UNDERSTANDING CHINA: VOICES FROM INDIA'S NORTHEAST

Rakhahari Chatterji Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury Ambar Kumar Ghosh

Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Rakhahari Chatterji Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury Ambar Kumar Ghosh © Observer Research Foundation 2020.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any part or by any means without the prior written permission of ORF.

Attribution: Rakhahari Chatterji, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Ambar Kumar Ghosh, “Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast,” May 2020, Observer Research Foundation.

Cover photo: India-China border post at Bumla, Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. Photo taken by the authors.

ISBN: 978-93-89622-84-3 Contents

Foreword Preface List of Figures and Tables

1 Introduction: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 1 Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

2 Quantitative Analysis of Survey Findings 9 Rakhahari Chatterji

3 Qualitative Analysis of Impressions of China 31 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Ambar Kumar Ghosh

4 Conclusion 45 Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

About the Authors 47

Annexure 49

iii iv Foreword

ORF Kolkata has a keen interest in China studies. Two previous publications—in 2016 and 2018—were on India’s national and regional media’s perception of China. To expand the scope of research, it has gone beyond the media and delved into public perception. The authors of this monograph conducted a study to identify the Indian citizenry’s perception of China and its resurgence, in the context of its dynamics with India. So far, this dynamic has only been explored in a limited manner.

The study is notable in its conscious attempt to identify views that are different from ‘generic’ perceptions on China, based largely on the opinions of strategic thinkers and foreign-policy experts around the national power corridors of Delhi. This report analyses the interface between foreign policy and public opinion in a democracy such as India and brings to the fore the voices of the communities residing in the areas close to the India–China borders, far from the hub of politics and policymaking.

The study focuses on the people residing in three Indian Northeastern states, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Sikkim. These states were selected based on their shared geographical proximity, historical legacy and potential for economic interdependence with China, which makes them more susceptible to the impacts of India–China relations. The study postulates a new dimension in foreign policy by incorporating the emotive and aspirational voices of the Indian populations at the border. Further, it creates a replicable framework to analyse similar questions in the domain; this is a significant contribution to the literature base of the discipline. Going forward, scholars can build on this research to explore newer policy questions in this domain, which will be academically enriching and thought-provoking.

Dr. Nilanjan Ghosh Director, ORF Kolkata May 2020

v Preface

hile the idea for this research is as old as the Kolkata Chapter of ORF itself, it was begun only in 2014. Recognising that the understanding of a country other W than one’s own depends on our perception of it, we believed that the key to our understanding of China would be in how we perceive it. Perception by itself, however, is a concept that needs to be objectified—even though such exercise may miss certain aspects of the entire concept. To conduct this research, we defined the concept of ‘perception’ twofold: media perception and public perception. For media perception of China, we analysed the online versions of select national and regional print media for the period 2012 to 2014 and published our findings in 2016 and 2018 respectively. For studying public perception, we conducted an opinion survey in 2015 of a sampled population in three of India’s states in the border regions of China on the eastern sector. This study presents and analyses the findings of the survey.

In conducting the survey, we were helped by Prof. Durga Prasad Chettri, Department of Political Science, Sikkim University; Prof. Nani Bath, Department of Political Science, Rajiv Gandhi University, Itanagar; Dr. Pahi Saikia, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati; and Prof. Chandan Kumar Sharma, Department of Sociology, Tezpur University. We are also thankful to the students of these institutions who have helped us in conducting the survey. Swagata Saha, a former researcher at ORF Kolkata, helped in the fieldwork, and Supriyo Basu of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in Delhi shared his expertise in data processing and management.

Our acknowledgements are also due to Dr. Manoj Joshi of ORF Delhi; Mr. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, a veteran journalist; Prof. Anindya Jyoti Majumdar of Jadavpur University; Mr. Ashish Chakraborty, a former journalist with The Telegraph; and Dr. Tansen Sen of New York University, Shanghai—they all gave us indispensable support at different stages of our research. Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman of ORF and Nilanjan Ghosh, Director, ORF Kolkata have encouraged and stood by us throughout. We are also indebted to Mr. Ashok Dhar, former Director of ORF Kolkata, for his enthusiasm and support for the project. Needless to say, for the content of this study, the authors alone are responsible.

Rakhahari Chatterji Former Adviser, ORF Kolkata May 2020

vi List of Figures and Tables

Fig. 2.1: Distribution of Total Sample Size from the Three NE States Fig. 2.2: Profile of Respondents by Age, Education and Income Fig. 2.3: Profile of Respondents by Occupation, Gender and Level of Media Exposure Fig. 2.4: Multi-Item Test Battery Model Fig. 2.5: Respondents’ Familiarity with the Neighbourhood by States Fig. 2.6: Views on Countries and Currencies by States Fig. 2.7: Views on China as a country Fig. 2.8: Views on China as a country by Age, Education and Media Exposure by Age, Education and Media Exposure Fig. 2.9: Reasons for Buying Chinese Goods Fig. 2.10: Reasons for Buying Chinese Goods by Income and Gender Fig. 2.11: Views on China as a Friend Fig. 2.12: Views on China as a Friend by States Fig. 2.13: Views on China as a Friend by Age, Media Exposure and Education Fig. 2.14: Identification of Problems with China Fig. 2.15: Identification of Problems with China by States Fig. 2.16: The Country More Responsible for Problems Fig. 2.17: The Country More Responsible for Problems by States Fig. 2.18: Possibility of Territorial Aggression by China Fig. 2.19: Possibility of China’s Territorial Aggression, AP Respondents Fig. 2.20: Possibility of China’s Territorial Aggression, Assam Respondents Fig. 2.21: Possibility of Aggression by China by Age, Education, Media Exposure and Income Fig. 2.22: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims Fig. 2.23: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims by Age, Education, Income and Media Exposure

vii Fig. 2.24: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims by Gender Fig. 2.25: India to Cooperate or Assert Fig. 2.26: India to Cooperate or Assert by States Fig. 2.27: India to Cooperate or Assert by Age, Education, Income and Media Fig. 3.1: Arunachal Pradesh: Identified Words from Expressions of the Respondents Fig. 3.2: Assam: Identified Words from Expressions of the Respondents Fig. 3.3: Sikkim: Identified Words from Expressions of the Respondents

Table

Table 3.1: Overall State-wise Observations Based on Qualitative Analysis

viii INTRODUCTION: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 1 Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury i Xin, managing editor of Caixin, a Chinese economics and finance magazine, in an article in World Policy, wrote in 2013: “Despite its size and proximity, India is a L gigantic blind spot in China’s foreign policy. For most urban Chinese, the terms that spring most readily to mind regarding India are rape, Buddhism (despite the fact that fewer than 1 percent of Indians are Buddhists), and yoga, while rural Chinese would tell you that they have few associations, if any.”1

Li Xin’s findings are not surprising; is it any different on this side of the border? How much do people here in India, especially those living close to the country’s border regions with China in the eastern sector know about China? To find out, ORF Kolkata conducted a limited opinion survey involving 246 respondents in the northeastern region near India- China border comprising the states of Arunachal Pradesh (AP), Assam and Sikkim.

The role and impact of public opinion on foreign policy, which has been largely regarded as an arena of ‘high politics,’ remains controversial. It is necessary then to bring up this issue, however briefly, and refer to the evolution of ideas on it.

What do the common people think of India’s foreign policy? What are their attitudes towards or perceptions about countries with which India relates positively or negatively? What are the citizens’ preferences regarding future policy/policies? Do our preferences have any impact on actual foreign policies? These questions lead us to the area of the relevance or importance of public opinion on matters relating to international politics and diplomacy. Diplomacy or foreign policy has been historically considered the preserve of the political elite. Hans Morgenthau, considered the father of modern international politics, in his book, Politics Among Nations, observed that “everywhere in the world, public opinion with regard to international affairs is moulded by the agencies of national policies.”2 Morgenthau was of the view that it was the task of the political authorities to shape and direct public opinion such that it remains in sync with the government’s views and priorities. In the early 1950s the so-called ‘Almond-Lippmann Consensus’ emerged, named after political scientist, Gabriel Almond and journalist, Walter Lippmann. This consensus was based on three assumptions about public opinion: that it is volatile; it is incoherent; and it is irrelevant to the policymaking process.3 They argued that the masses were emotionally driven and therefore possess untutored perceptions and unstructured

1 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

attitudes which cannot have any impact on foreign policy. Such sceptical view of public opinion dominated the intellectual and academic discourses for many decades, until the Vietnam War of the 1960s and early 1970s questioned the assumption that the ‘elites know best.’4 This led to the emergence of a ‘revisionist view,’ which argued that the public could have largely structured views on foreign policy that the authorities would ignore at their peril. The study of ‘who thinks what and why’ thus came to be recognised as legitimate by scholars of International Relations (IR).5

There are three aspects to the issue: one, whether people’s views on IR issues have internal consistency and stability; two, whether their views and perceptions are shaped by attributes like age and socio-economic status, or variables like education, occupation, income, ideology and party affiliation; and finally, how much impact, if any, their opinion has on actual foreign policy. To be sure, any study may or may not cover all these three aspects. Despite challenges to the view that ‘elites know best,’ foreign policy is still largely shaped by a small group of people often called the ‘strategic community.’6

Most studies on the role of public opinion in foreign policy have happened in the United States (US). Apart from a few early works, such as by Gabriel Almond7 or Philip Converse8 in the 1950s and 1960s, research in this area grew only from 1990s onwards.9 In recent years, researchers in other countries have started conducting similar studies.10 There are a few such studies found in India, although none of them are specifically on India’s perception of China. Thus, there is a need to review some of the existing reports before going into detailed discussion of our study.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In the last two decades there have been a number of studies of Indian opinion on foreign policy issues mostly as part of general opinion polls. Some of these have taken their samples from the general public while others, focusing on foreign policy issues, have concentrated on the strategic community mostly placed in Delhi. The studies are discussed in an order that is according to their substance. The first set of studies are similarly holistic kinds of surveys, while the subsequent set is different in terms of scale and scope.

One study, for instance, published in 2013 by the Lowy Institute in Australia, surveyed 1,233 Indian adults from both urban and rural areas.11 The survey asked questions on the domestic economy of India as well as the country’s relations with others. While it was not a survey of Indian opinion on China, it covered certain issues regarding India–China relations.

The survey found an overwhelming majority of the respondents (83 percent) considering China as a security threat, and more than half of them (58 percent) viewing China’s rise as

2 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

having negative consequences for India. At the same time, the survey found a fairly large number of respondents (45 percent) thinking that China’s rise as a more powerful country ‘would not be harmful to India;’ 41 percent of the respondents disagreed with the given statement. From its other questions, the survey also found 65 percent of the respondents suggesting that India join other like-minded countries to contain China’s influence, and 64 percent of them suggesting that India cooperate with China in playing an influential global role. The survey also found “almost two thirds of Indians (63 percent) would like relations with China to become stronger over the next 10 years, with 33 percent wanting them to be a lot stronger.”

These findings suggest some degree of incongruity in the beliefs held by the respondents. While this is not unexpected, since people’s beliefs are often idiosyncratic, what is pertinent is that the study finds wide regional variations within India as well: for instance, the study found that Indians’ threat perceptions from China “are most intense in north India, where 93 percent consider China a threat, and 81 percent consider this threat to be major. Threat perceptions are markedly lower in south India, where only 31 percent consider China a major threat, although a total of 77% there still consider China as a threat to some degree.”

A similar study was published in 2017 by the Pew Research Center, based on a survey of 2,464 respondents in Delhi and 16 other most populous states in India, excluding Kerala, Assam and smaller Northeastern states with low population.12 Their survey asked questions on a number of domestic and foreign issues, including the respondents’ attitude towards China. The researchers found China to be the second most unpopular country amongst Indians, after Pakistan. The respondents considered China’s growing power as a ‘zero-sum’ proposition for India. More than half of the respondents (56 percent) believed China’s growing military might have negative consequences for India, and 51 percent felt China’s economic strength ‘does not bode well’ for India. Overall, the study found a highly negative perception towards China.

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey of Spring 2018 similarly found India to have the lowest favourable opinion on China amongst 27 countries surveyed.13 Only 12 percent of Indian respondents had a favourable view of China.

In 2018, Brookings India surveyed India’s strategic community’s views on domestic and international issues. The 127 respondents comprised both ‘decision makers’ i.e., serving or retired army personnel, intelligence officials, foreign and administrative officials, as well as ‘influencers,’ i.e., academics, journalists, think tank analysts and business executives.14 It was not a survey of opinion exclusively on China, although it included some questions relating to China. More than half of the respondents (54 percent) considered China as

3 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

India’s biggest external challenge.15 Among the biggest obstacles in India’s relationship with China were: boundary dispute (identified by 41 percent of the respondents), China–Pakistan relations (31 percent), China’s role in the Indian Ocean region (17 percent), trade and economic ties (6 percent), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (5 percent).16 Only 2 percent of the respondents thought China can be India’s most important global partner, compared to 75 percent who identified the US as such.17

The most massive study of public opinion and foreign policy could be the 2006 one conducted by an Indian scholar in the US. The survey covered more than 200,000 households across 23 states in India.18 Amongst various issues, the study measured the ‘degree of warmth’ of Indian respondents towards seven countries (US, Japan, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Pakistan) and found China in fourth rank. Amongst the Indian states covered by the survey, it was only in Assam where the researchers found the degree of warmth towards China to be almost the same as that towards the US (63.4 and 63.6 percent, respectively).19 The study found that the respondents in most states (other than Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh) have higher level of distrust for the government of the US than that of China.20 The co-existence of greater warmth for the country (US) and lesser trust towards the government may indicate either that the respondents are highly discerning and make a clear distinction between the country and its government, or that they hold incompatible beliefs.

Overall, these surveys of Indian public opinion on China fail to provide comprehensive information on the subject. What they appear to have consistently pointed out is that generally, a majority of the respondents are of the view that China cannot be trusted and that its growing economic and military power pose a serious threat to India. On the question of what India should do, the respondents were often not sure whether India should adopt a cooperative or a conflictual stance.

One piece of research that was focused exclusively on China, although not based on the survey method, was published in 2003 and focused on the perception of Indian elites on China.21 Based on interviews with India’s strategic community, this analysis, although dated, remains relevant. The study pointed out a basic dilemma between two contrary perceptions of China:22 one assumes that China is not hostile towards India, and it wants to improve relations with India and the 1962 war was the outcome of mistakes by both sides; the second stand is that China is hostile and a long-term threat, and to mitigate it, India must follow assertive diplomacy backed by military force including nuclear. Besides these two there is a third position which argues that there is no short-term threat from China, although the long term is uncertain. Therefore, a strategy combining cooperation and conflict may be adopted. This requires diversification of relationship and not assuming that everything is hinged on the solution of the border issue.23

4 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Interestingly, Hoffmann’s findings of the views of the strategic community in 2003 stand in sharp contrast with Jaishankar’s survey findings on the same sort of people. Jaishankar’s are starkly negative findings on China. One wonders if Indian strategic community’s views and perception of China have worsened over these years as our relationship has shown signs of closeness with the US.

The present study is significantly different from these prior ones described in this section. To begin with, this is a study of Indian perception of China. Having examined earlier how the print media in India—both national and regional (Northeastern)—perceive China as expressed through their editorial pieces, ORF Kolkata researchers wanted to next examine the perception of the general public. Second, the researchers decided to explore such perceptions not of Indians, in general, but of only randomly sampled adult individuals living in three Northeastern states in the India–China border zones—i.e., Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. The sample size is 246 individuals, mostly from urban areas, and we conducted the survey in 2015. Third, the survey showed significantly different shades of opinion compared to most of the surveys described earlier.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The research team had reason to select the three Northeastern states. The states of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim share common borders with China. While Sikkim now has border trade with China as well, Arunachal Pradesh has been made a subject of territorial dispute. Although Assam now shares no common border with China, it was subject to the advance of the Chinese army in 1962. Besides, dam construction on the Brahmaputra, (Yarlung Zangpo to Tibet ཡར་ཀངུླ ས་གཙང་པ་ོ and 雅 魯 藏 布 江 in traditional Chinese) on the Chinese side also generates some apprehension amongst the Assamese people about the future of the flow of the river on which so much of their lives depends. The capitals of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Sikkim—Itanagar, Guwahati and Gangtok—were selected as nodal points for the survey. Tezpur city in Assam was also included as a nodal point for the survey as it had fallen to the advancing Chinese forces in 1962 war. (See Annexure 1 for a note on the field work)

The survey was conducted following simple random sampling, cutting across diverse age groups, income groups, occupation and education levels. While choosing the respondents, a deliberate effort was made to ensure gender parity (122 male, 122 female and 2 transgender). The sample size for this study was 246—90 from Sikkim, 82 from Assam and 74 from Arunachal Pradesh. (See Annexure 2 for a sample questionnaire)

Apart from the survey, the research team also conducted two focus group discussions, in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh (involving 12 individuals) and in Gangtok, Sikkim (10). In

5 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Tawang, the ORF team interacted with traders in the main market, both male and female and of various ages, while in Gangtok the researchers spoke mostly with the persons involved in transport business. The researchers also consulted officials of the District Administration in Tawang, the Department of Planning of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh in Itanagar, as well as journalists from All India Radio in Tawang and The Arunachal Times in Itanagar, along with experts from the Rajiv Gandhi University in Itanagar and Sikkim University in Gangtok.

The opinion survey involved both closed questions and open-ended ones where the respondents elaborated on their views. We also asked state-specific questions.

In the following chapters, this report will present the quantitative analysis of the closed questions of the survey, and the qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions and the data collected through the focus group discussions.

The questions in our survey were not random but rather logical; each question was linked with one of the four major themes that we examined for this report. These four subject matters constitute what is called an inter-linked ‘multi-item test battery’ (See Figure 2.4).

6 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

ENDNOTES

1. Possibly things are changing however. A more recent study on Chinese media perception shows growing Chinese interest in India, such as Indian democracy and Indian elections. Devin K. Joshi & Yizhe Xu, "What do Chinese Really Think about Democracy and India", Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 26, No 105, 2017, pp-385-402. 2. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (NY: Alfred Knopf, 1948) [revised by K. W. Thompson, New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1985], 281. 3. Ole. R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Lipmann-Almond Consensus,” International Studies Journal 36, no. 4 (1992): 439–466. 4. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (United States: Oxford University Press, 1956). 5. Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, August 2017, https://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/ 9780190228637.013.472. 6. Joshua. D. Kertzer, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Bibliographies, 29 November 2018, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo- 9780199743292-0244.xml. 7. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (NY: Praeger, 1950). 8. Philip Converse, “The Nature of Beliefs System in Mass Public,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (NY: Free Press, 1964). 9. Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, August 2017, https://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/ 9780190228637.013.472. 10. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “US Views of China turns Sharply Negative amid Trade Tensions,” Pew Research Center, 13 August 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/ global/2019/08/13/u-s-views-of-china-turn-sharply-negative-amid-trade-tensions/; “From Opinion to Understanding: Russia and the West,” Levada Centre: Yuri Levada Analytical Centre, 28 February 2020, https://www.levada.ru/en/ 2020/02/28/russia-and-the-west/. 11. Rory Medcalf, “Facing the Future: Indian Views of the World Ahead,” India Poll 2013, Lowy Institute and Australia India Institute, 2013, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ publications/india- poll-2013. 12. Bruce Stokes, Dorothy Manevich and Hanyu Chwe, India and the World, Pew Research Center, November 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/11/15/ india-and-the-world/. 13. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24. 14. Dhruva Jaishankar, Survey of India’s Strategic Community (New Delhi: Brookings India, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Survey-of-India%E2%80%99s- Strategic-Community.pdf. 15. Ibid., 10. 16. Ibid., 11. 17. Ibid., 13. 18. Devesh Kapur, “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy,” India Review 8, no. 3 (July–September 2009): 286–303. 19. Ibid., 299.

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20. Ibid., 302 and Table 8C, 304. 21. Steven, “Perception and China Policy in India,” in The India-China Relationship: What the US Needs to Know, eds. Francine Frankel and Harry Harding (NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), 33–74. 22. Ibid., 50–52. 23. Ibid., 58–59.

8 Quantitative Analysis of Survey Findings 2 Rakhahari Chatterji his chapter presents and analyses the findings from the closed questions of the survey. The chapter first describes the sample and its distribution across T respondents’ attributes, and then presents the ‘multi-item test battery’ model. Finally, it analyses the responses under each item.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

There are generally three aspects in the study of the relation between foreign policy and public opinion: What does the sampled population think about certain India–China issues? Are their views shaped by their individual attributes? What is the impact of their views on India’s official China policy?

The scope of this study extends only to the first two. Further, responses to the open-ended questions as well as interviews with some respondents is covered in Chapter 3, which is a qualitative analysis of the study. To present as complete a picture as possible of the respondents’ perception(s) of China, the authors offered the respondents the option to express themselves elaborately through responses to open-ended question instead of restricting the survey to standardised questions with pre-set answers. Further, the study also assesses variations in responses across states.

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the sample across the three Northeastern states. The states could not be equally represented due to ground-reality constraints. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict the sampled population in terms of their attributes, such as age, education, income, occupation, media exposure and gender. (The entire database is included in Annexure 3)

9 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Figure 2.1: Distribution of Total Sample Size from the Three NE States

Arunachal Pradesh Assam Sikkim

37% (90) 30%(74)

33% (82)

Figure 2.2: Profile of Respondents by Age, Education and Income N=246

Figure 2.3: Profile of Respondents by Occupation, Gender and Level of Media Exposure N=246

10 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

As seen in the figures, almost 80 percent of the total respondents across the states were below 40 years old. While one-third of Assam’s respondents are older (more than 40), respondents from Arunachal Pradesh (AP) and Sikkim are overwhelmingly younger (more than 80 percent). (For the state-wise data see Annexure 3)

In the area of education, the sample distribution is quite encouraging. About 92 percent of the respondents are educated (ranging from primary education or secondary education to college or above), with near-even distribution amongst the categories of school education and college education. An overwhelming number of respondents (62.2 percent and 54.9 percent, respectively) from Arunachal Pradesh and Assam are college educated. In terms of occupation, over 50 percent are self-employed, while 33 percent have salaried jobs. AP’s sample population consists of more salaried people than those of Assam and Sikkim. Interestingly, less than 5 percent of the total respondents are involved in agriculture. This is likely due to the hilly areas and inhospitable climate being unsuitable for extensive farming.

Notably, despite the high levels of education and the largely non-agricultural occupation of most of the respondents, over 72 percent earn less than INR 25,000 a month. Nearly 18 percent belong to the ‘under 50,000’ category. The middle-income group is largest in AP (25.7 percent), with Assam as a close second at 23.2 percent. Respondents from Sikkim are overwhelmingly in the lowest category of income (92.2 percent) compared to those from AP and Assam.

In terms of gender, the total sample is evenly balanced between male and female respondents. However, there is variation across states. AP has the lowest representation of males and Assam has the highest. From the former, only two people listed themselves as the third gender (or transgender).

To measure the respondents’ degree of exposure to political news, they were asked if they watch, hear or read political news on television, radio or newspaper. The scores ranged from zero to three, to indicate ‘no exposure’ to ‘high exposure.’ The majority of the respondents are well-exposed to some form of media from where they obtain political news. Only 22 out of 246 respondents (8.9 percent) said they were not exposed to political news.

To sum up, the selected sample is broadly younger, balanced in terms of gender, educated, largely non-agricultural, with low or medium levels of income, and with a reasonable degree of political interest.

11 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

MULTI-ITEM TEST BATTERY MODEL

The themes of our investigation are organised on the basis of the multi-item test battery (Figure 2.4).a It shows four interconnected dimensions with multiple items, to present an idea of the surveyed population’s perception of China. The model has been used in a crude form, which does not permit conducting a correlational or factor analysis.

Figure 2.4: Multi-Item Test Battery Model

a Wen-Chung Wang, Po-His Chen and Ying-Yao Cheng, “Improving Measurement Precision of Test- Batteries Using Multidimensional Item Response Models,” Psychological Methods 9, no. 1 (2004): 116–36, 116–118; Lars Bergkrist and John R. Rossiter, “The Predictive Validity of Multiple-item versus Single-item Measures of the same Constructs,” Journal of Marketing Research 44, no. 2 (May 2007): 175–184; Gavin T.L. Brown, “An Introduction to Multi-Battery Factor Analysis: Overcoming Method Artefacts,” Practical Assessment, Research and Evaluation 12, no. 7 (May 2007): 1–13, Pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=128n=7; “What is a Test Battery?” criteriacorp.com/resources/ glossary_test_battery.pht.

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NEIGHBOURING NATIONS

India’s Northeastern region is close to the country’s eastern and southeastern neighbours, including China in the north. AP shares international borders with Bhutan, China and Myanmar; Assam with Bangladesh and Bhutan; and Sikkim with Nepal, Bhutan and China. Based on this geopolitical reality, one assumption that forms the premise of this study is that the people from these states are familiar with their neighbouring states. The survey found that overall, the most ‘heard of’ neighbour is Nepal, followed by China and Bangladesh (Figure 2.5). The respondents were least familiar with Myanmar. AP respondents are quite familiar with China but have little knowledge about Myanmar, despite the state sharing a 441-km long border with Myanmar. Most Sikkimese respondents have little interest in China and are largely concerned about Nepal, probably owing to the high Nepalese population in Sikkim. The survey found Assamese respondents to be nearly equally concerned about China and Bangladesh, despite lacking any common border with China.

Figure 2.5: Respondents’ Familiarity with the Neighbourhood by State N=246

Figure 2.6: Views on Countries and Currencies by State N=246

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Currencies

To get an idea about the level of economic interactions of the regionally connected states, the survey included questions about the respondents’ preferences for using currencies other than the INR. Results show that the Nepalese currency (Nepalese Rupee) is the most preferred, closely followed by the Chinese currency (Yuan) (Figure 2.6). Assamese respondents prefer Chinese currency over Nepalese currency, while the reverse is true for AP respondents. This is despite Assam not sharing any border with China and AP sharing a 1,030-km long border with it. AP respondents prefer Bhutanese currency (Bhutanese Ngultrum) considerably more than the Chinese currency, although its boundary with Bhutan is only 160 km long.

Visits

To learn about people-to-people connectivity between these Northeastern states and the neighbouring nations, the authors asked the respondents about their foreign visits to these nations. Approximately 45 percent of all respondents said they had never visited any of the bordering countries. Amongst those who have, the most preferred country of visit is Nepal, distantly followed by Bangladesh. By state, in case of Arunachal Pradesh, 20 percent respondents prefer visiting Nepal, while 5 percent expressed their choice for Bhutan. About one-third of the Assamese respondents prefer visiting Bangladesh, with which the state shares an international border as well as linguistic affinity. Nearly 58 percent of the Sikkim respondents have visited its bordering country Nepal, perhaps due to Sikkim’s large Nepalese population. Of all the respondents, only 2.8 percent have ever visited China. Thus, despite the considerable interest in Chinese goods and currency, there is little interest in visiting the country. Lack of infrastructural facilities, difficult mountain terrain and/or language could be discouraging factors for such cross-border visits.

IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA

China as a Country

The respondents were asked whether they think of China as a ‘strong’ country or as a ‘rich’ or ‘expansionist’ country. About 70 percent of them think of the nation as a strong country, not as rich or expansionist (Figure 2.7). Only around 14 percent consider China to be expansionist. Interestingly, age, education or media exposure does not make any difference in the respondents’ opinion of China. Even amongst those with no media exposure, the majority (54 percent) views China as a strong country.

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Figure 2.7: Views on China as a Country N=246

By states, too, around 64–80 percent of the respondents express the same view, Assam with being at the top and Sikkim at the bottom.

Figure 2.8: Views on China as a Country by Age, Education and Media Exposure N=246

Thus, it is fair to conclude that the population looks at the India–China issue from a contemporary perspective, not through the lens of India’s historical war with China.

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Expansionism is more associated with territorial aggrandisement than dominance gained through trade or investments. At the time the study was conducted, China’s recent strategic territorial gains were not in focus, e.g., through investments in ports in other countries or through the acquisition of equity interest in infrastructural investments abroad as part of her Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) programme. Overall, the respondents seem tuned to the current facts (then prevailing) and not overwhelmed by nationalist rhetoric.

Chinese Goods

Of the 246 respondents, 230 have seen Chinese goods in the market and 184 regularly purchase such products. Only 16 respondents reported that they have not noticed Chinese goods in the market. Amongst buyers of Chinese goods, 74.5 percent cite price as the reason, since Chinese products are cheaper than similar Indian ones (Figure 2.9). This reasoning holds true across states, age and income groups. For instance, in the middle- and lower-income categories, around 75 percent buy Chinese goods because they are cheap; in the top-income group, nearly 58 percent prefer Chinese products for the same reason.

Figure 2.9: Reasons for Buying Chinese Goods N=184

The survey found no difference in the preference for Chinese goods based on gender. While majority of the respondents view China as a strong country, they are not likely to agree that they are prompted to buy Chinese products for their strength or quality, not for cheapness. (Figure 2.10). Thus, the price point of Chinese products is the primary driver for their prevalent preference in the market, which consequently pushes out Indian goods.

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Figure 2.10: Reasons for Buying Chinese Goods by Income and Gender N=184

China as a Friend

The survey asked the participants if they considered China a ‘friend.’ Figure 2.11 presents the responses.

Figure 2.11: Views on China as a Friend N=238

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Figure 2.12: Views on China as a Friend by States N=238

'The respondents from Arunachal Pradesh and Assam were almost evenly divided between viewing China as a ‘friend’ and as an ‘enemy’ (Figure 2.12). Amongst Sikkimese participants, however, almost 64 percent consider China a friend, and only 14 percent consider it an enemy state.

Figure 2.13 shows that almost all respondents across age, education and income groups have some opinion on this issue. About 40 to 50 percent are willing to consider China a friend. On the other hand, the percentage of those who see China as India’s enemy varies from around 15 percent to nearly 44 percent. This overall positive view of China in India’s Northeast may contribute to a positive relationship between the two nations in future.

However, it is also necessary to remember that a substantial proportion of respondents view China as unfriendly. Since those who think that China is not a friend of India stand closer to those who believe China is an enemy, if one studies the issue from a binary perspective, an overwhelming number of respondents—ranging from 49.5 percent to 70.8 percent—are not ready to look at China as a friend (overall, 53 percent; See Figure 2.11). The respondents belonging to high-income and older age groups are more likely to find China ‘unfriendly’ (70 percent and 69.6 percent, respectively) compared to other groups. Further, many respondents, though not an overwhelming number, across all education categories believe that China cannot be a friend of India. The younger respondents (less than 40 years) are nearly evenly divided between the alternative choices.

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Figure 2.13: Views on China as a Friend by Age, Media Exposure and Education N=238

INDIA’S PROBLEMS WITH CHINA

India’s borders with China are unsettled, and even the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is disputed. Most of the conflicts regarding Chinese troops trespassing into Indian territory or Indian troops going into China is due to this. Since the two nations have not been able to agree upon the international border, disputed territorial claims remain unresolved, especially Chinese claims on territories that India considers as its integral parts. An example of this is the Chinese claim on AP as part of Southern Tibet.

In light of this, the survey focused on the respondents’ knowledge of India’s ongoing problems with China. Of the 246 respondents, 155 (63 percent) were aware of the problems between the two nations. However, a considerable number of people (37 percent) were either ignorant of them or chose not to respond. Respondents from Assam seem to be particularly sensitive about such issues, followed by AP respondents. About 89 percent of Assamese respondents and 67.6 percent AP respondents answered positively while; somewhat surprisingly, 64.4 percent Sikkimese respondents opted for ‘No’ or ‘Not Sure.’ Older people were more knowledgeable about India–China issues, as were those with higher levels of education and higher media exposure.

To sum up, older people, due to greater experience, are likely to know or remember more about the troubles India has had with China. However, irrespective of age, people are more likely to be conversant with such issues if they were more exposed to education or media. Interestingly, even amongst those who are aware of the India–China conflicts, few ascribe them to an expansionist tendency on China’s part. This point is elaborated in the responses to the following questions.

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1. Identification of Problems with China

To find out which India–China problems are identified as most important, the authors presented an open-ended question so that the respondents could name one or more issues without being restricted to a preselected set of options. Further, this question was only presented to the 155 respondents who had answered ‘yes’ to the earlier question regarding awareness.

Figure 2.14: Identification of Problems with China N=132

Figure 2.15: Identification of Problems with China by States N=132

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Only 132 of the 155 respondents agreed to identify a problem (Figure 2.14). For cases where the respondent mentioned more than one problem, the study only counts either the one listed first or the one most elaborately described. Overwhelmingly, respondents chose ‘Border Dispute’ as the most important issue across all the three states: 84.8 percent overall, 94 percent in AP, 78 percent in Assam and nearly 90 percent in Sikkim (Figure 2.15). China’s dam construction on River Brahmaputra is seen as a problem only in Assam by a few respondents. Some respondents highlighted the issue of Chinese goods capturing the Indian market, but none in Sikkim for this particular question. This pattern of responses does not change by age, education, income or media exposure.

Interestingly, China’s ‘iron friendship’ with Pakistan, often covered negatively in Indian press, does not seem to have much of an impact on the public opinion of China. Only five out of 132 respondents cited this as a factor in India–China relations. This could be explained by Pakistan’s distance from India’s Northeast, which makes Sino-Pakistan relations a remote issue for the region. Additionally, for the Northeastern states, the border issue looms over all other issues.

2. The Onus of the Problems

To gauge the respondents’ views regarding which party should shoulder the responsibility of the India–China conflicts, the authors asked them if they would like to place the onus on either (or both) of the nations. Of the 246, only 197 respondents responded to this question. Interestingly, while only 155 respondents admitted any knowledge of problems between India and China, and only 132 of these 155 cared to identify problems, a larger number of respondents expressed an opinion on which party is to blame more.

Figure 2.16: The Country More Responsible for Problems N=197

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Figure 2.17: The Country More Responsible for Problems by States N=197

As Figure 2.16 shows, as few as 6 percent of the respondents put the blame on India, 41 percent believe China to be at fault, over one-third (39 percent) of them believe that both countries are responsible, and 14 percent are unwilling to venture any opinion. The variation amongst states is especially interesting. As with some other issues, the Sikkimese respondents are less inclined to blame China and put the responsibility on both nations. Over 30 percent of Sikkimese respondents did not offer any opinion, compared to only 10 and 6 percent of those from AP and Assam, respectively (See Figure 2.17).

There is little variation in responses across education, income or media exposure. However, age factor appears to play some role. The older respondents tend to put the blame on China (54 percent) more than the younger ones (37.3 percent). Further, more than 55 percent of the younger respondents either blame both countries or refuse to take any position, while only 43 percent of the older respondents make this choice. The variation based on age is interesting, since it reveals common patterns across variations amongst the respondents from the border regions of India. If one combines the ‘Both’ and ‘Not Sure,’ 53 percent of the respondents believe that the onus must be shared, i.e., both India and China have some responsibility in the creation and continuation of these problems, and neither can absolve responsibility.

China has a disputed border with India in this region (eastern sector of the boundary), it claims AP as the southern part of Tibet and therefore as a part of China, and it has started the practice of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens of this region for entry in China. Such Chinese activities can make the residents of this region feel especially threatened. Despite

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this, the majority of the respondents are not biased against China. This can be posited as an ability to take a rational and balanced view of political issues without giving in to jingoistic nationalism.

A caveat is in order. As mentioned earlier, out of the 246 respondents, only 155 said that they were aware of India–China conflicts. However, 197 respondents chose to answer the question regarding responsibility. This discrepancy highlights that 42 respondents who admittedly did not have any knowledge of the conflicts nonetheless chose to assign blame. Thus, it is quite likely they chose to blame one country or the other without adequate knowledge of the issues.

3. Possibility of Territorial Aggression by China

As established earlier, a large proportion of the respondents know that border dispute is the most important problem between India and China. While most respondents do not prefer to put the culpability on India, many of them blame both or remain unsure, instead of blaming China exclusively. Building on this, the authors sought to find out if the respondents felt that China could use force to settle the territorial dispute in its favour, i.e., by taking over territory that India considers its own (Figure 2.18). This question assumes added importance in light of frequent incidents over conflicting territorial claims that occur in the border areas between India and China even now. Moreover, China has now emerged as a great economic and military power in the region.

There is a significant difference between the responses from AP and Assam (Figures 2.19 and 2.20).1 Regarding the forcible occupation of Indian territory by China, only 6.9 percent of AP respondents believe it to be possible, as compared to 31 percent of Assamese respondents. Similarly, an overwhelming 75 percent from the former consider it unlikely or not possible at all (taking the two choices together) as against 58 percent of the latter. Both AP and Assam have experienced Chinese invasion in 1962, with Tawang (AP) being completely overtaken by the Chinese forces. Therefore, there is no historical reason for the perceived threat to be lower amongst the AP residents. One possible reason for the difference could be that amongst the AP respondents, over 80 percent are young, compared to only 67 percent amongst the Assam respondents. While 51 percent of the older respondents and 25 percent of those with moderate education and media exposure broadly concur with the view that it is possible for China to forcibly take over Indian territory, overall 60–75 percent of the total respondents believe it is unlikely or not possible at all (See Figure 2.21).

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The younger respondents, being temporally distant from the war of 1962, do not carry burden of the past. This allows them to take a more objective view of China. Thus, it is possible that in future, as the younger generation takes over, India’s approach towards China will become less burdened. The people living close to the Sino-Indian border are increasingly taking a more relaxed view of China, even while acknowledging the strength of the nation. They consider territorial claims and counter-claims between the two countries to be diplomatic posturing to achieve a better bargaining position. For Indians, in general, and border-regions residents, in particular, it reflects an increasing degree of self-confidence and greater faith in the Indian state and its armed forces. This view is also consistent with the view examined earlier, wherein neither country is exclusively to be held responsible for the border dispute.

Figure 2.18: Possibility of Territorial Aggression by China N=154

Figure 2.19: Possibility of China’s Territorial Aggression, AP Respondents N=72

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Figure 2.20: Possibility of China’s Territorial Aggression, Assam Respondents N=82

Figure 2.21: Possibility of Aggression by China by Age, Education, Media Exposure and Income N=154

INDIA’S POLICY OPTIONS

1. Negotiation or Force

With regard to India’s approach to China, the respondents were first asked whether they would want India to negotiate or use force to settle the ongoing border disputes.

Consistent with most of the responses mentioned earlier, a majority of the respondents (64 percent) feel that disputes and disagreements will best be handled through negotiation. Only 22 percent listed ‘use of force’ as the preferred approach (Figure 2.22).

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Figure 2.22: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims N=154

Figure 2.23: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims by Age, Education, Income and Media Exposure N=154

There is no variation in the choice of alternatives by state or age. However, education and income play some role in the decision. Those with higher education and better income strongly recommend negotiations for settling disputes, believing that force will not provide a long-term resolution (Figure 2.23). Moreover, the possibility of India and China—both armed with nuclear power—going to war again is reprehensible for most well-educated respondents. Thus, the majority believes that fervent nationalism must give way to a reasoned and peaceful settlement of dispute. Respondents with no formal education are more likely to suggest the use of force, driven perhaps by jingoistic sentiments. Interestingly, their responses are also

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inconsistent across the above two questions (See Figures 2.21 and 2.23). On the one hand, none of them thinks that China is capable of taking over Indian territory by force. On the other, two-thirds of them suggest that India needs to use force to stop China from claiming Indian territory. The lesson, perhaps, is that the better one is placed in society, in terms of education and income, the more inclined that person is towards peaceful options.

There is no significant variation in responses based on gender. However, a marginally higher percentage of males seem to prefer negotiation (See Figure 2.24).

Figure 2.24: India’s Approach towards China’s Territorial Claims by Gender N=154

2. Cooperation or Assertion

To elicit policy recommendations from the respondents, regarding how India should behave towards China, the authors asked them if India should maintain its current stance, or become more friendly, or more assertive. While few respondents think that China will use force in settling disputes with India, most are hesitant in suggesting that India should adopt a friendlier approach to China. (It should be noted, however, that on the question of the possibility of China using force to settle disputes with India, the number of respondents were only 154 as against 240 for this question.) Broadly, the respondents are evenly divided between friendly and assertive approaches (See Figure 2.25). Almost a quarter of the respondents believe that India should continue with its current approach.

A majority of Assamese respondents (53.7 percent) and more than one-third (36.1 percent) of the AP respondents want India to be more assertive. Sikkim respondents have a different

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take here as well: a much larger proportion of them (41.9 percent) suggest that India should take a friendlier approach (See Figure 2.26). A considerably larger number of respondents in older and higher education groups tend to favour assertive over friendly approach. For every other category, the difference between the two approaches is less than five percentage points.

Understandably, while the respondents show considerable confidence in answering questions regarding the present state of affairs between India and China, they display caution and lurking apprehension when suggesting a future course of action.

Figure 2.25: India to Cooperate or Assert N=240

Figure 2.26: India to Cooperate or Assert by States N=240

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Figure 2.27: India to Cooperate or Assert by Age, Education, Income and Media Exposure N=240

More cooperation Leave as it is More assertion

SUMMING UP

This chapter has presented the survey data in terms of the overall distribution of the sample as well as by states and by individual attributes of the respondents. The authors analysed the responses in terms of their familiarity with China as a neighbour, their impression of contemporary China, their view of India’s problems with that country, and their view of how India should deal with China. While the scope of the study is limited, the findings suggest that the public opinion on China is intelligible. Even in the most remote corners of India, the respondents were adequately informed and showed considerable consistency and judgement in their views on various interrelated issues. The overall perception of China, inferred from their expressed opinions, is neither entirely positive nor negative. There is sufficient optimism amongst people about the future of India–China relations. While an element of apprehension remains, it is not overwhelming or wholly discouraging.

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ENDNOTES

1. In eliciting responses for this particular question, the authors faced some logistical issues. The questionnaire for Sikkim respondents mistakenly excluded this question. Consequently, the responses to this question are only from Assam and AP.

30 Qualitative Analysis of Impressions of China 3 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Ambar Kumar Ghosh his chapter deals with the qualitative analysis of the study in order to further our understanding about the public perception of the three Northeastern states T regarding China. The attempt to undertake a qualitative assessment of the findings of the study was made to complement the previous chapter by bringing out the possible subtle dimensions of the public perception that might be difficult to illustrate in the numerical projections of the quantitative analysis.

This analysis has been divided into four segments: identifying the questions; analysing the expressions of responses; explaining points of divergences from quantitative findings; and analysing the state-wise overall observations.

IDENTIFYING THE QUESTIONS

1. Open-ended Questions

The qualitative analysis was done based on the open-ended questions posed to the respondents in the three states. They often gave long and subjective responses, which required a further qualitative assessment. Such opinions were interwoven with anecdotes and descriptive arguments. Each response reflected variegated human impulses and emotions like fear, anger, admiration and pride, with respect to their opinion on China and its relationship with India.

The first question was directed at understanding the respondents’ general idea about China or to study how they perceive China. Second question was asked to categorically understand what information or impression the respondents have regarding the outstanding disputes between India and China. Finally, the third question was posed to know about the respondents’ knowledge regarding any territorial claims of China in Arunachal Pradesh.

Apart from the three general open-ended questions, a state-specific open-ended question was asked only to the respondents from Arunachal Pradesh, given the gravity of the concerned border issue.1 The researchers were of the view that it was crucial to understand what impressions, ideas and opinions the residents of Arunachal Pradesh have regarding

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what has been one of the major areas of diplomatic concern between the two neighbouring countries.

2. State-specific Closed Questions

Apart from these four open-ended questions (three general and one specifically for the state of Arunachal Pradesh), the qualitative research has also considered the state-specific closed questions for the analysis (See Annexure 4). In the questionnaire for Arunachal Pradesh, three sets of questions were framed. The first deals with the issue of China’s dam- building activities over the Brahmaputra river; the second with the presence or movement of Chinese soldiers in keeping with the outstanding territorial claim by China and regarding Chinese incursions in the region; and the third deals with the issue of stapled visas—already taken up in the section on the open-ended questions. This question is asked to get an idea of how the respondents viewed China’s treatment of them.

For Assam respondents, the survey posed two sets of closed questions. The first concerns the 1962 India–China war, and the second deals with the China’s building of a dam on the Brahmaputra. In the case of Sikkim, question on Nathu La Pass was asked as it is important to understand the residents' awareness regarding the open border trade that takes place between India and China in that border.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES

The responses deal with a wide range of issues, from outstanding disputes, to the possibility of Chinese aggression, China’s rise, and the need for peace between the two countries. It has to be acknowledged that these themes are not entirely exclusive, as it has also been noticed in case of the qualitative findings of ORF’s study on national media’s perception on China.2 In this study, the possibilities of overlaps between each of these concerns will be much more obvious as spontaneous human responses are being dealt with. It is noteworthy that in most of the cases, the respondents were from diverse backgrounds. Thus, many responses were not presented in a direct, formalistic or structured manner. As a result, it was found that the responses to two different questions on China overlapped and coincided with each other. The emphasis given on each of the issues expressed by the respondents differed across states.

For instance, in Arunachal Pradesh, as the outstanding border disputes were found to be the most dominant issue, a strong desire for resolution of the dispute with China has also been traced in the course of the analysis. For Assam, China’s dam-building activity over the Brahmaputra river and the 1962 war memory appear as notable sources of apprehension; at the same time, urgent redressal of the river dispute through an amicable agreement with

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China has also been an expressed demand. As for Sikkim, though there has been a subtle fear regarding the dominance of Chinese goods in their local market, the overall perception has been very much relaxed and enthusiastic about expanding commercial as well as cultural ties with China.

The respondents in Arunachal Pradesh had elaborated on the border disputes and Chinese claims over their territory in their responses in the open-ended questions. After all, their lives are directly affected by the claims of China, as it views the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as the Southern part of Tibet.a Comments such as ‘China claims Arunachal as its own’ and ‘International boundary problem’ appeared frequently in the responses. Few responses regarding ‘China not supporting the LAC and McMahon Line’ indicate that quite a few people are aware of the contentious areas that have catapulted the territorial disputes between India and China. Many respondents dismissed Chinese territorial claims as ‘baseless’ and ‘absurd’ and firmly suggested that ‘India shouldn’t accept it.’

A considerable proportion of respondents of Arunachal Pradesh (50 percent) repeatedly mentioned China’s decision of issuing stapled visas to the residents of their state, which according to them, was a trigger point that could exacerbate the mutual suspicion between the two countries. The respondents felt this move was indicative of ‘China’s ploy’ to treat the people of the state ‘as their own people’ in order to reiterate Chinese sovereignty claims over Arunachal, and a ‘conspiracy to distinguish them (respondents) from mainland India.’ A majority of the respondents in the state (98 percent) were of the opinion that China should not give any ‘special preference’ to the people of Arunachal while issuing visas.

The issue of China’s dam-building activity in the Siang (Brahmaputra) river in Arunachal Pradesh was acknowledged ‘as a serious matter’ by only very few respondents and hence found limited resonance amongst the respondents.

Despite concerns about outstanding conflicts, there is a formidable consensus amongst residents on the need for cooperation between the two countries, as already reflected in the quantitative findings presented in the previous chapter. Arunachal Pradesh, whose perception seems to be relatively more uneasy for reasons discussed earlier, is found to be most enthusiastic about forging better ties with China. The respondents clamoured for peace and friendship with China as they came to the conclusion that ‘war is not a solution and it is better to negotiate and resolve’ the disputes. The study finds that the respondents seemed to be hopeful about the ongoing high-level diplomatic negotiations that India and a In this chapter, we have quoted certain expressions from the statements of the respondents, to qualitatively analyse their perception in the study.

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China have been engaging in, and ‘supported bilateral or multilateral negotiation initiatives’ to peacefully arrive at some point of mutual understanding. People have viewed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s May 2015 visit to China with a great deal of enthusiasm. Besieged by the territorial dispute, the people of Arunachal seemed to hope the most for an agreement to resolve the territorial dispute during Modi’s visit, which they feel would end the ‘fear in the heart of the people of the state.’ It is also noteworthy that the people of Arunachal Pradesh, despite the sensitive border issue, hope for ‘open border trade with China,’ which can bolster their economic prospects.

For Assam respondents, the river dispute seems to be a concern between India and China, as it directly impacts or has the potential to impact their lives, since the state is situated in the Brahmaputra river basin. The responses to the closed questions on Brahmaputra river show that a majority of the respondents (72 percent) are concerned that China’s planned dam over the river will either lead to the drying of the river, cause floods, or cause diversion of the river from India. The repeated references by the respondents of the ‘Chinese dams over upstream Brahmaputra’ shows they were aware of China’s activities in the Brahmaputra and its adverse repercussions. Moreover, the history of the Sino-Indian war and Chinese occupation of Tezpur town in Assam has created a mixed perception of fear as well as hope.b The details provided by the older respondents are especially interesting, as they might have witnessed the war themselves.c It also has a psychological implication for the few who are still apprehensive or are traumatised—fearing the capabilities of China to lead another border incursion in the Northeast.

The narratives of how ‘the Chinese army had reached Bomdila’ while the people of Tezpur had to be ‘shifted to the nearby town of Silghat,’ seems to dominate the memory of the respondents. Many respondents, while recollecting the memory of war as a part of their childhood, shared that they had to live in refugee camps in the wake of the military occupation by China. The question of unresolved border remains embossed within the memories of the survivors of war, apprehending future conflict. Apart from war memory, two other issues—the ‘China–Pakistan alliance’ to ‘destabilize India’ and ‘China’s support to militancy’ in the ‘northeastern parts of India,’ also found limited mention during the study. At the same time, the younger respondents, who did not witness the 1962 conflict, seemed to look beyond the past and strongly advocated ‘good and peaceful relations’ with

b In the 1962 Indo-China war, the Chinese army came down to the Tezpur town in the state of Assam after overrunning Indian Army posts at Tawang and Bomdila in Arunachal Pradesh. In the panic and confusion caused by the Chinese occupation, the residents fled their homes, turning Tezpur into a deserted town. c A question was posed on seeing the soldiers during 1962.

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China and felt that India should negotiate all the problems with China. The proposal of a mutually negotiated ‘treaty’ or ‘agreement’ with China on the issue of dam-building also reverberated with the people of Assam as it directly affected their lives. Moreover, Modi’s ‘warm reception in China’ during his visit in 2015 and personal warmth displayed between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has enthused the respondents and they perceived it as an indication of ‘improvement of ties’ between India and China.

As Sikkim does not have any current territorial dispute with China, the responses regarding China’s territorial ambitions are articulated in a subtle manner. While discussing territorial disputes, the respondents mentioned the ‘dispute over McMahon line and the 1914 agreement,’ ‘boundary dispute in the Karakoram Pass’ and contentious issues like ‘Dalai Lama,’ ‘Tibet’ and ‘1962 war.’ However, the apprehension is limited, and is probably similar to the larger narrative about China’s ever-increasing geostrategic as well as economic prowess. The illegal trade of banned Chinese goods has also made respondents feel uneasy, which is perceived as a challenge to the Indian economic prospects. Apart from this, a moderate apprehension persists due to the news reports and rumours in relation to ‘Chinese intrusion’ in the border areas. At the same time, prospects of better trade relations and trade agreements seemed to be a priority, which can further boost the open trade in Nathu La. The respondents were also keen to know how the ‘MOUs’ signed between the two countries during ‘Modi’s visit’ would further their border trade with China. Chinese products like toys, garments and electronic goods seem popular in the region as they are cheaper and better looking. Moreover, cultural exchanges like the visit of Indian actor Aamir Khan to China for the promotion of his movie, PK seemed to have grabbed the attention of Sikkim exclusively.

Another aspect that induces immense hope for cooperation with China is the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra—a religious pilgrimage undertaken by the Hindus, Jains and Buddhists at Mount Kailash, through Nathu La Pass in Sikkim. The other and older route is via Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand. The pilgrimage route via Sikkim is being viewed as a harbinger for stronger cultural ties and people-to-people contact between the two countries.

A small section of respondents of all the three states also absolved both India and China from the responsibility of the outstanding disputes. Some believe that it was a ‘failure’ on the part of the ‘colonial powers’ to ‘effectively’ draw the boundaries of the disputed sites that would have been ‘acceptable to both’ India and China. Another section of respondents blamed the ‘Western external powers’ for aggravating the misunderstandings between India and China for their own narrow ‘geopolitical and economic interests.’

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POINTS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The study revealed that some qualitative findings reflected nuances, which could not be captured by quantitative analysis. This section discusses the five major points of divergence that came up during the qualitative research.

ŸFear of Chinese Aggression

While the quantitative research findings indicate that only 14 percent respondents identified China as an expansionist country (See Figure 2.7) in relation to the question on overall impression of China, the narratives reflected a rather widely shared sense of paranoia, fear and mistrust towards China while discussing issues like border disputes (dispute over Arunachal finding recurring mention), the 1962 war, the dominance of Chinese goods in Indian market and China’s dam-building over Brahmaputra.

In order to make sense of these apparently contradictory findings, it is important to understand that the respondents, while choosing their options in the closed question on their impression of China, might have not been able to relate to the term or fully understand the connotations associated with the word ‘expansionist.’ It is possible that the respondents found the word ‘strong’ as much more common and familiar for describing China. So, it will not be imprudent to presume that while the majority of respondents (72 percent; See Figure 2.7) called China ‘strong’ instead of ‘expansionist,’ they actually might have used the term ‘strong’ to express their opinion on China with underlying negative connotations and not necessarily only indicating unqualified appreciation of Chinese multidimensional rise as a dominant global power. The paranoia and fear of Chinese military and economic might elaborately expressed in the narratives can stem from their perception of growing Chinese strength that can be military, economic and diplomatic.

In this context, it is interesting to note expressions such as ‘military expansion of China;’ ‘positioning of large number of soldiers across LAC;’ ‘China building roads to reach India;’ ‘Intrusion of Chinese army in Indian territory;’ ‘Chinese economy is booming,’ in the responses. These responses suggest that certain section of respondents are cognisant regarding Chinese aggressive military designs despite their reluctance to call China ‘expansionist’ in the closed question on the issue.

As the qualitative analysis records the fear of Chinese aggression, it is slightly contradictory from the quantitative findings about the overall impression of China (See Figure 2.7) as already discussed earlier. But as far as their views about India’s appropriate approach to the territorial disputes with China is concerned, both the quantitative and

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qualitative analysis recorded that the responses are largely pacifist. The considerable section of the respondents overwhelmingly chose peaceful methods of negotiation with China to resolve outstanding disputes over the use of force.

ŸDiscomfort Regarding Dominance of Chinese Goods

While the quantitative findings suggest that there is no fear amongst the respondents of Sikkim regarding the dominance of Chinese goods, the qualitative analysis records that there is a subtle and implicit allusion in some of the comments of the respondents like ‘monopoly of Chinese goods in Indian market;’ ‘Chinese goods do not come legally. Indian markets are flooded with electronic goods despite the ban in some places’ that indicate their discomfort regarding the rapid spread of Chinese goods in the Indian markets.

ŸUnease over China–Pakistan Relations

The quantitative analysis indicates there isn’t much concern about China’s friendship with Pakistan among the respondents from Arunachal Pradesh (See Figure 2.15). This may not be the actual case as exact quantification of the responses recorded by the respondents might not have been possible completely in the quantitative analysis. Hence, it would be incorrect to believe that the respondents from Arunachal have been totally silent on the issue. Responses to few unstructured questions indicate the China–Pakistan nexus as a source of concern. It comes out clearly in the qualitative analysis of questions which addressed this concern, though in a limited manner. Expressions like ‘helping Pakistan over nuclear and missile technology;’ ‘Supporting enemies of India like Pakistan and Bangladesh’ used by the people of Arunachal clearly show their concern.

ŸConcerns over Brahmaputra River Dispute and Construction of Dams not Confined to Assam

The river dispute found frequent mention in the quantitative analysis of the responses from Assam. However, this overlooks the fact that despite not identifying it as a problem between the two countries explicitly, quite a few respondents from Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim did register some discomfort in the open-ended responses. Expressions like ‘river dispute;’ ‘China is building a hydropower project on Brahmaputra’ found place in the responses in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh which indicates some concern regarding the issue.

ŸDissatisfaction with India due to its Inability to Resolve the Disputes with China

Despite the quantitative findings revealing that a considerable section of respondents found both, India and China, responsible for the outstanding territorial and river disputes

37 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

between the two countries, it might not necessarily mean that the respondents are not threatened by the Chinese aggression. It is even possible that the respondents held India equally responsible due to its inability to adequately check Chinese activities or to resolve the outstanding dispute. Qualitative responses recorded fear of China and dissatisfaction with Indian government. Some responses suggest a sense of disappointment with the Indian government’s inability to resolve the issue. A few examples are listed as follows: “Government of India should take permanent solution to this issue or else local population will live in constant fear”; “Chinese claims not genuine”; “Indian government should deal seriously with the issue for the satisfaction of the people of the state”; “India should take the matter to different international bodies”; “Indian government should be more friendly with China and thus solve the border issue over AP.”

STATE-WISE OBSERVATIONS

This section will discuss the overall impressions of the residents of all the three states regarding China and India–China relations. Apart from analysing the questionnaire-based survey, the Focus Group Discussion at Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and Gangtok, Sikkim conducted by ORF researchers was taken into consideration. The narratives thus collected did not perceive China in a similar fashion across the three states. To make better sense of the key issues, this section also intends to analyse the frequency of the key words used by the respondents.

Arunachal Pradesh

Researchers visited Itanagar, Bomdila, Tawang and Bumla and met common people, experts, media persons and entrepreneurs, all of who seemed to be concerned about China’s outstanding territorial claims over the region. This was evident as this contentious issue coupled with the 1962 war memory, predominates the narrative of the respondents. It is in this context that China is perceived as relatively more aggressive and threatening in Arunachal Pradesh than in the other two states. It is interesting to observe that the people of the states identified China as a ‘Communist,’ ‘non-democratic’ and ‘aggressive’ state3. The interviewees also seemed concerned about the Chinese policy of issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh and expressed their opinion against such a policy that they felt, might alienate the people of Arunachal Pradesh from rest of India. They also attributed the stapled visa issue to India’s inability in checking China from doing so.4 People’s fear further gained ground due to the increasing military and economic strength of China. However, the field visit revealed that the feeling towards China is not entirely similar across the state. The people from older generation shared their memories of the presence of People's Liberation Army (PLA) in their area during the conflict of 1962. While narrating

38 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

those days, they spoke of the positive role of the PLA in assisting in their survival. Those who were forced to leave their land due to the outbreak of conflict, found their properties left unharmed by the PLA. According to them, ‘Chinese did not destroy civilian property.’5

Besides the primary concern over the issue of territoriality, people were also aware of the historical ethnic linkages between India and China and the other dimensions of India–China relations. For instance, the age-old close relationship between the people of Tawang and Tibet (independent of China) continues.6,7

The interviewees in Arunachal Pradesh also showed interest in the Border Personnel meetings (BPMs) that take place between the armies of the two countries (formally started in 2013) to resolve disputes and improve ties at five major meeting points—two in Ladakh, one in Sikkim, and two in Arunachal Pradesh. In the course of the interviews, two notable observations regarding the BPMs were found. First, while the participants in such meetings from the Indian side comprise army personnel and civilians, only members of the Chinese army attend the meetings. Second, the interviewees felt that in such meetings, the Chinese come in luxury cars, and build good roads only near the meeting points in order to create a false impression of prosperity as opposed to India.8

Modi’s 2015 visit to China appeared to be a source of relief as it indicated a possibility of better relations between the two countries. The people also expressed their opinion that besides the trade relations, the initiation of the process of solving the border disputes would make Figure 3.1: Arunachal Pradesh: Identified Words their lives better. from Expressions of the Respondents

From the pictographic representation (See Figure 3.1), it is evident that border disputes remain a matter of concern for the people of Arunachal Pradesh, as it is linked to Chinese military activities and stapled visa issue. However, the figure also makes it clear that the responses revealed the importance of resolving the mentioned disputes through ‘agreements’ and ‘opening’ of borders.

Assam

In Assam, the researchers visited Guwahati and Tezpur and found that the respondents appeared to be relatively more relaxed regarding China’s aggressive demeanour. The older

39 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

generation recalled the India–China war with pain as well as satisfaction. While the sudden disruption of the 1962 war caused pain, the satisfaction was how the Indian government paid attention to the region in the aftermath of the Chinese aggression. This was reflected in the narratives as well. It was revealed that the people “have seen the development of Indian army which is now prepared to take on any kind of Chinese 9 onslaught.” Besides, dam-building activities Figure 3.2: Assam: Identified Words from over the Brahmaputra appeared to have Expressions of the Respondents strongly drawn the attention of the people of the state as it might directly affect their lives.

In the pictorial depiction (See Figure 3.2), respondents of Assam express their concerns through words like Brahmaputra dam issue, 1962 war and Tezpur, along with some focus on the China–Pakistan alliance and Chinese support to insurgency in the Northeast; but, at the same time, the respondents advocated for peace between the two countries through agreements and ‘MOUs.’

Sikkim

In Sikkim, the researchers visited Gangtok, Nathu La (India–China border) along with Lachung and Lachen situated in North Sikkim. The feeling of animosity or fear for China was almost absent in the findings of the survey as well as field visits, as there is no major outstanding dispute with China. Moreover, the open border trade at Nathu La had been welcomed enthusiastically by the residents, and it has facilitated people-to-people contact across the border. While interacting with traders, their enthusiasm and optimism about the opening up of the pilgrimage route for the Mansarovar Yatra was visible as they believed it would fetch more goods from both sides. People seemed to be hopeful about further economic cooperation with China as they feel it would bring economic prosperity in the region. According to a study published in The Telegraph based on researchers’ field visit, “Although the border is open for four days a week, the dumping of goods is very sporadic.”10 Indian traders make payments in rupees and the Chinese in yuan. Since ATM facilities exist in hilly terrain, traders express a desire to have currency exchange units right at the dumping centres to facilitate smoother transactions. People admit that Chinese blankets and woollens have saved them the time and energy expended on knitting them for one whole season or travelling all the way to Siliguri to buy them. But they also talk about the

40 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

sub-standard quality and poor longevity of the products. From this point of view, it may be inferred that ‘khasa ka saman’ (Chinese goods) has a limited market penetration potential, and people tend to buy them only on a trial basis. A sense of loss of indigenous industries prevails among the people as Gangtok markets are flooded with ‘khasa ka saman’ which far outnumbers the Figure 3.3: Sikkim: Identified Words from indigenous ones. Traders and tourism sector Expressions of the Respondents representatives are optimistic about the opening of the Nathu La Pass for pilgrimage. They are also appreciative of the low cost of the registration of traders and government support. However, the unpredictable weather and the hilly terrain make seamless trade difficult. Locals also revealed that traders who travel to China’s Rinchengang mention the four-lane road that leads from Nathu La to Rinchengang, compared to the deplorable road conditions on the Indian side.11

Figure 3.3 shows that the expressions used by the respondents of Sikkim and the issues raised by them reflect the absence of perceptible fear and paranoia. The emphasis on trade in Nathu La and the Mansarovar pilgrimage route have captured their imagination as far as India–China relations are concerned. Moreover, domestic issues like earthquake and shipwreck in China or Aamir Khan’s visit to China also find mention, which identifies the relaxed nature of their perception about China.

Despite the apprehension regarding some disputed areas, the people of all the three states strongly supported enhanced collaboration between China and India as they feel China is a ‘rising power in Asia’ (Table 3.1). Thus, more cooperation with China brings hope for better economic, technological and educational opportunities, apart from trade opportunities.

41 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 3.1: Overall State-wise Observations Based on Qualitative Analysis

Arunachal Pradesh Assam Sikkim

- Viewed all outstanding - Pr edominant expressions - Cert ain section aware of disputes between India in relation to “Rise of China’s domestic issues in and China with suspicion China,” “C hina’s relation to political towards China’s aggressive demeanour,” system, laws in family intentions but Chinese growth also planning and disasters viewed in positive light - Despite fear, memories - Consi derable section held of 1962 not always - Men tion of river disputes optimistic view about negative and creation of dams on China due to economic Brahmaputra and cultural interactions - Narratives predominantly about - A n underlying sense of - A sizeable portion Chinese territorial claims suspicion due to disputes mentioned border over the state and paranoia about disputes as a problem

Chinese intentions between India and China

- Blamed China for issuing

stapled visas - Memory of Chinese - Urge for peaceful

aggression still present, negotiation of

- Happy with Modi’s visit especially among the outstanding disputes

to China to strengthen older respondents from between India and China. bilateral ties but urge Tezpur Desire for strengthening resolution for commercial and outstanding border - Substantial section economic exchanges disputes emphasised on between the countries, cooperation and peaceful despite the fear of relations between India dominance of Chinese and China products in Indian markets

42 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

ENDNOTES

1. China has been making territorial claims over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. To further reinforce its claim, it is issuing special visas only to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh, which is different from the visas that China issues to Indian citizens of other states, claiming that the Arunachalese are China’s own people. 2. Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Understanding China Part 1: India’s Media Perception of China: Analysis of Editorials, Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, 2016.

3. Interview with Official, District Administration, Tawang, 25 May 2015; Journalist, All India Radio, Tawang, 24 May 2015; Official, Department of Planning, Itanagar, 18 May 2015.

4. Interview with a representative of People’s Party of Arunachal Pradesh, 18 May 2015.

5. Focused Group Discussion, Bomdila, 27 May 2015.

6. In the course of the interviews, it was found that the respondents, while discussing their historical ties with Tibet, dissociated themselves from China and highlighted the fact that Tibet did not join China, but was instead annexed by China.

7. Interview with Official, Department of Planning, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, 18 May 2015; an entrepreneur, 27 May 2015.

8. Interview with Official, District Administration, Tawang, 25 May 2015; Nawang Choidak, Announcer, All India Radio, Tawang, 25 May 2015.

9. Interview with Chandan Sharma, Professor, Department of Sociology, Tezpur University, Tezpur, 30 May 2015.

10. Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Swagata Saha, “How to Listen to Nathu La,” The Telegraph, 30 May 2015, https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/how-to-listen-to-nathu-la/cid/1440897.

11. Focused Group Discussion with transporters, Gangtok, 20 April 2015.

43 44 CONCLUSION Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

n ORF Kolkata’s 2018 study, Understanding China Part 2: Regional Media’s Perception of China: Analysis of Select Editorials from The Assam Tribune and The Arunachal Times the I researchers examined the editorial pieces of The Assam Tribune and The Arunachal Times between 2012 and 2014 to determine the perception of China that these two newspapers were projecting to their readers. The themes that were addressed most often by the editorial pieces were ‘China as rising power,’ followed by ‘India–China border issues.’ The Arunachal Times wrote more editorial pieces on borders, and The Assam Tribune focused more on the subject of China’s rising power. The researchers identified the type of perception and the degree of intensity with which it was projected. The findings showed that when The Arunachal Times was writing negative editorial pieces, it was doing so with a lot more assertion than when it was making a positive point about China. In the case of The Assam Tribune, meanwhile, both its positive and negative editorial pieces tended to be more moderate in tone. Both publications received more negative editorial pieces than positive ones.a

The present survey found popular thinking to be different from that of the media. More respondents, while identifying the border as the most important issue between India and China, tended to harbour a ‘moderate’ or ‘soft’ view of China and advocated a reasoned approach for India towards China: China may not be a friend yet, but neither does it need to be considered an enemy. Overall, the survey showed the respondents’ positive view of China, which is in contrast to the negative view displayed by the regional media. This calls for further research on the media’s reach towards shaping the views of its readers.

Earlier surveys and studies discussed in this report’s introduction almost uniformly found their respondents saying that China’s rise was a ‘zero sum’ proposition for India. The respondents largely harboured the least favourable opinion on China compared to several other countries and considered China as India’s ‘biggest external challenge.’ Hoffmann’s

a Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Understanding China Part 2, Indian Regional Media’s Perception of China: Analysis of Select Editorials from The Assam Tribune and The Arunachal Times, Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, 2018, 16–17. Incidentally, the national media was also negative, but proved to be less negative than regional media. See also, Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Understanding China Part 1: India’s Media Perception of China: Analysis of Editorials, Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, 2016.

45 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

study, in particular, based on interviews with India’s foreign policy elite found a ‘mainstream position’ between the binary positions of China is hostile/China is not hostile, which considers China not a threat in the short run but presenting uncertain future in the long term. Overall, therefore, these studies found a negative image of China amongst their Indian respondents.

The present survey is different on several counts: first, the respondents are focused in three Northeastern states; second, the sample size is small; third, the analysis has classified the sampled population on a number of attributes to examine variations, rather than using an undifferentiated sample as in the cited surveys; and finally, the statistical presentation is supported by a qualitative assessment of the data.

This study of three Northeastern states found the respondents to have a considerably less negative impression of China. Indeed, the respondents—across states and variables—suggested that China is not likely to apply force to settle its border issues with India, that negotiations will be the best way forward for India, and that China is more a strong country rather than an expansionist one. At the same time, the respondents expressed awareness about China’s expansionist activities and expressed apprehension about it, rather than paranoia. Only the older age group in the sample almost consistently deviated from the views of most of the respondents. When asked about their policy recommendations, respondents in all past surveys and this present one, were largely hesitant to do so; while they had their views and shared them with the researchers, the respondents were unwilling to recommend policies for the future.

Overall, this survey found a generally positive perception of China amongst the respondents in the three Northeastern states. This finding shows that the mindset of the people living in India’s border regions is different from that of the country’s foreign policy elite. This calls for further research into the subject.

46 About the Authors

Rakhahari Chatterji, Ph.D. (Chicago) is Former Adviser at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata. He is a former Professor in Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Calcutta. Prof. Chatterji was also Visiting Fellow, Political Science and Associate, Committee on South Asian Studies, University of Chicago; Visiting Fellow, Political Science at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and University of Virginia (Charlottesville); and Emeritus Fellow, UGC. He has authored and edited several books, in addition to contributing numerous papers and review articles to books, journals, newspapers and websites. He specialises in International Relations, Comparative Politics, Indian Politics and South Asia. His recent publications include “Para-Diplomacy: Concept and Context” (co-authored), India Quarterly 73, no. 4, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 2017; West Bengal under the Left (co-edited), Routledge, 2019; and “Rethinking Regionalism: The Idea of China-South Asia Trans-Himalayan Regional Cooperation,” ORF Occasional Paper, December 2019.

Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the Neighbourhood Initiative of Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata. She is the coordinator of the research project “Proximity to Connectivity.” She specialises in South Asia, refugees, forced migration, and women in conflict zones. She is the recipient of the Public Service Broadcasting Trust Senior Media Fellowship (2007) and the Kodikara Award from the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo (1998–99). Anasua was also ICSSR Post-Doctoral Fellow (2004–06) at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (New Delhi) and Visiting Fellow at The Maison des Sciences de I’Homme (Paris). Her recent publications include “India–Myanmar Borderlands: Ethnicity, Security and Connectivity” (co-edited), 2020; “Connecting Nations: India and Southeast Asia” (co-edited), 2019; “State of Being Stateless” (co-edited), 2015; “Women in Indian Borderlands” (co-edited), 2011.

Ambar Kumar Ghosh is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata. His research interests include Indian Democracy and Institutions, Constitutional Law, Political Leadership, Citizenship and Migration Studies. He is pursuing his PhD at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He previously served as a Guest Faculty at the Department of Political Science, Siliguri College and the Department of Political Science, Salesian College (West Bengal). He obtained his Master’s degree from the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata in 2017. Ambar completed his Baccalaureate at the Department of Political Science, Scottish Church College, Kolkata in 2015.

47 48 ANNEXURE

ANNEXURE - 1

FIELD WORK AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMMES

In order to conduct the survey, four eminent institutions of higher learning were selected in order to get local assistance and team of surveyors for conducting the field work. Professor Durga Prasad Chettri, Department of Political Science, University of Sikkim, Professor Nani Bath, Department of Political Science, Rajiv Gandhi University, Itanagar, Dr Pahi Saikiya, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Guwahati and Professor Chandan Kumar Sharma, Department of Sociology, Tezpur University were contacted for conducting the survey. With the inputs from nodal contact persons in all four segments, a survey sheet (questionnaire) comprising open ended and close ended questions was drafted cutting across generic question as well as region specific questions in order to decipher the public perception of China in these regions. After completion of drafting the survey sheets a dedicated team of 28 surveyors ( 7 members roughly in each team) comprised majorly PhD and Mphil scholars with few post-graduate students was formed from each of the respective universities for conducting the field survey. Consequently, an Orientation workshop was conducted for every survey team separately in all the four universities to share the aim, purpose and deliverables of this study. The surveyors were also trained in the workshop how to conduct interviews for the survey.

100 survey sheets were distributed in every state for the field survey. In every segment, the survey was mostly confined within urban and semi-urban locations. In few months time, the filled in survey sheets were received from the nodal contact persons and out of these sheets, the complete and the usable questionnaires were separated from the flawed ones. Thereby the final number of complete survey sheets those were used for the analysis remains 246 including 90 entries from Sikkim, 82 from Assam and 74 from Arunachal respectively.

DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

The data have been analysised both in quantitative and qualitative ways through collaborative interactions. The collation, coding and quantification of the data have been done by using SPSS. In the process of data quantification Mr. Suprio Basu of Centre for Studies in Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi has been in charge. Later the quantitative analysis of collected responses takes shape on the basis of tables framed following SPSS.

49 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

The responses collected from the filled – in questionnaires are analysed qualitatively keeping the fact in consideration that the absoluteness of the numerical depiction of human perception might show us some straight jacket findings. It is also important in this context to understand the detailed nuances and complex intricacies of the multi-layered and over-lapping nature of perception as human behavior and opinion is the subject of present study. In order to do so the researchers specially examined and analysed the open ended questions and usages of words. However, it should be clarified that qualitative assessment is not an attempt to override the quantitative analysis rather to complement the previous findings.

50 ANNEXURE - 2

It contains the general questions used for the survey in all the three states

INTRODUCTION OF INTERVIEWER

This interview will be conducted for preparing a report of Observer Research Foundation’s project on Understanding Public Perception: India and China. This study is not connected to any government department, political party or other agency.

Confidentiality of the interview will be strictly maintained. No names or reference will be attributed to any person who will agree to take part in this brief interview.

Questionnaire for the respondents of all the three states

1. BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENTS

(Instruction for Q101 to Q103 – Please note the name of the currently residing village/town/ district of the respondent. In case, the respondent family lives somewhere else, note the name of the state/city/town/village or district of the same. In case the respondent is working in the current location and lives/belongs to somewhere else, also note the same.)

101. Where do you stay? a) Village/Town ______b) District ______

102. If migrated, then for how long you are living in the present location? a) less than year b)______number of years

103. Choose the age group you belong to: a) Below 40 b) Above 40

51 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

104. Sex a) Male b) Female c) Third gender

(Instruction for Q. 106- Please note if other than any of these options. For e.g. University, etc.)

105. I believe you had some opportunity of going to school. Could you tell us up to which level did you study? a) Up to Primary (Low) b) Up to Higher Secondary (Medium) c) College and Above (High)

106. May I ask you what do you do for your livelihood? a) Salaried b) Professional c) Agriculture d) House Wife

107. What is your approximate monthly family income? a) Below 25,000 (Low) b) 25,000- 50,000/- (Medium) c) Above 50,000 (High)

2. MEDIA RELATED QUESTIONS

201. Do you read newspaper? a) Yes b) No

202. Do you listen to radio? a) Yes b) No

203. Do you see television? a) Yes b) No

204. Which item/s you like most in T.V.? a) Entertainment b) News c) Sports d) Other

205. Which item/s you like to hear most in radio? a) Entertainment b) News c) Sports d) Other

52 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

206. Which items you like most in newspaper? a) News related to entertainment b) News related to politics c) Sports d) Other

3. SALIENT ISSUES BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

(Instruction for Q. 301: Take down the answer serially in order of the country/s the respondent mentions)

301. India has many neighbours around this place such as, Nepal, Myanmar, China, Bhutan and Bangladesh. About which of these countries you hear most?

(Instruction for Q. 302.- This is an open-ended question. Please take down the answer)

302. Could you please share what have you heard recently about China?

(This is an open-ended question. Please take down answer)

(Instruction for Q. 303: The respondent may agree more than one, please note all serially)

303. When we talk about China, what impression comes to your mind? a) China as a rich country b) China as a strong country c) China as a expansionist country

304. Have you heard anything about India having problems with China? a) Yes b) No c) not sure

53 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

(Instruction for Q. 305 – This is an open ended question. Take down the answer. While taking down the answer, if you feel the respondent is diverting from the subject of survey or has not understood the question, then suggest the respondent with following clues as possible problems: smuggling, territorial dispute, and dispute over river water, too many Chinese goods in India, any other. Take down the response of the respondent serially: in order of what s/he said in response to this question)

305. If answer to the previous question is yes, then please ask: Can you share with us some of these problems?

(This is an open-ended question. Please take down answer)

306. Probably you know, for such problems usually some country is more responsible than the other or sometimes both are responsible. In the case of the problem/s you mentioned between India and China, which country is more responsible? a) India b) China c) both India and China d) not sure

4. ECONOMY AND TRADE

401. In your local market, do you find Chinese good? a) Yes b) No c) Haven’t noticed

402. If answer to the previous question is yes, have you ever bought such Chinese goods yourself? a) Yes b) No c) Not sure

54 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

(Instruction for Q. 403 -Ask Q 403 to respondents who have opted for ‘yes’ in Q402. )

403. If yes, do you buy Chinese goods because: a) You find them better in quality. b) Chinese goods cheaper. c) Chinese goods look better. d) Not sure

404. Given a chance, which of the following country’s currency you would like to use apart from Indian rupees here? a) Nepal b) Myanmar c) China d) Bhutan e) Bangladesh

(Instruction for Q. 405– The respondent may identify more than one option. Please tick following the response of the respondent)

405. Have you ever visited any of the following neighbouring countries? (Record the most visited) a) Nepal b) Myanmar c) China d) Bhutan e) Bangladesh

406. Sometimes we hear that China has claimed the territory where you reside. Do you have any idea? a) Yes b) No c) Not sure

407. If yes, can you tell us about what have you heard/seen?

(This is an open-ended question. Please take down answer)

5. OVERALL IMPRESSION OF CHINA

501. Overall, would you describe China as: a) Friend of India b) Not a friend of India c) Enemy of India d) No Idea

55 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

502. Towards China, would you like India to be: a) More friendly b) Leave it as it is c) Be more assertive

503. Do you believe China can forcibly take over our territory? a) Possible b) Possible but unlikely c) Not Possible at all d) Don’t Know

504. In your opinion, what should India do in view of China’s claims? a) Use force to stop China b) Negotiate with China c) Do Nothing d) Don’t Know

Field Note Interviewer’s Observations

FEW POSSIBLE GUIDELINES

1. Location of interview and place of the respondent (eg. market place, home, living area, bedroom, overall idea about the mahaulla, village- its socio-economic, religious or political nature, its distance from India-China border, etc.) 2. Overall attitude of the respondent(eg. cynical/apathetic, hesitant, less informed, frank/candid, articulate, etc.) 3. Major/recurrent point being made by the respondent throughout the interview. 4. Any particular point which the respondent was unwilling to answer

______(Signature of Interviewer)

Time taken: ...... Date: ......

56 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

ANNEXURE - 3 THE LIST OF ALL DATA TABLES

Description of the Sample

Table 1: States by age group N=246

Age Low (Below 40) High (Above 40) States Total [197] [49]

Arunachal 81.1 (60) 18.9 (14) 100.0 Pradesh (74)

Assam (82) 67.1 (55) 32.9 (27) 100.0

Sikkim (90) 91.1 (82) 8.9 (8) 100.0

Total 80.1 19.9 100.0

Table 2: States by education N=246

Education High Low (Up to Medium (College and States Primary) (Up to Higher Total Above) [20] Secondary) [115] [111]

Arunachal 1.4 (1) 36.5 (27) 62.2 (46) 100.0 Pradesh

Assam 2.4 (2) 42.7 (35) 54.9 (45) 100.0

Sikkim 18.9 (17) 58.9 (53) 22.2 (20) 100.0

Total 8.1 46.7 45.1 100.0

57 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 3: States by occupation N=246

Occupation Professional Agriculture Salaried House Wife States Total (132) (11) (81) (22)

Arunachal 45.9 (34) 4.1 (3) 47.3 (35) 2.7 (2) 100.0 Prad esh

Assam 58.5 (48) 3.7 (3) 28.0 (23) 9.8 (8) 100.0

Sikkim 55.6 (50) 5.6 (5) 25.6 (23) 13.2 (12) 100.0

Total 53.7 4.5 32.9 8.9 100.0

Table 4: States by income N=246

Income Low Medium High States (Below Rs 25000) (Rs 25000-50000) (Above Rs 50000) Total [178] [44] [24]

Arunachal 55.4 (41) 25.7 (19) 18.9 (14) 100.0 Prad esh

Assam 65.9 (54) 23.1 (19) 11.0 (9) 100.0

Sikkim 92.9 (83) 6.1 (6) 1.1 (1) 100.0

Total 72.4 17.8 9.8 100.0

58 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 5: States by gender N= 246

Gender Female Third Gender States Male (122) Total (122) (2)

Arunachal 39.2 (29) 58.1 (43) 2.7 (2) 100.0 Prad esh

Assam 62.2 (51) 37.8 (31) 0 100.0

Sikkim 46.7 (42) 53.3 (48) 0 100.0

Total 49.6 49.6 0.8 100.0

Table 6: States by media exposure N=246

Media Exposure States Nil (22) Low (88) Moderate (74) High (62) Total Arunachal 2.7 (2) 40.5 (30) 24.4 (18) 32.4 (24) 100.0 Prad esh Assam 4.9 (4) 17.1 (14) 45.1 (37) 32.9 (27) 100.0 Sikkim 17.8 (16) 48.9 (44) 21.1 (19) 12.2 (11) 100.0 Total 8.9 36.7 30.1 25.2 100.0

Note: We wanted to measure the degree of exposure to political news of our respondents and to get that we asked if they see/hear/read political news from TV/Radio/Newspaper amongst other categories of news. Then we have picked up the level of exposure to political news in each of the categories of media and made the above table. Since it is appropriate to assume that many would be exposed to one or more of these, we scored them from zero to three to indicate no exposure to high exposure.

59 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 7: Countries heard most as their neighbor by states N= 246

List of Countries State Nepal Myanmar China Bhutan Ba ngladesh None Tota l (93) (1) (79) (4) (34) (35) Arunachal 9.5 (7) 0 48.6 (36) 1.4 (1) 4.1 (3) 36.4 100.0 Pradesh (27) Assam 22.0 (18) 0 37.8 (31) 0 36.6 (30) 3.6 (3) 100.0

Sikkim 75.6 1.1 (1) 13.3 3.3 (3) 1.1 (1) 5.6 (5) 100.0 (68) (12)

All 37.8 0.4 32.1 1.6 13.8 14.3 100.0

Table 8 Preference for currencies other than Indian currency by states N=246

List of Countries

State Nepal Myanmar China Bhutan Ban gladesh US Non e Tot al (73) (11) (71) (52) (12) (1) (26)

Arunachal 36.5 (27) 2.7 (2) 16.2 25.7 5.4 (4) 0 13.5 100.0 Pradesh (12) (19) (10) Assam 20.7 (17) 6.1 (5) 35.4 20.7 3.7 (3) 0 13.4 100.0

(29) (17) (11)

Sikkim 32.2 (29) 4.4 (4) 33.3 17.8 5.6 (5) 1.1 5.6 (5) 100.0 (30) (16) (1)

All 29.7 4.5 28.9 21.1 4.9 0.4 10.5 100.0

Table 9: Neighbouring countries visited by states N=246

List of Countries

State Nepal (81) Myanmar China Bhutan Bangladesh Never v Total (3) (7) (18) (25) (112)

Arunachal 20.3(15) 2.7 (2) 2.7 (2) 5.4 (4) 0.0 68.9 (51) 100.0 Pradesh

Assam 17.1(14) 0 4.9(4) 7.3 (6) 30.5 (25) 40.2 (33) 100.0

Sikkim 57.8 (52) 1.1 (1) 1.1 (1) 8.9 (8) 0.0 31.1 (28) 100.0

All 32.9 1.2 2.8 7.3 10.2 45.5 100.0

60 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 10: Type of country China is by age, education and media exposure N=246

Age Education Media Exposure

Responses Low High Low Medium High Nil Low Medium High (197) (49) (20) (115) (111) (22) (88) (74) (62)

China as a 69.5 79.5 63.2 72.6 71.2 54.5 73.6 77.0 71.0 strong (137) (39) (13 ) (84) (79) (11) (64) (57) (44) country

China as a 16.2 6.3 15.8 15.0 13.4 31.9 14.6 10.8 9.7 rich country (32) (3) (3) (17) (15) (8) (13) (8) (6)

China as an 14.3 14.2 21.0 12.4 15.4 13.6 11.8 12.2 19.3 expansionist (28) (7) (4) (14) (17) (3) (11) (9) (12) country

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 11: Reasons for buying Chinese goods by states N= 184

States

Arunachal Assam (54) Sikkim (76) All Pradesh (54) Better in Quality 9.2 (5) 7.4 (4) 5.3 (4) 7.1 (13) Cheaper 74.1 (40) 81.5 (44) 69.7 (53) 74.5(137) Look Better 11.1 (6) 9.3 (5) 21.1 (16) 14.6 (27) Chinese Goods 0 0 2.6 (2) 0.5 (1) Have Variety Not Sure 5.6 (3) 1.8 (1) 1.3 (1) 3.3 (6) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

61 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 12: Reasons for buying Chinese goods by age and income N= 184

Age Income Low High Low Medium High (154) (30) (133) (32) (19) Better in quality 7.8 (12) 3.3 (1) 5.3 (7) 6.3 (2) 21.1 (4) Cheaper 72.8 (112) 83.4 (25) 76.6 (102) 75.0 (24) 57.8 (11) Look Better 14.9 (23) 13.3 (4) 14.3 (19) 15.6 (5) 15.8 (3) Chinese goods have variety 0.6 (1) 0 0.8 (1) 0 Not Sure 3.9 (6) 0 3.0 (4) 3.1 (1) 5.3 (1) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 13: Reasons for buying Chinese goods by gender

N=184

Reason For Buying Male (88) Female (94) Third Gender (2) Chinese Goods Better in Quality 5.7 (5) 8.5 (8) 0 Cheaper 75.0 (66) 73.4 (69) 100.0 (2) Look Better 15.9 (14) 13.8 (13) 0 Goods provide 0 1.1 (1) 0 variety Not Sure 3.4 (3) 3.2 (3) 0 Total 100 100 100

62 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 14: Is China a friend of India? by states N=238

Responses

States Friend of India Not A Friend of Enemy of India No Idea Total (108) India (55) (72) (3)

Arunachal 40.5 (29) 20.9 (15) 38.6 (28) 0 100.0 Pradesh

Assam 30.4 (25) 29.3 (24) 39.1 (32) 1.2 (1) 100.0

Sikkim 64.3 (54) 19.0 (16) 14.3 (12) 2.4 (2) 100.0

All 45.4 23.1 30.2 1.3 100.0

Table 15: Is China a friend of India? by age, education and income N= 238

Responses Age Education Income

Low High Low Medium High Low Me dium High (192) (46) (19) (111) (108) (172) (42) (2 4)

Friend 49.0(94) 30.4(14) 42.1 (8) 46.8 (52) 44.5(4 8) 48.5(8 3) 42.9(1 8) 29.2(7) Not a Friend 22.4(43) 26.1(12) 31.6 (6) 22.6 (25) 22.2(24) 23.3(40) 19.0(8) 29.2(7)

Enemy 27.1(52) 43.5(20) 15.8 (3) 29.7 (33) 33.3(36) 26.7(46) 38.1(16) 41.6(10)

No idea 1.5(3) 0 10.5 (2) 0.9 (1) 0 1.5(3) 0 0

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Table 16: Is China a friend of India? by Media N=238

Media Exposure Responses Nil (21) Low (83) Medium (72) High (62) Friend of India 42.8 (9) 43.3 (36) 43.1 (31) 51.6 (32) Not a friend of India 14.3 (3) 30.2 (25) 26.4 (19) 12.9 (8) Enemy of India 33.4 (7) 26.5 (22) 29.2 (21) 35.5 (22) No Idea 9.5 (2) 0 1.3 (1) 0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

63 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 17: Perception of China in relation to India by Gender N=238

Gender Responses Male (119) Female (117) Third Gender (2) Friend of India 43.7 (52) 47.0 (55) 50.0 (1) Not a friend of India 23.6 (28) 22.2 (26) 50.0 (1) Enemy of India 31.9 (38) 29.0 (34) No Idea 0.8 (1) 1.8 (2) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 18: Awareness of India having problem with China by states N=246

Responses

State Yes (155) No (47) Not Sure (44) Total Arunachal Pradesh 67.6 (50) 16.2 (12) 16.2 (12) 100.0 (74) Assam 89.0 (73) 4.9 (4) 6.1 (5) 100.0 (82) Sikkim 35.6 (32) 34.4 (31) 30.0 (27) 100.0 (90) All 63.0 19.1 17.9 100.0

Table 19: Awareness regarding India-China disputes by age, education and media exposure N=246

Responses Age Education Media Exposure

Low High Low Medium High Nil Low Medium High (197) (49) (20) (115) (111) (22) (88) (74) (62)

Yes 58.4 81.6 45.0 63.2 76.6 36.4 51.1 70.3 80.6 (115) (40) (9) (73) (85) (8) (45) (52) (50)

No 20.8 12.2 35.0 12.6 12.6 45.5 21.6 17.6 15.5 (41) (6) (7) (14) (14) (10) (19) (13) (10)

Not Sure 20.8 6.2 20.0 24.4 10.8 18.1 27.3 12.1 3.9 (41) (3) (4) (28) (12) (4) (24) (9) (2)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

64 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 20: Problems with China by states N=132

Problems State Border China support China China build Total Dispute Pakistan captured big dam on (112) (5) Indian Market Brahmaputra (8) (7) Assam 78.1 (57) 5.5 (4) 8.2 (6) 8.2 (6) 100.0 (73) Sikkim 88.9 (8) 11.1 (1) 0 0 100.0 (9) Arunachal 94.0 (47) 0 3.2 (2) 2.8 (1) 100.0 (50) Pradesh Total 84.8 3.7 6.0 5.5 100.0

*(Only 132 out of 246 respondents responded to this question)

Table 21: Problems with China by age, education and income N=132

Age Education Income

Low High Low Medium High Low Medium High (94) (38) (3) (52) (77) (74) (34) (20)

Border 82.0 84.2 100.0 81.6 100.0 75.2 97.0 100.0 Dispute (77) (32) (3) (44) (77) (56) (33) (20)

China 5.0 5.2 5.4 6.0 - - Supporting (4) (2) (2) (4) Pakistan

China 7.0 7.8 7.3 9.0 3.0 - capturing (7) (3) (4) (7) (1) Indian Market

China building 6.0 2.8 2.5 9.0 - - big dams on (6) (1) (2) (7) Brahmaputra

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

65 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 22: The country that is more responsible for the problems N=197

States State India (12) China (81) Both (76) Not sure (28) Total Arunachal 7.2 (5) 50.7 (35) 31.9 (22) 10.2(7) 100.0 (69) Pradesh Assam 2.7 (2) 41.3 (31) 49.3 (37) 6.7 (5) 100.0 (75) Sikkim 9.4 (5) 28.3 (15) 32.1 (17) 30.2 (16) 100.0 (53) All 6.1 41.1 38.6 14.2 100.0 (197)

Table 23: The country that is more responsible for the problems by education, Income and Media exposure

N=197

Education Level Income Level Media Exposure Low Medium High Low Medium High No Low Medium High (11) (82) (104) (134) (40) (23) (11) (67 ) (61 ) (58 ) India 18.2 7.3 3.8 6.0 5.0 8.7 0 7.5 3.3 8.6 (2) (6) (4) (8) (2) (2) (5) (2) (5) China 36.4 41.5 41.3 42.5 32.5 47.8 45.4 35.8 42.6 44.8 (4) (34) (43) (57) (13) (11) (5) (24 ) (26 ) (26 ) Both 36.4 34.1 42.3 36.6 50.0 30.4 27.3 35.8 39.3 43.1 (4) (28) (44) (49) (20) (7) (3) (24 ) (24 ) (25 ) Not 9.0 17.1 12.6 14.9 12.5 13.1 27.3 20.9 14.8 3.5 Sure (1) (14) (13) (20) (5) (3) (3) (14 ) (9) (2) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0

66 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 24: The country more responsible for the problems by gender N=197

Gender

Male Female Third Gender (104) (91) (2) India 10.6 (11) 1.1 (1) 0 China 36.5 (38) 46.2 (42) 50.0 (1) Both 38.5 (40) 38.5 (35) 50.0 (1) Not Sure 14.4 (15) 14.2 (13) 0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 25: Possibility of territorial aggression by china by states N=154

Responses

Possible Possible but Not possible Don’t Know Total (31) unlikely (54) at all (48) (21) Arunachal 6.9 (5) 38.9 (28) 36.1 (26) 18.1 (13) 100.0 Pradesh Assam 31.7 (26) 31.7 (26) 26.8 (22) 9.8 (8) 100.0

*(This question was asked only to the respondents of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam )

67 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 26: Possibility of territorial aggression by China by age, education, income and media exposure N=154

Age Edu cation Income Media Exposure Low High Low Me dium High Low Me dium High No Low Medium High (115) (39) (61) (90) (3) (94) (37) (23) (6) (4 2) (5 5) (5 1)

Possible 9.6 51.3 0 23.0 18.9 20.2 18.9 (7) 21.7 0 16.7 27.3 17.6 (11) (20) (21) (1) (19) (5) (7) (15) (9)

Possible 40 20.5 33.3 32.7 36.7 31.9 37.8 43.5 16.7 40.5 34.5 33.3 but (46) (8) (20) (29) (1) (30) (14) (10) (1) (17) (19) (17) unlikely

Not 34.7 20.5 33.4 29.5 32.2 31.9 37.8 17.4 16.7 28.6 25.5 41.2

possible (40) (8) (21) (27) (1) (30) (14) (4) (1) (12) (14) (21) at all Don’t 15.7 7.7 33.3 14.8 12.2 16 5.5 17.4 66.6 14.2 12.7 7.9 know (18) (3) (20) (13) (15) (2) (4) (4) (6) (7) (4) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 *(This question was asked only to the respondents of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam )

Table 27: Possibility of territorial aggression by China by gender N=154

Gender

Male (78) Female (74) Third Gender (2) Total Possible 19.2 (15) 21.6 (16) 0 20.1 (31) Possible but 32.1 (25) 36.5 (27) 100 (2) 35.1 (54) Unlikely Not Possible at 37.2 (29) 25.7 (19) 0 31.2 (48) All Don’t Know 11.5 (9) 16.2 (12) 0 13.6 (21) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 *(This question was asked only to the respondents of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam )

68 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 28: What should India do in view of China’s claims by State N=154

Responses States Use force to Negotiate with Do Nothing Total stop China (33) China (99) (22) Arunachal 20.8 (15) 65.3 (47) 13.9 (10) 100.0 Pradesh Assam 22.0 (18) 63.4 (52) 14.6 (12) 100.0 All 21.4 64.3 14.2 100.0

Table 29: What should India do in view of China’s claims by age, Education and Income? N= 154

Age (in years) Education Income (in thousands)

Low High Low Medium High Low Medium High (115) (39) (61) (90) (3) (94) (37) (23) Use force to 20.9 23.1 29.5 14.4 66.7 24.5 18.9 13.0 stop China (24) (9) (18) (13) (2) (23) (7) (3) Negotiate 64.3 64.1 54.1 72.2 33.3 55.3 75.7 82.6 with China (74) (25) (33) (65) (1) (52) (28) (19) Do Nothing 0 2.6 1.6 0 0 1.1 0 0 (1) (1) (1) Don’t know 14.8 10.2 14.8 13.4 0 19.1 5.4 4.4 (17) (4) (9) (12) (18) (2) (1) Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

69 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 30: India’s response in view of Chinese claims by Gender N=154

Gender Responses Male (78) Female (74) Third Gender (2) Total (154) Use Force to stop 21.8 (17) 21.6 (16) 0 21.4 (33) China Negotiate With 65.4 (51) 62.2 (46) 100.0 (2) 64.3 (99) China Do Nothing 12.8 (10) 16.2 (12) 0 14.3 (22) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 31: India’s response in view of Chinese claims by media exposure N=154

Media Exposure

Responses Nil (6) Low (42) Medium (55) High (51) Total (154)

Use force to 33.3 (2) 33.3 (14) 12.8 (7) 19.6 (10) 21.4 (33) stop China

Negotiate With 16.7 (1) 54.8 (23) 72.7 (40) 68.6 (35) 64.3 (99) China

Do Nothing 50.0 (3) 11.9 (5) 14.5 (8) 11.8 (6) 14.3 (22)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 32: Approach towards China by State N=240

Responses

States More Leave it as Be more Total friendly (90) it is (58) assertive (92)

Arunachal 31.9 (23) 31.9 (23) 36.2 (26) 100.0 Pradesh Assam 37.8 (31) 8.5 (7) 53.7 (44) 100.0

Sikkim 41.9 (36) 32.6 (28) 25.6 (22) 100.0

70 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 33: Approach towards China by Age, Education and Income N=240

Age Education Income

Responses Low High Low Medium High Low Medium High (195) (45) (19) (113) (108) (174) (42) (24)

More 36.9 40.0 21.1 44.2 33.3 35.6 42.9 41.6 Friendly (72) (18) (4) (50) (36) (62) (18) (10)

Leave It as 27.2 11.1 42.1 26.6 18.5 29.3 14.2 4.2 it is (53) (5) (8) (30) (20) (51) (6) (1) Be more 35.9 48.9 36.8 29.2 48.2 35.1 42.9 54.2 assertive (70) (22) (7) (33) (52) (61) (18) (13)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 34: Approach towards China by Gender N=240

Gender

Responses Male Female Third Gender (117) (121) (2)

More Friendly 35.0 39.7 50.0 (41) (48) (1)

Leave it as it is 24.8 23.1 50.0 (29) (28) (1)

Be more assertive 40.2 37.2 0 (47) (45)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

71 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

Table 35: Approach towards China by Media N-240

Media Exposure

Responses Nil (22) Low (85) Medium (72) High (61)

More Friendly 27.3 (6) 35.3 (30) 41.7 (30) 39.3 (24)

Leave it as it is 22.7 (5) 36.5 (31) 15.3 (11) 18.0 (11)

Be more assertive 50.0 (11) 28.2 (24) 43.1 (31) 42.7 (26)

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

72 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

ANNEXURE - 4

Questions in the questionnaire which are related to state specific issues

1. ARUNACHAL PRADESH SPECIFIC QUESTION:

101. Would you agree with the view that China is damaging the Brahmaputra (Siang) river? a) Yes b) No c) Not Sure

(Instruction to Q. 102)- If answer to the previous question is yes, which of the following you agree with- a) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will dry up the river on our side b) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will cause floods on our side. c) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will pollute the river d) Any other (specify)______

103. Have you heard/seen Chinese soldiers coming to your place? a) Yes b) No c) Not Sure

104. If answer to the previous question is yes, Can you tell us whether? a) It is a normal thing b) They come here losing their way c) They come on their own without permission d) Any other (specify) e) No idea

105. Do you know anyone from your state having gone to China getting a different kind of visa? (Stapled/not stamped on their passports) a) Yes b) No c) Don’t Know

106. In your opinion, is it all right for people of your state to get a stapled visa? a) Stapled visa is ok b) No, they should get a visa like other citizen of India c) Don’t Know

73 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

107. Do you know why China gives visa to people of your state?

(This is an open-ended question. Please take down answer)

1. ASSAM SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

101. Would you agree with the view that China is damaging the Brahmaputra (Siang) river? a) Yes b) No c) Not Sure

102- If answer to the previous question is yes, which of the following you agree with-

a) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will dry up the river on our side b) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will cause floods on our side. c) What China is doing to the Brahmaputra will pollute the river d) Any other (specify)______

103. Have you heard/seen Chinese soldiers coming into Tezpur during 1962 war? a) Yes b) No c) Not Sure

104. Are you afraid that China may do it again? a) Yes b) No c) Not Sure

1. SIKKIM SPECIFIC QUESTION:

101. Have you heard about the Nathula Pass which is close from here? a) Yes b) No c) Not sure

74 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

(Instruction to Q.102 )– The respondent may identify more than one option. Please take down the response of the respondent serially)

102. If answer to the previous question is yes, can you tell us anything about it? a) It is a place of India-China border trade b) It is a place of tourist interest c) Any other (specify) d) no idea

75 Understanding China: Voices from India's Northeast

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