus on socio-economic following the review of the UN peacebuilding May open debate on cooperation between the dimensions has been seen by some members architecture was the Council changing the title UN and regional and subregional organisa- as a good approach to providing incentives to of the agenda item under which it considers tions. The PBC chair, and other PBC repre- the government, which has been keen to see peacebuilding. The General Assembly cre- sentatives have also participated in a number the resumption of aid that western countries ated a new agenda item called “Peacebuild- of meetings of the Council’s Ad Hoc Working suspended after President Pierre Nkurunziza ing and Sustaining Peace” in its version of Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution decided to stand for a third term in 2015. the concurrent resolutions. In June 2016, the in Africa since 2015 when Angola was chairing day before the PBC would present its annual the working group and also serving as co-chair Liberia report for the Security Council’s first meet- of the intergovernmental process of the peace- Liberia stands out as another example of the ing on peacebuilding since adopting resolution building architecture review. Council’s increased engagement with the 2282, Council members similarly updated its PBC since the peacebuilding architecture

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Security Council-PBC Relationship since the Review review. The country is widely perceived as a UN mapping exercise that revealed signifi- stay up-to-date on challenges. While Canada key test for the PBC since the UN Mission cant technical capacity gaps facing the UN does not have an embassy in Sierra Leone, its in Liberia (UNMIL) is downsizing and is country team if the plan is to be executed. embassy in Ghana has been active in assist- expected to withdraw by the end of March The Council’s 24 July presidential statement ing the Canadian mission’s work at the PBC, 2018. In resolution 2333 (23 December encourages the international community which at present is focused on supporting 2016), which renewed UNMIL for a final to address the gaps identified in this map- Sierra Leone’s upcoming 2018 elections. time, the Council requested the Secretary- ping exercise. Skoog has further committed Regarding Sierra Leone, some of the suc- General to prepare a “peacebuilding plan” for to advocacy efforts to raise the $130 million cess of its transition has been attributed to Liberia, emphasising “the important conven- required for the first two years of the peace- the sequence of special political missions fol- ing role of the Peacebuilding Commission in building plan and to have the CSC monitor lowing the withdrawal of the peacekeeping the process of developing this plan”. This was the plan’s implementation. operation in 2006. The AGE report noted the first time the Council had sought such a The case of Liberia over the past year that Council resolution 1829 creating the plan for an upcoming transition ahead of the appears to demonstrate good cooperation peacebuilding-focused UNIPSIL in 2008 departure of a peacekeeping operation. between the PBC and the US as the Coun- contained a number of notable features, The idea for the plan, notably, came from cil penholder on Liberia. Following a visit to including establishing the role of Executive the US, which with and the UK have Liberia in October 2016 by Skoog to comple- Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen- shown an increasing interest in the role that ment a UN strategic assessment mission, Swe- eral to serve as both head of the mission and the PBC can play in supporting smoother den provided Council experts with a briefing resident coordinator. This seemed to facili- transitions during the drawdown of peace on his trip, hosted at the US mission. Coordi- tate integrating the work of the mission and operations. For the US, the emphasis on tran- nating with the US, Sweden drafted the Coun- UN country team, and to securing resources sitions fits well with its priority of reducing cil’s recent presidential statement on Liberia’s for peacebuilding activities. It also facilitated costs and deciding exit strategies for expen- peacebuilding plan—a level of cooperation the transfer of mission functions to the coun- sive, long-standing peacekeeping operations. between penholder and CSC chair that is not try team when UNIPSIL withdrew. The CSC During the General Assembly’s 24 January common. This has certainly been facilitated apparently maintained a good relationship high-level dialogue on sustainable develop- by Sweden’s currently serving on the Council with the mission, something that the Council ment and sustaining peace, the US showed and thus is less likely to be replicated for CSC called for in resolution 1829. what diplomats and Secretariat officials saw chairs or PBC members who are not simulta- as a new level of openness towards the PBC, neously Council members. As the PBC moves CAR and Guinea-Bissau when US Deputy Permanent Representative away from its CSC formats and broadens the It has been more difficult to identify niches for Michele Sison spoke about “the major oppor- situations before it, there might be opportu- the PBC’s CAR configuration, and to some tunity for the Peacebuilding Commission to nities, however, for countries with dual PBC- extent the Guinea-Bissau configuration. CAR show that it can help organize the UN’s efforts Council memberships to champion different is an active conflict setting, and Guinea-Bissau and mobilize international donors in support” country situations within the Council. has been in the midst of a political crisis for of a sustaining peace approach in Liberia. over two years, putting a hold on normal gov- In April 2017, the Secretary-General sub- Sierra Leone ernment activities and causing donors to freeze mitted to the Council a peacebuilding plan for The Council’s interest in seeing that the PBC over a billion dollars for its development pro- Liberia, which the UN had prepared through remains engaged with Liberia stands in con- gramme. The chair of the CAR CSC, Ambas- consultations with various actors, including the trast to the Sierra Leone transition a few years sador Omar Hilale (Morocco), recently sought government and Liberia’s political parties, in ago. In 2013, when the Council renewed the to improve cooperation with the UN peace- the context of forthcoming presidential and mandate of UNIPSIL for a final time through keeping operation when he visited the country legislative elections in October. The plan is con- resolution 2097, the Council requested the in July. Since returning, Hilale has expressed sistent with an approach of sustaining peace. It PBC “to review its engagement with a view strong concern about the risk of worsening identifies the potential sources of renewed con- to scaling down its role”. At the time, the UK, violence along religious lines, proposing that flict and sets out a division of labour among which was the penholder on Sierra Leone, the Council conduct a visiting mission. After the UN country team, UNOWAS, ECOWAS had in mind that Sierra Leone might also a country visit in July by its chair, Ambassador and the World Bank to support the government. come off the PBC’s agenda when the UN’s Mauro Viera (Brazil), the Guinea-Bissau CSC On 24 July, the Council adopted a presidential peacebuilding mission ended. A PBC assess- has been considering where to focus its support, statement welcoming the plan. ment mission was conducted, and along with including how to support preparations for the Council members have been positive the Sierra Leone government’s preference May 2018 legislative elections, which will occur about Sweden’s efforts as chair of the Libe- to maintain PBC support, it was decided to amidst a very unstable political situation. ria CSC, which is led by Ambassador Olof maintain the CSC in a “lighter” form. Both these two CSCs have demonstrated Skoog. Sweden has a long history of devel- Since UNIPSIL’s departure in March the opportunity for the PBC to speak more opment cooperation with Liberia, one of the 2014, this lighter form of engagement has frankly than UN missions. Hilale’s briefing largest recipients of its official development translated into fewer CSC meetings and to the CAR CSC following his recent mis- assistance in Africa. Since the peacebuild- more informal engagement by Canada as the sion notably conveyed greater alarm about ing plan’s finalisation, Sweden has organised CSC chair, who maintains communication the risk of widespread violence, while Viera PBC meetings to discuss the findings of a with the UN country team and UNOWAS to has recently highlighted the extent to which

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Security Council-PBC Relationship since the Review

Bissau-Guinean sides have different interpreta- views on the continuation of a UN mission. by other elected members, revive the propos- tions of the Conakry Agreement, brokered by Russia has been the most insistent on mak- al to invite the PBC chair and CSC chairs to ECOWAS to get the country out of its politi- ing use of the silence procedure. It strongly participate on a case-by-case basis in Coun- cal crisis. maintains that the PBC’s advice should be cil consultations. This remained unaccept- based on a common view of its members; able to at least some P5 members. Instead, P5 Perspectives otherwise, PBC or CSC chairs will present the revised Note 507 encourages informal Despite such developments, discussions with positions in their national capacity. Even the exchanges between the Council and the PBC P5 representatives reveal that they still per- framing of the PBC’s recommendations to and CSC chairs “as appropriate, through ceive the PBC’s contributions to the Coun- the Council can be sensitive when it appears informal interactive dialogues.” (Informal cil’s work as very limited. According to one as too prescriptive rather than suggestive. The interactive dialogues are often used by the P5 diplomat, however, it is hard to evaluate use of the silence procedure particularly frus- Council to engage representatives of states the PBC’s impact since the P5 and a number trates PBC members when it is required for or organisations that cannot attend consulta- of other Council members at any given time reports by the CSC chair on country visits in tions). Making greater use of informal inter- also serve in the PBC, thus making it unclear which P5 members did not participate. active dialogues to discuss shared agenda how much these Council members are influ- In general, concerns remain among the countries has been suggested as a way to sub- enced by PBC discussions. P5 over the PBC’s use as an instrument to stitute for the PBC and CSC chairs’ inability The sustaining peace agenda has been encroach upon the prerogatives of the Coun- to participate in Council consultations since described by one permanent member as cil. A reason cited as perhaps contributing to this allows for interactivity among partici- having helped shape discussions in the PBC. a positive relationship between the Burundi pants; it could be a way for the PBC and CSC However, complaints of P5 representatives CSC and the Council is that Switzerland is chairs to express views while responding to include a lack of concrete proposals or opera- careful not to try to influence core security questions and comments that they are unable tional advice from the PBC that the Council issues that the Council deals with. to make in prepared statements or reports. can act on. They still perceive discussions as Another proposal that was not included in theoretical, while they say the Council is more Revision of Note 507 the final version of Note 507 was the pros- focused on deliverables. PBC members, per- Negotiations earlier this year to revise Note pect of joint Council-PBC missions. Japan haps because they often do not have embas- 507 on the Council’s working methods included the idea in the section of Note 507 sies in countries under discussion, are said to reveals the continuing tensions between the on Council visiting missions. Russia rejected tend to focus on issues that are priority areas Council and the PBC. Japan, as chair of the it outright while the US expressed concerns. for their governments, rather than focusing on Council’s Informal Working Group on Doc- The idea had already proven sensitive. Previ- the particularities of the country concerned. umentation and other Procedural Matters, ously, in March 2016, when the Council was This may have contributed to P5 scepticism steered the negotiations on Note 507, which preparing to visit West Africa, the US broke a regarding the new PBC focal points. had last been updated in 2010. During the silence procedure on a proposal to invite then- On the other hand, PBC proponents feel negotiations, it proved difficult to get Rus- chair of the Guinea-Bissau CSC, Ambassador that some Council members are still very sia to accept the inclusion of language from Patriota, to join the mission’s leg to Bissau. reluctant to allow the PBC the larger role resolution 2282 on the Council’s intention to Overall, the Council’s engagement with it could play. The frailty of the relationship engage with the PBC, whose activities Russia and its consideration of the PBC have still shows itself in the tensions over the use of contended had not been very useful. remained largely dependent on its various “silence procedure” to obtain consensus Ultimately Note 507 brought in language elected members that champion the PBC. among PBC or CSC members in the prepa- from resolution 2282, saying that “the mem- Over the past year, this has been Egypt, Japan ration of statements or reports to the Coun- bers of the Security Council also acknowledge and Sweden, which seek to draw attention cil. For many PBC members, the exercise of the importance of maintaining communica- to the PBC in Council products or identify the silence procedure and the need to negoti- tion with the Peacebuilding Commission as an opportunities to engage with it. The decision ate statements or reports being delivered to intergovernmental advisory body and express to seek the PBC’s involvement on the Sahel the Council is a way for the P5 to screen the their intention to regularly request, deliberate strategy came from Egypt, while without Swe- advice and “water down” information pro- and draw upon its specific, strategic and target- den it is not clear whether the Council would vided to the Council. Its effect may even limit ed advice, in accordance with Security Council have followed up with its July presidential PBC members from offering proposals that resolutions 1645 (2005) and 2282 (2016)”. statement on the Liberia peacebuilding plan. they realise would likely be rejected, such as The negotiations saw , supported

Lake Chad Basin In addition to Liberia, another example understanding the security situation, the members discussed with interlocutors such over the last year of the Council’s contrib- humanitarian crisis, and the root causes of issues as the need for job creation and eco- uting to a sustaining peace approach is the the area’s problems—as outlined in its terms nomic development, and even the impact of way it has addressed the Lake Chad Basin of reference and repeated by its co-leads climate change and the shrinking of Lake region. A Security Council visiting mission in throughout the visit. During the Council’s Chad. Members were told that if the human- March 2017 to Cameroon, Chad, and meetings with government officials and UN itarian crisis was not effectively dealt with or was organised with the aim of better country teams, it was notable that Council if root causes were not addressed, the Boko

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 Security Council-PBC Relationship since the Review

Haram insurgency—which had been losing which were thought sensitive for some coun- the region. ground—would continue, or a new group tries that are cautious about the Council’s Council members have since discussed would emerge similar to it. engaging on these less traditional security the Lake Chad Basin region along with the When the Council returned to New York, issues which overlap with responsibilities of Sahel during its annual informal interactive it adopted resolution 2349, which is divided other UN organs. But in the end, the reso- dialogue with the PBC in June 2017. Also, as into sections on security and protection of lution’s references to root causes and devel- demonstrated by the Council’s last meeting civilians, the humanitarian crisis, and root opment were not the issues during the reso- on the situation in September, Council mem- causes and development. Initially, there were lution’s negotiation that proved difficult to bers have continued to call for the region to doubts among members about whether the agree on. As one member stated, this may develop a strategy that tackles the drivers that Council would be able to agree on a product have been because the visit helped create a contributed to Boko Haram’s emergence and that dealt with root causes and development, common understanding of the crisis affecting longer-term development needs.

Improving PBC Support to the Security Council

A common critique by the P5 has been that perspectives, it could seek to share ideas for opportunities to engage Council members the PBC has not provided added value to the how these needs can be addressed as part of could include CSC chairs or other relevant Council’s work. But what is the type of “spe- the activities of a mission or through broader PBC members making themselves available cific, strategic and targeted advice” that the international efforts. to provide their insights to Council members PBC can offer, that Council members are ahead of Council visiting missions or organis- not already in a position to receive or cannot Alignment with the Council’s ing, as necessary, briefings of Council experts. be provided by a UN peace operation in the Programme of Work country concerned? To develop input for the Council, last year’s Generating Resources working methods review led by Kenya rec- As one Secretariat official said, an issue that Convening Role of the PBC ommended that the PBC align its work with has been both the PBC’s greatest draw but The PBC’s greatest strength and comparative the Council’s calendar and relevant meetings, also its greatest failure has been its potential advantage over the Council is its convening emphasising the importance of the PBC’s pre- to marshal resources. The PBC can highlight role—its ability to bring together and meet paratory work. The Council’s consideration of the needs of a particular situation. This does with a diverse array of actors, including the an issue is usually known several months in not, however, readily translate into donor country concerned, member states, IFIs, UN advance, while mandate expirations and renew- countries or the IFIs coming forward to fill agencies, regional and subregional organisa- als of peace operations often are known a year such gaps. To a large extent, the difficulty tions and civil society. The Council itself in a in advance. For the PBC and CSCs, this means seems to be that member states’ diplomats number of its recent products on Liberia and convening meetings with IFIs, the UN country in New York are typically not in a position the Sahel strategy has notably highlighted the team, regional organisations and civil society— to influence these decisions, which are usu- PBC’s “convening role”. whether jointly or in separate sessions—dur- ally made by their governments’ development There appears to be broad agreement ing the months preceding the planned Council agencies. The fragmentation of the UN iden- among PBC and Council members on the meetings. It also involves timing country visits tified by the AGE is often replicated, some- importance and potential for the PBC to make by the CSC chair ahead of the Council meet- times even more markedly, within the govern- greater use of its ability to convene such actors ing. As one Secretariat official notes, Council mental machineries of member states. to gain their perspectives. In doing so, it can members are likely to dismiss a CSC chair’s The PBC may still aim to fill these resource then collect and package these views to pres- briefing if the chair has not been to the field. needs—and a test case is being presented by ent to the Council. Every country situation Liberia. PBC meetings on the capacity and will vary, but generally the PBC could focus Informal Interaction funding gap identified for the Liberia peace- on providing input on socio-economic dimen- The PBC can then continue to provide advice building plan has raised awareness among sions and longer-term development challenges, on peacebuilding needs through its state- UN-based representatives, and Ambassador which the Council and UN mission can often ments at Council meetings, reports or letters. Skoog repeatedly draws attention to this gap overlook as they become focused on more day- For more frank discussion, informal interac- during PBC meetings. It may be possible that to-day operational and political challenges. tive dialogues can be organised between the a higher profile and more active PBC going These are insights which the PBC should be Council and PBC members, in particular forward—along with a detailed plan, such well positioned to provide through its interac- ahead of the mandate renewals of missions. as that created for Liberia, which can con- tions with IFIs and UN country teams. The Informal engagement is also considered cretely identify funding shortfalls—might be PBC’s recent forays into considering the important. The PBC chair or lead PBC mem- able to raise awareness that can lead member regional dimensions of peacebuilding may bers on a country situation, such as the CSC states and IFIs to become more committed represent another perspective that would ben- chairs, could seek to maintain regular con- to meeting such needs. efit the Council. When the PBC offers these tact with Council penholders. Other informal Similarly, the PBC is planning a meeting in

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Improving PBC Support to the Security Council

December to raise awareness for a donor con- or deficiencies that are identified are acted on. In a way, the PBC has played this role ference on The Gambia. A follow-up session is With the headquarters of many such actors in relation to The Gambia, though this was then envisioned for next year to assess whether outside New York and in other countries, this not an official Council agenda item since the donors delivered on their pledges. A challenge becomes a challenge. The decision to hold an Council considered the crisis through the that seems to remain is whether the discus- annual dialogue between the PBC and World regional mandate of UNOWAS. Upcoming sions in the PBC will be noticed in capitals Bank, a critical funder, is a step in addressing opportunities, in addition to Liberia, could and among IFIs, and whether such a session such limitations. be with Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti. A related can impact decisions on aid that may or may opportunity for the PBC is to receive brief- not have already been made by capitals. One Transitions and Sustaining ings from UN country teams on various example of the PBC generating significant International Attention country situations where there are no Coun- resources over the years includes Switzerland’s The PBC can further exercise its advisory role cil-mandated missions, providing a level of organisation of a donor conference in 2012, by providing attention to situations that the attention that currently does not exist. In gen- where more than $2.5 billion was pledged for Council does not have time to monitor suffi- eral, the PBC does not always need to focus Burundi’s poverty reduction strategy. ciently or that no longer warrant its attention. on the input it can provide to the Council. If In advocating for and raising awareness When the Council requests or endorses plans its activities result in better meeting coun- of countries’ needs, the PBC does not neces- or strategies that seek to address root causes tries’ needs and supporting their stability, this sarily need to organise meetings, the impact of conflict situations or fragility, i.e. the Sahel would complement the work of an already of which on country situations may be lim- strategy or the Liberian peacebuilding plan, burdened Security Council. In the process, it ited. PBC members may therefore seek other the PBC can support the implementation of might make P5 members more interested in more proactive ways to assist countries, such these plans. In part it can do this by providing the PBC’s activities or perspectives. as informally connecting relevant representa- the necessary follow-up and sustained atten- As noted above, a challenge for the PBC tives of member states that the PBC is trying tion that the Council is unable to provide, remains the stigma which countries may feel to support to organisations or private sector while being well positioned—because of its if seen as a situation of continuing concern actors that can potentially meet needs. convening role—to engage with implement- to the international community. Instead of Another more tempered way in which the ing partners. referring to countries that the PBC consid- PBC can aim to raise the resources available to As suggested by the AGE, the PBC can ers as part of its “agenda”, these may better a country or regional situation is through pro- take the lead on situations that are undergo- be referred to as “PBC-supported countries”. moting increased coherence among interna- ing transitions, especially from a peace opera- Within the PBC and PBSO, discussions have tional actors. If the PBC can prove increasingly tion to a UN country team, or passing off emphasised the diverse formats and levels of effective at bringing together different actors the Council’s agenda. These are situations engagement that the PBC can use to encour- and creating a better understanding of their that usually still require the support of the age countries to overcome this concern. For different programmes for a country, the iden- international community, and again the PBC countries to become more open to being dis- tification of gaps and possible areas of dupli- would be well positioned to consider chal- cussed in the PBC, it will be necessary for the cation could lead to a more efficient use of lenges facing the country team and more PBC’s consideration to translate into tangible resources. Similarly, a challenge at a practical broadly during the transition period after a benefits—whether they be the resources that level is getting the people with influence from peace operation is withdrawn, while seeking are available for countries, or more effective the relevant organisations in the same room or to promote coherence among the continuing support provided by the UN country team at meetings that can ensure that redundancies programmes of international actors. and broader international efforts.

UN Reform, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Current efforts to improve the PBC and its report, which the General Assembly request- contributions, as called for in the resolutions. relationship with the Council are occurring in ed be provided to member states at least 60 In light of the political constraints for increas- the context of the Secretary-General’s broad- days ahead of its high-level event on “Peace- ing assessed contributions and official donor er reforms to make conflict prevention and building and Sustaining Peace”, planned for assistance, it seems that options are also being sustaining peace more central to the UN’s 24-25 April 2018. The report is expected developed that would rationalise or better work. As a follow-up to the Council and Gen- to bring together the relevant aspects of the coordinate the UN’s many trust funds relat- eral Assembly resolutions on the peacebuild- Secretary-General’s peace and security, devel- ed to peacebuilding and propose innovative ing architecture review, the Secretary-Gener- opment and management reforms as they financing methods. al is expected to submit his implementation pertain to sustaining peace. Regarding the The UN’s peacebuilding architecture report on the resolutions in February. much-anticipated options to increase, restruc- was expected to be impacted by the Sec- The PBSO, DPA and the UN Develop- ture, and better prioritise funding for peace- retary-General’s reforms, which are being ment Programme on behalf of the UN Devel- building activities, the report is expected to designed to reduce the UN system’s frag- opment Group have been preparing this contain proposals for assessed and voluntary mentation. In September and October, the

14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 UN Reform, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Secretary-General presented to member regional responsibilities, merging the current the opportunity to become significantly more states his proposals for restructuring the peace regional divisions of DPA and DPKO, would active and engaged. and security architecture, in a report to the link the new DPPA and DPO, and would be Against this backdrop, some member General Assembly and in briefings to member responsible for the day-to-day management states have expressed misgivings regarding states, including to the PBC on 28 September. of all political and operational peace and the sustaining peace agenda. Russia and some He has proposed creating a new Depart- security activities. countries of the Non-Aligned Movement are ment of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs An increasingly prominent role appears to concerned that the sustaining peace agenda (DPPA), combining the strategic, politi- be envisioned for the PBSO within the new and focus on conflict prevention could lead cal and operational responsibilities of DPA DPPA. During his briefing to the PBC, the to increased interference in issues pertaining and the peacebuilding responsibilities of the Secretary-General repeatedly said that the to states’ sovereignty. Russia, in particular, PBSO. The Department would prioritize and PBSO would serve as the hinge that draws has also expressed reservations regarding the direct capacities and resources to the preven- inputs from the development and human Secretary-General’s proposals, preferring that tion of conflict, mediation, conflict resolution rights pillars into the UN’s analysis. The a clear division and separation in the respon- and peacebuilding, and provide direction, Secretary-General is also seeking a “quan- sibilities of the UN’s different pillars should management and support for regional offic- tum” leap in the capacity of the PBF from its be maintained. Other countries that do not es. A new Department of Peace Operations current annual goal of a $100 million budget. see themselves as fragile states have expressed (DPO) would be created that would manage Guterres’ proposals have been less specific concern that development funding might be all peacekeeping and field-based special polit- regarding the PBC, beyond emphasising the diverted to greater spending on peace and ical missions outside the purview of DPPA. bridging role it should play, but the elevated security activities and that development A single political-operational structure under role of the PBSO and increased budget for might be increasingly “securitized”. three Assistant Secretaries-General with the PBF would portend that the PBC has

Conclusion

The 2015 review of the UN’s peacebuilding the two other review processes on peace oper- develop ways to make better use of the PBC, architecture occurred amidst an interest on ations and women and peace and security, this for example with the Sahel strategy and Libe- the part of member states to strengthen how has provided a strong mandate for incoming ria. This report has set out some of the ways the UN carries out peacebuilding after its Secretary-General António Guterres, who has that the PBC can better use its convening recent failures and descent into war in South embraced the sustaining peace agenda along ability and other areas of opportunity to sup- Sudan and the CAR, and the continued insta- with his focus on conflict prevention, to be port the Council, such as advising on coun- bility of many other countries where the UN reflected in broad UN reforms. tries’ longer-term socio-economic needs and has been involved. A rising trend in violent In the process, momentum has been gener- challenges or supporting transitions. conflicts further prompted renewed member ated to seek to revive and strengthen the PBC. The objectives of the PBC always made state interest to see the UN become more Since 2015, and even beginning in 2014, the sense conceptually, but they have been much effective in conflict prevention. PBC has invigorated the role of its Organiza- less clear and more complicated in practical This led to a review that looked at how the tional Committee, sought to move away from terms when the PBC has tried to fulfil its envi- whole UN system conducts peacebuilding its restrictive agenda formats and CSCs, and sioned role. Attempting to serve as a bridge (not only the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF), expanded the array of countries and situations to make the UN’s three organs—ECOSOC, followed up strongly by member states with before it, while developing cooperation with the General Assembly and Security Coun- a willingness to embrace most of the findings regional organisations and IFIs. cil—work together better for more coherent and ideas put forward by the AGE. These Improving the PBC depends greatly on a peacebuilding efforts and analysis remains a included adopting a broader understanding of more effective relationship with the Security challenge. The PBC now needs to translate its peacebuilding as preventing conflict in the first Council, or, as the AGE stated, a “deepened internal improvements and better focus into a place, during conflict and after conflict, and commitment” from the Security Council. greater perceived value to the Council and to formalising the concept of sustaining peace in There are signs of new openness on the part the countries that it seeks to support. the concurrent resolutions. Coinciding with of Council members, including the P5, to

Security Council Report Research Report November 2017 securitycouncilreport.org 15 UN Documents and Useful Additional Resources Security Council Report Staff Ian Martin Executive Director

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS peacebuilding in Africa. Joanna Weschler Deputy Executive Director S/RES/2349 (31 March 2017) was on the Lake Chad S/PV.7723 (22 June 2016) was the presentation of Basin region. the PBC’s ninth annual report. Shamala Kandiah Thompson Deputy Executive Director S/RES/2333 (23 December 2016) requested the S/PV.7694 (24 May 2016) was an open debate Secretary-General to provide within 90 days a on cooperation between the UN and regional Paul Romita peacebuilding plan for Liberia when extending the organisations. Senior Policy Analyst mandate of UNMIL for a final period until 30 March S/PV.7658 (28 March 2016) was an open debate on Victor Casanova Abos 2018. the role of women in conflict prevention and resolu- Policy Analyst S/RES/2282 (27 April 2016) was on the ten-year tion in Africa. Lindiwe Knutson review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. S/PV.7629 (23 February 2016) was an open debate Policy Analyst S/RES/1947 (29 October 2010) welcomed the PBC on the ten-year review of the UN peacebuilding Dahlia Morched review report and reaffirmed the importance of the architecture. Policy Analyst peacebuilding work carried out by the UN. S/PV.7359 (14 January 2015) was a briefing on the Vladimir Sesar S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding Policy Analyst five permanent members would have seats on the in the immediate aftermath of conflict and by the Eran Sthoeger PBC’s Organisational Committee and that the PBC outgoing PBC chair, Ambassador Antonio Aguiar de Policy Analyst will report annually to the Council. Patriota. Benjamin Villanti S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY Policy Analyst and the Peacebuilding Fund, concurrent with General COUNCIL Assembly resolution A/RES/60/180. Robbin VanNewkirk S/2017/507 (30 August 2017) was the new version Website Manager SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL of the compendium of Security Council working STATEMENTS methods. Audrey Waysse Operations Manager S/PRST/2017/2 (20 January 2017) was on West PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION DOCUMENTS Africa and the Sahel, which recognised the impor- Maritza Tenerelli S/2017/76 (27 January 2017) was the PBC’s tenth Administrative Assistant tant convening role of the PBC to support UNOWAS annual report, including an annex of recommenda- in implementing the UN Integrated Strategy for the Kaitlyn Lynes tions informally adopted by the PBC on its working Sahel. Research Assistant methods. S/PRST/2016/12 (28 July 2016) was on peacebuild- S/2016/115 (4 February 2016) was the PBC’s ninth ing in Africa with a focus on institution-building. annual report. Security Council Report is a non- SECRETARY-GENERAL’S REPORTS profit organisation supported by the S/2015/174 (11 March 2015) was the PBC’s eighth Governments of Australia, Austria, S/2014/694 (23 September 2014) was the Secre- annual report. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, , tary-General’s fourth and last report on peacebuild- Iceland, , Ireland, , Kazakhstan, GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the ing in the aftermath of conflict. Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, A/72/525 (13 October 2017) was the Secretary-Gen- Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore, SECURITY COUNCIL LETTERS eral’s report on restructuring the UN’s peace and Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor- S/2017/692 (7 August 2017) was the concept note security pillar. Leste, Turkey and United Arab Emirates, and Carnegie Corporation, Humanity for the Council open debate on peacekeeping opera- A/RES/70/262 (27 April 2016) was on the ten-year United and the John D. and Catherine T. tions and sustaining peace. review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. MacArthur Foundation. S/2017/282 (4 April 2017) was a letter from the Sec- A/RES/65/7 (23 November 2010) welcomed the PBC Design Point Five, NY retary-General transmitting the Liberia peacebuilding review report and underlined the same points high- plan. lighted in Security Council resolution 1947. Security Council Report S/2015/490 (29 June 2015) was the report of the One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza A/RES/60/180 (20 December 2005) was a founding Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding 885 2nd Ave at 48th St, 21st Floor document of the PBC, along with Security Council New York NY 10017 Architecture. resolution 1945. S/2015/446 (17 June 2015) was the report of the Telephone +1 212 759 6394 A/59/2005 (21 March 2005) was the Secretary-Gen- Fax +1 212 759 4038 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. eral’s report “In Larger Freedom: towards develop- Web securitycouncilreport.org whatsinblue.org S/2014/911 (15 December 2014) was a joint letter ment, security and human rights for all”. from the presidents of the Security Council and Gen- A/59/565 (2 December 2004) was the report of eral Assembly endorsing the Terms of Reference for the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. Change entitled “A more secure world: our shared S/2014/763 (24 October 2014) was input from the responsibility”. Secretary-General as part of preparations for the USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE 2015 peacebuilding architecture review. PSC/PR/COMM.(DCXXXIII) (18 October 2016) was SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING RECORDS the communiqué of the AU PSC at its 633rd meet- S/PV.8033 (29 August 2017) was an open debate on ing on its partnership with the UN Peacebuilding UN peacekeeping operations and sustaining peace. Commission. S/PV.7976 (19 June 2017) was the presentation of the PBC’s tenth annual report. S/PV.7857 (10 January 2017) was a ministerial-level open debate on conflict prevention and sustaining peace. S/PV.7750 (28 July 2016) was an open debate on

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