East-West Identities
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd i 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM International Comparative Social Studies
Series Editor Wil Arts
Editorial Board Duane Alwin, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA Wil Arts, University College Utrecht, The Netherlands Mattei Dogan, Centre National de la Recherche Scienti que Paris, France S.N. Eisenstadt, Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel Linda Hantrais, Loughborough University, UK Chan Kwok-bun, Hongkong Baptist University, Hong Kong Frank Lechner, Emory University Atlanta, USA Ola Listhaug, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim, Norway Rubin Patterson, University of Toledo, USA Eugene Roosens, University of Tokyo, Japan Masamichi Sasaki, University of Tokyo, Japan Saskia Sassen, Columbia University, New York, USA John Rundell, University of Melbourne, Australia Livy Visano, York University Toronto, Canada Bernd Wegener, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany Jock Young, London, UK
VOLUME 15
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd ii 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM East-West Identities
Globalization, Localization, and Hybridization
Edited by Chan Kwok-bun, Jan W. Walls and David Hayward
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd iii 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM The photograph on the front cover was taken by Choi Kwok-to
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
East-west identities : globalization, localization, and hybridization / edited by Chan Kwok-bun, Jan. W. Walls and David Hayward. p. cm. — (International comparative social studies ; v. 15) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-04-15169-7 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Hybridity (Social sciences) 2. Culture and globalization. 3. Identity (Psychology) I. Chan, Kwok B. II. Walls, Jan. III. Hayward, David. IV. Title. V. Series.
HM1272.E37 2007 306.0951—dc22 2007031596
ISSN 1568-4474 ISBN 978 90 04 15169 7
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CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd iv 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ...... ix
Introduction: Globalization, Localization and Hybridization: Their Impact on Our Lives ...... 1 Chan Kwok-bun
Chapter 1 Identity in the Politics of Transition: The Case of Hong Kong, ‘Asia’s World City’ ...... 21 Michael E. DeGolyer
Chapter 2 Depoliticization, Citizenship and the Politics of Community in Hong Kong ...... 55 Lam Wai-man
Chapter 3 Globalization and Hybridization in Cultural Production: A Tale of Two Films ...... 77 Georgette Wang and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh
Chapter 4 Globalization and Identity Formation: A Cross-cultural Reading of Amy Tan’s “Sagwa, the Chinese Siamese Cat” ...... 99 Lu Fang
Chapter 5 Identity Shifts as a Consequence of Crossing Cultures: Hong Kong Chinese Migrants Return Home ...... 121 Nan M. Sussman
Chapter 6 Japan’s ‘Beckham Fever’: Marketing and Consuming a Global Sport Celebrity ...... 149 Rie Ito
Chapter 7 On the Globalization of the Self: Internet Weblogs as an Identity-forming Activity ...... 175 Oscar Bulaong Jr.
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd v 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM vi contents
Chapter 8 Hybrid Language and Hybrid Identity? The Case of Cantonese-English Code-switching in Hong Kong ...... 189 Brian Chan Hok-shing
Chapter 9 Changing Heart (Beats): From Japanese Identity and Nostalgia to Taiko for Citizens of the Earth ...... 203 Millie Creighton
Chapter 10 Learning Hong Kong’s Body: Beauties, Beauty Workers and Their Identities ...... 229 Anthony Y.H. Fung
Chapter 11 The Impact of Localization and Globalization on Popular Music in the Context of Social Change in Taiwan ...... 241 Ho Wai-chung
Chapter 12 Building Traditions for Bridging Differences: Islamic Imaginary Homelands of Chinese-Indonesian Muslims in East Java ...... 265 Chiou Syuan-yuan
Chapter 13 Pi’s Passport: Identity and the Peculiar Economics of Popular Culture ...... 279 Chris Wood
Chapter 14 The Paci c Rim Consciousness of American Writers on the West Coast ...... 295 Chung Ling
Chapter 15 Making Do and Making Meaning: Cultural and Technological Hybridity in Recent Asian Animation .... 315 Steve Fore
Chapter 16 ‘Globalizentity’: Assessing the Effects of ‘Global Career’ on National Identity in Japan ...... 329 T.J.M. Holden
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd vi 9/10/2007 8:04:12 PM contents vii
Chapter 17 Cyberpatriarchy: Chat Rooms and the Construction of ‘Man to Man’ Relations in Urban India .... 361 Ashley Tellis
Chapter 18 Diverging Media Convergence: Perceptual Differences Across Cultures, Genders and Habits ...... 373 Jeffrey Wilkinson and Steven McClung
Notes on Contributors ...... 389
Index ...... 399
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd vii 9/10/2007 8:04:13 PM CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd viii 9/10/2007 8:04:13 PM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book comprises papers which were presented at the LEWI & IIBD International Conference, “East-West Identities: Globalization, Localization and Hybridization”, on 26–27 February 2004. The edi- tors of this book would like to thank Emilie Yeh, Associate Director of David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies (LEWI), and Vivienne Luk, Director, and Jane Moy, Associate Director, of Wing Lung Bank International Institute for Business Development (IIBD) at Hong Kong Baptist University for putting the conference together, refereeing the papers and selecting them for inclusion in this book. Elizabeth Cheung of LEWI has worked hard in contributing to the editing of the book, while other LEWI colleagues, Hidy Ng, Erica Poon and Deanna Leung, have rendered, as always, their hearty assistance and support through- out the book project. In an amiable and effective manner, this book represents the spirit of intercultural understanding and global collabo- ration in scholarship between the David Lam Centre for International Communication of Simon Fraser University, Canada, the Institute of Social Research of Swinburne University of Technology, Australia, and LEWI and IIBD at Hong Kong Baptist University.
Chan Kwok-bun Jan W. Walls David Hayward
CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd ix 9/10/2007 8:04:13 PM CHAN KOWN BUN_f1_i-ix.indd x 9/10/2007 8:04:13 PM Introduction
Globalization, Localization, and Hybridization: Their Impact on Our Lives
Chan Kwok-bun
As an idea, globalization is by no means new to social theory and social research. Sociologists initially discussed globalization in the 1960s and 1970s. Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and Powers, 1989) introduced the concept of the “global village” in 1960 to portray the world as being compressed in time and space by new technologies of communications. While McLuhan was concerned with communications, others were more interested in economic development. The neomarxist scholars, Barran and Sweezy (1961), for example, drew attention to the rise of MNCs (or monopoly capital, as they called them) and their impact on capitalism, while Wallerstein (1974, 1979) similarly pointed to their role in facilitating the expansion of world trade, and the international division of labor, which in turn was leading to a new model of global economy. These original ideas still have some currency today, although the instruments of globalisation have changed in various ways, for both better and worse. We live in a world of risk society (Beck, 2001), when globalizing forces such as the modern mass media in its increasingly converged form, not to mention email, mobile phones and the Inter- net, have become incredibly powerful drivers of change that open endless possibilities for the future, both good and bad. They invade all aspects of our being, including our local milieus—our homes and communities—and they permeate our private lives and our encounters with people from other countries and cultures, for better or for worse, in ways that were unimaginable only thirty years ago. Our everyday experiences and our cherished social institutions, such as the family and marriage, face an unrelenting pressure to respond and adapt to the relentless external forces unleashed by globalization—or face the consequences of being displaced or reduced to oblivion. The chari- oteers of globalization clamor, “live together or die alone!” Notably, our adaptation involves a rede nition of such close and personal facets
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of our lives as, for example, family structure, marriage patterns, sexual- ity or sexual orientation, spousal relations, gender roles, self-identity, social identity, identi cation with signi cant others, interpersonal rela- tionships, consumer behavior, work patterns, and so on. We live in a “runaway world”, as Anthony Giddens (2000) describes it, and the impact of globalization is intensely felt by each of us in the public domain as much as it is in the privacy of our own homes, irrespective of whether we like it or not, or whether we acknowledge it or try to look the other way.
Dimensions of Globalization
The recent discourses on the implications of globalization refer to the process whereby the world is said to be transformed into a single global system. Analysts approach the question (and debate) from three angles: economic, political, and cultural. The rst angle is observable in the emergent global economy, wherein capitalism is expanded and transformed into an integrated global economy as illustrated by world nancial markets. The globalization of nance, whereby capital circu- lates rapidly around the world as a hyper lubricant of world trade and investment, is accelerating, courtesy of a cocktail of highly technical and increasingly complex debt and arbitrage instruments overseen by global investment banks. This process of “ nancialisation” (see Frankel, 2001) affects everything from stocks and shares through to large chunks of public infrastructure such as roads. Even home mortgages are part of this global circuit of capital. The rapid development of informa- tion technology has tremendously facilitated nancial globalization, thus enabling markets to continue expanding on a global scale by, for example, the electronic transmission of funds and the detailed and nely-tuned tracking of economic transactions, which can increasingly be done from any location in the world. On the one hand, the internationalization of capital and free trade facilitate the continued development of MNCs, which occupy the lion’s share of the increase in world trade, either directly or indirectly, through the spider web of outsourcing relationships in which they are embedded. On the other hand, some of the biggest MNCs carry out their global activities in such a way that they are beyond the control of any national government. Both their internal operations and their transactions with other MNCs serve to integrate economic practices
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on a global scale. Helping to drive all this is government policy settings encouraging privatisation and deregulation, thereby opening up new investment opportunities in areas of activity previously assumed to be the preserve of the state—from the supply of water to the provision of prison services and even the supply chains that bring clothing and food to armies engaged in warfare. Such enormous changes have affected all states, but none more so than Hong Kong. While many fear the effect of globalisation on their national identity, Michael DeGolyer’s essay in this book, based on detailed empirical research, argues that Hong Kong’s history and geog- raphy as a major international port and nancial center have made it a source and bene ciary, not a victim, of globalization. Other socio-eco- nomic forces such as social diversity within a centralizing government, communications, and globalization played a key role in the making of Hong Kong. Geography has essentially determined Hong Kong’s destiny and affected its history. Rather than being resistant to globalization, the erstwhile British Crown colony was molded after 1841 into an open port for free trade with the entire world. It continues in that role today. These unique geographical and historical forces have been the major factors in forming its people’s culture, mindsets, and identity. Globalization can be approached from the second angle of global politics. The globalization process has strengthened the world economy’s regulatory mechanisms such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, which regulate the global economy and thereby act as constraints on the degree of freedom with which nation-states can pursue their own individual economic development and, by extension, their political policies. For example, the European Union is capable of exercising supra-national control over national sovereignty in the economic, social, and political affairs of its member states. The globalization of nancial markets and corporations also encroaches on the power of sovereign states to administer affairs within their own jurisdictions. Like the internationalization of capital and labor, MNCs can re-deploy their operations to other locations with relative ease, should they nd the policies of a government not to their liking. Thus, social critics are keen to point out that under the globalization movement, a number of highly contentious issues have arisen: the erosion of the authority of nation-states; environmental disasters; aboriginal rights and citizenship status; migration and inter- racial, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious con icts; and tensions between human rights and civil rights, as in the ethical issues of abortion and
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of distributive injustice between rich and poor nations, and between the north and the south. Others have drawn attention to the way white hot money ows can quickly turn a nation’s destiny upside down with incredible speed, as was demonstrated by the Asian nancial crises of the late 1990s. Globalization has also been held responsible for undermining the continuity and authenticity of indigenous cultures, which has often energized social movements in protest of real or putative homogeniza- tion or uniformization of cultures in certain societies—to the neglect of the cultural pluralization or heterogenization thereof. Roland Robertson (1992) coined the term “glocalization” to describe these immanent tensions between the local and the global, and he railed against incorporation of the former into the latter. On a more posi- tive note, Daniele Archibugi and David Held (1995) entertained the possibility of new modes of governance and cosmopolitan democracy in the new homogenizing global order. In this regard, Lam Wai-man’s essay in this book offers a critical examination of the development of citizenship and community-building in Hong Kong since 1997 as a unique development of a new form of governance. Lam explains that, “in every post-colonial society, reconstruction of community or citizen identities is one of the foremost tasks of the newly established post-colonial regimes.” The third way to approach globalization is in terms of its impact on culture, or cultures. Some critics liken cultural globalization to cultural imperialism by Western powers, and it is said to be the corollary of a groundswell of mass tourism—tours of the exotic indigenous cultures that have been re-packaged (and are, hence, unauthentic) to suit the appetite of foreign, deep-pocketed tourists on package tours (Luk, 2005). Increased migrations of peoples and refugees and other human traf cking between societies leads to the globalization of culture and the possibility of cosmopolitanism (Chan, 2005a, 2005b). The com- modi cation of cultural products (for example, package tours, Shaolin Ku Fu ghting, McDonaldization, Disneylandization) is part and parcel of the brainchild of Peter Berger’s (2002) recent theory of cultural globalization. The global dissemination of a postmodernist ideology of consumerism is destined to displace or intermingle with the more localized cultures (see a critique of the myths of consumerism by Jean Baudrillard [1998]). The global marketing of cultural objects by MNCs, reinforced by the all-pervasive mass media technologies that are them- selves controlled by these MNCs, contributes to cultural globalization.
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Berger gave the examples of McDonaldization or a “McJob” as the archetypal American cultural icons—and as part of global popular culture in the dynamics of cultural globalization. Georgette Wang and Emillie Yeh argue in their essay that, in the lms “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon” and “Mulan,” “the con- stant motion and incorporation of different elements brings with it new characteristics, new distinctions, and new similarities.” From this perspective, perhaps hybridization and globalization do lead to the loss of distinctiveness in cultural products—and in cultures as well. However, by losing what was there, we are presented with something new, something fresh, something that represents yet another hybrid. In a similar vein, Fang Lu offers that “Mulan” and “Sagwa” (a lm and a television series, respectively) belong to two different genres of hybridi- ties. “Mulan” is an example of the Americanization of Chinese culture aimed at assimilating it into American culture. By contrast, “Sagwa” seeks to localize Chinese culture in America, aiming at letting others recognize and embrace it by achieving a reciprocal understanding between two different cultures. Not only is globalization affecting aspects of the public domain, such as nancial markets and telecommunications, it is also impinging on our personal lives in varied ways—in our homes, in our communities through its exogenous forces such as the mass media, Internet and popular culture, and through voluntary and forced migration that put us in close contact with people from many alien cultures. In her essay, Nan Sussman considered the implications of globalization for the private lives of Hong Kong residents when the former British Crown colony was to return to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997. Many Hong Kong residents decided then that the consequences of remaining after 1997 were too daunting to contemplate, and out-migration skyrocketed from 22,400 in 1980 to 66,000 in 1992, tapering off to about 40,000 in 1994. The bulk of migrants acquired visas for the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia. These migrants were principally members of the educated middle and upper classes. Three generations of a family, rather than the husband alone, left Hong Kong. Commenting on the impact of globalization on those migrants who returned to Hong Kong, Sussman thrusts upon migration researchers frontal questions that every serious researcher must face. “What is the nature of the cultural identity of the Hong Kong returnee, whether husband or entire family? Another layer of identity has been added to the core Chinese, British/Western, Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis British, Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis China, and
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new passport country. Now the identity of repatriate is added. Who are these individuals and what is the con guration of identity? Do they feel at home again in Hong Kong or has identity transformation led to a new global transnational identity?” Looking at such issues of identity in Japan, Rie Ito provides a critical examination of Japan’s “Beckham Fever” during the 2002 football World Cup and its impact on the notions of “Japaneseness” and “otherness”. Ito argues that the Beckham phenomenon was something larger than one Western athlete in an Eastern country. “Beckham Fever” enabled local Japanese to talk about many issues ranging from sport to media, celebrity, globalization, race, gender, and national identity. At the same time, Japanese nationals could consider the complex ways in which these elements link to one another, as part of the world’s rst major global sport, which in turn has itself been truly commodi ed. The cultural meltdown of globalization is now omnipresent, omni- scient and omnipotent, and penetrates into our private lives. Imager- ies, notions, commodities, and lifestyles today spread like prairie re. World trade, cutting-edge information technologies, and a wired world of global media networks and of people have together quickened the traf c of different cultural forms across international jurisdictions. Some observers contend that we now have a single global culture and that we all live in a single global order. Nevertheless, Oscar Bulaong argues that as global communications spread, we are beginning to be able, to quote Heidegger, to conceive of a new possibility of understanding the human being and the human condition. “Only seeing ‘self ’ in a contingent situation of ‘dynamic absence’ is it possible to envisage ‘the self ’ unhindered in appearing uniquely, rather than uniformly . . . that every individual must project himself into the historical and contingent situation in which he is rooted,” Bulaong writes. I have visited the concept of “cultural imperialism” in the above because some observers fear that globalization is creating a “global culture” of homogenous tendencies. Global culture is a culture of the world’s most af uent military powers, such as the USA, and the mass media—Hollywood lm producers, CNN, the BBC, Reuters, and the opportunist, self-censoring and self-serving Chinese branches of Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. The values that these media octopuses convey to the world’s consumers overwhelm the forces of local customs and traditions and even their histories (a postmodernist argument), and such dynamics are often tainted by political expediency and capitalist pro t-motive ethics at critical moments in history. Under the in uence
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of the globalizing tendencies of the Western-dominated mass media, modern people are over-socialized, and yet they constantly feel a sense of social- and self-estrangement and alienation from the rest of the West. Hence, there is some truth to the argument that globalization today is a variant of “cultural imperialism,” as it held sway in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Cultural imperialism aims to disseminate the values, styles, worldviews, and behavioral patterns of Occidental countries to the rest of the world. This invidious cultural intrusion is so overwhelming that the contents thus propagated can suffocate the cultures of indigenous peoples. I argue for the continuing primacy of traditions (history, language, geography, culture, lived experience, practice, etc.) for a post-postmodern perspective on culture, history, and globalization. The merits of a post- postmodern perspective are that it is able to transcend the dilemma of a lingering structuralism by freeing itself from the shackles of pre-determined conceptual structures without being lost outside those structures in a twilight zone of total indeterminacy and ambivalence—a much-critiqued problem of postmodernism. Thus, a post-postmodern perspective is one that is able to carry forward and go beyond post- modernism without adhering to a postmodernist language of excess and in nitely deconstructive re exivity on culture and identity. A post- postmodern perspective is one that emphasizes the carrying forward (thus, the purposeful transformation) of biography, history, tradition and culture in the present, and toward the future, in actual human practice and in foregrounding a relationship between the present and the future in which future events carry out the implications of the pres- ent practice without simply repeating that practice. The emphasis of a post-postmodern perspective is therefore laid on biography, history, tradition, and culture as purposeful, transformative human praxis (as distinguished, but not entirely divorced, from abstract theorization), thus going beyond postmodernism and its logic of utter indeterminacy. On balance, however, other observers have argued that the global- ization movement has engendered a owering of cultural traditions and forms. All things considered, they have argued, instead of cultural homogeneity or uniformity, the world has now witnessed a tremendous momentum toward an awesome diversi cation of cultures co-existing with whatever the hegemonic culture be. Chan Hok-shing examines an interesting case of Cantonese-English code-switching in Hong Kong. The major argument he makes is that this code-switching does not project a “hybrid” Hong Kong identity; nevertheless, he believes
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that Hong Kong culture is “hybrid” because it comprises Chinese and Western elements—it is both Chinese and Western and yet is neither completely Chinese nor completely Western. This cultural hybridity is a result of the fact that Hong Kong was a British colony for about 150 years, and is geographically peripheral to the Chinese border but is politically separated from China. In her essay, Millie Creighton presents a participant-observer’s eld- work account of Kodo and taiko in Japan’s cultural landscape. Creigh- ton observes that Kodo rose to fame in Japan by renewing interest in drumming forms seen as strongly associated with the Japanese identity and a Japanese spirit, and its emphasis on taiko as a traditional Japanese percussion form. It also recognized taiko as a statement of Japanese or partial Japanese or even partial Asian descent, and later as a music form available to all peoples in a growing globalization of cross-fertil- izing musical in uences. In the process, the highly localized region of Sado Island, where Kodo is based, becomes a site of globalization and hybridization through the fusion of music forms and experiences from around the world. Anthony Fung discusses the interesting cultural product of beauti- cians and their cultural resistance to the dominant classes in southern Chinese society. In doing so, these beauticians nd an alternative path to making up their identities through working in beauty parlors, which reveals a kind of cultural resistance of particular signi cance for those who all too frequently assume that power relationships are one-way and that elites must always win. Fung explains that the dissemination of beauty culture is well received within the mainstream culture and that the beauty industry uses the female body as a vehicle or an object, either to raise the social status of beauty workers or to modernize (to effect a complete make-over). Body cosmetology is perceived as part of the “modernization” process. In both cases, the female body is only an object for modernization and a mere product readily commodi ed for other purposes. Moreover, for beauty workers, cosmetology represents cultural resistance inside the beauty parlors, where the power relations between workers and their high-heeled customers are temporarily reversed.
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Dimensions of Localization
Local traditions and cultures are penetrated by a handful of alien cultural forces from the center and the periphery, confronting indig- enous people with making an intelligent choice from a bewildering and intimidating assortment of cultural formations and alternative lifestyles (it is, one may argue, a Hobson’s choice—and who are we to judge whether one has made an intelligent choice or not?) As the famed postmodernist Jean Baudrillard (1998) intuited, far from being a uni ed global culture, the present global order is characterized by a fragmen- tation of cultural forms in which culture-based identities and lifestyles rooted in local communities are yielding to novel variants of “hybrid identity” that comprise essentials from diverse cultural sources like a salad bowl; people sample each recipe and mix in yet other ingredients to produce their own favorite “hybrid (sub)culture(s)”. As Peter Berger (2002) frames it, “localization shades over into another response, best described by the term ‘hybridization.’ This is the deliberate effort to synthesize foreign and native cultural traits.” Several other authors in this book speak of localization and hybrid- ization in various contexts. Ho Wai-chung maintains that from the lifting of martial law in 1987 to the reign of Chen Shui-bien, Taiwan has made good use of the dynamics of globalization and localization to harmonize the triangulation of the government, the music industry, and popular artists. This dialectical relationship between localization and globalization has resulted in the continual growth of Taiwan’s pop music, which has kept its local identity while incorporating global styles. Chiou Syuan-yuan discusses the history of Chinese-Indonesians and of the Chinese Islamic movement in Indonesia since the early 20th century. According to Chiou, the Association of Chinese Muslims of Indonesia of East Java (PITIEJ)’s identi cation of Chen Ho (a powerful eunuch during the reign of Yung-le in the early Ming Dynasty) and Chinese Hui (mainland Chinese Muslims) with their homelands has created a diasporic tradition that nurtures a kind of Islamic Chinese- ness that is very different from other forms of diasporic Chineseness, which usually identify China as the motherland without considering Hui Muslim culture. But the PITIEJ does not automatically equate conver- sion to Islam with assimilation to the Indonesian nation; members still keep their Chinese identity.
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Addressing the commonly mistaken belief that globalization means exclusively Americanization, Chris Wood argues that the lm “Mulan” is produced by Walt Disney, but based on a script originally attributed to a traditional Chinese saga. Wood also discusses “Hello Kitty,” from Japan’s Sanrio Corporation. This animated character earns her Japanese creators a fortune and is a phenomenal commercial success worldwide. So, Wood argues, it is inaccurate to equate the globalization of pop cul- ture exclusively with Americanization. The “nationality” of a corporate character and story is very often one of blended parentage, something we are likely to see even more of as lm studies—from Hollywood to Bollywood—come to embrace a wider cultural base from which they can produce the next global box of ce hit. In her essay, Chung Ling af rms the “Paci c consciousness” of American writers on the west coast. She argues that many American writers take the initiative in integrating Eastern and Western cultures in their writings. They absorb Asian cultural elements in their life and their works. These writers, who seek a new utopia, a new horizon, are in the minority in the United States. They see Asian culture as equal to their own, and actively learn from and adopt it. They strive for the communion of different peoples and cultures, and for a localization that is open and outreaching. A process of localization is under way here, Chung argues, because when these writers adopt Eastern and Asian cultural elements in their writings, they create a new, innovative hybrid- ity within the tradition of European civilization, one that is respectful as well as intellectually stimulating. Exploring certain technologically hybrid forms of animation as they exist in Asia today, Steve Fore argues that it has become increasingly common to digitize cel-based sequences within the production process in order to blend them with computer-generated material. That is, an increasingly large proportion of commercial animation is “hybrid” in nature while the traditional forms of 2D animation are becoming obsolete in commercial productions. Todd Holden’s essay illustrates this phenomenon vividly. He coins the term “globalizentity,” which refers to a phenomenon in Japan (and elsewhere) in which globalization bears on the discourse about national identity. This identity discourse transpires through the mediation of advertising, news, television entertainment, music, and webpages, and in uences the “global career” of Japanese diasporic human ows in sports. The hybrid product of a national identity arising through globalization can be signi ed by the compound word: “globalizentity.”
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High Culture and Popular Culture under Globalization
It can be argued that Chinese migrants nowadays may remain strongly in uenced by Chinese culture, Confucian ethics, and polygamous sexual orientation, for example. Yet they also perform religious rituals during the Hungry Ghosts Festival (held on the 14th of July), as they embrace cosmopolitanism as exempli ed in their donning designer jeans, gol ng in exclusive country clubs, collecting antique Chinese porcelain, mar- rying Caucasians, vacationing in Kenya, and so on. These activities represent a cosmopolitan lifestyle and taste. They are also what the literati call “high culture” or, as Berger (2002) phrases it, the “Davo culture” of the social elite and intelligentsia. But the elite culture must be distinguished from the “popular culture” alluded to earlier if only for conceptual clarity; however, elite culture and popular culture sometimes cross-cut each other and depend on each other, as cosmopolitanism depends on localism—without local- ism, there can be no cosmopolitanism. A generic de nition of popular culture is that it is simply culture that is widely favored or well liked by most people. Instances of this may include: best-selling books like the Harry Potter series, CDs, videos, sporting events, bull- ghting (against the bull) and bull-charging (against the Spaniards) in Spain, music festivals such as Woodstock, television sitcoms, and soap operas. All of these cultural manifestations can justi ably claim to be popular culture in the modern sense of having mass engagement. Another characterization of popular culture worthy of note draws upon the political analysis of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, especially his thesis of “hegemony.” By hegemony, Gramsci means the way in which dominant groups in society are able to win the hearts and souls of subordinate groups through a process of claiming the intellectual and moral highground (Gramsci, 1998a). Gramsci’s cultural theory is useful for our understanding of the political dynamics of popular culture in capitalist society. Other commentators pursuing his approach opine that popular culture represents a site of ideological struggle between subordinate groups in society, through resistance, and dominant groups intent on incorporation and cooptation. Football hooliganism may be seen in this light, for example, as might forms of popular music such as punk rock and rap music which challenge acceptable forms of behaviour and elite institutions. For Gramsci, then, popular culture is not simply an imposed mass culture that re ects the dominant ideology. It is not simply a spontaneously oppositional culture of the masses. In
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actuality, it is a terrain of negotiation and contestation between the subordinate class and the dominant class. It is a terrain of dialogic rela- tions characterized by resistance, incorporation, and cooptation, which are manifestations of popular culture that cruise within a “compromise equilibrium” or “dynamic equilibrium” (Gramsci, 1998a, 1998b). For Gramsci, this movement is a “historical” process, which determines that popular culture be labeled as “popular” at one historical juncture and as some other type of culture at another. This process is also “syn- chronic,” meaning its cultural symbolism moves between resistance and cooptation at any given moment in history. To illustrate this point, it can be noted that the seaside holiday began as an aristocratic pastime, but within the space of one hundred years it had been popularized and become a symbol of popular culture (Storey, 1998). The “com- promise equilibrium” in the theory of hegemony is a dynamic process that can be utilized to explain various types of con ict, such as class con ict within and across popular cultures. The theory of hegemony can also be employed to explicate con icts involving ethnicity, race, gender, generation, sexuality, identity, and so on (Storey, 1998). All of these categories were at different moments in history locked in variants of cultural struggle against the homogenizing forces of incorporation and cooptation of the dominant culture under the sway of globaliza- tion (Storey, 1998). On hegemony, as on patriarchy, Ashley Tellis presents in his essay a critique of the book Mobile Cultures: New Media in Queer Asia, authored by Chris Berry, Fran Martin and Audrey Yue (2003). Tellis chastises the authors for failing to analyze the political economy of sexuality, the dif- ferential power relationship between homosexual partners—differentials that constitute “glocalization” and eulogize the “glocal” as a progressive, impermeable, and resistant space of sexual cultures, thus facilitating supportive transnationalism. Tellis also takes the opportunity to lash out at the book’s authors for portraying the new media as a “crucial site for constituting new Asian sexual identities and communities” or “new forms of queerness,” without due regard to the in uences of external forces, such as unequal access to the Internet. Tellis contends that the authors’ rhetoric and optimism are without basis, and that the new media technologies they discuss can work to merely re-articulate and perpetuate conservative ideologies and practices. Instead, Tellis argues for an alternative perspective. He writes that in India, at least, although the queer political space created on the Internet is among the front-runners in Asia, in practice men sexually desiring men in
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India only further strengthens heterosexual marriage and patriarchy and further marginalizes women, as his research in cyber ethnography clearly demonstrates. By far the most intriguing concept in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is that of articulation. Articulation, for Gramsci and his adherents, is the hallmark of resistance discourses. Articulation embraces a double sense, designating both “to express” and “to join together” (in a suc- cession of events, for example, or in the sense of “connectivity”) (Storey, 1998). Chantal Mouffe (1981) is of the opinion that popular culture is marked by a “process of disarticulation-articulation.” To demonstrate this argument in action, let us take as an example the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. The message in one of the Party’s political broadcasts signi ed a process of “disarticulation of socialism” in Britain as a political movement devoted entirely to economic, social, and political emancipation (Storey, 1998). However, this partisan telecast actually favored the process of “articulation” as a political movement aimed at imposing restraints on individual freedom (Storey, 1998). To press the point further, it will be remembered that the feminist and gay movements have always taken cognizance of the centrality of cultural struggle within the bitterly contested terrain of popular culture. Homosexual and feminist publications have invari- ably included science ction, detective stories, and romantic dramas. These kinds of cultural incursions signal an attempt to articulate popular artistic endeavors for feminist or homosexual identity politics. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can be used to illuminate the ideologi- cal and intellectualized struggle between minority resistance and de facto attempts at incorporation and cooptation, which plays itself out within and across popular literary, artistic, and innovative endeavors. In this way, popular culture is rendered a sophisticated intermingling of different cultural tendencies. In other words, theories of popular culture are actually ideas of the constitution of “the people” (“com- munities,” such as feminist, gay or ethnic communities). Additionally, popular culture stands for nothing other than a contested site for the political construction of “the people” (“communes” and “communities”) and their relation to “the power blocs” (the “center” as opposed to the “periphery”) (Storey, 1998, p. 12).
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Postmodern Culture under Globalization
Under globalization, there appears to be an interpenetration of commerce and culture, or a postmodern blurring of the distinction between “authentic” and “commercial” cultures (Storey, 1998, p. 13). Globalization and postmodernism are closely related. For example, it can be observed today that there is a close relationship between televi- sion commercials and pop music. Pop music thrives in television com- mercials, which illustrates one of the basic points in the debate about the relationship between postmodernism and popular culture. In such a context, the distinction between high culture and popular culture arguably does not matter any more. Postmodernism extols an end to the elitist, hence arbitrary, status of culture. For post-postmodernists, however, the ultimate victory of commerce over culture is an occa- sion for sadness (as it also is for the great faiths of the world, hence their call for re-sacralization—for imbuing culture with something sacred—in the post-postmodern era). This in and of itself represents the commodi cation, hence the objectivization or externalization, of cultural objects for their “use value,” if not entirely for their “surplus value.” It is another way of saying that popular culture is controlled and manipulated by economic elites, despite the fact that popular culture penetrates the broad mass of people worldwide. It has been claimed by many social critics that the implication of commercial-driven popular culture is that its resistance potential is lost to the commercial pro t- motive. Neo-conservatives, on the other hand, aver that such a relationship (popular culture’s warming to globalization) may have a serious inimical effect on “high culture.” The debate in cultural studies goes on and on (Storey, 1998). Both of these critiques of the commercialization of culture, despite their different (hidden) political agendas, demonstrate a crucial facet of the dominant culture in Western societies, which is that the West is not a homogeneous cultural unit, but rather a multi- cultural entity, whose con ict-ridden heterogeneity is hauled along by its globalization dynamics (Berger, 2002, p. 15). As Berger maintains, this con ict-ridden heterogeneity in the West itself demonstrates the in-dwelling cultural forces of economic globalization. In their essay, Jeffrey Wilkinson and Steven McLung advance the argument, based on their empirical study of media convergence, that popular culture, including mass media technologies, is developing with lightening speed in the West, for example, in the US, and in some Asian regions such as Hong Kong. More importantly, Wilkinson and
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McLung stress that their ndings show that gender and age, as well as cultural, differences apply to the term “media convergence” and its usefulness. De ning “media convergence” as the coming together of media and consumer technologies, Wilkinson and McLung indicate the need to rethink the various theories and models of communication that concern the exponential increase in the application rates of the numerous varieties of mass media technologies.
Cultural Revitalization under Globalization and Hybridization
Another way of looking at the possible effect of the economic impera- tives of Western capitalism on its “high culture” (or the “Davo culture,” in Berger’s analysis) is that impinging global forces can also foster a revitalization of ethnic cultural forms (Berger, 2002, p. 10), quite apart from what the “resistance theorists” have said about the loss of opposi- tional possibilities when commerce and popular culture grow too close. According to Berger, the best word to characterize this ethnic cultural implosion is “hybridization,” which refers to the purposeful attempt to mix foreign and native cultural attributes (Berger, 2002, p. 10). This is also when localization shades over into globalization or when what Roland Robertson (1992) termed “glocalization” transpires. Nonethe- less, it has been argued elsewhere that the notion of “hybridization” is more useful as a social phenomenon than as a social fact, because it is actually dif cult to pinpoint if and when hybridization has indeed taken place, if only because cultures since the dawn of mankind have always been mixed. So, hybridzation then becomes the mind-boggling task of ascertaining the genealogy of human evolution, which is often deeply riven by conquests (Chan, 2002). The propositions of cultural hybridization and related cultural creativity have four dimensions (Friedman, 1999): (1) Ethnic cultures are syncretic; (2) such cultures challenge the mainstream and take the upper hand: for example, American pop music, which has become “blacker”, and American lmography, which has become increasingly willing to embrace proscribed themes as was the case with the 2006 Oscar award-winning and critically acclaimed “Brokeback Mountain,” which depicts a homosexual relationship; (3) with the goal of trans- forming society, these minority cultures are now understood as a kind of challenge and dynamism—culture as a composite and challenging force; and (4) transcultural identities have both cosmopolitan and local
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af liations, and, hence, globalization and the need for speci city/eth- nicity can be ful lled within transculturality. In Hannerz’s (1996) view, cosmopolitans and locals have a common interest in the survival of cultural diversity, which is to say that there can be no cosmopolitans without locals. On this topic, contemporary globalization theory argues that globalization comprises the two entirely contradictory processes of homogenization and differentiation, that there is a complex interaction between localism and globalism, and that there are powerful movements of resistance against globalization processes (Marshall, 1998). Also, in a derivative of the fourth dimension above, cosmopolitanism depends on localism, and transcultural people (transmigrants) combine the two to create hybridism. Many of these propositions in cultural studies can be boiled down to the issue of class con ict or the politics of ethnicity. For example, the analysis of “race” and “gender” issues is best understood in Marx- ist/class terms rather than in value-neutral/functionalist terms, and are reducible to a subculture of the current cultural discourse (Friedman, 1999, p. 245). Another perspective on ethnic con ict is that ethnic subcultures can give rise to a substantial transcultural social formation; a hybridized cultural transformation and new forms of communities; a return to ethnic traditions among migrants or a search for one’s roots, which can be described as cultural expansion or re-territorialization driven by a sense of homelessness and homesickness (see, e.g., Inglis, 2000). In a postmodernist world of cultural tumult and social fragmenta- tion, the interaction between ethnicity and modernity holds out the hope of new pathways toward some kind of transethnic, transcultural transcendence of boundaries and border existence, and toward a com- posite social formation (or toward reborn ethnic communities) nested (as distinguished from embedded) within a new global order with a new global culture (Friedman, 1999, p. 247). Such new composites are not just constructed from the cultural mosaic or from Western multicul- turalism, but express themselves as creative and constructive cultural hybridities with the speci c cultural legacy of their past. Or, to add a personal touch to it, I would say: modern strangers are going home at the same time they are away from home, or, to put it paradoxically, cosmopolitans are returning to their cosmopolis in a post-postmodern world without cosmopolis (centers), echoing William Butler Yeats’ pre- diction: “Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold” (cited in Wendy Griswold, 2004, p. 172). On Yeats’ view, Wendy Griswold (2004,
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p. 172) wrote an elegant and eloquent paragraph, which deserves to be quoted at length here: Now at the dawn of a new century, we realize that he (Yeats) was half right. Cultural centers did not hold. We have gone from a bipolar to a polycentric world, from a world of cultural pyramids to a world of multiple and parallel meaning systems. . . . Cultural purity is gone from the face of the earth; it was probably always a myth but now few even pretend to believe in it. We are all hybrids now. . . . At the same time, however, things did not fall apart. Human beings continue to ward off chaos through cultural objects. People continue to perpetuate their cultures through interaction and socialization. People still pick up mass-produced cultural objects and mix them up with their own cultures, thereby individual- izing and transforming the nal cultural product. Our original cultural de nitions still work. People may exist in multiple communities through multiple networks, but along these networks they still share meanings with one another. Communities, whether relational (humanistic) or spa- tial (geographical), still collectively represent themselves through patterns of meanings embodied in symbols, meanings that shape attitudes and actions.” (Italics mine).
Conclusion
Under the in uences of globalization and localization, there has emerged a prevalent social formation based on a hybridized culture in which the cultural norms are many and various: boundary transcendence, alterna- tive cultures, cultural hybridity, cultural creativity, freedom, autonomy, individuality, collectivity, connectivity, tolerance, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism. While the economic forces shaping globalization are powerful and seemingly getting stronger, they are not immutable, nor are their effects predictable or necessarily overwhelming. We are opti- mistic that the socio-cultural formations of the future will be a viable option for constructing global communities of migrants around the world. This proposition presents both an empirical and a theoretical question in studies of diaspora. For example, such cultural norms of newly constituted Chinese diaspora communities throughout the world are generated by the dialectic of cultural identi cation and social con- ict. Examples include racial exclusion and discrimination, which, in Western societies, have prompted a return (or repatriation) to Chinese cultural traditions, neo-fundamentalism or renewed Buddhism and Confucian ethics. These in turn have become increasingly ethnicized in Chinese diaspora communities—re-territorialization in the wake
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of de-territorialization. It is on these diasporic communities that the self-de nition (the self-identity) and cultural expansion of all Chinese migrants depends, and it is with these tools that Chinese migrants are best equipped to navigate the raging torrents of globalization in the new millennium of a post-postmodern era. Globalization brings with it a fear, a sense of loss and demise. It also brings with it opportunity and hope. It is in this spirit that the chapters which follow should be read.
REFERENCES
Archibugi, Daniele and Held, David (eds.) 1995. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Barran, P. and Sweezy, P. 1961. Monopoly Capitalism. Harmondsworth: Pelican. Baudrillard, Jean. 1998. The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. London: Sage Pub- lications. Beck, Ulrich. 1998. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Berger, Peter. 2002. “The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization”, Introduction, in P. Berger and S. Huntington (eds.) Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Con- temporary World. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–16. Berry, Chris, Fran Martin and Audrey Yue (eds.) 2003. Mobile Cultures: New Media in Queer Asia. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Chan, Kwok-bun. 1997. “A Family Affair: Migration, Dispersal, and the Emergent Identity of the Chinese Cosmopolitan”. Diaspora, 6 (2): 195–214. ———. 2002. “Both Sides, Now: Culture Contact, Hybridization, and Cosmopolitan- ism”, in Robin Cohen and Steven Vertovec (eds.) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 191–208. ———. 2005a. Chinese Identities, Ethnicity and Cosmopolitanism. London: Routledge. ———. 2005b. Migration, Ethnic Relations and Chinese Business. London: Routledge. Frankel, Boris. 2001. When the Boat Comes In: Transforming Australia in the Age of Globalisa- tion. Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press. Friedman, Jonathan. 1999. “The Hybridization of Roots and the Abhorrence of the Bush”, in Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (eds.) Spaces of Culture. London: Sage, pp. 230–256. Giddens, Anthony. 2000. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. N.Y.: Routledge. Gramsci, Antonio. 1998a. “Hegemony, Intellectuals, and the State”, in John Storey (ed.) Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, 2nd ed. London: Prentice Hall, pp. 210–216. ———. 1998b. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Griswold, Wendy. 2004 Cultures and Societies in a Changing World. 2nd ed. London: Pine Forge Press. Hannerz, U. 1996. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture” in his Transnational Connections. London: Routledge, pp. 102–111. Inglis, Christine. 2000. “The ‘Rediscovery’ of Ethnicity: Theory and Analysis”, in Quah, Stella and A. Sales (eds.) The International Handbook of Sociology. London: Sage, pp. 151–170.
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Levin, David Michael (ed.) 1997. Language Beyond Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking in Gendlin’s Philosophy. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Luk, Tak Chuen. 2005. “The Poverty of Tourism under Mobilizational Developmental- ism in China” in Chan Kwok-bun (ed.), Special Issue on Chinese Entertainment, Visual Anthropology, Vol. 18, nos. 2 & 3, pp. 257–289. Marshall, G. 1998. A Dictionary of Sociology. N.Y.: Oxford University Press. McLuhan, Marshall and Powers, Bruce R. 1989. The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Mouffe, Chantal. 1981. “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci” in Tony Bennett, et al. (eds.) Culture, Ideology and Social Process. Milton Kupness: Open University Press, pp. 219–234. Quah, Stella and Sales, Arnaud (eds.) (2000) The International Handbook of Sociology. London: Sage. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage. Storey, John (ed.) 1998. Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, 2nd ed. London: Prentice Hall. Varga, Ivan. 2000. “The Challenge of Modernity/Postmodernity to the Classical Heritage in Sociology of Religion”, in Quah, Stella and Arnaud Sales (eds.) The International Handbook of Sociology. London: Sage, pp. 101–121. Wallerstein, Immanuel, M. 1974. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press. ———. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Identity in the Politics of Transition: The Case of Hong Kong, ‘Asia’s World City’
Michael E. DeGolyer
Corporate Identity: The Geography and History of Experience
Geography has not just determined Hong Kong’s destiny or affected its history. Hong Kong exists solely because of a gift of geography: its deep water harbor. There would be no city without that central geographic feature. Hong Kong’s fundamental physical struggle has been with the surrounding sea, to wrest its food from it, to pump sand from it to make land to house its teeming masses, to batten down and shelter against the storms and typhoons which frequent it, and to travel upon it for the trade which is its lifeblood and fount of its wealth. Instead of spurning globalization like its mother country China did so long, the British who wrested the former colony from China by dint of their dominance of the sea established Hong Kong in 1841 as an open port for free trade with all the world. It continues in that role. It came into existence as a shipping port; it continues as one of the largest on earth. Though a giant port, Hong Kong has always been a tiny place under a different system uncomfortably adjacent to a huge continent-sized state which controls the supply of its water, its food, and its main resource other than its harbor: people. Hong Kong’s high, densely packed population has struggled from the rst with scarcity of at, buildable land. Many were willing to tolerate a degree of crowd- ing accepted nowhere else on earth because they regarded it as a way station to elsewhere. A place to make money, hone skills, do business, network and then emigrate to greener, or more appropriately, more golden, pastures: that was Hong Kong, the “borrowed place on bor- rowed time.”1 This history as a waystation of emigration has fostered a network of “overseas Chinese” that has made tiny Hong Kong a
1 See Ronald Skeldon, ed. Emigration from Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995). The phrase is Richard Hughes’ famous description of Hong Kong.
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global nancial and trade powerhouse. (van Kemenade, 1997; Meyer, 2000)2 Unlike the case of France, Hong Kong’s geography and history have made it a driver and victor, not a victim, of globalization. But both have been, as Fernand Braudel argued of France, fundamentally shaped by the forces of landscape, location, size and the past. In The Identity of France, the great historian Braudel asserted geog- raphy explained much about the culture and mindsets of the French. France, when compared to states like China, Russia, Canada, Brazil, the US or India is not that geographically sizeable. But it is one of the largest states in Europe, and until 1795 it was the most populous European state, even over Russia. France was also one of the earli- est countries, and at the time the biggest, to become a nation-state. Indeed, nationalism as an ideology and the self-identity of oneself as a ‘citizen’ of a nation arose in 18th century France. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994) The notion of state authority and power ran up against France’s size, population and geographic diversity. The primitive level of the technologies of communication and travel in the 17th to 18th centuries, the time of the rise of the nation-state as a form of political and international order, mitigated against the erection of a powerful centralized government. (Brubaker, 1996) Despite centuries of effort to centralize France from Paris, to the point that a Minister of Education boasted once that at any given time in the school day he knew precisely where every teacher in France was in that hour’s lesson, the diversity of the land and the people, the stubborn insistence, as Braudel put it, “for every community to avoid being confused with the next tiny ‘patrie,’ to remain other” is what makes France and the French what they are. “Throughout its history,” Braudel insisted, this underlying ‘plural’ France has been contradicting the ‘one’ France which has dominated it, controlled it, sought to blur its individualities while unfairly monopolizing the limelight and the attention of traditional history. Whereas France is not one, but many . . . (trans. Braudel and Reynolds, 1988, pp. 40–42) Braudel wanders over the face of French diversity, tracing in it the contours of French identity. In their geography lie many of the chal- lenges of French history. That history and geography comprise the ever-renewing sources and the very continuities of French identity, Braudel argued.
2 Hong Kong’s stock exchange is 8th in the world by capitalization, just behind Germany, a country 10 times its population.
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Geography and Hong Kong Identity
So too with Hong Kong and its people. If anything, the geography and history of Hong Kong has been a stronger factor in forming its people’s culture, mindsets and identity than that of France, or at least that of the 21st century France in which the Channel Tunnel and bul- let trains connect every part of France and France with every part of Europe in a network of commerce and travel in which mere minutes or a handful of hours separate one region from another. Connectivity, communication and globalization are, to the fury of many French, transforming, perhaps even erasing, the diverse France that Braudel so lovingly recounted. These same forces—history, geography, diversity within an even larger centralizing state, communication and globaliza- tion—played a major role in the formation of Hong Kong. Geographic location has, perhaps most of all, determined the culture and mindset of Hong Kongers. Hong Kong has always been part of China but always separate from it, and for over half a century—1950–2003—Hong Kong’s border with that dominating state was closed either fully or partially.3 Hong Kong, forcibly carved from Imperial China’s ank by the British conquerors, like any adult abandoned by a parent at birth, has had an uncomfortable relationship with its cultural motherland since its return to Chinese sovereignty in mid-1997.4 The chosen, of cial phrase characterizing its reuni cation, ‘one country, two systems’ is both a promise and a description which is even now under negotiation and elaboration as the boundaries of the one country and the dynamics of democratization promised to an uncomfortably incompatible system come into dispute.5
3 The border was closed and trade with China highly restricted from 1950 to 1978. The border remained closed to all traf c for about seven hours a night until January 2003, and not until late 2003 were greatly restricted numbers of mainland Chinese permitted to enter Hong Kong individually, and then were required to obtain a special visa to do so. 4 Michael E. DeGolyer, “Legitimacy and Leadership in Post-British Hong Kong,” in Robert Ash, et al., eds. Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003),139ff “Pre-handover views of reunion”; see also Suzanne Pepper, “Hong Kong and the reconstruction of China’s political order,” in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds. Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 20–66. 5 See Michael E. DeGolyer, “Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses,” (Hong Kong: Civic Exchange, 2004). Available: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp and http://www. civic-exchange.org.
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One country is a geographic assertion of unity; two systems is an acknowledgement of historical diversity. The ongoing dispute over these two givens is a political reality shaping Hong Kong’s future role in China and the world. The complex dynamics of these fundamental realities of this uncomfortable, advantageous, dangerous, competitive, evanescent and protean environment means that Hong Kongers have always had to live by their wits, hone their ability to make a deal, and survive if not pro t from their endangering yet vital and enriching proximity to ‘mother’ China.6 The land and the sea thus comprise the inseparable yin and yang of Hong Kong’s character. The sea and the struggle for survival upon and from it have rendered Hong Kong and Hong Kongers what they are. There is not much land to Hong Kong, and when it was originally founded in 1841 it was only one island surrounded by sea. Not until the 1960s and 1970s was Hong Kong Island connected rst by undersea road tunnel, then rail tunnel, to the Kowloon Peninsula to which it had expanded rst in the 1860s and then well beyond that to the New Territories in 1898. Sea-based travel was so vital to everyday survival that one of the biggest civil disturbances in Hong Kong’s history was sparked by a 10 cent rise in charges by Star Ferry in 1966, then the only means to cross from Kowloon to the island. This sea-dominated history and geography has even, perhaps, to account for Hong Kongers scoring highest in the world on IQ tests.7 While some of that high IQ has come from a nearly merciless process of natural selection (Hong Kong long had little to no government assistance and to this day has only the most minimal of safety nets for the unemployed), a diet heavy in sh and other seafood may have played some role.8 But without doubt, Hong Kong’s geography and its
6 See Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: HarperCollins, 1993) and also the documents detailing the economic aspects and often stormy relations with mainland China in David Faure and Lee Pui-tak, eds. Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004). 7 “Hong Kong ranks top in IQ world survey,” The Standard (23 Dec 2003) avail- able: http://www.thestandard.com.hk/thestandard/news_detail_frame.cfm?articleid= 44213&intcatid=1 An Oxford University study underway has reported initial results buttressing the role of oils found abundantly in seafoods with improved brain perfor- mance. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/3146574.stm reported by the BBC 23 September 2003 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1985548.stm reported 13 May 2002. 8 See also Birch E.E., Birch D.G., Hoffman D.R., et al., “Visual maturation of term infants fed omega 3 long chain polyunsaturated fatty acid (LCPUFA) supplemented
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location have molded its attitudes in everything from food preferences to government priorities to personal identity. The only question is to what degree. How may we measure such?
Measuring the Effects: Birthplace and History
Combining the aspects above—food, attitudes toward government and personal identity—a study conducted by the author in 2001 for Civic Exchange on environmental attitudes found that government priorities by cultural and political or patriotic self-identity manifested distinct pat- terns. The analytic framework within which are couched these prefer- ences and other survey results relevant to our overarching question of how Hong Kongers’ identity formed and how it affects attitudes toward democracy and government needs elucidation.9
formula.” ARVO Meeting 1996, New York; Farquharson J., Cockburn F., W.A., Jamieson E.C., Logan R.W. “Infant cerebral cortex phospholipid fatty-acid composi- tion and diet.” Lancet 340 (1992): 810–813; Florey C. Du V., Leech A.M., Blackhall A. “Infant feeding and mental and motor development at 18 months of age in rst born singletons.” International Journal of Epidemiology 1995;24:S21–26 and Martinez M.J. “Tissue levels of polyunsaturated fatty acids during early human development.” Journal of Pediatrics 120 (1992): 129–138. 9 Analysis of the Civic Exchange report by Michael E. DeGolyer, Professor of Government and International Studies and Director of the Hong Kong Transition Project. Survey questionnaire developed by Christine Loh, Executive Director Civic Exchange, Y.Y. Yip of Civic Exchange, Michael DeGolyer and P.K. Cheung, Research Assistant, of the Hong Kong Transition Project. Survey conducted and supervised by P.K. Cheung. Civic Exchange, an independent Hong Kong based policy research think tank directed by Christine Loh, and the Hong Kong Transition Project, a long term multi-university research project directed by Michael DeGolyer, collaborated in this survey on constitutional reform issues and process, funded by an anonymous donation to Civic Exchange. At a 95% con dence level, the range of error is plus or minus 4 points. The completion rate for the November 2003 survey was 28% of those contacted by telephone. As the project uses the Kish table to randomly identify the correspondents desired and then schedules a callback if that respondent is not at home, the comple- tion rate tends to be lower but the randomization of responses (needed for accurate statistics) tends to be higher than surveys that interview readily available respondents. Respondents were interviewed in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and other dialects as they preferred and as interviewers with the language skills needed were avail- able. Other surveys referred to above are Hong Kong Transition Project surveys. The demographic and methodological details of those surveys and reports can be found on the Hong Kong Transition Project website at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp Further details about Civic Exchange may be found at http://www.civic-exchange.org. The number of respondents in the Hong Kong Transition Project surveys.
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Birthplace is a standard demographic variable but one which has additional signi cance in Hong Kong.10 Technically, those born here since the 1 July 1997 reversion to PRC sovereignty are considered born in China, while those Hong Kongers born in mainland China are tech- nically now merely residents in a different part of the same country. However, birthplace has much greater identity shaping signi cance in the Hong Kong of today than in states such as the US. As Hong Kong does not determine citizenship by birthplace (again unlike many other countries), we begin the analytical framework by explaining the nature of this normally simple variable. The 2001 census indicated 59.7 percent of those normally residing in Hong Kong were born in the SAR, and that 85.1 percent of the population in 2001 had been resident seven years or more. Seven years residency is the minimum to qualify for permanent residency and the right to vote. The November 2003 sur- vey referenced may be taken as representative of that 85 percent who are or are quali ed to be citizens, not of all residing in Hong Kong. There is a large population of domestic helpers and expatriates and a signi cant number of recent mainland emigrants (approximately a million people). These have been excluded for the sake of examining
N = Nov 91 902 Feb 93 615 Aug 93 609 Feb 94 636 Aug 94 640 Feb 95 647 Aug 95 645 Feb 96 627 July 96 928 Dec 96 326 Feb 97 546 June 97 1,129 Jan 98 700 April 98 852 June 98 625 July 98 647 Oct 98 811 Apr 99 838 July 99 815 Nov 99 813 Apr 00 704 Aug 00 625; Aug 00 1059 Oct 00 721 Nov 00 801 Apr 01 830 June 01 808 July (media) 831 July (party) 1029 Nov 01 759 Apr 02 751 Aug 02 721 Nov 02 814 June 03 776 Nov 03 835 Dec 03 815
All gures are in percentages unless otherwise stated. All references should be to Civic Exchange and the Hong Kong Transition Project, which has project members at the Hong Kong Baptist University, the University of Hong Kong, the University of Macau and Lingnan University. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competi- tive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2033/01H) and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein. 10 The framework discussion is adapted from “Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses,” a report written by the author on constitutional reform commissioned by Civic-Exchange and conducted by the Hong Kong Transition Project in November 2003. The report is available in English and Chinese at http://www.civic-exchange.org and http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp. See end of this paper for details of surveys.
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the identity of Hong Kongers, not just in the sense of residing here, but in the sense of those who have established permanent residency or taken up citizenship. Of this group, the permanent residents surveyed, 73 percent said they were born in Hong Kong, 23 percent in mainland China, and 4 percent born elsewhere. Just because someone is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or even born here does not mean that they identify themselves as Hong Kongers. The survey asked 836 randomly selected permanent resident respondents how they classi- ed themselves—as expatriates, mainland migrants or professionals, returnees after an extended time abroad, or as Hong Kongers or ‘other’ classi cations. We referred to this form of identity as cultural af liation or simply cultural identity. We also asked another identity question (see below) which we refer to as the patriotic identity. These two forms of self-classi ed identity show distinct differences.11 Just 12 percent of permanent residents identi ed themselves in some other way than as Hong Kongers, indicating birthplace is not the only means by which permanent residents form an attachment that is suf- cient to identify themselves as primarily Hong Kongers. Table 2 shows reclassi cation of responses due to the need for a minimum number of respondents in each analytic category. Other surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project with more respondents have shown return- ees to have response patterns broadly aligned more with expatriate response patterns than with Hong Kongers or mainlanders. Thus, the 18 returnee respondents are grouped with the expatriate and ‘other’ identities of Table 1.12 Birthplace is the strongest factor in uencing identity, even though a majority of those born elsewhere (53%) also identify themselves primar- ily as Hong Kongers. Of those born in Hong Kong, 6 percent describe themselves as having an expatriate, other or returnee identi cation,
11 See http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp. 12 See, for example, Michael E. DeGolyer, “Western Exposure, China Orientation: The effects of foreign ties and experience on Hong Kong,” in Peter Koehn and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, eds., The Outlook for US-China Relations following the 1997–98 Summits (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999), pp. 297–323. Other Hong Kong Transition Reports discussing, among other things, this aspect are available at http://www.hkbu. edu.hk/~hktp. See also Kenneth L. Dion and Karen K. Dion, “Chinese Adaptation to Foreign Cultures,” in Michael H. Bond, ed., The Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 457–478. This reclassi ed table is used for signi cance of association testing.
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Table 1: Identity Self-classi cation Group No. % Expatriate 14 2 Chinese mainland migrant 38 5 Mainland professional 4 — Grew up in HK, returned from abroad 18 2 Hong Konger 734 88 Other 28 3
Table 2: Reclassi ed Identity Categories Group No. % Expatriate, other and returnee identity 60 7 Mainlander identity 42 5 Hong Konger identity 734 88
Table 3: Self-description Group No. % Hong Kong Chinese 226 27 Chinese 182 22 Hong Kong person 365 44 Hong Kong British 16 2 Overseas Chinese 13 2 Other 34 4
94 percent as Hong Konger. Of those born in mainland China, 75 percent identify themselves as Hong Kongers in the af liation identity question asked at the beginning of the questionnaire.13 Fifty-three per- cent of those born elsewhere chose Hong Konger identity. The second form of identity, patriotic identity, was identi ed from responses to a question providing an alternative list from which respondents were asked to select the most appropriate description of themselves.
13 A returnee is one of the half million or so who emigrated during the 1980s and 1990s in prospect of 1997 and then, after the 1997 reuni cation returned to Hong Kong with a foreign passport. Since most had to meet minimum residency require- ments of ve years on average and all had signi cant time living abroad, their identity underwent profound changes, as shown below. Expatriates include many ethnic Chinese, a signi cant proportion born in Hong Kong or China, who consider themselves foreign citizens or expatriates, even though Hong Kong or China is their native land.
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50 B Chinese 45 H H H H H H H H HHH H HHH H J HK Chinese 40 J H J H H JH H H HK people 35 JH H H H HJJ F HK British 30 BBB B J H J J J J B B BJ JJ JJ J JJB B J Ñ Overseas Chinese 25 JB J B B B J JJJB B B B B B B É Others 20 B B B B B B J B 15 10 F F F F F F 5 F F FF F FF F É ÉÉFFÑÑÑÑÉÉF F ÉF ÉÉF ÑÑÑÉÉÉÉÉFFF F FFFÉ Ñ 0 ÉÉÉÉÉÉ ÉÉ ÉÉÑÑÑÑÑÑÉ É ÑÑÑÑÑÉ Jan 98 Jan July 96 July July 99 July Feb 93 Feb 94 Feb 95 Feb 96 Feb 97 Feb Apr 00 Oct 98 July 98 July Apr 99 Apr 98 Nov 99 Nov 00 Nov Aug 93 Aug 94 Aug 95 Aug 00 June 97 June July 2001 July Apr 2002 Apr Nov 2001 Nov Aug 2002 Aug Nov 2002 Nov Nov 2003 Nov April 2001 April
Chart 1: Most Appropriate Description: Trends
The replies to the patriotic identity question above have been remark- ably stable after a period of considerable uctuation before and just after the 1 July 1997 handover, as Table 4 below and Chart 1 indicate. We refer to this form of identity as patriotic because it has been shown in many previous analyses to be strongly correlated to other questions probing the degree of patriotism felt by respondents.14 As Chart 1 shows, patriotic identity has a strong association with birthplace, but 28 percent of those born outside Hong Kong or China identify themselves as Chinese, whereas a third (not much less than the 44 percent for the whole sample) identify themselves as Hong Kong people. Identity in the case of Hong Kong is not a simple matter of birthplace or even nominal nationality or ethnicity. The chart shows, being born in Hong Kong makes one more likely to identify oneself as a Hong Kong person, but age also makes a dif- ference, as Table 4 shows. Analysis by age group shows that among those 20 to 59, or those who lived almost wholly during Hong Kong’s time of most complete isolation from the mainland, 1950–1978, and those who came of age during the disputes and negotiations over Hong Kong’s return, 1982–1997, were more likely to identify themselves as Hong Kong people. Those 70 and
14 See the Hong Kong Transition Project website http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp for earlier reports examining this aspect.
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Table 4: Patriotic Identity by Birthplace Hong Kong China Elsewhere Total born born Hong Kong Chinese 26 34 11 27 Chinese 19 32 28 22 Hong Kong person 49 30 33 44 Overseas Chinese, 7 5 28 7 Hong Kong British, other Total 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 52.37 with 6 df p 0.0001
Table 5: Patriotic Identity by Age Group 18–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–85 Total HK Chinese 36 32 25 28 25 33 19 28 Chinese 14 14 24 23 22 20 45 22 Hong Kong 38 50 44 44 48 33 31 43 person Overseas 1258661357 Chinese, HK British, other Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 32.46 with 18 df p = 0.0194
older, almost all born in China, were more likely to identify themselves as Chinese. Until 1997, only those who came of age in the late 1950s and 1960s, a period of intense anti-colonialism but also the start of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, tended to identity themselves as Hong Kong Chinese. Those forming their views as young adults at this time seem to have be repulsed from identifying themselves as plain Chinese or Hong Kongers, choosing a mixed label instead (these people are now in their 50s and 60s). This perspective may be return- ing among those in their teens and early 20s, the people forming their views under the uncertainties of ‘one country, two systems.’ Living outside and being born in Hong Kong rather than the main- land has a distinct impact on many aspects of identity and opinion. Nearly one in four citizens (23 percent) have such overseas experience. One in 10 surveyed in November 2003 had the right of abode in
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another country (and 44 percent had family members and close relatives living abroad with the right of abode, excluding those in Taiwan and Macau). The experience of Hong Kongers with overseas entities, either living in or having right of abode there, or living there for extended periods, or by visiting close relatives living there, is considerable.15 This direct experience with alternative forms of governance by so many lays a substantial basis for many Hong Kongers to compare their form of government and the conduct of their of cials with others.
Forming a Distinct Identity of Its Own
Having established the effects of birthplace and of history on identity in general, the tables and charts below show how these two aspects come together with Hong Kong’s geography and its trade-oriented behavior such as food consumption to form key aspects of its distinct- ness.16 Differences in cultural identity show up in a wide array both on preferences for what priorities respondents prefer government to assign particular issues, and the priorities those issues receive as personal concerns. In each category below, the rst column represents those who assign the issue top priority. The second column is the combined top plus medium priority. This is where signi cant differences emerge. For example, no cultural identity group differs much in terms of the extent to which it would like the government to assign top priority to pesticides in vegetables. The problem of pesticides in mainland-grown food, where controls over such chemicals are rudimentary, has been an ongoing one because so much local fresh produce comes from the main- land. However, in combined priority, only 75 percent of mainlanders gave that issue high priority versus 89% of expatriates/returnees. The difference is more dramatic on contaminated seafood, the top prior- ity for the great majority of expatriates/returnees. While 75 percent
15 The unusual nature of the Hong Kong family is discussed in William T. Liu, “Hong Kong Family in Transition: Will 1997 make a difference?” In Hong Kong in Transition 1992 (Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute, 1993), pp. 562–580. 16 The discussion of environmental issues over the next few pages is based on DeGolyer (December 2001) “Taking Charge and Cleaning Up: the search for a greener environment in the Hong Kong SAR,” (Hong Kong: Civic Exchange) available at http://www.civic-exchange.org and http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp The number of respondents to this survey was 830.
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of expatriates/returnees identi ed this issue as a top priority, only 45 percent of mainlanders agreed, and while 91 percent of expatriates/ returnees identi ed it as a high priority (top and medium combined), just 67 percent of mainlanders did so. In some real sense, those who call themselves returnees and expatriates are the most typically ‘Hong Kong’ in identity in the sense that they have identi ed themselves as returnees and expatriates even though they are permanent residents or even born in Hong Kong. They have moved abroad, traveled and traded and become so globalized in outlook that they see Hong Kong as a chosen base and optional af liation, not as the only home they have ever known. Expatriates/returnees and Hong Kongers seemed to rank issues more closely together than did mainlanders and Hong Kongers.
Table 6: Comparative Government Priorities by Cultural Identity
Expat/Returnee Hong Konger Mainlander
Issue Top Top/ Top Top/ Top Top/ Average priority Medium Priority Medium Priority Medium of all (Top)
Pesticides in 68 89 69 87 67 75 69 vegetables Contaminated 75 91 63 81 45 67 63 seafood Drinking water 62 92 63 81 50 65 62 pollution Littering & 57 84 51 80 50 68 52 hygiene Seawater 56 84 46 80 37 75 46 pollution Lack of land ll 41 79 47 75 30 55 45 space Illegal trade 44 79 43 71 47 67 43 in endangered species Noise pollution 43 78 42 79 35 62 42 Global 51 71 41 66 35 52 41 warming Indoor air 19 63 28 65 38 60 28 pollution
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Table 7: Differences in Comparative Priorities by Cultural Identity
Top priority Top priority Top priority Expat/returnees Hong Kongers Mainlanders
Issue Top Issue Top Issue Top priority priority priority
Contaminated 75 Pesticides in 69 Pesticides in 67 seafood vegetables vegetables Pesticides in 68 Contaminated 63 Drinking water 50 vegetables seafood pollution Drinking water 62 Drinking water 63 Littering & 50 pollution pollution hygiene Littering & hygiene 57 Littering & 51 Illegal trade in 47 hygiene endangered species Seawater pollution 56 Lack of land ll 47 Contaminated 45 space seafood Global warming 51 Seawater 46 Indoor air 38 pollution pollution Illegal trade in 44 Illegal trade 43 Seawater 37 endangered species in endangered pollution species Noise pollution 43 Noise pollution 42 Noise pollution 35 Lack of land ll 41 Global warming 41 Global warming 35 space Indoor air 19 Indoor air 28 Lack of land ll 30 pollution pollution space
In terms of concern about effects on personal health and well-being, 9 of 15 issues revealed signi cant differences due to cultural identi cation. On six issues—noise, drinking water, sea water pollution, loss and degradation of green areas, overpopulation and crowding, and the mainland’s environmental problems—there were no signi cant differ- ences in degree of concern. Concerns certainly affect behavior, but just as certainly behavior affects concerns. This can clearly be seen with the priorities assigned to the contaminated seafood issue, such as how often respondents eat seafood. Expatriates and returnees tended to eat fresh seafood every day far more often than any other group, whereas a majority of mainlanders said they never ate seafood. Hong Kongers by identity, and especially
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Table 8: Comparative Concerns by Cultural Identity Expat/ Hong Main- Returnee Konger lander Issue Great Great/ Great Great/ Great Great/ Average deal Some deal Some deal Some all (Great deal) Pesticides in 68 91 53 82 48 77 54 vegetables Outdoor air 56 89 50 88 43 80 50 pollution Littering & hygiene 51 81 48 84 40 72 48 Contaminated 65 89 45 80 30 63 46 seafood Indoor air pollution 43 82 43 83 35 67 43 Global warming 37 76 29 65 18 48 29 Genetically 40 73 27 62 27 58 28 modi ed food Lack of land ll 24 59 26 61 13 35 25 space Coastline 18 67 22 59 17 45 21 reclamation
Table 9: How Often Do You Eat Fresh Seafood? Expatriates/ Hong Mainlanders Average Returnees Kongers Nearly every day 5 1 0 1 Once or twice a week 22 8 8 9 Once or twice a month 24 22 12 22 A few times a year 22 31 25 30 Never 27385539
Chi-square = 32.64 with 8 df p 0.0001
those born here (not all who call themselves Hong Kongers were born here), eat seafood far more often than mainlanders born well inland. Here, geography as well as habits of the table and habits of trade and travel truly bear out the adage that you are what you eat.
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Seafood consumption evinces and demonstrates Hong Kong’s distinc- tion with the mainland. The old slogan that Hong Kong is the Pearl of the Orient seems far more apt to its identity and character than the insipid sloganeering of the Tourism Board (Hong Kong: City of Life; Asia’s World City; Hong Kong: Love it, Live it; and so on). The pearl is a jewel born of the sea, created by an oyster secreting minerals around an irremovable irritant. The pearl and the oyster almost per- fectly characterize the essence of the Hong Kong-China relationship, and encapsulate the origins as well as advantages of ‘one country, two systems.’ The jewel is a precious irritant, too valuable and too dif cult to expel, so the one shell becomes shared between the living mollusk and the tiny irritant. The differences are fundamental, but the relationship is organic and inseparable. Such is, not are, Hong Kong and mainland China. These fundamental relations and equally fundamental distinc- tions have formed the attitudes of Hong Kongers toward their local government and what is now their national government.
Identity and Politics: Between Worlds or in a World of Their Own?
The formation of Hong Kong’s corporate identity and the formation of personal political preferences are also part and parcel of one another. Birthplace, right of abode elsewhere and having family members over- seas and identity preferences both cultural and patriotic have effects on political attitudes of permanent residents. Table 13 takes one of the continuing questions posed, and presents the overall trends on the issue of the performance of the Hong Kong Government. As can be read- ily seen in the chart, trend lines show a fundamental transformation occurred in attitudes with the change of sovereignty in 1997. Before 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was in effect ruled by a condominium of locals and British of cials. The British were often long-term expatri- ates or China or colonial specialists who occupied most of the top of ces in government. But, side by side with these foreigners and often in roles in which they exercised the real power, were local Chinese civil servants. These civil servants were characterized by ‘patriotic’ local Chinese as collaborators. Tensions between the colonialists and patriots burst into ames during the 1960s, when scores died and hundreds were injured in riots and bombings that went on for months. In the 1970s and 1980s the system of governance became far more open and participatory, and from 1982 onward elections increasingly determined government
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80 1 B Satisfied B 1 70 11 B B 1 1 Dissatisfied 60 1 1 B B B 11 1 1 H Don’t know B B 1 1 1 50 B 1 1 B 1 1 1B B B BB1 40 1 B B B 1 1 B B B B B 30 1 1 B B B 11 1 1 H B B BB 20 1 1 B H H HH H 10 H H H HHH H H H HH H HHH HH H H H H H H H H 0 Jan 98 Sep 95 Feb 97 Feb 95 Feb 93 Oct 98 Oct 00 Feb 94 Feb 96 Feb Apr 98 July 96 July 98 July 99 Apr 00 Aug 93 Aug 00 Aug 94 Nov 99 Nov 00 June 97 June 98 April 99 pril 2002 July 2001 Nov 2001 Aug 2002 Nov 2003 Nov 2002 June 2001 June 2003 April 2001 A Chart 2: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with the Local Government Performance
representation. By the 1990s before the handover, as Chart 2 shows, Hong Kongers had on the whole become quite satis ed with the perfor- mance of what was nominally a foreign government but was in reality one more sensitive to their wishes than the one touted by Beijing as ful lling their promise of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’. The intensity of dissatisfaction had risen too, with only 1 percent (9 people out of 836 surveyed in November 2003) very satis ed, 19 percent satis ed, 45 percent dissatis ed and 30 percent very dissatis- ed with the government’s performance. Excluding those who did not know and reclassifying the very satis ed with the satis ed, shows 21 percent satis ed to any degree, 47 percent dissatis ed and 31 percent very dissatis ed. Birthplace has some association with satisfaction with government performance, being strongest in explaining satisfaction than dissatisfaction. While 81 percent of Hong Kong born were dissatis ed with the government’s performance, this dropped to 72 percent of those born in mainland China and elsewhere. But as Chart 3 indicates, age and education level are more strongly associated with level of satisfaction with government performance. Teenagers and those 50 and above had higher levels of satisfaction than the overall sample average. Those in their 30s and 40s had much higher levels of very dissatis ed than other groups. Only those 70 and above show a majority satis ed. In part, these patterns can be explained by workforce participation. Those in the workforce have the most stress put upon them by policies that have
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100 Satis ed 90 Dissatis ed 80 70 Very dissatis ed
60
50 40 30
20
10
0 18–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–85 total Chart 3: Satisfaction with Local Government Performance by Age Group
90 Dissatis ed 80 Satis ed 70
60
50
40 Lines indicate general 30 tendency for dissatisfaction to 20 increase and satisfaction to decrease with rising 10 level of education 0 Form 1–3 Form 4–5 Form 6–7 Form No formal Primary 1–6 Univ & Post-grad Chart 4: Satisfaction with Local Government Performance by Education Level
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pushed down wages by keeping immigration high and by bringing in professionals from the mainland and elsewhere under special programs. But youth may also have been affected by changes in educational prac- tices. The Tung government pushed ag ying and national anthem singing in the schools in an attempt to raise levels of patriotism among Hong Kongers. This program may be having some effect, but nearly seven years after handover, that effect seems minimal. Although age and education level are strongly associated (see the demographics section at end), the correlation of dissatisfaction with education can be seen in Chart 4 quite clearly. Post-graduate and tertiary levels are collapsed because only 17 respondents had post- graduate degrees, too few to analyze separately, and are charted by levels of satisfaction with the performance of the government (also collapsed into satis ed or dissatis ed to clarify the relationship). One consequence of higher education is that better educated citizens have more con dence in their abilities, including their ability to participate in the making of community and governmental decisions. In turn, better educated citizens expect better performance from government leaders than the less educated. Part I showed trade has played a major role in formation of identity. What one does certainly affects one’s outlook. The data show despite the theory that since 1997 Hong Kong has been run by businessmen for businessmen—with a ‘representative’ system that ensures not only disproportionate numbers of professionals and business people among Legco members, but gives them multiple levels of veto—managers and administrators as well as professionals/associate professionals show the highest proportion of dissatisfaction, whereas retirees show the highest proportion of satisfaction with government. The old bedrock of gov- ernment authority, business and professionals, has clearly been eroded, with only 13 percent of that category and 14 percent of professionals/ associate professionals satis ed with government performance. Even a larger proportion of the unemployed are satis ed than managers and administrators and professionals, indicating the argument that high unemployment is behind the government’s ‘unpopularity’ is not based in fact. Government gained most approval from retirees and those 70 and above, and the second most approval from students. Both groups are the least involved in the economy. As Chart 6 shows, more managers and administrators were very dissatis ed with the government than any other group. One in ve of those very dissatis ed were managers and administrators, well above
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100 90 Satis ed 80 Dissatis ed 70 Very dissatis ed 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Sales Total Clerk Retired Housewife Professional Unemployed Ag, Fish Craft Ag, Manager/Admin Students/Educators Chart 5: Satisfaction with Local Government Performance by Occupation
100 Students/Educators 90 80 Unemployed 70 Retired 60 50 Housewife 40 Ag, & Fish, Craft, Machine Operators 30 Service & Sales 20 10 Clerks/Secretaries 0 Very dissatis ed Dissatis ed Satis ed Professionals/Assoc Prof Managers/Administrators
Chart 6: Occupations of Those Dissatis ed and Satis ed with Local Government Performance
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the 13 percent of the sample that the occupational category comprises. Retirees make up nearly the same proportion of those satis ed with the government’s performance, 19 percent, far outweighing their overall sample proportion of just 9 percent. The measure to remember while examining Chart 6 is that just 22 percent were satis ed with government performance, meaning although retirees make up small proportions of the very dissatis ed and dissatis- ed columns, in actuality 53 percent of all retirees were very dissatis ed or dissatis ed. This is a key nding. The assumption was that turning Hong Kong over to business people, giving them a disproportionate in uence in the Legco and making sure the initial Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was a businessman, would virtually guarantee support of business people for government. With 88 percent of administrators and managers and 86 percent of professionals and associate professionals saying that they were dissatis ed or very dissatis ed with government, this cannot be assumed. Another assumption was that public sector (civil service and quasi-public services like the Airport Authority and the Hospital Authority) would continue to support the government. For the rst two years this was the case, but support among public sector workers declined under Tung and rose after the British-trained civil servant Donald Tsang took over in mid-2005. After pay cuts and job losses in the public sector, one would suspect workers in the public sector would be more dissatis ed with government than those in the private sector, and in terms of intensity of dissatisfaction, the assump- tion is correct. However, in terms of proportions satis ed, the private and public sectors are nearly the same. Only the non-workforce sec- tor—students, housewives, retirees and the unemployed—showed more satisfaction than the other two sectors. Cultural identity (see Part I above) makes a difference in satisfac- tion with government as the small group of permanent residents who identify themselves with the mainland show distinctly less dissatisfaction than Hong Kongers and much more satisfaction. This has continued through surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005 under the new leader- ship.17 While a third of those who identify themselves as being Hong Kongers were very dissatis ed, only 8 percent of mainlanders and 24 percent of expatriates/others were very dissatis ed. And while one third of mainlanders and 29 percent of expatriates/others were satis ed, only
17 See the Hong Kong Transition Project website for updated reports.
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Table 10: Satisfaction with Government Performance by Sector Public Private Non- Total working Very dissatis ed 40 33 27 31 Dissatis ed 42 50 45 47 Satis ed 19 17 28 22 Total 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 14.22 with 4 df p = 0.0066
Table 11: Experience Living Outside Hong Kong for 1 year or More by Cultural Identity Yes No Total Expatriate/Other 16 5 7 Mainlander 9 4 5 Hong Konger 75 92 88 Total 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 40.65 with 2 df p 0.0001
one in ve Hong Kongers felt the same. However, among all groups, dissatisfaction considerably outweighed satisfaction. Cultural identity was strongly associated with experience living abroad and with right of abode in another country. Of the 23 percent of the 836 respondents who had lived outside Hong Kong for one year or more, 16 percent identify themselves as expatriates and 75 percent called themselves Hong Kongers. But even 5 percent of those who have not lived outside Hong Kong for a year or more (remembering that this survey was of permanent residents with at least 7 years of residency or birth in Hong Kong), characterized themselves as expatriates or others. Table 12 reverses the dependent variable to show that of those who identi ed themselves as expatriates, 49 percent had not lived outside Hong Kong. This cultural identity was not formed solely by experience or birth, but among a fairly signi cant number by voluntary af nity. It seems possible that many of those who designate themselves as expa- triates who are natives and have never lived outside Hong Kong do so because of family ties, cultural choice or even legal designation as ‘foreign’ citizens despite never having left Hong Kong and having been born here. Until well after 1997 some South Asians, Indians, Nepalese
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Table 12: Cultural Identity by Living Outside Hong Kong for 1 Year or More Expatriate/ Mainlander Hong Konger Total Other Yes 51 43 19 23 No 49 57 81 77 Total 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 40.65 with 2 df p 0.0001
Table 13: Patriotic Identity by Experience Living Outside HK for 1 year or More Chinese HK Chinese Hong HK British, Total Konger Overseas Chinese, other Yes 24 25 19 34 23 No 76 75 81 66 77 Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 8.724 with 3 df p = 0.0332
and Vietnamese boat people who were granted asylum here (but born in detention camps) were legally permanent residents but not granted citizenship. However, the number is so small that those who fall into this group cannot account for a signi cant proportion of those who have not lived outside Hong Kong who call themselves expatriates. Even those with right of abode abroad show that cultural identity choices are not the same as legal nationality. Of those who called themselves expatriates, a majority did not have right of abode else- where. Of those calling themselves Hong Kongers, 8 percent had right of abode elsewhere. No mainlanders had right of abode abroad. Patriotic identity shows similar patterns to cultural identity. Of those identifying themselves as Hong Kong British, overseas Chinese and other, two thirds had not lived outside Hong Kong. Nearly one in ve who called themselves Hong Kongers had lived elsewhere for a length of time. And even 76 percent who called themselves Chinese had not lived on the mainland a year or more. Identity, cultural and patriotic, seems to be a choice similar to food preferences or brand loyalties, not
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Table 14: Patriotic Identity by Satisfaction with Performance of HKG Chinese HK Hong HK British, Total Chinese Konger Overseas Chinese, other Very dissatis ed 33 25 35 35 32 Dissatis ed 41 53 47 45 47 Satis ed 26 23 18 21 21 Satis ed 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 11.35 with 6 df p = 0.0781
legal origins or even experience. This, perhaps more than anything else, demonstrates Hong Kong’s globalized perspective in which the whole world, not just China or Hong Kong, is home. This patriotic identity does demonstrate that those who identify themselves as Chinese (predominately the aged and teenagers) are more satis ed with the performance of the local government than by those who identify themselves as Hong Kongers, but the association is not strong, indicating patriotism toward the mainland has less to do with people’s dissatisfaction. The call for ‘patriots’ to support the Hong Kong government still has some in uence, but increasingly those who identify themselves as Chinese do not necessarily agree that it means expressing satisfaction with the government. The difference between satisfaction with the performance of the mainland government in handling Hong Kong affairs and satisfaction with local government could hardly be greater, as Chart 6 shows. The leap in satisfaction following the withdrawal of the Article 23 legisla- tion was unmistakable, zooming from 57 percent satis ed two weeks before the 1 July march to 72 percent satis ed ten days before the November 2003 District Council elections that saw allies of the Tung government soundly trounced. The election was not initially about Beijing, but with Beijing announcing it would become deeply involved in deciding whether constitutional reforms would proceed, the election turned out to be a referendum on the issue, with 62.9 percent voting for pan-democratic candidates. The breakdown of responses to the question of satisfaction with the performance of the mainland government in dealing with Hong Kong affairs in November 2003 showed 4 percent very dissatis ed, 14 percent
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80 B Satisfied B 70 B B 1 Dissatisfied B B B 1 1 60 1 B B B H Don’t know 1 B B BB 1 1 B B B 50 1 B B B 40 1 1 1 30 B 1 1 1 B B 1 1 1 1 B 11 20 H HB H 1 H BH H H 1 H H 1 H B H H11 HHHH H H H HH1 HHH H 10 1 H
0 Jan 98 Feb 93 Feb 95 Feb 96 Oct 98 Apr 99 Apr 98 Apr 00 July 99 July 96 July 98 Aug 93 Aug 94 Aug 00 Nov 99 Nov 00 Sept 95 June 97 June 98 Apr 2001 Apr 2002 July 2001 Aug 2002 Nov 2001 Nov 2003 June 2003
Chart 7: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Mainland Government Performance
dissatis ed, 61 percent satis ed and 11 percent very satis ed, which is a very different picture from the results for satisfaction with the perfor- mance of the Hong Kong government. As in the analyses above those who did not know are excluded, but in contrast to the above analyses of satisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government, the very dissatis ed are consolidated with the dissatis ed (totaling 20 percent) because there are too few very dissatis ed to analyze separately. The very satis ed, at 12 percent of respondents, is large enough as are the 68 percent satis ed. Birthplace has almost no signi cant difference between those born in Hong Kong and those born in the mainland. The Hong Kong born were 20 percent dissatis ed, 69 percent satis ed and 11 percent very satis ed with the mainland government’s performance in Hong Kong affairs. The China born were 18 percent dissatis ed, 69 percent satis- ed and 13 percent very satis ed, while those born elsewhere were 27 percent dissatis ed, 46 percent satis ed and 27 percent very dissatis ed. This latter group was by far the most polarized. Another contrast with previous results can be found in the breakdown by age group. Younger groups and those over 70 had higher levels of dissatisfaction with the mainland government’s performance in Hong Kong affairs. These same groups had lower levels of dissatisfaction than other ages with the
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Table 15: Satisfaction with Performance of PRCG in HK Affairs by Age Group 18–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–85 Total Dissatis ed 30 24 15 19 17 18 24 20 Satis ed 65 69 71 70 68 58 58 68 Very satis ed 6 7 14 10 14 24 18 12 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 20.66 with 12 df p = 0.0556
Table 16: Satisfaction with Performance of PRCG in HK Affairs by Education 0 1–6 7–9 10–11 12–13 14–16 17–18 Total Dissatis ed 30 31 20 14 20 22 13 20 Satis ed 60 51 68 74 73 67 44 68 Very satis ed 10 18 12 13 8 11 44 12 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 31.64 with 12 df p = 0.0016
performance of the Hong Kong government. There seems to be very little connection between attitudes toward the central government and its leaders and those toward the local government and its leaders. The ‘China factor’ in Hong Kong elections appears well and truly dead. Again in contrast to earlier results, the less educated had higher levels of dissatisfaction than those with more education. The very satis ed among those with the highest levels of education are by far the most numerous among the groups shown in Table 16. Again in high contrast with satisfaction patterns with the Hong Kong government’s performance, business people and professionals showed high levels of satisfaction with the performance of the mainland gov- ernment in handling Hong Kong affairs. Housewives and students were the most dissatis ed occupational groups. Again in contrast, the public sector was more satis ed than the private sector with the mainland government’s performance in Hong Kong affairs. While 20 percent of the public sector respondents described themselves as very satis ed, only 9 percent of the non-working sec- tor respondents felt the same. The private sector fell in-between, with 13 percent very satis ed. However, the public sector respondents at
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Table 17: Satisfaction with Performance of PRCG in HK Affairs by Occupation Manager/ Admin Professional Assoc Professional Clerk Service & Sales & Fish, Craft, Ag, Machine Housewife Retired Unemployed Students/Educators Total
Dissatis ed 12 19 16 22 16 30 14 24 28 20 Satis ed 67 68 72 63 75 62 69 73 64 68 Very satis ed 21 14 12 15 9 8 17 3 8 2 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 30.57 with 16 df p = 0.0153
Table 18: Satisfaction with Performance of PRCG in HK Affairs by Patriotic Identity Chinese HK Hong HK British, Total Chinese Konger Overseas Chinese, other Dissatis ed 11 19 21 40 20 Satis ed 74 66 68 53 68 Very satis ed 15 15 10 7 12 Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 24.85 with 6 df p = 0.0004
15 percent and the private sector respondents at 17 percent had simi- lar levels of dissatisfaction, while the non-working sector respondents, at 26 percent, showed signi cantly more dissatisfaction. There is no signi cant relationship with cultural identity. Patriotic identity shows some association. The results in Table 18 demonstrate the ranking of patriotic iden- tity clearly, with the lowest level of dissatisfaction with the mainland government among those calling themselves Chinese and the high- est levels among Hong Kong British, overseas Chinese and others. However, even among these, a clear majority (60 percent) are satis ed with the performance of the mainland government in handling Hong
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70 B B Satisfied 1 11 60 BBB 1 Dissatisfied 1 1 B 1 1 B B B H Don’t know 50 1 1 B B BB 1 B B B 40 1 B B B 1B B B 11 1 30 1 1 1 B B B 1 B 1H H1 H H H H H H B B H HH11H H HH 20 H H 1 1 HH H H 11HH H HB H H 1 10 H
0 Jan 98 Jan Feb 97 Feb 95 Feb 93 Feb 94 Feb 96 July 96 July 98 July 99 Oct 98 Apr 99 Apr 00 Apr 98 Aug 93 Aug 94 Aug 00 Nov 99 Nov 00 Nov Sept 95 June 98June June 97June apr 2001 apr Apr 2002 July 2001 Nov 2001 Nov Aug 2002 Nov 2003 Nov June 2003 June
Chart 8: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Mainland Government Performance in the Mainland
Kong affairs. Patriotism had much less to do with political attitudes up to November 2003. In terms of political participation and attitudes toward the mainland government, those who were registered to vote were more satis ed than those who were non-registered. There is no signi cant relationship with those who were planning to vote in the District Council elections, or those who had signed petitions, or even the July 1 marchers. But attitudes toward the mainland have not just been based on Beijing largely keeping its hands off Hong Kong affairs, at least until January 2003. As Chart 8 shows, never have levels of satisfaction with the way the mainland government is ruling China been higher, quite in contrast to the record levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government. Whereas Hong Kong people once contrasted the performance of their government against China’s and found China’s governance to be seriously wanting, the situation post- 1997 was reversed, despite Hong Kong’s objectively greater freedoms, security, welfare and much greater wealth.
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Dissatisfaction with Government and Identity
The complex, dif cult relationship that so characterized Hong Kong until 1997 seems, as of late 2003, to have been resolved in China’s favor. Dissatisfaction became focused on internal governance. Many complain anecdotally of deterioration in Hong Kong’s perceived international and cosmopolitan nature, despite the administration’s proclaiming it “Asia’s World City.” The overall results of the growing dissatisfaction with local government and local trends can be clearly seen in the replies to whether people were satis ed or dissatis ed with their lives in Hong Kong. In November 2003 only 4 percent of the respondents described themselves as very satis ed, 47 percent as satis ed, 30 percent as dissatis ed, and a disturbingly large 14 percent as very dissatis ed. Reclassifying the categories by dropping those who did not know and collapsing the very satis ed, at 36 cases too small to analyze, into the satis ed group, shows 15 percent very dissatis ed, 32 percent dissatis- ed and 53 percent satis ed. The results of the November 2003 survey indicate by far the low- est level of satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. The 15 percent very dissatis ed equaled the entirety of those dissatis ed in 1991, and far exceeded the 9 percent dissatis ed in February 1997.
90 B BBB B B B B B B B Satisfied 80 B B 1 Dissatisfied B B 70 B B B B B B B H Don’t know BB B B B B 60 B B B 50 B 1 40 1 1 1 1 1 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1111 1 1 HH HH HH HHHHHHHHHHH 0 HHHH HHHHH HH HHH Jan 98 Jan Feb 97 Feb 95 Feb 96 Feb July 98 July Feb 93 July 96 July July 99 July Apr 00 Oct 98 Apr 99 Feb 94 Apr 98 Nov 91 Nov Aug 93 Aug Aug 00 Aug Aug 94 Nov 00 Nov Nov 99 Nov Sept 95 June 97June June 98June July 2001 July Nov 2001 Nov Aug 2002 Aug Nov 2003 Nov Nov 2002 Nov June 2003 June 2001 June April 2001 April April 2002 April Chart 9: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Life in Hong Kong
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Table 19: Satisfaction with Life in Hong Kong by Satisfaction with Hong Kong Government Performance Ver y Dissatis ed Satis ed with Total dissatis ed with with Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong government government government Very dissatis ed 394415 with life in Hong Kong Dissatis ed with 32 40 13 32 life in Hong Kong Satis ed with life 30 55 82 53 in Hong Kong Total 100 100 100 100
Table Contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 206.3 with 4 df p 0.0001
That satisfaction with life in Hong Kong is strongly associated with attitudes toward the government can be seen in Table 19. Only 4 per- cent of those satis ed with the performance of the government were also very dissatis ed with life in Hong Kong, whereas 39 percent of those very dissatis ed with government were also very dissatis ed with life in Hong Kong. Thirty percent of those very dissatis ed with the government were satis ed with life in Hong Kong, but this rises to 82 percent among those also satis ed with the government.
Identity and Conformity: History and Geography or Politics and the Motherland?
Did something fundamentally fail in the promise of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ that might explain this plunge in satisfaction? Per- haps there is signi cance in the fact that Hong Kong’s widely disdained rst Chief Executive was not actually a native of Hong Kong. Tung Chee-hwa came to Hong Kong at age 12, and to his nal day in of ce he spoke Cantonese with a very heavy accent.18 Perhaps Hong Kongers
18 Tung resigned in March 2005, well before the scheduled end of his term 30 June 2007.
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prefer the international tones of the British ‘received’ accent over the Shanghai-accented tongue spoken by the beleaguered Chief Executive. But more likely the increasingly well educated, increasingly interna- tionally oriented, increasingly globalized Hong Kongers are impatient with the pace of change and the direction set by the aging shipping tycoon whose greatest vision was stability and who wanted, above all, to calm and slow the pace of political change. Hong Kongers are not rejecting their past as a center of the shipping trade; they merely want their governance to keep up and change with the times. While its port is large, Hong Kong as an air freight and air passenger hub has grown even larger, and at a much faster pace. It has also become a global center of information, particularly in business and nance. The world has shrunk into a global village where comparing the competencies and performance of both employees and governments are routine. There is much to support such an interpretation. Surveys have shown Hong Kongers overwhelmingly approved of China entering the World Trade Organization. They adored the man who led that change in China’s traditional isolationism, Zhu Rongji.19 It may be no uke that China’s rst astronaut, Yang Liwei, the man who proclaimed to the world his internationalism by ascending with the ags of China and the UN ying in his spacecraft, created a sensation during his visit to Hong Kong. The visit had been arranged in an attempt to boost the agging political fortunes of Tung and his political allies in the run-up to District Council elections. Instead, it contrasted even more strongly and in striking images China’s heroic young astronaut with the increasingly tired and aged Hong Kong shipping captain. Yang epitomized change and China’s future; Tung became irretrievably mired in the past and became a symbol of vain resistance to change, not unlike the Empress Dowager a century earlier. Hong Kong began with its eyes xed to the sea in hope of opportunity and to the north in fear of interference if not destruction; it now has the stars in its eyes, and like all of China, wants to reach for the moon, not freeze things in place. “Fifty years without change,” a slogan Deng Xiaopeng once used to set Hong Konger’s hearts at ease by assuring them neither their wealth nor their freedoms would decay after 1997,
19 See Hong Kong Transition Project brie ng, DeGolyer, “The First Five Years: Floundering Government, Foundering Democracy?” (April 2002). Available http:// www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp.
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now seems like a sentence of death by permitting no change at all. The transformed geography and the utterly changed mental landscape witnessed on the mainland in the past 20 years may now account more for the fundamental disgruntlement of Hong Kongers with the lack of economic and political progress after reuni cation than anything else. After all, the very essence of Hong Kong identity is risky geography, rapid change, proximate threat and great opportunity.20 To insist that Hong Kongers accept no change, and meanwhile to witness a trans- formation taking place literally next door must be most frustrating.21 In 1978 Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone, was established on Hong Kong’s northern border. From roughly 40,000 inhabitants in 1980 today some 11 million people with the highest per capita income among all mainland cities call it home. Shenzhen’s growth rate has ranged between 15 and 30 percent per year since 1997. It looks set to soon be home to double Hong Kong’s population of 6.9 million. Opportunity, growth, risk taking, even population density: all seemed to move to the mainland after 1997. And Hong Kongers followed. From less than 50,000 living and working on the mainland in 1990, the Hong Kong government’s own study showed some 500,000 lived or worked there in 2005. Lack of progress may have been the deepest cause of Hong Kongers’ dissatisfaction. For example, Hong Kongers strongly reacted against pro-democracy groups that rejected even incremental constitutional change toward democracy in December 2005. Whoever blocks progress appears to stand against the essence of Hong Kong.22
20 In a brief outline, Edwin P.W. Leung acknowledged Hong Kong’s development of a separate identity and culture from China, but argued that it should provide the basis for a ‘re-ethnicization’ of Hong Kong along the lines of the 56 distinct but still ‘Chinese’ national cultures. See Leung, “Transition from De-ethnicization to re-ethni- cization: The Re-emergence of Chinese Ethnic Identity in Hong Kong prior to 1997,” in Hong Kong in Transition 1992 (Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute 1993), pp. 595–600. But a more detailed study by Albert H. Yee, A People Misruled (Singapore: Heineman Asia, 1992), esp. pp. 217–254, argues that there is a degree of duplicity in Hong Kong’s ‘Chineseness’ that is causing its disintegration rather than reintegration or Leung’s re-ethnicization. 21 See Kuo-Shu Yang, “The Psychological Transformation of the Chinese People as a Result of Societal Modernization,” in Michael H. Bond, ed., The Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Hong Kong: Oxford Univerrsity press, 1996), pp. 479–498 and James C. Hsiung, “The Hong Kong SAR: Prisoner of Legacy or History’s Bellwether?” in James C. Hsiung, ed., Hong Kong the Super Paradox,” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 307–348. 22 See “Parties, Policies and Political Reform in Hong Kong,” (May 2006) a report written by the author, commissioned by the National Democratic Institute for
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The refugees who became Hong Kongers populated a “barren rock,” took on the uncertain seas, lived under China’s guns, and built a breathtaking city largely on pumped up seabed. Those who expect fearful resignation of Hong Kongers to their fate under the thumb of China’s Communist Party fail to understand what geography and history forged here. Those who know nd it unsurprising that Hong Kongers vehemently rejected the “slowly, slowly” philosophy of their rst Chief Executive and the interpretation of “50 years without change” as a means of “protecting” Hong Kong by freezing it in situ like an insect in amber. Hong Kongers demand change, particularly political change, faster than mainland of cials will or want to give it. And they even reject those who in the name of democracy refuse to improve things by taking the small steps forward Beijing is willing to accept. Hong Kongers, more than anyone, have been the drivers and deal- makers behind China’s own breathtaking growth and modernization. These few on the margins facing the uncertain sea have played a massive role in transforming a continent and reforging a traditionally anti-com- mercial culture in their own rambunctious, pro t-hungry image. To make progress “slowly, slowly” toward democracy, and by democracy they mean imposing accountability on their own government and their own tax money, con icts with the history, geography, and very identity of this globalized city of capitalist risk takers. China’s rulers may want to force on Hong Kongers a new identity as patriotic citizens loyal to an eternally unchanged situation of China as a one party state. But patriotism stirred into this formidable character forged by Hong Kong’s history of challenge and response could change China politically far faster than its politically conservative rulers imagine. Unlike the French who protest and violently resist change, who seek state-guaranteed security and protection from all risk, who ercely protect farming as the essence of being French, Hong Kongers lit- erally cannot conceive of life without rapid, continuous change or without them captaining their own fate in whatever direction it may lead. Venturing in search of opportunity and seeking risk, not quietly bowing in surrender to a challenge or even a disaster, has become the essential character of this city. There are few if any places that have brought more change or experienced more change more rapidly than
International Affairs, on the Hong Kong Transition Project website, http://www.hkbu. edu.h/~hktp.
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Hong Kong. And that, more than anything, is at the core of the Hong Kong identity. Joining China has not changed that; instead, that is what is changing China. There is a new “Chinese” identity being forged in Hong Kong, but it is one the history and geography of change via trade and risk have forged, not that of the idealized obedient mainland masses cowed by the state-centric planned certainties of conservative communist cadres. The symbol of China increasingly, however, is no longer most aptly the Great Wall, built to repel outsiders, or the Forbidden City, meant to separate government from the governened, or even Tiananmen Square, lled with staged parades and dominated by the dead face of dictator- ship. The true symbols of China today are the Hong Kong harbor, open to the trade of all nations, the streets of this teeming city which have witnessed the marches of millions of Hong Kongers since the 1997 reuni cation to the ballot boxes and to government of ces demanding accountability and progress from their elected representatives, and the great bridge leading to the Chek Lap Kok International Airport, Hong Kong’s link to tomorrow. France, for its essence, looks inward to the land. Hong Kong, to the sea.
REFERENCES
Birch, E.E., D.G. Birch, D.R. Hoffman et al. 1992. “Visual maturation of term infants fed omega 3 long chain polyunsaturated fatty acid (LCPUFA) supplemented for- mula,” Lancet 340, pp. 810–813. Braudel, Fernand. (Sian Reynolds, trans.) 1988. The Identity of France. London: William Collins Sons & Co. Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Civic Exchange. “Taking Charge and Cleaning Up,” at website: http://www.civic- exchange.org. DeGolyer, Michael E. 2003. “Legitimacy and Leadership in Post-British Hong Kong,” in Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems, edited by Robert Ash et al. London: Routledge Curzon. ———. 2004. “Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses,” at website: http://www. civic-exchange.org and http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp. ———. 1999. “Western Exposure, China Orientation: The effects of foreign ties and experience on Hong Kong,” in The Outlook for US-China Relations following the 1997–98 Summits, edited by Peter Koehn and Joseph Y.S. Cheng. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Dion, Kenneth L. and Karen K. Dion. 1996. “Chinese Adaptation to Foreign Cultures,” in The Handbook of Chinese Psychology, edited by Michael Harris Bond. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Faure, David and Lee Pui-tak, eds. 2004. Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
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Florey, C. Du V., A.M. Leech, A. Blackhall. 1995. “Infant feeding and mental and motor development at 18 months of age in rst born singletons,” International Journal of Epidemiology, pp. 821–826. Hong Kong Standard. 23 December 2003. Hong Kong Transition Project. Reports at website: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp. Hsiung, James C. 2000. “The Hong Kong SAR: Prisoner of Legacy or History’s Bellwether?” In Hong Kong the Super Paradox, edited by James C. Hsiung. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith. 1994. Nationalism. London: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Liu, William T. 1993. “Hong Kong Family in Transition: Will 1997 Make a Differ- ence?” In Hong Kong in Transition 1992. Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute. Leung, Edwin P.W. 1993. “Transition from De-ethnicization to re-ethnicization: The RE- emergence of Chinese Ethnic Identity in Hong Kong prior to 1997,” in Hong Kong in Transition 1992, Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute. Martinez, M.J. 1992. “Tissue levels of polyunsaturted fatty acids during early human development,” Journal of Pediatrics, pp. 129–138. Meyer, David R. 2000. Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Pepper, Suzanne. 2002. “Hong Kong and the reconstruction of China’s political order,” in Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Skeldon, Ronald, ed. 1995. Emigration from Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Van Kemenade, Willem. 1997. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Welsh, Frank. 1993. A History of Hong Kong. London: HarperCollins. Yang, Kuo-Shu. 1996. “The Psychological Transformation of the Chinese People as a Result of Societal Modernization,” in The Handbook of Chinese Psychology, edited by Michael Harris Bond. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Yee, Albert H. 1992. A People Misruled. Singapore: Heinemann Asia.
CHAN KWOK BUN_f3_20-54.indd 54 9/10/2007 8:05:00 PM Chapter 2
Depoliticization, Citizenship and the Politics of Community in Hong Kong*
Lam Wai-man
This chapter critically examines government discourses on citizenship and community in Hong Kong from the 1960s to the present. By making special reference to the government discourses on three public events—the 1966 Star Ferry riots, the 1981 riots, and scuf es such as those that took place at the Cultural Center, Tsimshatsui, on Christ- mas and New Year’s Eve 2002—it reconstructs the meaning of good citizenship as promoted by the colonial and post-colonial governments. These three public events are selected as cases highly indicative of what governments expect an ideal citizen to be because all of them aroused substantial public attention that subsequently invoked considerable discourse and action. Citizenship is built upon a shared sense of com- munity. Considered in this context, I also trace the understanding of community of the governments, as it is intertwined with the notion of citizenship, through the development of government policies on youth and citizen education in the city from the 1960s onward. It is obvious that citizenship has been constituted from both above (by the govern- ment of the day) and below (by the civil society). By reconstructing the government discourses in this regard, I will shed light on part of the process of citizenship-making in Hong Kong.
Citizenship and Its Constitutive Stories
Although de nitions of citizenship are numerous, they usually encom- pass three major themes. Pamela J. Conover offers an example, explain- ing citizenship as the fundamental relationship of a person to a political
* A similar version of this chapter entitled “Depoliticization, Citizenship, and the Politics of Community in Hong Kong” was published in Citizenship Studies. 9(3): 309–322, July 2005 (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals). The author would like to thank the journal for permission to reprint.
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community that consists of a collection of individuals who are “com- mitted to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods.” A political community is “constituted by its members and its formal institutions, and citizenship shapes how individuals relate to both components. It is the basis, therefore, upon which people answer the fundamental ques- tions about public life: Who am I? What can I do? What must I do?” (Conover, 1995, pp. 134–5) Conover’s idea of citizenship reveals that it encompasses three ele- ments. The most basic element is membership in the political commu- nity. The second element is the sense of citizenship, which consists of the concept of citizen identity: that is, the affective signi cance people give to their membership in a particular community. It also connotes the common beliefs that people engender about their relationship to the state and other citizens. The nal element of the idea of citizenship is practice: that is, the forms of behavior in which people engage as part of their public lives. The practice of citizenship includes both political participation and civic activity. (Conover, 1995, pp. 134–5) While politi- cal participation manifests an active citizenship through which citizens assert their rights and in uence their government, civic activity indicates a relatively passive citizenship by which people’s obedience and ful ll- ment of civic duties serve to keep the political system going. In theory, the construction of the concepts of citizenship and politi- cal community is a process embedded with a sense of reciprocity and egalitarianism, as both the government and the citizenry have a part to play in bringing good citizenship to fruition. There should be a dual emphasis on the importance of political and civic activity. However, in politics, as Roger M. Smith (Smith, 2001, pp. 79–80) argues, the status of citizen is often utilized for creating common memories and feelings of identi cation, as well as to create belief in the importance of practices bene cial to governance. While citizenship indicates a politi- cal identity of a people, this identity, like other identities, is a political construction, subject to political manipulation. Also, shaping a sense of citizenship is a political process embedded with competing narratives of an economic, political and constitutive nature. Each type of story serves particular political functions. Economic stories promote accounts of interests, arguing that a particular version of citizenship advances each member’s economic well-being. Political narratives foster trust in the worth of a citizen identity by promising the people enhancement of their political power through institutions and policies, and protection
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from all external enemies. Constitutive stories show members of the community with shared identities, as de ned by their common religion, race, ethnicity, language, culture, history and so on. Building upon Smith’s perspectives, I will demonstrate that the of cial discourse of citizen identity and practices in colonial and post-colonial Hong Kong have been on the whole depoliticized, although the colonial and post-colonial governments have also been responsible for re-politi- cizing Hong Kong as a result of the proto-democratic reforms of the former and the promotion of nationalism of the latter. (Lam, 2004, pp. 231–42) The colonial depoliticized notion of citizenship placed great value on cultivating a passive citizenship. It was intertwined with economic discourses that emphasized citizenship qualities such as self- reliance, economical usefulness and contribution. It was basically an individualized and instrumental account, promoting a shallow sense of community. As a result, this notion af rmed the historic vision of the Hong Kong people as economic animals, and saw society’s primary goal as enabling economic activities to ourish. A narrowly de ned identity for its citizenry was entrenched within a constricted vision of society or community, which assisted in weaving the people together and strengthening governance. Although it has largely adopted the colonial government’s depoliticized understanding of citizenship and narrow sense of community, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government has been confronted with different political and economic circumstances since the return of sovereignty to China in 1997. Because of these circumstances, it has endeavored to cultivate nationalism as a part of citizenship and to experiment with various constitutive stories of a Hong Kong identity that caters to its governance needs.
The Three Events in Focus
The three public events selected here demonstrate vividly the devel- opment of the of cial discourses on citizenship and community from the 1960s to the present. The 1966 Star Ferry riots took place at a delicate moment in Hong Kong’s history. In 1965, a run on the banks had occurred. At the same time, there was a recession in the real estate market and many of its ancillary activities. The Star Ferry Company’s application for a fare increase further depressed the people in Hong Kong. Although the proposed magnitude of the rise in fare was not
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substantial,1 public opposition soared—at its height attracting 174,398 signatures on a petition against the increase. Regardless of the oppo- sition, the company’s application, although with a reduced level of permitted increase, was eventually granted. A signi cant turning point in the event came on April 4, 1966, when So Sau-chung, a young man in his twenties, began a lone hunger strike in protest. His hunger strike attracted numerous young supporters. As events escalated, riots also took place and a curfew was nally imposed on April 7. Order was restored on April 9. One casualty and twenty-six injuries were reported. Relatively smaller in scale and less political in intent, it appears that the 1981 riots were triggered by crowds of people concentrated in the downtown areas celebrating Christmas and the New Year. It was reported that a car bumped into a pedestrian on Christmas Eve, which subsequently led to arguments and open ghting. The driver was beaten up while other people began to riot. The crowds smashed the car and other cars nearby. They set re to cars, assaulted people (notably for- eigners), stoned policemen, and later rampaged into nearby districts, causing even more damage to public and private properties. Order was restored the next day with eleven injuries and twelve arrests, all of which were of people aged between fteen and twenty-seven. A few days later, on New Year’s Eve 1981, similar hostilities took place. Two non-Chinese youngsters danced on the street, which provoked hostility from the crowds that were also celebrating. The police subsequently made a number of arrests, most of which were of young people.2 Among the three events in discussion, the following scuf es were the smallest in scale. In recent years, the Hong Kong Cultural Centre has become a popular venue where people, notably youngsters, gather and celebrate Christmas and the New Year. However, problems of littering, graf ti, illegal hawking and vandalism are increasingly serious, and scuf es between youngsters and the police and minor disorders incited
1 The proposed fare increase of ten cents was for both rst and second-class round trips on the Central to Tsim Sha Tsui route. Also, the cost of an adult’s monthly ticket was to rise from HK $8 to $10, and a child’s monthly ticket from HK $4 to $5. 2 See Eddie Kwok-wai Wong. 1996. An analysis of disorder in Hong Kong society. M.A. dissertation in Public Order, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, in association with School of Professional and Continuing Education, Uni- versity of Hong Kong, 10; and Lawrence Yeung-yin Ng. 1995. Re ections on riots in Hong Kong in the 1980s: a study in public disorder. M.A. dissertation in Public Order, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, in association with School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong, pp. 71–2.
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by excited gangs have also become common during the celebrations. At Christmas 2002, con icts occurred between young celebrators and the police at the Cultural Center, leading to several arrests. Both the youngsters and the police complained about being assaulted. Similarly, during the celebrations for New Year of 2003, a crowd of youngsters sang and danced to express their feelings but were stopped by a police of cer. A scuf e occurred, and the policeman was surrounded. The police eventually took steps to disperse the crowd, cleared the venue and arrested at least seven youngsters. The authorities accused the celebra- tors, notably members of youth gangs, of a lack of self-discipline and care for public property, getting excited too easily and not cooperating with the police to maintain public order. Although the three types of events under study appear to be differ- ent in nature, they manifest the government’s changing focus in the construction of citizen identity, and the constitution of the types of citizenship stories suggested by Smith.
Political Passivity and Depoliticized Citizenship
It is no exaggeration that the of cial discourse on citizenship in Hong Kong has been narrowly focused and depoliticized. This depoliticized discourse consists of several major characteristics, including, rst of all, a passive notion of citizenship. The events described re ect that the concept of citizenship promoted by the Hong Kong colonial and post-colonial governments have been strikingly passive. It has emphasized civic duties rather than politi- cal rights and the development of critical ability. For example, in the 1966 riots and the 2002 scuf es, the main blame for the con icts was placed on the actions of so-called irresponsible youths who were also accused of just wanting excitement, lacking self-control, behaving in an ill mannered way and so on. On the whole, the young people involved in the con icts were accused of lacking a sense of civic consciousness, with the term “sense of citizenship” de ned as being well-mannered, well-adjusted and socially responsible. Citizenship in this sense skips its activist components. In fact, educating local people on how to become responsible citizens has remained a constant theme of government youth and community building policies since the 1960s. For example, the aims of many of the activities organized for young people and for community development
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have been explicitly designed to promote public-spirited citizenship. As early as the beginning of the 1950s, the Social Welfare Department stated that its common ideal was: To enable every member of the community to develop into a reliable neighbour, and a useful and informed fellow-citizen. Every practical step taken towards that ideal meant a gain to the community, inasmuch as successful social work resulted in fewer social mis ts, more individual self- reliance, and less dependence upon ‘charity’ by families or persons . . . in short, citizens with a much more highly developed social consciousness and sense of social responsibility than had existed previously. (Social Welfare Department, 1955, p. 1) Similarly, as exempli ed in a report published before the 1966 riots, citizenship meant being cooperative and ful lling civic obligations: This [community centre] is the network by which residents are helped to become citizens, to develop co-operative attitudes, to increase their capac- ity to work together, and, by furthering their own particular interests, to serve the wider interests of the community. (Social Welfare Department, 1965, p. 9) After the 1966 riots, the colonial government carried out a series of measures to strengthen its legitimacy. With regard to citizenship, it implemented the City District Of ce scheme,3 improved social welfare services, nurtured a sense of belonging in the people and developed civic education. It further promoted civic education in the 1980s in response to the 1981 riots and the question of Hong Kong’s political future. In his 1998 Policy Address, Hong Kong’s rst post-colonial Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, also stated that he looked to the younger generation to not only seek their rights as individuals, but also to meet their obligations to society. (Tung, 1998a, p. 111) In a similar vein, after the 2002 scuf es, calls for cultivating a sense of civic responsibility and civic consciousness among Hong Kong citizens were frequently heard. Notably, 140 “Ambassador” volunteers were mobilized as exemplary youth in assisting Madam Tung to clear up the situation at the Hong Kong Cultural Centre.
3 The City District Of ce scheme was implemented in 1969. The scheme established ten City District Of ces and a number of area committees in the urban areas of Hong Kong for better government coordination.
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A Citizenship Intertwined with Economic Narratives
We can make sense of the government emphasis on promoting civic obedience and responsible citizenship very easily. These qualities are essential conditions for maintaining stability and harmony in society, and are prerequisites for favorable economic investment and prosperity. Indeed, another notable characteristic of the depoliticized discourse of citizenship shared by the two forms of government is its economic emphasis. First of all, there is a tendency to seek economic explanations for poor citizenship. In the three social con icts examined above, government of cials closely scrutinized the occupations and social classes of those involved. The rioters or the so-called problem youth were described as unemployed, underemployed, undereducated or double-losers in compe- titions in schools and in the job market. The employment situation of the youngsters involved was said to have had a part to play in causing the problems, and also contributed to their poorly developed citizen consciousness. For example, regarding the 1966 rioters, the report of the Commission of Inquiry stated that The type of employment many of the boys were in held little for them by way of future security or advancement and this, coupled with the long unorthodox hours they worked, as well as the low pay they received, con- tributed to the feeling of aimlessness and boredom which was part of the motivation behind their involvement in the riots. Because of the demands of their employment, they lacked opportunity for normal teenage fun, so used the riots as one outlet for this need. (Commission, 1967, p. 106) Hence, it appears that the jobs of the youngsters had a part to play in causing the riots. Like the 1966 riots, the discourse invoked during the 2002 scuf es has a similar component. The participants in the scuf es were presumed to be unemployed and were labeled as “losers” in schools. They were from the so-called double losers, who had nei- ther career nor educational prospects, and who amounted to around 100,000 in number according to the government. Indeed, this type of economic explanation was particularly prevalent after the 2002 scuf es, re ecting the predominance of economic narratives in the city since the 1997 return of sovereignty to China. Second, good citizenship means not relying on government and con- tributing to economic growth. Suggestions to enable young people to become self-reliant and contributive were made after the events under study. In the aftermath of the 1966 riots, voices were raised to secure
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better prospects and more stable employment for young people through improved educational and training programs. (Social, 1968, p. 1) Such suggestions were also prominent after the 2002 scuf es, which doubtless indicates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region govern- ment regarded helping youngsters to nd employment and offering employment retraining programs as feasible solutions to the perceived problems of the young. Further, since reunifying with China, the aim of social welfare has been commonly stated as helping young people to “become participating and contributing members of society” and to provide individuals “with opportunities to achieve self-reliance and self-betterment, and promote social cohesion and harmony.” (Hong, 2001) This emphasis on the concept of self-reliance explains why Com- prehensive Social Security Assistance4 recipients who are able-bodied and have the ability to work are a problem. Driven by the fear that such recipients will become dependent on the government, the Active Employment Assistance Programme under the Support for Self-Reli- ance Scheme has been implemented to help them to become self-reliant again, offering them job retraining and job-hunting assistance. (Social, 2003, p. 11) Such calls for preserving a self-reliant culture and being economically contributive reveal an economic emphasis in government notions of ideal citizenship. If the concept of self-reliance is to orient the people of Hong Kong to be economically independent and useful, then the ful llment of that goal requires an active attitude from the people to search continuously for knowledge and skills that are bene cial to the city’s economic recovery and reconstruction. Since the handover, there has been an increasing emphasis on this “activist attitude” that was not found before. This discourse encourages people to actively acquire economic skills so they can contribute to and be useful in Hong Kong’s economic recovery. For instance, Tung Chee-hwa sated in his 1997 Policy Address that: It is important that we educate our young people, so that they master the knowledge and skills needed to make a living and to contribute to society. But this is far from being the only aim of importance. Knowledge and skills can propel economic growth. (Tung, 1997b, p. 104)
4 This is a type of government nancial assistance that serves as a “safety net” for the unemployed and poor.
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An Instrumental Overtone
The economic orientation of the idea of citizenship promoted by the colonial and post-colonial governments clearly contains an instrumen- tal overtone, seeing youth development and citizenship education as a social investment that in the end will mean a gain to the community or lead to economic and social prosperity. For example, a government report in 1964 stated that the government was obliged to concentrate on those social services that contributed directly to the self-reliance of individuals and so to the greater economic and social prosperity of the community. (Social, 1964, pp. 3–4) It can be understood that good citi- zenship meant, at least partly, satisfying the economic demands of the government. Good citizens could not constitute an economic burden. Instead, they had to be able to contribute to the economic growth of the city. It is worth noting that such demands from the government have intensi ed when Hong Kong’s economic situation has deteriorated. Since the economic downturn in 1999, the post-colonial government’s promotion of this ideal citizenship has become particularly prevalent. The instrumental overtone of the of cial stories on citizenship has also been revealed by government emphasis on social control. Good social control leads to good citizenry, which is potentially bene cial to economic growth. If citizens were all politically cooperative and socially responsible, they would pose no threat to stability. And social stability is a prerequisite for economic growth according to the governments. It is thus no surprise that in each of the three instances examined, the colonial and post-colonial governments stressed the need to enable young people to use their energy constructively. After the 1966 riots, the colonial governments focused its efforts on organizing summer youth programs and parties, and promoting youth activities. The 1981 riots led the Home Affairs Department to endorse the same themes. To avoid an over-concentration of restless youngsters in one district the next year, the District Boards were even given a special grant to set up lighting and Christmas and New Year’s celebrations in each district to ensure that adolescents would celebrate the festivals in their own neighborhoods. This “energy release” theme was reiterated after the 2002 scuf es. For instance, Legislative Councilor Chan Yuen- han stated that “adolescents are rebellious, we need to provide them with proper channels to release their feelings.” (Oriental, 2003) Under the instrumental view of citizenship promoted by the governments, the
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narrowly constructed political function of a good citizenry merged with its economic functions.
The Construction of a Narrow Sense of Community
A sense of community is a prerequisite to a sense of citizenship. How- ever, given the depoliticized overtone of the idea of citizenship in Hong Kong that has prevailed since the colonial era, it is no surprise that the cultivation of a sense of community was not perceived as imperative until the 1960s. Before that, the colonial government considered the promotion of Hong Kong citizenship and a local sense of belonging irrelevant or of negligible importance. An interesting example comes from the government’s response to the petition of the Reform Club of Hong Kong regarding the Young Plan5 to expand the Hong Kong electorate to include “Hong Kong citizens.” (Colonial, 1946–52, para. 24) In 1946, Governor Mark Young proposed to establish a Municipal Council based on representation, which would be granted a high degree of nancial autonomy and authority to handle certain important functions of the government. The proposed council would be composed of forty-eight members, of which sixteen would be elected Chinese members, sixteen elected non-Chinese members, and sixteen members nominated by Chinese organizations and non-Chinese organizations. In response to this proposal, the petition of the Reform Club of Hong Kong, submitted on June 22, 1949, suggested that the de ned electorate in Hong Kong should be composed of British sub- jects and Hong Kong citizens. Those who had resided in the city for ve years and applied for registration with an expressed commitment to upholding the interests of the colony would be quali ed as Hong Kong citizens and eligible voters. It was hoped that the proposal would help to build up a large and loyal body of citizens. Although attractive, Governor Alexander Grantham considered the proposal to be “based on a false premise.” In his perspective, promoting citizenship was of little value to governance, as there was not such an entity as a Hong Kong citizen. To quote him:
5 See, for example, Steve Y.S. Tsang. 1988. Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945–1952. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 32–3.
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This idea is super cially attractive but it is based on a false premise. There is no half-way house between a British national and a Chinese national, and it would be absurd to rely on any paramount loyalty of non-British Chinese other than self-interest arising from long and close connexion with the Colony and a desire to maintain the status quo. Any Chinese, who felt as a ‘Hong Kong citizen’ ought to feel, would have applied to become a British subject long ago. (Colonial, 1946–52, para. 24) In addition to the mistrust in the value of cultivating a local identity, the colonial government’s relative lack of interest in this regard was probably also generated by political fear. It appeared to believe that “if local interest was awakened, there were very real dangers of exploitation by triad societies or undercover political agents.” (Social, 1955, p. 32) Indeed, it was believed that the constitutive stories of a citizen iden- tity, once invoked, might engender too much solidarity and potentially threaten colonial rule. Why was that? If it is true to claim that a depoliticized discourse has prevailed in Hong Kong, one of the characteristics of this discourse was the wide- spread belief that political instability was the result of a left wing or local activist conspiracy. Because of Cold War politics, which in Hong Kong was further complicated by Chinese politics and the competing political allegiances of the Hong Kong people to the governments of the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China (Taiwan), society seemed to be trapped in an atmosphere of political sensitiv- ity that constantly feared Communist subversion. Also, high levels of political activism in the city, notably left wing activities in the 1950s and 1960s, and those by young people in the 1970s, further accelerated such fears. From the perspective of the colonial government, a Hong Kong identity contextualized by the city’s colonial history was probably harmful to governance because it united the people around the themes of nationalism and democracy.6 In the 1960s, the need to stimulate a sense of community in Hong Kong had become imperative, notably after the 1966 and 1967 riots. The sense of community, if successfully created, would encourage citizens to play a part in the development of a society comprised of responsible members, and hence ensure stability. (Social, 1965, pp. 6–7) The following is a typical example of this thinking:
6 See, for example, Lam Wai-man. 2004. Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization. New York: M.E. Sharpe, chapters 5–7.
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There has been an urgent need for conscious efforts to quicken this process without allowing this rootlessness characteristic of the past years’ remark- able development to take its own course and to expose the population to irresistible in uences. (Social, 1969, p. 11) However, intentionally or unintentionally, the colonial government had been careful to construct only a shallow community identity among the people of Hong Kong, as a buffer against Chinese communist in uence, yet still allowing it to protect its rule from the dangers of too much local interest and solidarity. In this construction, the people were depicted as a “great assemblage of people,” rootless refugees, sharing little common in their histories and memories. An interesting example follows: Hong Kong is in most practical ways not a settlement with a history of 124 years (much less an outpost of the world’s most ancient continuous and uniform culture) but rather a great assemblage of people, few of whose corporate memories can go back as long as twenty or twenty- ve years without some traumatic break. (Social, 1966, p. 6) It was also believed that most of these rootless refugees “had come here solely to make a living for themselves, to seek asylum, or to take advan- tage of Hong Kong’s social services.” (Social, 1955, p. 32) As a result, they were somewhat socially and politically apathetic, self-interested, and would likely return to China if circumstances allowed.7 In these examples, economic and political stories worked jointly to constitute a narrow understanding of the people and a constricted imagination of what constituted Hong Kong society. Indeed, in the previous few decades in Hong Kong, such narratives had become very pervasive not only in the of cial discourse on society but also in academia and within many sectors of the population. Nevertheless, contradictory attempts at repoliticizing Hong Kong on the colonial government’s part were witnessed after the 1980s. Negotiations between China and Britain over the political future of Hong Kong began in 1979. In 1984, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration stating that the British administration of Hong Kong would end in 1997, and that Hong Kong would become a special economic zone under Chinese sovereignty. However, Britain and China were of two different minds about the arrangement after 1997. While China determined to maintain Hong Kong’s capitalistic way of life, Britain
7 See, for example, Hong Kong Government. 1966. Report of the Working Party on Local Administration. Hong Kong: Government Printer, p. 11.
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introduced democratic reforms in the territory on the eve of the han- dover. For example, the 1981 White Paper “District Administration in Hong Kong” represented a turning point in government policy, introducing universal suffrage in Hong Kong’s district elections. The Legislative Council started to have an element of indirect election in 1985. In 1991, the colonial government allocated seats for direct elec- tion by geographical constituencies in the Legislative Council election, opening eighteen out of sixty seats. Intentionally or unintentionally, the British democratic reform in Hong Kong helped promote politi- cal activism in the community and unite the community under the umbrella of democracy.
Limited Repoliticization: Good Citizens as Nationalists
In every postcolonial society, the reconstruction of community or citizen identities is one of the foremost tasks of regimes. Examples include India, Algeria and many other colonies in Asia or Africa.8 In the reconstruction of a collective identity, nationalistic discourses often play an important constitutive role. Hence, not surprisingly, contrary to the colonial government’s ambivalence, we see in Hong Kong the new Special Administrative Region regime’s attempt to consolidate a “thicker” set of common memories necessary for increasing the sense of community by introducing nationalism into the concept of ideal citizenship. It is hoped that these memories can serve to consolidate the philosophical foundation of a cooperative and socially responsible citizenry. However, probably different from examples in other parts of the world, nationalistic discourses in Hong Kong exclude, instead of include, democratic discourses in the process of creating a collective postcolonial identity. Rather, the government has been keen on pro- ducing nationalism in citizenship building as a measure to eliminate the sense of community built under the umbrella of democracy in the nal years of British colonial rule in Hong Kong.
8 See, for example, Frantz Fanon. 1965. A Dying Colonialism, trans. H. Chevalier. New York: Grove Press; Partha Chatterjee. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed Books; Partha Chatterjee. 1993. The Nations and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; and Benedict Anderson. 1991. Imagined Communities: Re ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso.
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For example, in education, although depoliticization was the norm in the colonial era,9 former Chief Executive Tung started limited and directive repoliticization. Contrary to the colonial government’s ambiva- lence, the new regime is dedicated to repoliticizing civic education and the school curriculum. The Guidelines on Civic Education implemented since September 1996 aim to enhance students’ understanding of the Basic Law and the principle of “One Country, Two Systems,” culti- vate a sense of belonging to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, nurture identi cation with the home country and encourage contribution to the global community. In 1998, the Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education stepped up efforts to promote various themes of civic education, ranging from respect for human rights, equal opportunities and good citizenship to instilling a sense of belonging to Hong Kong, concern for the motherland and understanding of the Basic Law. (Hong, 1998, pp. 146, 163) However, the aim of repoliticization has been limited to renational- ization, which promotes ethnic nationalism and a sense of belonging to China rather than an all-round political consciousness and activism. Subsequent to its establishment, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government carried out series of measures to strengthen the Chinese elements in the existing school curriculum. For instance, school textbook publishers were provided with “guidelines” advising them to observe the “one China” policy. From 1998, Putonghua, the national language of China, has been taught in all primary schools, and civics has been made available as an elective subject in Secondary One to Three. (Morris et al., 2000, p. 249)
9 Not surprisingly, depoliticization is again a major theme in the colonial govern- ment’s education policy. The postwar period saw the colonial government exercising extensive power to ensure that schools did not promote political ideologies. The education system in Hong Kong was designed to produce depoliticized and dena- tionalized individuals. The situation did not change until the 1980s. See Paul Morris et al. 2000. Education, civic participation and identity: continuity and change in Hong Kong. Cambridge Journal of Education. 30(2): 247; Paul Morris and Chan Ka-ki. 1997. The Hong Kong school curriculum and the political transition: politicisation, contexualisation and symbolic interaction. In Education and Political Transition: Implica- tions of Hong Kong’s Change of Sovereignty, ed. Mark Bray and Lee Wing-on, pp. 101–118. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, the University of Hong Kong; Paul Morris and Anthony Sweeting. 1991. Education and politics: the case of Hong Kong from an historical perspective. Oxford Review of Education. 17: 249–67; and Tse Kwan-choi. 1999. Citizenship education in Hong Kong: problems and Issues. Journal of Youth Studies. 2(1): 178.
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In this light, the image of a good citizen is a nationalist, in the hope that this narrative will facilitate the building of a new collective identity in postcolonial Hong Kong. As Tung said in 1998: We must step up civic education so that our youngsters will have a better understanding of China, the Chinese culture and history, the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ and the Basic Law. Through better under- standing, we hope to inculcate in them the passion and the concern for China, the pride of being Chinese, and a constant readiness to contribute towards the well-being of not just Hong Kong but the entire country. (Tung, 1998) In this regard Tung obviously attempted to construct a “thicker” set of common memories necessary for the sense of community to build upon, and hoped that these memories would serve to consolidate the philosophical foundation of a cooperative and socially responsible citizenry. Unlike the colonial government that constructed the people of Hong Kong as a mere assemblage of rootless refugees, he explicitly endorsed neo-Confucianism and Asian values as the sources of the qualities of good citizenship. Singapore has been cited at times as an exemplar of good governance and a good government-people relation- ship. As Tung expressed: Every society has to have its own values to provide a common purpose and a sense of unity . . . For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the eastern and western cultures. We will continue to encourage diversity in our society, but we must also reaf rm and respect the ne traditional Chinese values, including lial piety, love for the family, modesty and integrity, and the desire for continuous improvement. We value plurality, but discourage open confrontation; we strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; we respect minority views but also shoulder collective responsibilities. (Tung, 1997)
Experimental Constitutive Stories of Citizen Identity and Collective Memories
While Tung’s intentions are obvious, the question remains whether the people of Hong Kong will accept such constitutive stories of their citizen identity. Apart from the fact that neo-Confucianism and Asian values are a bit anachronistic to the people of Hong Kong, the complexity of the question of Hong Kong identity also makes Tung’s goals dif cult to achieve. The development of Hong Kong society has increased the multiplicity of a postcolonial Hong Kong identity. Hong Kong’s people are both traditional and modern, cosmopolitan and familial,
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eccentric and conventional, apathetic and populist, materialistic and post-materialistic, and so on. It is the hybridity of this identity that keeps the city’s culture constantly in reformation, and it is still open to various possibilities. Also, for many, the discourses of neo-Confucianism and Asian values are rather hard to swallow. At the most, the ideas of homogeneity, consensus and harmony stressed by these values can only be a partial description of the identity of some sectors of the popula- tion. Also, there are obviously dif culties in invoking an imagination of community that unites people only around the theme of nationalism and not democracy, as democratic ideals have been part and parcel of the people’s identity since the 1990s. Indeed, post-uni cation Hong Kong has been like an experimental ground for constitutive stories of citizenship. In this respect, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government is certainly more imaginative than the colonial government, and its efforts are certainly comparable to those of any postcolonial government in the world. After the neo-Confucian and Asian values discourses, government of cials also invoked other stories to cultivate community cohesiveness, notably the ‘Lion Rock myth’ raised by former Financial Secretary Antony Leung Kam-chung. Lion Rock is a geographical landmark in Hong Kong. In the 1970s, a television drama series entitled “Below the Lion Rock,” produced by the government’s Radio Television Hong Kong and featur- ing stories of lower class people, was very popular and furthered the government’s attempts to consolidate a Hong Kong identity. Typically, the myth was embedded with nostalgic feelings, praise of traditional values such as hard work, mutual help and tolerance, and a community spirit believed to underpin Hong Kong’s economic takeoff in the 1970s. It urged a return to these virtues and a community of good people working to overcome their hardships. It is true that these memories were part of the collective memory and therefore might have been appealing, but they were not well received. There were many reasons for this rejection. Critics considered these narratives an undisguised means of discursive control and excuses on the part of the government to try to shirk its responsibility to the people.10 Also, Hong Kong has never been as harmonious as suggested, and the
10 See, for example, the criticisms of Cheung Man-yee published in the South China Morning Post, April 24, 2002, 16. Cheung was the producer of “Below the Lion Rock” and formerly the Director of Broadcasting in the colonial government.
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core values acknowledged by the people of Hong Kong at large appear quite different than those the government and the ruling elite imagine. This was re ected in a recent call by well-known local academics and professionals to uphold Hong Kong’s core values, including freedom and democracy, and only more remotely the virtues of endurance, diligence and unquestioned obedience as promoted by the government and ruling elite.11 Hong Kong identity has changed to an extent and in ways that the political leaders have failed to recognize. Tung’s dilemma was that although he perceived the need for common memories to support the language of citizenship, he had to be very careful in his choice of frameworks. Too much solidarity on unwanted issues, such as democracy, would be harmful to governance. Within the depictions of good citizenship as patriotic, cooperative and socially responsible, together with the promotion of neo-Confucianism, Asian values and the Lion Rock myth, we see the government’s deep fear of losing control over its people. Parallel to the Lion Rock myth, the government also went back to an economic concept of citizenship, invoking the economic theme of self-reliance. In contrast to the previously mentioned exhortations, this narrative seems to have worked quite well up until now. It matches the capitalistic tradition of the city and the government’s intentions to reaf- rm economic development as the society’s primary goal. It also serves political functions. Amidst the economic downturn in Hong Kong, the theme of self-reliance served to provide the “losers” with individualized explanations for why they failed and solutions to their plight. In the recent controversies about whether Hong Kong’s people can directly elect their Chief Executive in 2007 and all Legislative Council members in 2008, economic narratives were developed further. Although it is no surprise that Chinese government of cials and members of the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong labeled the city as an economic city and restated economic reconstruction as its primary goal, it is amazing that the individual pursuit of economic well-being was packaged as the
11 Recently, there has been a pervasive fear that Hong Kong is losing its freedom, as witnessed by the resignation of three renowned radio talk-show hosts. All of them alleged that because they were critical of the Hong Kong and the mainland govern- ments, they received threats authorized by the latter. The radio talk-show programs were well-known and important platforms for articulating public opinion in the city. In response to these incidents, some sections of the population, such as professionals and academics, called for a defense of freedom of speech in Hong Kong. See, http://www. hkcorevalues.net/b5_declar.htm.
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society’s collective goal. In this discourse, the city was urged by mainland leaders to reconsider its priorities, which should be economic develop- ment and preservation of such prerequisites for economic development as stability, to be China’s world-class city, and to achieve a decent living standard for everyone, rather than political reforms.12 Hong Kong has been compared intermittently with other international cities such as New York and London. Such talk thus serves to redirect the efforts of Hong Kong society to an economic rather than a political agenda by boosting the economic identity of its people. It is hoped that in the end the people’s economic identity will absorb their political identity, or they would simply forgo their political identity. If, as Smith argues, political narratives have any signi cance in the making of citizenship, it is the depoliticizing functions of certain political narratives that have worked hand in hand with the aforementioned economic talk in Hong Kong. The of cial notions of citizenship and community are unsurpris- ingly constricted and thin.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have critically examined government discourses on citizenship in Hong Kong from the 1960s to the present. By making special reference to three public events—the 1966 Star Ferry riots, the 1981 riots, and the scuf es in 2002—I have reconstructed the meanings of good citizenship as promoted by both the colonial and post-colo- nial governments. I have also traced the governmental understanding of community through the development of the policies on youth and citizenship education in the city from the 1960s onward. The idea of citizenship as promoted by the colonial and post-colo- nial governments is depoliticized. It places exclusive importance on the values of economic independence and contribution, and lauds an enterprising characteristic of citizenship. Also, stressing civic obedience and responsibility instead of rights and critical judgment, it is narrowly de ned politically. For both the colonial and post-colonial govern- ments, economic stories intertwined with political stories to provide
12 For example, Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed serious concerns over the debate on political reform in Hong Kong, and claimed that the most pressing priority for the city was to stand united to improve the economy. See South China Morning Post, April 24, 2004.
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notions of good citizenship that provided individualized explanations and hope for those who had thus far failed. While the discourses on citizenship of both governments are on the whole depoliticized, the colonial government gave weight to the need for repoliticization by initiating proto-democratic reforms from the 1980s onward, and the post-colonial government gave weight to the need for renationalization. Although both governments recognized that community identi cation was a prerequisite for the development of good citizenship, they feared that the solidarity thereby engendered would be too hot to handle. As a result, they chose to construct predominantly limited and shallow com- munity memories based on the themes of political passivity, economic self-reliance, and self-interest. In the government discourses on citizenship and community in Hong Kong, we see the merging of depoliticized, economic and constitu- tive narratives. However, the political narratives for making sense of citizenship suggested by Smith are packaged in highly depoliticized language, although they are similarly embedded with political intentions to strengthen governance. While the making of citizenship clearly indicates the prevalence of a depoliticized narrative in Hong Kong, it should be noted that the narrative has been paradoxically balanced by political activism at signi cant levels. Hong Kong society has had a rich history of collec- tive mobilization, numerous social organizations and an active media. Looking back, civil society in Hong Kong, such as the numerous civic and resident associations that were active during the colonial era, has contributed signi cantly to challenging the depoliticized narrative, and building up an active and democratic citizenship. These circumstances combine to make the process of citizenship building in Hong Kong highly interesting and complex.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Re ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso. Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed Books. ———. 1993. The Nations and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. City and New Territories Administration. 1992. Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Civic Education Committee, Education Department. 1985. Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
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Colonial Of ce (Constitution of Hong Kong: Correspondence 1946–52). CO 882, no. 2: part 2, para. 24. Commission of Inquiry on Kowloon Disturbances. 1967. Kowloon Disturbances 1966. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Commission on Youth. 1991. Charter for Youth. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Conover, Pamela J. 1995. Citizen identities and conceptions of the self. Journal of Political Philosophy. 3(2): 133–65. Curriculum Development Council. 1998. Syllabuses for Secondary School: Civic Education. Hong Kong: Education Department. ———. 1999. A Holistic Review of the Hong Kong School Curriculum: Proposed Reforms. Hong Kong: Education Department. Fanon, Frantz. 1965. A Dying Colonialism, trans. H. Chevalier. New York: Grove Press. Home Affairs Department. Various years of 1968–1980. Departmental Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Hong Kong Government. Various years of 1970 to 2000. Hong Kong Annual Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer. ———. 1966. Report of the Working Party on Local Administration. Hong Kong: Govern- ment Printer. Hong Kong SAR Government. 2001. Policy Objectives: The 2000 Policy Address. Hong Kong: Government Printer. ———. 2002. Policy Objectives: The 2001 Policy Address. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Lam, Wai-man. 2004. Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Lee, Wing-on. 1996. From depolitization to politization: the reform of civic educa- tion in Hong Kong in political transition. In Educational Reform: From Tradition to Postmodernity, ed. Chinese Comparative Education Society-Taipei. Taipei: Shih Ta Publishing. Ming Pao. April 1966; December 1981; December 2002. Morris, Paul and Anthony Sweeting. 1991. Education and politics: the case of Hong Kong from an historical perspective. Oxford Review of Education. 17: 249–67. Morris, Paul and Chan Ka-ki. 1997. The Hong Kong school curriculum and the political transition: politicisation, contexualisation and symbolic interaction. In Education and Political Transition: Implications of Hong Kong’s Change of Sovereignty, ed. Mark Bray and Lee Wing-on, pp. 101–118. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, the University of Hong Kong. Morris, Paul et al. 2000. Education, civic participation and identity: continuity and change in Hong Kong. Cambridge Journal of Education. 30(2): 243–62. Ng, Lawrence Yeung-yin. 1995. Re ections on riots in Hong Kong in the 1980s: a study in public disorder. M.A. dissertation in Public Order, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, in association with School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong. Oriental Daily. January 5, 2003. Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Various years of 1950–1968. Departmental Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Smith, Roger M. 2001. Citizenship and the politics of people-building. Citizenship Studies. 5(1): 73–96. Social Welfare Department. Various years of 1948–2003. Departmental Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer. South China Morning Post. April 24, 2002, p. 16. Tsang, Steve Y.S. 1988. Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945–1952. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Tsang, Wing-kwong. 1995. National and citizenship education. Education Journal. 23(2): 1–26. Tse, Kwan-choi. 1999. Citizenship education in Hong Kong: problems and Issues. Journal of Youth Studies. 2(1): 177–86. Tung, Chee-hwa. 1997a. Speech at the celebration of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, July 1. ———. 1998a. Speech at the Gala Banquet of the International Forum of Leaders in Higher Education, July 4. ———. Various years of 1997b–2003. Policy Address. Hong Kong: Government Printer. Wah Kiu Yat Pao. April 1966; December 1981. Wong, Eddie Kwok-wai. 1996. An analysis of disorder in Hong Kong society. M.A. dissertation in Public Order, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, in association with School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong. Yau, Shing-mo et al. (eds.). 1983. A Study of Youth Problems in Hong Kong. In Chinese. Hong Kong: Chun Sin Publishing.
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Globalization and Hybridization in Cultural Production: A Tale of Two Films
Georgette Wang and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh
Hybridity, Hybridization and Global Culture
Globalization has been seen as a process, but also a project; a reality, but also a belief (Mattelart, 2002). There is continuing debate over its onset, de nition and end result. Many believe that a global culture will emerge with the rise of globalization. Yet opinions are divided over what the nature of this culture will be whether it will be a single, homogeneous system that is characterized by convergence and the presence of the universal in the particular (Wallerstein, 1990), or whether it will be an ensemble of particulars that features long-distance interconnectedness (Hannerz, 1996). With the rise of post-colonialism, the concept of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) has become a new facet of the debate about global culture in the social sciences. Hybridity, according to Bhabha, opens up what he calls a third space within which elements encounter and transform each other (Young, 1995; Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 170). It is, at the same time, the site of struggle and resistance against imperialist powers (Kraidy, 2002, p. 316). With the goal of abolishing the distinctions between center and periphery, and other forms of binarism, this post-colonial inter- pretation of cultural change is a signi cant departure from the linear diffusion model of the West to the rest. It directly challenges the idea of essentialism, according to Pieterse (1995, p. 64), because it unsettles the introverted concept of culture, a concept that underlies ideologies such as romantic nationalism, racism and cultural essentialism. It helps to release us from the boundaries of nation, community, ethnicity or class, while presenting a kaleidoscope of collective experience in motion. In the globalization debate, hybridization presents yet another scenario for the outcome of cultural globalization besides hegemonic Westernization and postmodern diversity. The concept of hybridiza- tion, however, falls short of acknowledging structural inequalities, and
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has allegedly become a neocolonial discourse that is complicit with transnational capitalism (Dirlik, 1997; Kraidy, 2002, Friedman, 2000, p. 3). Another, perhaps more fundamental, weakness of the concept of hybridity lies with its intellectual power. The histories of the hybridiza- tion of metropolitan cultures, as Pieterse (1995, p. 64) indicated, show that hybridization, with its downturns and upswings, its go-slows and its turns of speed, has been taking place all along. Moreover, hybridiza- tion is not unique only to certain societies; the creolizing spectrum, as Hannerz pointed out, extends from the First World metropolis to the Third World village (Hannerz, 1987, p. 555). Hybridity, therefore, is the ongoing condition of all human cultures, which contain no zones of purity because they undergo continuous processes of transculturation, as Rosaldo (1995, p. xv) concluded. In this sense, hybridization is a tautology, and globalization has brought about nothing more than the hybridization of hybrid cultures. The paucity of communications research on this topic indicates the ontological and political quandaries that are inherent in using the concept as an analytical device (Kraidy, 2002, p. 317). Nowhere can we nd more convincing and abundant evidence for the hybridiza- tion of the hybrid than in cultural products, as imitation, borrowing, appropriation, mutual learning, and representation erode all possibilities for authentic cultural production. In an interview with the New York Times, Baz Luhrmann, the Australian director of the Hollywood lm Moulin Rouge, admitted that the idea to combine high comedy, high tragedy and song and dance in that lm was deeply in uenced by popular Hindi, or Bollywood, lms (Shome and Hegde, 2002, p. 184). Bollywood lms, in turn, draw on mythological epics, classical, folk, and modern theatre, and MTV and Hollywood for inspiration, and thus are hybrids in themselves (Ciecko, 2001, p. 125). To those in the business of cultural production, boundaries and restrictions serve to sti e, rather than enhance, creativity. The issue here is not one of nding evidence for hybridization in cultural products, but, given the globalized production practices in the cultural industries, of discovering the terms and conditions under which it takes place, the way in which hybridization has been achieved, and the cultural features that the end products exhibit. As Chan pointed out (2001, p. 4), we are experiencing a give and take among cultures that encounter each other, a multifaceted and complex working of forces. However, nagging questions remain about who has given and taken what, what has been the result of such give and take within the exist-
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ing industrial framework, and what the implications of the answers to these questions are for the cultural globalization debate.
Deculturalization, Aculturalization and Reculturalization
As cable and satellite television mushroomed in the 1990s, the demand for lms and television programs grew twenty-fold and more, leading to the localization of global products and the globalization of local products on an unprecedented scale. This phenomenon allows produc- ers to borrow ideas to enlighten an established story model or to make content adjustments to cater to the needs of a different audience, but it also creates a need to adapt, repackage or transform an existing product to make it more appealing to different viewer groups. In meeting the needs and tastes of different viewer groups or simply as a re ection of the way production is organized today a set of content design strategies has emerged that removes, incorporates, transforms, or rede nes elements that relate either to a speci c geographical loca- tion, time, social, political and economic setting, or to cultural values and practices. Lee (2003) used the term de-localization to describe the minimiza- tion of local elements to create content that is least objectionable to a larger, more diversi ed audience both in form (e.g., dubbing) and content, and the term re-localization to describe the incorporation of local elements into transnational products. The same concepts can be used to describe the globalization of local products, and the localiza- tion of global products. For lms such as Mulan, the meaning of local is expanded from covering the spatial to encompassing a combination of the spatial and the temporal, or more precisely, it takes on a cultural denotation. Through a process of deculturalization, all of the elements that are culture-speci c, including those that are ethnic, historical or religious, that create barriers to intercultural reception or are deemed un t for a new presentation style, may be contained in a familiar narrative pat- tern that not only plays down cultural differences but also guarantees comprehension across viewer groups. The result is the emergence of a new breed of lms and television programs the aculturalized cultural product. In analyzing the presence of Japanese cultural products in Asia, Iwa- buchi (2002, p. 257; 2000) noted that one of the major reasons for their
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popularity is a lack of Japaneseness, the fact that they do not invoke images of Japan, and thus of Japanese cultural presence. Mu-kokuseki, a Japanese term that is the equivalent of acultural, refers to something or someone that lacks any nationality, and the erasure of racial or eth- nic characteristics and any context which would embed the characters in a particular culture or country. This feature not only characterizes Japanese animation, but also other Japanese products such as karaoke, computer games, comics or televised singing contests. In place of tradi- tional icons such as the kimono dress, bon dance and sumo wrestling, Japanese cultural products now feature cute cartoon characters with big round eyes and girls with knee-high socks. This cultural odorlessness, which now gives Japanese cultural exports an effective competitive edge, is itself a product of American domination in the 1950s and the early part of 1960s, according to Iwabuchi (2002, p. 260). American television programs and most Hollywood blockbusters have long been accused of following a universal formula that enables them to cross cultural barriers and capture a transnational market the same cultural facelessness as is found in Japanese products. They typically present a fantasy world of romance and adventure (Wang, 2001a). Constructed with dazzling visual and audio effects and easily comprehensible story lines, these fantasy worlds are full of dangers that rarely fail to hold the undivided attention of viewers regardless of age, gender, ethnic, religious, social, and cultural differences. Although deculturalization may be the key to entering the global market, its acultural outlook may in fact be deceptive, as storytelling cannot be accomplished without touching on beliefs, attitudes, values, and behavioral patterns. When characters are pushed into action and decisions are made, the underlying beliefs and values emerge. It does not take a careful viewer to notice that in the cultural blender of Holly- wood blockbusters, superheroes, space ghters, young adventurers and even the charming princes of the animal kingdom are depicted as high achievers who, rising from below, play the role of guardians of freedom, equality and peace. Reculturalization, therefore, is often as symbiotic with deculturalization as it is with aculturalization.
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A Tale of Two Films
In 2001, a Chinese-language martial arts lm became the highest grossing foreign-language lm in the history of Hollywood (Lahr, 2003, p. 72).1 The lm, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, has almost every ingre- dient needed to make it authentically Chinese. Adapted from a novel published in China in the early 1930s, it features a romantic martial arts story that is set in ancient China. The Chineseness of the lm is also characterized by dazzling sword- ghting scenes, period costumes, an iconic Chinese setting and an all-Chinese cast who speak Mandarin throughout. However, one aspect of the lm production sets it apart from other Chinese martial arts lms: it was made with an eye on the market beyond Greater China, was nanced through international presale,2 bonds and bank loans, and was distributed by a transnational distributor. Despite the attacks that the lm has received from critics, its market success in repackaging an ethnic story for a global audience manifests two closely linked characteristics of cultural production today: the indispensable role of the capitalist mechanism in nancing, market- ing and distribution, and the emergence of cultural fusion and hybrid- ization as a prevailing strategy for transnational content design. Strictly speaking, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is not the rst lm of its kind to feature a speci c Chinese location, characters, actions and narrative motifs. Chinese stories or historical backgrounds are nothing new in Hollywood. Hollywood’s interest in Chinese themes or motifs began in the second decade of the twentieth century. Many of the lms that employ such themes have been criticized either for enhancing the stereotypes of China under Western imperialism, or for recreating what Edward Said calls an Oriental fantasy. However, this has not stopped Hollywood from appropriating Chinese stories or from utilizing a Chinese setting. Mulan is the most prominent example in recent history of Hollywood borrowing Oriental narratives and repackaging them as global blockbusters. In contrast to Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, which is a Chinese-owned, Chinese-made art lm with similar objectives, Mulan is a distinctly Hollywood lm with a clear corporate product
1 This record has recently been broken by yet another high grossing foreign language lm, The Passion of the Christ (2004). 2 International presale is a method for lmmakers to raise funds through the sale of the showing rights before shooting begins. It was introduced to the US in the 1980s by the Italian producer De Laurentis (Wasser, 1995, p. 430).
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differentiation for global consumption. Despite the Chinese origin of its story, as a Disney animation picture, Mulan is a global product par excellence.3 Its transformation of a Chinese folktale into a global box of ce success testi es to the spiral process of hybridization. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Mulan thus represent two different kinds of hybridization in the current mediascape of global cultural ow. One employs a glocal strategy of incorporating transnational nancing models and the aesthetics of art house cinema into the making of a seemingly local story; the other usurps a story of foreign origin and adds it to the gigantic Disney pantheon. Both are hybridized entertainment products, but they display different approaches to the process of mixing and matching distinct cultural and social elements. In the following, we employ the terms deculturalization, aculturalization and reculturaliza- tion to describe and analyze the many faces of hybridization. In telling the stories of two hybrids, we tease out a detailed description of the compound conditions of globalization. We argue that globalization and hybridization, as is illustrated by our case studies, have become ever more intertwined and multivalent, and are far from being a one-way ow of capital, talent and ideas.
The Chinese Heroine and American Multiculturalism: Deculturalization, Reculturalization and Aculturalization The Mulan story is based on a popular ballad that was written during the Northern Wei Dynasty (386 A.D. to 534 A.D.) about a legendary fourteen-year-old girl, Mulan, who joins the army in place of her aging father to ght invaders from the north. There are several renditions of the story, although they all share the similar premise of the incred-
3 Although its revenues are dwarfed by the dazzling global successes of blockbuster series such as The Lord of Rings, Harry Potter, or Star Wars, Mulan grossed US$303,500,000, and was ranked 66th (http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/Theater/3540/topworld. htm) in the top-100 list of all-time worldwide box of ce successes, only a few places behind Schindler’s List and Air Force One. It is also one of Disney’s ten most pro table lms. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, with a box-of ce total of US$213,200,000 and numerous international awards, including the Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film Award, was the most successful “non-American lm” ever made. Judging from the box of ce returns, both Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Mulan achieved a success that went well beyond cultural boundaries, an accomplishment that is especially signi cant given that Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was originally targeted at art theaters outside of the Greater China region.
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ibility of Mulan’s ability to pass as a man and a ghter. Mulan’s father is suffering from various ills when the draft arrives. The draft requires at least one man from each household to join the army to defend the country. Mulan, as a lial daughter, volunteers to join the army hiding her gender in her father’s place. Mulan miraculously survives the ten- year war against the invaders, and ghts so well that she is decorated by the emperor. However, she declines the emperor’s offer of a high appointment to return home to her parents. The story, which features Mulan as a role model, is one of the ten most popular folk tales in China, and exempli es both lial piety and patriotism. It has been adapted into operas, television series and at least two lms in China prior to the Disney production. The Chinese star Michelle Yeoh has adapted it again into a martial arts picture called Hua Mulan (forthcom- ing) with special effects and location shooting in China. Compared with the Chinese story in its various forms, signi cant changes have been introduced to the Disney rendition, whereas the previous Chinese lm adaptations are relatively unadulterated. What should be noted here are the strategies employed by Disney to transform a Chinese legend into a modern, entertaining product with a cultural distinction or avor. The entertainment commodity, true to the Disney brand, contains a kernel of American-style individualism in the context of ethnic and gender assertion. This is in contradiction to the ideology of the Chinese source material. Mulan is introduced in the Disney lm by a series of comic gags that are built on misunderstandings and bickering, which are typical of early Disney cartoons such as Silly Symphonies (1927). This is con- trary to the way in which Mulan is introduced in the original Chinese story. The Chinese ballad begins with Mulan retiring to the traditional women’s place of the loom, and contemplating ways in which to help her family. Whereas the Chinese story characterizes Mulan as a quiet and thoughtful girl in the domestic sphere who attends to duties such as weaving, the Disney Mulan is sprightly, tomboyish and un t to be an ideal wife. This major difference represents the familiar dichotomy between old China and the modern West. Whereas the Chinese story immediately proceeds to Mulan’s course of action as a lial daughter, Disney’s Mulan spectacularly fails her bridal test. Dejected, she begins to have doubts about herself. The opportunity for redemption comes when the war breaks out. She wants to prove to her family and herself that she can bring the family honor, not by marriage, but by taking
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on the male duty of ghting a war. Therefore, we have a major shift from the Chinese cultural trait of lial piety to the pursuit of a sense of selfhood. Another signi cant change in the Disney version of the story of Mulan relates to the issues of cross-dressing and sexual ambiguity. In the Chinese ballad they are handled with subtlety and a wry under- standing of the (im)plausibility of a woman serving in the army as a man. In the original story, Mulan is not discovered to be a woman until she decides to return home. Accompanied by her fellow soldiers, Mulan arrives home and immediately changes back into her old dress. Seeing a great warrior in a woman’s dress, her companions are shocked: for ten years, they had no idea that she was a woman! The Chinese commentary concludes by drawing an analogy to explain the ambiguity of sexual identity and how it can easily fool the eye of the beholder. Perhaps Mulan does look like a man, which in turn questions the assumptions of sexual stereotyping. This subversive coda was considered too threatening for Disney’s popular image and they neutralized it by having Mulan’s identity disclosed in the middle of the story, a typical narrative development in which obstacles have to be created for the heroine to overcome to achieve nal victory. In the lm, Mulan is expelled from her military duties when her identity is revealed, but soon after she proves that girls can ght and ght even better than men. The necessity of cross-dressing becomes, in the end, a shrewd military tactic. To animate a Chinese story that was unfamiliar to the rest of the world, at least two processes of cultural hybridization were involved. The rst has to do with the blending of cultural iconography and the sounds of ancient China, complete with pagodas, willow trees and ow- ing robes, and classical Chinese music. These Chinese cultural icons may simply be used instrumentally to ensure a façade of otherness. In the second process, Disney’s Mulan signi es Hollywood’s packaging of multiculturalism that glori es the multiplicity of culture, ethnicity, nation, gender and race. Consider the various voices that dub the main characters of the lm: African American Eddie Murphy for the mini dragon, Mushu; Chinese American Ming-na Wen for Mulan; B.D. Wong for Mulan’s commanding of cer General Li Shang; and James Hong for Mulan’s fellow soldier, Chi Fu. It is apparent that the Disney version of Mulan wishes to present itself as a multicultural lm for a wider demographic that is inclusive of white, Jewish, African and Asian Americans. To do this, Disney
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plays with several extant stereotypes of Asian Americans and their culture. The name Mushu immediately brings to mind ethnic food, Mushu pork being a popular Chinese takeout food in America. Hence, Mushu is a highly recognizable ethnic-comic type that calls to mind various generic conventions, just as his name conjures up a delicious and cheap stir-fried pork dish with vegetables. What is more interesting in Disney’s typecasting of Mushu is the choice of voice artist for the mini-dragon Eddie Murphy. Murphy is a big star who is known for playing swaggering wisecracking characters in mainstream American comedy action lms. In the successful Beverly Hills Cop movies, Murphy plays not a loser, but a sh out of water who nevertheless beats the uptight Caucasians on their own turf. Similarly, in Mulan, nobody eats Mushu, but he is a runt and an underdog, a good-for-nothing dragon who is trying to earn his stripes. At the beginning he is craven, stupid and driven by status. This makes him a good parallel to Mulan herself, as at the beginning of the lm she also is a good-for-nothing daughter: the you ll bring honor to us all song is highly ironic, given her tomboy inclinations. Mulan is unsuited to her feminine destiny by respectable patriarchal standards. Similarly, Mushu lacks the stature and mystical powers that are appropriate to a Chinese dragon, yet both prove themselves in the end. Mulan successfully passes herself off as a soldier and a leader of men, which takes place under cover of gender when her band of brothers in ltrates the palace and defeats the Huns by going in drag. Mushu gets the assignment to help Mulan by pretending to be the great stone dragon. He fools the chief ancestor, and tries to fool Mulan in the next scene (her horse stomps all over him), but he proves himself useful to her despite his diminutive size. Both Mulan and Mushu prevail through imposture and guile, while managing to hold on to their real characters. The message of the lm implies, and the song at the end Be True to Your Heart explicitly states, that proof of authenticity does not come from one’s social role but from who one is inside and the need to stick to that. In the end, Mulan manages to meet her father’s expectations and restores the fam- ily honor and, as is typical of Disney heroines (Wasko, 2001, p. 116), nds her prince charming. Such have-it-all endings can only be possible in the popular imagination, but not in practice, as in Chinese feudal societies family honor has never been the business of daughters. The values that the lm endorses are not simply those of family love or even individual freedom, but speci cally the true value of authenticity, of
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the recognition of one’s identity, and the celebration of the triumph of the will and the victory of the underdog. These values are all too familiar in Hollywood blockbusters (Wang, 2001). Thus the story, although set in ancient China, is resolutely modern and American, in which the dark past of the other is represented by two minor but annoying characters, the matchmaker and the prime minister. One is a fussy gatekeeper of traditional femininity, and the other is an of cious, mean-spirited bureaucrat who cares only about the rules. Through the obese, meticulous and rigid caricature of the matchmaker, the lm criticizes the view that the role of women is limited only to that of the virtuous wife. The prime minister is characterized as a tiny, physically un t meddler, whose only priority is to make sure that the rules will be followed. Together, they encapsulate the old, out- moded traditions and practices of feudal China, and everything that the modern Disney Mulan is up against. With the Confucian doctrines of loyalty, lial piety and ideal femi- ninity represented as ancient, if not primitive, ideologies, the introduc- tion of gender equality and contemporary concepts of femininity, and the erasure of the gender bending that is speci c to Chinese theatre,4 the Mulan story was remade into a timeless legend aimed at Disney’s family audience that celebrates universal, acultural values of love, courage and independence. Even the history of con icts between the Chinese and the so-called barbarians of the north is depicted as a type of medieval warfare that could occur at any time and in any place in human history.
Pathways to the Crossover Market: Cultural Negotiations in Global Cultural Production What the Disney producers have done to the Chinese ballad of Mulan is far from unprecedented. Similar to the disappearance of lial piety and loyalty from the Disney lm Mulan, the issue of social hierarchy, which is central to the novel of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, was side- stepped in the lm version. Like Mulan, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is a
4 It is important to note that Hua Mulan’s persistent presence in Chinese popular memory is largely to its endless renditions in operas. By gender bending, we refer to standard practices in Chinese opera such as cross-dressing in all-male troupes in Peking opera, and women’s troupes in regional opera. The Hua Mulan story conveniently casts the woman warrior at the center of stage, as us required by both the story and the institution of Chinese opera.
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romantic martial arts story that centers on a young girl’s struggle toward self-discovery. The hidden dragon of the title refers to the sensational martial arts of Jiaolong (or Jen), which remain under wraps due to her background as the daughter of an imperial of cial. Jen’s secret passion is the jianghu, or outlaw demimonde of banditry and bodyguards. Like Mulan, she has a double life; her martial arts are practiced to serve dark, anarchic purposes. Unlike her mentor Jade Fox, she is not a villain, but a supremely gifted prodigy in need of guidance. Her martial arts need to be honed, turned into the virtues of justice and benevolence that are represented by her good mentors, Yu Xiulian and Li Mubai. Here we nd the central problem of the deculturalization process, because Jen’s domestication in a properly arranged marriage is sidelined in favor of the struggle for control of her martial arts. Compatibility of rank and social hierarchy was probably the main consideration for all marriages in feudal China. Given the supreme importance of social hierarchies, the sexual encounters between Jen, the high-born mistress of a noble family, and her bandit lover Lo (Tiger) would have been unthinkable, and they were therefore very carefully staged in Wang Dulu’s novel. First there is the removal of hostility when Lo, the charismatic bandit leader, rescues Jen from imminent death in the desert while dutifully keeping a physical distance from her, as is required of a gentleman. Second, there is the removal of hierarchical distance when Lo con des his family tragedy to her, implying that he was not low-born, and had possibly had quite a respectable background that was compatible with hers. Finally, there is the removal of personal distance when Jen, in an act of self-defense, unintentionally aggravates Lo’s injuries. His pain and agony triggers her sympathy and she turns to help, an act that eventually triggers love and passion. In the lm’s treatment of their romantic encounter, however, subtlety and decorum are replaced by libido and passion. When James Schamus was asked to rewrite one love scene between Jen and Lo in a romantic way with a modern sensibility, he added starry skies, falling stars, a desert, and solitude to the screenplay (Zhang and Lee, 2002, pp. 298–9). With solitude setting the two free from their social bondage, this backdrop prompts the disappearance of personal distance and justi es the explo- sion of passion. This sequence leaves out crucial information about Lo’s background, which is the key to Jen’s change of attitude toward Lo from animosity to sympathy. Instead, Director Ang Lee emphasizes Jen’s willful and intuitive propensity that leads her to live through impetuous emotion, rather than rationality.
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In the novel, the issue of social compatibility continuously haunts Jen. Wang Dulu repeatedly describes Jen’s inner deliberations on this problem, and emphasizes the contradictions between her choices and her true feelings. In the lm, however, Jen is depicted as a relatively at character who is devoid of any psychological dimension. This major difference may explain the change of emphasis that Lee makes at the end of the lm. The ending of the novel begins with a mysterious plan that Jen has carefully set up. The plan turns out to be the staging of her own suicide so that she can be reunited with her lover, Lo. However, the story does not end with their elopement, as might be expected by readers. Instead, Jen disappears by herself after a romantic night with Lo (Wang, Vol. 2, pp. 756–774). The stark contrast of social strata is the key to the suspension of a love relationship between Jen and Lo in the novel. Because of the irreversible hierarchical boundary between the two ill-fated lovers, Jen decides in the end to leave Lo. However, this essential obstacle that prevents a happy ending is greatly played down in the lm. The lm ends with the death of Jen’s two masters, which does not take place in the novel. The good master Li Mubai dies to save Jen’s life, but the evil master Jade Fox is also killed to set Jen free to go back to the desert with Lo. However, Jen does not choose the path to the ultimate happy ending. Instead, she falls off a cliff into a roaring falls. Therefore, Jen’s dif culty in trying to reconcile love and class is displaced by a sense of redemption and regret for her willful personality. Social strata was not the only factor that caused Ang Lee and his writers to make adjustments to the ending of the lm in contrast to the source material. The alteration was also due to the perception that popular Chinese ction is old fashioned, and the lm attempts to revive it with the forms and patterns of international art cinema. According to Ang Lee, several features of Chinese martial art ction and lms are considered incomprehensible and antiquated. One is the authors compulsive discussion and exposition of the motivations of the characters and cause-effect relationships. For instance, Wang Dulu adds an expository coda that is addressed directly to readers, which explains how and why Jen must choose to leave Lo in the end (Yeh and Davis, 2005). To readers who are unfamiliar with this crude convention in Chinese martial arts ction, it is problematic, because it assumes that readers lack the ability to surmise the story and must be told explicitly of the twists and turns in the plot arrangement. This type of literary trope also featured heavily in the popular lms that are derived from the
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martial arts tradition, including many both low-budget and major lms of the 1960s and 1970s. It might have been an acceptable practice in the past with a predominantly Chinese audience, but it probably would not work for a transcultural lm that is intended for a contemporary niche audience across cultural and national boundaries. Hence, Lee and his writers had to strip away this practice that was embedded in the source material. The lm must not come to an end with a closure, either narratively or ideologically, and so Lee stages what looks like a suicide, or a redemption, by allowing Jen to throw herself off a cliff of the Mudan mountain, which is known as a Taoist pure land. This ending gives rise to several possible interpretations. One is that Jen nds a level of self-awareness by choosing the path to death, which in the Taoist tenet signi es a way to enlightenment, the ultimate achievements of martial arts. This line of argument, however, could be re-interpreted by feminists who might see Jen’s action as a submission to cultural and social authorities. Conversely, the ending might also indicate a silent de ance of any attempt to contain the ying dragon. Jen leaps and ies away so that she is free from any social (class and hierarchy), cultural (gender) and sexual (romantic relationship) bounds. With this ambiguous ending that is open to various interpretations, the lm ful lls the expectations of an art lm audience, who would prefer to infer the meaning on their own. In searching for the nal meaning of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, the audience is given the opportunity and space for playful hermeneutics. Another major example of reculturalization is the language of the lm. The dialogue is a hybrid, and underwent various rounds of trans- lation, retranslation, writing and rewriting. The multi-layered writing comprises the work of Chinese-language scriptwriters Wang Hui-ling and Tsai Kuo-jong, Ang Lee’s own translation, James Schamus’s rewrite and overwrite, and Lee’s rewrite, and colloquial expressions, literary language, classical, provincial and Western and Chinese language (Zhang and Lee, 2002, p. 297). This mixed, hybrid language is not unproblematic, and has attracted criticism. For Ang Lee, the antiquity of the historical setting and the linguistic particularity of classical Chi- nese that is embedded in the story needed translation to contemporize an old text. Yet to critics in Taiwan and mainland China, Tiger’s love talk sounds too modern, largely as a result of the period inaccuracy of his language. Perhaps the most telling evidence of Lee’s efforts to make a Chinese lm that is globally accessible comes from the translation. According to
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Lee, when we did the subtitling we translated in a way to allow Western audiences access, nding equivalences to likely speech and syntax pat- terns in a Western context (Zhang and Lee, 2002, pp. 304–5). This was a daunting problem, because the English titles are not the same as the spoken dialogue at all, and it was like writing a whole new script. Doubling pairs of characters and organizing them into binaries middle-aged versus young, reserve versus passion, traditional versus modern, re ective versus impetuous also serve to make the theme of the lm comprehensible to global audiences. These binary themes are connected with the ideologies of individualism, obligation to society and to family, and hierarchical and social norms. They point toward Lee’s use of a formula (cf. Kristin Thompson) to create the clarity of value judgment that is a requirement of a global media commodity. They also point to Lee’s recreation of a modern martial art stage from old materials through the mixing of West and East, art and marketplace. The strategies of mixing, synthesizing, and hybridizing East and West may be similar in the making of both Mulan and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, but they were employed for quite different aims and entailed quite different outcomes.
Terms and Conditions of Hybridization
The background of the two production teams reveals interesting com- mon features that may explain the similarities in the measures that were adopted to achieve cultural hybridization. First, both teams had already accumulated signi cant experience in producing for the global market when they launched the lm project. Although Ang Lee’s team neither carries a transnational brand name like the Disney team, nor can it afford a production scale that is comparable to any Disney production, it does enjoy an international reputation that has helped it to acquire funding through international presale, bonds and bank loans. Second, both teams comprise members of different cultures who ensure the multivalence of the product, and both teams went through rounds of debate and negotiation before the nal product was hammered out. In the last stages, both teams managed postproduction tasks through an international division of labor, and both lms were marketed and distributed through transnational corporate networks with a global market reach.
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The similarities, however, stop here. Ang Lee, being ethnic Chinese, has attempted to instill a speci c cultural signi cance in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon that no member of the Disney team would be interested in. According to his autobiography, Lee saw Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon as the embodiment of a dream to prove to the world that martial arts stories can be made with a sense of artistic beauty. He also wanted to accomplish the mission of presenting a quality product to the world audience and to bring glory to Chinese lms (Zhang, 2002, p. 421). The creation, to him, re ects who he is, what he knows about, identi- es with, and the in uences that he has been exposed to, including his Chinese cultural upbringing and Western lm education. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon represents Ang Lee’s conception of ancient China and his vision of Chinese art and ethics. As a homage to earlier Chinese art directors such as King Hu, the martial arts in the lm are presented as a synthesis of Peking opera, kung-fu and the Taoist world view. Moreover, the narrative of the story does not strictly follow that of the classical Hollywood formula. In Ang Lee’s view, Chi- nese drama is built on the release of tension from suppression, which is contrary to Western drama, which feeds on the escalation of tension (Lahr, 2003). These features explain why Ang Lee stood rm when Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was charged with Westernization and of presenting a silent, Taoist image of China, a long-standing stereotype, to attract Western viewers. Lee did not deny having had foreign view- ers in mind when making the lm, but to him this did not mean that Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was just another Hollywood lm. It does not take many more examples to show that the mission that Ang Lee loaded onto Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is a rare exception in an industry that is ruled by capitalist logic and transnational cor- porations that link a global network. As critics (Dirlik, 1994, p. 349; Miller, et al., 2001) have pointed out, these transnationals hold the key to the current imbalanced market structure by forming business alliances, achieving vertical and horizontal integration, and buying out reproduction rights from independent and local producers. Yet within this tightly controlled business world, the possibility of raising funds through pre-sale, credit insurance, and bank loans, and of lm distribution through contract arrangements with transnationals, have opened up opportunities for a limited number of independent produc- ers with good credentials and creative ideas. Ang Lee con ded in his autobiography that the autonomy he has enjoyed in lmmaking comes
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with the back up of overseas investment and global distribution (Zhang, 2002, p. 257), and it is this autonomy that has allowed him the chance to realize his childhood dreams. This autonomy, however, does not translate into total freedom for lmmakers. Unbeknownst to Lee, both the source of investment for the lm and his dream of proving to the world have made it impossible not to deculturalize the original Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon story and the tradition of martial arts lmmaking. The clash of ideas and dif- ferent practices became evident in the production process, which was a painstaking dialogue and negotiation between cultures, old and new, East and West. It reached a climax at the scriptwriting stage, when the narration of the story unfolded. In his autobiography, Lee admitted that the Chinese social structure was one of the rst obstacles that he encountered in communicating with James Schamus, his long-time partner and one of two scriptwriters for the lm (Zhang and Lee, 2002, p. 287). What draws viewers to a different culture is curiosity, Lee said. Once their curiosity is aroused comes comprehensiveness. There is not much more to mutual understanding than logic and reason, and the reference framework that is constructed on the basis of common sense. Lee admitted, beyond these, crossing cultural barriers would become dif cult. To an outsider there are things about other cultures that are insen- sible, illogical or unreasonable, and yet are accepted without question as habits or traditions by the members of those cultures. To solve the problem, cultural elements that were deemed to be beyond common sense to Schamus were compromised. Given his cultural background and expertise, Schamus in this case did not stand for one person, but for mainstream values and a predominantly cosmopolitan worldview. In an interview, Schamus admitted that he began to understand how central the idea of the book is to the genre, and to the culture as a whole during the process of rewriting the script, and that he resolved to preserve its function and its importance (Teo, 2001). Yet it does not alter the fact that throughout the production process, the Chinese team relied on Schamus to sensitize its members with regard to what would be considered absurd or interesting from a Western perspective, pointing to the parts in the original work that should be omitted or elaborated, an exercise that was described by Lee as a frustrating, yet useful (Zhang and Lee, 2002, p. 292).
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Globalization and Hybridization: A Third Space? A Third Possibility?
In his more recent work, Homi Bhabha has extended his notion of hybridity to include forms of counter-authority, a third space that intervenes to affect the hybrid moment of political change. Here the transformation value of change lies in the re-articulation, or transla- tion, of elements that are neither the One (unitary working class) nor the Other (the politics of gender), but something else besides which contests the terms and territories of both (Young, 1995, p. 23). Hybridity, in this sense, involves the generation of new ways in which to understand and to generate possible new cultures. The birth of a third space, therefore, requires a process of dialectic discourse and re ective interaction through which ideas, values, and meaning clash and are negotiated and regenerated. Without this element, hybridity is not much more than a simple mixing and hybridizing to include forms that blend different elements. In practice, however, hybridity in cultural production is not always achieved through dialectical discourse among cultures, whether in an effort to globalize or to localize. Under the capitalist maxim of mini- mizing cost and maximizing pro t, hybridization is all too frequently reduced to hasty, cosmetic and even casual incorporations of different nominal elements. The localization of transnational text, for example, often involves no more than using local actors and actresses in trans- national advertisements, local hosts and players in licensed televised game shows, or, as is seen in some obscure soap operas, local names for cities and characters. Hybridity in these products, whether initiated by transnationals or local producers, may be common, yet has remained at the super cial level where the mainstream, as de ned by market size, permeates and prevails. As some have warned, localized products are not local products; they are essentially global. To go beyond this super cial level of hybridization, deculturalization and reculturalization become necessary. Deculturalization, as witnessed in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, is key to ensuring comprehension and acceptance by a global audience, as much as Lee would like to claim the Chineseness of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, it was necessary to remove, or play down, cultural values such as lial piety or social hierarchy, despite the autonomy of the lmmaker and his cultural background and aspirations, because the lm was tar- geted at the global market. What causes the difference in the type of hybridity that comes out of the process of transformation is the kind
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of reculturalization strategy that the lmmaker seeks to adopt, and the objectives that the lm is expected to achieve. For Disney’s Mulan, no cultural mission or personal vision was involved in producing the lm. Tony Bancroft, Mulan’s co-director. admitted that there were limitations to how Chinese the lm would be: we knew we had to respect the material, but the bottom line is we also knew we weren’t going to make a Chinese picture. We couldn’t We are not Chinese. In addition, Disney has already established a production model for its lms, which has a different sensibility, a different storytell- ing style (Chan, 2002, p. 237). Disney’s middle of the road approach to Mulan and the occasional deviation from Disney’s favorite formula5 was therefore a way in which to show respect for the original legend, a courtesy gesture that does not alter the fact that Mulan represents the transculturalization of an ethnic story by a transnational giant. To Disney managers, neither cost nor cultural literacy were a real problem, yet cultural fusion that goes beyond the level of their winning formula was deemed unnecessary in terms of corporate pro t. The authentic outlook of the lm gave the repackaging of the formula a fresh and exotic appearance, but it was important not to overkill the original context within which the story takes place, given the importance of the Chinese market. The level of hybridity achieved in these products, therefore, is instrumental in nature, and is no different from the hybridity that is found in most transnational advertisements or localized television serial dramas. Looking at the way in which Disney has built its animation kingdom through the adaptation of popular fairy tales and folk stories such as Aladdin and the Hunchback of Notre Dame, it can be seen that Tony Bancroft was merely following a Disney tradition that was established by Walt Disney himself. After deconstructing the process of cross-cultural re guration in The Three Caballeros, a Disney cartoon released in 1945, Burton-Carvajal (1994, p. 147) noted sincerity in Disney’s quest for ethnic originality. Yet to him, all these good intentions served but one purpose to mask the evidence hidden behind the comic frenzy and the authentic cultural appearance that no cultural reciprocities are created equal.
5 The Disney formula, according to Chan (2002), includes the following: good prevailing over evil, emotional catchy songs, cute animal sidekicks for comic relief, young romance, funny in-jokes, an assorted supporting cast with a grumpy to dopey personality range, and character voices performed by lm stars.
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The difference between Ang Lee and Tony Bancroft is therefore not just that of a brand-name independent producer/director versus a generic transnational executive, but is the difference in aim of the realization of a cultural mission and the production of another box of ce hit. Mulan and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon are both hybridized products, yet the aim and outcome of their reculturalization operations are distinctly different. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon is a rare case in which a re ective dia- lectical process was attempted. The paradox lies in the fact that the process was not intended to achieve cultural fusion. Rather, the purpose was to present a contemporary rendition of a classical Chinese work in a way that was acceptable to the West, and to change the stereotype of martial arts lms. In making Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon as a modern Chinese lm, Lee attempts to deconstruct the stereotypes of Chinese culture, cinema, and language. What critics noticed in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was the removal of traditional values, such as social hierarchy, from the story, the change in presentation style, and hence the lack of Chineseness. To its production team, however, Chineseness and authenticity did not exclude creativity and innovation. In response to the question of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon’s cultural authenticity, Schamus suggested a different interpretation of Oriental- ism which suggests that Orientalism lies as much in the perception of what one is from the perspective of the colonizers as in the perception of what one is not from the perspective of the colonizers. Schamus claimed that Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon was criticized for failing to be authentically Chinese or Asian because the idea that one can attain expertise in different cultural realms and feed it back into one’s own culture is essentially a Western idea and prerogative (Teo, 2001). Others non-Westerners are expected to stay faithful to their genres and to cultivate authenticity, much like a panda in a zoo, as Ang Lee put it. A Chinese product that has excluded certain Chinese cultural attributes and incorporated Western elements, from this perspective, is considered a fake and the result of cultural bastardization. This point touches on an important issue that has largely been overlooked in the literature, namely, the nature and characteristics of hybridized products other than their exhibition of features of the par- ent cultures. Many, including Schamus himself (Teo, 2001; Pong 2002; Wei, 2003), attributed the success of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon in the Western market to that which is identi ed as being Eastern in the lm, and the success (or failure) in Asia to that which is identi ed as
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being Western in the lm. The focus of attention was readily put on the question of the lm’s Chineseness or Easternness, yet there was less interest in seeing, if not a reluctance to see, the lm in its own right. What can a cultural product be if it is neither here nor there? To label a cultural product fake, in disguise, or authentic presumes the existence of a standard prototype that simply does not exist. The case of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon implies that modern cinema should not, and perhaps cannot, be restricted to national and aesthetic boundaries, because lmmaking appropriates anything that is fun and anything that the producers are able to create. It is no longer a secret that a great majority of the historical lms and soap operas which ll movie theaters and television channels in Greater China have also been deculturalized. Female characters no longer subject themselves to the tyranny of patriarchal rules, commoners casually play jokes on emperors, and children ght with their parents. The Chineseness of these cultural products lies in their ability to identify with, and attract, viewers in contemporary Chinese societies, rather than in a faithful re ection of stereotypical images of feudal China. We are reminded by Ulf Hannerz that cultures are by nature uid and are always in motion as the result of continuing interaction and discourse both from within the culture itself and with the outside world. Both Bakhtin and Levi-Strauss noted, each from their own perspective, that all cultures are hybrids (Werbner, 1997). However, it is important to also note that the constant motion and incorporation of different elements brings with it new characteristics, new distinctions, and new similarities. From this perspective, perhaps hybridization and globalization do lead to the loss of cultural distinctiveness in cultural products and in cultures as well. However, by losing what was there, we are presented with something new, something fresh, something that represents yet another hybrid. It is only when we lose sight of the dynamic nature of culture and lock ourselves into a quest for cultural essentialism that the hybridization of cultural products will necessarily lead to stale homogeneity. Globalization may have stepped up the process and scale of the hybridization of cultural production, and may favor certain elements over others, but it has hardly changed the nature of the process.
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Bhabha, H. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Burton-Carvajal, J. 1994. Surprise Package: Looking Southward with Disney, in Disney Discourse, edited by E. Smoodin. New York: Routledge. Chan, J.M. 2002. Disneyfying and Globalizing the Chinese Legend Mulan: A Study of Transculturation, pp. 225–248 in In Search of Boundaries: Communication, Nation- states and Cultural Identities, edited by Joseph Man Chan and Bryce T. McIntyre. Westport, Connecticut, London: Ablex Publishing. Ciecko, A. 2001. Superhit Hunk Heroes for Sale: Globalization and Bollywood’s Gender Politics. Asian Journal of Communication 11:2, 121–143. Dirlik, A. 1994. The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, Critical Inquiry 20, 328–56. ———. 1997. Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism. Durham, Duke University Press. Friedman, T. 2000. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books. Hannerz, U. 1987. The World in Creolisation, Africa 57:4, 546–560. ———. 1996. Transnational Connections. London and New York: Routledge. Iwabuchi, K. 2002. Recentering Globalization: Popular culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press. ———. 2000. To Globalize, Regionalize, or Localize Us, That is the Question: Japan’s Response to Media Globalization, pp. 142–159 in The New Communica- tion Landscape: Demystifying Media Globalization, edited by G. Wang, J. Servaes and A. Goonasekera. London: Routledge. Kraidy, M.M. 2002. Hybridity in Cultural Globalization, Communication Theory 12:3, 316–339. Lahr, J. June 30, 2003. Becoming the Hulk, The New Yorker, pp. 72–81. Lee, C.C. 2003. Media Business Strategies in the Global Era: From a Connectivity Perspective, Mass Communication Research 75, 1–36. Mattelart, A. 2002. An Archaeology of the Global Era: Constructing a Belief, Media Culture and Society 24: 591–612. Miller, T., Govil, N., McMurria, J. and Maxwell, R. 2001. Global Hollywood. London: British Film Institute. Papastergiadis, N. 2000. The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization, and Hybridity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. Pierterse, J.N. 1995. Globalization as Hybridization, pp. 45–68 in Global Modernities, edited by M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson. London, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. Pong, Jixiang. 2002. Chinese Visual Arts under the Globalization discourse, pp. 1–12 in Globalization and the Destiny of the Chinese Film and Television, edited by Zhang F., Huang Z and Hu Z. Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Academy. Rosaldo, R. 1995. Foreword, pp. xiv–xxi in N.G. Calclini, Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity. Minneapolis: University of Minnestoa Press. Shome, R. and Hegde, R.S. 2002. Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Globalization, Critical Studies in Media Communication 19:2, 172–189. Teo, S. April–May, 2001. Love and Swords: The Dialectics of Martial Arts Romance. Senses of Cinema (http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/11/crouching. html). ———. March–April, 2001. We Kicked Jackie Chan’s Ass! An Interview with James Schamus Senses of Cinema (http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/01/13/ schamus.html). Thompson, K. 1999. Storytelling in the New Hollywood. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har- vard University Press.
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Wallerstein, I. 1990. Culture is the World-System: A Reply to Boyne pp. 63–66 in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, edited by M. Featherstone. London: Sage. Wang, D.L. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (1985) 2 vols. Taipei: United Literature. Wang, G. July 12–13, 2001a. Hollywood the Global vs. Taiwan the Local: Universal Formula and Beyond, paper presented at the International Conference on Trans- culturalism, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. Wang, G., L.L. Ku, and C.C. Liu 2000. Local and National Cultural Industries: Is there Life after Globalization? pp. 52–73 in The New Communications Landscape: Demystifying Media Globalization, edited by G. Wang, J. Servaes, and A. Goonasekera. London: Routledge. Wasko, J. 2001. Is It a Small World, After All? Pp. 3–30 in Dazzled by Disney? Edited by J. Wasko, M. Phillips and E.R. Meechan. London: Leicester University Press. Wei, T. 2003. From Local to Global: Critique on the Globalization of Taiwan Cinema, paper presented at 2003 Focus on Taiwan Cinema, Nov 28–30, 2003, Taipei, Taiwan. Werbner, P. 1997. Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity, in Debating Cultural Hybridity, edited by P. Webner and T. Modood. London: ZED Books. Young, R. 1995. Colonial Desire: Hybridity, Culture, and Race. New York: Routledge. Yeh, E. and D. Davis 2005. Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island. New York: Columbia University Press. Zhang, J.P. and Ang Lee. 2002. A Ten-Year Movie Dream. Taipei: Times Culture.
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Globalization and Identity Formation: A Cross-cultural Reading of Amy Tan’s “Sagwa, the Chinese Siamese Cat”
Lu Fang
Introduction
Childhood and adolescence play crucial roles in the process of iden- tity formation. Experiences and education during this period shape a person’s worldview and determine a possible future self. There is a Chinese popular saying: “The youth can be known by three, and by seven know how the elder will be.”1 It is always a great challenge for parents and educators to provide children with positive values and beliefs and a healthy social environment. However, this challenge becomes more rigorous for people who have left their homeland and make a living in other countries. The sense of uprooting and the dilemma in straddling between different cultures create enormous confusion and identity crises for both adults and children. This phenomenon is quite common among Asian North Americans, and has been addressed in the writings of many of second or third generation Asian North American writers.2 Many of us may have been impressed by Amy Tan’s3 portrayal in The Joy Luck Club of the frustra- tion of raising children in a society different from that of the parents. Lindo, one of the mothers in this novel says, that “I wanted my children to have the best combination: American circumstances and Chinese character. How could I know these two things do not mix?” (Tan, 1989,
1 Chinese saying, 中國民間諺語, “三歲知小, 七歲知老,” trans. Dr. Jan Walls, talk with author, January 20, 2004. 2 Such as Louis Chu’s Eat a Bowl of Tea (1961), Maxine Hong Kinston’s The Woman Warrior (1975), Wayson Choy’s Jade Peony (1976), Joy Kogawa’s Obasan (1981), Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club (1989), Mary Paik Lee’s Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America (1990), and Denise Chong’s The Concubine’s Children (1994), etc. 3 Amy Tan (1952–) was born to Chinese parents in Oakland, California. Her major works include The Joy Luck Club and The Kitchen God’s Wife.
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p. 289) This reveales both the dream and the fear, the perplexities and the dif culties that numerous Asian North Americans encounter when living between cultural spaces. The lives of Asians in North America have greatly improved in recent decades along with the progression of globalization. Discrimi- nation and racism have gradually diminished or gone into recession. However, the personal and psychological struggle in identifying places between two very different cultures has not eased, and to a certain degree it has even complicated and intensi ed as—unlike rst gen- eration immigrants who were mostly isolated in ghettoized spaces such as Chinatowns and maintained sojourner mentalities—the later generations have more opportunities to politically, socially, and cultur- ally integrate themselves into North American mainstream life. Asians are becoming the fastest growing minority population in both the US and Canada, but not enough is known about their particular cultural and psychological needs. How can they achieve an ideal balance of assimilation and their own cultural heritage? What are the common causes of their intergenerational con icts? Which factors are crucial to forming their personal and cultural identities? What does it mean to be both Asian and North American in an age of globalization? Although these questions should be the focus of academic study, creative and productive means of nurturing the spiritual needs of these people in daily life are even more important, especially in early childhood and at elementary school. On September 3, 2001, a new animated daily television series, designed for the 5–8 age group and entitled “Sagwa, the Chinese Sia- mese Cat” was launched on the PBS KIDS4 television station. Viewers were delighted to learn that the series was originated by Amy Tan, who has been long concerned about the identity crises of the younger gen- eration of Asians in America. Forty half-hour episodes were produced by CineGroupe5 in association with the Children’s Television Workshop
4 Headquartered in Alexanda, Virginia, PBS is a private, nonpro t media enterprise owned and operated by the nation’s 346 public television stations. PBS Kids is one of the most trusted places for pre-school television in North America. For more informa- tion, visit http://www.PBSKids.org. 5 Headquartered in Montreal, Canada, CineGroupe is one of the leading anima- tion companies in North America. It is an internationally acclaimed leader in kids and family programming. For more information, visit http://www.cinegroupe.com.
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(Sesame Workshop),6 and distributed in the United States, Canada, and af liates with satellite service worldwide. The Chinese Siamese Cat, Amy Tan’s original tale, begins with a Siamese mother cat who tells a story to her kittens about their ancestor, Sagwa of China, and explains how Siamese cats got their distinctive dark markings on their faces, paws and tails. Sagwa (literally meaning ‘silly melon head’) is a pearl white, spirited and curious young cat, about 8 years old. She lives with her parents along with her siblings Dongwa (winter melon) and Sheegwa (water melon) in a foolish magistrate’s house in China at the end of 19th century. Her parents are often forced by the magistrate to write his strict and sel sh rules by dipping their brush-like tails in ink. One day, they are called again to write a new rule, which is that no one can sing until the sun goes down. Sagwa, the most mischievous of the kittens, changes this unhappy rule by falling from a bookshelf accidentally into an inkwell and walking over the selected parts of the scroll with her blackened paws and tails. When the people learn of the new happy rule that they must sing until the sun goes down, they sing songs in praise of the magistrate. The magistrate is so touched by the songs that he takes back old rules and becomes a wise man. He does not punish the frightened Sagwa, but instead declares that “all Chinese cats shall have dark faces, ears, paws, and tails—in honor of the greatest of felines, Sagwa of China.” (Tan, 1989) This curious and spiritual cat became the source of inspiration for the television series, with Amy Tan and the illustrator Gretchen Schields working together with a team of talented creators from CineGroupe and Sesame Workshop. Set in the far-off beautiful land of ancient China and the magistrate’s marvelous house, Sagwa, the spunky kitten, along with Dongwa, Sheegwa, and her best friend Fu Fu, the nearsighted bespectacled bat, start a series of adventures to nd their places in the world. Following the humorous adventures and explorations of the kittens, young audience members are introduced to the splendid land- scape of China and a miniature, yet comprehensive Chinese cultural system of written characters and calligraphy, festivals and customs, history and legends, values and beliefs, music and folklore, gardens and architecture, Tai Chi and dance, pandas, crickets and zodiac zoo,
6 A nonpro t organization in the US, created in 1967 to produce the educational program Sesame Street, designed to promote the intellectual and cultural growth of preschoolers. For more information, visit http://www.sesameworkshop.org.
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and so on. Meanwhile, they are also presented with a series of strate- gies for dealing with personal and social issues. Although Sagwa and her friends frequently get into trouble and make numerous mistakes unintentionally, they learn many important lessons as they grow into a variety of new roles: how to appreciate differences and appreciate what one has, how to accept the consequences of one’s actions, why one should stand up for what one believes in and believing in oneself, how to build up friendships and be honest, and Chinese family values and history. Sagwa has been greatly welcomed by young children and their parents regardless of their ethnic background. When the theme song “Sagwa, My Best Friend” starts each day, numerous young children (like my son and his friends) sit enthusiastically in front of the television to learn what Sagwa’s next adventure will be. Soon after Sagwa was released, it won several awards, such as the Daytime Emmy Award for individual Achievement in Animation for outstanding Children’s Series, the Sil- ver Award at the Chicago International Film Festival for Outstanding Children’s Series and the Silver Award at the Houston Film Festival for Children’s Animated Series. (Cinegroupe, 2004) Several book and TV reviews have had Sagwa as a cover story (Cinegroupe, 2000; Moor, 2002);7 Amazon.com has many reader’s reviews, written by children as well as adults, claiming that the Sagwa picture book and video series are the best they have ever had.8 In September 2003, the Sagwa began a run in France and Africa. “We are thrilled that children in France and Africa will have the chance to discover Sagwa’s incredible universe,” declared Marie-Christine Dufour, Executive Vice President, Distribution and Marketing, at CineGroupe. “Audiences worldwide appreciate the Sagwa series, thanks to its quality stories and animation.” (PBS, 2000) Why all this fascination? How can a children’s program, aiming at celebrating Chinese culture, at the same time “embrace universal themes accessible to children of all cultures”? (Wong, 2001) Where does Sagwa’s ‘incredible universe’ come from? What motivated Amy Tan to create this tale and led her to achieve this enormous success?
7 Also in “DVD Review: Sagwa: Sagwa’s Storybook World,” Entertaining Kids, January 2003. http://www.edutainingkids.com/reviews/vdsagwasstorybookdvd.html (accessed on 12 February 2004). 8 “Editorial Reviews,” and “Customer Reviews,” Sagwa, The Chinese Siamese Cat, Amazon.Com. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0689846177/inktomi- bkasin-20/ref%3Dnosim/103–9463335–2548661#product-details (accessed on 12 February 2004).
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Are there any important strategies we could learn from this achieve- ment? To what degree has Sagwa affected the young generation of Asian North Americans, and of North Americans in general? And what is the series’ signi cance in the context of globalization? In the following sections, I will address these questions. I begin by analyzing the successful narrative and cultural strategies of Sagwa’s localization of Chinese culture in North America.
Narrative and Cultural Strategies of Sagwa’s Localization of Chinese Culture in North America
Sagwa’s extraordinarily good reception in North America suggests a successful communication between Chinese and Western cultures. “Every culture has created its own world, its own truth or meaning,” writes Antonio Gallo in his article Hermeneutics as a Path to Inculturation, “to go inside a culture is to enter some very special and inward truth produced by communication within the group.” (Gallo, 2004) Hence, the methods for making paths into another cultural world and reaching the goal of reciprocal understanding are critical and worth careful study. In this section, I will examine the narrative and cultural strategies that Amy Tan and the other creators applied in the Sagwa series to make the communication so successful. Storytelling has long been used around the world as a means of helping children understand the world and develop their sense of self, suggesting resolutions to universal problems and transmitting cultural heritage to them. Sagwa uses this timeless vehicle. It works on children’s minds, which are full of fantasy, soaring imagination and curiosity, but still immature and unordered. The Sagwa series could be viewed as a series of lessons, but in the rst place they are all brilliant children’s tales. The Swedish children’s writer Lennart Hellsing once said that “all great art is educational, all educational art is bad.”9 Sagwa is just art at its best: teaching without preaching, or in the Chinese saying, teaching while enjoying.10 From the perspective of narrative skills, it has almost all the advantages of children’s literature. Serious messages are wrapped in humor or irony, sometimes in nonsense. Personi cation
9 “Sweden Children’s Literature.” http://www.sweden.se/templates/FactSheet_ 3279.asp (accessed on 15 February 2004). 10 A Chinese idiom: “寓教於樂”.
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is successfully applied and leads young audience members to identify themselves easily with the kittens and view them as their good friends. The personality traits of the cats and people are humorously exagger- ated: Sagwa’s curiosity leads her into numerous traps and magni cent discoveries, and so does the magistrate’s foolishness, which has often caused his stupid actions and silly rules. Misunderstanding and coin- cidence are frequently used to link the plots and create a climax: had Sagwa not fallen into the inkwell, the generations of Siamese cats would not have got such remarkable markings on their faces, paws, and tails! Logical inconsistency is also applied to make things seem foreign and enhance attractiveness, and the effects are sometimes comedic, some- times absurd. While watching these series, the audience’s normal sense of time and space are intermittently stretched, so the gap between the contexts in which the stories are set and contemporary challenges that children face today are bridged. The stories follow exactly a child’s way of logical thinking, which converts impossibilities into possibilities. Magical and mysterious colors are also added to the tales: what kind of fantastic tails the kittens have, how talented they are in writing Chinese calligraphy! All these excellent literary qualities are indispensable for Sagwa’s success in the children’s market and make it comparable to many world classic children’s tales. However, the more fundamental factor in its success, especially in its accessibility by other cultures, lies in its structure. There are numerous resemblances between oral culture and writings for young children, because the structure of the children’s tale is very similar to the structure of myth. According to the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss,11 the structures of myth provide basic structures for understanding cultural relations. He explains why myths from cultures all over the world seem so similar. Though the content, the speci c characters and events of myths may differ widely, they share structural sameness. Levi-Strauss also insists that myth is a language, because it has to be told in order to exist. (Adams and Searle, 1986, pp. 809–822) By applying Levi-Strauss’ theory to the analysis of Sagwa, we can see clearly that its structure has provided a language that makes the stories accessible to many different cultures.
11 Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–) is best known for his development of structural anthropology. His major works include The Raw and the Cooked, The Savage Mind, Structural Anthropology and Totemism.
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Based on structural similarities, several interesting narrative and cul- tural strategies were successfully developed. One of these strategies I can name with a Chinese expression “ ll the old bottle with new wine.”12 This refers to the insertion of new content, and thus signi cance, into narrative forms that are already quite familiar to the young audience. Typical titles of the episodes in this category are “The Tortoise and the Cat,” “Sister Act,” “The Foolish Magistrate’s New Robes,” “Lord of the Fleas” and “My Fair Kitty.” I will use three examples to illustrate this strategy.
1. The title of “The Tortoise and the Cat” is a wordplay on Aesop’s fable “The Tortoise and the Hare.” In this tale, Sagwa likes to move fast and pretend to be animals that she’s not, whereas the tortoise likes to sit back, move slowly and appreciate the beauty of the palace garden. The tortoise shows Sagwa what she’s missing: the sweet smell of a rose bush, the amazing strength of the garden ants, the joy of throwing rocks into the pond and so much more. Sagwa then plays follow-the-leader with a couple of mice, showing them the beauty of the garden as well. (TV Tome, 2004) In this beautiful fable-like episode, Sagwa learns how to appreciate the difference. This reminds us of some of Zhuang Zi’s most memorable parables illustrating the same idea, such as an encounter between a giant sea turtle and a frog in a well (Zhuang, 1964, pp. 107–108) and the great bird and the small cicada (Zhuang, 1964, pp. 23–24) Zhuang Zi says in “Autumn Flood” that “if we know that heaven and earth are tiny grains and the tip of a hair is a range of mountains, then we have perceived the law of difference.” (Zhuang, 1964, pp. 100–101) That is how Amy Tan uses this strategy on the one hand to make the story more easily accessible to children, and on the other hand to introduce Zhuang Zi’s philosophy and guide them to look at the world from other perspectives. 2. The episode “Cat of a Different Class” also illustrates Zhuang Zi’s ideas. Sagwa learns here the idea of following nature and how to appreciate the freedom she has. One day, Sagwa meets some royal cats from Beijing who wear beautiful slippers and use silver food dishes. She is amazed by their luxurious life and wants to talk to them, but they arrogantly refuse to do so. However, the curious and
12 A Chinese idiom: “舊瓶裝新酒”.
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persistent Sagwa soon discovers the true reason for their arrogance is their unhappy life and their sacri ce of freedom. Sagwa discovers that the silver dishes are lled with rice (if they ate shrimp, their breath would stink). So she gets them shrimp from the kitchen in exchange for trying on their beautiful slippers. However, the slippers are much too tight. Therefore Sagwa frees them and lets them play in the palace lake. The royal cats say that Sagwa lets them be real cats for the rst time. These cats are quite similar to the sea bird in Zhuangzi’s “Supreme Happiness:” “once a sea bird alighted in the suburbs of the Lu capital. The marquis of Lu escorted it to the ancestral temple, where he entertained it, performing the Nine Shao music for it to listen to and presenting it with the meat of the T’ai Miao sacri ce to feast on. But the bird only looked dazed and forlorn, refusing to eat a single slice of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it was dead.” (Zhuang, 1964, p. 116) The same idea is also expressed in Zhuang Zi’s “The Secret of Nourishing Life:” “the swamp pheasant has to walk ten paces for one peck and a hundred paces for one drink, but it doesn’t want to be kept in a cage. Though you treat it like a king, its spirit won’t be content.” (Zhuang, 1964, p. 48) 3. The title of “The Foolish Magistrate’s New Robes” is a wordplay on Hans Christian Anderson’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” Through the hint of the title, young audience members immediately nd similarities between the emperor and the foolish magistrate, and see joyfully how the stupidity of the authorities is ridiculed; meanwhile, they also realize that this kind of stupidity could happen anywhere in the world. The child who tells the truth about the invisible clothes in Anderson’s tale is transformed into Sagwa in Amy Tan’s tale, who has learned how to tell the truth.
The art of dialogue is applied systematically in the structural organiza- tion of Sagwa, which leaves it open and dynamic. Most of the stories in the series are structured intertextually. Thematically, Chinese cultural topics are constantly compared to those of other nations, and open to the dialogue in a universal context. For example, Chinese ancestor worship is connected to root-seeking and knowing family history in general; the Chinese Spring Festival is shown in parallel to all the new year’s celebrations around the world; the Mid-Autumn Festival is related to the myth of moon and sun in East Africa, or the worship of natu- ral forces in general everywhere; Tai Chi and Gong Fu are discussed
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together with acrobatics and dance in other countries; and the bat as a lucky symbol in China is compared with frog and cricket elsewhere. Through dialogical comparison and demonstration, universal themes underlying the seemingly quite different surface themes are gradually revealed. In addition to the well structured tales, this TV program also features with two interesting segments: Curious Cat and What About You? After each 11 minute animated adventure ends, there is a mini- documentary in which real children from different cultures share their hobbies, music, special festivals, foods, and show off their neighbor- hoods. “Through this combination of adventure and documentary, children explore both the culture of China long ago as well as the cultures of children around the world today.” (PBS Kids, 2004) “It resonates with a universal theme of discovery, hope, and childlike joy which will touch a wide and diverse audience.” (PBS 2000) With the advantages of technology, the program also launched many interactive activities on the pbskids.org website, inviting children to continue the experience in cyberspace. These narrative and cultural strategies and the dialogical structure provide the young audiences with a very good environment for active reception. According to Hans Robert Jauss’13 aesthetic theory on liter- ary horizons of expectations, the textual strategies, overt and covert signals, applied by authors actually de ne reception and construct horizons of expectations. “A literary work with an unusual aesthetic form can shatter the expectations of its reader” and positively change “people’s perceptions of the world in which they live.” (Holden, 2003) This explains how the dynamic and open space of Sagwa has been constructed for an active communication and how this in uences the positive reception of the young audiences. In the meantime, Norman Holland’s14 psychological reception theory adds another dimension to the explanation of this successful two-way dialogue. He believes that audiences actually “identify with characters and plots when identity themes similar to their own are expressed.” (Holland, 1998) This speaks
13 Hans Robert Jauss (1921–1997), German literary critic, famous for his literary theory of reception, important works including Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, Theory and History of Literature (Brighton: Harvester, 1982). 14 Professor at the University of Florida, famous for his psychological approach in literary studies, important works include The Dynamics of Literary Response (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1968).
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to the role of exchangeable relationships between the kittens and the young audience of Sagwa.
The Desire to be Recognized and the Interrelated Cultural Strategies
Chinese culture is enormously rich, complicated and profound. People approach it from different perspectives to meet their speci c interests and needs. Amy Tan’s policies of thematic selection in this miniature version of Chinese culture have disclosed some very important cultural strategies that she uses in her multidimensional dialogues with global readers. And the motives for her to create Sagwa indicate her strong desire in expressing her never-diminished cultural nostalgia. One of the most striking and attractive features of this series is that the cats can write Chinese characters by using their magic, brush-like tails. By watching this program and using the web-based interactive exercises, kids are expected to acquire a basic knowledge of Chinese language and written characters. Language, as the essential means of communication, plays a signi cant role in forming an individual’s identity. Our personal identity, which is af rmed by our culture, cannot be dissociated from the cultural language that we have acquired since childhood. Our sense of who we are is rst expressed through language. It is therefore extremely important and challenging for immigrants to preserve their native language and culture, and to nd balance between their original/parents’ identities and their adopted identities. Many writers have addressed the issue of the severe language barrier that has existed between different generations of Asians in North America, which have caused serious identity crises and intergenerational con icts. Wayson Choy’s Jade Peony (1976) reveals these crises and con icts in a family among three generations as different acculturation outcomes. In this story, second generation Chinese Canadians, who are ready to t into Canadian society and give up their Chinese ways and language, are trapped like prisoners between two cultures. In Denise Chong’s Concubine’s Children, Winnie, the daughter of the concubine, having been assimilated into mainstream life and kept her children away from a Chinese language environment, is only able to communicate successfully with her daughter after their visit to China and having been nourished again in that cultural environment. Jade, the young actress in Mina Shum’s Double Happiness, has a sense of split identity, mainly due to her experiences of being torn between two worlds. She
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considers herself as a Canadian, but she does not t into the main- stream image. When she auditions for a Chinese part in a local lm she is turned down because she cannot read Chinese script. Often, many older generations of Chinese North Americans use term such as banana (yellow on the outside and white on the inside) or bamboo (empty inside) to refer to these Westernized Chinese youth who are no longer able to communicate in Chinese, and express their worries about the new generation who might become useless after losing the signi cant part of their own culture. It is extremely dif cult to keep one’s language facility in another overwhelming language environment even if it is one’s mother tongue, not to mention that many immigrants are under other social pressures, such as having to improve their English to assimilate into mainstream society. For these reasons, many parents and kids have to give up the effort of maintaining and learning Chi- nese after several years of struggle. It is therefore very important for Chinese in North America to have Sagwa available to help kids to learn the language through the Public Broadcast System. Amy Tan once talked in an interview about her Chinese language capability and her fascination with Chinese words: “I also grew up, thankfully, with a love of language. That may have happened because I was bilingual at an early age. I stopped speaking Chinese when I was ve, but I love words. Words to me were magic . . . It was amazing to me that words had this power.” (Academy, 1996) In the Sagwa project, Amy Tan and the team of creators have designed many interesting ways, including web-based interactive exercises, to demonstrate the art of Chinese calligraphy and the interesting combinations of the ideographic words, aiming at demystifying written Chinese characters and encouraging young children to learn their own language. For non-Chinese children, learning the basic ideas of the Chinese ideographic writing system and the beauty of calligraphy is an eye-opening experience. It suggests another way of thinking, encourages them to appreciate cultural differences, and gives them a good sense of global consciousness. “Before you go out into the world,” Ming Miao told her ve kit- tens, “you must know the true story of your ancestors . . .” so begins the story of Sagwa, and a series of themes closely related to family, history and ancestor worship, which are the essential avenues to under- standing Confucian-orientated traditional Chinese society and human relationships. Amy Tan’s interest in traditional Chinese culture is actually deeply related to her early experience as a Chinese living in a Caucasian society.
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In an interview, Amy Tan talked about her childhood and adolescent identity crises growing up in America in the 1950s and 1960s. As a child at a time when “children all want to be the same, the same as whatever is popular,” (Detroit, 1995) she was different. She remembers putting a clothespin on her nose hoping to make it pert, to change its Asian shape. (Detroit, 1995) When she was 17, Tan says, she vowed “I’m not going to have anything to do with anything Chinese when I leave home; I am going to be completely American.” (Academy, 1996) Yet when she started to write, “it started off with family. It started off with knowing myself, with knowing the things I wanted as a constant in my life: trust, love, kindness, a sense of appreciation, gratitude . . . Those were the things that helped me decide what I was going to write.” Ironically, “that the very thing she felt so ambivalent about in growing up—her Chineseness, her relationship with her mother—have been at the center of her books and her success.” (Detroit, 1995) Amy Tan’s personal experience with Chinese tradition is partially re ected in the stories of the daughters in her novel The Joy Luck Club, who are unable to understand their mothers due to cultural barriers. The daughters, however, nd new ways to be independent and assert themselves posi- tively only after they have recognized the cultural spirit their mothers have tried to pass onto them. In one episode of Sagwa called “Royal Cats,” Dongwa at rst announces that he hates history. But after he has learned the roots of his family from his uncle and discovered some interesting relationships between himself and the ancestor statues in a cave, Dongwa takes back what he said. This episode re ects exactly what Tan talked about regarding her own attitude towards history: “one of the subjects I hated the most was history. I thought it was completely a waste of time . . . Today, I love history. I nd it is absolutely relevant to everything that is going on . . . You see the undercurrents of change and culture and that is history . . . History really is a record of behaviors and intentions and actions and consequences.” (Academy, 1996) She also talked about her interest in philosophy. “I wish I had known it when I was younger, because I think I missed a lot of observations in life. That is to develop your own philosophy . . . It’s extremely important in how you perceive the world and your place in the world and what happens in the world . . . all of those things are so important in how you deal with the changes that happen in life—how you deal with your successes, your failures, with love, with loss.” (Academy, 1996) This explains why Tan has written so many fable-like tales in Sagwa to illustrate Zhuangzi and other philosophers’ ideas and to discuss the commonalities between
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the different approaches of Eastern and Western philosophy. It is all these understandings that have contributed to her motives to write for readers, especially for young children, who are at a critical age for forming their identities. Cultural nostalgia, which is commonly considered to be one of the noblest feelings of a human being, has permeated thoroughly Amy Tan’s writing and encouraged her to seek roots, to write about her culture, to give voices to the voiceless, to the desire to be recognized. “I often believe that what made me become a storyteller is my memory of childhood. This is why I am so thrilled that we are creating a television series for children . . . The series will echo the wonders of childhood, and spur imagination and self-discovery in a young audience.” (Cinegroupe, 2000) Wounded childhood memories have been transformed into beautiful wishes for the younger genera- tion; she shares her understanding of the Chinese cultural spirit with them, tells stories to them just like a mother does for their children, and encourages them to have a sense of pride toward their own culture instead of the sense of inferiority that she once suffered. These kinds of wounded childhood memories and distorted identities do not just belong to a single or a few writers. They actually belong to a group, a generation or two, and are expressed remarkably in many of their writings: to mention a few, Jade Snow Wong’s Fifth Chinese Daughter (1950), Louis Chu’s Eat a Bowl of Tea (1961), Maxine Hong Kingston’s Woman Warrior (1975), Wayson Choy’s Jade Peony (1976), Joy Kogawa’s Obasan (1981), Mary Paik Lee’s Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America (1990), Sky Lee’s Disappearing Moon Café (1992) and Denise Chong’s The Concubine’s Children (1994). They release a painful yet thoughtful voice from deep within the hearts of these Asian North Americans. This is where the desires come from—the desire to connect the tradition, to get rid of the dark shadows of inferiority, the desire to be recognized. “It is the desire for recognition, ‘for somewhere else and for something else’ that takes the experience of history beyond the instrumental hypothesis . . . it is the space of intervention emerging in the cultural interstices that introduces creative invention into existence,” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 9) writes Homi Bhabha in the introduction to his book The Location of Culture. Our sense of who we are, on the other hand, is largely based on internalization of re ections and feedback from other people. If, in the early years of one’s life, the re ections and feedback provide a healthy and well-integrated sense of self, then one will be in a better position to maintain a strong sense of self-con dence and weather adversities
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later in life. Therefore, the external social structure and environment also play signi cant roles in shaping one’s identity. However, for those Asians who make their home in North America, especially during the early years, the institutionalized racism, harsh government legislation and social pressures not only prevent them from achieving economic success, but also cause internalized inferiority feelings at being Asian, socially, historically and culturally. This has haunted and hurt many, especially young children. Some Asian North American writers have recorded such encounters in their books: for example, Mary Paik Lee talked in her Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America about how she was teased and hurt by other girls in kindergarten. (Lee, 1990, p. 17) Jade Snow Wong recorded in her Fifth Chinese Daughter how she was made fun of by other kids just because she was a Chinese: “Chinky, Chinky, no tickee, no washee, no shirtee.” (Wong, 1989, p. 68) The dreadful atmosphere at school made the young girl decide to “endure by not talking. The image of silence is equated with a sense of inferiority of being Chinese.” (Wong, 1989, p. 66) Even today, many Asian Canadian students in my classes at university have also talked about their experi- ence of racism at an early age, when they were called names, teased by funny songs, but knowing that even their parents were powerless to prevent these from happening. The distorted images and stereotypes of Asians as ‘yellow perils’ have deep roots in Western societies and have caused self-identity confusion for several generations of Asian North Americans. Although these phenomena have been diminished to a great degree, the roots are hard to expel thoroughly. Therefore, to readdress the stereotypical image of Asians and to reduce the discrimination of Westerners towards Asians shares the same importance as enriching young Asian Americans through the Asian cultural spirit. Sagwa’s success has set an excellent example. Its popularity has actually helped to reduce misunderstanding of Western kids towards Chinese people and culture, and in general provided them with a very good basis for preparing to be cosmopolitan, good new members of the global village. One customer review of Sagwa on Amazon.com points out that the illustrations in the book contain images that are stereotypes in the worst way. The reviewer believes that “the portrayal of the Foolish Magistrate in his Manchurian costumes and menacing looks, coupled with the Reader and his long queue, harken back to the days of the ‘Yellow Peril’ hysteria which gripped the country in the early part of the
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20th century. These characters are right out of the 1930s ‘Fu Manchu’ era”.15 The reviewer’s worries actually re ect the dark shadows of the harsh history of Asians in North America, and the deep internal psy- chological injury that many Chinese have suffered and are still suffering. However, one should be aware that readdressing the wronged images of Asians in Western societies does not mean being overly sensitive or becoming too frightened to touch wounded history. The human gures in Sagwa, although with distinctive costume and queue, are as normal as the villagers and of cers in other children’s tales from all over the world. They may be foolish, laughable, kindhearted or evil, but they are typical people. To normalize the image of Chinese people, regardless of which historical period, is a strategy that Amy Tan has used to correct wronged images, to counteract Orientalism. The content of the signi ers are re-signi ed, which is not necessarily related to the distorted images from a certain historical period. By the way, the protagonists in this series are Sagwa, Sheegwa and Dongwa, the spiritual and adventurous Chinese cat, not the foolish magistrate. Amy Tan’s policies in redress- ing stereotypical images of Chinese in the Western mind are therefore quite strategic. “Rough propagandistic pressure in the end works real violence and is a principle of alienation for the members of the group.” (Gallo, 2004) This emphasizes the importance of achieving true com- munication between peoples from different cultures, which Amy Tan recognizes and has applied in her writing practices. Another noteworthy cultural strategy that Tan uses successfully in the Sagwa series is the power of naming. A name is a sign, represent- ing subjectivity, but it is not just a single sign. Successful naming has power, not only to establish an important representation compactly and saliently, stimulating our imagination and impressing our memory, but also in occupying a space and creating a voice. Sagwa, in Chinese pronunciation, literally means ‘silly melon head,’ but she is not silly at all. As the Chinese idiom states, “the greatest wisdom often appears dim-witted or silly,”16 and so is Sagwa. Although
15 Ron Lee, Reviewer from Palo Alto, California, “Shades of Yellow”. http://www. amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0689846177/ref=cm_rev_all_1/103–9463335–2 548661?v=glance&s=books&n=507846&vi=customer-reviews (accessed on 12 February, 2004). 16 In Chinese, “大智若愚”.
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she gets into all sorts of trouble by accident, she never stops searching for her own position in this world. Through all these adventures and mistakes she discovers that there is more than one way to view the world. She is also never afraid of letting her own voice be heard, no matter how small she is and how dif cult it could be. Sagwa represents a distinguished new way of thinking, and so do Dongwa and Sheegwa. Dongwa, winter melon, homophonically in Chinese can be also under- stood as eastern melon, and Sheegwa, water melon, as western melon. Dongwa’s way of doing and thinking is quite antagonistic, different from Sheegwa’s, which is very Daoistic, enjoying what she has and practicing non-ado. East and West, with the Silly Melon Head in the middle—the names of three kittens in one family could imply different ways of thinking about the world. Successful naming is connected to seeds and roots, and can also generate seeds and roots. Sagwa is now one of the most famous g- ures in the world of Children’s literature and is admired by children in many countries. She is listed together with the Ugly Duckling, the Little Mermaid, Alice in Wonderland and Snow White, among the most loved gures of children. She also stars alongside Clifford, the big red dog, Angela, the dancing mouse, the Berenstain Bears, the curious adventurers, Peter, the smart rabbit, the Teletubbies and gures from Japanese anime such as Robotech or Ultraman. Sagwa, with her brilliant appearance, interesting characteristics, untiring adventures, and her fantastic, magical brush-like tail, occupies a remarkable place in the world of Children’s literature.
Creative Dialogue in the ‘In-between’ Cultural Space—the Values and Signi cance of Sagwa in the Context of Globalization
The success of Sagwa is especially signi cant in the context of global- ization. “Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, the Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat.” (Yang et al., 1997) What Rudyard Kipling said in “The Ballad of East and West” (1889) is proven to be even more wrong as Sagwa adds a new dimension to the meeting of East and West. In Eastern Standard Time (1997), a book that is almost a mini encyclopedia on almost every aspect (from philosophy to daily life) of Asian in uence on contemporary American culture, the editor Jeff Yang writes that East and West “have not only met—they’ve mingled, mated, and produced myriad offspring,
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inhabitants of one world, without borders or boundaries, but with plenty of style, hype, and attitude.” (Yang et al., 1997, p. 1) This shows that Asian cultures have not only been incorporated into the ‘mainstream’ of North American life, but are also essential constituents of it. Before Sagwa, there was another interesting animated movie that gave American youth a feel for Chinese culture: Mulan, produced by Disney Studios in June 1998, directed by Tony Bancroft and Barry Cook. The lm is a cross-cultural retelling of a Chinese legend about a girl who disguises herself as a man and takes her old father’s place in the emperor’s army. She comes back both as an accomplished soldier and a dutiful daughter. “Tsiek tsiek and again tsiek tsiek, Mu-lan weaves, facing the door. You don’t hear the shuttle’s sound, you only hear Daughter’s sighs.”17 The original poem is from the Northern Wei period of ancient China, about 1,500 years ago. However, it inspired the Disney team to create a breathtaking animation movie that is one of the most remarkable Disney classics, full of action, laughs, sensational music and emotion, and also, of course, with an exotic setting. Over the centuries, Mulan has been retold and altered in China to suit different times, and it was also once retold in America, by Maxine Hong Kingston in her book Woman Warrior (1975). The legend is rearticulated by Kingston in a quite Western feminist way, in that it lays emphasis on a woman not needing to t into tradition-bound society, and a prince needing be saved by a princess. To put the consideration of the American audiences rst, Disney’s animated version also changes a lot of content; spiritually it is close to Kingston’s retelling. The movie is also “a mix of many different ingredients palatable to the tastes of America,” (Seno, 2001) such as adding a dragon and a cricket to meet the commonly exotic images in America about Chinese culture. By comparing the different ways of representing Chinese culture in North America in Mulan and Sagwa, we can recognize that they belong to two different types of hybridities. Mulan is a good example of the Americanization of Chinese culture, which aims at assimilating Chinese culture into American culture and not necessarily correctly portraying Chinese cultural images and cus- toms; misreading happens in the process of assimilation. In contrast, Sagwa seeks to localize Chinese culture in America, which aims at letting
17 In Chinese, “唧唧復唧唧, 木蘭當戶織。不聞機杼聲, 唯聞女嘆息,” rst two lines from “Ode of Mulan,” Yue-Fu, by an anonymous author (c. 5 A.D.). http://www. chinapage.com/mulan.html (accessed on 10 February 2004).
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others recognize and embrace their culture by achieving a reciprocal understanding between different cultures. Localization, or domestication, in contrast to assimilation or Ameri- canization, has particular signi cance for minority cultures. “The social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation.” (Bhabha, 2004, p. 2) Sagwa’s localization of Chinese culture in North America represents exactly this effort. To establish roots in a new place is a way of pio- neering, to nd the ‘location of culture’ in the marginal, ‘haunting,’ ‘unhomely’ space between dominant social formations. (Gewertz, 2002) Sagwa therefore retains her enlightening values for cross-cultural adaptation. Globalization and internationalization have created a greater degree of intercultural contact than ever before. Writing in a space of hybridi- ties, seeking a location of culture in a world “where time and place are increasingly compressed,”18 writers today are facing unprecedented challenges of cosmopolitanism. Homi Bhabha once talked about his interest in the writers and artists who have this kind of global conscious- ness: “one of the greatest things that modern literature does is to show how the human imagination ranges across countries and cultures to extend its inspiration and imagination, so that, while we tend to study history or literature in national frames, writers and artists tend to consider themselves imaginatively to be citizens of the world. So I am very interested in that aspect of literary culture and the cosmopolitan imagination—what would a global culture be?” (Gewertz, 2002) This echoes Amy Tan’s effort in searching for universal themes in her writ- ings. Tan usually refers to herself as an American writer in general and not necessarily as ‘Chinese’ in nature, as she believes in the universal themes of her writings, which make people from different cultures and age groups accessible to each other. When she was asked how to de ne ‘American’ and ‘American culture,’ she answered: Well, I think it’s an interesting question, especially now that the demo- graphics are changing and people are wanting to close borders. What
18 “Rationale,” International Conference on “East West Identities: Globalisation, Localisa- tion and Hybridisation,” Hong Kong Baptist University, 2004. http://www.hkbu.edu. hk/~lewi/conf1.html (accessed on 20 February, 2004).
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do we mean by American culture? And I think we’re lacking a good consensus on what we mean by that, what keeps us together, what makes us proud. I would say it’s that right or that ability that—I would like to claim—allows us to create the life that we wish, that we can become who we want to be. We have the right to shape our identity, which is not true of a lot of other countries. And within that right there’s freedom of expression, freedom of the pursuit of happiness. Not that the opportuni- ties are always available to do that—as when we look at people who are stuck in lives full of despair—but that potential exists and that’s what I think is America. (Mosaic, 1994) This poignant, suggestive and positive answer af rms Amy Tan’s strong belief in cosmopolitanism and her strategic effort in the “on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation.” (Bhaba, 1994, p. 2) Scholars around the world have been discussing the possible futures of cosmopolitanism, or ways of thinking, representation, etc., beyond one’s particular society. Questions such as what are the possible univer- sal themes and where more paths to access reciprocal understanding between cultures can be found, are frequently posed. Sagwa’s success has suggested some excellent models, thematically, structurally and methodologically. Amy Tan is famous for her adult novels; few know that she is also an excellent writer for children. Her attention to the eld of children’s literature has suggested that we turn our gaze to more common themes in our daily life. The openly structured Sagwa also encourages us to apply dynamic equivalence when we are thinking across different cultures. Taking Children’s literature as example, you could question in Sagwa’s way and link many interesting ideas between East and West: is there any similarity between a ying Arabic carpet in One Thousand One Nights and the magical cape that American Superman wears? Are they not both representative of the same human dream to y? Sagwa’s best friend Fu Fu, the bespectacled bat, is he a modern version of Alice in Wonderland? How different is the ancient Chinese Monkey King from the modern Spiderman? Why are the Brothers Ultraman in Japan spiritually so close to the Brothers of Gourds in China? The evils they are ghting are also almost the same, just with different appearances—as foxes or snakes in China, and as machine-like demons in Japan. There are so many possible universal themes because human nature has so much in common around the world.
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If it is true that Jehovah confused the human language and scattered its parts from the Tower of Babel over all the surface of the earth,19 then he must be wondering at the many ways that people have discovered to achieve better communication. Myth is a language for all; music is too, and there are many others. Sagwa has constructed a creative dialogue in the ‘in-between’ space of East and West, and suggested that there are endless possibilities in this new space. Just to add one example more, in January 2004 an interesting program called Creative Exchanges: Sights and Sounds of the Silk Road, was held at the Peabody Essex Museum, in Salem, Massachusetts. The program was directed by the world-renowned cellist Yo-Yo Ma and aimed “to create greater aware- ness of both the diverse peoples and the interactions of rich cultural traditions in the lands along the historic Silk Road.” (Silk, 2004) Artists from disparate cultures from both the musical and visual sphere joined together. When the strangers met, when the artistic collaboration started, a magical transformation took place; new meanings were generated and shared by different cultural groups. “The borderline work of culture demands an encounter with ‘newness’ that is part of the continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new as an insurgent act of cultural translation.” (Bhaba, 1994, p. 6) This signi cant practice of cross-cultural exchange, like the creation of Sagwa, evidences again the incredible creative vigor that exists in this ‘in-between’ cultural space. The ‘Silk Road’ image symbolizes numerous bridges and passages that cross different cultures, illustrating what Martin Heidegger said in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” “a boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing.” (Heidegger, 1971)
REFERENCES
Academy of Achievement 1996. “A Uniquely Personal Storyteller.” Interview: Amy Tan. http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/tan0int (accessed 10 January 2004). Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy (eds) 1986. Critical Theory Since 1965. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida. Cinegroupe 2000. “Amy Tan’s Sagwa, The Chinese Siamese Cat, Produced by Cine groupe in Association With Children’s Television Workshop and IF/X Productions, is
19 Genesis 11:1–11:9, New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, trans. New World Bible Translation Committee, revised 1984, p. 18.
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Coming Daily to PBS KIDS,” News Room, 9 January. http://www.cinegroupe.com/ english/news/pdf_communique/sagwaeng.pdf (accessed 12 February 2004). Cinegroupe 2004. “Awards.” Filmography & Awards. http://www.cinegroupe.com/eng- lish/ lmo/awards (accessed 20 February 2004). Bhabha, Homi 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Chow, Wayson 1995. Jade Peony. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre. Chong, Denise 1994. The Concubine’s Children. Toronto: Viking. Chu, Louis 1961. Eat a Bowl of Tea. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Detroit News 1995. “The Joy Luck Lady,” Detroit News. http://detnews.com/menu/ stories/22098.htm (accessed 20 August 2001). Gallo, Antonio 2004. “Hermeneutics as a Path to Inculturation,” Hermeneutics and Inculturation, edited by F. George et al. http://www.crvp.org/book/Series07/VII-7/ chapter%20ii.htm (accessed 20 February 2004). Gewertz, Ken 2002. “Telling Tales out of, and in, Class: Bhabha Studies Culture and Genre with a Moral Squint.” Harvard Gazette Archives. http://www.news.harvard. edu/gazette/2002/01.31/03–bhabha.html (accessed 05 February 2003). Holland, Norman 1968. The Dynamics of Literary Response. Cambridge: Oxford Uni- versity Press. ———. 1998. “Reading and Identity.” http://www.clas.u .edu/users/nnh/rdgident. htm (accessed 20 February 2004). Holden, Philip 2003. “Hans Robert Jauss and Literary Horizons of Expectations.” University Scholars Programme. National University of Singapore. April. http:// www.thecore.nus.edu/literature/Jauss.html (accessed 15 February 2004). Mosaic 1994. “An Interview with Amy Tan,” MOSAIC. http://dolphin.upenn.edu/ ~mosaic/fall94/page15.html (accessed 21 August 2001). Jauss, Hans Robert 1982. Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kingston, Maxine Hong 1977. The Woman Warrior. New York: Knopf. Kogawa, Joy 1994. Obasan. New York: Anchor Books. Lee, Mary Paik 1990. Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Levi-Strauss, Claude 1983. The Raw and the Cooked. Chicago: University of Chicago. ———. “The Structural Study of Myth,” pp. 809–822, in Critical Theory Since 1965, edited by Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1986. Moor, Sean 2002. “Sagwa: Sagwa’s Storybook World,” DVDtoons, 23 November. http:// www.dvdtoons.com/reviews/118/print (accessed 20 February 2004). New World Bible Translation Committee 1961. New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures. translated by New World Bible Translation Committee. New York: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York. PBS 2000. PBS News, January 19. http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/news/20000119_ sagwa.html (accessed 12 February 2004) PBS Kids 2004. “About the Show,” Caregivers Area. Sagwa. PBS Kids. http://pbskids. org/sagwa/caregivers (accessed 10 February 2004). Seno, Alexandra 2001. “Woman Warrior: An unconventional Chinese heroine who stays true to Disney tradition,” Asiaweek Magazine. http://www.path nder.com/ asiaweek/98/0605/feat7.html. (accessed on 5 February 2004). Shum, Mina 1994. Double Happiness. Canada: Steve Hegyes and Rose Lam Waddell. Silk Road Project 2004. “Creative Exchanges: Sights and Sounds of the Silk Road,” 20–31 January. http://www.silkroadproject.org (accessed 25January 2004). Swedish Institute 2004. “Sweden Children’s Literature.” http://www.sweden.se/tem- plates/FactSheet_3279.asp (accessed 15 February 2004). Tan, Amy. The Joy Luck Club. New York: Ivy Books, 1989.
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———. Sagwa, the Chinese Siamese Cat, produced by CineGroupe in association with the Children’s Television Workshop and distributed in US, Canada, and af liates with satellite service worldwide. September 2001. ———. 1994. The Chinese Siamese Cat, illustrated by Gretchen Schields. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1994. TV Tome 2004. “Sagwa, the Chinese Siamese Cat-Episode Guide.” Season 1. http://www.tvtome.com/SagwatheChineseSiameseCat/season1.html (accessed 20 February 2004). Wong, David. 2001. Creators Making the Show, Sagwa, PBSkids. http://pbskids.org/sagwa/ bts/creator/textres/index6.html (accessed 20 January 2004). Wong, Jade Snow 1989. Fifth Chinese Daughter. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Yang, Jeff et al. (eds) 1997. Eastern Standard Time: a Guide to Asian In uence on American Culture, from Astroboy to Zen Buddhism. Boston: Houghton Mif in. Zhuang Zi 1964. Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press.
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Identity Shifts as a Consequence of Crossing Cultures: Hong Kong Chinese Migrants Return Home*
Nan M. Sussman
In this chapter, I explore a psychological conceptualization of the dynamic nature of cultural identity and the behavioral consequences of East-West transitions. Amidst the existing complexity and emergence of a Hong Kong identity is added the newest geographic movement from Hong Kong to North America, Australia and England in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the remigration to Hong Kong in the rst decade of the 21st century. The case of Hong Kongers’ changing cul- tural identities and the behavioral manifestation of those identities is viewed through the lens of a model of cultural transitions and identity response pro les proposed by Sussman (2000), and will be contrasted to both US/European and Japanese repatriation experiences. Three central premises of this chapter upon which theoretical and empirical data are presented are the exible and dynamic nature of cultural identities which enables transformation and hybridization, the evaluative variability of affective, cognitive and behavioral outcomes, and the ability of individuals to maintain and negotiate multiple cultural frames activated by situational cues. In turn, these cues access differential sets of behavior and cognition that re ect the cultural frame. De nitions of terms will clarify this discussion. In the cultural tran- sition literature, distinctions are frequently made between sojourners and migrants, the former being expatriated citizens of one country
* I am grateful to the William J. Fulbright Program of the US Department of State for granting me a Fulbright Research Award to travel to Hong Kong for data collection and to Kwok Leung and the Department of Management at the City University of Hong Kong for their warm welcome. Also, many thanks go to Loraine Pun and Yat Yee Lee, who served as research assistants and kept the project on track. The College of Staten Island, City University of New York provided sabbatical leave and subsequently granted me a Presidential Research Award which provided the opportunity to analyze the data and write this manuscript. For this, I am appreciative.
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temporarily taking residence in another for a speci c task or assign- ment (education, business, diplomacy or conversion) with the intention of returning home. Immigrants have been described as taking perma- nent residence in a new country with amorphous political, economic and social motivations and goals. Hong Kong cultural transitors blur these distinctions, as we will see later in this chapter. Those intending to return do not, those choosing permanent change return, and the intentions of many are unclear to themselves and others. Through the discussion of linked themes, I propose to explore the identity change process that Hong Kong Chinese are undergoing and the consequential negotiation of multiple identities. First, a discussion of the place of identity research within the psychological perspective will be summarized. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to present an exhaustive review of the literature, I will present several critical elements of identity conceptualizations. The case will then be made that collective identity and more particularly, cultural identity, are subsets of the multiplicity of possible identities. Second, I provide an abbreviated review of research documenting the identity of the Chinese population of Hong Kong and the emergence of the ‘Hong Konger’ identity. Third, I use the cultural identity model of cultural transitions (Sussman, 2000) to describe the cultural transitions of outgoing Hong Kong migration and re-migration during the last two decades. Fourth, I review empirical ndings that examine the cultural identity pro les and outcomes of US and Japanese repatriates. Finally, drawing on the results of a recent study, I discuss variations in the Hong Konger cultural identity response to remigration.
Psychological Perspective on Identity
At its core, psychology has always explored issues of the self and identity. While other social sciences have shared this interest, result- ing in conceptualizations of political, linguistic, class and geographic identity theories, the essential element of psychological thought has been the individual, and so it is with identity. Personal identity, or those characteristics which are unique to an individual and set them apart from others, and relational identity, or those features in which the self and familiar others interact, were the major focus of attention. Social psychological writings, however, broadened the concept by examining group membership in which members do not necessarily interact or
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even know each other. These concepts were developed by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, pp. 61–76) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987), in which the emphasis was on self-categorization and the outcomes of ingroup-outgroup bias and group cohesiveness respectively. Several writers have recently sug- gested replacing the term ‘social identity’ with ‘collective identity’ as less ambiguous and more meaningful. Ashmore, Deaux and McLaugh- lin-Volpe (2004), in a much-needed integrative article, de ne collective identity as a multidimensional concept that serves as a statement about categorical membership which must be personally recognized by the individual (a “subjective claim”, Deaux, 1996). Individuals possess a multiplicity of collective identities including gender and familial position (ascribed characteristics) and occupation or avocation (achieved characteristics). Cultural identity can be construed as one element or subset of collective identity, although this not well explored in the psychological literature. This identity element can be de ned as that identity which, through geography, ancestry or perceived similarity, links an individual to a membership group that encompasses affective ties, cognitive frameworks and behavioral actions. Cultural identity may be overlapping with national (or passport) identity, but it is not a requirement and often in heterogeneous national settings it is distinct. Extrapolating from the collective identity framework developed by Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004), cultural identity has several fundamentals. These include an evaluation of the cultural iden- tity, sense of belonging, behavioral involvement and ideology (or a nar- rative about the cultural group and the individual’s link to it). However, I suggest that distinct from other collective identities, cultural identity may occasionally be re ected more in cognitive frames and behavior than in self-categorization; that is, individuals may not be required to make the self-categorization statement that is considered necessary for collective identities in general. Baumeister (1986) points out that not all beliefs about oneself are simultaneously part of our self-awareness. The lack of cultural identity awareness may be explained conceptually through the phenomenal self or the working self-concept (Markus and Kunda, 1986), which refers to a part of self-knowledge that is present or not present in our awareness at a particular time. Finally, note that the individual experience of cultural identity, as with other individual level elements of collective identity, develops over time and may have considerable variability. This is particularly true of the
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individual experience of Hong Kong identity, in which developmental changes (individuals progressing, for example, from adolescence to adulthood) intersect with historical changes (e.g. the 1949 Communist revolution, the 1997 handover and the 2003 SARS epidemic). Due to both geographic mobility and increasing cultural heteroge- neity within national borders, individuals can possess several cultural identities, often referred to in the psychological literature as ‘frames’ (e.g., an Italian-American, a Japanese living in Peru, a Dutch citizen as a permanent resident in Thailand). These multiple cultural identities or frames interact in a variety of ways, and several competing theories have been developed to account for individual responses to multiple cultural identities—identity maintenance, identity con ict, integration, biculturalism, hybridization and situationalism. Berry’s (1986, pp. 37–51) acculturation theory proposes four iden- tity responses to multiple cultural identities—assimilation, integration, marginalization and separation—with variable acculturative stress levels associated with each response. Berry’s model was devised to explain identity issues facing indigenous individuals who are confronted with an imposed dominant or ruling culture, although later it was applied to sojourner adaptation as well. Other writers have focused their attention on the movement of individuals (sojourners or immigrants) from one culture to another and the competence associated with biculturalism. LaFromboise, Coleman and Gerton (1993) review this literature, which tends to stress the positive outcomes of an integrated or bicultural identity, although Rudmin (2003) disputes this claim. Hermans and Kempen (1998) suggest that the increasing cultural connections experienced by the world population will result in the phenomenon of cultural hybridization, and they speculate that this will lead to new forms of cultural identities. Oyserman (1993) similarly examine the layering of two cultures into a hybrid or bicultural iden- tity while further exploring the situational prime in which one set of cultural identities become activated. Others have explored in greater detail the situationalism and cultural frame switching of biculturals (Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee and Morris, 2002; Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris and Menon, 2001). Baumeister and his colleagues (Baumeister, Shapiro and Tice, 1985; Baumeister, 1986) propose a theory of identity con ict in which indi- viduals have irreconcilable components of their identities. Further, individuals may have positive affective responses to both identities yet incompatible behavioral repertoires. In a test of this model, Leong
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and Ward (2000) nd that among Chinese sojourners in Singapore, increased contact with the host nationals positively predicts cultural identity con ict. With Hong Kong in the early 21st century as a case study, what is the genesis of multiple cultural identities among a population of nearly 7 million inhabitants, and how are they negotiated in the public and private arenas?
Hong Kong Identity
The complexity of Hong Kong Chinese identity began in 1841 when the British claimed the island of Hong Kong at the terminus of the rst Opium War with China. While the battles ceased, the identity turmoil continues today. The ontogeny of the identity of Hong Kong Chinese has several discrete time periods. Before 1841, four distinct indigenous communities of farmers and shermen existed in Hong Kong, governed loosely by a fth landowning group, the Cantonese (Morris, 1989). When Hong Kong Island and later Kowloon (1860) and the New Territories (1898) came under British rule, the foreign population grew. However, then as now, the popula- tion of Hong Kong remains 98% Chinese in origin and language. The island grew slowly in population during the next 100 years and only experienced a dramatic growth beginning in 1949 on the heels of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese, many from southern China, poured into Hong Kong and became the workforce that transformed Hong Kong from an entrepôt of Chinese and foreign goods to an independent manufacturing, production and nancial center. The Chinese population doubled in the following 30 years. The indigenous and immigrating residents brought with them to Hong Kong core Chinese values: the self de ned by one’s duties and obligations toward family (Chiu and Hong, 1997; Nisbett, 2003), avoid- ance of non-familial group associations (Lau, 1981, pp. 195–216), social structures that are immutable and individuals who are malleable (Chiu and Hong, 1999), a preference for harmonious social relations and avoidance of con ict (King and Bond, 1985, pp. 29–45), self-effacement (Yik, Bond and Paulhus, 1998), and attention to the situational context (‘high-context’, Hall, 1976) as well as traditional Chinese cognitive struc- tures: an attributional style in which the behavior of a group member
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is attributed to the group rather than to the individual (Chiu, Morris, Hong and Menon, 2000), continuity and wholeness, and a philosophical belief in dialectical arguments (Peng and Nisbett, 1999). Layered over the core Chinese identity were introduced values, social and behavioral structures, communication styles and cognitive preferences common to British and northern European culture. These Western values included conceptions of the person as independent and the belief in inalienable individual rights (Shweder and Miller, 1985), distinctive attributes of each person, orientation toward individual success and achievement, motivation to increase self-esteem (Triandis, 1995), equality in social relationships or if unequal, preference for the superior position (Nisbett, 2003) and cognitive preferences toward cat- egorization and logic. Not all values were in con ict; both the Chinese and British had long histories of successful and creative entrepreneurship with elaborate trade relationships beyond their borders. While the British were in a numerical minority, as colonial rulers the institutions and public laws, rites and rituals that they established re ected their Western cultural preferences. The Chinese population, during the nearly 150 years between 1841 to 1984, at which point the Sino-British treaty was signed stipulating that Hong Kong would revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, was exposed to a dual system of Chinese and Western cultural elements (Bond and King, 1985, pp. 29–45). Chinese values and behavior were primarily operational in the home among family and friends, and Western values and behavior were operational in the public realm. Many residents saw themselves as “sampling the best from both cultural traditions, the Chinese providing the spiritual grounding, the Western, the technical prowess” (Bond and Hewstone, 1988, p. 134). Identity was often described in oppositional terms as ‘we’ (Chinese) versus ‘they’ (British) but behaviorally, a hybrid- ization was emerging. Siu (1999, pp. 100–118) suggests that the Chinese of Hong Kong have avoided rigidly de ned identities, are comfortable with their multicultural qualities and have learned how to “be exible in themselves” (p. 111). Western values and behavior became more salient and infused within Hong Kong identity for the middle and upper classes who choose to have their children educated in the West. In the latter half of the 20th century, thousands of Hong Kong Chinese children attended high schools and universities in the UK, Australia and to a lesser extent
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Canada and the US. This sojourner experience deepened and broad- ened the Western cultural layer surrounding the individual. Exposure to Western culture was also pervasive for Hong Kong resi- dents who did not leave Hong Kong but found themselves as part of the local workforce for the British-style civil service and international companies in Hong Kong. They spent their working days communicat- ing within the Western corporate style with Western managers and to a lesser extent co-workers. By 1984, the specter of a 1997 handover of political control from Britain to China was becoming a reality. While Hong Kong and the world discussed the political and economic consequences, a more per- sonal cultural identity crisis was brewing. Not prepared to abandon their sophisticated, urbane behavior and cultural identity for the drab and autocratic Chinese-ness of mainland China, a new Hong Konger identity began to emerge, now in opposition to the Chinese rather than the British. Utilizing her optimal distinctiveness theory, Brewer (1999) posits that Hong Kong Chinese needed to ful ll the twin motivations of being connected to the Chinese (through ethnicity and origin) and being distinctive. The Hong Konger identity appeared to be three nested identities: a core Chinese identity surrounded by Western economic and civic values encased in a regional identity. Empirically, Bond and Hewstone (1988) show that Hong Kong Chinese identi ed more with and had similar characteristics to both British and mainland Chinese than did the British with either mainland or Hong Kong Chinese. Others identify this same duality. Siu (1999, pp. 100–118) reports that designers of the Hong Kong room in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing debated whether English and Ming furniture should be juxtaposed. Wong (1999) suggests that Hong Kong identities were rooted in family experience within China and Hong Kong, and that individual preferences for cultural identity re ected that family history. In 1991, 45.9% of the population de ned themselves as Chinese while 48.4% choose the Hong Konger label. Wong de ned the emerging Hong Konger identity as characterized by being mobile, pluralistic, exible, situational and pragmatic. However, as the 1997 handover approached, the motivation for dis- tinctiveness between the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese identity became more salient and polarized. The Hong Kong Transition Proj- ect, which collected self-categorization data between 1995 and 1997,
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found that in the rst six months of 1996, the percentage of Hong Kong residents who identi ed as Hong Kongers increased from 35% to 45%, while those who identi ed as Hong Kong Chinese decreased from 32% to 20%. Simultaneously, there was an increase in those claiming Chinese identity from 22% to 30%.
Cultural Transitions
Hong Kongers on the Move The handover of sovereignty from the UK to China, from a frenetic capitalistic environment that was ruled by a democratic Western coun- try to a communist country characterized by limitations on individual rights of speech and private property, created fear, anxiety and uncer- tainty about what the future might bring. Hamilton (1999) encapsulates these feelings when he states that the entrepreneurs and professional classes needed to “assess whether the risks of being grounded in Chi- na . . . outweigh[ed] the opportunities that might ensue from becoming China’s broker to the world” (p. 8). The decision-making process appeared to be family-focused, and behavioral intentions were in uenced by identity descriptors: among those identifying themselves as Chinese, 60% were committed to stay- ing in Hong Kong, while among those claiming a Hong Kong identity, 45% said they would de nitely stay after the handover. Thousands of Hong Kong residents decided that the risks of staying were too great, and migration soared from 22,400 in 1980 to a high of 66,000 in 1992, leveling off to about 40,000 in 1994 (Wong, 1999). The majority of immigrants obtained visas for the UK, Australia, Canada and the US. Distinct from the 19th century migration of skilled and working class people who built the railroads and established the Chinatowns of the US and Canada, this migration was primarily of educated, middle and upper class people; three generations of a family rather than a husband leaving alone. When the handover occurred on July 1, 1997 the people of Hong Kong held their collective breath. But as no calamitous changes occurred in the next few months, the population cautiously exhaled. So did the Hong Kong immigrants who were now adapting to life in Vancouver, Los Angeles, Sydney and London. For many, their fears about the sovereignty of China were not realized and neither were their optimistic expectations of life as immigrants. Professionals found
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themselves under- or unemployed, subtle discriminatory practices were uncovered, and English language skills were insuf cient. What began as a trickle of husbands returning to Hong Kong to work, turned into a steady ow of returnees. One study suggests that 30% of those who left in the 1980s returned to Hong Kong (Kee and Skeldon, 1994). While return immigration has occurred in small num- bers in other geographic settings, sociologically, this was not, at rst, a typical remigration. Instead of the entire family returning to Hong Kong, wives and families frequently remained behind in the country of immigration while husbands pursued their livelihoods and entre- preneurial dreams in Hong Kong. For example, more than 160,000 Canadian passport holders presently reside and work in Hong Kong, many of whom are ‘single’ husbands. Dubbed ‘astronauts’, such men originally ew back and forth between Hong Kong and their new countries of citizenship, leading bi-national lives while their ‘satellite’ families struggled to adjust to new cultures and new identities. By the late 1990s and the rst decade of the 2000s, however, the lone husband returnee was expanding to include intact families, returning to live, work and be schooled in Hong Kong. Psychologically, what is the nature of the cultural identity of the returnee, whether husband or entire family? Another layer of identity has been added to the core Chinese, British/Western, Hong Konger identity in relation to the British, Hong Konger identity in relation to China. The identity of repatriate has been added. Who are these individuals and what is the con guration of their identity? Do they feel at home again in Hong Kong, or has their identity transformation led to a new global transnational identity? While initially devised to con- ceptualize the repatriation of the sojourner, the cultural identity model (CIM) of cultural transitions may provide a framework with which to understand the repatriated immigrant identity (Sussman, 2000).
Model of Repatriation and Cultural Identity
This model suggests that self-concept disturbances and subsequent shifts in cultural identity characterize cultural transitions, and argues for three fundamental elements: identity salience, sociocultural adaptation and self-concept/cultural identity changes. These features interact within a larger cyclical framework of cultural transition to predict consequences for the transition process made evident during repatriation.
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Identity Salience. While self-construal, emotion and motivation may be shaped by the cultural context, few individuals are cognizant of culture’s in uence. Culture may be part of the self but cultural identity is not explicitly recognized. Like a sh in water, culture surrounds an indi- vidual but its impact is seldom a salient feature of an individual’s self- concept; individuals rarely recognize the imprint of their own culture and its ubiquitous nature. In my social psychology classroom in New York, few students, in describing themselves, ever list ‘American’ among their top twenty attributes. There are exceptions to the general lack of cultural identity aware- ness, such as when an individual holds more than one identity, either distinctly separate or embedded. The multiplicity of identities for the Chinese residents of Hong Kong makes for a heightened salience of cultural identity generally and embedded or overlapping identities speci cally. The CIM predicts that one situation in which one’s cultural identity will emerge or become heightened is during the commencement of a cultural transition. Enveloped in a new social environment where behavior and thinking diverge from one’s familiar cultural context, awareness of the profound in uence of culture on behavior begins to grow. In close juxtaposition to the emerging cultural identity salience, a new social identity status emerges, that of outgroup member, an expa- triate or immigrant in a new cultural environment. These twin cogni- tions—of cultural identity salience and outgroup membership—appear to strengthen, at least initially, identi cation with the home culture. For the Hong Kong transitor, Chinese identity may be activated as a result of both heightened identity salience and the motivation to be distinct.
Sociocultural Adaptation. Following the cultural re-af rmation phase, the model posits that immigrants recognize the discrepancy between their cultural selves (and the goals that direct behavior and thought) and the new cultural context. Higgins (1996) suggests that self-knowledge is pursued for practical reasons, in part for the adaptive bene ts of improving the person-environment t. This is precisely the context in which cultural newcomers nd themselves. Cultural readjustments, prompted by the lack of t between one set of cultural cognitions and behavior no longer appropriate within the new cultural context, may lead individuals to modify behavior, cognitions, or both, and conse-
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quently cultural identity. For the Hong Kong resident, this phase may activate the latent Western identity. Immigrants are faced with a continuum of accommodation choices that range from maintenance of the cultural self and its behavioral repertoire at one anchor to transposition to a new cultural self and a new behavioral and cognitive repertoire at the other, the latter colloqui- ally described as ‘going native’. They might also nd the new culture too dif cult to understand, suffering from what Shweder (1991) refers to as ‘confusion-ism’, an immigrant’s honest assessment that cultures can be so diverse that it is impossible to comprehend the framework of another culture. Distinct from adjustment, however, adaptation is conceptualized as the successful endpoint of the accommodation process. Newcomers have adapted to their new culture if they utilize to some extent the behavioral repertoire, beliefs and attributional conventions of the host culture to smoothly engage in social relationships, and understand and utilize the cultural rules of social and professional life to appropriately lead, motivate, negotiate, decide and plan.
Repatriation. The classic migrant story ends with gradual accommoda- tions and adaptations to the new culture. The nature of the sojourner experience is to return home, but this is not true of the migrant. Similar to the emergence or salience of home culture identity at the commencement of the sojourn, the model suggests that as a result of cultural accommodation and adaptation, the self-concept is disturbed and consequent changes in cultural identity become salient upon the commencement of repatriation. In a process that is parallel to culture identity awareness when sojourning, though now against the backdrop of the home culture, repatriates evaluate their personally held values, cognitive maps and behavioral repertoires against the prevailing cultural norms at home. For many repatriates, there is no longer a t between their newly-formed host culture identity and that of the culture of origin. For most repatri- ates, the affective response is overwhelmingly negative, with repatriates reporting feelings of ‘not tting in’ with former colleagues, friends and family. Behaviorally, actions that were functional in the host country are blocked or opposed. Home culture identity no longer matches and the sojourner is now a member of a new outgroup within the home country, that of the repatriate.
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The Relationship between Self-Concept Disturbances and Cultural Identity Change As sojourners and immigrants successfully adapt to the new culture by modifying behavior and social thought, cultural identity changes. Newly learned cultural scripts that enabled the newcomer to t into the host environment are not appropriate in the home culture. Those trivial and profound aspects that in combination create home culture identity are no longer actively engaged at the point at which one has adapted to a new culture. Behaving Australian while in Melbourne is adaptive, but what about in Kowloon? It is upon repatriation that the cultural identity shift emerges and becomes salient. Upon repatriation, sojourners experience the most severe level of stress at any time dur- ing the cultural transition. Repatriation may be more jarring for the immigrant who did not anticipate returning home. The CIM suggests that four distinct types of identity shift might occur, the shift latent until repatriation makes it salient to the repatri- ate. These cultural identity shifts are labeled as subtractive, additive, af rmative, or global/intercultural.
Figure 1: Substractive and Additive Identity Shifts
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Subtractive and additive identity shifts (see Figure 1) commence the transition cycle identically with an obscured cultural identity (shaded in the rst box of the gure), which becomes salient as the transition to the new culture begins (indicated as an unshaded box). Home-cul- ture and new culture discrepancies are recognized, and the adjustment process is triggered. The two identity types diverge at this point, distinguished from each other by the individual difference variables of identity centrality and cultural exibility. For sojourners whom home-culture identity centrality is low and cultural exibility is low to moderate (indicated by striped shading in the gure), a track begins that leads to a subtractive identity shift. For sojourners whom home-cultural identity centrality is moder- ate and cultural exibility is high, additive cultural identity becomes the repatriate response. Subtractive and additive identity shifts are both associated with high sociocultural adaptation, and it is predicted that sojourners will experi- ence a more dif cult repatriation than those with low adaptation. Suda (1999) shows that the more integrated the sojourner is into the host culture, the more distressing the re-entry and the more long-lasting the distress. The subtractive identity shift (in the striped shaded box) results in repatriates feeling less comfortable with their home culture’s values and norms and less similar to their compatriots. An additive cultural identity shift would result in repatriates feeling more similar to their host culture, such that the repatriates’ cultural identity more closely resembles the host culture’s values, norms and forms of behavior. One outcome of an extreme form of this shift category nds repatriates seeking opportunities to return to the host culture as soon and as often as possible. Although both subtractive and additive identity shifters experience similar negative effects, their behavioral consequences vary. For the subtractive repatriate, responses to home might include seeking out other repatriates while perceiving other compatriots as less similar in culturally-shaped values and behavior. At the extreme, the subtrac- tive repatriates feel devoid of cultural identity. In contrast, additive repatriates might seek out opportunities to interact with members of the former host culture, participate or attend entertainment, sports or culinary representations of the host culture, or continue study of the host culture language. The model does allow for repatriates to adopt both types of identity shifts, subtractive and additive. Alatas (1972) describes this psychological
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state as the “captive mind syndrome,” whereby a sojourner rejects the home culture identity and uncritically adopts the host identity. In both identity shift categories, interaction with the home culture collective is minimized, exacerbating the experiencing of isolation from the home culture and the perception of not tting in with co-nationals. The third category of identity (see Figure 2), af rmative, can be described as one in which the home culture identity is maintained and strengthened throughout the transition cycle. These newcomers also begin with an obscured cultural identity (indicated by the shaded box in the gure), which becomes salient during the early stages of the cul- tural transition. In contrast to the subtractive and additive experience, af rmative shifters largely ignore the cultural discrepancies between home and host cultures, resulting in low adaptation to the host culture environment. Cultural self-concept consequentially will be highly stable and unambiguous, which in turn will result in a repatriation experience that is low in distress. For af rmative sojourners who neither adapted successfully overseas nor experienced an identity change, it is predicted that repatriation comes as a welcomed relief. The intercultural or global identity shift (see Figure 3), a less common identity modi cation, enables repatriates to hold multiple cultural scripts simultaneously and draw on each as the working self-concept requires. The transition cycle commences for these transitors with an awareness of their own cultural identity (unshaded box in the gure). Recognition of the cultural discrepancies between the sojourner’s current cultural values and behavior and that of the new sojourn site triggers the adjust- ment process. Adjustment is facilitated by low cultural centrality and high cultural exibility, resulting in high adaptation. Structurally, the self-concept of the sojourner with an intercultural identity can be described as more complex. This identity shift paradigm is neither the integration of home and host culture values (hybridization) nor the bicultural strategy that results from the acculturation experi- ence, but rather an identity in which the repatriates de ne themselves as world citizens and are able to interact appropriately and effectively in many countries or regions by switching cultural frames as needed. Intercultural identity shifts result in positive affective responses and little repatriation distress. Behaviorally, intercultural repatriates might seek to develop friendships with individuals representing many different cultures, selecting a wide-range of international entertainment (movies, sports and television programming), and reading material (books and newspapers), and participating in international electronic discussion groups.
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Figure 2: Af rmative Identity Shift
Figure 3: Intercultural Identity Shift
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It is important to note that multiple cultural transition experiences are not suf cient to result in an intercultural identity. Self-concept complex- ity and subsequent positive response to the return home is dependent on two features. First, before the commencement of the transition, the sojourner is actively aware of his or her cultural identity and its consequences—that is, they understand themselves as cultural beings. Second, during the adaptation and repatriation phases, the sojourner is also actively cognitively processing cultural aspects of the self-concept and is aware of changes in cultural identity. Physical movement home, then, is not coupled with an unexplained negative effect, as is the situ- ation with additive and subtractive shifters. Rather, the intercultural identity shift evokes a positive affective response.
US, European and Japanese Identity Responses to Repatriation
The United States, Europe and Japan have not experienced signi cant remigration patterns, and thus repatriation research in these locations has been limited to the repatriated sojourn experience. While all four types of identity responses to repatriation have been found among Western and Japanese returnees, they differ in the variability and typi- cality of response. Negative effects of returning home to the US are most frequently associated with subtractive identity responses as repatriated Americans report feeling less American, less similar to other Americans and less able to “ t in” (Sussman, 2002) compared to pre-departure identity. The negative effect is exacerbated by the unexpectedness of the iden- tity response, and it is often misattributed to the re-entry job, the city where the returnee is settling or to spousal or familial relations (Suss- man, 2001). Af rmative identity responses are the second most frequent for Ameri- can returnees coupled with the positive effects of and relief at returning home. These grateful repatriates rarely make cultural adaptations in their host countries and therefore do not experience self-concept and identity changes. A smaller percentage of American repatriates experi- ence additive or global identity shifts. Recent research among Italian sojourner repatriates reports con- sistently negative effects and subtractive, additive and global identity responses. Few returnees react positively to their return and to their Italian identity (Grisi, 2004). One woman who repatriated to Italy fol-
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lowing a sojourn to Sweden remarked, “I’ve experienced the feeling of no longer tting into my home country, and talking with other students, they had the same feeling, the same distress.” In a study of repatriates to Finland, subjective identity appeared to be a common consequence of cultural transitions. A woman returning from Australia noted, “Coming back home was more dif cult than going abroad because I had expected changes when going overseas. During repatriation it was real culture shock! I felt like an alien in my own country. Surprisingly, I was totally unprepared for the long, harsh, cold, dark Arctic winter. My attitudes had changed so much that it was dif cult to understand Finnish customs. Old friends had moved, had children or just vanished. Others were interested in our experiences, but only sort of. Most simply could not understand our overseas experience or just envied our way of life.” Additionally, negative effects upon repatriation are correlated with a lack of communication with home family and friends while the sojourner is overseas (Gregersen and Stroh, 1997). Adolescents returning to Turkey after many years of living in various European countries experience more depression, anxiety and academic achievement problems than those who have never left Turkey (Sahin, 1990). While the repatriation effect is negative, identity data has not been collected. Japanese sojourners, due in part to the cultural homogeneity of Japan, report high cultural salience before departure from Japan. Despite that awareness, Japanese repatriation is also often negative in effect but characterized as an additive response as a result of successful adapta- tion to the host culture. However, the negative effect is tempered by the awareness of self-concept and identity changes (Sussman, 1985). Japa- nese repatriates report knowing that despite additive identity changes, the norms of Japanese culture demand adherence to Japanese forms of behavior and lifestyle once they return home—that is, low cultural exibility. In an attempt to negotiate his two cultural identities, one respondent indicated that he often hid “Newsweek” magazine inside a Japanese magazine when reading on the subway. The prevalent identity response among adolescent Japanese returnees is subtractive, with participants reporting a sense of “feeling different” from mainstream society (Kidder, 1992) in that they are usually more assertive and individualistic than peers who have not left Japan (Mino- ura, 1988) resulting in a prolonged negative effect. Japanese women repatriates who accompany their husbands on overseas assignments
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also report “dif culty in tting in to Japanese society” due to feeling “less Japanese” (Suda, 1999). An intercultural or global response is found among Japanese cor- porate executives who have had several overseas assignments. This is particularly evident when the overseas site is a small-sized city, the Japanese expatriate community is small and local adaptation is more compelling.
Hong Kong Identity Response to Repatriation
Factors that affect repatriation The case has been made in this chapter that residents of Hong Kong have developed complex identities. Triggered by situational cues, they have learned how to negotiate these identities in Hong Kong, the region and the world. Wong (1988) provides a rich example of the ability to switch cultural identities among Hong Kong textile executives (cotton spinners) who were born in Shanghai: According to the situation, a Shanghainese can activate regional ties of various scope . . . In international forums such as textile negotiations, the cotton spinners usually present themselves as industrialists from Hong Kong . . . Vis-à-vis their foreign buyers or the senior British of cials of the colony, they are Chinese. Meeting in regional associations, they are people from Ningpo or Shanghai city who enjoy their local cuisine and theatri- cal entertainment. When they participate in the activities of their trade associations, they are modern, Westernized businessmen. (pp. 111–112) How will migration and remigration affect these cultural identity frames? Among the professional/educated repatriates, the CIM predicts that although identity pro les for Hong Kong repatriates will be found among all four types, the modal one will be the global identity. In part, this is due to pre-departure cultural identity salience and the multidimensional nature of Hong Kong identity. The CIM model also describes identity response as being affected by individual difference variables. Some individual level variables that may affect adaptation and repatriation include English pro ciency and the appropriateness of host country and repatriation employment. In Hong Kong, due to the collectivist nature of the core culture, dif- ferences in familial variables are expected to moderate individual identity responses to repatriation. Such familial factors include the number of
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family members accompanying the head of household, host country adaptation level of family members, number of years spent in the host country, ages of children and the nature of immigrant/home country experience (intact family versus astronaut family). Based on the global identity pro le alone, one might expect the affec- tive response to repatriation to be positive. However, there is reason to believe that Hong Kong remigration will result in a more nuanced and complex identity response. Psychological, sociological and economic factors indicate that re-migrants may experience a negative repatriation affect. First, psychological expectations were not met for the transition experience. The basis for immigration, imagined economic and political catastrophe as a consequence of the 1997 handover, did not material- ize; the “push” of immigration was unfounded. Further, the “pull” of immigration, nancial success and smooth adjustment, may not have been realized. The attempt to minimize handover anxiety and provide for future family stability may not have worked, and repatriation may have become the public statement of a failed strategy. There does appear to be a category of immigrants for whom a multination residential life was purposely planned. These migrants may have already possessed a global identity, and obtaining a foreign passport was viewed as a hedge against political turmoil in Hong Kong and not a re ection of a desire for a either a new identity or a new permanent abode. However, there were unexpected consequences for some of these immigrants. While husbands commuted between Hong Kong and their immigrant country maintaining and strengthening bi-cultural identities, adolescent children were developing new cultural identities which in many cases may have supplanted the Hong Kong or Chinese identity. Repatriation compounded the differing familial identities. Anecdotal evidence sug- gests that adolescents discovered that they now possessed a combination of “subtractive” and “additive” identities and experienced discomfort in returning to Hong Kong. Frequently, these returnee children have continued their education at international schools in Hong Kong due to their lack of Cantonese pro ciency, which further isolates them from the general population. Sociologically, both migration and re-migration may have resulted in unexpected familial stresses. Absentee husbands who left families behind in the country of emigration resulted in changes in spousal roles. Wives, for example, found themselves as heads of households for long periods, and were thrust into being sole decision makers. Repatriation found
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families united again physically but fractured culturally and structurally. One additional aspect of the acculturation process for many migrant families involved joining Chinese Christian churches. In maintaining these af liations upon their return to Hong Kong, yet another life choice might have separated them from non-emigrant friends and family. A nal factor that may in uence the negative effects of the repatria- tion experience is economic. The cycle of the world nancial markets were particularly unkind to Hong Kong migrants. In the decade leading up to handover, property prices in Hong Kong fell as anxiety ourished and departing immigrants sold real estate and businesses at loss. However, economic booms in Australia, Canada and the US led to these same migrants investing in their new countries at high prices. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, when re-migration began, economies in the West had slumped and Hong Kong re-migrants lost on their investments.
Current investigation and results I interviewed 50 male and female returnees in Hong Kong during 2004. These re-migrants departed Hong Kong between 1984 and 1995 and returned after living at least one year in either Canada or Australia. The age range at the time of emigration was 13 to 47 years. Interviewees were obtained through targeted advertising and snowball sampling. The methodology of the project combined qualitative interviews with quantitative psychological scales that measured overseas adaptation, identity, repatriation stress, satisfaction with life, and independent ver- sus interdependent self-concept. The interviews each lasted 1½ hours and consisted of participant responses to a semi-structured interview schedule. Analyses of the data collected from these interviews reveal some sur- prising results. First, in contrast to American and European returnees, very few of the Hong Kongers exhibited subtractive identity changes. Irrespective of immigration location, gender or length of time overseas, only two Hong Kongers in the study indicated feeling less a part of Hong Kong culture or substantially different from friends, family or co- workers. One woman who lived in Australia for six years before return- ing to Hong Kong remarked “. . . I don’t like Hong Kong tricky things anymore. I like to be frank and simple, be honest . . . People give me feedback . . . and they ask “have you come back from another country? Were you born somewhere else?” even though my Cantonese is quite
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good. They say I act Caucasian.” For this re-migrant, a subtractive identity was both her perception and those of others. Why were subtractive identity changes so rare in Hong Kong when they were the most prevalent response of American returnees? It appears to be a result of two factors. First, among the middle class, a large per- centage of the population has lived overseas, if not as migrants, then as sojourners. Until recently, for example, the Hong Kong government provided most civil servants with an overseas education allowance (to the UK) for their children, a remnant of the colonial days in which British workers in Hong Kong were provided with this education perquisite. The children of thousands of government workers, including teachers and professors, have attended either secondary school or university overseas. Additionally, many Hong Kongers spend summer holidays and other vacations in Western countries visiting family. Therefore, rather than perceiving themselves as different from their compatriots and not tting back into Hong Kong culture, the re-migrants’ experience might echo that of the returned sojourner. A second reason for the subjective identity response being rare focuses on the complexity and exibility of the core Hong Kong identity. In contrast to Japan for example, Hong Kong culture allows for a broad range of acceptable behavior and thought from its residents. While successful adaptation in the new citizenship country may have resulted in the adoption of new Western forms of behavior and values, and in the expression of some of these forms of behavior upon return to Hong Kong, this did not appear to supplant the Chinese or Hong Kong identity among the re-migrants. This interpretation underscores the second major nding from the study described next. The most common cultural identity pro le for the Hong Kong re-migrants is additive, with nearly fty percent of the interviewees adopting this identity pro le. High cultural exibility allowed for high adaptation when living in Canada or Australia and an appreciation of the values of these cultures. Although the study participants had returned to Hong Kong to live, many anticipated moving back to their new country of citizenship, perhaps during retirement. Quantitative analysis revealed that Western and Chinese identities were associated with each other and that most re-migrants held both Western (on a 4-point scale, average 2.6) and Chinese (average 3.0) identities. Con- rmation of the additive identity was also found in the results of a self-description task. Forty-nine percent of the descriptions in the study sample were dispositional or personality traits that are most common
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in Western cultures, compared with 18% being relational (these inter- personal descriptors, such as wife, mother and daughter, are more prevalent in Chinese cultures). The remainder of the descriptions fell outside of these two categories (e.g. “I am very busy” or “I like to ski”). Qualitative analyses that coded for identity themes indicated that the additive identity response was more complex than anticipated, and represented two sub-categories: hybridization, in which the Western and Hong Kong identity combined to form a unique set of behavior and thoughts; and biculturality, in which the re-migrant’s behavior was situationally determined, either Chinese/Hong Kong or Western, by the setting in which the behavior took place. The additive/hybrid pro le is exempli ed by one re-migrant who returned from Australia. In comparing the Australian and Hong Kong work style, she commented “(the Australians) are very direct and blunt. They say what is on their minds. In work (back in Hong Kong), I express myself although I am not blunt. I am also seen as quite independent. I will go out to lunch myself or shop. I don’t always need to be with others.” Additive/bicul- tural identity and behavior is characterized by a male re-migrant from Australia. “I am a mix of Australia and Hong Kong . . . a mixture in the sense that at home I am Chinese but at work I feel like I’m not a Chinese guy. Most of my bosses are foreigners, or Australian or English or American.” Additive identity, however, did not result in generalized repatriation distress as it does among Western returnee groups. The Satisfaction with Life Scale revealed much satisfaction (average of 5.1 on a 7- point scale), and the Repatriation Distress Scale revealed low distress (average of 2.9 on a 7-point scale). There were ample opportunities in Hong Kong for additive repatriates to engage in Western activities, cuisine, entertainment and work-styles when they wished. Technol- ogy and communications also facilitated ties to the passport country. One interviewee, the only one experiencing some distress, remarked that he regularly watched his favorite Canadian hockey team on the Internet and couldn’t wait to get back to Canada. He was, however, an “astronaut” and his family still resided in Toronto, which accounted in large measure for his distress. In general, the Hong Kongers exhibited additive identity of a bi-cultural variety, switching cultural frames and behavior as the situation necessitated. A third more limited result pertained to men who migrated after the age of 40. Their cultural shift resulted in af rmative identities—low
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overseas adaptation, high motivation to return to Hong Kong, and strong desire to remain. A behavioral manifestation of the af rmative identities was the choice of the traditional naming pattern when using English (family name followed by Chinese given name) among 50% of the af rmatives. This compared to traditional usage among only 20% of the additives and 20% of the globals. One male returnee expressed a strengthening of his Chinese as opposed to Hong Kong identity: “I felt very Chinese when I returned to Hong Kong. Then I went back to China more frequently . . . When I am older maybe I will move back to China . . . maybe move to Canton.” Approximately 8% of the interviewees held a global identity, all of whom had experienced multiple cultural transitions before migrating. A women who had migrated to Canada and then returned to Hong Kong explained: “We lived in Singapore, I lived and worked in Australia, we lived in Michigan . . . so it’s like departure and re-entry, many times before we did this. I was pretty international . . . there may be some ingrained Chinese values, but I was more cosmopolitan because of all the con- tacts that I’ve made.” Although it was predicted that most Hong Kong re-migrants would experience a global identity, the additive identities better captured the cultural exibility combined with bi-culturalism of the returnees. However, as predicted, the affect was generally positive, with re-migrants expressing satisfaction with their returnee lives. Two groups that were more likely to experience some repatriation distress were women and those who migrated at a younger age (teen years). These results con rm earlier studies of Japanese repatriates. It has been suggested that if adolescent development intersects with cultural transitions that the identity consequence encompasses more cognitive and behavioral variables and results in more negative effects. Additional investigations need to pursue the characteristics that might lead to increased risk for repatriation distress among these populations. An unanticipated nding suggests a link between immigrant adapta- tion and political behavior in Hong Kong. Consistent with the additive identity pro le, many returnees noted that they have incorporated into their cognitive and behavioral repertoire the Canadian/Australian value of individual freedom and the need to speak their minds despite the opposing views of co-workers, friends or family. With tens of thousands of Hong Kongers returning, these beliefs and forms of behavior could have consequences for local politics and the burgeoning democracy movement.
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Conclusion
Geography, history, economics and psychology intersect with any inves- tigation of Hong Kong identity. When cultural transitions are added to the mix, the outcome is understandably complex. Cultural exibility and pragmatism, hallmarks of Hong Kong society, set the tone for both overseas adaptations and for repatriation accommodation. Most of the interviewees in this study experienced successful overseas adaptation, adopting the values, forms of behavior and thought patters of the to which they emigrated. The resultant additive identity (both hydrid and bi-culturalism types) affords Hong Kongers the ability to feel comfort- able both in the diaspora and in Hong Kong. In both large and small decisions, the behavioral consequences of additive identities were enacted. It seems clear that in the future, Hong Kongers will continue to be both geographically and psychologically mobile. What is more dif cult to predict is the effect of cognitive hydribity and bi-culturality on political and social attitudes and behavior. This investigation suggests that the cultural identity model should be expanded to include more external or cultural variables. In its current form, the CIM highlights individual difference (personality) variables as the antecedents of repatriation experiences. Although earlier explica- tions of the model (Sussman, 2000) indicated cultural limitations, the Hong Kong case is particularly instructive. Here, the positive affective consequences of the additive identity re ect similar results found among global identi ers from Western countries. Additionally, the distribution of the repatriation identities differed signi cantly from those experienced by Western repatriates: few subtractive and af rmative identities, with the majority additive. I posit that these are due in large part to the internal factor of the cultural exibility of Hong Kongers and to the external factor of the cosmopolitan characteristics of non-migrating compatriots who themselves possess rich and complex identities. The stories that the re-migrants shared were simultaneously heart- breaking and inspirational, courageous and mundane. They encom- passed dramatic changes in patterns of thinking and friendship networks, and small preferences for food types and leisure pursuits. They are all reminders of the consequences of monumental political decisions on the intimate, personal decisions and lives of individuals and families. The ever-changing narrative of Hong Kong identity continues. As cultural and political ties with China increase, Hong Kong identity will again be transmuted. Increases in sojourns in China for employment
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will add yet another layer to the already rich and complex identity of the people of Hong Kong.
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Japan’s ‘Beckham Fever’: Marketing and Consuming a Global Sport Celebrity
Rie Ito
Introduction
Sport has been an integral part of globalization (Maguire, 1999). This is especially true in the case of sport celebrities.1 Despite overwhelming neglect by academic researchers (but see Andrews and Jackson, 2001), these sports stars have increasingly traveled the world as commodities and popular images, as much as athletic laborers. The issue in this paper—‘Beckham Fever’ in Japan—can be viewed as an exemplar. During the Korea-Japan World Cup in 2002, David Beckham served as captain of England’s national football team and, consequently, received enormous attention in Japanese society. This was not exclusively due to his play on the eld. His hairstyle (the so- called ‘Beckham hair’), adopted by many Japanese boys, and his so- called ‘sweet mask’ (raved about by numerous women) also fueled the enthusiastic gaze of both media and public. The increasing attention soon led to the widespread of the use of the Japanese honori c, ‘Beck- ham-sama.’ This was signi cant, because such an honori c was rarely used for athletes. In this respect, we can nd only a few contemporary rivals including ‘Leo-sama’ (the Hollywood star, Leonald DiCaprio) and ‘Yon-sama’ (the Korean TV drama star, Bae Yong Joon). The variety of these markers serves as evidence of Beckham’s tremendous popularity. What is more, this popularity continued and even developed following
1 The de nition of sporting individuals has been one of confusion and controversy. The point at the heart of the confusion seems to stem from a famous description by Boorstein (1961, p. 61): “the hero was distinguished by his achievement: the celebrity by his image or trademark. The hero created himself; the celebrity is created by the media. The hero was a big man; the celebrity is a big name.” As a result, there has been a certain amount of dif culty in fully differentiating the sporting individual into the roles of ‘hero’ and ‘celebrity.’
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the World Cup, due to the media’s consistent reportage and his wide daily visibility via advertisements. This was most clearly evidenced by the enthusiastic response to him when he revisited Japan as a member of his club team, Real Madrid, in June 2003. Hundreds of passionate fans ocked to Narita airport to witness Beckham’s arrival with his wife, Victoria, the former Posh Spice. Re ective, perhaps, of his honori c, their ve day schedule was accorded blanket media coverage, rivaled in frenzy only by the imperial wedding a decade before. In observing the Beckham phenomenon, I seek to explore Japan’s mediated national identity under the conditions of globalization. To do so, I will detail how the global footballer was marketed and con- sumed. By employing content analysis of differing media—including newspapers, magazines, TV and Internet web pages—I will show how he was presented in and represented and interpreted by Japanese media. The point of this analysis will be to measure whether and how Beckham was used to (re-)create distinctions of ‘we/they,’ ‘Japan/the West’ and ‘Japan/others’, which are historically key distinctions in Japanese society. As this chapter will show, the Beckham phenomenon was some- thing larger than a Western athlete in an Eastern country. It enables me to talk about many issues, ranging from sport to media, celebrity, globalization, race, gender and national identity. At the same time, I can consider the complex ways in which these elements link to one another. The discussions that Beckham stimulates vary, and include at least the sport-media complex (e.g. Boyle and Haynes, 2000; Hashi- moto, 2002; Rowe, 2004; Wenner, 1989, 1998), the globalization of sport (e.g. Holden, 2003; Maguire, 1999; Miller et al., 2001), the trans- formation of athletes into celebrities (e.g. Andrews and Jackson, 2001; Boyle and Haynes, 2000; Vande Berg, 1998; Whannel, 1992, 2002), the globalization of popular culture (e.g. Tobin, 1992; Iwabuchi, 2002) and celebrity and ‘collective con gurations’/power (Marshall, 1997). In other words, Beckham is a perfect case of the contemporary sport celebrity who is embedded in global capitalist culture and also serves as a site for (re-)production, negotiation and challenges to the socially privileged meanings of race, class, gender, ethnicity, nationality and more (Andrews and Jackson, 2001). It is important to know that the media serves as the locus where celebrity and national identity (or, national identi cation) may embrace
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one another.2 In much the same way as it has been in other societies, national identity has been a mediated matter in Japan. A major cur- rent element has been the discourse of Nihonjinron—a perception of the Japanese as a unique collectivity. In the words of Yoshino (1997; 1999), Nihonjinron has served as the marketplace for the reproduction and consumption of cultural nationalism. It has also worked to enable the creation of cultural distinction into “Japan and its Others” (Clammer, 2001)—a division, it is often asserted, that Japanese society strongly makes. Moreover, it should be noted that Japan’s continuous national
2 This may need a little more explanation. In a society where a celebrity is more than ever created by and communicated through media, there is a temptation for consumers to believe that they truly know the celebrities whom they worship. After all, contemporary media reports to consumers detailed information about a celebrity’s per- sonality, preferences, activities and life history, as well as constantly providing glimpses of their daily appearance. Japan is undoubtedly one of the leading societies in this regard, according increasing public attention to celebrities-cum-celebrities. In truth, they make regular appearances on ‘wide-show’ TV programs (as targets of conversa- tion and gossip), as well as various other media. They are so pervasive because they are easy to produce and much in demand for consumption. In this way they serve as a source for media presentation 365 days a year, with almost no holiday. (Indeed, even their holidays are mediated!) Despite this mediation, however, there is very little of the actual person there. The mediated gure delivered to audiences is nothing more than a “simulacra” (Baudrillard, 1993). The celebrity’s representation is a creation that comes to have its own tangible existence. The representation by media ends up attaching new meaning for the con- suming audiences, shaping the public gure of the celebrity. In turn, there cannot be a celebrity where there once stood an actual person, without an identi cation being made by the media and a reception of it by the mass consumers. Even though the images received among consumers are not always the same—they differ from person to person—the media represents the celebrity and, at the same time, largely shows collective ways of identi cation (i.e. interpretation, signi cation and evaluation) of the celebrity in society. If one allows this claim—thereby reading celebrities (as a block) as mediated identi cations—it would be correct to seat them at the same table in the discussion of identity. In truth, it is not a stretch of the imagination to suggest that identity is a mediated matter. In a way, media invites audiences to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are in relation to who ‘we’ are not (Cottle, 2000, p. 2). This is certainly true in Japan, where ‘we’ is often constructed with ‘they’ in mind—a pattern that has been historically ingrained for centuries. Such strategies work to identify self and others often by refer- ring to global-local levels (although not exclusively) and even aids in the construction of what Anderson (1983) has called ‘imagined communities.’ This is precisely the methodological perspective that I employ in this chapter. By focusing on the images and discourses as the result of the mass mediation of ‘Beck- ham Fever,’ I seek to catch Japan’s national identity in the presence of this global sport celebrity.
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cultural identi cation as Nihonjinron discourse has been accomplished by holding a signi cant other fully in mind: the ‘West’ (Aoki, 1990; Befu, 1987; 2001). As Befu has suggested, in particular, whether it was Europe before the Second World War or the United States thereafter, Western societies have consistently been involved in Japan’s national identity formation since the Meiji restoration, above all as a gure for contrast (2001, p. 123). Taken together, I use this chapter to question whether globalization has changed this. Has increasing global cultural ow worked to dimin- ish or dismiss Japan’s view of distinction? If so, how? Although these questions are not easily answered, in the case of mediated national identity, the prospects do not seem all that positive (i.e. Holden, 2003). That is, in contemporary Japan, while identity increasingly appears to be tied to discourse about globalization in the media, it is refracted through or directed toward the ‘local’ (and the ‘national’), rather than the ‘global.’ In the remainder of this chapter, I will look back at ‘Beckham Fever,’ focusing on marketing as well as consumption. In particular, two types of consumption will be addressed: the image of Beckham and the sign of Beckham. In analyzing both marketing and consumption, I will refer to various related elements—including sport, media, globaliza- tion, celebrity and identity; primarily, though, I will seek to discern the ways in which the phenomenon—especially representation and interpretation by the media—was a matter of Japan’s self-identi cation vis-à-vis the ‘West’ or ‘others.’ This will lead, naturally, to discussion of mediated national identity in Japan under conditions of globaliza- tion. In so doing, I especially wish to show whether and how it can be said that the marketing and consumption of this global celebrity has shaped Japan’s identity.
Marketing Beckham
Selling a Global Sport Sport is increasingly becoming a major global business. This is most re ected by the increasing cost of broadcast rights, which enables sport to employ media as sponsors more and more easily. This was true in Japan during the Korea-Japan World Cup of 2002. It was estimated
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that a consortium of Japan’s public and private broadcast channels and a satellite channel, SkyPerpecTV paid about JPY 18.6 billion (roughly US $186 million) to broadcast the games (Sugiyama, 2001).3 It would not be incorrect to say that this related to the issue at the heart of this chapter. In truth, to a large extent, the Beckham phe- nomenon was created by the Japanese media. Before the 2002 World Cup—or, more correctly, until the moment that media began paying attention to this global event, the name David Beckham was practically unknown in Japan. Beckham was the exclusive property of football, and his appeal was limited to a small number of enthusiastic football fans interested in professional leagues abroad. But then, as media increasingly concentrated on the World Cup, Beckham rapidly came to be known throughout Japanese society. This was certainly a re ection of a fact that the larger part of Japanese media—including (regular) non-sports media—started to spotlight footballers competing in the event. In so doing, their eyes began to turn to players who represented foreign national teams. It should be noted that this tendency was not unintentional. Beck- ham was employed as a tool by the media to secure the largest pos- sible audience. In particular, they sought to capture the attention of non-regular football fans—namely women—as a means of heightening public enthusiasm for the World Cup. In fact, according to some (e.g. Psiko Henshbu, 2002), Beckham was quite often introduced in articles featuring footballers or concerning the Cup, mainly on the basis of his attractive face and physical characteristics, rather than his football talent and skills. To provide but one example, immediately before the opening of the 2002 World Cup he was introduced in a special pho- togravure entitled “Cool Guys’ World Cup,” which ran in the weekly magazine, Shkan Asahi. As for ‘Beckham Fever,’ it can be said that the efforts by the media to emphasize the footballers’ individual (mainly, visual) images bore fruit. In the case of Beckham, the success was exceptionally large. The original purpose of heightening public recognition of the event was almost completely accomplished, as the headline in the Shkan Sakk
3 This was based on the prior contract between FIFA and the agency, Sporis and Kirch. The corporation was reported to have bought the TV broadcast rights from FIFA for about 1.3 billion Swiss Francs. The Sports Illustrated’s report (2002) translated this sum into American $779 million, but a Japanese sport journalist did $1 billion (Sugiyama, 2001).
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Magajin proclaimed: “I Love Beckham. First of All, From That (I’m stepping into the World Cup).” What the title clearly underscored was the idea that many women were opening the door to the World Cup for the sole purpose of pursuing the English footballer. Because of him they were hastily transformed into football fans. More precisely, of course, they were rst and foremost Beckham fans.
Becoming a Marketable Commodity The explosive increase of Beckham fans produced economic effects in a wide range of markets. For example, in a sporting goods store in Tokyo, about three hundred people per day bought the replica English team uniforms, paying the additional charge of about US$30 “BECKHAM 7” on the back (Ueda, 2002). This was not limited to the world of sport- ing goods. During the World Cup, the English footballer’s hairstyle (the so-called ‘Beckham hair’) was quickly adopted by Japanese boys. As the staff in a hair salon in Tokyo commented, “half of the male customers ordered Beckham hair” (Ueda, 2002).4 Other products associated with Beckham were also traded at a high rate. These included the jeans he wore in a photo carried in his biography, Italian brand sunglasses he modeled in a PR campaign, a special (but pricey) tour package to sleep in the hotel at which the English team stayed during their camp in Japan, and even a short-term tour plan to England just to watch Manchester United, his club team at the time, play (Ueda, 2002). The publish- ing business was also greatly impacted, in much the same way in his home country. As an assistant editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine for women explained, the sales of female-oriented magazines increased by using Beckham’s photos—especially on their covers—or carrying stories about him. This was true even if the stories were rather insubstantial or short (Katagiri, 2002). All told, it is clear that Beckham became more than a footballer. From the marketing viewpoint, one can say that the World Cup served as the occasion for Beckham to gain a reliable, steady, lucrative, alter- native ‘career’ in the Japanese advertising world. After the Cup he signed endorsement contracts with some of Japan’s elite companies
4 This craze even led to a special issue on ‘how to make Beckham hair’ in a weekly magazine for women (Takahashi 2002). In the history of women’s magazines, Takahashi estimated, this was the rst case that an angle was employed to introduce a man’s hairstyle.
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for an aggregate sum (for one year) of about US$4 million (Katagiri, 2002).5 What is more, the most successful case (from Beckham’s perspec- tive) was probably a series of ads that Beckham made for a body-care company, TBC, in which he made appearances with his wife, Victoria under the theme ‘Just Beauty.’ Until that time Victoria had not been well known in Japan (unlike other countries where her celebrity often exceeded that of her husband). In fact, many Japanese were not familiar with her past singing career and persona of Posh Spice; rather, Japanese media quite often labeled her as ‘Mrs Beckham’ or ‘the wife of David Beckham.’ One magazine (Shkan Josei Jishin) even depicted her life as an almost-Cinderella story by focusing and tracing her life-story until she nally had the good fortune of becoming married to the prince had the good fortune to become married to the prince, David Beckham (of course, the details do not much rival Cinderella’s: Victoria was [and remains] even richer than Beckham). Despite all of this, Victoria became so well known through these early advertisements that she nally was awarded an advertising contract of her own with the auto maker, Daihatsu. In a word, it seems true that she started to do business in the Japanese market as a result of her husband’s popularity. Putting aside the matter of Beckham’s image (which I will spotlight in a section to come), it should be noted that these advertisements also functioned as an intentional tool for Beckham’s self-promotion. In fact, according to a report (i.e. Katagiri, 2002), despite the pricy sum for the endorsements, the footballer’s agency required some restrictive pre- conditions regarding Beckham’s appearance: the advertisements had to be shot using a hair and make-up artist, stylist and photographer cho- sen by Beckham’s handlers. This last condition should be emphasized here, because the photographer demanded was the one who had been in charge of David and Victoria’s photograph collection. Here we see that athletes as well as sport organizations/associations and media, take charge of their transformation into celebrities; moreover, their advertise- ments are tied to (and driven by) their ‘image business.’6
5 Katagiri also reported many abandoned planned contracts with this celebrity due to severe nancial pre-conditions insisted on by his management agency, SFX. For instance, the agency once asked for a contract in the sum of US$5 million which would last for two years or more. 6 In this respect, Beckham’s case was not necessarily exceptional. According to Nanba (2000), a recent trend in Japanese advertisement making has accorded more direct communication between the talent presented and the audience. In a country like
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This is not to say that the companies failed to use Beckham’s image strategically in pursuit of a positive reaction to their products. In fact, in seeking increased public attention and positive reaction to their products, the companies emphasized that Beckham’s appearance in their advertisements was (close to his) natural (state). A perfect example of this was Meiji (a famous Japanese confectionary company), which employed Beckham as an image character in a series of advertisements for chocolate-coated nuts. A PR person explained that the concept of the television advertisement in which Beckham simply threw a choco- late-covered nut in the air and caught it in his mouth was “natural Beckham” (see Katagiri, 2002). Other companies sought to play up this natural or authentic angle. The website of the abovementioned body-care company, TBC, recommended that audiences pay attention to the (natural) behavior and facial expressions of Beckham and his wife; the website also explained how they both behaved during lming. A similar strategy of depicting Beckham as ‘just himself ’ was adopted by a satellite pay per view TV channel for which sport was the second largest content. After Beckham moved to his new club, Real Madrid, the TV channel, WOWOW, billed itself as the only tool available for meeting him (i.e. the only broadcaster of the Spanish football league in Japan). Doing so, it featured Beckham calling out to the audience (in English): “Watch me on WOWOW.”
The Image of Beckham
Beckham as a Kind, Family-oriented Man As I have shown, the earliest media focus on Beckham was almost exclusively on his visual image(s). This changed, though, as his popular- ity increased. Media started to cover his ‘private faces’—including past
Japan, where the advertisements devote a larger proportion of advertising time and money to the talent (the so-called ‘talent-CM’), the border between reality and ction has become more and more blurred. After all, the celebrity appears in the ads to sell not only the product, but also him- or herself. Although image control is not unusual, it is worth noting those many cases in which celebrities, especially American lm stars, have stipulated before appearing in Japanese advertisements that the distribution of their image be limited to the Japanese market. According to a report by Newsweek in 1989, the images of these celebrities in Japanese advertisements (including the image of Arnold Schwarzenegger raking in Nisshin cup noodles) are often quite at odds with the images that the celebrities have carefully created and nurtured in their home countries.
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and present experiences, family relationships, friendships and more—in addition to his play on the eld. This helped to produce a reputation of a personality that was ‘shy,’ ‘cute,’ ‘honest’ and ‘kind.’ Over time, what came to be most emphasized was his kindness and familial face (above all, a man who was a devoted husband and indulgent father). In fact, a weekly magazine for women Shkan Josei Jishin featured a special issue that revealed just how shy, kind and family-oriented he was; in particular, it detailed his rst meeting and kiss with his wife and his presence at the delivery of their rst son. In addition, of his several tattoos, only two received extended, nearly exclusive focus. These include the words “Victoria”—in Arabic—on his left arm, and “Brooklyn” (his rst son’s name)—in hip-hop style script—on his waist. These symbols were introduced as evidence of his love for his family. This image of devoted family man was reinforced during Beckham’s visit to a primary school during his trip to Japan in 2003. The visit was extensively (and enthusiastically) covered in the media, punctuated by Beckham’s confession that he had a strong desire to interact with the children of Japan. The image of kind family man was also communicated in adver- tisements. In truth, Beckham (and his management team) succeeded in reproducing and maintaining a particular image among Japanese fans throughout his tenure. It was an image that in no way offended, and made him appear sweet and loveable. This was achieved, above all, through his kind gaze and perpetual smile. Viewing this, audiences recon rmed their prior perception of his personality—a perception that not only resonated with, but was reproduced by, multiple past media reports of his kindness. An exemplar was the abovementioned series of 2003 advertisements featuring Beckham and his wife Victoria for the Japanese body-care company TBC. The series tended to highlight Victoria, with husband David in the role of assistant. As such, he often did something for her: he tenderly escorted her, praised her beauty; and even took a bath alongside her separate bathtub lled with beautiful owers. In the bathroom situation, Beckham lled his tub with small footballs, making Victoria laugh in amusement. Combined, such scenes heightened the impression that Beckham was a good partner—a fun-loving, faithful, gentle companion—and husband. More, for the women watching televi- sion, the advertisements encouraged them to run out to the company’s salon with the aim of becoming like Victoria (and therefore catching a tender man like Beckham). The message underlying these spots was,
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‘see this most blessed lady beside David, who is the most attractive catch: handsome, fashionable, kind, as well as talented and rich. Come to TBC salon, soon you will be like her!”
A Global Celebrity, a Global Image? Cashmore (2002) has observed the presence of and attention to Beck- ham among the British. He writes: Manchester United fans often chant (to the tune of José Fernandez Diaz’s Guantanamera): ‘One David Beckham. There’s only one David Beckham.’ Actually, there are two: the esh-and-blood father with a fondness for cars, decorously pale looks and ne soccer skills; and the icon, the celebrity, the commodity, the Beckham that exists independently of time and space and resides in the imaginations of countless acolytes. (Cashmore, 2002, p. 4). Methodologically, this is a basic statement, but it is stimulating in terms of the globalization of popular culture. In light of Beckham’s movement ‘Eastward,’ it would not be strange to ask how many David Beckhams there are. On the one hand, as The Observer’s 2002 special report observed, the increase of women addicted to Beckham was certainly a phenomenon on a global scale. The reason for this addiction seemed to have been uniformly due to his being family-oriented, extremely cool, fashionable and gorgeous. Certainly, in the case of Japanese fans, these were the traits singled out for affection. Despite such universality, it is important to bear in mind Giardina’s (2001) observation about the global postmodern celebrity. In his view, in societies where transnational celebrities make appearances, they are blessed with “ exible citizenship” because they do not begin with any original image for mass consumption. Following this, their images can change in ways that re ect any local context. In a word, celebrities “do not just drop from Heaven. They are to large extent home-grown.” (Buruma, 1995, x) Applied to the case at hand, ‘Beckham Fever’ in Japan assumed its own unique contours; it should be distinguished from fan reception in the player’s homeland. Consider, for instance, Cashmore’s research that is cited above. It indi- cates that Beckham’s ‘soft-ness’ is perceived by the British as a departure from the commonly-held image of footballers, which, in turn, bears on discussions of racism, violence, alcohol use, ‘hard’ masculinity and ‘blue collar’ origins. Yet, almost none of these elements, I would argue, held
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true in Japan. Little of Beckham’s Japanese audience experienced any hint of ‘class’ in his sport.7 Instead, as one can see from the marketing of the J-League ( Japan’s professional football league), the advertising strategy from the start was aimed at a different kind of fan (i.e. Watts, 1998). One intention was to provide an alternative to baseball—a sport that is associated with salarymen (or white collar workers).8 To do this the sport was marketed as a new lifestyle for younger people, includ- ing young ladies; its image was made more accessible and fashionable than other major sports. In contrast, although Beckham’s ‘soft’ gure apparently rendered him a gay icon in England (Cashmore, 2002), this dimension was almost wholly absent in Japan, at least insofar as everyday media production was concerned. This became particularly clear when one considers the contemporary tendency among young Japanese men to favor a softer aesthetic, part and parcel of a heterogeneous appearance. As Miller (2003) has shown, this has encouraged the development of a male beauty business. Aesthetic salons for men have proliferated, as has the practice among men of daily facial care: cleansing, eyebrow trimming and using sheets to remove oil from the skin. Indeed, this ‘male esuté’ (beauty care) is one of the services for which Beckham became a commercial spokes- man. In truth, Beckham was not the rst footballer to be presented in an advertisement for a Japanese esuté company. Compared to those of sportsmen from other elds (such as baseball and sumo), images of soccer players seem less resonant in terms of traditional masculinity. What is more, footballers tend to be identi ed with and portrayed in more intimate terms. They are depicted as having an interest in (and some sense about) fashion and trends concerning body care. They are often represented in media as being cognizant of their appearance, whether it be hairstyle, accessories or clothing. Noting these points, it can be said that ‘Beckham Fever’ to some extent involved indigenous aspects. Although his popularity was global, in Japan his gure was also shaped and conceptualized locally. The
7 Watts (1998) has referred to the notion— rst introduced by Ohnuki-Tierney (1987)—that in Shinto belief the foot was perceived as a polluted part of the body. Still, at least in contemporary Japanese society, football does not appear to carry any such negative connotations. 8 Apart from Watts’s understanding, I take into account that baseball in Japan is not popularly limited to ‘white collar’ workers. It seems to appeal to and engage a number of ‘blue collar’ fans, as well.
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