Huá Guófeˉng ढ೑䫟

Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch

Year: 2014

Hua Guofeng ฀฀฀

Grano, Simona Alba

Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-94123 Book Section

Originally published at: Grano, Simona Alba (2014). Hua Guofeng ฀฀฀. In: Brown, Kerry. Berkshire dictionary of Chinese biography. Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire Publishing., 1416-1429. Huá Guófeˉng ढ೑䫟

1921–2008—“Chairman” of the People’s Republic of China (1976–1981)

Summary Party media portrayed him as a benevo- Hua Guofeng, the handpicked successor lent and reserved leader tinged with an of Mao Zedong, was relatively unknown aura of sanctity. Political biographies when he assumed the title of “Chairman” written on him both in the 1980s (Ding

• in 1976; less than two years later he was 1980) and more recently (Weatherley eclipsed by Deng Xiaoping’s rise. Infor- 2010) have shown different sides of him. mation on his personal life and child- According to Robert Weatherley and ढ೑䫟 • hood years is scant. His tendency to stay Zhaˉng Pínghuà ᓴᑇ࣪, the Hunan First behind the scenes is possibly what Secretary in 1959 who worked under Hua convinced Mao to appoint him as his after 1977 in the Central Propa ganda successor and unifi er of the country. His Department, Hua was a self-effacing cautious character was likely also one of leader who did not spurn getting directly the reasons why he didn’t succeed in involved in the projects he was overseeing staying in power for long; he had no real (Weatherley 2010, 73; Zhang 1977, 17–18). allies to sustain him in time of crisis. To others, however, he was a career- Hua Guofeng was an important name, oriented politician who managed to but it was also one that passed from become China’s topmost leader, starting celebration into silence in a very short from a low provincial-level cadre position time span, doomed to play only a tran- in the 1960s. What is remarkable is that in sitional role. less than ten years he was able to rise from the post of provincial Chinese Com- ua Guofeng was an exceptional munist Party (CCP) secretary to that of H personage in many aspects. During Chairman of the Communist Party and the period he was in offi ce, Communist de facto leader of the country in 1977.

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www.berkshirepublishing.com © 2014 BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING GROUP, all rights reserved. Beginning in 1976, Hua held briefl y the to a rich peasant by the name of Liu, three most important positions of China’s nicknamed “white monkey” (bái hóuzi administrative and political echelons: ⱑ⤈ᄤ) because of his pale complexion. leader of the party, head of state, and While at his side, Hua Yu had an illicit chief of the Central Military Commission. liaison with a tenant farmer employed by Liu. In 1920 she gave birth to a child, Early Life Liu Zhengrong, who grew up as Liu’s son for a few years. When it was clear Hua Guofeng’s childhood years are that he didn’t look like Liu at all, due to shrouded in mystery. His family’s back- his dark-skinned complexion, Liu became ground, as well as the identity of his suspicious; a suspicion that quickly father, is still unknown to this day. This became reality when he caught Hua Yu has prompted speculation that his past is and her lover, Qin, together. While being obscured deliberately (Ding 1980, I). Qin was incarcerated, Hua Yu was able Two rumors in particular have circulated to fl ee with her son. They moved around in the past twenty years regarding his for a few years, eventually ending up childhood. The fi rst one, based on a leaf- in Taiyuan, Jiaocheng County. There, • Huá Guófeˉng • let named “Bombarding Hua Guofeng” Hua Yu married a Communist under- allegedly produced by a pro-Deng Xiaop- ground worker named Hua (given name ing faction named “The Spartacus Troops unknown), and from that moment on of the number 637 Headquarters,” was her son’s name was changed to Hua translated into English and published in Guofeng, which may have been a refer- Hong Kong as well as in mainland China ence to resisting Japanese occupation. It in 1977. Although it is only an assumption, was common for Communist leaders at given that the leafl et came from Guang- that time to take on revolutionary names. zhou (Canton), where *Dèng Xiaˇopíng’s This would indicate that his change of 䙧ᇣᑇ (1904–1997) military friends were names had nothing to do with his newly based, it is very plausible that these were acquired father, and that it happened, in in fact the people responsible for writing fact, much later. and distributing the leafl et in an attempt According to the same “Bombarding to damage Hua’s credentials as chairman, Hua Guofeng” leafl et, in 1938 Hua Yu favoring Deng. went to Yan’an and there became inti- According to this publication, Hua mate with Kaˉng Sheˉng ᒋ⫳, who was in Guofeng’s mother, Hua Yu, daughter of charge of secret service and intelligence a rich landowner, was sold as a concubine at the time and who later had Hua Yu’s husband murdered (Ding 1980, 5; CNA

*People marked with an asterisk have entries in this 1977). It is clear from these events, which dictionary. depict Hua’s mother as a philanderer

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and a promiscuous woman, that this already married to Yang Kaihui (his fi rst source cannot be considered unbiased or wife). When she found out that he was purely motivated by the urge to inform having an affair with a woman by the in its description of Hua Guofeng’s early surname of Yao she supposedly reacted years. The information about his mother by demanding that Yao (who died being the daughter of a landowner could shortly after) and the young Hua partly explain, if true, why the Chinese Guofeng be sent to Jiaocheng County, Communist authorities were—and still near Taiyuan (The Epoch Times 2008). are—keen to keep his past well hidden. According to the same Hong Kong mag- The exact opposite is true for *Máo azine, after Zhou Enlai revealed the truth Zédoˉng ↯⋑ϰ (1893–1976) and other offi - to Hua Guofeng about his origins in cial leaders, such as *Zhoˉu Eˉnlái ਼ᘽᴹ 1966, Hua agreed to keep quiet for Mao’s (1898–1976; fi rst Premier of the People’s image but decided, in 2001, to withdraw Republic of China), whose childhood from the Chinese Communist Party, years have been described and recounted citing as an explanation that the Party in detail by the media. had betrayed the legitimate interests of The second rumor is even more dam- workers and farmers. According to the aging and states that Hua was none authors of the article, the true reason

• other than Mao Zedong’s illegitimate behind this choice was that by doing this child born out of wedlock. An unverifi ed he could fi nally claim his rightful name Internet rumor claims that in 1966, dur- as the eldest son of Mao Zedong (Asahi ढ೑䫟 • ing a conversation with Kang Sheng and News 2001 as quoted The Epoch Times Zhou Enlai Hua discovered his true 2008). This version seems to be quite identity and that Mao Zedong was his unrealistic, however, and an unk nown biological father (quoted in Weatherley source has recently claimed that the Bei- 2010, 22). jing Hospital is actually in possession of According to this version, Hua was DNA material proving that the two (Mao actually born in Hunan Province, as and Hua) were not related (BBC 2008; Mao’s eldest son, in 1920. (Until recently NAOL.CA 2008). the exact date of his birth was unde- During an interview with the British cided, with some sources stating that it Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1977, was 1920 and others stating 1921; the Hua himself stated quite vaguely that fi nal determination was ironically found after his father’s death, at the age of six, in the many obituaries published after he grew up with his mother and elder his death in 2008, from which we can brother in very poor conditions (Weath- infer that he was born on 16 February erley 2010, 22). It is quite unusual for a 1921). At that time Mao was leading CCP leader to be characterized by such a the local farmers’ movement and was lack of personal information. Numerous

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www.berkshirepublishing.com © 2014 BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING GROUP, all rights reserved. biographies have been written on famous for example, both established their politi- and infamous leaders of the CCP, and cal reputation there. In this regard, Hua’s every detail of their early lives has been experience in Shanxi is atypical in the scrutinized. This has prompted some sense that no event of major political or scholars (e.g., Ding and Weatherley) to professional meaning occurred to him ask themselves whether there was some- while there, nor was he able to build a thing in Hua’s past that would be highly meaningful network of contacts for his damaging to his political career, which later career (Weatherley 2010, 21). His made it best kept unspoken. This would career was, at best, ordinary, which explain why even in 2010, two years makes his subsequent rise to China’s after his death, no additional posthu- administrative and political top positions mous detail on his childhood years had even more impressive. yet come out (Weatherley 2010, 25). It seems that his skills at organizing armed resistance led him to quickly climb the professional ladder. After Early Career holding a series of senior posts he soon Hua Guofeng was not widely known became one of the major CCP cadres of • Huá Guófeˉng • early in his career. While he was gifted in the Jiaodong County Committee while military organization, this time in his life coordinating anti-Japanese activities at all did not produce a wealth of networking levels (Ding 1980, 17). In 1940 he became in order to work toward climbing the chairman of the Joint Anti-Japanese political ladder. His low position in Association (Kàngrì Jiùguó Liánhéhuì ᡫ terms of national status during this time ᮹ᬥ೑㘨ড়Ӯ). Hua’s main task con- makes his later political rise in China sisted in organizing people belonging to that much more unusual. the association into separate guerilla units (mínbıˉng zuˇzhıˉ ⇥݉㒘㒛), who then provided assistance to the Eighth Route Hua in Shanxi (1921–1949) Army (baˉlù juˉn ܿ䏃ݯ), which was the During the 1940s, Hua was a young larger of the two major Chinese Com- guerilla fi ghter in the operations against munist forces that formed a unit of the Japanese in Jiaodong County, Shanxi. the National Revolutionary Army of the Shanxi is a province of symbolic impor- Republic of China, which fought the tance for the generation of Chinese Japanese from 1937 to 1945. These units Communist Party leaders who were in tried to resist the Japanese campaigns of power after the founding of the People’s destruction in Shanxi. In 1942 Hua was Republic in 1949. Deng Xiaoping and appointed director of the Jiaodong Pro- *Péng Déhuái ᕁᖋᗔ (1898–1974, military paganda Department. Among many other leader of the Chinese Communist Party), tasks, he had to provide sponsorship and

• 1419 •

ideas to Communist theatrical troupes rise. Hua became known to Mao Zedong from the area. In the course of the three during this time and began gaining his years (1942–1945) he served in this trust consistently showing unfailing capacity, he came to be involved and support of Mao’s ideas. This ultimately infl uential in the activities of the Village led to Mao’s endorsement of Hua to Drama Movement (Nóngcuˉn xìjù yùndòng become his successor. ݰᴥ៣࠻䖤ࡼ). Hua left Shanxi in 1949 and went There has been debate regarding his fi rst to Hebei for a one-month training. role during the Civil War period, and dur- After that, as part of a Southbound Work ing the land reform era that came later. Group (Nánxià goˉngzuòtuán फϟᎹ԰ಶ), According to author Ding Wang, Hua he moved to Hunan where he would distinguished himself for his ability and remain for twenty-two years, the most ruthlessness in suppressing landlords and important years of his political career middle peasants, becoming “notorious for before becoming party chairman in 1976. being brutal and relentless” while confi s- He fi rst settled in Xiangyin, where he cating properties (Ding1980, 25). Weath- soon became party secretary and a politi- erley aptly points out, however, that cal commissar of the County Armed while it may very well have been so, in Forces Department. In June 1951, he was

• the absence of irrefutable proofs we sim- transferred from Xiangyin to Xiangtan ply cannot be sure (Weatherley 2010, 41). County where he took up a list of offi cial During the ten years he spent in assignments from secretary of the county’s ढ೑䫟 • Shanxi, Hua became an expert of guerrilla CCP Committee, to political commissar and intelligence networks but again, the of the county’s People’s Armed Force peculiarity of this period is its insignifi - Department. Even though the transfer in cance in terms of contacts and profes- itself was not a promotion, by working sional experiences that Hua was able to in Mao Zedong’s home province he was build while in Jiaodong. In other words, able to attract Mao’s attention, an event at least during his Shanxi period, he was a that most probably had a direct correla- gifted and capable local cadre, well known tion in Hua being, years later, hand- at the local level but still utterly unknown picked by Mao himself to be his successor. at the national level. (See the sidebar on In Xiangtan, Hua became deputy party page 1437 of this volume for details on the secretary of the Xiangtan Prefecture and Communist Party’s cadre system.) was then promoted full party secretary in 1953. This promotion marked the moment in his career when he rose from Hua in Hunan (1949–1971) a middle-cadre position (zhoˉngjí gànbù It was when Hua left Shanxi toward Ё㑻ᑆ䚼) to a high-level cadre position Hunan that his political career began to (gaˉojí gànbù 催㑻ᑆ䚼).

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During the rural collectivization years when he was in power, increase the period, in which land cooperatives were popularized image portrayed by the media formed, Hua busied himself particularly of a gifted and pragmatic problem-solver. with those mutual assistance groups (or mutual aid teams) that were established The Post-Leap Recovery Period in Shaoshan, Mao’s birthplace; there is speculation that, willingly or by chance, (1958–1965) this earned him Mao’s attention and In 1958, after fi lling in a number of posts trust (Ding 1980, 41; Weatherley 2010, 5). dealing with culture and education, So during the seven years he spent in Hua shifted his interests to the economy Xiangtang Prefecture, he became a com- and construction sectors. In July of the petent party secretary with good organi- same year he became vice-governor of zational skills, in-depth knowledge of Hunan Province, and in September he propaganda techniques, and a high level was also named alternate secretary of of education. the Hunan Provincial CCP Committee, Hua was always quite committed to becoming one of the leading members of Mao’s revolutionary ideas and, especially the committee’s economic department. • Huá Guófeˉng • regarding the collectivization period, For the fi rst time, since his arrival in embraced enthusiastically every policy Hunan, he started chairing and heading coming from Mao that called for an a number of bodies responsible for eco- acceleration of the process. This was an nomical planning. attitude that made him quite unpopular In the early 1960s, his political career among his immediate local superiors, suffered a setback and he was “sent down” who had lukewarm reactions toward the by being assigned to a lower level of party rapid pace of rural collectivization. hierarchy. To be more precise, he was In May of 1956 he was transferred from sent back to Xiangtan where, due to his Xiangtan to the Hunan provincial People’s extensive knowledge of the area, he was Council in Changsha where he took up the supposed to remedy the innumerable position of chief of the Culture and Edu- problems provoked by Mao’s Great Leap cation Offi ce (ZGHW 1977, 21) and, at the Forward (Dàyuè jìn ໻䎗䖯) and assist in same time, became secretary of the local the local recovery program. (The Great CCP section. This was the fi rst step in his Leap Forward was a campaign aimed at career as a party and government cadre at advancing China’s agricultural and the provincial level. Those were the years industrial development to the level of when he consolidated his previously the West through the promotion of peo- acquired skills (Shanxi warfare units) in ple’s communes, and by encouraging organizing and coordinating activities at the rural workforce to smelt iron in back- various levels, which would then, in the yard furnaces, among other ill-advised

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schemes.) This was a diffi cult moment renovation of Mao Zedong’s old school for Hua, in part because of the profes- and the construction of a display hall. sional setback but also because, being a This has prompted speculation, among fervent supporter of Mao’s agricultural some scholars, that he had ulterior communes, he was opposed to some of motives (namely ingratiating himself to the measures introduced in order to sal- Mao) for taking up these projects (Weath- vage the economy, such as “fi xing pro- erley 2010, 7; Ding 1980, 72). Between duction quotas on the household basis.” 1965 and 1966 he was also assigned to Weatherley notes, however, that Hua the foreign policy realm and, specifi cally, was not as slavish toward Mao or to the to oversee war preparation in case of an offi cial party line (Weatherley 2010, 70) escalation in the Vietnam War and a pos- as he is often portrayed to be both in the sible Chinese involvement in the war. offi cial literature (for obvious reasons) and in the scholarly literature (Ding 1980, 50; The Beijing Period Oksenberg and Yeung 1977, 13, 15). We fi nd evidence of this in his taking a (1971–1981) critical position against the “unrealistic By the early 1970s, Hua had become output targets” set by certain offi cials fi rst secretary of the Hunan Provincial

• during the Great Leap Forward’s initial Party Committee and political commissar phase and in his taking Mao’s side on of the Canton Military Region. At this rural collectivization even when, ini- point, he moved to Beijing, probably in ढ೑䫟 • tially, it seemed that a more cautious September of 1971. At the national level, approach would prevail. Hua Guofeng had already become a According to Ding, in the summer fairly important member of the State of 1964 Hua was transferred back to Council by 1971, ranking as high as vice- Changsha, albeit with an extension of premier. These promotions had hap- his duties and competences to areas like pened largely due to the institutional culture, education, agriculture, propa- void left by the “Red Guard purges” in ganda, fi nance, and trade (Ding 1980, 65; the political echelons of Hunan Province. Oksenberg and Yeung 1977, 46). After Thanks to his technical expertise, he was 1965 he became mainly responsible for able to put his capabilities to good use at farm work and for the Shaoshan irriga- the State Council. One of his main tasks tion plant, a project that contributed to was assisting Zhou Enlai in his daily making him well known around the duties. In 1973 he was promoted to the country and increased his political pres- Politburo while continuing to work in tige in spreading the idea of Hua as a the State Council as vice-premier, and capable and skilled organizer of man- two years later, in 1975, he became power. While there, he also oversaw the minister of public security. Offi cially,

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www.berkshirepublishing.com © 2014 BERKSHIRE PUBLISHING GROUP, all rights reserved. • People’s Republic of China (Part I) • 1949–1979 • though, recognition that he was acting to Hua by taking up the leadership of the as vice-premier came only in 1975 at Academy of Sciences. the fi rst meeting of the Fifth National A particularly eventful year in the People’s Congress (NPC) to reorganize history of the People’s Republic of China the State Council. At the time it was in was 1976. Not only is this the year in fact a common practice to be assigned which three of the country’s most infl u- to a certain post without a previous ential leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, offi cial announcement. and *Zhuˉ Dé ᴅᖋ) passed away, but a Around the year 1975 the struggle series of events like the Tangshan earth- for the leadership in the highest echelons quake in July and the Tiananmen inci- of the CCP became fi ercer than ever. The dent in April—the latter triggered by the two politicians who had dominated the death of Zhou Enlai four months before, Cultural Revolution decade (1966–1976), and not to be confused with the Tianan- Chén Bódá 䰜ԃ䖒 (1904–1989) and *Lín men Square protests of 1989—generated Biaˉo ᵫᔾ (1907–1971) (Mao’s chosen suc- social disturbance among the people cessor), were removed by Mao after that further aggravated the economic the latter plotted against him and the crisis of China. At the same time a deli- • Huá Guófeˉng • party. (Offi cially called the “Great Prole- cate political battle was raging between tarian Cultural Revolution,” this was a the two most infl uential factions of China’s complex socio-political mass movement political echelons: that of Mao’s last wife, that urged people—especially young *Jiaˉng Qıˉng ∳䴦 (1914–1991) and the people—to rebel against traditional, capi- Gang of Four with their radical ideas, talist, and so-called backwards cultural and that of the “bureaucrats,” among elements in Chinese society; this radical- whom were the late Zhou Enlai, Lıˇ ization, spurred on by Mao Zedong, Xiaˉnniàn ᴢܜᗉ, Deng Xiaoping, and caused massive social, political, and cul- many others. Among the numerous tural disruptions, killing and injuring struggles between different political fac- many Chinese people.) In 1975, follow- tions, Hua was fortunate enough to be ing the Fifth National People’s Congress, able to steer himself from one side (the Deng Xiaoping became responsible for more radical one being that of the Gang the reorganization of the party appara- of Four) to the other without getting tus; Hua was vice-premier in charge of burned. If Mao had originally planned to science and technology (an assignment have his wife and three of her associates, that brought him very close to Deng, at Wáng Hóngwén ⥟⋾᭛, Yáo Wényuán the time unoffi cially in charge of the ྮ᭛ܗ, and Zhaˉng Chuˉnqiáo ᓴ᯹ḹ, country), while future National Party succeed him, his aims didn’t take into leader Hú Yàobaˉng 㚵㗔䙺 (1915–1989) account the strong reactions from the took over the role that previously belonged bureaucrats and from the military leaders.

• 1423 •

Hua Guofeng was thus most probably was removed, Hua became fi rst vice picked as a compromise leader and chairman of the party and then premier appointed as acting premier. Ding Wang of the State Council in April of that same seems to suggest that Hua Guofeng was year. The decision to remove Deng and never actually meant to be Mao Zedong’s promote Hua came from Mao (through successor. He claims that when Mao had the words of his nephew and, at the time, previously nominated Lin Biao as his sole confi dant, Máo Yuaˇnxıˉn ↯䖰ᮄ), but rightful heir, everyone was aware of it the decision was then made offi cial by and no one dared to attack Lin Biao. But the Politburo, although through an with Hua everything was different; not unconstitutional process. only was he constantly attacked by the Hua was actually appointed as act- Gang of Four, but he was also never pub- ing premier, the fi rst time such a position licly named by Mao, even though he was being used in China, suggesting that claimed he was (Ding 1980, 126). He the time was not ripe yet to make him seems to have been a choice of compro- full premier, which could be done only mise on the part of Mao who, being after a meeting of the National People’s unable to elect one of his more radical Congress. As observed both by Weath- acolytes due to the resistance of the party erly (127) and MacFarquhar (1997, 298fn)

• veterans, opted for Hua instead. Having when Hua fi nally became full premier, in served as fi rst provincial party secretary October of 1976, he became so in absence and having been in charge of various of any constitutional process (suggesting ढ೑䫟 • important sectors while living in Hunan, no meeting by the NPC had actually he had signifi cant credentials that were taken place). Hua consistently tried to not easy to discredit. He had moderate keep himself in a political middle posi- political views, which were for the most tion, cautious not to counter Mao’s will, part unknown to the majority of the peo- but also careful not to clash with the ple, and was thus an acceptable choice “bureaucrats” faction by refraining to both for the party elders and for Mao as attack them unnecessarily. According to someone who was easy to control and Ding Wang, at the time Hua was ascribed gets things done. This could also explain to the Third Force Group ㄀ϝ࢓࡯, a why, at fi rst, he was only nominated as group defi ned by the Chinese media as acting premier and not full premier, being, “the wind faction” because its members in fact, a compromise fi gure. opportunistically switched sides when On 3 February 1976, Hua was named convenient (Ding 1980, 108). acting premier by the CCP Central Com- Another hypothesis is that Hua mittee. After Zhou Enlai’s death, Mao was actually a kind of symbolic fi gure launched a campaign to purge Deng, in elected by General Yè Jiànyıˉng ৊ࠥ㣅 which Hua also took part. Once Deng (1897–1986), who acted as Hua’s kingmaker,

• 1424 •

promoting him in order to discredit 1976, Hua became chairman of the CCP, and dismantle the radical elements of a place that had been vacant since Mao’s the Gang of Four. At any rate, even death on 9 September, and of the Central when Hua Guofeng became full premier, Military Commission. In this way, all of he did so without a formal appoint- the party and government positions had ment and in the absence of a formal been assigned to Hua following offi cial procedure, a fact that Deng Xiaoping procedures. Hua was effectively China’s later sought to exploit in order to dis- most dominant leader. The legitimacy of qualify him. his post was stated at the third plenum of the Tenth CCP Congress in July of 1977. In March of 1978, the National Hua as Chairman (1976–1981) People’s Congress met for its annual After Mao’s death in September of 1976, session and elected Hua as premier. the political scene was still dominated Experts claim that his rise from obscu- by two opposing factions trying to seize rity to notoriety started in 1973, the year power. Mao’s testament, dated 1976, in which he was elected to the Politburo, consisted of three notes, of which the a post that later enabled him to play a • Huá Guófeˉng • most famous one, meant for Hua Guofeng, leading role in overthrowing the Gang said: “With you in charge, I’m at ease” (Nıˇ of Four. bàn shì, woˇ fàng xıˉn Դࡲџ៥ᬒᖗ). This At his fi rst NPC meeting, Hua ensured that Hua eventually ended up Guofeng proposed four tasks in his fi rst victorious in the struggle for power with famous long speech (published on 28 Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. It is fair December 1977) at the “Second National to say, though, that there has been a dis- Conference Learning from Dazhai in pute regarding whether Mao really Agriculture” (Chi 1977, 94). This speech wrote this note or not, since Hua did not sparked a great deal of interest at the actually release it until after the arrest of time, which was visible in the great pop- the Gang of Four members. He is in fact ularity that its topics enjoyed among the the one who facilitated the coup d’état in public, who discussed the problems which the members of the Gang of Four addressed in it on the streets or at home. were purged. The fi rst task proposed for 1977 was to A mixture of elements probably “Deeply develop the great mass move- prompted Mao to choose Hua as his suc- ment to criticize the Gang of Four.” The cessor: his loyalty to him, his skills as second was “Strengthening Party Build- administrator and organizer, his unify- ing,” which set out from the idea that to ing fi gure, and also the fact that there regain legitimacy, the party fi rst had to were no other credible alternatives reestablish the correct order wrecked by (Weatherley 2010, 135). On 7 October the Gang of Four. The third main task

• 1425 •

was “to strive to push national economy peculiar shift in the upper echelons of forward,” which was the task that most China’s politics occurred: Hua was offi - satisfi ed the wish of the people after the cially in power but Deng was the real de disasters brought about by the Cultural facto head of the country. After the arrest Revolution and the damages of the Gang of the Gang of Four, and Deng Xiaoping’s of Four. The fourth main task proposed consequent return, Hua relinquished in the speech was to study Mao’s work political control at the Third Plenum of and Marxist-Leninist works. It seems that the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978. in trying to legitimize his position by Offi cially, though, he remained in power associating himself closely to Mao, Hua until 1981 when he was formally made a mistake in choosing a path that removed from each of his three political was considered too radical by voicing his posts. He remained a member of the fervent hopes that many more Cultural Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) Revolutions were awaiting in the future. and the Politburo until 1982, even though One of his newly coined mottos his chairman period was over in 1981. was the “two whatevers” (liaˇng ge fánshì The main motivations for his relinquish- ϸϾ޵ᰃ) policy, which embodied his ing power to Deng Xiaoping’s men were utmost loyalty toward Mao: “Whatever linked to popular protests and discon-

• policy chairman Mao decided upon, tent developing in rural and urban areas we shall resolutely defend; whatever regarding the economic and social con- directives Chairman Mao issued, we shall ditions of the masses. The national econ- ढ೑䫟 • steadfastly obey (޵ᰃ↯Џᐁ԰ߎⱘއㄪ, omy was in very poor condition due to ៥Ӏ䛑മއ㓈ᡸ; ޵ᰃ↯Џᐁⱘᣛ⼎, ៥Ӏ several factors, such as the production 䛑ྟ㒜ϡ⏱ഄ䙉ᕾ).” He also tried to sabotage operated by the Gang of Four, establish a “Hua Guofeng’s cult” after the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, and Mao’s death through the publication, in above all other reasons the havoc and the offi cial party media, of numerous destruction caused by the Cultural Rev- articles depicting his accomplishments olution (Chi 1977, 34). The dire situation and values. If Mao was known as the increasingly worried the military, which “great teacher” (weˇidà daˇoshıˉ ӳ໻ᇐᏜ), realized the need for stability after the Hua became the “wise leader” (yıˉngmíng tumultuous years of the Cultural Revo- lıˇngxiù 㣅ᯢ乚㹪). These measures were lution. This stability was more likely to aimed at reinforcing Hua’s legitimacy to be brought about by Deng, who had inherit Mao’s role as chairman (Ye 1998, many supporters both among the military 172–175). echelons and the Politburo, as well as Although Hua Guofeng’s rise to among the people, who saw him closely power was remarkable, his descent was connected to the greatly missed Zhou even more so. From 1977 onward a Enlai (Weatherley 2010, 144).

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Hua’s Legacy His tendency to stay “behind the scenes” is possibly what convinced Mao What comes out after a careful analysis to appoint him as his successor and uni- of Hua Guofeng’s life is his ability to fi er of the country. On the other hand, his interpret events and situations in order cautious character was most probably to use them to steer clear of troubles. also one of the reasons why he didn’t According to Ding Wang, Hua was succeed in keeping the power for very always on the radical side, but many of long; never fully part of either group, he his radical actions occurred when he had no real allies to sustain him in time knew that his moves were certain to of crisis. His strengths were his intimate bring something in return. As mentioned knowledge of basic and mid-level organi- in the section on Hua and the Post-Leap zational structure, his ties to the security Recovery Period, he was initially quite apparatus, and his managerial abilities in critical of those offi cials who set “unreal- water conservancy issues, among others. istic output targets” during the Great His weaknesses derived mainly from Leap Forward’s initial phase. If any- his scarce knowledge of the international thing, this would prove that Hua was scene and the small group of supporters indeed far more radical and sincere— • Huá Guófeˉng • among the Chinese political elitè. This, and for personal reasons—than it is gen- coupled with the fact that he failed to erally believed by those scholars claiming distinguish himself politically, made his that his loyalty to Mao was strategically brief rule an exceptional parenthesis in motivated (Ding Wang for example). the procession of Chinese politics. It seems that his “staying away” from the factional fi ghting, which was going on Simona A. GRANO in China since the beginning of the 1970s, Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, gained him a favorable reputation as an University of Zurich honest and loyal man. Unlike Deng Xiaop- ing, who was brilliant and extremely tal- ented but had an unrestrained character, Further Reading Hua was calm and approachable, and per- formed well in group work. Even though Bartke, Wolfgang. (1997). Who was who in the he was not bestowed with a particular cha- People’s Republic of China: With more than 3,100 por- risma, he nonetheless projected an image of traits (2 vols.). München, Germany: K. G. Saur. modesty and frugality that appealed to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2008). masses and that struck a powerful contrast Hong Kong centre says DNA proves Hua Guofeng with that of other party members (e.g., not Mao Zedong’s son. Retrieved August 24, 2010, Wang Hongwen) accused of spending huge from: http://www.hkhkhk.com/engpro/messages/ amounts of money for personal reasons. 2452.html

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CNA. (1977, August). Bombarding Hua Kuo-feng: to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982). Columbia: An underground circular. China News Analysis, University of South Carolina Press. 19, 1–4. Myers, James T.; Domes, Jürgen; & Yeh, Milton Chi, Hsin. (1977). The case of the Gang of Four: With D. (1995b). The death of Mao (1976) to the fall of fi rst translation of Teng Hsiao-Ping’s “Three poison- Hua Guofeng (1980). Columbia: University of ous weeds.” Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, Ltd. South Carolina Press.

Ding, Wang. (1977). Leadership realignments. North America Online (NAOL.CA). (2008, August Problems of Communism, XXVI (July–August), 17. 23). Beijing Yiyuan DNA Yanzheng shenfen: Hua Ding, Wang. (1980). Chairman Hua—Leader of the Guofeng fei Mao Zedong Sishengzi ࣫Ҁए䰶 Chinese Communists. London: C. Hurst & Company. '1$偠䆕䑿ӑ: ढ೑䫟䴲↯⋑ϰ⾕⫳ᄤ [Beijing’s hospital DNA testing proves that Hua Guofeng is Dittmer, Lowell. (1987). China’s continuous revolu- not Mao Zedong’s illegitimate child]. Retrieved tion: The post-liberation epoch, 1949–1981. Berkeley: September 10, 2010, from http://naol.ca/news/ University of California Press. world/0808/0823-1.html Domes, Jürgen. (Ed.). (1979). Chinese politics after Mao. Cardiff, UK: University College Cardiff Press. Oksenber, Michel, & Yeung, Sai-cheung. (1977). Hua Kuo-Feng’s pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan The Epoch Times ढ೑䫟⫳ࠡ㽕 . (2008, August 24). years, 1949–1966: The making of a political gener- ∖䅸⼪ᔦᅫᑊ䗔ܮ [Former Communist Party chief alist. The China Quarterly, 69(1), 3–53. quits the party]. Retrieved November 3, 2013, from • http://epochtimes.com/gb/8/8/24/n2239870.htm Teiwes, Frederick C. (1995). The paradoxical post- Mao transition: From obeying the leader to “normal Gardner, John. (1982). Chinese politics and the suc- politics.” The China Journal, 34, 55–94. ढ೑䫟 cession to Mao. London: Macmillan Press. • Teiwes, Frederick C., & Sun, Warren. (2008). The Hu Jiwei. (1998). Cong Hua Guofeng xiatai dao Hu end of the Maoist era: Chinese politics during the twi- Yaobang xiatai Ңढ೑䫟ϟৄࠄ㚵㗔䙺ϟৄ [From light of the Cultural Revolution 1972–1976. Armonk, the downfall of Hua Guofeng to the downfall of NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hu Yaobang]. New York: Minjing Chubanshe. Hua Guofeng. (1955). Chongfen Yanjiu Nongcun ge Thornton, Richard C. (1982). China: A political his- .ߚⷨおݰᴥ৘䰊ሖⱘࡼᗕ tory, 1917–1980. Boulder, CO: Westview Pressܙ jieceng de Dongtai [Thoroughly research the development of various Vloeberghs, Gustaaf. (1979). The position of Hua strata in the countryside]. Xuexi, 11, 29–31. Kuo-Feng. In Jürgen Domes (Ed.), Chinese politics Kuo, Hua-lun. (1979). Patterns of intra-élite confl ict. after Mao (pp. 71–81). Swansea, UK: University Chinese Politics after Mao, 23–35. College Cardiff Press. MacFarquhar, Roderick. (1997). The succession to Weatherley, Robert. (2010). Mao’s forgotten succes- Mao and the end of Maoism. In Roderick MacFarq- sor: The political career of Hua Guofeng. New York: u har (Ed.), The politics of China: The eras of Mao and Palgrave Macmillan. Deng. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ye, Yonglie. (1998). Cong Hua Guofeng dao Deng Myers, James T.; Domes, Jürgen; & Yeh, Milton D. Xiaoping: Zhonggong Shiyijie Sanzhong Quanhui (1995a). Chinese politics: Fall of Hua Kuo-Feng (1980) Qianhou Ңढ೑䫟ࠄ䙧ᇣᑇ: Ё݅कϔሞϝ⾡ܼӮ

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ࠡৢ [From Hua Guofeng to Deng Xiaoping: to Mao’s revolutionary line (pp. 13–32)]. Hunan, Before and after the CCP’s Third Plenum of the China: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe. Eleventh Central Committee]. Hong Kong: Tiandi Zhao, Ziyang. (2009). Prisoner of the state: The secret Tushu Youxian Gongsi. journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang. London: Simon and Zhang, Pinghua. (1977). Hua Guofeng Zhuxi shi Schuster. Weida Lingxiu he Daoshi Mao Zhuxi de zui Hao Zhongguo Gongchandang Hunansheng Weiyuan- Jiebanren ढ೑䫟Џᐁᰃӳ໻乚㹪੠ᇐᏜ↯Џᐁⱘ hui (ZGHW) Ё೑݅ѻܮ␪फⳕྨਬӮ [Hunan ᳔ད᥹⧁Ҏ [Chairman Hua Guofeng is a great Province CCP Committee]. (1977). Hua Guofeng leader and tutor and is Chairman Mao’s best suited Tongzhi shi Mao Zhuxi Geming Luxian de Zhuoyue successor]. In Hua Guofeng Zhuxi shi Mao Zhuxi Jichengzhe ढ೑䫟ৠᖫᰃ↯Џᐁ䴽ੑ䏃㒓ⱘध䍞㒻 Geming Luxian de Zhuoyue Jichengzhe (pp. 13–32) ᡓ㗙 [Comrade Hua Guofeng is an outstanding ढ೑䫟Џᐁᰃ↯Џᐁ䴽ੑ䏃㒓ⱘध䍞㒻ᡓ㗙 successor to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line]. [Chairman Hua Guofeng is an outstanding successor Hongqi 㑶᮫ [Red Flag], 2, 19–25. • Huá Guófeˉng •

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