The European Union and the Mainstreaming of the Radical Right

COMMENTARY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MAINSTREAMING OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

ARISTOTLE KALLIS*

ABSTRACT Radical right wing parties have been increasingly effective in challenging and eroding this consensus, using a redemptive sovereigntist platform to ‘take back control’ from the EU in a number of important policy areas. Their electoral gains, but more importantly their growing agenda-setting momentum, have combined with an alarming hardening of attitudes in large sectors of the political and social mainstream in the same sovereigntist direction. Unless the EU shifts the discussion effectively and convincingly, addressing the causes of citizen resentment without adopting the language and logic of the right wing populists, its future as a united, politically relevant block looks uncertain.

Violent Extremism and the Crisis consensus. Democracy, pluralism, of Liberal Values pacifism, respect for individual human rights, freedom of movement, an institutional setup geared towards hat we nowadays call the greater supranational integration, European Union (EU) has a new model of mixed sovereignty changed dramatically in that pointed, however tentatively, in W 1 the 51 years of its existence. It has a post-national direction –these and grown in members, expanded geo- other similar values have been con- graphically, and developed institu- sidered and treated as belonging to tionally. It has also become far more the genetic makeup of the EU. complex, cumbersome even, and more far-reaching than perhaps any But what happens when this con- of its initial founders would have ever sensus is facing its most serious, dared to hope. Yet something central concerted challenge, from within * Keele has, in theory, remained the same: the EU as well as from outside? The University, UK the EU has always been –and con- world that we inhabit in 2018 is diz- Insight Turkey tinues to be– rooted in a set of values zyingly different from the one that Vol. 20 / No. 3 / that derive from the post-war liberal many took for granted only a de- 2018, pp. 61-75

DOI: 10.25253/99.2018203.04 2018 Summer 61 COMMENTARY ARISTOTLE KALLIS

Far right party leaders from Italy, the Netherlands, cade ago. As one of the European rope and the wider world are moving Austria, the UK, France, Belgium Commission’s Vice-Presidents, the decisively towards a period of reas- and Poland hold a former Prime Minister of Finland, sertion of an ever more narrow and press conference Jyrki Katainen, noted recently, the exclusive national sovereignty.6 to announce a rise of Euroscepticism now poses an new grouping of existential threat to the EU.2 It is not It is the non-mainstream right that European far right parties, called just Brexit or even the avalanche of has attracted the bulk of analysts’ Europe of Nations statistics over the last years pointing attention in this regard. This broad, and Freedom, on to declining trust in the Union.3 In- diverse family extends from radical, June 16, 2015. stead, the rise of populist parties of populist and anti-establishment but EMMANUEL DUNAND various political shades in many EU non-violent organized parties of the AFP / Getty Images member states, some of which have right, to clandestine terrorist individ- now entered the government or may uals and groups fighting their own do so in the near future, has cast version of culture wars on the terrain a grave shadow on the continuing of ultra-nationalism, anti-immigra- commitment to these liberal values.4 tion, anti-multiculturalism, anti-glo- Meanwhile, the worldwide financial balization, Islamophobic and anti-Se- and refugee crises, as well as the re- mitic identity politics.7 cent backsliding into protectionism,5 have put unprecedented strain on There have been growing concerns the principles of solidarity and free about the threat posed by far right movement that constitute the pillars violence, whether coming from orga- of European integration. From the nized movements, informal networks viewpoint of 2018, it seems that Eu- or individuals.8 Especially since the

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turn of the new millennium, the threat of violent radicalization has For too long played down received fresh attention, especially in light of the terrorist attacks that illus- or ignored by the EU and trated its highly destructive poten- national governments alike, tial and complex transnational links. the danger of violent Taken together with the appreciable rise in instances of hate speech and in far right extremism has violent incidents against vulnerable recently come to be groups, it is now feared that we may be witnessing a much broader and recognized as one of the most more profound ‘reverse wave’ toward significant existential threats more intolerance, exclusion, and nor- to the Union and its member malization of violent extremism in contemporary societies.9 For too long states played down or ignored by the EU and national governments alike, the danger of violent far right extremism has recently come to be recognized as The Rise and the Continuing Rise one of the most significant existential of the Radical Right threats to the Union and its member states.10 Until recently, the rise of the radical right was largely presented in terms Yet it is the challenge posed by the of an unfolding threat rather than a radical, non-violent parties of the concrete reality. These parties tended non-mainstream right that has been to poll better in local, regional, and making the most of the headlines in European elections while usually recent years. These parties are be- falling short in national ones. For ex- coming increasingly successful in ample, in the most recent (2014) elec- a number of critical fields, from se- tions for the European Parliament, curing a high(er) share of the popu- the ‘Europe of Freedom and (Direct) lar vote and entering government, to Democracy’ group grew from 34 to influencing the political agenda and 45 MEPs, while strong parliamentary shifting social attitudes. Their vision constituencies of the radical right of a nativist, ‘fortress’ Europe, nation- now appear in the ‘Independents’ alist and mono-cultural, made up group with a cumulative strength of of fully sovereign nation-states, has 52 MEPs. Parties of the radical/pop- been steadily gaining traction among ulist right polled very strongly in a disaffected voters. As a result, the large number of European countries European political and social main- and delivered a political ‘earthquake,’ stream has been shifting in a sover- coming first in France and Britain eigntist direction that challenges 60 while increasing their share of the of European integration and casts a vote in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and shadow on its future prospects. elsewhere.11

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Since 2014, however, parties of the parties that had dominated the po- radical right have made their pres- litical scene in previous decades have ence felt more emphatically in the seen their electoral appeal decline electoral field, including countries dramatically (as in the case of the where they were previously unsuc- Socialist Party in France and Spain, cessful or under-represented. The the Democratic Party in Italy, and landscape changed dramatically af- the Social Democrats in Germany) ter more recent elections in Austria or collapse altogether (as happened (where the Freedom Party secured in Greece, the Czech Republic, and 26 percent in 2017), France (where the Netherlands).14 In comparison, Marine Le Pen received 21.30 percent the recent electoral fortunes of the and 33.90 percent in the two rounds center-right paint a significantly of the 2017 presidential elections), more mixed picture: the decline of Hungary (where Jobbik scored 19 Silvio Berlusconi’s party in Italy and percent in 2018), Germany (where the Republicans in France has been the Alternative for Germany nearly matched by a growing share of the trebled its vote to 12.6 percent), and vote for the Austrian People’s Party more recently Italy (where the Lega’s (from 24.5 percent to 31.7 percent), share of the vote climbed to 17.37 the Law and Justice Party in Poland percent, in addition to the anti-estab- (up 7.69 percent to 37.58 percent), lishment Five-Star Movement’s 32.66 and even more impressively the Hun- percent). In hindsight, the respite in garian ruling Fidesz (49.5 percent in right wing ascension signaled by the 2018, up 4.40 percent). victory of the centrist, pro-EU Em- manuel Macron in France12 and the collapse of electoral support for the The Ideological Porosity between right wing UKIP (from 12.8 percent Radical and Mainstream Right in 2015 to 1.8 percent)13 proved temporary and not enough to change It is far from a coincidence that the the dynamics of the overall trend of nominally center-right parties that populist parties of the right making bucked the trend of mainstream elec- significant inroads at the expense of toral retrenchment have benefited traditional mainstream parties of the from a hardening of their ideologi- previously dominant liberal, global- cal platform towards immigration, ist, and pro-EU consensus. Islam, globalization, and European integration.15 The case of Hungary is What is particularly striking is the the most instructive in this respect. disproportionate impact of this up- In the midst of the 2015 refugee cri- ward trend for the radical right on sis, the Hungarian government de- the traditional mainstream political cided to erect a long ‘border barrier’ parties. In the last decade, there has along the country’s frontier with Ser- been a dramatic collapse of support bia and Croatia. While the barrier for the center-left in many European proved effective in halting the refu- countries. Many social democratic gee flows into Hungary and diverting

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them to other parts of the continent it also staged a theatrical performance It is far from a coincidence of sovereignty as permanent security ‘reassurance’ to Hungarian citizens. that the nominally center- Meanwhile, in spite of a ruling by the right parties that bucked European Court of Justice calling on the trend of mainstream the Hungarian and Slovak governments to implement a 2015 quota electoral retrenchment have agreement for the relocation of ref- benefited from a hardening ugees inside the Schengen Area, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor of their ideological platform Orban, has refused to implement it, towards immigration, Islam, citing security and identity concerns globalization, and European in relation to the refugees.16 Thus, in spite of threats from the European integration Commission to sue the two member-state governments, Hungary has successfully defied its international to the hardening of his campaign’s commitments as a member of the Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, and EU and has used the issue to stage a anti-Islam political messages in the spectacle of national sovereignty on run-up to the second round of the its borders. As Orban said after his election.19 The victory of the conser- recent election triumph, “the election vative Sebastian Kurz in Austria was result [shows] that Hungarians have largely attributed to his successful re- decided that only they can decide fashioning as “anti-immigration mil- with whom they want to live in Hun- lennial”20 and his emphatic rightward gary and the government will stick ideological shift.21 Meanwhile, even to this position.”17 Empowered by his the electoral resilience of the UK 2018 triumphant re-election, Orban Conservative party –surprising for a could effectively claim that he was party in its ninth year in power after a clawing back sovereign control from prolonged period of harsh austerity– distant (European and global) or in- has been attributed to a significant visible (the ‘stop Soros’ campaign, extent to its anti-immigration stance merging anti-Semitic and anti-Mus- and Brexit credentials that have mit- lim stereotypes)18 elites on behalf of igated its earlier ideological distance Hungarian and indeed European from UKIP.22 people.

Still, Hungary may be the most ex- The Post-Liberal Moment? treme example of an otherwise increasingly common political-ideo- Back in 1999, when the Freedom logical shift. The recent victory of Party of Austria (FPÖ) scored a spec- Miloš Zeman in the Czech presiden- tacular 27 percent of the vote in the tial elections was largely attributed parliamentary elections and even-

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(a mainstream coalition govern- It is becoming less and ment supported by the Danish Peo- ple’s Party between 2001 and 2011) less possible to maintain was replicated in the Netherlands the conventional fiction in 2010-2012. Then in 2017 the ul- that mainstream society is tra-nationalist United Patriots party coalition formally joined the govern- irreversibly committed to ment headed by a center-right party; liberal democracy, human and this was followed by another formal coalition agreement between rights, globalization, diversity, the conservative Austrian People’s and pluralism Party and the FPÖ in Austria in late 2017. Poignantly, even the Austrian Social Democrats dropped their ban on a coalition with the far right in the tually joined the government, the run-up to the 2017 elections.25 Mean- notion of an impenetrable cordon while, the cordon sanitaire has proven sanitaire around extremist parties even less robust on the regional and (effectively, a political ‘quarantine’ to local level, with mainstream parties bar them from power) was thrown more likely to succumb to the temp- into doubt.23 The EU’s response to tation to court the support of the rad- the shocking news that the FPÖ ical right as the price of power. would lead the government of one of its member states was to impose But 2018 brought an unprecedented sanctions on Austria.24 This unprec- challenge to the very foundations of edented form of censure directed the post-war quarantine against right at a member-state lasted only a few wing extremist parties. The safety net months, but divulged the Union’s assumed that the final decision would discomfort with the Austrian prece- always rest on a mainstream party dent and its determination to defend topping the polls –or at least a stable the political safety net against any at- coalition of mainstream parties that tempt to undermine or relativize it. could still block or mitigate the radical right’s access to power. The results Since then the proverbial cordon of the Italian parliamentary elections sanitaire has faced many, far more marked such an extraordinary swing demanding tests. While it has been of votes to non-mainstream political reconfirmed in Sweden, France, Ger- parties (together the M5S and the many, and elsewhere against growing Lega received just over 50 percent of electoral challenges from the radi- the national vote), making possible cal right, it has been perforated by a a majority power arrangement that number of bespoken agreements be- could exclude the traditional politi- tween mainstream and radical parties cal forces of the center-right and the in order to support national govern- center-left.26 The new government ments. The so-called Danish model agreement between M5S’s Luigi Di

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German Chancellor Merkel speaks to parliamentary group co-leaders of Germany’s far- right Alternative for Germany Alice Weidel and Alexander Gauland during a session at the Bundestag on June 28, 2018. JOHN MACDOUGALL / AFP / Getty Images

Maio and the Lega’s Matteo Salvini human rights, globalization, diver- means that the post-war safety net sity, and pluralism. Until recently, the has been rendered de facto irrelevant, focus of attention was firmly on the since mainstream parties in Italy can electoral strengthening of the radi- no longer perform their expected role cal right and the strategies needed to as gatekeepers of executive power. effectively defend the liberal status Meanwhile, the collapse of the vote quo from the radical right’s corro- of the ruling Democratic Party on sive ideological effect. Comparatively the center-left was matched by the less attention was being paid to the decline of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza underlying creeping political con- Italia, which lost its status as senior vergence between mainstream and partner in the right wing coalition.27 radical programs –a convergence that Péter Krekó has described as Whether this extreme scenario con- mainstreaming of the extreme and stitutes an anomaly or is likely to extremization of the mainstream.28 replicate itself in other EU member The vicious circle is hard to ignore: states remains to be seen. There are, as new political entrepreneurs of however, powerful warning signs that the radical right have been refining the so-called post-war liberal con- their message and embracing new sensus has been waning. Put simply, communication techniques to reach it is becoming less and less possible new audiences, the mainstream po- to maintain the conventional fiction litical class has found it increasingly that mainstream society is irrevers- tempting to co-opt radical-right par- ibly committed to liberal democracy, ties and/or their ideas in an attempt

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ities of the global economic system.32 The radical right offered a With one blow, ‘take back control’ re- jected, convincingly as it turned out, taboo-breaking license that the very foundations of the EU’s rai- re-inflamed old prejudices son d’être –supra-nationalism, pool- and new anxieties, directing ing of sovereignty, porous borders, trans-national mobility and cultural them at external international diversity. ‘others’ while also using them Sovereignty has thus become the to re-define the community vanishing point of the radical right’s of ‘we’ as rooted in space and program and of the growing popu- united in history lar revolt against the tired post-war liberal consensus. This is because it subsumes an array of issues that have steadily climbed up the list of priori- to diffuse the challenge posed by the ties for European electorates –immi- radicals to their power and ideolog- gration and control of borders; dem- ical hegemony.29 But recent develop- ocratic accountability; fears of status ments across the EU member states vis-à-vis cultural, religious, ethnic –not to mention the U.S.– point to and other minorities; unease with a new stage in this creeping conver- multiculturalism and globalization. gence: a popular revolt against the This is precisely where many radi- tired liberal political class and their cal right wing parties have met and fundamental ideas.30 joined forces with an increasingly more receptive social audience, long alienated by the promises of liberal- Sovereigntism as the Banner of ism and European integration. This is the Revolt what binds Donald Trump’s “Amer- ica First” slogan with Salvini’s “Ital- The outcome of the 2016 referendum ians First of All” motto in the 2018 on Britain’s membership in the EU elections.33 was the first milestone in this revolt against the mainstream and its as- Why did the mirage of seizing back sumed liberal, globalist consensus. sovereignty prove such an effective ‘Take back control,’ the rallying cry of banner for the mainstreaming of the Leave campaign, proved so effec- the radical right? Back in 1997, at tive because it offered an actionable the heyday of liberal confidence in vision of collective empowerment on globalization’s irreversible forward behalf of a narrowly re-defined na- march, Dani Rodrik struck a discor- tional community.31 This vision was dant note when he spoke of the dan- a reassuring substitute for the per- ger that this same globalization was ceived atomization of contemporary advancing much faster than our abil- society and the authoritarian procliv- ity to govern it or indeed our capacity

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to comprehend it; and that this situa- a nativist, homogeneous commu- tion was likely to generate a backlash nity against incursions from people, against it.34 Since then, it would seem, ideas, commodities, and any other the mainstream ‘center’ of Europe flow from the perceived ‘outside’ that has moved decisively from a global- could threaten the identity of their ization Zeitgeist to an increasingly national communities and their vi- nationalist-populist and sovereigntist sion of ‘Europe’ as a ‘Judeo-Christian’ one.35 The distance traveled is signifi- fortress.38 cant but not as dramatic as it may appear at first. For beneath the surface No wonder then, that during the of a confident, seemingly irreversible campaign for the 2016 EU referen- embrace of post-war liberal values lay dum in Britain, the Leave campaign a growing but previously suppressed used the imagery of the border as the unease, disaffection, and resentment most eloquent marker of the differ- with these very values. The radical ence between in and out, between a right offered a taboo-breaking li- crisis-ridden present and an alter- cense that re-inflamed old prejudices native future of reclaimed popular and new anxieties, directing them at self-determination on behalf of the external international ‘others’ while territorial nation-state.39 Two of its also using them to re-define the com- most potent visual campaigns in- munity of ‘we’ as rooted in space and volved the notion of a threatened united in history.36 national border by large numbers of refugees from Muslim countries. No It is not a coincidence that the re- wonder the Hungarian high-tech cent electoral and political success border fence has been praised by of the radical right owes so much to Viktor Orban as the last line of de- its anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim fense for a ‘Christian Europe’ against discourses. These two groups have ‘Muslim invaders.’40 No wonder that served as the targets of an increas- the case of Anis Amri, the culprit of ingly ‘acceptable racism’ directed the 2016 attack on a busy market in against them as perennial, dangerous Berlin who then traveled through the ‘outsiders.’37 Their exclusion is per- Schengen zone and was shot down formed at the point where the inter- in Milan a few days later, united the national and the national collide and stars of the European radical right – are forcibly demarcated –namely, at from Le Pen to Salvini to Wilders– in the border. The border that according condemnation of the EU’s internal to globalization theorists only two de- borders policy.41 cades ago was waning or disappear- ing altogether as a temporary phase in the history of sovereignty, is being The Radical Right’s Sovereigntist re-constituted as the marker of a new Challenge to the EU era of territorial national sovereignty. The sovereigntists of the radical right Across the EU member states, radical have come to view it as a bulwark of right parties have been refining their

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Italy’s Interior Minister and Deputy PM, Matteo Salvini, speaks during the annual meeting of Italy’s far right party the Northern League in Pontida, northeast Milan on July 1, 2018. MIGUEL MEDINA / AFP / Getty Images

sovereigntist message, using it as the bitiously into the international and sharp edge of their attack against na- indeed global domain. tional, European, and global elites. Claiming to represent, and respond It is thus no coincidence that the to, the authentic voice of ‘the peo- forces of the radical right in Europe ple,’ their calls for radical change have cultivated increasingly closer cast a shadow on the legitimacy of transnational political links in re- the ‘elitist’ national political systems cent years. In May 2018, some of Eu- and forms of governance. In addition, rope’s radical right wing parties were however, their horizon is increas- hosted by Marine Le Pen in Nice.42 ingly inter- and trans-national. This After years of trying in vain to form underlines the significance of their a coalition of like-minded radical an- confrontation with the EU, its insti- ti-establishment nationalist parties tutions, and its operating principles. in the European Parliament,43 Le Pen In directing the bulk of their chal- managed to bring together Wilders lenge at the EU, they correctly recog- and Salvini (the latter via video) with nize the symbolic status of the insti- FPÖ’s MEP Harald Vilimsky and tution as the poster child of the kind Tomio Okamura, leader of the Free- of post-sovereigntism that they are dom and Direct Democracy Party in determined to challenge and reverse. the Czech Republic. Together they This reflects the ambition of their launched a joint anti-immigration campaign as a two-pronged attack – campaign that struck at the heart of one focusing on national issues, the the EU’s immigration and Schengen other reaching further and more am- policy.44 Their alternative, ‘a union of

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independent nations,’ has remained a sovereigntist anti-utopia of Euro- The EU has been forced into sceptic forces across Europe since the 1980s. What has changed is the an increasingly defensive ideological conflation of sovereign- position of having to justify tism with layers of transnational an- its contemporary relevance ti-immigration and anti-Muslim discourses. The converging stereotypes in the face of growing dissent of the immigrant, the refugee, and the even within political and social Muslim as existential threats to western civilization have helped the radi- mainstream constituencies cal right to ‘mainstream’ its core political message. But the same stereotypes have also underpinned an ideological across all member states to learn from and attitudinal shift towards more ex- the successes of the populists of the treme positions on immigration and radical right.45 This is wise counsel – religious/cultural diversity at the very so long as it points to the need for re- heart of mainstream society. thinking how the values of diversity, respect for difference, human rights, This dramatic shift of the radical right and international cooperation can towards the mainstream is now far be made more relevant to the needs more worrying for the EU than the and expectations of contemporary prospect of any formal grouping of voters. The world today is very differ- Europe’s notoriously fractious radical ent from that of the 1980s (when the right wing parties in the European union’s current institutional founda- Parliament. It is worrying because it tions were put in place), let alone the points to the reality of a deep social 1950s. Years of assumed ideological demand for a sovereigntist alterna- hegemony for the sort of post-sov- tive platform to the conventional lib- ereigntist, supranational globalizing eral mainstream; and because it poses liberalism championed by the EU a direct challenge to the core values have bred complacency and blunted behind the Union’s key political ex- reflexes. Significant momentum was periments since the 1980s. The EU squandered after the turn of the new has been forced into an increasingly century on projects that appeared too defensive position of having to justify centralizing, too distant or even vain its contemporary relevance in the face to European citizens. Simply clinging of growing dissent even within polit- to the status quo is no longer a viable ical and social mainstream constitu- option. After managing one crisis af- encies. The role of the radical right in ter another for the last decade, the EU facilitating this reversal over the last must at long last use its power at the three decades cannot be exaggerated. service of a new, positive and inspiring future for its citizens.46 This may There are increasing calls for the EU involve a shake-up in terms of its im- and its mainstream political pillars mediate priorities, its key figures, and

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convincingly; and unless it addresses After managing one crisis after the causes of citizen resentment without adopting the language and logic another for the last decade, of the right wing populists, its future the EU must at long last use its as a dynamic and united block looks power at the service of a new, decidedly bleak. positive and inspiring future for its citizens Endnotes 1. Jiří Přibáň, Sovereignty in Post-Sovereign Soci- ety: A Systems Theory of European Constitutional- perhaps as importantly, the ways in ism, (New York: Routledge, 2016). which it communicates and interacts 2. Daniel Boffey, “Rising Euroscepticism ‘Poses Existential Threat to EU,’” The Guardian, (March 3, with European citizens. 2017), retrieved May 21, 2018, from http://www. theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/03/brexit- This is a meaningful medium-term has-put-other-leaders-off-wanting-to-leave-says- strategy; but it is not going to make ec-vice-president. the challenge of the radical right go 3. Yann Algan, Sergei Guriev, et al., “The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism,” Brookings, away. It is likely that we have not yet (September 7, 2017), retrieved May 21, 2018, from reached the apex of the parabola of https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the- the populist nationalist surge in Eu- european-trust-crisis-and-the-rise-of-populism/. rope. In hindsight, 2017 was little 4. James Dawson and Sean Hanley, “The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus,’” Journal of more than a lull for the liberal main- Democracy, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2016), pp. 20-34; Ivan stream and the Europhiles across the Krastev, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The continent.47 The EU must learn to live Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus,” Journal with this challenge and prepare more of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2007), pp. 56-63. effectively for the hostile questioning 5. “The Mounting Challenge of Economic Na- tionalism,” Financial Times, (January 30, 2017), of its principles by the radical right retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://www. in its member states. As highlighted ft.com/content/c8d3d226-e6e6-11e6-967b- by the ongoing key discussions about c88452263daf; Viktor Jakupec, Development Aid immigration and border control on – Populism and the End of the Neoliberal Agenda, 48 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), both EU and national levels, the pp. 53-68. political discourse will continue for 6. Michael Ignatieff, “The Return of Sovereignty,” some time to provide the forces of The New Republic, (January 25, 2012), retrieved the radical right with significant op- May 21, 2018, from https://newrepublic.com/ar- portunities for both electoral gain ticle/100040/sovereign-equality-moral-disagree- ment-government-roth. and agenda-setting.49 Yet the temp- 7. Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in tation to make concessions to the Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ‘closed,’ exclusionary, nativist vision 2007); Jens Rydgren, Movements of Exclusion: of the radical right must be resisted Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World, (New York: Nova Publishers, 2005); Matthew at all cost, even at the risk of short- J. Goodwin, The New Radical Right: Violent and term electoral loss. Unless the EU Non-Violent Movements in Europe, (London: Insti- shifts the discussion effectively and tute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012).

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