DOCSLIB.ORG

Die Reden Des Dion Von Prusa Über Sklaverei Und Freiheit (Reden 14 Und 15)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Die Reden Des Dion Von Prusa Über Sklaverei Und Freiheit (Reden 14 Und 15) Die Reden des Dion von Prusa über Sklaverei und Freiheit (Reden 14 und 15) Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philologischen Fakultät der Universität Trier Fachbereich II Klassische Philologie – Gräzistik vorgelegt von Ivano Loffredo Vorwort Diese Publikation ist die überarbeitete Fassung meiner im Sommersemester 2009 im Fachbereich II der Universität Trier eingereichten Dissertation. Sie entstand im Rahmen des Graduiertenkollegs 846: „Sklaverei – Knechtschaft und Frondienst – Zwangsarbeit. Unfreie Arbeits- und Lebensformen von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert“, das von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft großzügig gefördert wird. Ihr und den Verantwortlichen des Kollegs gilt mein Dank. Meine besondere Wertschätzung gilt meinem Doktorvater, Prof. Dr. Georg Wöhrle, von dessen fachlicher und persönlicher Betreuung ich sehr profitiert habe, sowie Frau Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Herrmann-Otto, die das Zweitgutachten übernahm und meine Arbeit mit Anregungen und Kritiken stets unterstützt hat. Für die anregenden Diskussionen und für die freundschaftliche Unterstützung danke ich meinen ehemaligen Kolleginnen und Kollegen des Graduiertenkollegs, sowie den Kreis der klassischen Philologen der Universität Trier. Für die sprachliche Betreuung bedanke ich mich bei Herrn Peter Willenborg und Frau Annika Stello, die meine Dissertation Schritt für Schritt gelesen und verbessert haben. Frau Fabia Neuerburg und Frau Silvia Carlitz haben meine Arbeit gelesen : Auch ihnen gilt mein Dank. Meiner Frau Barbara und meinem Sohn Gabriele ist diese Arbeit gewidmet. Bozen, im Februar 2015 Ivano Loffredo Inhalt A. Einführung 5 1. Das Leben 6 2. Das Werk 14 2.1 Papyrusfragmente 15 2.2 Zeugnisse verlorener Werke 16 3. ‚Sklaverei’ und ‚Freiheit’ im corpus dioneum 20 3.1 Terminologie 20 3.2 Thematik 31 3.2.1 Die soziale Perspektive 33 3.2.2 Die politische Perspektive 35 3.2.3 Die ethische Perspektive 36 4. Freiheit und Sklaverei in der 14. und 15. Rede 38 5. Die innere Freiheit bei den Zeitgenossen Dions 40 6. Ziel, Publikum und Datierung der Reden 45 6.1 Das Publikum der Reden 49 6.2 Die Datierung der Reden 51 B. Texte und Übersetzungen 55 1. Anmerkungen zum griechischen Text 56 2. Sklaverei und Freiheit I (Rede 14) 58 3. Sklaverei und Freiheit II (Rede 15) 68 C. Kommentare 85 1. Rede 14 86 2. Rede 15 164 D. Anhang 239 1. Literaturverzeichnis 240 3 A. Einführung 5 1. Das Leben Dion Chrysostomos1 kam in den 40er Jahren des 1. Jhs. n.Chr. 2 in Prusa als Sohn einer begüterten und einflussreichen Familie der Bithynischen3 Aristokratie zur Welt. Dion spricht in seinen Werken stolz von den Leistungen seiner Familie. Der Großvater mütterlicherseits hatte in der Verwaltung von Prusa4 eine bedeutsame Rolle gespielt. Dank seiner Freundschaft mit einem römischen Kaiser5, vermutlich Claudius6, hatte sein Großvater die römische Bürgerschaft und das Bürgerrecht von Apameia7 erhalten. Er war gegen seine Stadt sehr großzügig, verschleuderte sein Vermögen in Ausgaben für Prusa8 und bemühte sich, vom Kaiser Vorteile für die Stadt zu gewinnen. Er erreichte allerdings sein Ziel nicht, weil das freundschaftliche Verhältnis zum Kaiser plötzlich abbrach9. Dions Vater, Pasikrates10, Ehrenbürger von Apameia11 wie die Mutter, war ein Stadtverwalter12 und wurde von den Mitbürgern für seinen Einsatz zugunsten der Stadt 1 Den Beinamen Chrysostomos hat Dion nach dem Bericht von Photios (Bibl. 209, 165 b 5-8 Bekker) bereits von seinen Zeitgenossen bekommen. Er erscheint allerdings zuerst bei dem Rhetor Menander (390, 1-2 Spengel) und dann bei Themistios (or. 5, 63 d) und Synesios (Dio 1,2). S. dazu Crimi (1972) 389-393; Desideri (1978) 519. 2 Aufgrund der Rede 12, 15, in der Dion sich als Mann, «dessen beste Lebensjahre bereits hinter ihm liegen» darstellt, vermutet Jones (1978) 133, dass er in jener Zeit 50-60 Jahre alt gewesen sein muss. Wenn man die 12. Rede auf das Jahr 101 datiert (die Datierung ist allerdings umstritten und schwankt zwischen 97 und 105 n. Chr.), kann man annehmen, dass Dion zwischen 40 und 50 n. Chr. geboren ist. Vgl. dazu auch Schmid (1903) 850; Moles (1978) 82 Anm. 27. 3 Nach dem Tod des Königs Kleomedes IV. im Jahr 74 v. Chr. wurden die agri regii zur Bezahlung des Zehnten an die Zöllner verpflichtet. Bereits zehn Jahre später machte Pompeius diese Region zur Provinz Pontus, nachdem er die Pläne des Mithridates VI. für dieses Land zerschlagen hatte; s. dazu Salmeri (1982) 11; Strobel (1997) 700-702; zur Stadt Prusa, dem heutigen Bursa, s. Jones (1978) 1-7. 4 S. or. 50,7. Die Verwaltungsordnungen der povlei" waren auch nach der Unterwerfung unter die römische Herrschaft noch in Kraft, obwohl die kaiserliche Macht Einschränkungen und Kontrollen auferlegte. So bestimmte Pompeius neue Regelungen für den Zugang zur boulhv. Nur die ehemaligen Magistrate und die Bürger über 30 Jahre, die ein öffentliches Amt bekleiden durften, bekamen Zugang zur boulhv. Er wählte so eine begrenzte Gruppe von Bürgern der Oberschicht aus, die Interesse daran hatte, dass alles ruhig blieb, und er machte sie für die örtliche Verwaltung Rom gegenüber verantwortlich. S. dazu Salmeri (1982) 12; Desideri (1994a) 11-12 mit weiterer Bibliographie. 5 S. or. 41, 6; 44, 5; 46, 3. 6 S. dazu von Arnim (1898) 123; Jones (1978) 4. An Tiberius denken dagegen Veyne (1967) 748; Salmeri (1982) 14. 7 Auch die Mutter Dions bekam vom selben Kaiser das Bürgerrecht von Rom und Apameia. S. or. 41,6. 8 Eine übliche Praxis bei den Familien der Oberschicht war, ihr Vermögen zugunsten der Stadt auszugeben. Das Geld wurde für die Liturgien verwendet und auch dazu, um die Veranstaltung von Aufführungen und Festmählern zu organisieren sowie Bauprojekte zu finanzieren. S. dazu Salmeri (1982) 12-13. 9 S. or. 44,5. Der Großvater Dions strebte danach, dass seiner Stadt der Status einer civitas libera gewährt wurde, was später auch Dion versuchte. 10 Der Name ist von Photios (Bibl. 209, 165 a 39-40 Bekker) und in der Suda (s.v. Divwn, oJ Pasikravtou" (n. 1240) II, 117 Adler) überliefert worden. 11 Auch Dion, wie sein Großvater und seine Eltern, war Ehrenbürger von Apameia (s. or. 40, 22 und insbesondere or. 41, 10; dazu Desideri (1978) 454 Anm. 9). Er berichtet, dass es üblich war, dass die einflussreichsten Bürger einer Stadt von einer anderen das Bürgerrecht bekamen. Der Erhalt des Bürgerrechts einer Provinzstadt konnte auch vom Kaiser entschieden werden, wie im Fall von Dions Großvater und Mutter. Da Dion Sohn einer römischen Bürgerin und eines peregrinus war (zum Stand des Vaters s. Sherwin- 6 und sein Ansehen hoch geehrt13. Pasikrates war wohl ein ausgezeichneter Stadtverwalter, er war allerdings kein guter Verwalter innerhalb der Familie, da er Dion viele Schulden hinterließ14. Als Kind einer Familie der Oberschicht erhielt Dion eine gute Bildung. Er hat die drei für die Söhne aristokratischer Familien vorgesehenen Bildungsstufen durchlaufen: Zuerst die Grundschule, dann die Schule des Grammatikers und des Rhetors15. Obwohl Dion nie von seiner literarischen Ausbildung spricht, lässt sich aus der Stilebene seiner Reden16 und aus den von ihm selbst erteilten Ratschlägen über die für einen Politiker wichtigen Lektüren erschließen, dass er sich während seiner literarischen Ausbildung mit den Historikern Herodot, Thukydides, Xenophon und Theopomp, mit den Rhetoren Hypereides, Aischines und Lysias so wie mit den homerischen Epen und den Dramen Euripides’ und Menanders beschäftigte17. Um seine Ausbildung zu vervollständigen, begab er sich Ende der 60er Jahre18 nach Rom und ließ in Prusa seine Frau und seine Kinder19 zurück. In der Hauptstadt des Römischen Reiches war er Schüler des Stoikers Musonius Rufus20 und bekam eine vollständige philosophische Ausbildung. Philostrat berichtet, dass er während der Jahre seines römischen Studiums nach Alexandria gekommen sei und an einem Treffen zwischen den Philosophen Apollonius und Euphrates und dem Kaiser Vespasian teilgenommen habe21. Die Vier hätten über die beste Verfassungsform gesprochen und Euphrates, der sich gegen die Monarchie und für ein demokratisches Regime erklärte, habe mit Apollonius, der für White (1966) 676; Moles (1978) 82; dagegen Jones (1978) 7), konnte er sich des römischen Bürgerrechts nicht von Geburt rühmen. Wie der Vater war er peregrinus von Geburt und erwarb das römische Bürgerrecht erst als Erwachsener; s. dazu Salmeri (1982) 18 Anm. 49; vgl. unten Anm. 51). 12 In der Rede 50, 7 behauptet Dion, dass sein Großvater und sein Vater Vorsitzende (prostavtai) der boulhv waren. 13 Die Stadt Prusa ließ zu Ehren der Familie Dions zahlreiche Statuen errichten. Sie ehrte die Mitglieder der Familie auch mit Staatsbegräbnissen und Leichenspielen und ließ einen Altar für Dions Mutter errichten. S. or. 44,3 14 S. or. 46, 5. 15 S. dazu Marrou (61965) 359-360. 16 S. dazu Schmid (1887) I, 72-191. 17 S. or. 18, 7; 10; 11 e 14 und dazu Desideri (1978) 137-142. Zu der rhetorischen und philosophischen Ausbildung Dions s. Desideri (1991a) 3884; Desideri (1994b) 842. 18 Moles (1978) 86-87, ist der Meinung, dass Dion vor dem Tod Neros nach Rom gekommen sei; s. auch Jones (1978) 13-14. 19 Dion war verheiratet (or. 46, 13) und hatte Kinder (or. 46, 6), darunter nur einen Sohn (or. 40, 2). 20 S. Front. Ad M. Antonin. imp. de eloq. 1, 133, 8-11 Hout = 2, 50 Haines, der ihn unter den Schülern des ‘römischen Sokrates’ neben Euphrates, Timidoros und Atenokrates nennt. Die Lobesworte, die man in der Rede 32, 122 liest, richten sich wahrscheinlich an seinen Lehrer. Zu dem Zeugnis Frontos s. Desideri (1978) 6-16. Unter dem Namen Dions sind zwei vermutlich unechte an einen gewissen Rufus adressierte Briefe überliefert; s. dazu Desideri (1991b) 3925-3926. 21 S. Philostr., Leben des Apollonius von Tyana 5, 27-38; dazu s. Moles (1978) 83-85; Desideri (1978) 22-35. 7 die Monarchie und die Macht Vespasians eintrat, gestritten22. Obwohl der Bericht Philostrats sich auf ein Ereignis bezieht, das wirklich stattgefunden haben könnte, muss man annehmen, und so ist es fast einhellig in der Forschung betont worden23, dass das Treffen in Alexandria nie stattgefunden hat24.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Military Law Review
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET 27- 100- 16 MILITARY LAW REVIEW Articles - DISCHARGE AND DISMISSAL AS PUNISHMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES Captain Richard J. Bednar SPACE-A LEGAL VACUUM Joseph J. Simeone ARGUMENT OF MILITARY COUNSEL: LIMITATIONS AND ABUSES I Lieutenant Commander Gardiner M. Haight Survey of the Law A lNUAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SURVEY OF MI ITARY JUSTICE: THE OCTOBER 1960 TERM OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS Comment THE HISS ACT AMENDMENTS HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY APRIL 1962 AGO 4870B PREFACE The Military Law Review is designed to provide a medium for those interested in the field of military law to share the product of their experience and research with their fellow lawyers. Articles should be of direct concern and import in this area of scholarship, and preference will be given to those articles having lasting value as reference material for the military lawyer. The Military Law Review does not purport to promulgate De- partment of the Army policy or to be in any sense directory. The opinions reflected in each article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Judge Advocate General or the Department of the Army. Articles, comments, and notes should be submitted in duplicate to the Editor, Military Law Review, The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. Footnotes should be set out on pages separate from the text and follow the manner of citation in the Harvard Blue Book. This Review may be cited as Mil. L. Rev., April 1962 (DA Pam 27-100-16, 1 April 62) (number of page).
    [Show full text]
  • The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction
    G Chin FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2012 3:03 PM ARTICLE THE NEW CIVIL DEATH: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT IN THE ERA OF MASS CONVICTION † GABRIEL J. CHIN INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1790 I. CIVIL DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES ............................................ 1793 A. Civil Death and Its Decline Before 1980 .................................... 1793 B. The New Civil Death in the Regulatory State .............................. 1799 C. Mass Conviction, Not (Just) Mass Incarceration ....................... 1803 D. Collateral Consequences as Unrestrained by the Constitution ............................................................................. 1806 1. Individual Collateral Consequences as Regulatory Measures ...................................................... 1807 2. Innovative Collateral Consequences.............................. 1811 3. No Right to Notice at Plea or Sentence ......................... 1814 II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW CIVIL DEATH ......................... 1815 A. Civil Death and Collateral Consequences as Punishment ............................................................................. 1816 B. Collateral Consequences and Constitutional Criminal Procedure .................................................................. 1821 III. TOWARD ACCOMMODATING THE NEW CIVIL DEATH INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ......................................................... 1825 A. Ex Post Facto ...........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies
    Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies Dayan, Joan, 1949- Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 3-39 (Article) Published by Duke University Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nep/summary/v002/2.1dayan.html Access Provided by University of California @ Santa Cruz at 08/28/12 7:00PM GMT ESSAYS Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies Joan Dayan During my last visit to Haiti, I heard a story about a white dog. Starving, its eyes gone wild, it appears late at night with its tongue hanging out. Reclaimed by an oungan or priest who “deals with both hands,” practicing “bad” magic, the dog comes back to life in skin bloated with spirit. Afriend called it “the dog without skin,” but this creature was not a dog. Instead, when a person died, the spirit, once stolen by the oungan, awakened from what had seemed sure death into this new existence in canine disguise. We all agreed that no manhandled spirit would want to end up reborn in the skin of the dog. Being turned into a dog was bad enough, but to end up losing color, to turn white, seemed worse. In this metamorphosis, the skin of the dead person is left behind, like the skin discarded by a snake. But the person’s spirit remains immured in the coarse envelope, locked in another form, trapped in something not his or her own. I begin with this story, evidence of what some call the “supernatural,” as entry into my discussion of the sorcery of law: most instrumental when most fantastic and most violent when most spectral.
    [Show full text]
  • SELECTED DECISIONS of the HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE Under the OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE under THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL Volume 7 Sixty-sixth to seventy-fourth sessions (July 1999 – March 2002) UNITED NATIONS New York and Geneva, 2006 NOTE Material contained in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, provided credit is given and a copy of the publication containing the reprinted material is sent to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Palais des Nations, 8-14 avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. CCPR/C/OP/7 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.06.XIV.1 ISBN 92-1-130294-3 ii CONTENTS (Selected decisions — Sixty-sixth to seventy-fourth sessions) Page Introduction........................................................................................................................... 1 FINAL DECISIONS A. Decision declaring a communication admissible (the number of the Committee session is indicated in brackets) No. 845/1999 [67] Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago............................. 5 B. Decisions declaring a communication inadmissible (the number of the Committee session is indicated in brackets) No. 717/1996 [66] Acuña Inostroza et al v. Chile.............................................. 13 No. 880/1999 [74] Terry Irving v. Australia...................................................... 18 No. 925/2000 [73] Wan Kuok Koi v. Portugal .................................................. 22 C. Views under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol No. 580/1994 [74] Glen Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago ................................... 29 No. 688/1996 [69] María Sybila Arredondo v. Peru.......................................... 36 No. 701/1996 [69] Cesario Gómez Vázquez v. Spain........................................ 43 No. 727/1996 [71] Dobroslav Paraga v. Croatia ................................................ 48 No. 736/1997 [70] Malcolm Ross v.
    [Show full text]
  • Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied Russell L
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 2014 Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied Russell L. Christopher Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Christopher, Russell L., "Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 241. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/241 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHRISTOPHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:28 PM Article Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied Russell L. Christopher† INTRODUCTION In many of the top death penalty states, the leading cause of death for prisoners on death row is not lethal injection. Nor is it the electric chair. It is not even any form of execution. It is death by natural and other causes.1 From 1973–2011, in four of the top five states with the largest death row populations in 2011, more death row prisoners died of old age than were exe- cuted.2 In California during that period, for every one prisoner executed, six died on death row of other causes.3 In Pennsylva- nia during the same period, a death row prisoner was nine times more likely to die from other causes than by execution.4 The ballooning number of prisoners spending decades on death row who will die prior to execution stems from the combined ef- † Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa.
    [Show full text]
  • Montana Model UN High School Conference
    Montana Model UN High School Conference General Assembly Third Committee Topic 1: Abolishing the Death Penalty1 25 September, 2017 Capital punishment, or the death penalty, is punishment by death for a crime. According to the human rights group Amnesty International, as of 2017, more than half of countries worldwide have abolished capital punishment completely. These states, known as “abolitionist,” now number 104. There are 141 countries, two-thirds of the world’s countries, that have abolished capital punishment in “law or practice.” Over the past twenty years, an average of two states per year have abolished the death penalty. The most recent states to do so were Benin and Nauru, which abolished capital punishment in 2016.2 States that retain the death penalty are known as “retentionist.” According to Amnesty International, 57 countries continue to use capital punishment.3 Of those, 23 are known to have carried out executions in 2016. That year, 87 percent of all 1,032 reported executions took place in four countries: Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. The US was not among the most prevalent users of capital punishment for the first time since 2006. The only remaining European country with capital punishment is Belarus, while Russia is abolitionist for ordinary crimes.4 According to human rights activists, the death penalty violates the right to life of all persons proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights treaties. Over time, this view has gained support. Since 2007, the UN General Assembly (GA) resolved to establish a worldwide moratorium (suspension) of the death penalty six times.
    [Show full text]
  • In the Supreme Court of Mississippi No. 2000-Dr-00343
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2000-DR-00343-SCT STEPHEN VIRGIL McGILBERRY v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 2/12/1996 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES W. BACKSTROM COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ROBERT M. RYAN DAVID P. VOISIN STACY PREWITT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MARVIN L. WHITE, JR. CHARLENE R. PIERCE JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DEATH PENALTY - POST CONVICTION DISPOSITION: POST CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED - 03/06/2003 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: EN BANC. WALLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Stephen Virgil McGilberry was tried and convicted of four counts of capital murder committed when he was sixteen years old. The Circuit Court of Jackson County thereafter sentenced him to death. We affirmed the conviction and sentence in McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1006, 120 S. Ct. 1273, 146 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2000). After filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, McGilberry, now represented by the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel, has also filed an application for leave to seek post-conviction relief in the circuit court in which he raises multiple issues. Finding no merit in these issues, we deny McGilberry's petitions. FACTS ¶2. Sixteen-year old Stephen Virgil McGilberry was charged with the deaths of 44-year-old Patricia Purifoy, his mother; 44-year-old Kenneth Purifoy, his step-father; 24-year-old Kimberly Self, his half- sister, and 3-year-old Kristopher Self, his nephew and Kimberly's son.
    [Show full text]
  • Death by Incarceration As a Cruel and Unusual Punishment When Applied to Juveniles: Extending Roper to Life Without Parole, Our Other Death Penalty
    DEATH BY INCARCERATION AS A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WHEN APPLIED TO JUVENILES: EXTENDING ROPER TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, OUR OTHER DEATH PENALTY ROBERT JOHNSON, PH.D.* AND SONIA TABRIZ** I. INTRODUCTION In Roper v. Simmons,1 the United States Supreme Court held that juveniles2 could not be subjected to the death penalty.3 The Court emphasized that the well-documented immaturity of juveniles makes them less culpable for their crimes and less easily deterred by the threat of punishment.4 The Court also stressed the unformed characters of juveniles, which raised the possibility of reform and even forgiveness for their crimes5―neither reform nor forgiveness is possible with a final and irrevocable punishment such as execution, because ending a juvenile’s life prevents him from attaining “a mature understanding of his own humanity.”6 Finally, the Court emphasized “evolving standards of decency” as evidenced by a number of state legislatures prohibiting the execution of juveniles and the increasingly rare execution of juveniles in states where capital sentences are permissible.7 For these reasons, the Court held that death by execution, Copyright © 2010 by Robert Johnson, Ph.D. and Sonia Tabriz. * Professor of Justice, Law and Society, American University. ** Honors Student of Law and Society & Psychology, American University. 1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 2. Juveniles are offenders who committed their crimes before turning eighteen. See id. at 574–75. 3. Id. at 568. 4. Id. at 569–71. 5. Id. at 570. 6. Id. at 574. The Court emphasizes that “there are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: ‘retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.’” Id.
    [Show full text]
  • Cruel and Unusual: the End of the Eighth Amendment
    Cruel and Unusual: The end of the Eighth Amendment Colin Dayan (Vanderbilt University) http://bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dayan.php (accessed June 23, 2011) Describing the standard interrogation techniques for Iraqis detained at Abu Ghraib, Mr. Womack, the lawyer for Specialist Charles A. Graner, said “a certain amount of violence was to be expected,” adding, “Striking doesn’t mean a lot. Breaking a rib or bone— that would be excessive.” Mr. Volzer, the lawyer for Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl, juggled his terms, arguing that it was intimidation, not torture: “I wouldn’t term it abuse.” Mr. Bergrin, the lawyer for Sergeant Javal S. Davis, argued that the prisoner was not harmed when Davis stomped on his fingers. “He may have stepped on the hands, but there was no stomping, no broken bones.” After the revelation of abuses at Abu Ghraib, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld found time to draw comparably subtle distinctions: “I’m not a lawyer, but I know it’s not torture—probably abuse.” Rumsfeld’s own blurring of the distinction between obvious torture and possible abuse has a real legal history. The now-famous documents written by lawyers for the White House and the Departments of Defense and Justice—an August 1, 2002, memorandum prepared by Judge Jay S. Bybee and a March 6, 2003, memorandum entitled “Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism” (authorized by the Pentagon’s general counsel, William J. Haynes II)— redefined the meaning of torture and extended the limits of permissible pain. It might seem at first that the rules for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners were founded on standards of political legitimacy suited to war or emergencies; based on what Carl Schmitt called the urgency of the “exception,” they were meant to remain secret as necessary “war measures” and to be exempt from traditional legal ideals and the courts associated with them.
    [Show full text]
  • The Death Penalty the Seminars of Jacques Derrida Edited by Geoffrey Bennington and Peggy Kamuf the Death Penalty Volume I
    the death penalty the seminars of jacques derrida Edited by Geoffrey Bennington and Peggy Kamuf The Death Penalty volume i h Jacques Derrida Edited by Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon, and Thomas Dutoit Translated by Peggy Kamuf The University of Chicago Press ‡ chicago and london jacques derrida (1930–2004) was director of studies at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, and professor of humanities at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of many books published by the University of Chicago Press, most recently, The Beast and the Sovereign Volume I and The Beast and the Sovereign Volume II. peggy kamuf is the Marion Frances Chevalier Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the University of Southern California. She has written, edited, or translated many books, by Derrida and others, and is coeditor of the series of Derrida’s seminars at the University of Chicago Press. Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2014 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2014. Printed in the United States of America Originally published as Séminaire: La peine de mort, Volume I (1999–2000). © 2012 Éditions Galilée. 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 1 2 3 4 5 isbn- 13: 978- 0- 226- 14432- 0 (cloth) isbn- 13: 978- 0- 226- 09068- 9 (e- book) doi: 10.7208 / chicago / 9780226090689.001.0001 Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Derrida, Jacques, author.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Death - a New Look at an Ancient Doctrine
    William & Mary Law Review Volume 11 (1969-1970) Issue 4 Article 8 May 1970 Civil Death - A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine Harry David Saunders Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Criminal Law Commons Repository Citation Harry David Saunders, Civil Death - A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 988 (1970), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/8 Copyright c 1970 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr CIVIL DEATH-A NEW LOOK AT AN ANCIENT DOCTRINE The incongruous and often unexplainable effects that arise from ap- plication of the doctrine of civil death have plagued the law for cen- turies. It has survived a long history to become a statutory incident of a sentence to life imprisonment. With living men regarded as dead, dead men returning to life, and the same man considered alive for one purpose but dead for another, the realm of legal fiction acquires a touch of the super- natural under the paradoxical doctrine of civil death.' Such has been the effect in fourteen jurisdictions which have retained this statutory consequence of a life sentence. The application and conse- quences of this doctrine vary among the states. Since several detailed articles are available concerning civil death in the various states, 2 the approach of this discussion is to give a broad overview of the doctrine as it is generally construed. This article will present a brief history of the fiction of civil death, some of the effects on rights of those sentenced to life imprisonment, and finally an analysis of the doctrine in regard to modern parole and rehabilitative penology.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Death Is Different: an Examination of a Post- Graham Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth Amendment Sarah C
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 102 | Issue 2 Article 4 Spring 2012 Civil Death Is Different: An Examination of a Post- Graham Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth Amendment Sarah C. Grady Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Sarah C. Grady, Civil Death Is Different: An Examination of a Post-Graham Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth Amendment, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 441 (2013). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol102/iss2/4 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/12/10202-0441 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 102, No. 2 Copyright © 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. COMMENTS CIVIL DEATH IS DIFFERENT: AN EXAMINATION OF A POST-GRAHAM CHALLENGE TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT Sarah C. Grady* “A man without a vote is a man without protection. He is virtually helpless.” Out of such feelings of helplessness were revolutions born.1 Since the founding, the United States has struggled with the question of who should be permitted to vote. In their first days as political communities, some states required prospective voters to adhere to specified religions in order to qualify.2 As conceptions of citizenship changed throughout history, various groups began to lobby for inclusion into the * J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Iowa, 2008.
    [Show full text]