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ISS Paper 117 Warutere.Pmd The Goldenberg conspiracy The game of paper, gold, money and power Peter Warutere ISS Paper 117 • September 2005 Price: R15.00 INTRODUCTION all court cases related to Goldenberg, paving the way for the commission, which was empowered to hear In February 2003, hardly a month after being sworn evidence about the matter in open court. The com- in, Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki appointed a Com- mission, chaired by Justice Samuel Bosire, was ap- mission of Inquiry into one of the largest financial pointed in the public interest “to inquire into allega- scandals in Kenya’s history. The fiddle, popularly tions of irregular payment of export compensation to known in Kenya and even in international financial Goldenberg International Limited” and also to look and donor circles simply as ‘Goldenberg’, is estimated into “payments made by the Central Bank of Kenya to have cost Kenya some US $600 million in just less (CBK) to Exchange Bank Limited in respect of ficti- than three years. This estimate is considered in some tious foreign exchange claims”.1 circles to be conservative; there are computations which indicate that as much as US $1 billion could The appointment of the commission pulled the rug have directly and indirectly been si- out from under Moi, who had ruled phoned through Goldenberg net- Kenya with an iron grip for 24 works. years. He retired under pressure in Goldenberg tore December 2002, paving the way Goldenberg tore through Kenya’s through Kenya’s for a democratic election in which 2 political, economic and social fab- political, economic NARC was swept to power. It was ric not just during the years when a shocking end to the KANU ad- the actual transactions took place and social fabric ministration, which had governed but also long afterwards. The re- Kenya since independence in corded transactions associated with 1963. Moi had tried to impose Goldenberg were mainly between Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first 1990 and 1993 but the spill-over effects continued to president, the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, as his suc- be felt for more than a decade thereafter, even until cessor in the leadership of both KANU and the gov- President Kibaki’s election, under the National Rain- ernment. To many observers, Moi’s motivation was to bow Coalition (NARC) party, in December 2002. ensure that the regime he presided over was shielded from prosecution for the economic and political At the peak of the scandal in 1993, transactions asso- crimes it was widely accused of abetting during its ciated with Goldenberg networks together accounted years in office. The Goldenberg scam hung over the for over 10% of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product regime’s head like the sword of Damocles, but a pro- (GDP). Yet the regime of Kibaki’s predecessor, Daniel Moi administration would possibly have ensured it Arap Moi, and the Kenya National African Union was buried and forgotten with time.3 (KANU) party, was not only reluctant to have the scam investigated but it also interfered with the machinery By all accounts, Goldenberg was a high-level con- of justice to shield the perpetrators of the economic spiracy by senior officials of the Moi administration, crime from being prosecuted and convicted. together with local and international wheeler-dealers who ostensibly capitalised on the government’s des- In appointing the commission, President Kibaki peration for foreign exchange and the greed of Moi’s brought to an end a circus in the courts that had be- cronies. These cronies displayed an insatiable appe- come an all too familiar result of any attempt to pros- tite for plundering the economy even when it was flat ecute the principal suspects in the Goldenberg affair. on its back.4 It was the climax of a series of monu- Kenya’s Attorney General, Amos Wako, terminated mental cases of corruption but it was the most blatant The Goldenberg Conspiracy • 1 Paper 117 • September 2005 of all that Moi was associated with, which turned one The Export Compensation Act was intended to pro- of Africa’s most promising economies into a state of vide incentives to Kenyan exporters, particularly if they desperation. Endemic corruption in Kenya’s public ventured into the export of non-traditional goods, but, sector, including government ministries, state corpo- like the exchange controls, this was widely abused rations, banks and financial institutions, depressed through corruption. The compensation was paid in Kenya’s economic performance to the lowest level in the form of cash, equivalent to a percentage of the history and the business community, as well as Ken- total value of the goods exported. All that the law ya’s development partners, found it increasingly dif- required to process compensation claims was CD3 ficult to continue operating under an increasingly forms stamped by the necessary authorities and con- hostile economic and political environment.5 firmation that all the foreign exchange relating to the exports had been received and sold to the CBK. The The genesis of financial buccaneering loophole was that the authorities did not require or verify details such as the volume and the true value, It is important to understand the political and eco- including unit prices, of the goods exported. Under nomic environment which prevailed in Kenya before the circumstances, it was possible for an exporter to 1993 to understand how a small financial operation bribe government officials to secure all the stamps was able to get so out of hand that it became a scan- required to show that an export transaction had taken dal of mega proportions. Kenya was a fairly closed place and foreign exchange earned, provided that the economy, with the government controlling prices, in- exporter could organise for a hard currency remit- terest rates and foreign exchange transactions. Two tance for the receiving bank to sell to the CBK as con- laws were of particular significance to Goldenberg: firmation that payments for the exports were received. the Exchange Control Act and the Ex- port Compensation Act. To see just how easy it was to abuse this incentive, a Kenyan student (call him KK) told of how he used Under the Exchange Control Act, all The Export export compensation to support his authority for dealing in hard cur- Compensation Act family when he was studying over- rency was vested with the CBK, seas. He simply arranged with his which then licensed commercial was intended to wife to export a calabash every banks to deal in foreign currency on provide incentives month and, since he was doing part behalf of their customers. However, time jobs overseas, he remitted part the banks were required to sell to the to Kenyan of this money to the wife, who con- CBK all the foreign currency they exporters firmed that she had received export received within a stipulated period earnings and therefore claimed ex- and it was illegal for anyone else, port compensation. The important either individuals or firms, to be in thing here is that the wife had to possession of or trade in foreign cur- declare on the CD3 forms an in- rency. This law stipulated that all exports leaving the flated price for the calabash as what the importer was country had to be certified by the Department of Cus- willing to pay, and the husband did not have to sell toms and Excise. Exporters were required to complete the calabash because he did not have a market for it. customs declaration forms (referred to as CD3 forms) Assume the wife bought a calabash at US $5 equiva- for all exports, declaring the goods being exported lent but on the CD3 forms declared that it was worth and their value. They were then required, through their US $500. As long as her husband could send US $500 banks, to account for all their export earnings and back to Kenya, she could claim US $100 (20% of the convert these proceeds into Kenyan Shillings within export value) as compensation. How much they could a stipulated period. The essential element of these make from the deal would depend entirely on how controls was that no Kenyan individual or firm could much the husband was able or willing to remit back deal in foreign currency or retain any part of the pro- home. Though export compensation supported KK’s ceeds of exports, even if they needed the funds to family in a small way, he could not make a fortune finance their imports or foreign commercial obliga- from it because his earnings overseas were limited. tions. Importers who needed foreign exchange to An exporter with more resources, however, or a good import raw materials, for instance, were required to source of hard currency remittances, could make apply for import licenses from the Ministry of Com- millions of dollars out of this simple process. merce and Industry and then await foreign exchange allocation approval by the Treasury and the CBK. This The architects of the Goldenberg scheme turned KK’s process often took several months and allocations modest idea into a multi-million dollar operation be- even for essential imports were not always assured cause they had several advantages, including finan- because of the abuse and corruption involved in im- cial resources and the right connections in the right port licensing and foreign exchange allocation pro- places. Goldenberg’s roots are traced to August 1990, cedures. when a firm called Goldenberg International Limited The Goldenberg conspiracy • 2 Paper 117 • September 2005 was registered by the Registrar of Companies, the tions associated with Goldenberg. The first signal, Kenyan company registry which is under the auspices perhaps, was the registration documents filed at the of the Attorney General.
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