Economic Research Paper Revisiting the Coyne Affair: A Singular Event that Changed the Course of Canadian Monetary History Pierre L. Siklos* August 2008 * Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Jennifer Brickman and Garry Tang provided excellent research assistance. Richard Burdekin, Charles Goodhart, and David Laidler provided comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to Simon van Norden and Robert Rasche for their help in providing some of the real time data used in the paper. I also wish to thank Heather Ryckman and Jane Boyko of the Bank of Canada Archives for their assistance in providing documents from the Coyne era. An earlier version was presented at the International Economic History Association Conference, Helsinki, Finland.. Abstract The Coyne Affair is the greatest institutional crisis faced by the Bank of Canada in its history. The crisis took place in 1959-1961 and led to the resignation of the Governor, once he was cleared of any wrongdoing. The crisis eventually resulted in a major reform of the Bank of Canada Act. Archival and empirical evidence is used to assess the performance of monetary policy throughout the 1950s. In doing so, a real-time dataset is constructed for both Canada and the US that permit estimation of reaction functions. I find that the case against James Coyne is ‘not proven’. Pierre L. Siklos, Wilfrid Laurier University e-mail:
[email protected] Home Page: www.wlu.ca/sbe/psiklos Phone: (519) 884-0710, ext. 2491 Fax: (519) 884-5922 JEL Classification Codes: N100, E52, E58, C52 Keywords: Coyne Affair, monetary policy stance, Taylor rules, real-time data.