Law School Record, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 1987) Law School Record Editors
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On Linde, Lawmaking, and Legacies Philip
HONORING HANS: ON LINDE, LAWMAKING, AND LEGACIES PHILIP P. FRicKEY* It is a great honor to present the keynote address at this symposium, "Unparalleled Justice: The Legacy of Hans Linde." The symposium raises several concerns, however. First, consider the title. In his wonderful book, The Devil's Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce defined "legacy" as "a gift from one who is legging it out of this vale of tears."' Yet the work of Hans Linde remains vigorous and ongoing. Indeed, to those of us who know and follow his activities, he remains the Energizer bunny of public law at the age of 82. He just keeps right on going, on the Council of the American Law Institute, on the Oregon Law Commission, and in conversation with students and scholars alike. Second, in honoring Hans, we run the risk of duplication. This is not the first festschrift for him.2 To see if I could find anything new to say, I ran a Google search. I discovered the following: "Hans Linde happens to have a big thing for blondes."3 Alas, it turns out that this particular Hans Linde is a middle-aged fellow who lives in Germany and is involved in some sort of flight simulation club. This Hans Linde likes to simulate flights to Scandinavia. Not our Hans Linde. But for a moment there, I thought I had a new headline for all *Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). This essay encompasses the keynote address presented at the Willamette University College of Law Symposium, UnparalleledJustice: The Legacy of Hans Linde, held on October 27, 2006, supplemented by light footnoting. -
Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First Century Supreme Court Justices: an Empirical Analysis
2012] APPENDIX TO 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399 A-1 LAW REVIEW SCHOLARSHIP IN THE EYES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Brent E. Newton APPENDIX: OPINIONS ISSUED DURING 2001-11, IN WHICH ONE OR MORE JUSTICES CITED AT LEAST ONE LAW REVIEW ARTICLE 1. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). Id. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873 (1993)). Author: Associate, Van Ness, Feldman & Curtis Law Review Ranking: 454 Id. at 178 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503 (1977)). Author: Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law Law Review Ranking: 6 Id. at 195–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ―Race-to-the-Bottom‖ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992)). Author: Professor of Law, New York University Law Review Ranking: 5 2. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001). No citations 3. Gitlitz v. Comm‘r of Internal Revenue, 531 U.S. 206 (2001). Id. at 221 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing James F. Loebl, Does the Excluded COD Income of an Insolvent S Corporation Increase the Basis of the Shareholders‘ Stock?, 52 U. -
2013 Mont Pelerin Society Membership List
MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 1 ARGENTINA Dr. Martin Krause _____________________ San Isidro, Buenos Aires Argentina Dr. Alberto Benegas-Lynch Jr. San Isidro, BU Argentina 2000 Eduardo Marty 1978 Buenos Aires Argentina Gerardo Bongiovanni 2004 Rosario, Santa Fe Argentina Maria Gabriela Mrad 2007 Buenos Aires Argentina Mr. Walter Castro 2002 Rosario, Santa Fe Argentina Professor Martin Simonetta 2011 Buenos Aires Argentina Mr. Eduardo Helguera 2011 Argentina 1988 _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 2 Professor Hector Siracusano AUSTRALIA _____________________ Buenos Aires Argentina Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Drummoyne, NSW Australia 1994 Life Member 2011 Eduardo Stordeur Argentina DR. Janet Albrechttsen 2012 Sydney, NSW Dr. Esteban Thomsen Australia Martinez, Buenos Aires Argentina 2011 1988 Professor James Allan Mr Guillermo Yeatts Sherwood, Brisbane, QLD Australia San Isidro, Buenos Aires Argentina 2010 1998 Mr. David Archibald Dr. Meir Zylberberg Perth, WA Buenos Aires Australia Argentina 2011 1969 Life Member _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 3 Prof. Jeff Bennett Ms. Juel Briggs Gladesville, NSW Gundaroo, NSW Australia Australia 2008 2011 Mr. Chris Berg Mr. Robert Carling Mosman, NSW Melbourne, VIC Australia Australia 2011 2011 Mr. James Cox PSM Dr. Peter J. Boxall AO Sydney, NSW Coogee, NSW Australia Australia 2011 2011 Dr. Jonathan Crowe T. C. Beirne School of Law- The Professor Geoffrey Brennan University of Queensland Canberra W232A Forgan Smith Building, St. Lucia Capus Australia Brisbane, QLD 4072 Australia 1987 2011 _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 4 Michael Darling Mr. -
The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court Neomi Raot
A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court Neomi Raot The Supreme Court's decisions in Vacco v Quill' and Wash- ington v Glucksberg2 held that a state can ban assisted suicide without violating the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these high profile cases, six phi- losophers filed an amicus brief ("Philosophers'Brief') that argued for the recognition of a constitutional right to die.3 Although the brief was written by six of the most prominent American philoso- phers-Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson-the Court made no mention of the brief in unanimously reaching the oppo- site conclusion.4 In light of the Court's recent failure to engage philosophical arguments, this Comment examines the conditions under which philosophy does and should affect judicial decision making. These questions are relevant in considering the proper role of the Court in controversial political questions and are central to a recent de- bate focusing on whether the law can still be considered an autonomous discipline that relies only on traditional legal sources. Scholars concerned with law and economics and critical legal studies have argued that the law is no longer autonomous, but rather that it does and should draw on many external sources in order to resolve legal disputes. Critics of this view have main- tained that legal reasoning is distinct from other disciplines, and that the law has and should maintain its own methods, conven- tions, and conclusions. This Comment follows the latter group of scholars, and ar- gues that the Court should, as it did in the right-to-die cases, stay clear of philosophy and base its decisions on history, precedent, and a recognition of the limits of judicial authority. -
Trump Judges: Even More Extreme Than Reagan and Bush Judges
Trump Judges: Even More Extreme Than Reagan and Bush Judges September 3, 2020 Executive Summary In June, President Donald Trump pledged to release a new short list of potential Supreme Court nominees by September 1, 2020, for his consideration should he be reelected in November. While Trump has not yet released such a list, it likely would include several people he has already picked for powerful lifetime seats on the federal courts of appeals. Trump appointees' records raise alarms about the extremism they would bring to the highest court in the United States – and the people he would put on the appellate bench if he is reelected to a second term. According to People For the American Way’s ongoing research, these judges (including those likely to be on Trump’s short list), have written or joined more than 100 opinions or dissents as of August 31 that are so far to the right that in nearly one out of every four cases we have reviewed, other Republican-appointed judges, including those on Trump’s previous Supreme Court short lists, have disagreed with them.1 Considering that every Republican president since Ronald Reagan has made a considerable effort to pick very conservative judges, the likelihood that Trump could elevate even more of his extreme judicial picks raises serious concerns. On issues including reproductive rights, voting rights, police violence, gun safety, consumer rights against corporations, and the environment, Trump judges have consistently sided with right-wing special interests over the American people – even measured against other Republican-appointed judges. Many of these cases concern majority rulings issued or joined by Trump judges. -
The Judiciary and the Academy: a Fraught Relationship
THE JUDICIARY AND THE ACADEMY: A FRAUGHT RELATIONSHIP RICHARD A. POSNER* I have been a federal court of appeals judge since 1981, and before that I had been a full-time law professor since 1968. And since becoming a judge I have continued to teach part time and do academic research and writing. The United States is unusual if not quite unique in the porousness of the membranes that separate the different branches of the legal profession. The judiciary both federal and state is a lateral-entry institution rather than a conventional civil service; and unlike the British system (though that system is loosening up and becoming more like the U.S. system), in which the judges are drawn from a narrow, homogeneous slice of the legal profession – namely, senior barristers – American judges are drawn from all the different branches of the profession, including the academic. Among appellate judges who came to the bench from academia are Oliver Wendell Holmes (although he had joined the Harvard Law School faculty only months before being appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he had been doing academic writing for many years), Harlan Fiske Stone, William O. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer (U.S. Supreme Court); Calvert Magruder, Charles Clark, Jerome Frank, Joseph Sneed, Harry Edwards, Robert Bork, Ralph Winter, Frank Easterbrook, Stephen Williams, J. Harvie Wilkinson, John Noonan, Douglas Ginsburg, S. Jay Plager, Kenneth Ripple, Guido Calabresi, Michael McConnell, William Fletcher, and Diane Wood (U.S. courts of appeals); and Roger Traynor, Hans Linde, Benjamin Kaplan, Robert Braucher, Ellen Peters, and Charles Fried (state supreme courts). -
2002-2003 Year in Review
Oregon Lawyer 2 0 0 3 UNIVERSITY OF OREGON SCHOOL OF LAW Since 1884, Oregon’s Public 2002-2003 Law School YEAR IN REVIEW NEW STUDENTS Academically Impressive, Geographically Diverse— and More Applicants PROFESSORS Federal Prosecutor, Corporate Attorneys Join Faculty PROGRAMS Appropriate Dispute Resolution and Environmental Law Programs Expand, Portland Business Program Grows. Public Interest/Pro Bono Champs Again! PICTURES Four Seasons at the Knight Law Center, 2003 Commencement and Frohnmayer Award Banquet KUDOS Volunteers Transform Law Students into Lawyers WWW.LAW.UOREGON.EDU U O S C H O O L O F L A W MESSAGE FROM THE DEAN NEW FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATORS, are using our new space in the Portland Center STRENGTHENED PROGRAMS AMONG building owned by the UO for summer school FIRST YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS classes, student recruitment, and career services activities. It has been an exciting and eventful first year, and We continue to add energetic new faculty with I am very pleased with the steps forward that the impressive academic and practice credentials to law school has taken. our ranks. Tom Lininger, who previously worked This year we had 1,900 as a federal prosecutor in Oregon and with the applicants for 180 places law firm of Skadden, Arps in San Francisco, will in our entering class, be teaching evidence and legal profession. Judd and the students we Sneirson, who previously worked for Willkie, admitted as the Class of Farr & Gallagher in New York and as a law clerk 2006 are among the best for a federal judge, will be teaching contracts credentialed and most and business associations. -
Ten Lessons in Appellate Advocacy
Federal Trade Commission Ten Lessons in Appellate Advocacy Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission before the Howrey LLP Antitrust Fundamentals Seminar Washington, DC February 24, 2011 Last Fall at the ABA Antitrust Section’s Masters Course in Williamsburg, I talked about some of the lessons—both good and bad— that I learned during the forty-plus years I was an antitrust trial lawyer.1 There were more lessons I could have shared—like who gets to sit closest to the jury (it’s always plaintiff’s counsel, as Bill Schwarzer and I learned to our dismay one day when, representing Chrysler, we tried to preempt those coveted seats only to have the trial judge The views stated here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other Commissioners. I am grateful to my attorney advisor, Henry Su, for his invaluable assistance in putting these thoughts to paper. 1 J. Thomas Rosch, Can Antitrust Trial Skills Really Be “Mastered”? Tales Out of School About How to Try (or Not to Try) an Antitrust Case, Remarks Presented at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Antitrust Masters Course (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100930roschmasterscourseremarks.pdf. (old Judge William Sweigert) sternly tell us to take our proper places).2 And whether there’s any point, as a defendant, in contesting the seating of a 6-person instead of a 12-person civil jury (there isn’t, though that would always seem to favor the plaintiff, given the unanimity requirement).3 But today I’d like to talk about something else: appellate advocacy.4 More specifically, I’d like to share with you some of the good and bad things I have learned about that subject over the same forty years and a lot of appellate arguments. -
Promising the Constitution
RE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2016 2:41 PM Copyright 2016 by Richard M. Re Printed in U.S.A. Vol. 110, No. 2 Articles PROMISING THE CONSTITUTION Richard M. Re ABSTRACT—The Constitution requires that all legislators, judges, and executive officers swear or affirm their fidelity to it. The resulting practice, often called “the oath,” has had a pervasive role in constitutional law, giving rise to an underappreciated tradition of promissory constitutionalism. For example, the Supreme Court has cited the oath as a reason to invalidate statutes, or sustain them; to respect state courts, or override them; and to follow precedents, or overrule them. Meanwhile, commentators contend that the oath demands particular interpretive methods, such as originalism, or particular distributions of interpretive authority, such as departmentalism. This Article provides a new framework for understanding the oath, its moral content, and its implications for legal practice. Because it engenders a promise, the oath gives rise to personal moral obligations. Further, the content of each oath, like the content of everyday promises, is linked to its meaning at the time it is made. The oath accordingly provides a normative basis for officials to adhere to interpretive methods and substantive principles that are contemporaneously associated with “the Constitution.” So understood, the oath provides a solution to the “dead hand” problem and explains how the people can legitimately bind their elected representatives: with each vote cast, the people today choose to be governed by oath-bound officials tomorrow. Constitutional duty thus flows from a rolling series of promises undertaken by individual officials at different times. -
Judical Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals
Florida State University Law Review Volume 32 Issue 4 Article 14 2005 Judical Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals Michael E. Solimine [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael E. Solimine, Judical Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2006) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol32/iss4/14 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW JUDICAL STRATIFICATION AND THE REPUTATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS Michael E. Solimine VOLUME 32 SUMMER 2005 NUMBER 4 Recommended citation: Michael E. Solimine, Judical Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331 (2005). JUDICIAL STRATIFICATION AND THE REPUTATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE* I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 1331 II. MEASURING JUDICIAL REPUTATION, PRESTIGE, AND INFLUENCE: INDIVIDUAL JUDGES AND MULTIMEMBER COURTS ............................................................... 1333 III. MEASURING THE REPUTATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS . 1339 IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF -
Annual Report 2016
ANNUAL REPORT 2016 Section 1 WE THOUGHT WE WERE JUST PLANTING ‘‘A WILDFLOWER AMONG THE WEEDS OF ACADEMIC LIBERALISM, AND IT TURNED OUT TO BE AN OAK.” — Antonin Scalia (1936–2016) Section 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 7 8 13 The President’s Student Lawyers Message Division Chapters 16 21 24 Faculty Practice State Division Groups Outreach 26 28 30 Alumni International National Lawyers OUR PURPOSE Relations Affairs Convention Federalist Society Senior Vice President Lee Liberman Otis, President Eugene B. Meyer, and Executive Vice President Leonard A. Leo. 38 40 43 Regulatory Article I Digital Transparency Project Initiative Law schools and the legal profession are currently emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal say what the law is, not what it should be. The Society ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform seeks both to promote an awareness of these principles 46 48 society. While some members of the academic and to further their application through its activities. Publications Benefactors community have dissented from these views, by and & Blog large they are taught simultaneously with (and indeed This entails reordering priorities within the legal as if they were) the law. system to place a premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the rule of law. It also requires 53 59 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy restoring the recognition of the importance of these Independent Officers & Studies is a group of conservatives and libertarians norms among lawyers, judges, law students, and Audit Staff interested in the current state of the legal order. -
Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: a Hard Look at the Process†
UNPUBLISHED COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS: A HARD LOOK AT THE PROCESS† STEPHEN L. WASBY‡ I. INTRODUCTION The burgeoning caseload of the U.S. courts of appeals, which has outpaced the increase in district court filings and also has risen more rapidly than has the number of appellate judges, has caused a problem for these courts. As mandatory jurisdiction courts which must rule on all appeals brought to them, even if the issues are elementary and the answers obvious, what should they do? Both formally and informally, they have used a type of triage by sorting out cases for differing types of treatment. To aid in coping, for over thirty years the courts of appeals have issued dispositions which are not published and which are not to be cited as precedent. Whether dispositions become published opinions or unpublished memoranda is a result of the judges, clerks, and parties who prepare them and the process through which dispositions move. A published opinion may have started as such, or it may have been proposed as an unpublished judgment. A disposition that began life as a proposed memorandum disposition may see the light of day as a published opinion, and there may have been debate within the panel of judges as to the type of disposition to be issued. Because it is time for systematic attention to the actuality of practices in the courts of appeals leading to unpublished dispositions,1 this article is offered to provide some empirical groundwork about the process † This article is based on a paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, Ill.