Peirce's Haecceitism Author(S): Jeffrey R

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Peirce's Haecceitism Author(s): Jeffrey R. DiLeo Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 79-109 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320316 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 15:55

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Peirce's Haecceitism

I. Introduction Pcircc'shaccccitism is centralto his theoriesof indexicalrefer- N ence, secondness and individuals.In particular,"haecceitism is Peirce's theoryof individuation,and "haecceity"is the indescribable, unqualitativeand indefinite"hereness and nowness"of an individual. Around 1890, Peirce found it necessaryto supportexplicitly a doctrineof haecceitismsimilar to Scotus1notion of "haecceitas."1 Althoughit was during his "MonistPeriod (1891-1914)"2 that haecceitismwas most clearlyarticulated, an implicitacceptance of haecceitismis presentin his writingsas earlyas 1885. Despite dis- cussing and defendinghaecceitism both explicitlyand implicitly forthe last thirtyyears of his life,it has not receivedthe attention in the secondaryliterature that it warrants. This discussion will begin with a look at Scotus' notion of haecceitasand then proceed to considerPeirce's motivationsfor the late introductionof haecceitisminto his philosophicalsystem. Thereafter,Peirce's haecceitismwill be presentedin an extensive, although not exhaustiveaccount. Finally,given the recentsurge of interestin haecceitismamong contemporarymetaphysicians and philosphersof language, specificallyin regard to questions concerningthe metaphysicsof modality,the relevanceof Peirce's haecceitismto contemporarytheories of haecceitismwill be considered.This essay aims not only to providea positivecontribu- tion to the extantstudies on Peirce's haecceitism,but also, and perhapsmore importantly,to presentcontemporary discussions of haecceitismanother chapter to take into account,thereby extend- ing the rangeof Peirce'srelevance.

//. The ScotisticNotion of Haecceitas The notion of haecceitaswas introducedby the medievaltheo-

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logian and philosopher,John Duns Scotus, "Doctor Subtilis"(ca. 1266-1308).3 Given that Peircc "derivedthe greatestadvantage froma deeplypondering perusal of some of the worksof medieval thinkers"after his studyof Kant (1.560),4 his firstformal ac- quaintancewith Scotus1 haecceitas was probablysometime around 5 1867-68. In fact,he does not mentionScotus in any of his lec- turesbefore 1867, nor is thereany evidentScotistic influence in the writingsof 1865 and 1866.6 Peirce highlyregarded and was stronglyinfluenced by the work of Scotus (1.6). For example,in Chapter6 of the "Grand Logic" of 1893, Peirce praisedScotus as "one of the greatestmetaphysi- cians of all time,whose ideas are well worthcareful study, and are remarkablefor their subtlety, and theirprofound consideration of " all aspectsof the questions [of philosophy] (4.28). He even ex- presseddisappointment for the factthat "no considerableScotistic school of thoughtis now extant"(N3:174). Still,

it must not be supposed thatthat which I findto admire in Scotus lies upon the surface.Anything more terribly metaphysicalcannot be imagined.He is alwaysdiscussing some question which means nothingin this world. And his argumentsappear to be exclusivelylittle texts of Aris- totle, or of some other authority,wrested completely fromthe meaningthey originally bore. It is only by the most determinedstudy that one can discoverany sense in it; and even then thereis but a grainof wheatto a bushel of chaff.(MS 1000:02) Nevertheless,the profoundinfluence of Scotus' workon Peirce is indubitable,7and one such "grainof wheat" that Peirce found is Scotus1principle of individuationwith its account of haecceitas- one of Scotus' major contributionsto philosophy. During the earlyfourteenth century, an intensedebate concerning the ontological status of universalstook place. This debate was based on a rejectionof the Platonisticaccount of universals. Whereas Platonistshad argued that universalnatures exist inde-

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pcndentlyof both the mind and of the particularswhose natures theyare, fourteenthcentury "moderate" realists, like Scotus, took the Aristotelianview that the natureof a thingcannot existinde- pendentlyof it and agreed that naturesmust be somehow common to particularsin reality.8They argued that thiscommon nature must reallyexist as a metaphysicalconstituent of the things whose naturesthey are, yet noticed that this view raisesdifficul- ties. Prominentamong these difficultiesis the problemof distin- guishingone particularfrom another. That is to say, because any given genus or species can have more than one particularas a constituentof it, particularsmust have more than only common naturesas their metaphysicalconstituents, for if they did have only common naturesas theirmetaphysical constituents, then it would be difficultto distinguishone particularfrom another. The resolutionof thisdifficulty was to be found in the postulationof a principleof individuationthat will allow fordistinctions among particulars.The question now was what is the best principleof individuation.Negation? Existence? Quantity? Matter?9 One of the basic principlesof Scotus' metaphysicswas that the individualis the only existingthing.10 This principlewas not new withScotus; it was one of the fundamentalprinciples of Scholastic pluralism.For Scotus, metaphysicsinvolved the investigationof the plentifulontological status of individualthings, for the richbe- ing of individualthings makes up one extensivehierarchy with God at its summit.11Scotus held thatsomething must be done to the common nature12of the individualin orderto make it universal or to make it singular,for it is not by itselfeither way. Never- theless,singularity and universalitydo not determinethe common naturefurther in the intellectualor quidditiveorder. That is to say, theydo not add anythingto the being of the individualand do not bringit to a higherposition in the vasthierarchy of things, ratherthey are "modes" of the common nature of individual thingsthat do not change the contentof the nature.According to Scotus, the common natureis indifferentto existence(cssc)y althoughit has itsown quidditivebeing, or essentialbeing.13

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Whereas in itselfthe common naturehas the abilityto be in " " manythings, or community,it is not by itselfable to be predi- cated of many.To be predicableof many,or universal,the common naturehas to be thought,for it is the conceptthat is universal, not the nature in itself. In short, the principle of universalizationof the common natureis the mind.14On the other hand,Scotus' principleof individuationof naturesis haecceitas. Scotus argues that the common natureis not singularall by itself,viz., it is not by itselfa "this,"15nor is individuationof the common natureaccomplished by negation,existence, quantity, or matter.16In the individual,the common natureis "contracted" by the haecceitas,such that the haecceitydifferentiates the individual. Contractionis the methodwhereby the common natureis convertedinto an individualwith numerical unity. Haecceitas in a real existentthing contracts the common natureto an individual mode of existence. Haecceitas is not a thing (a res) which is combined with the common nature as two things are combined to form a third thing,because it cannot existseparately and thatwhich it is combined with cannot exist separatelyfrom it. Haecceitas does not add anythingto the characterof Socrates,for Socrates is not a man and a "this." Haecceitas is the principleby whichSocrates is the unique individualthat he is- it is a principleof differentia- tion. The individualdifference is a special kind of thingtermed haecceitasor "thisness,"i.e., the haecceitasof Socrates is "So- cratesness,"and not "Socrates."17 Between an individual'shaecceitas and its nature,there is a 18 "formaldistinction," viz., a formaldistinction which "refersto the objective'formalitates' which are realizedin one and the same individualsubstance independentlyof any intellectualact" and not a "real distinction"19like the distinctionbetween matter and form.20A real distinctionwould implythat haecceitas and essence are two differententities, whereas Scotus contendshaecceitas and essence are not separable,viz., theyare merelyformally distinct.21 Their relationshipis such that not "even the divine power can

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separatephysically the 'Socratesness'of Socrates and the human natureof Socrates."22Socrates' human nature(his humanity)and his haecceity(his "Socratesness")are not two things,but two re- alities which are formallydistinct, and have numericalunity.23 Scotus' formaldistinction can be definedas "a distinctionfrom the nature of the thing occurringbetween two or more really identicalformalities, of whichone, beforethe operationof the in- tellect,is conceivablewithout the othersthough inseparable from themeven by divinepower."24 For Scotus, formaldistinction ex- plainsthe validityof our universalconceptions of individuals. Haecceitasor "ultimarealitas entis" or "entitas singularis vel individualis,"25is the finalor ultimatereality of the being whichis matteror formor the compositething.26 In effect,haecceitas is the last perfectionof a thing- a perfectionthat is necessaryfor a thing'sconcrete existence.27 Haecceitas restrictsthe specificform, matteror compositething and completesit by sealing the being as "this"being,28 yet it does not conferany furtherqualitative determination.29 What haecceitasactually is for Scotus is not easilyunderstood, for it is neitherform, nor matter,nor the compositething, and yet it is at the veryheart of his philosophy.A major difference among medievalphilosophers such as Aquinas, Ockham and Sco- tus, is "whereyou wantyour great mystery": for Scotus it is haecceityor individuality.30Haecceitas is known to God and can be knownby man in the futurelife, where his intellectis not so de- pendentupon sense perception.Full knowledgeof the haecceitas of all things,although impossible for us in our presentcondition, is equivalentto fullknowledge of all reality.31In our presentcondition we are unable to grasp a thing's haecceitas,even though we know thingsin theirconcrete existence, and thereforeas individuals.32The requirementof haecceitasis a logical one, for in practicewe do not differentiateindividual persons or objects because we know theirrespective thisness, or herenessand nowness, but because of such accidentaldifferences as being in different places at the same time,or havingdifferent colored hairor eyes.33

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It is logicallycontradictory for Socrates' haecceitasto be the same " as Parmenides'haecceitas, for Socratesness" is differentiatefrom and not the same as "Parmenidesness."

///. TheRoad to Haecceitism While in the early 1890's, Peirce began to defendexplicitly a notion of haecceitysimilar to that of Scotus, the acceptanceof haecceitiesis implicitin his workas earlyas 1885. Beforediscuss- ing this, the use of the word "defend"should be explainedfor haecceitismis a questionablenotion to many,and Peirce was not a strangerto such doubts. In a letterdated April 7, 1897 to E. Schroder,Peirce com- mentson Schroder'sdifficulties with his notionof haecceity. You say "Your notion of 'hecceities'does not a[t] first sight commend itselfto my mind; and I have not yet overcome its delerious effect."Very just! I have always maintained,and I thinkalways shall maintain,the whole- somenessof what we call Occam's razor34. . . meaning that in explaininga given phenomenonwe should refuse to admit any kind of elementnot alreadyadmitted by us untilit becomes manifestthat without such [an] element the phenomenoncannot be explained.This is not distinc- tivelynominalistic doctrine but is an indispensablecondi- tion to the rationalcoherence of philosophy.What distin- guishes the nominalistis that he does not admit certain elements.The realist,if he is a sound thinker,must once have occupied the same position. By no means would I approvethe waysof thinkingof a man who did not hesi- tate long to admitmy hecceities.(MS L392:2)

Given thatPeirce claimsthat he would not approveof our ways of thinkingif we did not questionthe population of haecceity,it is importantto examine the reasons why Peirce believes that the postulationof haecceityis necessary.Schroder's comment is im- portantbecause it shows that Peirce was well aware thathaecceit-

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ism is a surprising,if not shocking,thesis to some. On the basis of ontologicaleconomy alone, the postulationof haecceitiescan be seriouslychallenged. This sectionwill discussthe developments that led to Peirce's acceptanceof haecceitism,for Peirce was not alwaysa haecceitist. Around 1885, just afterleaving Johns Hopkins, Peirce's writings begin to suggestthe acceptanceof haecceitismto explainthe natureof existentthings. These writingsin particularare a reviewof JosiahRoyce's The ReligiousAspect of Philosophy(MS 1369) and "One, Two, Three: FundamentalCategories of Thought and of Nature" (MS 901). In general,the formativeperiod of Peirce's haecceitismis the interval1885 throught1889, and the aforemen- tioned writingsare the earliestfrom this period. AlthoughPeirce surelylearned of Scotus' haecceitasover twentyyears earlier, the term haecceityor haecceity35is, for the most part, only to be foundin his writingsafter 1889. The sole exceptionis his review of Porter'sHuman Intellectfor the Nation in 1869 wherinhe dis- playsan excellentknowledge of Scotus' haecceitas.36What can this be attributedto? The keyis to be found in Peirce's reformulationof the categories around 1885, and his growingacceptance of haecceitismin the formativeperiod of 1885 through1889. Thus, to understand Peirce's acceptanceof haecceitism,it is necessaryto explainsome of the main developmentsin his theoryof categories. Peirce firstpublished his categoriesin a paper of 1867 entitled "On a New List of Categories."The main argumentof the paper was a logical analysisof cognitionand judgmentthrough which Peirce attemptsto derivesome abstract,universal conceptions or categories.These categoriesare universalin the sense that they are sufficientto classifyany object of thoughtor experience,and also in the sense that theymay be understoodby anyonecapable of reflectingon and formingjudgments about experience. His argumentin the "New List" was stronglyinfluenced by Kant's Critiqueof Pure Reason^and Peirce begins the paper with an acknowledgmentof this influence:"This paper is based upon

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the theoryalready established, that the functionof conceptionsis to reduce the manifoldof sensuousimpressions to unity,and that the validityof a conceptionconsists in the impossibilityof reduc- ing the contentof consciousnessto unitywithout the introduction of it" (W2, 29). Peirce's argumentthen procedesroughly as follows:the universalconception of "the presentin general11or "IT in general" is nearestto sense and is called a "conception," because it is universal.This conception is "the pure denotative power of the mind" and "as an act of attentionhas no connota- tion at all." "IT in general" is "renderedin philosophicallan- guage by the word 'substance'in one of its meanings."Further- more, "the unityto which the understandingreduces impressions is the unityof a proposition.""This unityconsists in the connec- tion of the predicatewith the subject; and, therefore,that which is impliedin the copula, or the conceptionof bring,is thatwhich completesthe work of reducingthe manifoldto unity."For example, take the proposition"The stove is black." In thisproposition "the stove is the substance,from which its blacknesshas not been differentiated."Moreover, "the is, while it leaves the sub- stancejust as it was seen, explainsits confusedness,by the applica- tion to it of blacknessas a predicate."Thus, at the beginningand end of everyconception is substanceand being,wherein substance is inapplicableto the predicateof the proposition,and beingis inapplicableto the subjectof the proposition(W2, 49-50). Furthermore,while "substance"and "being" are two absolutely basic conceptions,or categories,in the "New List," thereare also three "intermediate"categories which "maybe termedaccidents" (W2, 55). The first"intermediate" category, "quality," is that whichthe predicateof the propositionexpresses.

A propositionalways has, besides a term to expressthe substance, another to express the quality of that substance; and the functionof the conceptionof being is to unite the qualityto the substance.Quality, therefore, in its verywidest sense, is the firstconception in order in passingfrom being to substance.(W2, 52)

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The second category,"relation," arises fromthe factthat em- piricalpsychology has establishedthat we can know a qualityonly by means of its similarityto or contrastwith another. Abstraction requiresthat "a thingis referredto a correlate,if this termmay be used in a widersense than usual" (W2, 53). The third,and "last conceptionin order passingfrom being to substance"(W2, 54) is "representation"which is necessitatedby the feet that everyproposition implies referenceto an interpretant. "[T]he referenceto an interpretantarises upon the holding togetherof diverseimpressions, and thereforeit does not join a conception to substance, as the other two referencesdo, but unites directlythe manifoldof the substance itselP (W2, 54). Thus, Peirce's categoriesof 1867 consistedof the absolutelybasic conceptionsof "substance"and "being," and the "intermediate" categoriesof quality,relation, and representation.37 In "One, Two, Three" (c.1885), Peirce proposed a modified list of categories.By the 1890's, Peirce had two quite different methodsfor arriving at virtuallythe same intermediatecategories of 1867, althoughby thistime the "absolutelybasic" conceptions of "substance"and "being" had long since been omittedfrom his explicitlist of categories.38The firstmethod of derivingthe categories is by means of the positivescience of Phenomenologyin whichthe categoriesare broughtout fromwhatever seems or ap- pears; the second methodelicits the categories"from an inductive examinationof the methodsand tentativeconclusions of the posi- tivespecial sciences."39 Althoughthe categoriesof 1885 and laterare substantiallythe same three "intermediate"categories of 1867, Peirce shiftsem- phasis in describingthese categories.This is most noticeable in the categoryof "relation."40Although Peirce does not explain whyhe adopted differentmethods of derivingthe categories,and a shiftin the emphasisof the categoriesper se, there has been speculationon the matter.For example,Savan contendsthat "a comparisonof the deductiveand Kantian approach to the '60's with the observationalemphasis of Phenomenologyrenders it a

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likelyhypothesis that it is the logical and empiricaldifficulties of the earlyderivation which led him to searchfor a more empirical approach to the categories/41while Muphey argues that there were two major reasons for this revision:(1) the discoveryof quantification;and (2) the desire to escape fromthe subjectivism in whichthe collapseof his theoryof realityleft him.42 Whateverthe actual motivationfor Peirce's revisionof the cate- gorieswas, surelythe reasonsstated by Savan and Murphyform a crucialpart of thatexplanation. After 1884, the categoriesare pre- sentedas threesorts of logical relations:monadic, dyadic and tri- adic. They have the virtueand advantageof generality,for all possible logical relationsincluding the sign relationare assertedto belong to one of the threesorts of logical relations.Also, the re- visedcategories can accommodateall possiblecognitions, for every predicateof a propositionis classifiedby the schema.43All things and everyexperience contains elements from each of the threecat- egories,although at any timeone categorymay dominate. The categoriesof the revisedlist could be called "quality,""reaction," and "mediation," "[b]ut for scientificterms, Firstness, Secondness,and Thirdness,are to be preferredas being entirely new wordswithout any falseassociations whatever" (4.3). In their formalaspect, these categoriesonly pertainto the logical classifi- cation of relations,whereas in theirmaterial aspect, they deal di- rectlywith the classificationof experience(1.452). Peirce's phenomenology indicates that all phenomena or experience whatsoeverpossess three modes of being or aspects, specifiable underthese categories. Firstnessis the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positivelyand withoutreference to anythingelse. It is considered a possibility,potentiality, or qualityand is "perfectlysimple and withoutparts; everything has its quality"(1.531). Firstnessis "ex- emplifiedin everyquality of a total feeling,"and is "withinitself, withoutany elementsor relations"(4.157). It is the indecompos- able, irreducibleand indescribable,monadic aspect of a phenomenon (1.424).

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Sccondncss is an idea of fact,struggle or "hcrenessand nowness." It is the shock of reaction between ego and non-ego, whose veryessence is its "thisness."Although it is consideredan actualityor existent,the termthat best characterizessecondness is "fact,"viz., secondnesscomprises the actual facts.Peircc claims, "[w]e feel factsresist our will," this being the reason why "facts are proverbiallycalled brutal" (1.419). A fact is dyadiallystruc- tured(1.435), and the dyadicismof secondnessis mostevident in the elementof struggle(1.322). There is no elementof generality " in secondness,no referenceto thirdness. Secondness is without law or reason" (1.427). "A second is strictlyspeaking just when and where it takesplace, and has no other being; and, therefore, differentsecondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselvesno qualityin common" (1.532). The factualcharacter of secondness consistsin pure individuality,excluding both generality(universal- ity) and possibility.Secondness (like firstness)is an irreducible characteristicof phenomenon. Finally,unlike secondness and firstnesswhich are merelyexperi- enced and non-cognitiveand incapableof being known,thirdness is cognition,viz., it is the mode of being of thatwhich is such as it is in bringingfirstness and secondnessinto relationwith each other.Thirdness is the categoryof connectionand mediationbe- tween firstnessand secondness,but is not reducibleto eitherof them.Thirdness may be characterizedby the termsmeaning, representation,mediation, and thought,although is best considered as both generalityor universalityand law: notionswhich are necessaryfor thirdness. The categoryof "relation"from the "New List" included the conceptof denotationand an object thatitself was neverimmedi- atelyknown. Objects were known only throughtheir properties, such that the Identityof Indiscerniblesholds trueof them.Thus, considerthe proposition"This is black." In 1867, Peirce under- stood thisproposition to be alwaysambiguous, unless the properties of "this" were revealedor the object was given.The demonstrative"this" in the propositionreferred to an object in the

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:55:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 90 JeffreyR. DiLeo extensionaldomain of the precedingsign, thus the object to which "this"referred is only the one forwhich the precedingsign stood. By the earlycategories, the proposition"This is black" was an incomplete sign. Furthermore,if objects are only known throughproperty possession, then the Identityof Indiscernablesis capable of leavingobjects withouta unique identity.The discoveryof quantificationchanged this,44allowing Peirce to reconsider the category"relation." Around 1885, Peirce discoveredthe theoryof quantification, and thus altered his theoriesof denotationand the object that were proposedin the 1867 "New List." He now claimedthat the demonstrative"this" is a sign thatrefers directly to an existentin- dividual.The second "intermediate"category of the "New List," "relation,"was substantiallyrevised to conformwith the category of secondness.Objects are now denotable by the non-qualitative - and non-descriptivedemonstratives "this" and "that" words whichare signs thatawaken and directthe attention.

A sign which denotes a thingby forcingit upon the at- tentionis called an index.An index does not describethe qualitiesof its object. An object, in so faras it is denoted by an index,having thisness, and distinguishingitself from other thingsby its continuousidentity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishingcharacters, may be called a hecceity.(3.434)

Thus, it is the haecceity,"thisness," or "herenessand nowness" (1.405; 8.266) of objects, which is denoted by termssuch as "this," "that," "here," and "now," thatenables the objects to be unambiguouslydistinguishable. These termsare to be regardedas indexicalsor indicatorsthat serve a purelydenotative function, although theydo not denote any propertiesor qualitiesof objects. Consequently,one can inferthe importantrole Peirce'shaeccetism has in his theoryof semeioticsand betterunderstand how and whyPeirce's revision of the categoriesincorporated haecceitism.

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The use of the term"thisness" by Pcircecan be foundno earlier than c.1895,45 although the influenceof the concept of thisness, as well as haecceity,is noticeablein his writingsas earlyas 1885. As stated earlier,it is difficultto determineprecisely what led Peirce to utilizethe conceptof haecceity.It is almostcertain, given Peirce's knowledgeof and respectfor the work of Scotus, thatwhen he saw the need to propose a non-descriptive and non- qualitativeprinciple of individuation,he would turn to Scotus1 haecceitasin formulatingthe categorysecondness. *Hic et nunc is the phrase perpetuallyin the mouth of Duns Scotus, who first elucidatedindividual existence" (1.458). In fact,Peirce explicitlypoints out that Scotus1haecceitas (hie et nunc) is much the same as his categoryof secondness.

Duns Scotus said it [thatwhich all thingshave thatmakes them individual]is a peculiarelement, a blind insistency, by which the nature crowds its way into a place in the world.This is the hecceity.It is much the same as Second- ness. (MS 1000:02)

It is importantto note here that Peirce realizes his notion of haecceityis not identicalwith Scotus1 notion of haecceitas.Differ- ences are quite clear,but then again, so are the similarities.Com- mentatorshave been quick to pick up on thisfact, and have been led to a varietyof interpretationsas to the natureof the relation betweenScotus1 haecceitas and Peirce's haecceity.The variousin- terpretationscan be generalizedinto two camps: those who claim "it correspondsin natureand functionwith Scotus' haecceitas"46 and those who claim that "it does not correspond."47The cruxof these generalizationsis that while the similaritiesand differences betweenScotus and Peirce with regardto haecceitismare recog- nized by all the commentators,the determinationas to whether Scotus' and Peirce's haecceitismcorrespond or not is a matterof interpretation.

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IV. Peirce'sHtucceitism In Section III, Peirce's doctrinesof indexical reference,secondness, and individuals,have all been at least mentioned.This gives a hint of the interrelatednessof these doctrinesnot only with Peirce's haecceitism,but also with each other. Althougha discussionof each of these doctrineswould increaseour under- standingof Peirce's haecceitism,it would also extend the scope of this articlewell beyond a manageable limit. In view of this, and the factthat it would be impossibleto discussPeirce's haec- ceitismwithout referring to these doctrines,they will be present- ed in the ensuing discussionin a less than completemanner and only when necessary. Peirce'sfirst use of the termhaecceity occurs in a workof 1890 entitled"A Guess at the Riddle."48

Most systemsof philosophymaintain certain facts or prin- ciples as ultimate.In truth,any factis in one sense ultimate- that is to say, in its isolated aggressivestubborn- ness and individual reality. What Scotus calls the haecceitiesof things,the herenessand nownessof them, are indeed ultimate.. . . Indeterminacy.. .or pure firstness,and haecceity,or pure secondness,are factsnot call- ing forand not capable of explanation.Indeterminacy af- fordsus nothingto ask a question about; haecceityis the 'ultimaratio,' the brutalfact that will not be questioned. (1.405) " As "puresecondness, haecceityis

not a conception,nor is it a peculiarquality. It is an experience.It comes out most fullyin the shock of reaction betweenthe ego and non-ego. It is therethe double con- sciousness of effortand resistance.That is something whichcannot properlybe conceived.For to conceiveit is to generalizeit; and to generalizeit is to miss altogether the herenessand nownesswhich is its essence. (8.266)

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That is to say,sccondncss can be thoughtof as a kindof bi-polar experiencedescribed by a diversityof termsby Peirce: compul- sion, struggle,brute actions, limitation,interruption, constraint, intrusion,conflict, resistance, etc.. Each of theseterms emphasizes the dyadic and experientialcharacter of secondness. "Hecceity," "thisness,""hereness and nowness," "hie et nunc^ etc., is that which is presentin secondness,but must not be thoughtof as that which definessecondness. It is importantnow to note that haecceityis the materialaspect of secondness. These bi-polar experiencesprovide an experientialbasis for Peirce's characterizationof haecceityas the "ultima ratio" and "brutalfact that will not be questioned."As a "brutalfact," "hecceity"is not a conceptionor quality,but is irrational.

Those who experienceits effectsperceive and know it in that action; and just that constitutesits verybeing. It is not in perceivingits qualities that they know it, but in heftingits insistencythen and there,which Duns calls its haecceitas.(6.318)

Thus, forPeirce, not only is haecceityonly knownthrough experience,its verybeing is determinedthrough experience. Scotus1 haecceitascarried the existencequantifier, and such is the case for Peirce. Existence,for Peirce, is the totalityof that whichis actual, and "whateverexists is individual,since existence (not reality)and individualityare essentiallythe same thing" (3.613). H[T]he essence of actual existenceis reaction"and it is this "reactionwhich confers actual existenceupon the substances" (MS 942:28). He argues that individualsare discoveredin our will-independentreaction with them. Individualsare "brutefacts" concerningthe natureof what exists,and althoughthere are individuals,it is impossibleto provethis: it is somethingthat we must simplydiscover through experience.49 An individual,for Peirce, is someting which reacts,viz., "it does react against some things,and is of such a nature that it

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mightreact, or have reacted,against my will" (3.613). Individu- als, as well as existence,are per se unintelligible(3.613). Further- more, "[existence, thoughbrought about by dyadism,or opposition, as its proper determination,yet, when broughtabout, lies abstractlyand in itselfconsidered, within itselP (1.461). Existence is experiencedas the brute,irrational insistency or secondnessof individuals.As fact, secondness "fightsits way into existence;for it existsby virtueof the opppositionswhich it involves"(1.432). Moreover,what is experiencedas an individualis a kind of bi- polar experience,i.e., shock,rather than an entityper se. Peirce's theoryof individualsis rich and complex,and an un- derstandingof it sheds lighton some of the more significantrevi- sions that Peirce made after 1884. It must be mentionedthat priorto the mid-1880's, viz., beforerecognizing a need forquan- tifiersand otherindices, Peirce denied the existenceof individuals and claimed that all being was general.50After the mid-1880's Peirce both affirmedthe existenceof individuals,51and claimed that universals(generals) and individuals(particulars) have different modes of being. He repeatedlyemphasized that secondness and thirdnessare the respectivemodes of being of individualsor particulars,and universalsor generals.

The thisnessof the accidentof the world of existenceis positivelyrepugnant to generality.It is so because of its intrinsicduality; and if you call it individualyou are for- gettingone termof the pair. For example,a thisis an object; but it only is so, by virtueof being in reactionwith a subject. . . . Thisnessis reaction.. . . Everyreaction is antigeneral.It is thisact. It is act, not power. Secondness not firstness.(MS 942:16-17)

Furthermore,there are differentkinds of existencefor Peirce. For example, M[t]hereis the existenceof physicalactions, there is the existenceof physicalvolitions, there is the existenceof all time,there is the existenceof the present,there is the existenceof

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materialthings, there is the existenceof the creationsof one of Shakespeare'splays, and, foraught we know,there may be another creationwith a space and time of its own in whichthings may exist" (1.433). Thus, existenceis not limitedto the physical,psy- chical,or otherwise,rather existence consists in anything"having a place among the total collectionof such a universe"(1.433). Each of these differentkinds of existenceis to be understoodas an example of haecceity.In general,haecceity for Peirce can be understoodas thatwhich renders existence and individualityupon objects: wheneverthere is haecceity,there is individuality,existence and thinghood.The presenceof haecceityis not an affirma- tion of the existenceof the haecceityas per se any thing,but is ratherthe affirmationof non-ego,otherness, reaction, opposition, and struggle. In the famous Baldwin's Dictionaryentry for "individual," Peirceclaims that

everythingwhose identityconsists in a continuityof reac- tions will be a single logical individual.Thus any portion of space, so foras it can be regardedas reacting,is for logic a single individual;its spatialextension is no objec- tion. ... As forthe principleof indiscernibles,if two individualthings are exactlyalike in all other respects,they must. . .differin their spatial relations,since space is nothingbut the intuitionalpresentation of the conditions of reaction,or of some of them.(3.613).

From this entry,it is should be clear that thereis an important (and interesting)relationship between space, individuals,secondness and hecceityfor Peirce. Let us reflecton thisfor a moment. Althoughspace, "in so faras it is a continuum,is a merelaw, - a mere Thirdness"(7.488), it must be somethingmore than a merethirdness, contends Peirce: it mustbe capable of being indi- viduated. "[A]ny portionof space, so faras it can be regardedas reacting"is capable of individuation. Individualsare distributedin

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space such that thereis nothingthat logically prevents two things frombeing exactlyalike in all other respects.Even if two things are alike in all otherrespects, they are stilldiscerned as differentia- ble, by theirrespective spatial relations, or hecceity. While space and time evolve fromsecondness as a framework requiredfor existence and individuals,space and timedo not pro- duce secondness.52Peirce contends that space is necessaryonly because objects can have identicalproperties, and yet stillremain distinct,viz., space is necessitatedby haecceitism.Individuals are extendedin space, each havingunique relations.Space allows for things to have identicalproperties. In effect,Peirce is denying that spatio-temporalcoordinates have a qualitativenature, and is in factclaiming that haecceity is that "elementof existencewhich, not merelyby the likenessbetween its differentapparitions, but by an inwardforce of identity,manifesting itself in the continuity of its apparition throughouttime and space, is distinctfrom everythingelse" (3.460).53 The haecceityof each object is not dependenton any property that the object may bear. Also, haecceitydoes not and can never possess qualitiesper se- not even a qualityin whichits individu- alityand uniqueness can be said to consist- for if it did possess such a quality,it would stillfall prey to the Identityof Indiscern- ables. In regardto the questionof whetherhaecceity is internalor ex- ternal,Peirce contends that

[w]e are consciousof hittingor of gettinghit, of meeting witha fact. But whetherthe activityis withinor without we know only by secondarysigns and not by our original facultyof recognizingfact. (1.366)

One must subject the activityto "varioustests in order to ascer- tain whetherit be of internalor of externalprovenance" (6.333). Althoughhaecceity renders existence and individualityto the activity,it does not necessarilyindicate the internalityor externality

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of the activity.This can only be determinedby subjectingthe activityto the "Tests of Externality"(6.334). Haecceityis perceived and not inferred,whereas externality is inferredfrom tests and not perceived. It has been noted thatPeirce's revisedsecond category,secondness, which is directlypresent in all awareness,instead of being knownonly throughinterpretants (as was the "New List's" relation), bringshim closer to a Kantianposition. With the existence quantifiertaken as basic, Peirce's position is similarto Kant's whereinexistence is that which must be given in intuition,not concepts,and the copula of the propositionis being. Existenceis givena prominentposition as distinctfrom being and reality.54 Of existenceand reality,Peirce claimsthat "realitymeans a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought. . .while existence means reactionwith the environment.. .and accordinglythe two meanings.. .are not the same" (5.503). In fact,"reality and exis- tenceare two differentthings" (6.348). By positinghaecceity as an experiencethat is non-conceptual, Peirce revealsthat not only does experiencecontain events which are non-qualitative,but experiencecannot be entirelyreduced to a series of qualities. That is to say, if each and everything qua thinghas haecceity,then it is impossiblefor it to lose its identity throughthe abstractionof its properties,for haecceityis not a property,and as such is not abstractablefrom a thing. It is interestingto mentionPeirce's responseto a possible ob- jection to the non-qualitative character of haecceity.The objec- tion mightbe statedas follows:Why is it necessarythat the expe- rienceof haecceityis always non-descriptive and non-qualitative, for is it not possible that it could be otherwise?That is to say, what eliminatesthe possibilityof haecceityconferring a qualitative and/or descriptiveexperience? For Peirce,because the "facts"are characterizedby particulari- ty,they are completelydeterminate in regardto whetherthey are in the possessionof qualities.Moreover, the principlesof contra- diction and excluded middle are applicableonly to what is indi-

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vidual,viz., "the individualis determinatein regardto everypos- sibility,or quality,either as possessingit or as not possessingit" (1.434). Thus, given that the principlesof contradictionand excluded middle hold for haecceity,the qualitativeexperience of haecceityis impossible. A major differencebetween Scotus and Peirce on haecceityis H " found in Peirce's rejectionof Scotus' notion of contraction, where contractionwas the process wherebythe common nature was convertedinto an individualpossessing numerical unity. For Scotus, haecceitasin a real existentthing contracts the common nature to an individualmode of existence.In referenceto this doctrine,Peirce writes that

Even Duns Scotus is too nominalisticwhen he says that universalsare contractedto the mode of individualityin singulars,meaning, as he does, by singulars,ordinary ex- istingthings. The pragmaticistcannot admit that. (8.208)

Peirce rejectedcontraction as a process of individuationbecause his phenomenologyprohibits secondness from being reduced to firstness,and thirdnessfrom being reduced to eitherfirstness or secondness.For Peirce,thirdness cannot be reducedor contracted to secondness- the common natureis not contracted.But in do- ing this, Peirce is not denyingthe importanceof individualsor haecceity:he is merelydenying "reductionism" of the categories. Also, he does not deny individualsor haecceity,for without indi- vidualsand haecceitythere would be neithersecondness nor perception,and withoutperception Peirce's epistemologywould be untenable.55Although Peirce denies Scotus' contractionand em- ployshaecceitism of a differenttype, this does not detractfrom the correspondencebetween Peirce's and Scotus' haecceitism- a corre- spondence,which althoughnot one-to-one,can be noticed from the similaritiesin SectionsII and IV. The impactand influenceof Scotus' haecceitason Peirce'shaecceitism seems undeniable. Finally,Peirce considered a logician's "showing for the first

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rimethat some clement,however vaguely characterized, is an element that must be recognizableas distinctfrom others" as original workin logic of the "firstand highestgrade" (MS 816:4). He notes thatScotus' haecceitasis an exampleof such work,and follows Scotus by claimingthat a haecceityis an elementrecogniza- ble as "distinctfrom everything else" (3.460). Furthermore,in Peirce's exact logic, individualscan only be distinctfrom one another in threeways: first,by being haecceities;second, by having per se differentqualities; and third,by being in one-to-onecorre- spondence to individualsthat are distinctfrom one another in one of the firsttwo ways(3.568). Basically,haecceities are always distinctin Peirce'sexact logic. From the praisePeirce has forSco- tus' haecceitas,as well as the centralrole haecceityplays in his own overallphilosophy, it is clear that Peirce set the highestim- portanceon haecceitism.

V. The ContemporaryRelevance of Peirce's Haecceitism Today, articlesagainst haecceitism are just as frequentas articles defendinghaecceirism. The haecceitistthesis of the thisnessof in- dividualsprovides and should continue to providecontemporary metaphysicianswith importantand relevantgrounds for polemic. The laterhalf of the twentiethcentury has had a surgeof interest in questions concerning haecceity,with philosopherssuch as RoderickChisholm, David Lewis, David Kaplan, Alvin Plantinga, et al.ydeveloping and debatinghaecceirism. This sectionwill look brieflyat one of the main contemporaryviews as to what typesof problemsany theoryof haecceitymust accommodate,and then ask whetherPeirce's haecceirismcould be relevantto them. David Kaplan in "How to Russella Frege-Church"claims that haecceitismis the "doctrinethat holds thatit does make sense to ask- withoutreference to common attributesand behavior"the followingthree questions:

(Kl) Is this the same individual in another possible world?

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(K2) Can individualsbe extended in logical space (i.e. through possible worlds) in much the way we commonly regard them as being extended in physicalspace and time?

(K3) Does a common "thisness" underlie extreme dissimilarityor does a distinctthisness underlie greatresemblance?

Kaplan contends that by means of haecceitismit is possible to speak meaningfullyof "a thingitself- without reference either ex- plicit,implicit, vague, or preciseto individuatingconcepts (other than being thisthing), definingqualities, essential attributes, or any other of the paraphernaliathat enable us to distinguishone thingfrom another."56 Does it make sense accordingto Peirce's haecceitismto ask thesequestions? I thinkthe answeris yes. In late 1896, Peirce inventedan ingeniousfamily of logical dia- grams, or systems,which he came to call the "Existential ffS7 Graphs. Peirce's existentialgraphs consist of three systems: "Alpha" correspondsto the classicalpropositional calculus, viz., it deals withthe logic of propositions;"Beta" correspondsto quan- tificationtheory, viz., it deals withthe logic of quantification;and "Gamma" correspondsto logical relationsin general. Although the Alpha and Beta systemsare developedso as to treatthe actual existentworld, "Peirce had no intentionlimiting his logical work to the 'actual existentworld.'"58 Peirce's Gamma systemof existentialgraphs is essentiallya modal system.Gamma, unlikeAlpha and Beta whichonly used one sheet of assertion(formulas written on the sheet of assertionare true in that universe),utilized a bookof sheetsof assertion.Each of the sheets in the Gamma system'sbook representsa possible world,and one of the sheetsis the actual existentworld. Accord- ing to Zeman, "[t]hat whichis possibleis too importanta partof the real forPeirce to ignore;indeed, his desireto account forthe logic of the possible may well be a chiefmotivation leading him

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to adopt the existentialgraphs as the formatfor his logic"- the Gamma systemwas Peirce's attemptat dealing with the logic of possibleworlds: modal logic.59 AlthoughPeirce did not fullysucceed in articulatingthe logis- tics of Gamma, others did. Eventually,Peirce's Gamma system of existentialgraphs was shown to obtain the semanticsfor modal logic S4 and S560, and latershown to obtain the lower sys- ternT.61 The point of introducingPeirce's existentialgraphs, and em- phasizing the developmentsin the Gamma system,is to show that Peirce has a sufficientlyrich modal logic to accomodate Kl and K2 and was concerned with logical space and possible worlds. Issues in the metaphysicsof modalitythat arise from questions Kl and K2, can be addressed by an appeal to modal logic and Peirce's haecceitism.But K3 is a question thatcould be asked by Peirce withoutan appeal to his systemof modal logic, forit can be addressedby observingthe natureof haecceity.Al- thoughit makessense to ask thesethree questions in Peirce'ssys- tem,it is anotherquestion altogetheras to how Peircewould an- swerthem.62

Indiana University,Bloomington

NOTES

1. Fisch (1967), p. 195, Almcdcr(1980), p. 172. 2. Fisch (1967), p. 192. 3. Copleston,p. 199. 4. This numberrefers to the CollectedPapers of CharlesSanders Peirce, volumes (1-6) edited by Charles Hartshorncand Paul Weiss, 1931-35; volumes (7-8) edited by ArthurBurks, 1958, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard UniversityPress). The numberpreceding the V refersto the volume number,and the numbersucceeding it refersto the paragraphnumber, i.e., '(1.10)f refersto Volume One, paragraph10 of the CollectedPapers, op. cit. 5. Fisch (1971), p. 228, and Boler, p. 152. These dates nicely correspondwith Peirce's purchaseof a large partof his impressivecollec-

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tion of Scotus1works in 1867 (cf. Fisch (1952), p. 52). 6. Michael (1976a), p. 47. 7. There are a numberof extantstudies on Peirce and Scotus thatdevelop thispoint in greaterdetail. Among themare Almeder(1973 & 1980), Boler, Goodwin, Haas, McKeon, and Moore (1952 & 1964. 8. Two points mightbe added here: (1) the "Platonistic"view that universalnatures exist independentlyof particularswas a view that virtuallyno one in the Middle Ages supported;(2) "moderaterealism" goes back at least to Boethiusin the 5th-6thcentury. I thankProfessor Spade forpointing these out to me. 9. Adams (1982), p. 411. 10. The materialon JohnDuns Scotus1metaphysics in this section is to a great extentbased on Paul VincentSpade's A Surveyof Me- dieaval Philosophy,chapters 57-59, unlessotherwise noted. 11. DeWulf(1926), p. 72. 12. The "common nature" (natura communis) will sometimes simplybe referredto as "natures." 13. Spade (1985), Chapter57, pp. 17-18. 14. Spade, Chapter57, pp. 17-18. 15. "de se hoc" 16. Scotus rejectseach of these as principlesof individuationin his OxfordCommentary on theSentences of PeterLombard (or simplythe Ordinano), Book II, distinction3, questions 1-5, and provideshis own theoryin question 6. Althoughit would be superfluousto outline why and how Scotus rejectseach of these principlesof individuation,it is in- terestinghere to note Scotus' rejectionof the Thomisticthesis that prime matteris the principleof individuation.He criticizesSt. Thomas for maintainingthis thesis because primematter is of itselfindeterminate and indistinct,and thereforecannot be the primaryreason of distinctionand diversity.Copleston summarizesScotus' criticismof Aquinas as follows: "if matteris the principleof individuation,it followsthat in the case of substantialchange the two substances,that corrupted and thatgenerated, are preciselythe same substance,since matteris the same, even though the formsare different.""St. Thomas's theoryseems to implythat quan- tityis an accident and a substancecannot be individuatedby an accident" (Copleston, 239). Whereas Aquinas asks the questions "What makes a thingan individual?"and "What contractsthe specificcommon natureto the individual?,"and gives differentanswers to both of them, Scotus tends to mergethem, thus indicatinga crucialdifference between Scotus and Aquinas on the use of the term individual(Harris, pp. 15- 16). But Spade thinksthat while Scotus is primarilyconcerned with the latterquestion, in answeringit, he may also be answeringthe former

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(Spade, Chapter58, p. 1). 17. Spade points out that althoughScotus' haecceitaslooks like " the recentnotion of a "bare particular, it is not the same forit is not a subject of predication,it does not underlieanything, and does not exem- plifyanything. Once again, the haecceityof Socrates is "Socratesness," and not "Socrates"for Scotus. 18. "distinctioformalis a parterei" 19. "distinctiorealis" 20. Dc Wulf,p. 74. 21. Copleston,p. 240. 22. Copleston,p. 235. 23. Spade, Chapter58, p. 8. 24. Grajewski,p. 93. 25. AlthoughDuns Scotus did not use the term "haecceitas"for the principleof individuationin the OxfordCommentary, it is so used in the ReportataParisiensia, II: 12, 5, nos. 1, 8, 13, 14 and in the Qua- sionesin librosMetaphysicorum, 7, 13, nos. 9 and 26 (Copleston, 240). 26. cf. Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense,2, 3, 6, no. 15. 27. Bettoni,p. 121-122. 28. Copleston,p. 240. 29. Copleston,p. 240. 30. Spade, Chapter58, p. 9. 31. Bettoni,p. 122. 32. Bettoni,p. 122. 33. Copleston,p. 235. 34. "(the maxim Entia non sunt multiplicandapraeter necessita - tern)" 35. These are the Englishforms of the Latin term"haecceitas." 36. The followingis a chronologicalordering of Pcirce's references to "haecceity"or "hecceity":

Date Source

1869 Nl:23 (also W2:273) c. 1889 The CenturyDictionary and Cyclopedia c. 1890 1.405 1894 N2:75 (also MS 1396 (draft)) 1895 1.341 1896 2.341,3.434,3.438,3.453 c. 1896 MS 521 c. (1896-1898) MS 1000 1897 3.460, 3.461, 3.462, 3.475, 3.479, 3.480, 3.500,

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3.535, 3.543, L392 1899 N2:207 (also LI 59. 110 & MS 1417 (draft),MS 154 (also NEM3:464) 1901 3.612 1902 MS 581 1904 N3:174 (also L159.266 & MS1482 (draft)) 1905 or 1906 MS 816 1908 6.318

37. The precedingexposition of the "New List" was intended onlyto give the readera generalsense of Peirce'scategories of 1867, noth- ing more. Peirceproceeded to philosophicallydevelop the "New list" in threepapers he wrote for the Journalof SpeculativePhilosophy in 1868. Each of the categoriesin the "New list" can be derivedfrom Peirce's sign relation- a point that was not developed in the exposition.Indicative of thisderivation is Peirce'sfollowing listing of the categories: BEING Quality(reference to a ground) Relation(reference to a correlate) Representation(reference to an interpretant) SUBSTANCE (W2, 54). 38. Thompson (1963), p. 29. 39. Savan, p. 185. 40. Savan, p. 185. 41. Savan, p. 192. 42. Murphey,p. 319. 43. Murphey,p. 303. 44. See Murphey,p. 309. 45. The followingis a chronologicalordering of Peirce's references to "thisness":

Date Source c. 1895 1.341* 1896 1.497,3.434* 1897 3.460* 1897-1898 MS 942 c. 1898 7.488

'*' indicatesthat the "thisness"was used in conjunctionwith "haecceity" in the noted passage. It is interestingto note the relativescarcity of references to "thisness"without being accompaniedby the term"haecceity."

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46. Some proponentsof this view are Goodwin (1961), Goudge (1950), and Moore (1952 & 1964). 47. Some proponentsof this view are McKeon (1952), Haas (1964), and Almeder(1980). 48. Statingthat "A Guess at the Riddle" is "a workof 1890" is not entirelyaccurate, for the "Guess at the Riddle" projectwas worked on by Peirce fromaround 1886 through1890. These dates put it well withinthe bounds of the "formative"period of Peirce's haecceitism,as well as at the beginningof Peirce's full acceptance of haecceitism.It should be noted that Peirce wrote the definitionof "haecceity"for the CenturyDictionary and Cyclopediaaround this time also (c.1889). 49. Michael (1976b), p. 327. 50. Hookway,p. 167 and (5.349). 51. Although,commentators such as Rileyand Michael (1976b) presentconvincing arguments that verifythat this is the case, it is only fairto note that this interpretationis not unanimous.Some commentators,such as Weiss and Almeder(1980), claimthat there are no individuals for Peirce, whereasothers, such as, Boler and Bernstein,argue that Peircehad no clear theoryof individuals. 52. Ross, p. 58. 53. Note that "Space is nothingbut the intuitionalpresentation of the conditionsof reaction,"a framework,resembles Kant's view of Space in the Critiqueof Pure Reason. 54. Savan, p. 193. 55. Riley,p. 146. 56. Kaplan,p. 723. 57. Roberts,p. 109 & Zeman (1973), p. 129. 58. Zeman (1973), p. 129. 59. Zeman (1973), p. 129. 60. Zeman (1964). 61. Butterworth. 62. I am gratefulto Hector-NeriCastañeda, Karen Hanson and Romaine Clark for reading and commentingon various draftsof this paper; to Paul Spade forwisdom on Scorns;to the PeirceEdition Project forthe use of manuscriptmaterial; to Max H. Fischfor sharing his research withme; and to NathanHouser forhis generousassistance and support.

REFERENCES

CharlesSanders Peirce: Contributionsto 'The Nation^' edited by Kenneth L. Ketnerand JamesE. Cook, (Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech Press,

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1974-87). Referredto as N followed by the volume and page numbers. CollectedPapers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volumes (1-6) edited by Charles Hartshorneand Paul Weiss, 1931-35; volumes (7-8) edited by Arthur Burks, 1958, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress). Referred to by the volume and paragraph numbers. The New Elements of Mathematicsby Charles S. Peirce, edited by CarolyneEisele, (The Hague: Mouton, 1976). Referredto as NEM followedby the volumeand page numbers. Writingsof Charles S. Peirce: A ChronologicalEdition, edited by Max Fisch et al., (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1982-). Referredto as W followedby the volume and page numbers.

All manuscriptsand lettersare referredby by MS or L followedby the numberthat is given in the AnnotatedCatalogue of thePapers of Charles S. Peirce,by RichardRobin (Amherst:University of MassachusettsPress, 1967) and the page number(Texas Tech University,Lubbock, Texas).

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