The Whitlam Experience: a Little Potpourri #2

Perrin – Volume 10, Issue 1 (2019)

e-Journal of Social & Behavioural Research in Business Vol. 10, Iss. 1, June 2019, pp: 54-60. ”http://www.ejsbrb.org”

The Whitlam Experience: A Little Potpourri #2

Ronald William Perrin Faculty of Business University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the cycle of political upheavals that affect society in general and result in changes to the political landscape. Design/ methodology/ approach: This paper consists of commentary or discourse regarding historical events, involving biographical, rhetorical, mythical, structural, allegorical, with notes along the way underpinned by philosophical perspectives drawn from Foucauldian, and Habermasian ideology. Results / findings: There are no empirical results there are only observations and reflections pertaining to significant political events that inevitably affected Australian society. Originality: This is a reflection on the historical events of the Whitlam Labor Government and how they compare to events occurring in the USA under Donald Trump.

Key words: Dismissal of the Whitlam Labor Government; political ideology.

JEL Classification: H52; I21; L88 PsycINFO Classification: 3510 FoR Code: 1301; 1608 ERA Journal ID#: 123340

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Discussion The present political climate in Australia and the USA can best be described as undergoing dramatic tensions. In Australia the leadership of the Liberal party and consequently the Prime Ministership has changed hands three times in the last 5 years , this is not, however, unprecedented the Labor Party had a change of leadership three times in the 6 year period before this and of course prior to that there was the Hawk / Keating debacle. In the USA President Trump is under intense scrutiny and pressure with cries for his impeachment, of course impeachment is not a new thing in the USA there are examples of Presidents being targeted for impeachment from Richard Nixon and even back further into the inglorious past.

Change of Prime Ministers and Presidents is something that has happened in ways other than the current manner beseeching Australia and the USA. The point is change does happen and in some cases it is not always due to leadership inequities or political unrest. The events currently unfolding in Australia and the USA do lead me to reflect upon the nature of the rapid decline of the Whitlam Labor Government. In essence, this paper is a potpourri of ideas and discussions that took place in 1996 and yet resonates with the current leadership political crisis. For this I have to acknowledge the encouragement of my colleagues from those dim dark ages Dr Mary Day, Dr Mary Kaidonis, Dr Ciorstan Smark and Emeritus Professor Michael Gaffikin (Kaidonis, 2009; Gaffikin, 2008)who made it possible for all of us to delve into the alternative perspective of research as well providing the freedom to debate through differing philosophical views. In this regard I refer to the competing ideologies of Foucault (Foucault, 1982; 1987; Smark, 2012) and Habermas (Habermas, 1990; Day, 1993). The discussions initially occurred as part of the seminar series of the Department of Accounting at the University of Wollongong, although these have now been modified to include more current events.

This paper draws on and is informed by a wide-range of scholarship from fields as diverse as Habermas and German-language media studies, Foucauldian historiography, and even as far afield as archaeological research.

The Australian Labor Party had been in political exile for an unprecedent period of time and as a result lacked political acumen. It had become unused to dealing with the public service and was effectively Sir Humphrey Appleby’d1 into untenable political positions2. When the Labor Party returned to power under Edward Gough Whitlam in 1972 it seemed consumed by a frenzy for change, without (arguably) adequately enrolling the electorate to accept its vision, style, interests or timetable.

Whitlam was the prototype of the new style of Labor leaders. His sheer physical stature (well over 6ft 4 inches with a frame to suit and yet matched more than adequately by his equally lofty wife, Margaret3) his lilting speech, his flowery language, and his background in the law completely separated him from his working class predecessors. Whitlam was the first Australian leader to emulate the presidential style of the USA. He understood the power of marketing to sell both himself and his party as a swish political product (something which is still evident in today’s political campaigns).

Whitlam had been elected on a platform for change which encompassed exiting the Vietnam conflict, with government funding for both health and education. Unfortunately, the labour movement, of which the Labor Party was encapsulated, opposed both wage restraint and economic restructuring, and this was something that would prove to be his undoing. For the first two weeks or so of his government, he conducted a duumvirate with Lance Barnard, while the Labor Caucus was busy sorting out its ministerial selections. Just three years later in 1975, Whitlam was ignominiously dismissed by the ‘Queen’s Man’, Sir John Kerr and his commission

1 The reference here is to the BBC TV show ‘Yes Minister” which went on to become ‘Yes Prime Minister’. 2 Consider the Tirath Khemlani Loans affair and how inept the Government was with dealing with the opprobrium of the media. 3 Back in 1969, I was fortunate to win a high school speech night prize. Margaret Whitlam had been invited as the School’s special guest. During practice for the prize night our English master told us to “shake hands with Margaret – be firm but not too tight, she’s a woman you know!” That evening when I mounted the stage, remembering “firm but not tight”- I thrust my hand towards her, she grabbed it and squeezed so hard, the blood immediately drained from my entire upper torso. © e-JSBRB Vol.10, Iss.1 (2019) 55

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handed directly to the Liberal (conservative) Party leader, Malcom Fraser (but more about his later). Let us start by understanding the economic climate that Whitlam existed in so that we may better understand the source of his problems.

To start the post-war economic boom had ended in the early 1970s resulting in "stagflation"i. The big-ticket items affecting the Australian economy at the time were in particular the Oil Crisis, Britain's entry into the E.E.C., and growing economic competition in Australia's traditional export markets. Subsequently, the economic policies that the Whitlam Government sought to introduce, at break neck speed, proved to be ineffective in dealing with stagflation. In fact it stoked the fire creating strong inflationary pressure and culminated in mismanagement. To be fair Whitlam had other problems that made it difficult for his government to effectively manage the economy he lacked a majority in the Australian Senate and was confronted the hostility of the conservative state governments.

The dismissal of the Whitlam Labor government in 1975 is shroud in mystery, the truth or at least the full truth and nothing but the truth is still a guarded secret. Here I refer to the letters between the Queen and the Governor General which are still unavailable for public scrutiny. I wonder what other revelations may be contained in the correspondence since Whitlam had gone to Britain to confront the Queen with a request for the Australian Constitution to be kept in Australia and to put on notice the intention to Have Australia become a Republic. Strangely, Whitlam returned to Australia without having achieved either of the two goals – nothing was ever officially raised or recorded about his meeting with the Queen to explain this apparent change of mind. Now to return to the dismissal. While I use Paul Kelly’s account of the act of dismissal, I always caution the reader to be mindful of the minefield of interests and power-plays of the recorder as historian4. Kelly had been both parliamentary roundsman and editor-in-chief of a national daily newspaper. Any attempt on his part to claim a dispassionate, objective role in the recording process needs to be taken with a large salt shaker handy.

Governor General, Sir John Kerr may or may not have had the power to dismiss Edward Gough Whitlam. This argument will likely be the subject of conjecture or historians one hundred years from now. But for me it is of much lesser interest than the actual act of dismissal itself. Briefly, a government cannot theoretically run without money to pay it bills, the largest of which is the public service salary bill, due, without fail, every 2nd Thursday (at least within the context of Australia). This is where we start to get some similarity with events currently happening in the USA – paying the government employees is still a major financial requirement. However, in the USA it seems the conflict between the President, the Senate and House of Representatives took precedence over paying the employees.

The situation was simply that the Opposition Leader, John Malcolm Fraser and his shadow cabinet colleagues had the numbers in the Senate to win any vote, But the Senate, as a house of review, had traditionally accepted money, supply or appropriation bills to be sacrosanct, and beyond the arg-bargy of pure politics. Fraser’s idea was to force Whitlam to the polls in a general election, an election which the Liberal Party and popular polling suggested it could win. The strategy was for the Senate to deny supply to the Government which would have bought the opprobrium of thousands of penniless public servants down on Whitlam’s head. Whitlam was prepared to offer a Senate election in the new year as a way of overcoming the impasse, but he was not about to sacrifice the House of Representatives to the same fate. Kerr had already sounded out Fraser on his capacity to have the supply bills passed with the ultimate objective of withdrawing Whitlam’s commission as Prime Minister. Fraser would be given the commission provided he and his parliamentary colleagues would act as a caretaker administration and call a general election forthwith.

Whitlam claims that on November 11, 1975 following a phone call to Kerr earlier that morning he arranged a 1 pm appointment with Kerr, at the GG’s residence at Yarralumla. Whitlam maintains that he planned to offer a Senate election to Kerr at this meeting. Kerr’s version of appointment times is that he had agreed to meet Whitlam at 12.45 and that (unknown

4 A full, and decidedly entertaining account of the following background and events can be found in Chapter 10 of Kelly’s book “November 1975”- see list of references. © e-JSBRB Vol.10, Iss.1 (2019) 56

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to Whitlam) he had another appointment to see Fraser 15 minutes later at 1 pm. Immediately, the account differ. The House of Representatives rose for lunch at 12.55 and Whitlam was running late for his supposed 1 pm appointment. As luck would have it Fraser arrived at Yarralumla before Whitlam and was hurriedly ushered into an outer office. His car was parked discretely away from the view of the main entrance and a ‘cuckatoo’5 posted to keep watch for Whitlam’s white Mercedes. Whitlam later claimed that had he seen Fraser’s car, he would have turned around and gone back to Parliament House.

Kerr was determined to have Whitlam agree to a general election6. Any other outcome would result in Whitlam’s dismissal. Whitlam carried with him a letter advising a Senate election and was prepared to hand it to Kerr. Whitlam was brought into Kerr’s office. On Kerr’s desk, face down, was the letter of dismissal. Whitlam was invited to sit. He did so and began the conversation by referring to their phone discussions earlier in the day. Whitlam followed on by confirming his advice that he would be seeking a Senate election when Kerr suddenly interrupted, and (it is generally agreed by both Whitlam and Kerr) the following exchange occurred: “Before you say anything Prime Minister, I want to say something to you. You have told me this morning on the phone that your talks with the leaders on the other side have failed to produce any change and that therefore things remain the same. You intend to govern without parliamentary supply”. He said “Yes”. “I replied that in my view he had to have parliamentary supply to govern and as he had failed to obtain it and was not prepared to go to the people, I had decided to withdraw his commission.”

Now the question is ‘when is a dismissal a dismissal?’. Kerr always maintained that this was the point in time – a moment in eternity – when Whitlam’s fate was in his own hands. Depending on his reaction Kerr would decide whether to actually hand him the letter of dismissal. So it seems that it was the actual passing of the letter from Kerr’s hand to Whitlam’s hand that would signal the act of withdrawing the commission.

Whitlam’s account of the moment is that, as he took the document in hand, he asked Kerr: “Have you discussed this with the Palace?”7

To Which Kerr replied: “I don’t have to and it’s too late for you. I have terminated your commission.”

Kerr’s account, continues from the point where he tells Whitlam that he has decided to withdraw his commission. At this exact point in time, the dismissal letter is still face down on the desk. Kerr suggests that: “ … Mr Whitlam then jumped up and looked around the room, looked at the telephones and said sharply “ I must get in touch with the Palace at once” … I now knew there would be no changed advice, only the certainty of constitutional disruption if any time were allowed to elapse. I therefore made my final decision to withdraw his commission and hand him the signed documents … When he said, “I must get in touch with the Palace at once”, I replied. “It’s too late” He said, “Why?” and I told him, “Because you are no longer Prime Minister. These documents tell you so and why.” I handed them to him and he took them. He did not read them. There was a short silence after which he said, “I see” and stood up. He made no gesture towards discussion.

This very last sentence of Kerr’s account attracted no attention in Kelly’s book. But if we assume Kerr is quoted correctly his observation that no ‘gesture’ was made to continue

5 The term ‘cockatoo’ is used to mean a person who is acting as a lookout and is generally related to illegal activities 6 This notion could well have some historical support – although Kerr never raised it nor did any one else for that matter – historically in the UK, in 1910 the House of Lords rejected a Bill from the House of Representatives referred to as the "People's Budget" the intention was to raise taxes predominantly from the rich to pay for reforms – both King Edward VII and following his death King George V argued that the solution to the impasse was a general election to establish a clear mandate. An interesting decision to what could have been considered a constitutional crisis. 7 Whitlam’s account infers that Kerr did not have the authority to terminate his commission without referral to the Queen herself. Once again, this point relates to the conjecture over whether the authority for an act of dismissal arose from powers vested in the governor General. © e-JSBRB Vol.10, Iss.1 (2019) 57

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discussion almost implies that there was still the slightest hope that Kerr could e dissuaded from his chosen path. Even to suggest that, after the letter is passed from one to another, there is still an opportunity for both men to recant their positions may be an over-interpretation or unlikely construction of the moment. But that’ the beauty of post-modernity – everyone rules – OK!

Whitlam’s account is that any opportunity to do a deal that Kerr might have constructed out of the exchange did not occur to him (Whitlam). The way he constructs the exchange is that Kerr had made up his mind and that there was: “… no use arguing with him …”

I find this point of view to be completely out of keeping with Whitlam’s character, after all he was a notable adversary in debates within the House of Representatives and had forced his will on the Australian Labor Party. Are we to believe that with this background he could think of nothing to say no questions to ask other than ‘have you discussed this with the Palace’. This does not make sense in retrospect! Then again Kerr had claimed that he took the decision to avoid a constitutional crisis – I am not sure what he thought sacking the standing Prime Minister was if not a constitutional crisis (Quentin-Baxter, 1979). This all seems to be rather clandestine with him having spoken to the Opposition Leader some considerable time before the event, even though he claimed that Whitlam had been aware that he would sound out the Leader pf the Opposition – I am not sure what he inferred, or what Whitlam interpreted, this to mean.

Of course, Whitlam when Leader of the Opposition had announced in 1970 that ‘our opposition to this Budget is no mere formality. We intend to press our opposition by all available means on all related measures in both Houses. If the motion is defeated, we will vote against the Bills here and in the Senate. Our purpose is to destroy this Budget and to destroy the Government which has sponsored it.’[Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 25 August 1970: 463.] The bill in question at that time was a tax bill, however, Whitlam had made it very clear that his party was willing to vote against appropriation bills as well. So perhaps it was only

There you have it. Two men, a moment in history, and differing accounts (Zines, 1977). Perhaps the egos of the three men involved were greater than any others at the time. I can only muse on how things may have been different had Whitlam relented. He could have fought the subsequent campaign from a position of greater strength. Perhaps he could have made Fraser’s opportunism a greater issue and not involved the Governor General. The slogans during the election were the likes of ‘Shame Fraser Shame’ and ‘ Kerr’s cur’ - so perhaps not. Although another three years in power may have seen the Labor government overcome its ineptitude in dealing with its senior public servants.

Now for the Trump debacle (Weber, 2017) and the very different circumstances in the USAii. For a start there was no one to stand up for the public servants they actually did go unpaid for 35 days. One has to wonder if the American system of government is really better than the one we have here in Australia if supply can be stopped and all those government employees had to undergo the hardship of not getting paid – so much for having a President, a Senate and a House of Representatives if the outcome is poverty. Perhaps this is in keeping with the impoverishment of metacapitalism (Mickhail & Ostrovsky, 2007). I am not sure who should dismiss who but it seems the Senate and the House of Representatives has the means to dismiss the President by way of ‘impeachment’.

It seems the President of the USA caused this shut down by rejecting the Senates’ alternative payment allocation for his Mexican Wall, something that he so believes is warranted to protect society (Pramuk, 2018). Strange how in this instance the President was the one who rejected the supply not the Senate. Interesting to note, the explanation seems to lie in the fact that the President is an elected person with both political ties and a political agenda. By contrast the Governor General of Australia is not elected and is not tied to a political party nor does he or she have any political agenda – basically the Governor General acts according to the wishes of the people and under normal circumstances and merely gives his or her ascent – the events of 1975 however, were not normal. The Senate in the USA would seem to be more open to © e-JSBRB Vol.10, Iss.1 (2019) 58

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negotiation than the Senate in Australia. To emphasise this point, in 1964 President Lyndon Baines Johnson was able to persuade over 20 odd Southern Senators to cross the floor and vote for the “Civil Rights Bill”, an achievement that would seem to be unthinkable in the Australian Senate. The comparison casts a blinding light on the essence of democracy and the impact of political power and goes to the question of workable checks and balances. Is society really protected from political ineptitude by either of the democratic systems?

References & Bibliography

Aiken, J. R., Salmon, E. D., & Hanges, P. J. (2013). The origins and legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Journal of Business and Psychology, 28(4), 383-399. Cashin, S. D. (2004). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Coalition Politics. St. Louis University Law Journal, 49, 1029-1046. Davidson, J. (1979). The de-dominionisation of Australia. Meanjin, 38(2), 139. Day, M.M. (1993). Habermasian Ideal Speech: Dreaming the (Im)possible Dream, Accounting & Finance Working Paper 93/13, School of Accounting & Finance, University of Wollongong. Foucault M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Afterword to Dreyfus HL & Rabinow P. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester. Foucault M. (1987 [1984]). The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom — An Interview with Michel Foucault. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 12,112-131. Gaffikin, M.J.R. (2008). Accounting Theory – Research, Regulation and Accounting Practice. Pearson: Frenchs Forest, NSW. Habermas, J. (1990 [1983 in German]). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Kaidonis, M. A. (2009). Critical accounting as an epistemic community: Hegemony, resistance and identity. Accounting Forum, 33(4), 290-297. Kelly, P. (1995). November 1975: The Inside Story of Australia's Greatest Political Crises, Allen & Unwin: Australia. Maddox, G., & Battin, T. (1991). Australian Labor and the socialist tradition. Australian Journal of Political Science, 26(2), 181-196. Mickhail, G., & Ostrovsky, A. (2007). MetaCapitalism: The dialectics of impoverishment. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 18(6), 671-705. Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice (10th ed.). (2001) Edited by Harry Evans. Department of the Senate. Pauley, G. E. (1997). Presidential rhetoric and interest group politics: Lyndon B. Johnson and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Southern Journal of Communication, 63(1), 1-19. Pramuk, J. (2018). Shutdown talks collapse: Trump won’t sign spending bill without wall money, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/ryan-says-trump-will-not-sign-senate-passed-bill-to-avoid- government-shutdown.html Quentin-Baxter, R. Q. (1979). The Governor-General's Constitutional Discretions: An Essay towards a Re- Definition. Victoria University Wellington Law Review., 10, 289. Smark, C. (2012). Tribes in personal finance? The Dave Ramsey phenomenon. e-Journal of Social & Behavioural Research in Business, 3(2), 1-9. Szekeres, J. (2004). The invisible workers. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 26(1), 7- 22. Trump, D.J. (2011). Time to Get Tough: Make America Great Again!, Regnery Publishing Inc: Washington. Weber, C. (2017). The Trump presidency, episode 1: simulating sovereignty. Theory & Event, 20(1), 132- 142. Zines, L. (1977) ‘The Double Dissolutions and Joint Sitting,’ in Evans (1977). Zines, L. (ed.). (1997). Commentaries on the Australian Constitution. Butterworths.

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i The social construct ‘stagflation’ is one that holds an interesting meaning as a concept within the discipline of economics. However, it was in the 1990’s that a colleague and life long friend of mine Dr Greg Laing who found an anonymous inscription in building 19 at the University of Wollongong. The inscription read “How many Metaphysicists does it take to change a light bulb? Answer – none because light bulbs are a social construct and Metaphysicists don’t deal with social constructs.” It then went on to say: “How many social constructs does it take to change an economist? Answer - four Stagflation, Inflation, Recession and Depression!”. The point being that these are all social constructs that exist only because of the way society has evolved and the need to explain economic conditions. Those were the days when anonymous inscriptions provided meaningful insights. ii Interesting to note that Trump had in fact written or at least had published a book addressing what could be considered as his manifesto something that would be a good indicator of his vision for the future if he became President of the USA. It was revised in 2016 when he was closer to realising the dream. Perhaps history has taught us something about people with leadership aspirations and the value of checking whether they have actually committed to writing any indication of what sort of leader they are likely to become if ever they should gain power.