Rayuwa MIDTERM QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
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Food and Nutritional Security Program PROSAN- Rayuwa MIDTERM QUALITATIVE EVALUATION ---------- October 2009 Final Report Mimi Gaudreau, Agronomist, Team Leader * Abdoulaye Mohamadou, Social Anthropologist Dr Djibo Jaharou, Public Health Specialist Robin Kraft, English Translation * Mimi Gaudreau was Team Leader for the in-country data collection and initial report drafting. After a loss of contact with Mimi Gaudreau after her departure from Niger, national consultants Abdoulaye Mohamadou and Dr. Djibo Jaharou completed the final draft. 1 ACCRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS ASC Community Health Agent AOP Annual Operation Plan CSI Integrated Health Center CVA Village Development Committee CCC Communication for Behavior Change COSAN Health Committee COGES Management Committee CSCOM Health Community Center CRS Catholic Relief Services CS Cooperating Sponsors (Africare; CRS, HKI, CARE) DAP Development Activity Plan DIP Detailed Implementation Plan ECD District Support Team FFW Food For Work FFP Food for Peace GAA Food Support Group GSA Breastfeeding Support Group HKI Helen Keller International IB Bamako Initiative IDA Health II project funded by the World Bank IEB Immediate and Exclusive Breastfeeding IEC Information, Education and Communication INRAN Niger National Agronomic Research Institute ISA Food Security Initiative MYAP Multi-Year Assistance Program ONG Non-Governmental Organization PEV Extended Vaccination Program PN Project Number SCVM Households Livelihood Security SIS Health Information System S&N Health and Nutrition SCAP-RU Community Early Warning System and Responses to Emergencies SRO Oral Rehydration Drink SSS Salted and Sweet Drink USAID United States Agency for International Development 2 ACCRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS…………………………………………….. 2 CONTENTS …………………………………………………………………………….. 3 1 – Introduction…………………………………………………………………………. 4 1.1 Background ………………………………………………………………………… 4 1.2 MYAP Goal and objectives……………………………………………………………….. 6 1.3. Evaluation objectives …………………………………………………………. 6 1.4. Methodology………………………………………………………………………… 8 2. Program Results……………………………………………………………………… 9 2.1 SO1: Livelihoods of vulnerable HHs are protected and enhanced by2011 through increased agro-pastoral production and improved agro-enterprises 9 2.1.1 Impact Indicators……………………………………………………… 9 2.1.2 Intermediate Results…………………………………………………….. 12 2.1.3 Recommendations……………………………………………………… 14 2.2 Health/Nutrition…………………………………………………………………….. 20 2.2.1 Impact indicators ….................................................................................... 20 2.2.2 Intermediate Results ……………………………………………………… 22 2.2.4 Conclusion and general recommendations ……………………….…….. 27 2.3 Risks prevention and management ………………………………………………. 30 2.3.1 Impact Indicators………………………………………………………… 30 2.3.2 Intermediate Results ……….……………………………………………… 30 2.3.3 Community assets are protected during shocks ……………………… 34 2.3.4. Recommendations………………………………………………………. 35 3. Program operational strategy and management………………………………….. 36 3.1. Operational strategy ................................................................................................. 36 3.2. Project Management………………………………………………………………… 38 3.3. Monitoring and Evaluation………………………………………………………… 38 3.4. Recommendations………………………………………………………………….. 39 4. Cross-cutting Issues………………………………………………………………… 39 4.1 Gender………………………………………………………………………………. 39 4.2. Partnership/participation…………………………………………………………… 40 4.2.1. Partnership with local NGOs…….…………………………………….. 41 4.2.2. Partnership with the technical services……….………………..……… 41 4.2.3. Partnership with the Commune………………………………….……. 42 4.3. Recommendations………………………………………………………………….. 43 4.4. Literacy and Food for Training……………………………………………………. 43 4.4.1 Literacy……………………………………………………………………. 43 4.4.2. Recommendations………………………………………………………… 45 4.4.3. Food for Training…………………………..…………………….…….. 46 4.4.4. Recommendations………………………………………………………... 47 4.4.5. Cash for Work…………………………………………………………… 47 4.4.6. Recommendations……………………………………………………….. 49 3 5. Sustainability………………………………………………………………………… 49 6. Lessons Learned……………………………………………………………………… 50 Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………. 50 4 1. Introduction In November, 2006, the consortium of international non-governmental organizations Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Cooperative for Relief Everywhere (CARE) and Helen Keller International (HKI) began to implement a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Food For Peace (FFP) five year Multi-Year Assistance Program (MYAP) in the Dosso, Tahoua, and Zinder Regions of Niger. This Food Security and Nutrition Program - PROSAN (Programme de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle) was designed to consolidate and expand activities from a successfully implemented Food Security Initiative in which the same organizations worked together to achieve project objectives. 1.1 Background The cooperating sponsors (CSs) established a detailed implementation plan (DIP) based on FFP resource levels in each of the five DIP years. For most of FY07 and FY08, the regional teams were unable to implement the project activities as originally planned. In FY08, FFP was unable to supply rice to be sold for project financing due to increased purchase and distribution costs, thereby reducing the amount of project funding from rice monetization as well as the financial contribution of the Government of Niger (GoN). Later in FY08, FFP added a cash contribution to line item 202e in order to replace the resources lost due to reduced revenue from rice monetization, effectively increasing the general budget. The political decision by the GoN in 2007 to ban Food For Work (FFW) for non-emergency programming added another dimension to project implementation and to FFP resource distribution decisions. The CSs were forced to reconsider their strategies, SO1 in particular given its strong dependence on FFW. When the GoN made its decision, the first shipment of commodities had already been received and was warehoused in Niamey. As a result, the consortium had to renegotiate the project with FFP and the GoN, and simultaneously find a satisfactory way to distribute the commodities before spoilage. To the credit of all partners (CS, GoN, FFP) an agreement was made to distribute these commodities as emergency aid to flood victims, hospitals and the handicapped; the GoN agreed to allow direct distribution as Food For Training (FFT) in order to meet the requirements of FFP and retain the ability to raise funds through commodity monetization. In the time it took to negotiate this agreement, the field teams missed nearly two agricultural seasons. The teams were also obliged to reconsider the infrastructure aspect of the program, which would now be executed under Cash for Work (CFW). The CSs' lack of experience with CFW led to frustration concerning the implementation of transparent systems. This in turn contributed to delays in health center construction/rehabilitation, road repair and land rehabilitation. After much discussion and intense negotiations, the consortium submitted a program amendment replacing FFW with CFW and FFT, while adding a new literacy component. However, the numerous modifications of the implementation plan, the impact and monitoring indicators, as well as the continued uncertainty about the future of the project led to low moral among project staff. Most of the regional teams indicated that they only really began PROSAN implementation starting in October 2008, the beginning of FY09. 5 The loss of FFW alone could have crippled the program in the absence of a new strategy. The inability of FFP to provide commodities for monetization in FY08, and their subsequent replacement with cash only at the end of the fiscal year, presented a major challenge to the consortium. Despite this, the consortium has shown a surprising ability to adapt and rebound in the face of this difficult situation, in large part because it could fall back upon its experience from the 2000-2006 Development Activity Program (DAP). Knowing it could no longer count on monetization funds after FY09, CARE emphasized activities with relatively high cash burn rates. This included restocking livestock and setting up and stocking cereal banks, as well as activities using CFW funds (e.g. rehabilitation of health facilities, road repair, and land rehabilitation). From FY08 to the present, CARE has disbursed more than 33,000,000 CFA for CFW alone. CRS was less aggressive in submitting a budget for the increased 202e line item and their field teams were still incomplete until November 2008. HKI relied heavily on other projects in the PROSAN regions, because its PROSAN activities depended on having its field agents hired by CRS. When budgetary constraints limited the recruitment and mobility of HKI field agents, this impacted HKI in the field as well. There can be no doubt that the consortium successfully adapted to the financial constraints and rapidly changing political context it faced in FY07 and FY08. The program is now fully operational, and according to the results of the quantitative mid-term evaluation, it is fairly well positioned to reach most of its targets at the end of the program in September 2011 if there are no additional delays in the delivery of commodity shipments. The PROSAN continues the work of 2000-2006 DAP by consolidating its achievements to date and extending its activities to new sites. It started in 2007 in the wake of the 2005 food security crisis in Niger. Although PROSAN's general orientation has not changed markedly, there