Peirce's Haecceitism Author(S): Jeffrey R
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Peirce's Haecceitism Author(s): Jeffrey R. DiLeo Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 79-109 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320316 . Accessed: 28/06/2014 15:55 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:55:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JeffreyR. DiLeo Peirce's Haecceitism I. Introduction Pcircc'shaccccitism is centralto his theoriesof indexicalrefer- N ence, secondness and individuals.In particular,"haecceitism is Peirce's theoryof individuation,and "haecceity"is the indescriba- ble, unqualitativeand indefinite"hereness and nowness"of an in- dividual. Around 1890, Peirce found it necessaryto supportexplicitly a doctrineof haecceitismsimilar to Scotus1notion of "haecceitas."1 Althoughit was during his "MonistPeriod (1891-1914)"2 that haecceitismwas most clearlyarticulated, an implicitacceptance of haecceitismis presentin his writingsas earlyas 1885. Despite dis- cussing and defendinghaecceitism both explicitlyand implicitly forthe last thirtyyears of his life,it has not receivedthe attention in the secondaryliterature that it warrants. This discussion will begin with a look at Scotus' notion of haecceitasand then proceed to considerPeirce's motivationsfor the late introductionof haecceitisminto his philosophicalsystem. Thereafter,Peirce's haecceitismwill be presentedin an extensive, although not exhaustiveaccount. Finally,given the recentsurge of interestin haecceitismamong contemporarymetaphysicians and philosphersof language, specificallyin regard to questions concerningthe metaphysicsof modality,the relevanceof Peirce's haecceitismto contemporarytheories of haecceitismwill be con- sidered.This essay aims not only to providea positivecontribu- tion to the extantstudies on Peirce's haecceitism,but also, and perhapsmore importantly,to presentcontemporary discussions of haecceitismanother chapter to take into account,thereby extend- ing the rangeof Peirce'srelevance. //. The ScotisticNotion of Haecceitas The notion of haecceitaswas introducedby the medievaltheo- This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:55:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 80 JeffreyR. DiLeo logian and philosopher,John Duns Scotus, "Doctor Subtilis"(ca. 1266-1308).3 Given that Peircc "derivedthe greatestadvantage froma deeplypondering perusal of some of the worksof medie- val thinkers"after his studyof Kant (1.560),4 his firstformal ac- quaintancewith Scotus1 haecceitas was probablysometime around 5 1867-68. In fact,he does not mentionScotus in any of his lec- turesbefore 1867, nor is thereany evidentScotistic influence in the writingsof 1865 and 1866.6 Peirce highlyregarded and was stronglyinfluenced by the work of Scotus (1.6). For example,in Chapter6 of the "Grand Logic" of 1893, Peirce praisedScotus as "one of the greatestmetaphysi- cians of all time,whose ideas are well worthcareful study, and are remarkablefor their subtlety, and theirprofound consideration of " all aspectsof the questions [of philosophy] (4.28). He even ex- presseddisappointment for the factthat "no considerableScotistic school of thoughtis now extant"(N3:174). Still, it must not be supposed thatthat which I findto admire in Scotus lies upon the surface.Anything more terribly metaphysicalcannot be imagined.He is alwaysdiscussing some question which means nothingin this world. And his argumentsappear to be exclusivelylittle texts of Aris- totle, or of some other authority,wrested completely fromthe meaningthey originally bore. It is only by the most determinedstudy that one can discoverany sense in it; and even then thereis but a grainof wheatto a bushel of chaff.(MS 1000:02) Nevertheless,the profoundinfluence of Scotus' workon Peirce is indubitable,7and one such "grainof wheat" that Peirce found is Scotus1principle of individuationwith its account of haecceitas- one of Scotus' major contributionsto philosophy. During the earlyfourteenth century, an intensedebate concern- ing the ontological status of universalstook place. This debate was based on a rejectionof the Platonisticaccount of universals. Whereas Platonistshad argued that universalnatures exist inde- This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:55:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Pcircc's Haccccitism 81 pcndentlyof both the mind and of the particularswhose natures theyare, fourteenthcentury "moderate" realists, like Scotus, took the Aristotelianview that the natureof a thingcannot existinde- pendentlyof it and agreed that naturesmust be somehow com- mon to particularsin reality.8They argued that thiscommon na- ture must reallyexist as a metaphysicalconstituent of the things whose naturesthey are, yet noticed that this view raisesdifficul- ties. Prominentamong these difficultiesis the problemof distin- guishingone particularfrom another. That is to say, because any given genus or species can have more than one particularas a constituentof it, particularsmust have more than only common naturesas their metaphysicalconstituents, for if they did have only common naturesas theirmetaphysical constituents, then it would be difficultto distinguishone particularfrom another. The resolutionof thisdifficulty was to be found in the postulationof a principleof individuationthat will allow fordistinctions among particulars.The question now was what is the best principleof in- dividuation.Negation? Existence? Quantity? Matter?9 One of the basic principlesof Scotus' metaphysicswas that the individualis the only existingthing.10 This principlewas not new withScotus; it was one of the fundamentalprinciples of Scholastic pluralism.For Scotus, metaphysicsinvolved the investigationof the plentifulontological status of individualthings, for the richbe- ing of individualthings makes up one extensivehierarchy with God at its summit.11Scotus held thatsomething must be done to the common nature12of the individualin orderto make it univer- sal or to make it singular,for it is not by itselfeither way. Never- theless,singularity and universalitydo not determinethe common naturefurther in the intellectualor quidditiveorder. That is to say, theydo not add anythingto the being of the individualand do not bringit to a higherposition in the vasthierarchy of things, ratherthey are "modes" of the common nature of individual thingsthat do not change the contentof the nature.According to Scotus, the common natureis indifferentto existence(cssc)y al- thoughit has itsown quidditivebeing, or essentialbeing.13 This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:55:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 82 JeffreyR. DiLeo Whereas in itselfthe common naturehas the abilityto be in " " manythings, or community,it is not by itselfable to be predi- cated of many.To be predicableof many,or universal,the com- mon naturehas to be thought,for it is the conceptthat is univer- sal, not the nature in itself. In short, the principle of universalizationof the common natureis the mind.14On the oth- er hand,Scotus' principleof individuationof naturesis haecceitas. Scotus argues that the common natureis not singularall by it- self,viz., it is not by itselfa "this,"15nor is individuationof the common natureaccomplished by negation,existence, quantity, or matter.16In the individual,the common natureis "contracted" by the haecceitas,such that the haecceitydifferentiates the indi- vidual. Contractionis the methodwhereby the common natureis convertedinto an individualwith numerical unity. Haecceitas in a real existentthing contracts the common natureto an individual mode of existence. Haecceitas is not a thing (a res) which is combined with the common nature as two things are combined to form a third thing,because it cannot existseparately and thatwhich it is com- bined with cannot exist separatelyfrom it. Haecceitas does not add anythingto the characterof Socrates,for Socrates is not a man and a "this." Haecceitas is the principleby whichSocrates is the unique individualthat he is- it is a principleof differentia- tion. The individualdifference is a special kind of thingtermed haecceitasor "thisness,"i.e., the haecceitasof Socrates is "So- cratesness,"and not "Socrates."17 Between an individual'shaecceitas and its nature,there is a 18 "formaldistinction," viz., a formaldistinction which "refersto the objective'formalitates' which are realizedin one and the same individualsubstance independentlyof any intellectualact" and not a "real distinction"19like the distinctionbetween matter and form.20A real distinctionwould implythat haecceitas and essence are two differententities, whereas Scotus contendshaecceitas and essence are not separable,viz., theyare merelyformally distinct.21 Their relationshipis such that not "even the divine power can This content downloaded from 193.142.30.220