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C2 Risk-Shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle

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C2 Risk-Shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle Risk-shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle Keming Li [email protected] Department of Finance and Real Estate University of Minnesota – Duluth Jimmy Lockwood [email protected] Department of Finance and Real Estate Colorado State University Hong Miao [email protected] Department of Finance and Real Estate Colorado State University This Version: Oct. 2015 Risk-shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle Abstract This paper examines the relationship between financial distress and equity returns. Using strategic action proxies, we find that financial distress is a robust and negative predictor of future stock returns apart from the effect of strategic shareholder actions. This shows that the distress puzzle cannot be fully explained by shareholder strategic actions or shareholder advantages. The distress effect also cannot be explained by traditional risk factors, characteristics, or mispricing. However, the results presented in this paper are consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis. Three findings support this claim. First, distressed firms tend to overinvest, earn low profits, and exhaust their cash flows. This effect is concentrated in low growth opportunity firms and in hard-to-value firms. Second, distress effects are concentrated in firms without credit ratings or convertible debt and in which CEOs have equity holdings. Third, distressed firms tend to have high credit spreads. JEL classification: G02; G11; G33 Keywords: Financial Distress; Bankruptcy; Insolvency; Risk-Shifting; Credit Spread; Risk Return. Financial distress risk is commonly cited as an underlying cause of several cross-sectional return anomalies. The basic argument is that investors should demand higher premiums for holding stocks with higher levels of financial distress risk. However, empirical studies have shown that firms exhibiting higher levels of financial distress risk do not consistently earn higher returns, resulting in the creation of the so-called distress puzzle. Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between financial distress and stock returns. 1 That is, stocks with higher measures of financial distress actually earn lower returns. One explanation of this result pertains to market mispricing — investors fail to demand a sufficient premium that is commensurate with the degree of financial distress. Proponents of this explanation argue that this is particularly true of firms exhibiting a high degree of financial distress, which investors fail to grasp. However, beyond behavioral explanations, the distress puzzle remains anomalous. While investors are expected to require a premium to hold distressed stocks, the evidence shows that they discount these stocks. A possible explanation for the distress puzzle stems from the agency theory of debt. The risk- shifting hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling 1976) states that managers of financially distressed firms maximize shareholder benefits by accepting excessive risk whereby firms invest in risk-increasing projects that offer improbable high pay-offs at the expense of bondholders. Intuitively speaking, firms in distress present abnormally large leverage ratios, and proportions of equity are relatively small within they capital structure. At the same time, shareholders are likely to lose value, as interest payments may dominate the total cash flow. Even trivial shocks to a firm’s cash flows may result in default. Consequently, shareholders of firms in distress have different preferences for operating risks — rather, they prefer to accept risky (possibly value-reducing) projects. When these projects are successful, shareholders repay their bondholders and retain the surplus. Conversely, when these projects fail, shareholder downside risks are limited to their stake in the firm upon bankruptcy. Furthermore, a 1 See, for example, Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). 1 firm’s residual value can decrease dramatically. As a result, risky projects result in a transfer of risk from shareholders to debt holders. Related to the risk-shifting hypothesis, recent studies by Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) contend that strategic equity holder actions during distressed firm debt renegotiation can explain the distress puzzle. More specifically, Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) argue that distressed firms with a greater “shareholder advantage” should state lower expected returns. The authors define shareholder advantage as shareholder capacities to take advantage of other claimholders. Shareholder advantage is measured by asset size, R&D intensity, and liquidation cost, and it is high for large firms with lower R&D costs and higher liquidation costs (proxied by asset specificity).2 In this study, we examine the shareholder advantage hypothesis in a cross-sectional setting. More specifically, using proxies for strategic actions, we find that distress risk is a robust and negative predictor of future stock returns after controlling for the effects of strategic shareholder actions. We employ proxies of shareholder advantage with firm-specific variables suggested by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), including asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio of total assets, and the current-to-total liability ratio. Distress risk is measured based on default probability levels following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). Primary measures of equity risk are a firm’s CAPM beta and conditional beta as described in Avramov and Chordia (2006). Following McLean’s (2011) methodology, we find that equity risk does not become less sensitive to firm cash flow fluctuations during the sample periods.3 This finding raises Commented [J1]: Might move into text doubts regarding whether the shareholder advantage hypothesis explains the distress puzzle. 2 Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) present empirical evidence that is consistent with the shareholder advantage hypothesis across different countries. 3 Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) argue that the prospect of a favorable debt renegotiation can encourage shareholders to predict the timing of a default. This indicates that equity risk will be less sensitive to firm cash flow fluctuations over time. 2 Our results are robust to alternative definitions of stock returns and equity risk, as revealed through Fama and French’s (1992) methodology. In addition, we show that the negative relationship between distress risk and stock returns is not concentrated in post-1980s periods. The problem is not sample-specific, nor is it due to a different proxy of distress risk. Furthermore, this relationship is less likely to be caused by mispricing issues, as event-time analyses show persistent underperformance patterns and lower equity returns in high default risk firms. In this study, we show that default risk is related to the likelihood of risk-shifting behaviors rather than to shareholder advantage. Three major findings support this claim. First, high default firms tend to overinvest, earn low profits, and exhaust their cash flow. These effects are concentrated in low-growth- opportunity firms and in hard-to-value firms. Second, distress effects are concentrated in firms without a credit rating or convertible debt and in firms where CEOs hold equity. Third, high distress firms tend to exhibit higher credit spreads. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature on distress risk. Section II describes the data and estimations of default probabilities. Section III tests the shareholder advantage hypothesis. Section IV confirms the risk-shifting hypothesis for the fundamental data. Section V tests different risk-shifting incentives across different subsamples. Section VI shows the effects of distress risk on credit spread, and Section VIII concludes the paper. I. Related Literature Financial distress has been hypothesized in the asset-pricing literature to explain the empirical findings of anomalies (e.g., the size and value effects) in the cross-section of stock returns.4 Default risk is generally 4 For example, Chan and Chen (1991) claim that size effects are caused by “marginal” firms exhibiting high leverage and cash flow problems. Fama and French (1992) suggest that the book-to-market ratio serves as a proxy 3 defined as the probability that levered firms cannot fulfill their financial obligations, leading to bankruptcy or restructuring debts.5 This alludes to an empirical question: How is distress risk really priced? Several influential studies have claimed the existence of a default risk premium in the cross- section of equity returns, as financially distressed firms tend to move together as systematic risk (see, for example, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996), Chan and Chen (1991), and Ferguson and Shockley (2003)). To compensate investors for bearing these risks, firms that are close to defaulting must offer higher expected returns than healthy firms (Vassalou and Xing 2004). However, the existing evidence for this argument is ambiguous. Size and value premiums have been claimed to serve as distress proxies and have been found to be positively and monotonically related to future returns.6 Shumway (1997) documents that firms exhibiting high levels of exchange delisting risk earn abnormal positive returns. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) support this conclusion by showing that high default risk firms are concentrated in small portfolios and in high book- to-market portfolios. Other studies found a negative relationship
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