The Impact of DDOS and Ping of Death on Network Performance
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Many Slides Borrowed from Ben Zhao, Christo Wilson, & Others
12. Network Attacks Blase Ur and David Cash (many slides borrowed from Ben Zhao, Christo Wilson, & others) February 7th, 2020 CMSC 23200 / 33250 Network threat model • Network scanning • Attacks on confidentiality (e.g., eavesdropping) • Attacks on integrity (e.g., spoofing, packet injection) • Attacks on availability (e.g., denial of service (DoS)) Scanning and observing networks Network Scanning: Ping • Essential, low-level network utility • Sends a “ping” ICMP message to a host on the internet $ ping 66.66.0.255 PING 66.66.0.255 (66.66.0.255) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 66.66.0.255: icmp_seq=1 ttl=58 time=41.2 ms • Destination host is supposed to respond with a “pong” – Indicating that it can receive packets • By default, ping messages are 56 bytes long (+ some header bytes) – Maximum size 65535 bytes • What if you send a ping that is >65535 bytes long? Ping of Death • $ ping –s 65535 66.66.0.255 – Attack identified in 1997 – IPv6 version identified/fixed in 2013 Network Scanning: Traceroute • traceroute — hops between me and host – Sends repeated ICMP reqs w/ increasing TTL Port Scanning • What services are running on a server? Nmap • 5 seconds to scan a single machine!! SYN scan Only send SYN Responses: • SYN-ACK — port open • RST — port closed • Nothing — filtered (e.g., firewall) Port Scanning on Steroids • How do you speed up scans for all IPv4? – Don’t wait for responses; pipeline – Parallelize: divide & conquer IPv4 ranges – Randomize permutations w/o collisions • Result: the zmap tool – Scan all of IPv4 in 45mins (w/ GigE cxn) – IPv4 in 5 mins w/ 10GigE Eavesdropping Tools: Wireshark, tcpdump, Bro, … Steps: 1. -
Wikileaks Wars: Digital Conflict Spills Into Real Life
Home | Tech | Science in Society | News | Back to article WikiLeaks wars: Digital conflict spills into real life 15 December 2010 by Jacob Aron Magazine issue 2791. Subscribe and save For similar stories, visit the Computer crime and Weapons Technology Topic Guides ADVERTISEMENT Editorial: Democracy 2.0: The world after WikiLeaks WHILE it is not, as some have called it, the "first great cyberwar", the digital conflict over information sparked by WikiLeaks amounts to the greatest incursion of the online world into the real one yet seen. In response to the taking down of the WikiLeaks website after it released details of secret diplomatic cables, a leaderless army of activists has gone on the offensive. It might not have started a war, but the conflict Dress code for an Anonymous vendetta (Image: is surely a sign of future battles. Sander Koning/AFP/Getty) 1 more image No one is quite sure what the ultimate political effect of the leaks will be. What the episode has done, though, is show what happens when the authorities attempt to silence what many people perceive as a force for freedom of information. It has also shone a light on the evolving world of cyber-weapons (see "The cyber-weapon du jour"). WikiLeaks was subjected to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which floods the target website with massive amounts of traffic in an effort to force it offline. The perpetrator of the attack is unknown, though an individual calling himself the Jester has claimed responsibility. WikiLeaks took defensive action by moving to Amazon's EC2 web hosting service, but the respite was short-lived as Amazon soon dumped the site, saying that WikiLeaks violated its terms of service. -
WHITE PAPER Distributed Denial of Service
WHITE PAPER Distributed Denial of Service DDoS Attack Testing and Verification Solutions OVERVIEW “Xena recreates complex First seen around 2000, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are a serious traffic so client and server threat to businesses around the world. Attackers use multiple hosts to swamp targets with bogus traffic, paralyzing the network and potentially costing the victims millions of communicate in exactly dollars. There are many security systems for preventing DDoS attacks – and they all need to be thoroughly tested and verified prior to being activated. the same order as the Xena offers a complete test solution for DDoS mitigation and network security with captured traffic to ensure high-performance products and ample features. Going beyond generating DDoS traffic, Xena’s solutions can help companies test their security products and operators test realistic network scenarios networks and detect flaws, thereby ensuring business continuity and preserve business for the DUT”. integrity. WHITE PAPER Xena Networks – Global Price/Performance Leaders in Gigabit Ethernet Testing – www.xenanetworks.com Distributed Denial of Service DDoS Attack Testing and Verification Solutions Contents INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 3 DDOS Attacks and Business Disruption ........................................................................... 4 Understanding Different DDoS Attacks .......................................................................... -
Impact of Distributed Denial-Of-Service Attack On
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive Impact of Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack on Advanced Metering Infrastructure Satin Asri1 and Bernardi Pranggono2 1Department of Computer Science and Engineering Manipal Institute of Technology Manipal, India Email: [email protected] 2School of Engineering and Built Environment Glasgow Caledonian University Glasgow, UK Email: [email protected] Abstract The age of Internet of Things (IoT) has brought in new challenges specifically in areas such as security. The evolution of classic power grids to smart grids is a prime example of how everything is now being connected to the Internet. With the power grid becoming smart, the information and communication systems supporting it is subject to both classical and emerging cyber-attacks. The article investigates the vulnerabilities caused by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on the smart grid advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Attack simulations have been conducted on a realistic electrical grid topology. The simulated network consisted of smart meters, power plant and utility servers. Finally, the impact of large scale DDoS attacks on the distribution system’s reliability is discussed. Keywords advanced metering infrastructure (AMI); distributed denial-of- service (DDoS); smart grid; smart meter 1 Introduction In 2011 McAfee reported over 60% of critical infrastructure companies regularly found malware designed to attack their systems. Smart grid is arguably the most fundamental cyber-physical infrastructures of the humankind and modern society. Smart grid and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) or commonly known as the smart meter are considered as the main signs of classical electrical grids evolution toward smarter grids. -
Guide to Ddos Attacks November 2017
TLP: WHITE Guide to DDoS Attacks November 2017 This Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) document is a guide to aid partners in their remediation efforts of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. This guide is not inclusive of all DDoS attack types and references only the types of attacks partners of the MS-ISAC have reported experiencing. Table Of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Standard DDoS Attack Types ................................................................................................................................... 4 SYN Flood ................................................................................................................................................................ 4 UDP Flood................................................................................................................................................................ 5 SMBLoris .................................................................................................................................................................. 7 ICMP Flood .............................................................................................................................................................. 8 HTTP GET Flood ................................................................................................................................................. -
DNS Threats November, 2015
DNS Threats November, 2015 This document contains brief descriptions of a number of potential DNS threats. Direct DNS amplification Direct DNS amplification attacks are aimed at congesting DNS server outbound bandwidth. They start by sending a large number of DNS queries, specially crafted so that they result in a very large response that can reach up to 70 times the size of the request. Since DNS relies on the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), the attacker can use a small volume of outbound traffic to cause the DNS server to generate a much larger volume, resulting in congestion of the DNS server’s upload and eventually a denial of service (DoS). Reflection Reflection attacks use a third-party DNS server (typically an open recursive name server) in the Internet to propagate a DoS or DDoS attack by sending queries to the recursive server. Recursive servers will process queries from any IP address, and they return responses. The attack spoofs the DNS queries it sends by including the victim’s IP address as the source IP in the query, so that the query has the victim’s server information rather than the attacker’s. So when the recursive name server receives the requests, it sends all the responses to the victim’s IP address. A high volume of such “reflected” traffic can bring down the victim’s site. Distributed reflection DoS Distributed reflection DoS (DrDoS) attacks combine reflection with amplification that significantly increases the size of the response to the initial queries—and the likelihood that the victim’s server will be overwhelmed. -
Cyber Attacks Explained: Dos and Ddos
CYBER ATTACKS EXPLAINED: DOS AND DDOS With this article, we begin a new series on the major kinds of cyber attacks that weaken the IT security infrastructure within organisations. With the rapid spread of Internet technologies and applications, the number of those seeking to break into systems is also increasing — usually to gain fame, money, or to damage the target’s reputation. The first to be covered in this series is the Denial of Service attack (DoS) and the distributed version (DDoS). We will learn how these attacks work technically, and discuss ways to stop them at the network entry point. The fundamental technique behind a DoS attack is to make the target system busy. In a computer server, when a network packet is being received, all components (right from the network interface card or NIC to the application running under the OS) are participating to ensure successful delivery of that packet. The NIC must monitor the Ethernet frames meant for it, align data and pass it to the network card driver, which then adds its own intelligence and passes it to the OS, which takes it to the application. Each component involved can exhibit some form of vulnerability, and DoS attacks are devised to exploit one or more of these, to penetrate into the system. Let’s now understand the basics of the TCP/IP protocol, which uses a handshake between the sender and receiver. Figure 1 shows how a healthy TCP handshake takes place, and how a SYN flood attack compares with it. Figure 1: A healthy TCP handshake When the sender wants to communicate, it sends a SYN packet with its own IP address as the source, and the receiver’s IP address as the destination. -
Deploying Crowd-Sourced Formal Verification Systems in a Dod Network
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2013-09 Deploying crowd-sourced formal verification systems in a DoD network Dumlupinar, Mahmut Firuz Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37617 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS DEPLOYING CROWD-SOURCED FORMAL VERIFICATION SYSTEMS IN A DOD NETWORK by Mahmut Firuz Dumlupinar September 2013 Thesis Advisor: Geoffrey G. Xie Second Reader: Thomas Housel Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2013 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS DEPLOYING CROWD-SOURCED FORMAL VERIFICATION SYSTEMS IN A DOD NETWORK 6. AUTHOR(S) Mahmut Firuz Dumlupinar 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. -
Turning a Smartphone Into a Mobile Attack Vector
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ZENODO SlowDroid: Turning a Smartphone into a Mobile Attack Vector Enrico Cambiaso∗, Gianluca Papaleo†, Maurizio Aiello‡ National Research Council, CNR-IEIIT, via De Marini, 6, 16149 Genoa, Italy Email: ∗[email protected], †[email protected], ‡[email protected] Abstract—Nowadays, last generation of smartphones are (DoS) menace, executed to make a network service unavailable comparable to desktop computers in terms of computational for its legitimate users. While the first generation of DoS capabilities. Such characteristics can turn a smartphone into a attacks were based on a particular exploit or on flooding the mobile attack vector. In this paper we analyze the use of mobile victim with a large amount of network traffic, novel threats, devices to perpetrate cyber attacks. We present a mobile threat, known as Slow DoS Attacks (SDAs) [6], are particularly suit- SlowDroid, running on Android operating system. Such menace able to a mobile environment, since they require tiny amount of implements a Denial of Service attack and it is particularly suitable to a mobile execution, since it makes use of low amounts network and computational resources. Moreover, since SDAs of computational and bandwidth resources. We present in detail are considered particularly dangerous, a mobile execution of SlowDroid implementation and our choices in terms of design, these menaces should represent an amplification of the threat, graphical user interface, and system architecture. as a portable and position varying threat execution may elude detection methodologies. Keywords—android, mobile attack, cybersecurity, slow dos at- tack, denial of service The rest of the paper is structured as follows. -
JETIR Research Journal
© 2020 JETIR February 2020, Volume 7, Issue 2 www.jetir.org (ISSN-2349-5162) REVELATION OF INFECTED NODES IN NETWORK USING HONEYPOT 1Sabari Giri Murugan S, 2Shravya R Nadig, 3Thiyagu S 1Assistant Professor, 2Student of BCA, 3Assistant Professor 1Department of BCA, 1Jain Deemed to be University, Bangalore, India. Abstract: The network which we use for the various purpose may have anonymous nodes that need to be determined detected with a various counter attempt which is done by the unauthorized user (attackers). In this, we use honeypot which can be detected by the intrusion detection system that can be identified the malicious code or activity or software that is performed by the attacker over the network. Further, we can analyze the behavior of different tools that have been created by DOS and DDOS attack over the network. In a DoS defence mechanism, a honeypot acts as a detective server among the pool of servers in a specific network; where any packet received by the honeypot is most likely a packet from an attacker. There are also many loopholes that have been created by the attacker that could be getting information about the legitimate user for his software and hardware requirements. Index Terms – Attacker, DoS and DDoS. I. INTRODUCTION In the present fast paced world consistent continuous productive assistance is the establishment for all help associations. The achievement of any new or existing endeavor is basically subject to the unwavering quality and nonstop accessibility of administration. Continuously every individual is getting increasingly more reliant on the web for creative and well-coordinated satisfaction of his need. -
(DOS) Testing Ixchariot
TEST PLAN Denial of Service (DOS) Testing IxChariot www.ixiacom.com 915-6681-01, 2005 Contents Overview of Denial of Service functionality in IxChariot..................................3 A brief outline of the DoS attack types supported in IxChariot...................... 4 Test Case 1: Ping Attack on Oracle Traffic........................................................5 Test Case : VoIP and TCP SYN Attacks...........................................................8 Copyright © 2005 Ixia. All rights reserved. The information in this document is furnished for Ixia informational use only, is subject to change 6601 W. Agoura Road without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by Ixia. Ixia assumes no Calabasas, CA 9130 responsibility or liability for any errors or Phone: (818) 871-1800 inaccuracies that may appear in this document. Ixia and the Ixia logo are trademarks of Ixia. All Fax: (818) 871-1805 other companies, product names, and logos are Email: [email protected] trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. Internet: www.ixiacom.com Copyright © Ixia, 005 Denial of Service (DOS) Testing: Sample Test Plans Denial of Service (DOS) Testing: Sample Test Plans Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a reality for most organizations with connections to the public Internet. In order to protect yourselves from the potential hazards of network hackers and malicious coders, a set of devices and software- based tools such as DUTs, intrusion detection systems (IDS), remote access solutions (VPN) and sophisticated routers and L4-7 application switches have been developed to effectively block malicious traffic and protect the organization’s data and information infrastructure. Leveraging the advanced functionality of Ixia hardware, IxChariot is now capable of generating line-rate traffic that emulates common DoS attack types while at the same time generating and measuring the performance of application traffic (VoIP, Internet, enterprise) that is being sent over the network. -
Efeitos Do Ataque LOIC
GTS 2012 Efeitos do ataque LOIC. Eduardo Bergmann Roteiro •LOIC: Definição, participação e ferramentas •Cenário de testes •Metodologia •Resultados •Prevenção •Conclusão LOIC: Low Orbit Ion Cannon •Desenvolvida pela Praetox Technologies •Ferramenta de teste de carga •TCP(Transmission Control Protocol), •UDP (User Datagram Protocol) •HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) •Disponível em: http://sourceforge.net/projects/loic/ Funcionamento Funcionamento via canal IRC •Iniciar ataque: !lazor targetip=<IRC_server> message=<texto> port=80 method=http wait=false threads=15 method=tcp random=true start •Finalizar ataque: !lazor stop Implementações Windows Web Linux Android BSD (JavaScript) Participação consciente •Downloads: 1.Estados Unidos 2.França 3.Brasil 4.Alemanha ... http://sourceforge.net/projects/loic/ em 26 de abril de 2012 Popular e acessível Agendamento de ataque http://pastebin.com/WEydcBVV em 26 de abril de 2012 Receberam ataques •FBI •MPAA – Motion Picture Association of America •Departament of Justice •RIAA – Recording Industry Association of America •Sony •Visa •MasterCard •Paypal Cenário dos testes Servidor atacado: • Core 2 Duo 2.2 Ghz • 2 Gb RAM • Ubuntu 10.04 • Apache 2.2 • Conectado a um switch ethernet 100 Mbps Cenário dos testes PC iPad 2 Galaxy SII Motorola Defy Core 2 Duo 2.2 Dual-core Dual-core 1.2 800 MHz Ghz Apple A5X GHz Cortex-A9 Cortex-A8 2 GB RAM 512 MB RAM 1 GB RAM 512 MB RAM Cenário dos testes Ferramentas de ataque PC Galaxy SII Motorola Defy iPad 2 LOIC JSLOIC JSLOIC JSLOIC JSLOIC Android LOIC Android LOIC Metodologia