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Potential and Challenges of E-Voting in the European Union

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Potential and Challenges of E-Voting in the European Union DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES OF E-VOTING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION STUDY Abstract This study was commissioned and supervised by the European Parliament’s Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee. It addresses the potentials and challenges of the implementation of Internet voting in European Parliament elections. It considers the social, political, legal, and technological implications of its introduction as an alternative to on-paper ballot and builds on the recent experience of previous trials and successful e-enabled elections to issue technical recommendations regarding Internet voting in the European Union. PE 556.948 EN ABOUT THE PUBLICATION This research paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs and commissioned, supervised and published by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Policy departments provide independent expertise, both in-house and externally, to support European Parliament committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU external and internal policies. To contact the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, or to subscribe to its newsletter, please write to: [email protected] Research Administrator Responsible Roberta PANIZZA Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected]. AUTHORS Prof. Dr. Alexander H. Trechsel In collaboration with: Dr. Vasyl Kucherenko, Frederico Silva European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) European University Institute, Firenze, Italy and Prof. Dr. Urs Gasser xUpery Ltd., Zurich, Switzerland LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN Manuscript completed in May, 2016 © European Union, 2016 This document is available on the internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses Potential and challenges of E-Voting in the European Union ____________________________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 6 2. INTERNET VOTING: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS? 8 3. INTERNET VOTING: CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS 12 3.1. Legal considerations 12 3.2. Political considerations 14 3.3. Technological and security challenges 16 3.4. Social challenges 19 4. THE MISSING ELEMENT: VOTERS? 22 4.1. Citizens digital competencies in the EU 22 4.2. Trust to operations over the Internet 23 4.3. Citizens attitudes toward Internet voting 23 5. RECENT INTERNET VOTING EXPERIENCES IN EUROPE: A SHORT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 27 5.1. Estonia 27 5.2. Switzerland 28 5.3. Norway 28 6. CONCLUSIONS: ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS THE OPPORTUNITY OF INTRODUCING INTERNET VOTING FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 30 7. RECOMMENDATIONS 31 REFERENCES 33 ANNEX 36 3 Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report analyses the opportunities of Internet voting and its challenges, namely with regard to legal constraints, political and social implications, and technological and security challenges, discussing the merits of this solution and possible pathways to eliminate threats or minimise their effects. It builds on the latest academic research on the topic and on the previous technical reports developed by the European Parliament, i.e. the “E-public, e- participation and e-voting in Europe - prospects and challenges” final report, and “The Reform of the Electoral Law of the European Union”. Furthermore, it includes empirical evidence from the most recent trials of Internet voting and e-enabled elections and evaluates its implementation while bearing in mind the specificity of European Parliament elections. The implementation of Internet voting carries the promise of elections with more participants, of strengthened efficiency in the electoral process, and the hope of bringing voters and their representatives closer together. In the current context of decrease in participation in many Western democracies and generalised disappointment toward politics, policy-makers have been searching for innovative strategies to reengage citizens and promote a participated democratic process. Internet voting is a particularly attractive innovation in this regard, in the sense that is combines technology to the core of democratic participation. Therefore, it is commonly perceived as a panacea for many of the problems affecting contemporary democracies and great expectations arise concerning its potential impacts on the electoral process. However, both successful and unsuccessful cases of attempts to develop e-enabled elections are revealing of the complexity associated to a fully operational Internet voting procedure. On the one hand, Internet voting offers many potential advantages such as facilitating the voting process, increased convenience to voters, gains in efficiency and the promise of increase in turnout rates in the long run. Thus, Internet voting consists in an important opportunity to modernise European elections. On the other hand, it also comes with multiple challenges which, if not properly addressed, can undermine the integrity of elections. Legal challenges are related to the fact that Internet voting must be conceptualised within the broader framework of the European Electoral Law, as well as national legislation. Obtaining a uniform solution across Member States is most challenging, hence the optimal solution seems to consist in a decentralised approach where Member States operate within the restricting confines of an overarching European Law. In this regard, the Reform of the European Electoral Law is an important contribution to harmonise electoral procedures across all Member States. It is of utmost importance to future Internet voting in European Parliament elections. Politically, it is fundamental to foster a broad consensus among political elites for the implementation of Internet voting. This calls for a transparent, involved and participated process, where the relevant actors have a voice. Internet voting should also be relatively neutral from the political point of view, that is, the new procedure should not benefit disproportionally given factions of the political spectrum. The responsibility for bearing the costs with the design and implementation of the system is another important issue to consider, as well as the role of private actors in e-enabled elections. Finally, Internet voting at the European Parliament level could lead to a call for the dissemination of the new procedure at the national, regional and local level, both by citizens and national political actors. 4 Potential and challenges of E-Voting in the European Union ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Technological and security concerns are often pointed at as the main threats to Internet voting. Nonetheless, recent research demonstrates that the multiplication of pilots, trials and number of e-enabled elections has been contributing decisively for the development of more secure Internet voting systems. In addition, recommendations for a coordinated but decentralised i-voting system offer a good solution in terms of damage control in the event of attack or partial system malfunction. The most relevant social challenge is the digital divide. Although inequality has been a historical determinant of electoral participation long before computers and the Internet saw the light of day, it is a concern that parts of the population remain excluded from these technologies and that a gap persists between European countries regarding computer literacy and household Internet usage and availability. However, recently European countries have been progressing significantly in this regard, inverting these trends and diffusing the use of Internet-based technologies. It is to be expected that, in the medium run, the digital divide – at least in terms of access, but even in a longer perspective with regards to literacy - progressively fades away and becomes negligible. The success of Internet voting depends largely on how it is perceived by the people meant to use it: citizens. Therefore, it is fundamental to know what their attitudes towards the implementation of Internet voting are. Listening to citizens’ opinions and identifying their main concerns provides policy-makers with the opportunity to design the system in a way as to address these concerns and thus be both responsible and responsive. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of data on citizens’ attitudes towards Internet voting at the European level. There are a few studies addressing this topic with isolated approaches focused on specific trials conducted in very particular contexts. Hence, this report strongly recommends to develop a cross-country study to adequately measure this important dimension. Note that the few
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