AAAD)— Codebook, Version 5 (September 2020)
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APPENDIX 2 Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD)— Codebook, Version 5 (September 2020) Scope and Background Tis database contains publicly available information regarding attempts by authoritarian states to repress exiles abroad from 1991 through 2019. Tis database contains informa- tion about cases in which authoritarian leaders try to silence their critics abroad. Te da- tabase was inspired in part by the Exeter Central Asian Political Exiles Database (CAPE) (Heathershaw and Furstenberg 2020) as well as related work on political exiles featured in Cooley and Heathershaw (2017, 187–219) and the conceptual work found in Glasius (2018). Tis project difers from CAPE insofar as it moves beyond Central Asia to cast a global net and uses some diferent categories and defnitions for each case. Using strategic search terms and multiple sources, the events recorded in this database represent cases in which individuals, and sometimes groups, were targeted while abroad by their home state in some capacity. Te countries included in the database are based on those defned as authoritarian in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) “authoritarian spells” typology afer 1991 and for the relevant years. Some adjustments were made for states that had become authoritarian afer the GWF coding fnished (e.g., Tailand in 2014; Turkey in 2014) or for cases omitted from the GWF data for other reasons, such as population size. Other regime data- gathering eforts were used as guidance in these cases (e.g., Wahman et al. 2013). Because authoritarian actions abroad of the sort tracked are usually secretive by nature, it is likely that for each case recorded there are many more that will never be publicly reported or verifed. Te data are freely available here: https:// alexdukalskis.wordpress.com/ data . If you choose to use it, please credit it by citing this book (Alexander Dukalskis, Making the World Safe for Dictatorship, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). Search Process Searching was done using a four-stage process. First, where similar databases existed, their content was used. Most prominently, the CAPE database was drawn upon to categorize cases from Central Asian states, but other databases, such as the Front Line Defenders (2019) database and the Xinjiang Victims Database (2019), were also used given that researchers had already gathered the informa- tion and made it public. Second, Google News and Google search terms were utilized to identify a population of news articles that contain information about the actions of authoritarian leaders against 206 Appendix 2 exiles abroad. A complete list of search terms can be found in in the “search procedure” section. For each search term, the frst 10– 20 Google pages were examined, and a popu- lation of relevant articles were gathered and then re- examined for data extraction. Te search terms were designed to cast a wide net and therefore required readers to determine the relevance of each article. Tird, given the possibility of recency bias in Google News search terms, Lexis Advance UK was mined, with a focus on earlier years in the dataset, using similar search terms as those from the Google News and Google search procedures. Fourth, afer steps 1– 3 were completed in English, searches were completed in Chinese, French, Arabic, Korean, Turkish, and Russian to fnd new cases and to re-evaluate cases for which more detail was available in non-English media. Sourcing Criteria Information from credible NGOs, international watchdog groups, and credible journal- istic sources were sought. Where news articles were found, attempts to corroborate each incident were made. Ofen, multiple news sources report on the same event. Ultimately, if corroborated, the incident was included in the database. If the report was uncorroborated but the source is a credible organization, then the source was included in the database. Authoritarian actions abroad are ofen inherently secretive— indeed, they are usually designed as such—and so in cases where responsibility was not always clear, the coding team discussed the case and used its best judgment to determine whether the case should be included or excluded. Te database was cross- checked and validated by the coding team to ensure inter-coder reliability. List of Countries Afghanistan 1992– Algeria, 1992– Angola, 1991– Armenia, 1994– Azerbaijan, 1991– Belarus, 1991– Burkina Faso, 1991– Burundi, 1991– 1993; 1996– 2005 Cambodia, 1991– Cameroon, 1991– Central African Republic, 2003– Chad, 1991– China, 1991– Congo– Brazzaville, 1997– Congo, DRC, 1997– Cuba, 1991– Djibouti, 1991– Egypt, 1991– El Salvador, 1991–1994 Eritrea, 1993– Ethiopia, 1991– 2018 Appendix 2 207 Gabon, 1991– Gambia, 1991– Georgia, 1991– 2003 Ghana, 1991– 1992 Guatemala, 1991– 1995 Guinea, 1991– 2010 Haiti, 1991– 1994, 1999– 2006 Indonesia, 1991– 1999 Iran, 1991– Iraq, 1991– 2003 Ivory Coast, 1991– Jordan, 1991– Kazakhstan, 1991– Kenya, 1991– 2002 Kuwait, 1991 Kyrgyzstan, 1991– 2010 Laos, 1991– Lebanon, 1991– 2005 Lesotho, 1991– 1993 Liberia, 1991– 2003 Libya, 1991– Madagascar, 1991– Malawi, 1991– 1994 Malaysia, 1991– 2018 Mauritania, 1991– Mexico, 1991– 2000 Mongolia, 1991– 1993 Morocco, 1991– Mozambique, 1991– Myanmar, 1991– Namibia, 1991– Nepal, 2002– 2006 Niger, 1996– 1999 Nigeria, 1991– 1999 North Korea, 1991– Oman, 1991– Pakistan, 1999– 2008 Peru, 1992– 2002 Qatar, 1991– Russia, 1993– Rwanda, 1991– Saudi Arabia, 1991– Senegal, 1991– 2000 Serbia, 1992– 2000 Sierra Leone, 1991–1998 Singapore, 1991– Somalia, 1991– South Africa, 1991–1994 Sri Lanka, 1991– 1994 Sudan, 1991– 208 Appendix 2 Swaziland, 1991– Syria, 1991– Tajikistan, 1991– Tanzania, 1991– Tailand, 2006– 2007, 2014– Togo, 1991– Tunisia, 1991– 2011 Turkey, 2014– Turkmenistan, 1991– UAE, 1991– Uganda, 1991– Uzbekistan, 1991– Venezuela, 2005– Vietnam, 1991– Yemen, 1991– Zambia, 1996– Zimbabwe, 1991– Coding Notes and Defnitions Column Name Defnition ID Placeholder for # of cases Country Te source country of the action Target Country Te country in which the incident occurred Action Type of action conducted by the source country. In some cases, attempts at repression are recorded. Tese cases contain an underscore and “attempt” to denote their distinction. For example, an assassination attempt is denoted by “assassination_attempt.” In all cases the coding team made its best determination about the motivations for the action given available evidence. Types of actions: Treatened: Denotes an individual reporting being personally threatened by agents of their home state. Treats by online “trolls” were generally excluded because they are so ubiquitous and difcult to verify. Family Treatened: Denotes an individual’s family being coerced in the home state to target the exiled individual. Arrested/ detained: Denotes individuals who are arrested or detained in a foreign state on behalf of their state or are formally arrested or detained in foreign state by ofcials from the home state. Appendix 2 209 Column Name Defnition Attacked: Denotes an individual who was physically assaulted by the host state or its proxies while abroad. Extradited: Denotes individuals who were formally extradited to their home state while living in a foreign state or where there was an attempt to do so (denoted by “_attempt”). Abducted: Denotes an individual who was kidnapped or where there was an attempt (denoted by “_attempt”), likely with the intent to extradite her/ him back efectively informally to the home state. Assassinated: Denotes an individual who was killed or where there was an assassination attempt (denoted by “_attempt”). Target Individuals or groups being targeted by their home state. Targets were disaggregated into the following categories: Journalist. Denotes an individual active in the media sector. Activist. Denotes an individual or group that criticizes the government and/ or opposes it nonviolently. Opposition. Denotes a member of a political party opposed to the government. Where the opposition member is also former government ofcial, the designation is made based on which category the individual is better known for. Former government ofcial. Denotes someone who was a member of the regime and defected, or who was a member of the previous regime and is being targeted by the current regime. If members of the previous regime were arrested or extradited for violence or major human rights abuses associated with the previous regime, they are not included. Citizen. Denotes people who were not especially politically active abroad but who because of some aspect of their identity were seen as threatening to the source state’s image. Target_ name Name of target, if available. Year Te year in which the incident occurred. Month When available, the month in which the incident occurred. Persons_ involved In many cases, countries target groups involved in opposition or dissent. Where possible, these groups were separated into independent cases. However, some sources provide only generic information, so some cases involve more than one individual. Source Links that correspond with evidence that each event occurred. Where several links were available, one was chosen. Detailed Search Procedures for Steps 2 and 3 To isolate specifc cases in which authoritarian states target their own citizens abroad, use the following search terms and replace COUNTRY or NAME with the country in ques- tion or the leader’s name (1991–2019). 210 Appendix 2 Ofen variations of the verb render the same results, but sometimes a new case emerges. Omit additional verb- tense searches when necessary (i.e., if it is a smaller country and there are not many news articles, then just search one tense of the verb, but try a few before making this decision). For larger countries, browse the frst 10– 20 pages of the Google search (if available). For smaller countries, browse through the frst 5 pages, but if many results are found, then continue to 10– 15 pages. Gather all seemingly relevant articles frst by browsing the headlines and key points. Once a country is completed, carefully read each relevant article again for potential data points. Using Lexis Advance UK, use a restricted version of the initial search terms and target searches by year.