Conflict Trends (No 43): Real Time Analysis of African Political Violence, November 2015
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 43) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, NOVEMBER 2015 Welcome to the November issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED re- searchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Weekly updates to realtime conflict event data are pub- lished on the ACLED website, and are also availa- ble through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS). This month’s issue focuses on the diffusion of protests in Algeria amidst elite corruption, State of Sinai activity and parliamentary elections in Egypt, intra-party political violence in Guinea, a sharp increase in political contestation in Republic of Congo following President Denis Sassou Nguesso’s constitutional amendment to term limits, demonstrations over university fees in South Africa and heightened protest activity re- lated to the 2016 elections in Uganda. A Special Focus Topic explores the effect of income and investment on inducing political conflict. Elsewhere on the continent, violence continued to decrease in Burundi and Libya, whilst clashes between Ethiopian troops and the Ogaden Na- tional Liberation Army (ONLA) continued in Ethio- pia. Conflict Trajectory, November 2015 Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Country, May - October 2015. 1 ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and actors. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting [email protected]. Follow @ACLEDinfo on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis. CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 43) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, NOVEMBER 2015 Algeria While Algeria’s active role in the Malian and Libyan crises Concerns for the future sustainability of Algeria’s govern- confirms its regional and international engagement, con- ance also extend to the security sector. According to a flict dynamics point to the increasing vulnerability of its report published by Transparency International, un- domestic economic and security prospects (International checked military spending and widespread defence cor- Crisis Group, 12 October 2015). ruption are undermining public trust in the government Over the last two months, northern Algeria experienced a and in its armed forces, while feeding arms proliferation, organised crime and regional instability (Transparency series of service-delivery protests that saw local communi- International, 2015). The organisation ranks Algeria ties denouncing a lack of public services and marginalisa- tion of rural areas. Although conflict levels have not risen among the most corrupt countries in the region, revealing significantly in absolute terms compared to previous peri- weak institutional oversight, lack of transparency and widespread nepotism and distrust. Whilst the link be- ods (see Figure 2), the diffusion of protests reflects wide- tween corruption and conflict might be less direct than spread popular discontent with the socioeconomic situa- tion and the country’s ruling elites, the pouvouir. Howev- the report states, popular discontent with the corruption of the elites is more likely to increase in times of crisis. er, protest events remained spontaneous and short-lived despite persisting contestation, proving that the absence In this context, Algeria’s military elites are undergoing a of strong socio-political networks, such as trade unions phase of major reorganisation (Jeune Afrique, 14 Septem- and parties, constitutes an important obstacle to wider ber 2015). Since 2013, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has mobilisation. sacked a number of high-level officers in the Department Worsening macroeconomic trends present an additional of Intelligence and Security (DRS, Département du rensei- gnement et de la sécurité), including Lieutenant General challenge to the Algerian government. In September, Al- Mohammed “Toufik” Mediène, who led the DRS since geria’s trade deficit rose up to 10.33 billion dollars, com- 1990 and was forced into retirement in September. Ac- pared to 4 billion in the same period last year, 6 billion in May and 8 billion in July (Jeune Afrique, 21 October 2015). cording to many observers, these changes at the top of Algeria’s security services do not reflect any substantial The economy is affected by falling hydrocarbons exports, change in the current system of governance, nor the be- which constitute the 95 % of all Algerian exports and have decreased by 41.41 % since January. The wave of unrest ginning of a democratic transition (Africa Confidential, 24 that followed the economic crisis of mid-1980s suggests September 2015). They instead point to power struggles within the ruling elites over who will succeed Bouteflika, that political stability will ultimately hinge on the govern- which may intensify in the near future. ment’s ability to address the economic crisis and promote social development. Figure 2: Number of Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities in Algeria, from January - October 2015. 2 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 43) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, NOVEMBER 2015 Egypt Despite a dramatic decrease in insurgent activity in North across Cairo and other large cities. Small-scale, tit-for-tat, Sinai through October (see Figure 3), the Islamic State and diffuse incursions targeted security checkpoints and affiliate group ‘State of Sinai’ have claimed responsibility the vehicles of police conscripts and army generals who for downing a Russian passenger plane on 31 October. were mostly off-duty. These sorties generally focused on Although several rival statements have thrown the validity inflicting damage in a ‘hit-and-run’, assassination-style of the Islamic State’s claim into question – two days after fashion to express contempt for President Sisi’s draconian the crash, the Russian airline Kogalymavia denied the pos- measures. For this reason, the violence until now has re- sibility of technical failure or human error (Egypt Inde- mained centred upon national policy grievances, linking a pendent, 2 November 2015) and speculation of IS in- peripheral insurgency to urban mobilization and protest. volvement continues to grow (The Telegraph, 3 November But with the overt attempt to capture territorial outposts 2015; Xinhuanet, 5 November 2015) . If the State of Si- in the attacks on 1-2 July and with the possibility that last nai’s claim is substantiated, this represents a significant Saturday’s plane crash was a deliberate attack on civilian escalation of violence and transformation in strategy since targets, further support is given to Zack Gold’s assessment 1 July, after attempts to seize territory in Sheikh Zuweyid of a shift to sustained urban warfare (The Financial Times, left 21 soldiers dead. 1 July 2015) and a possible internationalization of the This change in tactic may represent a more wholesale re- conflict. Major General Mohamed Ali Belal commented on branding of the Wilyat Sinai and a departure from the the intense two-week offensive conducted by the military logic underlying its use of violence in the previous year. that began on 6 September, saying that "a comprehensive The majority of attacks in the towns of Al-Arish, Rafah and campaign has been launched based on an estimation of Sheikh Zuweyid often posed a direct rebuke of the Egyp- the situation and fresh information about many hideouts tian government’s aggressive response to demonstrators and targets” (Al Ahram Online, 8 September 2015). This and sustained targeting of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates two-phase ‘Martyr’s Right’ operation sought to eliminate Figure 3: Number of Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities in North Sinai, Egypt, from August 2012 - October 2015. 3 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 43) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, NOVEMBER 2015 Egypt all militant threat from North Sinai and create conditions are believed to have worn voter enthusiasm for participa- for infrastructural development in the peninsula. Howev- tion down. er, coupled with Major General Mohamed Ali Belal’s com- With the success of the ‘For the Love of Egypt’ coalition in ments it seems to signal a more concentrated coordina- the first round of voting, it becomes evident that little has tion between the Islamic State leadership and its regional changed from the authoritarian electoral politics under partner in Egypt that has prompted serious engagement Mubarak. The absence of parties competing on ideological from the Egyptian military. platforms is indicative of that fact that “votes are not cast This month also saw the first round of Egypt’s parliamen- on the basis of political issues or party platforms but as a tary elections take place through 17-19 October, with a choice between competing personalities within a context low turn-out of 26.56% in the first round (The Washington of patron-client relations” (Zaki 1995: 101). ‘For the Love Post, 30 October 2015) and with violence surrounding of Egypt’ coalition won all 60 seats in the first round of the electoral process kept to a minimum. Minor episodes voting across 14 governorates, despite the fact that the 10 of violence were recorded in October with low-levels of parties comprising it do not have a unified political philos- protest held in large towns and cities by the pro-Morsi ophy. As a result, the closed party lists have enabled pre- Anti-Coup