Christian Solidarity Worldwide

PAKISTAN Annual Report 2002

March 2002

PAKISTAN ANNUAL REPORT 2002

CONTENTS

1 COUNTRY PROFILE ______3 1.1 MAP AND GENERAL PROFILE ______3 1.1.1 Government______4 1.1.2 Economy ______5 1.1.3 Military ______5 1.1.4 Transnational Disputes______6 1.2 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND ______7 1.3 GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS ______8 1.3.1 Thematic concerns ______8 1.3.2 Discrimination against Women______8 1.3.3 Pakistan and the United Nations ______10 1.4 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OVERVIEW ______10 1.5 ISLAMISATION______12 1.5.1 The Constitution ______13 1.5.2 The Implementation of Shar’iah and Other Discriminatory Legislation ___14 1.5.3 Ahmadis______15 1.5.4 Islamic Militant Groups ______15 1.5.5 Sunni and Shi’a conflict ______16 1.5.6 The Blasphemy Law ______17 1.5.7 Apostasy (Conversion from Islam to other faith) ______20 1.5.8 The Separate Electoral System ______20 1.6 INTERFAITH INITIATIVES ______21 2 REVIEW OF 2001 ______22 2.1 SUMMARY______22 2.2 MUSHARRAF’S POLICIES AND RECENT CRACKDOWNS______22 2.3 RESTORATION OF THE JOINT ELECTORAL SYSTEM ______24 2.4 DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES ______24 2.4.1 Sectarian Violence ______24 2.4.2 Blasphemy Law______25 2.4.3 Forced Conversion ______28 2.4.4 Other Cases of Religious Intolerance ______28 2.5 CSW ACTION ______29 2.5.1 Prayer ______29 2.5.2 Information sharing ______29 2.5.3 Campaigning initiatives ______30 2.6 CONCLUSIONS______30 2.7 RECOMMENDATIONS______31

1 COUNTRY PROFILE

1.1 MAP AND GENERAL PROFILE1

Country Name Islamic Republic of Pakistan (long form) Pakistan (short form), West Pakistan (former) Capital Islamabad Independence 14 August 1947 (from British India)

Geography Border countries Iran and Afghanistan in the west, China in the north, Kashmir in the northeast and India in the east Border waters Arabian Sea in the south Area 778,720 sq. km. Climate Mostly hot, dry desert; temperate in northwest; arctic in north Terrain Flat Indus plain in east, mountains in north and northwest; Baluchistan plateau in west

Government Form of Government Military-led administration (Federal Republic; Multiparty democracy prior to military coup in October 1999) Head of State President General Pervez Musharraf Head of Government President General Pervez Musharraf (as Chief Executive)

1 All figures are from the World Factbook 2000, unless otherwise indicated.

People Population2 144.6 million Annual Growth 2.11 % (2001 est.) Life expectancy 57.7 years Literacy3 Male 47%, Female 21% Languages Urdu (official) and English (official); Punjabi, Baluchi and Pashtu

Religion State Religion Islam Demography4 Muslim: 97% (approx. 140 million) (Sunni 77%, Shi’a 20%) Hindu: 1.51 % (approx. 2.17 million) Christian: 1.56% (approx. 2.25 million) Others : 0.26% (including Ahmadis)

Economy G.D.P. US$282 billion (2000 est.) G.D.P. Real Growth Rate 4.8% (2000 est.) Population below poverty 40% (2000 est.) line

1.1.1 Government

Pakistan is currently under military rule. General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, took power by ousting a democratic government in October 1999.

To bolster his own political power and to create an image of national stability for foreign lenders and investors, the General took an unconstitutional move and assumed the presidency on 20th June 2001. In the wake of US led air strikes on Afghanistan, he further extended his tenure as the Chief of Army for another three years5. However, he promised to return to civilian rule by 12th October 2002.

Prior to the 1999 coup, Pakistan was an Islamic republic, with a democratic parliament. The bicameral federal legislature (currently suspended) consisted of the Senate (Upper House)6 and the National Assembly (Lower House)7.

Administratively, Pakistan is a federal republic comprising four semi-autonomous provinces (Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sindh), one territory

2 Statistics based on the 1981 census, the latest figures available. The Pakistan Government conducted a census in 1998 but the update is not yet available. 3 Age 15 and over who can read and write. 4 It is widely believed that minority groups are grossly underrepresented and the actual size of their current populations should be considerably higher. Both Ahmadis and Christians are estimated to be in the region of 3 to 4 million, which is over 2% of the population. As Ahmadis would not register themselves as non-Muslims, most Ahmadis are not represented. 5 He was scheduled to retire as the army chief on 6th October 2001. 6 87 members, approximately half of its members, are elected every 3 years for a six-year term. 7 It has recently been increased from 217 seats to 350 seats. Each member is elected for a 5-year term.

4 (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and one federal capital area (the Islamabad Capital Territory).

The civil and criminal judicial systems as well as the Shari’ah system run concurrently in Pakistan. Various courts have overlapping jurisdictions. The Civil court, District court, High court and the Supreme court form the civil appeals process, whereas the magistrate, sessions court, High court and Supreme court is the progression in the criminal system. The Shari’ah Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and the Federal Shari’at Court hear appeals under Shari’ah.

1.1.2 Economy

Pakistan’s economy relies heavily on simple cotton-based industries. Largely owing to political turmoil, both domestically and with increasing tensions with India, Pakistan’s economy has been teetering towards bankruptcy in the last few years. A significant percentage of the population suffers from acute poverty. About two-fifths of the population is without access to clean water and over half has no access to sanitation.

Things took a turn for the worse after Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapon testing programme in May 1998. The already-fragile economy was faced with a package of economic sanctions from major industrial countries, including a freeze on most foreign aid and concession loans.

Pakistan owes in excess of £25 billion (US$ 37 billion) in foreign debt. Foreign loans and grants provide for nearly a quarter of government revenue. In an effort to rescue the country from bankruptcy, General Musharraf made it a priority to root out corruption and poverty.

As of 22nd September 2001, in acknowledging Pakistan’s co-operation to the ‘war on terrorism’, the US has waived all nuclear-related sanctions. Sanctions relating to the export of arms technology and those imposed in 1999 after General Musharraf took over the democratically elected government, however, remain in force.

Since the IMF resumed lending to Pakistan last November, the World Bank has also approved £302 million (US$ 450 million) in standby loans to help Pakistan revive its ailing economy.

1.1.3 Military

The Army, Navy, Air Force, Civil Armed Forces and National Guard are responsible for national security. Pakistan’s 610,000 strong army, the world’s eighth largest, is the country’s most cohesive national institution. Prior to September 11, military expenses accounted for 4% of the country’s GDP expenditure.

5 1.1.4 Transnational Disputes

1.1.4.1 Afghanistan & the Taliban

For decades Pakistan has been inextricably linked with Afghanistan and the Taliban. In the 1970s, Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) worked closely with the CIA in mobilising Muslim guerrillas to fight Afghanistan’s Russian invaders.

Until very recently, Pakistan has been widely suspected of providing vital military aid, including technical assistance, transport and soldiers, to the Taliban in violation of international sanctions. Most of the Taliban leadership were trained in Pakistani religious schools and much of its funding came illegally through Islamic militant networks in Pakistan. An estimated 5 to 10 million illegal weapons in Pakistan were used in support of the conflict in Afghanistan.

The ongoing civil war, the drought and the economic situation in Afghanistan have had an adverse impact on Pakistan. According to UNHCR, towards the end of 2001, Pakistan was hosting over 2 million refugees from Afghanistan. The influx of refugees and the growth of armed Islamic guerrilla movements at the border have augmented Pakistan’s internal instability and are inhibiting economic development.

1.1.4.2 India & Kashmir

The partition of Hindu-dominated India and Muslim-dominated Pakistan has never been satisfactorily resolved.

At the time the Indian subcontinent gained independence from Britain in August 1947, all the rulers of the 565 princely states had to decide whether to come under India or Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu maharajah ruling over the predominantly Muslim state of Kashmir and Jammu, was reluctant to join either. When Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province invaded in October 1947, however, he was forced to pledge allegiance to India in exchange for military assistance. As a result, India occupied the eastern portion of Kashmir while one-third of Kashmir in the west came under the control of Pakistan.

In the original Instrument of Accession, Majaraja Hari Singh only agreed to surrender powers in areas of defence, foreign affairs and communications. Since then, India has progressively integrated Kashmir. Exactly when the Instrument was signed is also an ongoing dispute. Pakistan believes that India has not been acting in good faith and the agreement should therefore be nullified.

The status of Kashmir has been the cause of three8 between India and Pakistan. In 1972, India and Pakistan agreed to accept the Line of Control as a de facto border.

8 In 1947, 1965 and 1971.

6 Pakistan’s relationship with India deteriorated sharply after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th December 2001. India accused Pakistan of training and harbouring separatist groups responsible for the bombing and responded by mobilising its armed forces into a threatening posture along the border.

1.2 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Pakistan has been under military rule for half its 54 years of independence. Although periods of civilian rule have taken place, stability has failed to take root. The country continues to be marked by turmoil and corruption.

In 1978 military dictator General Zia ul-Haq took power after staging a coup. To gain support from Islamic militant groups, he pursued a policy of Islamisation. For the following nine years after his death in 19889, the government oscillated between two national parties – the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).

On 12th October 1999, the Chief of Army, General Pervez Musharraf, overthrew Nawaz Sharif’s administration with a bloodless military coup 10. Two days later, he declared a state of emergency, dissolved the federal and provincial parliaments, and suspended the 1973 Pakistan Constitution.

Critics in the West decried his actions on the basis that he ousted a democratically-elected government. As a result, Pakistan was suspended from the Council of the Commonwealth. Plans for the signature of a new EU-Pakistan Co-operation Agreement (which would have replaced the 1986 Co-operation Agreement) were also halted.

Following the coup, in an attempt to revamp the economy and to consolidate his own position, General Musharraf stated his intention to bring Pakistan onto a new path of improved governance, focusing on devolution of power to lower levels of government, poverty reduction and bringing the plight of marginalized people to the forefront of the development agenda.

He also proposed a procedural reform to ‘end abuses of the controversial Blasphemy Law’ and to restore the Joint Electoral System. Regrettably, in the face of mass protests by militant Islamic groups, he backtracked from both his pledges within a month.

In May 2000, the Pakistan Supreme Court validated the October 1999 military takeover but set a three-year time limit for Pakistan to return to civilian rule. The Court also restricted the government from making any Constitutional amendment of a fundamental nature.

9 General Haq died mysteriously in an air crash. 10 Nawaz Sharif’s administration was widely regarded as corrupt and inefficient.

7 On the 54th Anniversary of Pakistan’s independence, a day before the arrival of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation, General Musharraf announced that Provincial and National Parliamentary Elections would be held between 1st and 11th October 2002.

In the wake of the US-led air strikes on Afghanistan, General Musharraf has taken courageous strides to side unequivocally with the US against the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime. Almost immediately, as a gesture of support, the international community relaxed their diplomatic and economic sanctions over Pakistan.

On 24th November 2001, the EU and Pakistan signed a new Cooperation Agreement. In a Joint Declaration on the same day, both parties reconfirm their commitment to the respect, protection and promotion of human rights. Pakistan also reiterated its firm commitment to return to democratic government in accordance with the roadmap announced by President Musharraf on August 14, 2001.

1.3 GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

At present, under military rule, all fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution are, in theory, suspended.

1.3.1 Thematic concerns

International human rights groups continue to voice their concerns regarding torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest, denial of fair public trial, partiality of the judicial system, discrimination against women, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, judicial corporal punishments, the death penalty, freedom of expression and the press, freedom of movement, political and extrajudicial killings committed by the police, politically motivated disappearances, human trafficking and prisoners of conscience.11

1.3.2 Discrimination against Women

The position of women in Pakistan remains a matter of serious concern. Sexual abuse, rape, forced marriage, domestic violence including ‘stove burn’ accidents12, acid throwing and ‘honour killings 13 remain practices deeply entrenched in the society.

11 For further information, see reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 12 The throwing of kerosene on women and setting them alight. 13 Honour killing is the practice of punishing women who are said to have brought dishonour to the men in their families. Women are often brutally murdered by their brothers, husbands, fathers or sons for the least sexual indiscretion and upon the slightest suspicion of adultery.

8 According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in the year 2000, one woman was raped every two hours, over 1,000 women were murdered in the name of honour in Punjab Province alone, and hundreds of others were victims of acid throwing and stove burning accidents.

Crimes against minority women, particularly Christians, continue to escalate. In January 2000, a minority woman accused of desecrating the Qur’an was burned to death by Muslim extremists. In May 2000, eight Christian girls were allegedly gang raped by Muslims when travelling home from work. All the Muslim women with whom they were travelling were unharmed. When the incident was reported in the local newspaper, the employer of these Christian girls fired sixty Christian workers in retaliation.

In most cases, due to social and cultural pressure, victims are reluctant to report their ordeals to the authorities. Members of human rights organizations who encourage the girls to register their cases have also received death threats.

Often, minority women who are victims of rape are forcibly converted to Islam14 and married off to their rapists or sold into prostitution. According to a ruling of the Lahore High Court, if a non-Muslim married woman converts to Islam her marriage is automatically dissolved.

Worse still, these women are at risk of being accused of committing adultery. Under Shari’ah15, there is no distinction between rape and adultery. Both offences are called zina but the punishments are different. The penalty for zina (adultery and fornication) is death of stoning. To discharge adultery, the burden falls on the victims to prove rape (zina bil-jabar), which by law requires the testimonies of four adult Muslim males who have witnessed the act of penetration. The testimony of the rape victim alone, or even that of four female witnesses, is not sufficient. If the accused is a Muslim, no non-Muslim is allowed to testify against him.

In July 1993, Safia Bibi, a blind girl, was raped by her employer. When she failed to identify the culprit she was found guilty of adultery and sentenced to three years imprisonment and five lashes.

During his time in power, General Zia introduced a number of other repressive laws against women including dress codes, gender segregation, an end to foreign diplomatic postings for women and limitation on women’s recruitment possibilities. These laws are still protected by the 8th Amendment to the Constitution.

Pakistan has been a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) since 1981.

14 Usually they are made to recite a short incantation, which is sufficient to make them a Muslim. The rape, conversion, marriage, and in some cases the subsequent divorce, can all take place in the space of a single evening. 15 The Shari’ah law on zina was incorporated in the Hudood Ordinances by General Zia in 1974.

9 1.3.3 Pakistan and the United Nations

Pakistan joined the UN in 1947. Presently, Pakistan is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 1969, the CEDAW 1981, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) as well as the Geneva Conventions (GCs) 1949. Pakistan is also a party to a number of key International Labour Organisation Conventions.

The then Special Rapporteur of UN Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All forms of Religious Intolerance, Mr Abdulfateh Amor, visited Pakistan in 1995. He concluded in his report to the 52th Session Commission on Human Rights that the legislation in Pakistan related to religious minorities and to religious freedom generally were likely to favour or foster intolerance in the society16. He further recommended that the Government of Pakistan make the necessary changes to amend this situation and take steps toward becoming a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

1.4 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OVERVIEW

Pakistan is an Islamic republic and Islam has been a tenet of the Pakistan Constitution since 1956.

By 1964, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan17 and the Constitution was amended to include considerable references to the Qur’an and Sunnah18. By 1973, Islam was formally established as the state religion.

The 1973 Constitution, on the one hand states that adequate provisions shall be made for minorities to profess and practise their faith, on the other hand requires all legislation to be consistent with Islam and imposes some elements of Qur’anic law on both Muslims and religious minorities.

Minorities, such as Christians and Ahmadis, continue to be marginalised politically, economically, socially and culturally. Under the suspended Constitution, both the President and the Prime Minister must be Muslims and all senior officials must swear allegiance to the country’s ‘Islamic ideology’. In education, the ability to read the Qur’an is used as a yardstick to assess literacy.

16 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 52th Session, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.3, para. 82. 17 The 1962 Constitution described Pakistan simply as “Republic of Pakistan”. Ayub Khan amended the Constitution in 1964 by adding the prefix “Islamic” to the name. 18 The examples and sayings of the prophet Mohammed.

10 95% of the Christians in Pakistan come from the Dalit outcast community. In a country like Pakistan where the caste system is deeply entrenched in the society, the social stigma on Christians is severe. Most Christians are economically deprived and can only work in brick kilns or as sweepers (sanitation workers) or domestic servants.

In some areas, restaurants display notices asking customers to disclose their religious identity before ordering food. In Hafizabad, one restaurant near a Christian colony displayed notices of separate utensils and wash-basins for Muslim and non-Muslim customers. CSW received reports that some teachers refused to taste food cooked by non- Muslim students.

Violence in the name of religion has been at the core of much communal conflict throughout the history of Pakistan. Since the implementation of Shari’ah in 1991, minorities have been facing escalating intolerance and hostility from Islamic fundamentalists. In 1997, the Christian village of Shanti Nagar in southern Punjab was attacked by a mob of 30,000 Islamic fanatics. 1,500 homes were looted. 80% of the village was torched. Fourteen churches in nearby Khanewal were also destroyed.

Often, as in the case of Shanti Nagar, the police are reluctant to offer protection or to investigate crimes associated with religious tension. The unwillingness of the government to act on behalf of religious minorities further promotes an atmosphere of impunity.

Discriminatory legislation prescribed by successive governments severely interferes with minority religions. Ahmadis are, for example, prevented by law from calling themselves Muslims. They are also banned from using Muslim practices in worship or in the public manifestation of their faith. Freedom of religious speech by minority faiths is also limited.

Meanwhile, Islamic fundamentalists continue to abuse the Hudood Ordinances and the blasphemy law to oppress religious minorities. In the year 2001 alone, at least 40 Muslims, 23 Ahmadis, ten Christians and two Hindus have been charged with blasphemy. Any voice raised against these pieces of discriminatory legislation is ruthlessly suppressed.

With the implementation of Shari’ah in 1991, converts from Muslim background are particularly at risk. According to some interpretations of Islamic Shari’ah, the penalty for apostasy is death.

Forced conversion of non-Muslims to Islam is also a concern. According to the National Commission of Justice & Peace, compared with 1999, there has been a 56% increase of forced conversion incidents in the year 2000. Eighty-seven of the 113 reported cases were from Christian background. Often if a minor converts to Islam, he or she will be taken away from the non-Muslim parents.

Until recently, Pakistan was the only country in the world where voters were not allowed to vote for candidates outside their religious affiliations. The separate electoral system (SES) promoted religious apartheid and eroded Pakistan’s democracy. Religious

11 minorities, who are already cut off from mainstream politics, were further alienated by the system.

1.5 ISLAMISATION

Islamisation is the biggest threat to religious freedom in Pakistan. It affects all areas of political, civil, cultural, economic and social rights.

When Pakistan was founded over half a century ago, the vision was of a secular state where every citizen would be equal under the law. Sadly, that vision has become badly tarnished as successive governments allied themselves with fundamentalist Islamic groups for political support, and in the process, succumbed to their demands to turn Pakistan into a theocratic Islamic state governed by Shari’ah law.

The campaign to implement Shari’ah was intensified by the Pakistan National Alliance in 1977. When General Zia ul-Haq took power, he made Islamisation the primary objective. In 1979, he created Shari’at benches to compare the laws of Pakistan against the Qur’an and Sunnah. By 1980, General Zia created the Federal Shari’at Court. Through further constitutional amendments, the Federal Shari’at Court, presided exclusively by Muslim judges, was given considerable power to examine Pakistan legislation and review decisions of other courts.

In July 1985, Qazi Latif and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, two pro-Islamic senators, introduced a private Shari’at Bill to the Senate. The bill was shelved when Zia dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed the government on 29th May 1988.

On 26th March 1989, Qazi Latif and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq introduced another private bill, called the Enforcement of Shari’ah Bill. The Bill called for Shari’ah law to be the ‘supreme law in Pakistan’.

In 1991 the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, formally incorporated the Islamic (Shari’ah) law into the country’s legal code. He was, however, successfully barred from making a constitutional amendment to establish Shari’ah law as the country’s supreme law19.

The implementation of Shari’ah law provides further ground for Islamic extremists to repress religious minorities.

19 The National Assembly (Lower House) passed the Bill with a two-thirds majority. Owing to strong opposition from religious Christian minorities and human rights groups, Nawaz was unable to table the Bill in the Upper House (Senate) within the specified time frame. Meanwhile, the military coup took place and General Musharraf suspended both the Constitution and the parliament.

12 1.5.1 The Constitution

The first constitution (1956) was a compromise designed to appease both Islamic fundamentalists and moderates. Despite fierce opposition from the Ulemas (Islamic cleric and scholars), it was carefully formulated to avoid references to Shari’ah law as the authoritative source of Islamic law. Instead, the preamble stated that Pakistan was founded to be a democratic state ‘based on Islamic principles of social justice’.

Article 18 further guaranteed minorities the freedom to profess and practise their religions. The Constitution however gave Islamic law jurisdiction over personal matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, and stipulated that the state should ‘enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah’ (Article 25(1)).

Throughout the following five decades, as Pakistan oscillated between military dictatorships and democracy, pro-Islamic elements have systematically introduced substantive amendments to the Constitution.

The current suspended Constitution of Pakistan (CoP) 1973 is heavily biased against religious minorities. Although Shari’ah law is not expressly established by the Constitution, its supremacy is implied. Article 2 of the CoP 1973 stipulates that Islam is the State religion and in all matters of the state, Qur’anic principles will be followed.

The government is empowered to promote the Islamic way of life (Art. 31). The head of State must be a Muslim (Art. 41) and the office of the Prime Minister is also reserved for Muslims (Art. 91(3)).

Although Art. 20 guarantees the freedom of every citizen to profess, practise and propagate his religion and to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions, such freedom is subject to ‘public order, law and morality’.

The Federal Shar’iat Court set up by General Zia is given constitutional status with power under Art. 203 to nullify any law it deems ‘un-Islamic’ (Art. 203D)20. The Shar’iat Court therefore functions as a parallel judiciary with supra-parliamentary status. Its decision is final on all legal matters.

In a similar vein, Art. 227 states that all existing laws should be interpreted in the light of, and brought into conformity with, ‘the teaching and requirement of Islam as set out in the holy Qur’an and Sunnah’. The Constitution further gives power to the Council of Islamic Ideology to ensure compliance (Art. 228).

20 Although the Federal Shar’iat Court cannot repeal the legislation concerned, once it declares the law ‘un-Islamic’ the parliament will have to act accordingly and make the necessary changes in the legislation. Theoretically, the Federal Shar’iat Court has power to override the Constitution if the latter is deemed ‘un-Islamic’.

13 1.5.2 The Implementation of Shar’iah and Other Discriminatory Legislation

The status of Christians and other religious minorities is best reflected in their standing under the Shari’ah law.

According to Islamic law, if the dispute is between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, the case will automatically be decided according to Shari’ah law.

The Hudood21 Ordinances, promulgated General Zia in 1974, is a collection of five criminal ordinances relating to theft22 (including robbery), intoxication23 (including drink and drugs), bearing false witness24, gambling and adultery25 (zina). To Muslims, these hadd offences are offences against the ‘boundaries’ set by God. The penalties are fixed by the Qur’an and Sunnah, from which no deviation is allowed. The Hudood Ordinances require strict adherence to Muslim practices and blatantly discriminate against non- Muslims in a court of law.

In Shari’ah, complex rules govern the number of witnesses required, their competence and the weight of their testimonies. In 1984, General Zia-ul-Haq brought the law of evidence in criminal cases into conformity with Shari’ah law by enacting the Quanoon-e- Shahadat Ordinance. The Ordinance applies different standards of evidence for Muslims and non-Muslims, and for men and women with regard to alleged violation of Islamic laws. For Islamic offences where punishments are imposed at discretion (Ta’zir), the valid testimony (Shahadat) of a non-Muslim male is worth half the value of a Muslim male’s and the testimony of a non-Muslim female is quarter that of a Muslim male. For Islamic offences where punishments are fixed (hadd), for example under the Hadood Ordinances, the evidence of a non-Muslim is inadmissible unless the accused is also a non-Muslim. It does not matter whether the victim is a non-Muslim. Consequentially, there is little redress for violence and discrimination against religious minorities, in particular against non-Muslim women.

Under Qisas (hurt) and Diyat (compensation), murder and personal injuries are no longer crimes against the state. Instead, they are crimes against individuals. A murderer can therefore pay financial compensation (blood money) to the victim’s family if he does not wish to be hanged for his crime. The rate of compensation depends on the gender and religious persuasion of the victim. The diyat for a female Muslim victim is only half that of a male Muslim victim. Likewise, if the victim is a Christian man, his life is worth half that of a Muslim man. If a Christian woman is killed, the rate of compensation is further halved and her life is worth only a quarter of that of a Muslim man.

21 Hudood is the plural for hadd. 22 The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. 23 The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. 24 The Offences of Qazf (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. 25 The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979.

14 In his fervent pursuit to Islamise the country, General Zia introduced five additional provisions to sections 295 and 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code (1861)26: a law punishing the defiling of the Qur’an27, the law against blasphemy28, a prohibition against insulting the wives, family or companions of the Prophet29, and two laws directed against the Ahmadis30. In so doing, the general respect for religious beliefs was replaced by exclusive respect for Islam.

Each of these pieces legislation is further protected by the 8th Amendment to the Constitution. In 1992, section 123A of the Penal Code was modified to criminalise any act prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan.

1.5.3 Ahmadis

In 1952 Islamic militant group, Jamait-e-Islami, declared that Ahmadis were not Muslims on the basis that they object to the principle of jihad (holy war) against non-believers and recognise an additional prophet, Mirza Ghirlam Ahmad, after Mohammed. This declaration resulted in a wave of destruction of Ahmadi property and mosques.

In 1974, through a constitutional amendment, the government of Pakistan31 officially declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Since then, the practise of Ahmadi faith has been severely restricted in law.

The systematic discrimination of Ahmadis was formalized when General Zia-ul Haq added sections 298B and 298C to the Penal Code in 198432. The new laws forbad Ahmadis from describing themselves as Muslims, from using any Islamic terminology to describe any of their buildings, from using azan (public call to prayer) and from propagating their faith. Arrests and repression33 against the Ahmadis continued under Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf regimes. To many Ahmadis, there is no real freedom of religion in Pakistan.

1.5.4 Islamic Militant Groups

Islamists (Islamic militants) estimated to comprise about 10% of Pakistan’s population, poses a real threat to national stability and international security. Successive governments have appeared weak in face of pressure from these extreme elements. Today, these

26 Originally, ss.295 and 298 of the Penal Code, inherited from the British, were designed to prevent and limit religious violence by punishing religious offences. 27 s.295B. 28 s.295C. 29 s.298A. 30 s.298B-C. 31 Under the leadership of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto. 32 Ordinance XX. 33 Other flagrant breaches of religious freedom against Ahmadis include the sealing or destruction of places of worship, desecration of graves, denial of burial grounds, withholding construction permits, etc.

15 groups are highly organised, powerful, well-resourced and fully armed – all in the name of Islam.

The country’s 2,430 km34 porous northern border with Afghanistan has long been a breeding ground for Islamic militant groups. North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, in particular, remain beyond the control of central government. Their distance from the capital, intense poverty and proximity to Afghanistan have combined to create an area rife with heroin processing, arms smuggling and extremist religion. In certain areas, local Taliban-inspired jihadi groups rule. Kidnap and ransom of foreign aid workers occur frequently.

Madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) further instil fundamentalist values among the poor and the uneducated. These schools are increasingly seen as recruitment centres and training grounds for Islamists and exist solely to motivate and train the next generation of young Muslims to wage jihad (holy war).

Driven by an intense desire to see Islamic law become the supreme law of the land, Islamic militant groups, such as the Jamait Ulema-e-Islami (JUI)35, have become one of the most divisive forces in the country. To achieve their agenda, they exploit the country’s high unemployment and rampant poverty. Most of these militant groups are believed to be funded by Islamic states in the Middle East. Many of them are sympathetic to the Al-Qaeda and have links with the network.

Of the five main militant groups operating in Kashmir, four are based in Pakistan. The largest training camp in Pakistan is run by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a wing of an Afghan mujahedin group known as Markaz Al Dawa Wal.

Pakistan has been under immense international pressure to stem the growth of militant Islam and to curb jihad activities. Since taking power, General Musharraf has ordered the closure of Afghan banks on Pakistani soil and frozen Taliban bank accounts within the country.

With an illiteracy rate of approximately 57.3%, the need to offer young people an education that equips them for mainstream society is crucial if the drift towards increasing fundamentalism is to be curbed.

1.5.5 Sunni and Shi’a conflict

Meanwhile, tension between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims is also simmering. Over 95% of Pakistan’s population is Muslim. About 77% are Sunni and 20% are the relatively better- off Shi’a minority. Pockets of Shi’a communities can be found in Sindh, Punjab and North West Frontier Provinces although the majority of them live in Karachi.

34 The World Factbook 2000. 35 A southeast Asian Islamist network believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist group.

With the backing of the West, General Zia-ul Haq actively encouraged Islamic militancy to fight a holy war in Afghanistan against communism. As a result, Pakistan became home to a number of predominantly Sunni groups that were funded, armed and trained by his regime. At the same time, the climate created by the Iranian revolution encouraged the backing by Iran of a small number of Shi’a groups in Pakistan. Before long, hardliners on both sides acquired arms. A seemingly endless cycle of tit-for-tat violence began.

According to local press, at least 2,000 people have been killed in sectarian violence every year over the past decade. Thousands have died in clashes between the small number of Sunni and Shi’a armed extremist groups in Karachi alone. More were probably never reported.

Over the years, strict security measures have been implemented and the death toll in sectarian clashes has reduced significantly. However, recent attacks indicate that extremism is far from being kept at bay.

1.5.6 The Blasphemy Law

The government of Pakistan has so far failed to take steps to address the blasphemy law, which has been widely used by extremists to victimise not only members of the minority faiths but even Muslims with whom they disagree.

On 21st April 2000, at the Convention of Human Rights and Human Dignity in Islamabad, General Musharraf proposed a procedural reform to the controversial blasphemy law. He suggested that the merits of individual cases should be scrutinised by a Deputy Commissioner prior to an arrest. The procedures for filing a first information report (FIR) should also be changed to make the process more official and less open to abuse.

A month later, however, to appease Islamic militant groups who threatened a three-day nationwide strike, the General backtracked on his commitment. He declared at a press conference, “As it was the unanimous demand of the ulema [Islamic clerics] and the people, therefore, I have decided to do away with the procedural change in registration of FIR under the blasphemy law.”

1.5.6.1 The law

Commonly known as the blasphemy law, section 295C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 stipulates that any person who ‘by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly’ defiles the name of the Islamic Prophet, Mohammad, is liable for blasphemy. The penalty, in additional to a fine, is death sentence or imprisonment for life.

17 In 1990, the Federal Shari’at Court ruled that the penalty for blasphemy should be mandatory death sentence, with no right to reprieve or pardon. The decision of the Federal Shari’at Court is binding but the Pakistani Government has so far failed to pass the necessary bill to amend the law. Hence the current situation is that the clause ‘or life imprisonment’ is void, even though the Pakistani Government has often used this anomaly to defend itself against critics of the death penalty.

1.5.6.2 The practice

The wording of the blasphemy law is vague and open-ended. The law does not require proof of the actual state of mind of the accused and disregards the element of intention. Since its enactment in 1986, the legislation has been misused to intimidate or punish religious minorities and to settle personal scores. Hundreds of innocent people have been imprisoned, forced to flee the country or killed by Islamic fundamentalists under the pretext of punishing blasphemers.

Over the years, over 40 Christians known to CSW have been charged with blasphemy under s.295C. At least 100 Ahmadis have been charged. In recent years, many moderate Muslims have also fallen victim to the law.

According to Ms. Asma Jahangir, former Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and current UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, “The anti-blasphemy law has tended to be abused. Because of the public sentiment the allegation arouses, the law has also been liable to a miscarriage of justice. Clearly, the incidence of blasphemy was no greater than before the law came in than it is after it. There are certainly more allegations of it now. The experience points to the need for serious rethinking of the law”. 36

Blasphemy charges are often founded on frivolous or malicious accusations, and are arbitrarily brought. It is not uncommon for instigators to be motivated by religious bigotry, personal prejudice, selfish gain or professional rivalry. In many cases complaints are filed at the insistence of local mullahs (Muslim clerics) or members of the Islamic parties.

Anyone can be arrested for blasphemy without a warrant. No bail is available. Ill- treatment in custody and torture are commonplace. Judicial proceedings typically take years, resulting in innocent victims languishing in jails pending trial or appeal. The delay is compounded by the fact that judges are reluctant to try these prisoners.

It only takes the testimony of four Muslims to bring about a conviction. Prosecutions often rely only on the unsubstantiated oral testimony of the complainants.

36 State of Human Rights in 1998 Report (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, February 1999), 164.

18 The very existence of the blasphemy law encourages hostility towards minorities and has been interpreted by some Muslim fanatics as a licence to take the law into their own hands. In many mosques, Muslims are taught that those who blaspheme deserve to be killed immediately and that protecting a blasphemer is as bad as blaspheming itself. A Muslim is therefore duty bound by his faith to kill the blasphemer, except when such duty is shifted to the Islamic State. Meanwhile, private acts of vengeance enjoy impunity.

In 2000, Lahore High Court Judge Mr Justice Nazir Akhtar publicly stated that anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed on the spot by Muslims as a religious obligation (swab). He further remarked that there was no need for any legal proceedings for a blasphemer. Although the statement was subsequently retracted, it indicated the extent of judicial bias on the subject.

Customarily, the accusing party packs the courtroom with zealous mullahs in a show of righteous concern. On one occasion, extremists built a gallows outside the courtroom to signify that even if the court found the accused not guilty, the crowds would carry out the required punishment themselves.

The mandatory capital punishment has long been denounced as excessive and disproportionate to the crime. It is a matter of controversy even within Islamic circles.

Although officially no one has yet been executed under the blasphemy law, at least four Christians known to CSW have died at the hands of extremists. Baba Bantu Masih (65) was stabbed eight times in a Lahore police station in 1992 by a young Muslim who accused him of blasphemy. He later died from the injuries. A post mortem revealed that Tahir Iqbal had been poisoned inside Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat Jail in 1992. Nehmat Ahmer, a Christian teacher from Faisalabad, was stabbed to death by his accuser in broad daylight on 6th January 1992. Manzoor Masih, Rehmat and Salamat Masih were shot at outside Lahore High Court on 5th April 1995. While Rehmat and Salamat survived the ordeal, Manzoor Masih was killed on the spot.

Judges and lawyers involved in blasphemy cases are harassed and threatened. Others are under pressure to avoid convicting Muslims who carry out atrocities against Christians. The murder of Justice (R) Arif Ibaql Bhatti in October 1997 after he acquitted Rehmat and Salmat Masih in a previous blasphemy case demonstrates the seriousness of these threats and the obstacles they pose to justice.

Once accused, and even if he is subsequently exonerated, the alleged ‘blasphemer’ is in great danger of being pursued and killed by zealots. His family is also at risk. Over the years, hundreds have been rendered homeless and jobless. A handful has had to flee the country to save their lives. Those who could not afford to leave were forced into hiding. They face death threats and are vulnerable to blackmail. The number of those imprisoned on blasphemy charges is estimated to be in the hundreds.

19 1.5.7 Apostasy (Conversion from Islam to other faith)

The treatment of converts from Islam is an issue of increasing concern. The right to change religion is not expressly protected by the Constitution although there is no legislation against proselytism and conversion.

According to all schools of Islamic jurisprudence, a male apostate should be put to death. Some schools are, however, of the opinion that while a female apostate is not subject to capital punishment, she should be kept in confinement and beaten until she recants and returns to Islam. Although the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) does not list apostasy as a ‘hadd’ offence, the very existence of such teachings put an apostate in great danger.

Many orthodox Muslims hold the view that conversion from Islam to another faith is rebellion against Allah and it is the duty of a Muslim to slew an apostate. Converts from Islam are often at risk of being murdered for ‘insulting Islam’, bringing ‘shame and dishonour’ to the family or the community, or even ‘betraying the whole civilisation’. They are also likely to be rejected by their family, discriminated at work and will most certainly lose the right to their inheritance. Only a handful of converts dare to openly identify themselves.

1.5.8 The Separate Electoral System

Throughout the last five elections in 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, Pakistan’s religious minorities were marginalised by the separate electoral system (SES), under which voters were barred from voting for candidates outside their own religious affiliation.

The SES was first introduced to the local bodies elections by General Zia-Ul-Haq in 1979 as part of his Islamisation programme. In 1985, through a presidential order, General Zia replaced nearly four decades of the joint electoral system with the separate electoral system at both the Provincial and National Assemblies levels. Using religion as the key determining factor for voting rights and the right to stand for political representation, Zia politically compartmentalised the whole country into five religious groups: (1) Muslims, (2) Christians, (3) Hindus, (4) Ahmadis and (5) Parsis, Sikhs and other non-Muslims. This provision was given statutory protection by the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution.

The SES limited the voting options of the people of Pakistan. Religious minorities were unable to vote for Muslim candidates in their constituencies or to stand as candidates for the Muslim electorates. Muslim candidates were also unable to benefit from the votes of religious minorities within their constituencies.

20 Furthermore, the system strictly limited the number of seats which religious minorities were able to win in elections, reserving the vast majority for Muslim candidates37. The representatives whom minorities elected effectively had a negligible impact on legislation rendering the minorities effectively voiceless.

By making every minority group a political rival of the other, the SES had the tendency to damage the political and social integration of religious communities. Minority groups believe that the SES was designed to segregate the nation on the basis of religion.

The SES violated the civil and political rights of all citizens in Pakistan. It also contravened the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, in particular Article 25 which guarantees equal rights to all citizens, regardless of religious persuasion.

1.6 INTERFAITH INITIATIVES

For the few years, various faith minorities have been working together to end the cycle of violence and to promote interfaith social harmony.

At the local level, minority faiths are engaging in meaningful dialogues with the Muslim community. They are taking measures to curb inflammatory statements and are holding training seminars on conflict resolution. They have also established a closer network with local councils, police chiefs and other government officials.

At the national level, a National Communication Network was set up to facilitate closer liaison with various senior officials, ministers and the head of State. Inter-faith conferences have also been held in Lahore, Islamabad, Faisalabad and other major cities.

37 In the National Assembly, only 10 seats out of a total of 217 seats were reserved for religious minorities – 4 for Christians, 4 for Hindus, 1 for Ahmadis and 1 for other non-Muslims. In the Provincial Assemblies, only 23 out of a total of 483 seats were reserved for religious minorities. The number of seats allocated was proportional to the perceived size of each religious group. Religious minorities claim that the official figures, based on the 1981 census, are inaccurate and further marginalise the minority population.

21 2 REVIEW OF 2001

2.1 SUMMARY

2001 has been an eventful year for the Christian minority in Pakistan. To most, it will be remembered for the 15 Christians and a Muslim killed during the Bahawalpur church bombing. This kind of sectarian violence illustrates the extent of religious hatred and intolerance against the Christian minority.

The year 2001 will also be remembered for the resolute determination of President Musharraf to back the US-led Coalition against the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime, and to confront religious militants at home.

History will probably be the best judge on Musharraf’s intention and performance. Meanwhile, however, Pakistan remains a country of major concern with regard to religious extremism. At a conference in April 2001, over a million fundamentalists vowed that they would model the Taliban in Afghanistan and make Pakistan an Islamic theocracy. For the first time in Pakistan legal history, the High Court, due to pressure from Islamic extremists, failed to overturn a blasphemy conviction.

Before Musharraf’s sweeping measures begin to bear lasting results, violence is resurfacing. Minority faith communities are concerned that they would bear the brunt of extremist aggression and that Islamic fundamentalists would use the US-Afghan conflict as a platform to step up their campaign to Islamise the country. Interfaith groups remain fully alert and closely monitor the situation as events unfold.

2.2 MUSHARRAF’S POLICIES AND RECENT CRACKDOWNS

Following the death of the Taliban’s relatively moderate second-in-command Mullah Mohammad Rabbani in April 2001, Pakistan became increasing concerned that the Taliban leadership council would maintain or even increase its extreme tendencies. To control the flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and to limit Taliban’s access to Islamic militants and supplies, Pakistan began to take steps to seal its borders in May.

In a bid to demonstrate his commitment to economic improvement and to encourage foreign investment, President Musharraf began to crack down on Islamic extremist groups in the second half of 2001.

In August 2001, police in the southern port city Karachi of the Sindh Province launched a crackdown on Islamic militant groups and arrested some 200 people, including several Shi’a leaders of the Jaffaria Alliance (Jaffia-I-Tayyar Society). The arrests came after some militant groups defied a warning from the provincial government to stop public fund raising. The authorities also banned local mujahadeen groups such as Lashkar-e- Taiba and Al-Badr Mujahideen.

22 Elsewhere, the Musharraf administration cracked down on illegal weapons and banned various Sunni and Shi’a Islamic organisations 38. Islamic activists described these moves as ‘un-Islamic’ and vowed to resist the crackdowns.

In the wake of the US-led air strikes on Afghanistan, President Musharraf further launched a nation-wide campaign to crack down on religious militants. The authorities seized over 137,000 pieces of weaponary, banned five of the country’s most notorious Islamic groups39 and arrested close to 2,000 Islamists.

Official campaigns were also launched to regulate the country’s madrassahs and to offer students a wide-ranging curriculum in place of mere intense theological training. Under the new regulations, madrassahs cannot be built without permission from the government and all of them have to register and be brought into the mainstream education system.

On 12th January 2002, in a televised national address, President Musharraf publicly denounced religious extremism. Stating that Pakistan would not tolerate terrorist groups, he urged the people of Pakistan to “banish intolerance and hatred and to establish a climate of equality and brotherhood”. The President vowed to close mosques and Islamic religious schools that teach an extreme version of Islam and instigate violence.

President Musharraf’s stand against terrorism and Islamic extremism has provoked various Islamic militant groups. While there has been no major backlash, a reaction is brewing. Islamists have vowed to bring the President down, describing the military leader as a ‘threat to national security’.

The growing number of Pakistanis joining the Taliban forces has exacerbated the military government’s dilemma. The government admits that it is almost impossible to seal or monitor the entire 2000 km border. The worst fear of the government is that the Taliban forces will re-group on Pakistan soil and strengthen local militant groups.

The presence of fundamentalists within the army and the Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) also poses a potential source of trouble. Pro-Islamic elements within the military are already criticising General Musharraf of limiting the power of those actively involved in Kashmir and thereby abandoning his claim to the region.

To appease the Islamists, President Musharraf has released over 800 of the 2,000 extremists arrested and the rest have yet to be brought to justice.

38 Accusing them of propagating sectarian hatred and violence, General Musharraf banned Shi’a organisation Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most violent Sunni Islamic extremist underground groups. He also kept their respective parent groups (Tehreek-e-Jafia and Sipah-e- Sahaba) under close surveillance. 39 The five groups are Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish -e-Muhammad, the two jihadi groups blamed for the attack on Indian Parliament, the Sunni extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba (the Guardian of the Friends of Prophet), its Shi’ite counterpart Tehreek -e-Jafria and Tehreek -e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (a pro- Taliban movement based in the tribal areas in the NWFP).

23 2.3 RESTORATION OF THE JOINT ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Throughout 2001, the religious minorities augmented their campaigning efforts in calling for the restoration of the joint electoral system (JES). The Christian Organisations for Social Action in Pakistan (COSAP), in particular, initiated a countrywide campaign to boycott the four phases of the local bodies elections held between 31 December 2000 and mid-August 2001. The protest received overwhelming40 support from all minority groups.

On 28 June 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that the elections of mayor, deputy mayor, labourers, farmers and women at the Local Council would be based on the JES. However, the election for general seats was still based on the split electoral system.

On 16th January 2002, President Musharraf finally decided to abolish the SES and announced that the general elections in October 2002 would be held under the principle of one person one vote regardless of religious persuasion.

The religious minorities believe the return to the JES will reduce the significance of discriminatory legislation such as the blasphemy law as the Muslim MPs will be obliged to take up their cases under the principle of electoral accountability. More crucially, as minorities tend to live together in colonies, to gain minority vote, Muslim MPs will have the added incentive to represent them.

To ensure adequate representation of the minorities, the original 1973 Constitution guaranteed both a joint electoral system as well as assigned seats for non-Muslims in the parliament. Unfortunately, in restoring the joint electorate, President Musharraf has done away with the reserved seats. Without the reserved seats, minorities are concerned that they would struggle to win any general seat in the October 2002 elections. Various Muslim parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League, are standing in solidarity with the minorities in their demand for reserved seats.

2.4 DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES

The following comprises a list of cases CSW campaigned on in 2001. This catalogue does not purport to be a complete listing of all instances of religious intolerance.

2.4.1 Sectarian Violence

2.4.1.1 Bahawalpur Church Massacre

Three weeks after the US started its bombing campaign against Afghanistan, Pakistan hit international headlines when pro-Islamic gunmen shot dead 15 Christians and a Muslim guard during a church service at St. Dominic’s Church in Bahawalpur, south Punjab, on

40 Over 78%.

24 28th October 2001. No group has claimed responsibility, but suspicion falls on Islamic extremists who are angry that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States in its war on terrorism. In spite of President Musharraf’s promise to step up protection for minorities and to bring to justice those responsible for the violence, no one has been arrested.

2.4.1.2 Islamabad G/8 Church Bombing

On 13 January 2002, a bomb exploded inside a church in G/8 Christian Colony in Islamabad. Apart from damage to the building, no one was injured. Church leaders believed the attack was in retaliation to President Musharraf’s pledge to crack down on militant groups.

2.4.1.3 Rawalpindi Mosque killing

At least 10 people were killed and a dozen critically injured41 when three gunmen fired indiscriminately at worshippers during an evening prayer in a Shi’ite Muslim mosque in Rawalpindi, Punjab Province, on 26th February 2002. The attack is believed to be a reaction to the nationwide crackdown on extremism.

2.4.2 Blasphemy Law

2.4.2.1 Ayub Masih (a Christian)

On 25th July 2001, for the first time in Pakistan legal history, the High Court failed to overturn a blasphemy conviction and rubber-stamped the mandatory death penalty imposed on Ayub Masih.

Ayub Masih, a Christian accused of blasphemy under s.295C of PPC, was arrested on 14th October 1996 in his village, Arifabad in Sahiwal District (about 700 km from Islamabad) following a complaint filed by a Muslim, Muhammad Akam. Akam allegedly heard Ayub saying, “If we want to know the truth about Islam, then read Salman Rushdie 42.”

According to reliable local sources, the accusations against Ayub Masih were fabricated in order to force fifteen Christian families in his village to drop a local land dispute. The case appeared to have been registered without proper investigation and based merely on an oral statement made by the complainant.

On numerous occasions, extremists have threatened to kill Ayub and his lawyers if Ayub is acquitted. On 6th November 1997, Ayub was shot at by the complainant inside the

41 Some local press reported that 12 people were killed and sixteen injured. 42 Ayub Masih was accused of making a reference to Salman Rushdie’s book, Satanic Verses. The book allegedly contains blasphemous comments against the Prophet Mohammed and its British author is the subject of a fatwa, a religious decree, by Iranian leaders, calling for his death.

25 Sahiwal Sessions Court. No arrest was made but the trial was subsequently transferred to Sahiwal Central Jail and held ‘in camera’ for fear that extremists would further jeopardize the proceedings. The closed prison trial concluded on 27th April 1998 with the Sahiwal Sessions Court judge sentencing Ayub to death by hanging.

When Ayub Masih appealed before the Multan Bench of the Lahore High Court on 25th July 2001, it was reported that Islamic fundamentalists surrounded the courthouse to intimidate the proceedings.

In December 2001, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Ayub Masih’s detention was arbitrary and that the threats and atmosphere surrounding his trial and appeal denied him any chance of having a fair trial.

On 13th February 2002, the Supreme Court granted Ayub Masih leave to appeal on the basis of legal irregularities. The Court’s decision will potentially set a precedent for all future blasphemy cases.

Ayub Masih is currently detained in Multan prison, where he is held in solitary confinement without sufficient light, proper facilities or adequate medical treatment. The daytime temperature of his 4 by 6 foot (2 by 1.3 metres) cell often exceeds 120 ?F (49?C).

2.4.2.2 Parvez Masih (a Christian)

Parvez Masih, a Christian headmaster from Daska, 100 miles southeast of Islamabad, was accused of blasphemy in April 2001. According to local sources, the complaint was filed by a rival Muslim, Mohammad Ibrahim, in a malicious attempt to force Parvez Masih into closing down his school.

The allegation was based on the testimony of three Muslim students43. All were said to have told Mohammad Ibrahim and a close relative that Parvez Masih had uttered blasphemous words against the Prophet Mohammed during a lesson. According to Pakistan human rights groups, the case was registered without due and proper investigation.

It was reported that the local Bar Council threatened to kill any lawyer taking up Parvez Masih’s case. Islamist groups in the area, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Sipah Sihaba, also warned that those assisting Parvez Masih would be dealt with severely.

Parvez Masih is currently incarcerated, pending trial. His situation in jail is far from satisfactory. He was reportedly tortured and was under pressure from the prison staff and Muslim inmates to convert to Islam.

43 Wakeel Ahmed, Mohammad Bashir and Mohammad Ramzan (all minors).

26 In an interview on 2nd May 2001, Parvez Masih complained of his treatment in prison, “They (the police) beat me severely with rifle butts and kicked me. I almost lost consciousness. Then they said I should recite the first tenet (of Islam). I refused and they blindfolded me and lowered my trousers …...they said they would circumcise me and make me Muslim …… I can never lead a normal life now, even if they free me. Some fanatic will kill me. My whole life, as well as that of my family, is ruined ………”

2.4.2.3 Dr. Mohammed Younus Shaikh (a Muslim)

Dr. Mohammed Younus Shaikh, a physiology professor at the Capital Homoeopathic College in Islamabad, was convicted of blasphemy under s.295C PPC. He was allegedly accused by his students of making sacrilegious remarks about the prophet Mohammed during a lecture. A lower court judge 44 reportedly commented that the professor deserved to be hanged for making derogatory remarks about Mohammed. Local mullahs and extremists vowed to kill the professor if the court acquitted him. Dr Shaikh claimed that his remarks were twisted out of context.

2.4.2.4 Sharif (an Ahmadi)

40-year old Sharif, an Ahmadi businessman from the Engineering University Campus in Lahore, was accused of blasphemy under s.295C PPC on 30th January 2001. According to local witnesses, the allegation was instigated by business rivalry and brought by some anti-Ahmadi fundamentalist students. Sharif is currently in detention pending trial. Extremists and local mullahs are demanding that he be hanged.

2.4.2.5 Seven journalists from Frontier Post (all Muslims)

Seven senior journalists from one of the country’s leading English newspapers, the Frontier Post in Peshawar, were arrested and charged with blasphemy in January 2001 after they inadvertently published a letter written by a Jew entitled ‘Why Muslims hate Jews’. Hundreds of Islamic extremists set fire to several of the newspaper’s offices. They demanded the journalists be hanged and issued a fatwa (holy decree) against all Jews.

2.4.2.6 The release of Hussain Masih, Isaac Masih and Sehr Ghouri (all Christians)

On 25th January 2001, the Division Bench of the High Court acquitted Hussain Masih, his son Isaac Masih and co-accused Sehr Ghouri from s.295C. This is the only other case where Christians were acquitted from blasphemy since Salamat and Rehmat Masih in 1995.

44 Mr Safdar Hussain Malik of Rawalpindi District Court.

27 2.4.3 Forced Conversion

2.4.3.1 Naira Nadia (a Christian)

In February 2001, a 14-year old Christian girl, Naira Nadia, was kidnapped and gang- raped by Maqsood Ahmed Shiekh and a group of armed Islamic extremists as a punishment for sharing her faith with school friends. To ‘absolve’ their crime, the perpetrators forcibly converted the girl to Islam and sent the parents a certificate of conversion. The local police initially refused to register the complaint until a human rights group intervened. When the case eventually came before the Lahore High Court, the judge ruled that the conversion certificate was void and nullified the marriage. Sadly, the police had been bribed and they failed to take steps to recover the girl.

Naira Nadia is currently residing with Maqsood Shiekh at an unknown address. Without significant external pressure on the Pakistani authorities, Naira Nadia is unlikely to be restored to her family.

2.4.4 Other Cases of Religious Intolerance

2.4.4.1 Hamid Masih and wife (Christians)

On 25th June 2001, Islamic extremists robbed the home of Hamid Masih and raped his wife. Hamid Masih is the brother of Rasheed Masih and Saleem Masih, two men convicted of blasphemy in May 2000. Both men were sentenced to 35 years imprisonment after allegedly uttering ‘bad remarks’ against Islam and the Prophet Mohammed. They are held in Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat Jail pending an appeal hearing. Hamid Masih and family are currently in hiding for fear of retaliation by extremists groups.

2.4.4.2 Khalid Masih and Nasir Masih (all Christians)

On 11th January 2001, two Christians from Campus Crusade, Khalid Masih and Nasir Masih, were arrested for distributing Christian literature and the ‘Jesus Film’ amongst the Christian community in the Railway Christian Colony in Jacobabad. According to reliable sources, their activities enraged the local Muslim community and a complaint was registered with the police. The two Christians were detained for seven days before they were released and charges dropped. Both were reportedly beaten while in custody.

2.4.4.3 Father Arnold Heredia and sixteen others (Christians and Muslims)

Father Arnold Heredia, a Council member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and sixteen others were arrested during a peaceful demonstration in Karachi on 10th January 2001.

28 The protest was organised by an interfaith movement to call for an end to the misuse of the blasphemy law. It was violently interrupted when armed police sealed off the area and used baton and teargas to forcibly disperse the crowd. One hundred and fifty protesters were arrested. Many were reportedly brutally beaten.

Father Arnold Heredia was charged with rioting, being armed with weapons, unlawful assembly, obstructing public servants, assault, wilful assault and attempted murder. Two Christians, Aslam Martian and Riaz Nawab, and fourteen Muslims were charged with under the Pakistan Penal Code. Due to strong domestic and international condemnation, all seventeen were subsequently released45 and all charges were dropped.

2.5 CSW ACTION

2.5.1 Prayer

At the requests of Christians in Pakistan, one of CSW’s key efforts in 2001 has been to galvanise prayer support, both in UK and abroad, through numerous prayer networks, churches, conferences, Christian radio broadcasting and Christian publications.

2.5.2 Information sharing

In addition to issuing press releases to Christian and national press, CSW launched awareness campaigns through Premier Radio, United Christian Broadcasters, Response and Action Info (CSW’s two bi-monthly magazines), secular magazines, newspapers and various other media channels.

CSW also sent regular briefings on Pakistan to a broad range of foreign ministries, foreign missions, national commissions, parliamentarians, various working groups in the United Nations, intergovernmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, human rights groups and religious bodies.

CSW also raised the profile of persecuted Christians in Pakistan by providing update, analysis and recommendations to the UK Prime Minister, the US President, the EU troika delegation and other high level officials, both in the UK and abroad, prior to their ministerial visits to Pakistan.

CSW regularly worked with supportive Members of Parliament both in the UK and in the European Parliament to table parliamentary questions on religious persecution in general and on specific cases. CSW also worked with MPs to table an Early Day Motion (EDM), highlighting concerns about the blasphemy law and forced conversion in particular. The

45 Father Heredia and two other Christians were released on 10th January 2001 after paying Rs. 30,000 (£370) bail.

29 EDM gained significant support from parliamentarians, attracting over a hundred signatures.

In light of the new EU-Pakistan Co-operation Agreement, CSW is particularly influencing the EU to raise religious freedom issue and specific cases with its counterpart.

2.5.3 Campaigning initiatives

In addition to canvassing supporters to campaign on individual cases, CSW also initiated public campaigns on thematic issues including the restoration of the joint electoral system, the reform of the blasphemy law and procedures, and more recently, the disarming of Islamic militant groups.

At Spring Harvest Conference 2002, CSW launched an electronic campaign on the case of Ayub Masih and raised the profile of Naira Nadia. The support was overwhelming.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS

CSW welcomes President Musharraf’s decisions to take steps to crack down on religious extremism and to abolish the controversial separate electoral system. In the last seven years, however, Pakistan has made little effort in implementing the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur of UN Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of All forms of Religious Intolerance.

As true democracy can only be achieved when the State respects, upholds, protects and promotes individual’s rights and freedoms, including freedom of religion, Pakistan must take concrete steps to disarm all militant groups and rescind all discriminatory legislation if it is to emerge as a democratic and progressive nation. It must also take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of religion in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life.

President Musharraf’s recent policy changes have created a window of opportunity for Pakistan to break away from fundamentalism and to stride towards progressive secular Islam. The international community should now use this window to exercise positive influence Pakistan on good governance, human rights and religious harmony. The international community should encourage President Musharraf to introduce key reforms to improve the status of religious minorities and to ensure equality for all. It should also strongly urge him to implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur in full as a demonstration of his pledged commitment to the respect, protection and promotion of human rights and democratic principles as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

CSW calls on the Government of Pakistan to:

1. Respect and uphold all tenets of religious freedom, particularly Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

2. Accede to and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

3. Offer tighter security to minorities and bring to justice the perpetrators of sectarian and religious violence;

4. Bring to trial the leaders of banned Islamic groups and those inciting sectarian violence;

5. Oversee the complete disarming and banning of all Islamic militant groups and develop a comprehensive strategy to root out extremism;

6. Take concrete steps to identify and purge the extremist elements from within the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, the judiciary, the army, the civil service and the education institutes;

7. Maintain law and order in the tribal areas, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province and western Baluchistan, which are generally considered as the breeding grounds for religious extremism;

8. Provide constitutional guarantees of religious liberty in accordance with the definition of religious freedom provided for in the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief;

9. Bring their law and practice into line with international standards, in particular:

(a) to take steps to repeal all discriminatory legislation including Art. 203, 227 & 228 of the Constitution of Pakistan, sections 295-A,B & C, 298- B & C of the Pakistan Penal Code, the Hudood Ordinances & the Quanoon-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984;

(b) to introduce and implement legislative and administrative measures to safeguard against abuses and pressure from extremist groups while pending more substantive constitutional and legislative amendments;

10. Set up a national commission on religious tolerance to enhance greater understanding and goodwill amongst people of all faiths and monitor intolerance;

11. Provide human rights training, particularly on religious freedom, to administrative staff, police, judges, army and ISI officials;

12. Strengthen communal harmony through education, media, public awareness campaigns and dialogues;

13. Set targets to increase the employment of minorities in fields where they are currently under-represented;

14. Fully comply with the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom and to provide the conditions under which all Pakistani citizens can enjoy equality of treatment and freedom of religion;

15. Fully apply the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/173 of 9 December 1988 in order to improve conditions of detention, in particular in the field of health, and to eliminate unnecessary restrictions imposed on the detainees.

CSW calls on the United Nations to:

1. Urge the Government of Pakistan to fully comply with its recommendations;

2. Respect and uphold Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948;

3. Respect and uphold the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief;

4. Ensure compliance to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1981.

CSW calls on other Governments to:

1. Encourage the Pakistan Government to implement the recommendations listed above;

2. Encourage Pakistan to return to democratic rule and closely monitor the election process;

3. Press the Pakistan Government to release those detained for their religious beliefs, particularly those imprisoned under the blasphemy law (s.295C Penal Code);

4. Press the Pakistan Government to abolish the death penalty, in particular in relation to the blasphemy law;

5. Make clear to the government of Pakistan that improvement on religious liberty and equality will significantly enhance diplomatic and trade relations, whereas continuous discrimination against religious minorities will dampen those relations.

Acknowledgement: CSW would like to thank the Christian Liberation Front, the National Commission of Justice & Peace, the Justice & Peace Commission and others for the provision of accurate and timely information and for their tireless commitment to those who suffer. LH/03/02