Nov 2012

Al Shabaab Update 15 November 2012

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TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

OEA Team Threat Report

Purpose

• To inform the Army training community on recent changes to al Shabaab’s organization, associations, and area of operations. • To review the group’s funding and recruitment sources. • To identify the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used in recent attacks by al Shabaab. • To examine the 12 September 2012 attack on the Jazeera Hotel in . Executive Summary

• Al Shabaab has lost control of approximately half its territory in the past two years due to a coordinated effort by Somali Federal Government (SFG)1, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and African Union Mission in (AMISOM) troops. • The group has undergone three mergers with other organizations during 2012, most notably with al-Qaeda (AQ), which has given rise to disagreements among senior leaders. • Al Shabaab has lost important income sources, namely tax revenue from Mogadishu’s Bakara Market and Kismayo’s charcoal export industry. • The group has shifted from conventional military tactics to more asymmetrical methods, such as the 12 September 2012 attack on the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu.

1 On 20 August 2012, the mandate of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government expired and authority passed to a new, more permanent government. To aid in the readability of this report, both governments are referred to as the SFG and no distinction is made between them unless necessary.

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Cover: Al Shabaab logo and flag.

Area Map

Location and map of Somalia, CIA, 2012, public domain Introduction

The past two years have seen a reversal of fortune for al Shabaab in Somalia. Previously in control of the southern half of the country, the group now finds its territory reduced by almost 50%. Mergers with two other organizations have not stemmed the reversal, and may have weakened the group due to subsequent disagreements among its leaders. Recruitment and fundraising continue, but the latter has been hard-hit by the loss of specific revenue sources. Al Shabaab has also shifted tactics, techniques, and procedures from more conventional warfare

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methods to a focus on asymmetric techniques. Despite setbacks, the group still retains the potential to regain ground, both physical and psychological, if allowed the opportunity. Area of Operations

In the beginning of January 2011, al Shabaab controlled practically the entire southern half of Somalia. The only exceptions were a small area adjoining near the Kenyan border and less than one-quarter of Mogadishu (Banaadir Region).

This began to change in 2011 as the SFG and its allies began an offensive from the north and in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab initially attempted to hold on to its territory, but without success. After losing around 200 fighters trying to retain the Bakara Market area in Mogadishu, the group withdrew from the city on 6 August 2011.

Control of Somalia as of 1 January 2011, Wikimedia Commons, 2011, public domain (Al Shabaab in green; SFG and allies in blue)

Kenyan troops arrived on the western border in September 2011, and crossed over into Somalia on 16 October of that year. Ethiopia joined the fight a month later, entering from the north and moving southward. Djibouti then added its troops to the AMISOM effort in Mogadishu in December. By early 2012, pro-SFG forces controlled Mogadishu, had gained territory in the north, and had made significant inroads on the west.

Control of Somalia as of 10 February 2012, 4 UNCLASSIFIED

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Wikimedia Commons, 2012, public domain

The SFG and its allied militias along with Kenyan, Ethiopian, and AMISOM troops continued to act in concert in 2012. Kenya moved westward, capturing Afmadow in June and the major port city of Kismayo on 3 October. Ethiopian troops continued to advance to the south and southeast, liberating the cities of Baydhaba and Xudur in Bay and Regions, respectively. AMISOM forces took Afgoye and Marka, the latter being another port city. By the end of October 2012, al Shabaab had lost approximately half of the territory it had controlled just two years earlier.

One area, however, has become more available to al Shabaab. After a merger with a - based Islamist organization in February 2012, many al Shabaab fighters have moved to the Galgala Mountains area south of the city of Bosaso, which lies in Puntland on the Gulf of Aden. There the insurgents have engaged in tactics such as ambushes and remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against local security forces. Control of Somalia as of 25 October 2012 Wikimedia Commons, 2011, public domain Organization and Associations

Al Shabaab has made multiple changes to its structural organization during 2012, mainly via mergers with other Islamist groups.

The Muslim Youth Center (MYC), a militant Islamist group based in Kenya, had a history of giving support to al Shabaab in the form of funds and recruits, in addition to its own activities. The two groups formally announced their merger in January. Associated changes to the MYC included a new name (al-Hijra), a new amir – Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali, and a new organizational structure. The latter occurred in order to allow a front organization, the Nairobi-based Pumwani Riyadha Committee, to continue its current funding of al Shabaab.

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Though al Shabaab had pledged its loyalty to al-Qaeda multiple times in the past, it had never been able to establish a formal organizational relationship. This changed on 9 February 2012, when al Shabaab and AQ announced that the former had officially joined the AQ fold. In line with its new association, al Shabaab appears to have taken the name “AQ East Africa.”

In late February 2012 the Islamist group Mujahideen in the Galgala Mountains merged with al Shabaab. Based near the city of Bosaso in northern Puntland, the Mujahideen was headed by Sheikh Mohammed Said Atom, an arms supplier for al Shabaab members operating in the region. The merger also brought some organizational changes, as Yasin Khalid Osman was appointed as the Mujahideen’s new amir.

The above changes have not been without their share of problems. There are reports that Sheikh Atom, the former head of the Puntland Mujahideen, was not pleased at being replaced and may choose to leave the group. – the leader of another group that had merged with al Shabaab in late 2010 – has been openly critical of its leadership due to recent activities, including the killing of civilians. Mukhtar Robow, one of the group’s senior leaders, was publicly critical of its merger with al-Qaeda. Finally, another senior al Shabaab leader – Omar Hammami – has overtly stated that leaders are in disagreement.

Hammami’s activities have been particularly revealing during the past year. Also known as Abu Mansour al Amriki, he is a U.S. citizen who joined al Shabaab in 2006 and has since become a senior leader in the organization.2 In October 2011, he released an audio sermon – his first – encouraging Western Muslims to engage in jihad. Five months later, Hammami released a video claiming he feared for his life due to disagreements with other group leaders over strategy and Sharia Law. No attempt on his life was made, however, and he published both an autobiography and a four-part sermon in May, followed by an appeal to leaders to resolve differences between Somali and foreign fighters in October 2012. His activities are significant for two reasons: First, none of these media products was released through al Shabaab’s media wing, despite Hammami being a senior leader. Second, at least two of these postings state outright that differences exist between group members on issues such as strategy, implementation of Sharia (Islamic) Law, and vision (national vs. global).

2 Hammami was added to the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of Specially Designated Nationals on 29 July 2011 due to his support to al Shabaab. See Additions to the Specially Designated Nationals List in the References section.

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Fundraising and Recruitment

Al Shabaab recruits locally, regionally, and globally. At the local level, the group is known to perform forced recruitment, including the induction of boys as young as 11 years old. Regional recruitment takes place via its affiliates, including the Ansar Muslim Youth Center in Tanzania and the aforementioned MYC in Kenya. Globally, the group continues to focus its efforts on those living in the West through such methods as Omar Hammami’s sermons.

Though al Shabaab receives funding from organizations outside the country – such as the MYC and the Ansar Muslim Youth Center – its most important revenue source has been the taxes imposed upon commercial activity within its own territory. The group took a large economic blow from the loss of Mogadishu’s Bakara Market in 2011, which had generated a large share of its income. The loss of Kismayo in October greatly affected the group’s revenue as well, as the city’s port is the regional charcoal industry’s primary export facility. Al Shabaab still controls the port city of Baraawe, however, so this source of income has not been completely shut down. Recent Attacks and TTP

Al Shabaab began to perform a tactical shift in August 2011. Previous to this, the group had been frequently involved in conventional military engagements with SFG and AMISOM forces. After losing some 200 fighters that month in the battle to keep Mogadishu, however, al Shabaab elected to withdraw the bulk of its remaining forces from the city. Since then, the group has withdrawn from the cities of Beledweyne, Baydhaba, Afgoye, and Kismayo rather than face the opponent directly.

It has become clear with the passage of time that al Shabaab has chosen to revert to fighting an asymmetrical battle using guerrilla tactics. In addition to the “tactical withdrawals” (al Shabaab’s words1) from several cities in lieu of fighting, the group has performed ambushes, raids, suicide bombings, grenade attacks, IED emplacement, kidnapping, and targeted assassinations. The organization has continued to use INFOWAR during this time, including showing photos of dead SFG-aligned troops and false or inaccurate reporting through its media wing. Intimidation is a favorite tactic, usually taking the form of harassment, beatings, arrest and execution of “spies,” and the killing of journalists. Tactics that the group has de- emphasized or eliminated are attacks, assaults (except suicide bombers), and the use of snipers.

Selected Recent Attacks:

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• 11 Jan 2012: Around 100 al Shabaab members attacked the Gerille Administration Police post in Wajir South District, Kenya. They burned down buildings, stole firearms and ammunition, kidnapped four individuals, killed six, and wounded four.

• 24 Jan 2012: An al Shabaab suicide bomber attacked a base in Beledweyne that housed Ethiopian troops. The bomber was shot and killed at the compound gate but the explosives detonated. Casualty figures were not released.

• 14 Mar 2012: An al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated himself by the Speaker of Parliament’s residence, which lies inside the Somali Presidential Palace compound, killing four and wounding ten.

• 4 Apr 2012: Al Shabaab successfully detonated a bomb inside the National Theater in Mogadishu when the Somali Prime Minister and several Members of Parliament (MPs) were present, killing ten and wounding over thirty. An MP and the Olympic Committee President were among those killed. Authorities stated the group used a young female suicide bomber, while al Shabaab claimed the bomb had been planted ahead of time.

• 1 May 2012: An al Shabaab suicide bomber targeted Somali MPs at a hotel café in Dhusa Mareb, killing three MPs and one additional person, and wounding several more.

• 22 Jul 2012: Al Shabaab publically executed three men for spying for Western intelligence agencies.

• 12 Sep 2012: Three al Shabaab suicide bombers attacked the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu when the Somali President and the Kenyan Foreign Minister were present, killing at least five and wounding ten. (See below for details of this attack.)

• 29 Oct 2012: Popular anti-al Shabaab poet Warsame Shire Awale was shot and killed near his home. Al Shabaab denied responsibility. Attack on Jazeera Hotel, Mogadishu

On 12 September 2012, Somali President and Kenyan Foreign Minister Sam Ongeri were the key speakers at a news conference at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu. The president had been staying at the hotel since his election just two days prior, and was to hold his first press conference. Security at the hotel was tight, consisting of hotel security guards, Somali soldiers, and AMISOM soldiers – all carrying small arms – as well as armored vehicles mounted with heavy machine guns. 8 UNCLASSIFIED

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As the press conference began, two men wearing suicide vests approached the hotel compound. One of them detonated himself a few yards away from the gate. The second – who was also wearing a camouflage jacket – gained access to the compound in the subsequent confusion, likely by running through the gate. Firing a gun as he ran, the assailant attempted to reach the building, but was shot and killed by security personnel before he succeeded. Around ten minutes later, a third attacker detonated his suicide vest farther down the street, on the other side of the hotel. At least five people – mainly security personnel – were killed in addition to the assailants, and ten were wounded.

Sequence of Events

1. First attacker approaches gate, detonates explosives 2. Second attacker enters compound 3. Security personnel engage, kill second attacker 4. Third attacker detonates explosives

Key Road Guard Tower Compound Wall Guard Shack Other Wall Gate Hotel SVIED Blast Other Building Gunman

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Al Shabaab claimed credit for the attack through its Twitter account. The timing of the attack has led officials and reporters alike to suspect that the group had received inside information. The conference began more than three hours later than planned, but had been underway for less than five minutes when the first blast occurred. One of al Shabaab’s Tweets on the attack stated that it “successfully targets a hotel…where a high profile meeting was being held,” implying that it knew the meeting was ongoing when the bombers initiated their attack.2 Weapons and Equipment

Al Shabaab weapons include the following:

• IEDs • Pistols o Suicide vest IEDs (SVIEDs) • RPGs o Remote-controlled IEDs • Landmines o Shaped charges • Artillery • Hand grenades • HE mortars • Sub-machine guns • Home-made grenades • PK machine guns • AK-47s

Analyst Assessment

Al Shabaab has suffered considerable loss of territory during the past two years, but that does not mean that the group is either incapable or uninterested in reversing the trend. As with other Islamist organizations, senior leaders are driven by ideology as opposed to material considerations. This will compel them to continue striving for the goal of an Islamist Somali state; only their tactics will change. Instead of utilizing conventional military TTP, the group will continue its current emphasis on asymmetric warfare methods. It will also fight the information war from an “underdog” position, presenting itself as the alternative to an oppressive, corrupt, and heretical government.

Al Shabaab will need to need to overcome several obstacles in order to be successful. First, its finances have been diminished due to its loss of the Bakara Market and the port of Kismayo – though the group still profits from charcoal exports through the port of Baraawe. Secondly, its handling of the region’s drought and resultant famine was less than optimal: in addition to banning international aid agencies, the group refused to allow the local populace to travel to locations where food was available. Resentment by local over their treatment during the famine will be hard for the organization to overcome. Finally, internal disagreements among senior leaders over vision and methods threaten to divide the organization. If any of

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these leaders was to leave, it is likely that he would take both a majority of his followers and much of his former support network with him, thus weakening al Shabaab’s capabilities.

The SFG has made significant progress against al Shabaab in the past two years, but several issues threaten its ability to maintain these advancements. The first and most obvious is the continued involvement of foreign troops in the country’s military affairs. The current AMISOM mandate expires on 16 January 2013, a mere two months in the future as of this writing. In addition, the Ugandan defense minister has announced the country’s ‘irreversible decision’ to withdraw its troops due to unrelated reasons.3 Any reduction to the present level of forces will negatively affect the SFG’s ability to maintain security and hold territory.

Another major issue the SFG faces is that of corruption in and resentment toward the current government. Political corruption has been a significant problem in the past, and is unlikely to diminish in the future. It played a large role in the adoption of Somalia’s new constitution – which was done without the required popular referendum – and the selection of the new parliament. President Mohamud will need to act openly and with complete transparency in order to instill confidence in his administration; anything less will play into al Shabaab’s information warfare efforts.

Al Shabaab’s move into the autonomous Somali region of Puntland is of particular concern. Though the Puntland government has agreed to work with the SFG on security issues, including piracy and terrorism, the region still remains a separate entity with only local forces available to combat the group. The mountainous terrain and proximity to the Gulf of Aden in al Shabaab’s chosen territory offers additional logistical routes via Yemen and hinders any operations against the organization, thus allowing it the opportunity to regroup and strengthen. Training Implications

Introducing groups such as al Shabaab in a training scenario can provide several benefits.

• An insurgent groups’ ability to quickly shift between conventional and asymmetric TTP allows for training against both

• Disagreements among senior insurgent leaders may not only divide the organization from within, but allow exploitation by outside forces

• Reliance on in-country revenue sources (taxation) presents a method to interfere with the group’s ability to fund itself

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• Political corruption in the host government promotes skepticism from the general populace against the ruling regime

• Change of basing territory provides an additional challenge to friendly forces

Related Products

Follow these links to view related products:

• Al Shabaab Update – Dec 2011 • Al Shabaab – June 2010 • Al Shabaab Suicide IED Attack – Dec 2009 • Horn of Africa Operational Environment Assessment – Feb 2009 See also the Red Diamond Newsletter, which contains current articles on a variety of topics useful to both soldiers and civilians ranging from enemy TTP to the latest news on cyberspace developments. For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the Worldwide Equipment Guide. AKO:

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POCs

OEA Team 913-684-7920 (COMM) 552-7920 (DSN) 913-684-7929 (COMM) 552-7929 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) 803 Harrison Drive, Bldg 467 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

References

Anzalone, Christopher. “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks in Somalia.” Combating Terrorism Center. 31 October 2011. Aynte, Abdi. “Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Post-Transition Somalia.” AllAfrica. 3 September 2012. Bayoumy, Yara. “Somali president, Kenyan FM escape deadly bomb attack.” Arab News. 12 September 2012. Daily Nation. “Somalia: Shabaab Displays Four Abducted Kenyans.” AllAfrica. 13 January 2012. Deperani, Jama. “TFG-Puntland Join to Fight Piracy, Al-Shabaab.” Somalia Report. 18 October 2011. Garvelink, William J. “The Dadaab Refugee Complex: A Powder Keg and It’s Giving Off Sparks.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. 1 March 2012. Hinshaw, Drew and Idil Abshir. “Somali President Escapes Attack.” Wall Street Journal. 12 September 2012. Ibrahim, Mohammed. “Somalia’s New President Survives Suicide Bombings.” New York Times. 12 September 2012. Joscelyn, Thomas. “2 Eritrean officials designated for supporting Shabaab.” Long War Journal. 6 July 2012. Joscelyn, Thomas and Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab formally joins al-Qaeda.” Long War Journal. 9 February 2012. Joselow, Gabe. “Suicide Bombers Target New Somali President.” VOA. 12 September 2012. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. “Al-Shabab’s Western Recruitment Strategy.” Combating Terrorism Center. 18 January 2012.

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Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander and Solomon, Hussein. “Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab’s Losses in Somalia.” Combating Terrorism Center. 26 September 2012. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). UN Security Council. 11 July 2012. Mukasa, Henry. “Uganda: UPDF Overruns Al-Shabaab Hideout.” AllAfrica. 25 October 2012. Onsarigo, Calvin. “Kenya: Police Thwart Al-Shabaab Jailbreak Plot.” AllAfrica. 31 October 2012. Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Al-Qaeda-linked suicide bombers target Somalia’s new president.” Washington Post. 12 September 2012. Reuters. “Attack in Somalia exposes fragile new era.” Daily News. 14 September 2012. Roach, Morgan Lorraine. “Somalia’s Government Transition Maintains the Status Quo” Heritage Foundation. 20 August 2012. Roggio, Bill. “American terrorist feels 'life may be endangered' by Shabaab.” Long War Journal. 16 March 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Kenyan Muslims riot after murder of Shabaab-linked cleric.” Long War Journal. 28 August 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Omar Hammami 'not endangered by the Mujahideen,' Shabaab claims.” Long War Journal. 17 March 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Omar Hammami says 'friction' exists between Shabaab, foreign fighters.” Long War Journal. 20 October 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab abandons Afgoye as Somali, African Union troops advance.” Long War Journal. 26 May 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab abandons western city as Ethiopian troops advance.” Long War Journal. 22 February 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab claims bombing at Mogadishu theater.” Long War Journal. 4 April 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab displays bodies of Kenyan soldiers near Kismayo.” Long War Journal. 1 September 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab dodges questions on rumor of Hammami's death.” Long War Journal. 20 April 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab executes 3 alleged spies.” Long War Journal. 23 July 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab has not denied rumors of Omar Hammami's death.” Long War Journal. 26 April 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab names new leader of Kenyan branch.” Long War Journal. 13 January 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bomber kills 3 members of Somali parliament.” Long War Journal. 1 May 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bomber strikes at presidential palace in Mogadishu.” Long War Journal. 14 March 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bomber targets Ethiopian troops.” Long War Journal. 24 January 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bombers attack new Somali president, Kenyan foreign minister.” Long War Journal. 12 September 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bombers attack restaurant in Mogadishu.” Long War Journal. 3 November 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab to try, execute 3 more Somalis for 'spying'.” Long War Journal. 28 July 2012. Roggio, Bill. “Somali Islamist group formally declares allegiance to Shabaab, al-Qaeda.” Long War Journal. 25 February 2012. Roggio, Bill and Lundquist, Lisa. “Shabaab threatens Britain over extradition of Abu Hamza al Masri.” Long War Journal. 23 October 2012. 14 UNCLASSIFIED

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Sentinel Staff. “Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity.” Combating Terrorism Center. 18 January 2012. Shabelle Media Network. “Somalia: Al Shabab Behead Two in El Bur Town, Central Somalia.” AllAfrica. 11 June 2012. Shabelle Media Network. “Somalia: Three Killed As Somali Forces, Al Shabab Clash Near Baidoa City.” AllAfrica. 31 October 2012. Sheikh Nor, Mohamed. “Somalia: Govt Arrests Over 300 Suspected Al-Shebab.” AllAfrica. 13 October 2012. Throup, David W. “Kenya’s Intervention in Somalia.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. 16 February 2012. Tomei, Lizzy. “Warsame Shire Awale, Somali poet, killed in Mogadishu.” Global Post. 30 October 2012. -----. Additions to Specially Designated Nationals List. U.S. Department of Treasury. 29 July 2011. 1-2. -----. “Al-Shabab claims attack on new Somalia leader.” Al Jazeera. 13 September 2012. -----. “AMISOM foils attack on Somali President.” AMISOM. 12 September 2012. -----. “Deadly blast in Kismayo leaves 4 dead.” Shabelle News. 31 October 2012. -----. “New Somali president survives double suicide bombing.” Los Angeles Times. 12 September 2012. -----. “Somali poet Warsame Shire Awale killed by gunmen.” BBC. 30 October 2012. -----. “Somali President Mohamud's hotel targeted by bombers.” BBC. 12 September 2012. -----. “Somali President Safe After Hotel Bombing.” VOA. 12 September 2012. -----. “Somalia: 'Al-Shabab weapons seized in Puntland'.” BBC. 19 October 2012. -----. “Somalia: From Troubled Transition to a Tarnished Transition?” International Crisis Group. 20 August 2012. -----. “Treasury Targets Regional Actors Fueling Violence and Instability in Somalia.” U.S.Department of Treasury. 25 July 2012. -----. “Twin suicide bombers hit new president's hotel in Mogadishu.” Xinhua News. 12 September 2012. End Notes

1 Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab abandons Afgoye as Somali, African Union troops advance.” Long War Journal. 26 May 2012. 2 Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Al-Qaeda-linked suicide bombers target Somalia’s new president.” Washington Post. 12 September 2012. 3 Roggio, Bill. “Shabaab suicide bombers attack restaurant in Mogadishu.” Long War Journal. 3 November 2012.

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