The Buzz Around the Ballot

2|2017 2(11)|2017

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The Buzz Around The Ballot

www.visegradinsight.eu ISSN 2084-8250 11 Media Landscapes and Disinformation in the V4 9 772084 825077

VI 11 cover.indd 1 21.11.2017 13:14 PROSPERITY — SOLIDARITY — INNOVATION Focus on Central Europe

7 December 2017 Warsaw

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editor-in-chief Wojciech Przybylski (Res Publica, PL) twitter: @wprzybylski

director of operations Magda Jakubowska (Res Publica, PL) [email protected] + 48 694 40 19 80

editor Galan Dall (Res Publica, USA) [email protected]

online content editor Gabriela Rogowska (Res Publica, PL) [email protected]

senior associate Marcin Zaborowski (Res Publica, PL) twitter: @MaZaborowski

associate Anna Wójcik (Res Publica, PL) twitter: @annawojcik

economy section editor Martin Ehl (Hospodářské noviny, CZ) twitter: @MartinCZV4EU

intelligent mind editors Éva Karádi (HU) Marta Šimečková (SK)

books editor Julia Sherwood (SK)

contributing editors Juraj Čorba (SK) Katarína Kucbelová (SK) Marek Sečkař (CZ) Sophie Shevchuk (UA) Máté Zombory (HU)

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Cover by Paweł Kuczyński

Visegrad Insight is an analysis and opinion journal led by accomplished editors from the Visegrad Group countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Its aim is to provide a platform for high profile debate on the perspectives and challenges for cooperation of the Central European governments, business and communities. Published by Res Publica, Poland.

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2 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 - - - - - 3 EDITORIAL stream media is further undermined by poor business not catching are models that growing quickly up with the digital advertising market. social era, counting of democracy, estate fourth media the Post-truth In the in, has start with build up democratic, let’s resilience become To democracy. to a challenge of quality media.resilience financial crisis struck downthat traditional media and second all acrossthe world, growth rapid of social media.– the Capitalism internet, and the one a Russian neither quickly becameinvention, new the age. weapons information of the ways, in many Europe, hasCentral become exposed EU more USA or other the than partners. The swift growth of social mediatook revenue traditional mediafrom outlets and exposed societies political pure to propaganda. Editorial oversight, often referred asto gatekeeping, no longer safeguards social mediaand friends followers from direct divisive to exposure practices. Asintroduced its a reaction,Facebook own editorial been not have but it might was soon that oversight revealed enough earlier year, this had already been that countries for heavily exposed. people2017 more andin prefer (+10%) V4 the in Germany, to compared Asshow, we in main in mainstream outlets. than trust media” have in so-called Trust “alternative ly revealed electoral the campaign to USA. in the in relation fake-news Russian makes the What con campaign the appears so that successful? It temporary mastersthe global of lies IRA demo the influence considerably to able are process.cratic our weakness? due to or more strength their Is it due to makes more sense. explanation digitalrecent Duringthe revolution The latter – a had a vast process that rapid impact on our societies, we let hostile scouts take over part of our domestic electoral agenda. revealed self-audit the American nearly half of that populationTwitter’s autumn, This has been exposed campaign fake-news. and Russian this to of hate apparent The goal, elected polarise but to American was Donald the society. Trump have not only to ly, The IRA sponsored radicalismthe left.both the and of of right was But why it possible first place?in the particular developments revived 2008Two mass this – the scale First disinformation. Every period in history era. has its This Post-truth one has jokes the including been occupation following the of Crimea:told if it looksa duck, like quacks and a duck like duck. a Russian a duck, In truth, does our duck not quack – it tweets! it’s denies it’s Russian the IRA of The acronym standsfor a newtoday terroristkind of organisation Research Internet Agency (AKA factory)– the troll the whose recent operations were The buzzThe around the ballot - -

Editor-in-chief WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI PROPAGANDA DITIONAL MEDIA OUTLETS AND EX OUTLETS AND MEDIA DITIONAL POLITICAL PURE TO SOCIETIES POSED PIOTR BEKAS SOCIAL GROWTH OF SWIFT THE TRA FROM REVENUE TOOK MEDIA CONTENTS

EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ 6 Survey – The Impact of the Internet on Media and Politics Szabolcs Töhötöm Tóth, Karel Kovář, Zuzanna Ziomecka, Tomáš Bella, Eric Maurice 10 House Undivided – How pro-Putin ideologues have united both the far-right and the far-left in their unwavering support of the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda Péter Krekó, interview with Lóránt Győri Robert Pszczel from 13 Fire and Brimstone – Deception and the NATO HQ Dread in Central Europe Galan Dall 16 From Tweets to Tanks – interview with Robert Pszczel from the NATO HQ

ECONOMY PAGE 16 Illustration: Kuczyński Paweł SOCIAL MEDIA 18 Report: Media Consumption Trends – in cooperation with weCAN network 20 The Vulnerable V4 Miriam Lexmann WHAT ARE MEDIA

MEDIA CONSUMPTION POPULISM & POWER TRENDS IN V4 24 The Cassandra Curse Danuta Dobrzyńska-Schmimer 26 The Czech Elections and the Future of Media Independence Václav Štĕtka 28 The New Enemy Zselyke Csaky 30 The Shadow over media Michał Kobosko 34 Journalism’s Growing Pains in Visegrad Beata Balogová PAGE 38 Making lemonade 18 Zosia Wasik 40 The Pitfalls of Censoring Fake News Barbora Bukovska in conversation with Aleksandra Eriksson SECTION 43 Imbalance and Glass Ceilings Greta Gober 45 Gender Equality in CEE Media, Helena Chmielewska-Szlajfer

SECURITY CYBER 48 The State of Cyber Security in the V4 Botond Feledy 51 June 2017 Cyber Attack in Ukraine Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security 52 How vulnerable is the Polish Cyber World to Attacks Tomasz Matuła PAGE 24 4 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 CONTENTS

INTERVIEW EU ON THE EDGE TheTHE HURDLES Hurdles Ahead 55 TremorsThe Report in Europe’s Card Foundation AHEAD FOR Roland Freudenstein CENTRAL Their European EUROPE Foil for Central Europe V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU Iveta Radičová 59 The End of Convergence Cornelius Ochmann, Wojciech Przybylski 60 The Different Faces of Visegrad Kai-Olaf Lang 61 The Hurdles Ahead for Central Europe Iveta Radičová 64 Germany and Central Europe Michal Kořan 68 The Euro, Always on the Central European Edit Inotai 70 Additional Conditions Zoltán Kovács, Secretary of State of Hungary, on the adoption of the euro in Hungary PAGE 71 Eurozone membership – the Facts, 61 the Game, and the Debate – flash

report by Visegrad Insight Their European 72 The Parisian Mirror Milan Nič Foil 75 Who Will Be Served at the Table and Who Will Be Served for Dinner, PAGE 84 Edit Zgut 78 The Small Steps of Europe Paweł Kowal, former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Rastislav Káčer 82 What German Elections mean for Central Europe Marcin Zaborowski

INTELLIGENT MIND SLOVAKIA 84 Don’t Merchandise Doubt Rastislav Káčer

BOOKS FICTION WE LOVE 89 In Literature Julia Sherwood 90 PAGE Emöke Szabó Lovas 89 92 Magdalena Mullek 93 Anna Zaranko 94 Michal Jareš

Julia Sherwood, Emöke Szabó Lovas, Magdalena Mullek, Anna Zaranko, Michal Jareš 5 EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ

We have asked five internet savvy editors about the buzz around the ballot. What was the impact of the internet on media and politics SURVEY in recent years?

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SZABOLCS TÖHÖTÖM TÓTH Editor-in-Chief of Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian nation), a Hungar- ian daily founded by Sándor Pethő in 1938. He is also project leader for the online development of the newspaper.

ith Donald Trump rising to power, the debate on To make things worse for those Hungarian news outlets fake news has engulfed editorial pages, prompt- that still try to resist this surge, the government has become ed hosts of news stories and provoked myriads one of the biggest advertisers in the media market. In fact, W of twitter posts all over Europe and in the United according to the CANnual Report 2017 (see pages 18–19 in States. Less attention has been paid though to another dan- this issue), the Prime Minister’s Office was the second biggest gerous phenomenon. One that I would call the “fake media”. advertiser in Hungary in 2016, following the German telecom- In Hungary, the government has managed to create one munication giant Telekom. so successfully that newspapers, television stations and online Of course, this advertisement money goes to friend- news sites belonging to its propaganda machine now threaten ly media companies. To add more insult to injury, there is a to suffocate the real thing: those who still try to maintain ed- widespread perception that private companies are under pres- itorial independence and work with the traditional watchdog sure by the Hungarian government not to place ads in news approach to those in power. outlets that are perceived as enemies by Fidesz, Hungary’s In the last three or four years, through friendly business- ruling party. men and thinly veiled direct funding, the Hungarian govern- This brutal interference has resulted in an extremely dis- ment has channeled hundreds of billions of forints into buying torted media market, where independent players are bound existing media companies and creating new ones. Now, it ef- to compete with a thinly-veiled state-run media conglomerate fectively controls (through its cronies) one of the two over- that is awash with public and (scared) private money in an the-air commercial television channels (Tv2), two national economic system that is more and more controlled and bullied newspapers (Magyar Idők and Magyar Hírlap), a free daily by the state. distributed on mass transit lines (Lokál), two national tabloid Meanwhile, market trends that have hit media compa- daily newspapers (Ripost and Bors), the biggest Hungarian on- nies hard in other countries of Europe are of course present line news site (Origo), a television news channel (Echo TV), a in Hungary as well. The decline of print ad revenue coupled news radio channel (Karc FM), all of the regional daily news- with the growing amount of money that Google and Facebook papers (!) and their associated online news sites, and an addi- is diverting from these companies are huge problems for tional two, relatively new, online news sites (Pesti Srácok and Hungarian media companies. 888) – besides weekly newspapers and several smaller scale Thus, under these circumstances, the Hungarian govern- news operations on the internet. ment does not have to curb press freedom to silence dissent: While acquiring all these riches, in 2016 it managed to all it has to do is to create competitors to private companies buy and shut down the leftist Népszabadság, one of Hungary’s that are already under siege by market forces, in order to cre- flagship daily national newspapers. ate fake media that tries to behave like the real one. Except for Of course, the government is also served by the whole its main goal is not to hold the government accountable, but to public media, which has practically been enslaved and re- assist it, not to expose propaganda, but to spread it, and not to duced to a propaganda machine on steroids, including the unveil the truth but to hide it in an artificially created noise. state-run news agency, multiple television channels, radio stations and an online news site. All financed with taxpayer money, of course.

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ZUZANNA ZIOMECKA Editor-in-Chief of NewsMavens.com. A media maker driven by the conviction that diversity and inclusion are the best way forward for our VUCA world. She uses media and journalism to create leadership interventions into issues that she feels deeply about. A woman, a mother, a European, a practitioner and pro- moter of mindfulness, and a great admirer of pirates.

he internet has eliminated the barrier of entry into media. In these days of intense social media penetration, everyone is a commentator and politicians no longer T need the media to get through to their constituencies. A major challenge in this situation is that advertisers, the bread and butter of the media business, also no longer need the media to reach audiences. This puts media in a position it has never been in before – we now have to prove our utility to both the public and the consumer goods industry. KAREL KOVÁŘ A clear trend in this search for a new “reason to be” is the One of the most popular Czech video bloggers who introduced emergence of fact checking as a media format. Instimojer, a political themes to Czech video blogging cementing his status fact checking NGO in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example by being one of three to interview President Juncker. In 2016, of a stand-alone institution dedicated to checking claims and he received the Blogger of the Year award. Forbes has identified promises made by local authorities. A story recently released him as the 17th most influential Czech on social networks in on Instinomjer gives an inside look at how Bosnian politicians 2016 and listed him as one of the 30 most talented Czechs make use of loose regulations to put up their own online news aged under 30. He was also listed as a New Europe 100 chal- sources that launch smear campaigns against political rivals. lenger by Res Publica, Google, Financial Times and the Visegrad Another example is Gazeta Wyborcza’s SONAR – a big data Fund in 2017. start-up also created to track local politicians.

t is brutal I would say. News especially. Basically, everybody is dealing with something I call information mad- ness nowadays. Sometimes it´s very hard to tell what´s I the truth and what´s just a fake story. People are mostly confused not knowing what to trust anymore, which creates instability and distrust. That is extremely convenient for big powers (especially Russia), which want to see the EU divided and unstable. There is enough evidence that Russia itself is helping to create this kind of situation through hacking and paid “news outlets” which have been successful in spreading an epidemic of fake news stories. Feeling that the EU does not care enough, Visegrad is moving closer to the so-called strong leadership idea and basic values like free independent media or parliamentary democracy are being threatened.

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ERIC MAURICE Editor-in-Chief of EUobserver. Before joining the Brussels-based news website, he was editor-in-chief of Presseurop, a pan-Euro- pean and multilingual media project. A graduate from the Par- is-Sorbonne University in history of international relations and the Paris École Supérieure de journalisme, he started his career at the French weekly Courrier International, where he suc- cessively was in charge of the French, US and Western Europe desks.

t is not an original thing to say, but the internet has ac- celerated the pace of news because everyone now – including journalists – expect articles on any event to come Ionline very quickly, as if they were just an extension of tweets and news alerts. That tendency is intensified by the fact that the internet has also extended the competition – traditional media, pure players, news agencies (which traditionally were only provid- TOMÁŠ BELLA ers for news organisations, not directly to the public) are at the Co-founder and head of online at Dennik N, independent Slo- same level but with their own characteristics and pace. vak daily newspaper. Daily “N” was founded in 2015 by former To follow that pace, you have to try to publish different members of the editorial team of SME daily. Previously, he was kinds of news – breaking, factual or analytical. In these realms, the editor-in-chief at Sme.sk and CEO at Piano, a company pro- the biggest publishers have an advantage. ducing paid-content software for publishers. Nominated as a On EU politics, the impact – seen from a more cyni- New Europe 100 challenger for introducing the ground-breaking cal perspective – is that the institutions, and mainly the EU technology of a pay-wall for media content by Res Publica, Goog- Commission, use this environment to better control the le, Financial Times and the Visegrad Fund. information. They know that we journalists have to work quickly, and often they give us documents at the last minute, just before a he internet, especially in smaller countries, allows poli- commissioner comes to make an announcement. Then we have ticians to cut out the (media) middle man, which can be only their point of view if we want to write our article quickly. used for both good and evil. Some politicians enter into Politicians – and I include commissioners, MEPs, more T honest public discussions with their voters which allows than just EU national leaders – also communicate more citizens to get direct answers from them and better informa- through social media by sharing articles and reports they tion about their attitudes than through media (or billboards). like, or in which they are quoted, or even opinion pieces they On the other hand, the internet made it very easy for wrote (and which are mainly written in order to be shared on extremists to communicate directly with potential voters, social media). something that used to be much harder through the filter of EU officials and politicians know that journalists in traditional media. Brussels spend all their days on Twitter. So that’s how they In the end, I believe the effect will be positive but, as share their speeches, react to events, deny news, try to spread with any other new medium, people will need to go through their spin. From that point of view, Twitter has become a years of slowly learning how to use the medium and how to quasi-official means of communication, much more than recognize and avoid its potential traps. Facebook.

9 EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ A House Undivided How pro-Putin ideologues have united both the far-right and the far-left in their unwavering support of the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda Illustration: Kuczyński Paweł

PÉTER KREKÓ AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI

little more than a year mostly older pensioners burnt out by the the works of the leading neo-Eurasian ago, a limited circle of Trianon trauma and some youths sport- ideologist Alexander Dugin. fans gathered in a small ing discreet Hitler-Jugend haircuts, all The sympathy of Ms. Őry to the far-right bookstore lo- of them ready to hear the author, Daniel pro-Kremlin emigre circle of far-right ac- cated underground of Friberg, speak about the immigrant situ- tivists residing in Budapest is not surpris- one of the most prom- ation in Europe. ing. She is the Head of the Foreign Desk inent plazas in Buda- A journalist, Mariann Őry was also at the right-wing Magyar Hírlap news- pest to welcome the among the crowd and even introduced paper – owned by a pro-Fidesz oligarch new book of the European “alt-right” (in Mr. Friberg as a regular economist in her – that openly promotes an anti-immigra- Afact: Nazis in suits) titled “The Real Right journal. The author is in fact an ex-Swed- tion, illiberal, misogynistic and homo- Returns: A Handbook for the True Op- ish neo-Nazi turned CEO of the Arktos phobic agenda, resonating governmental position”. The audience was composed of group, the main European publisher of messages. 10 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE

Where this story gets interesting is portrays him (as well as Putin) as a Saint ANTI-FASCISTS IN ARMS IN V4 that Őry is in fact the daughter of Gyula George who fights against the dragon of COUNTRIES: HUNGARY, CZECHIA Thürmer, the Chairman of the Hungarian Islamic terrorism. AND POLAND Workers’ Party (HWP) – a successor of The second important point is that Of course, after four decades of state the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party converging anti-establishment, anti-EU socialism, the post-communist block is (MSZMP), the only political remnant and anti-NATO narratives on the radi- not the stronghold of the radical left any- of hardcore, orthodox communism. cal left and radical right often manifest more. The general fate of Central-Eastern She used to be on the political board themselves in cooperation. One such European far-left parties is that they fade of the party, when her father turned it example involves the “nationalist radical away, unable to modernize themselves, into a pro-Russian family-business after leftist portal” called Bal-rad. This web- losing their old voters while having diffi- 2010. She also enthusiastically reported page, pushing several pro-Russian arti- culties to attract the new urban, educat- about her father’s press conferences on cles embedded in a bizarre combination ed electorate that the green parties reach Syria, Crimea and other foreign policy of radical left-nationalist and anti-glo- out to. Instead, these parties keep living issues – in all of these cases, presenting balist narratives was sponsored by Lukoil as communist spectres of the Soviet past. standpoints totally compatible with the – despite their being an utterly marginal The only relevant political force in Kremlin’s. Thürmer, for example, ap- site and, therefore, having zero PR value. the region is in Czechia. The Communist peared bizarrely enthusiastic after the Then, not-so-surprisingly, it moved to a Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) annexation of Crimea by Russia – Russian server in April 2017. received 15% of the vote in 2013, but has “If Albanians have the right in Here, we can see again the manifes- declined to 8% by 2017. Over the years, Kosovo for self-determination, Russians tation of a global phenomenon on a local they have been able to maintain a close have the same right in Crimea. (…) We level: the ideological convergence of the relationship with the Russian Communist should rather cherish that the borders fringes is at the same time spontaneous Party – after the Soviet Union fell apart – of the second world war are not carved and facilitated. Russia, a natural ally of which is, these days, a pseudo-opposition in stone. We should not feel sorrow over fringe movements in their fight against party with a strong nationalist and even Trianon, (…) Europe would be much bet- the global establishment, is trying to nostalgically imperialist agenda. ter off by re-drawing the map according make the most out of this anti-Western While having seen better days, the to the will of the people.” coalition. leader of the Russian communist party, Gyula Thürmer’s son, Gyula Máté Another important instance in- Zyuganov, received almost 30% of the T. is also politically active: he used to be a volved the Hungarian communist par- vote in the presidential elections in 2000 candidate for the Hungarian Communist ty which cooperated with the now when Putin was first elected as president. party, and he is right now also the column- dissolved neo-Nazi Hungarian National In the latest Duma elections, they were ist of pro-governmental newspapers such Front (MNA). This party became no- still the strongest opposition party with as Magyar Hírlap and Pesti Srácok that torious for its leader shooting down a more than 13% of the vote, and Russian are also pushing an authoritarian, illiberal, policeman in late 2016. He also conduct- communists keep an important role in xenophobic agenda and tons of fake news. ed “airsoft drills” with members of the keeping the old comrade networks alive. Russian military service, the GRU (dis- However, the Russian communists WHERE ALL RADICALS guised as Russian diplomats accredited are not the only force reaching out to the CONVERGE in Hungary). Surprisingly enough, it ac- radical left in Europe. While the Kremlin- Two important conclusions can be drawn knowledged the Workers’ party as a gen- driven disinformation campaigns are fre- from this seemingly marginal and par- uine representation of the “Hungarians’ quently described as strongly ideological, ticular case. First of all, an increasing real interest.” While the Hungarian com- in fact, they are totally opportunistic, overlap between the narratives of the rad- munists are, originally, known for their aiming to reach different audiences via ical left and the radical right, especially notorious and militant anti-fascism, various channels. In 2016, the Russian when it comes to foreign policy issues in Thürmer’s party protested together in Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, for ex- which Russia is involved. They usually social matters with the neo-Nazis, and ample, published an English article in come to the same conclusion on different the MNA published ideological articles the Russian Global Affairs (the “Russian logical routes; while the radical right, for promoting the “formation of a workers’ Foreign Affairs magazine”), which explic- example, like to refer to Putin as the last state” on Hungarian communist websites. itly targets left-wing intellectuals and pol- real Christian, conservative leader in Eu- After the annexation of Crimea, iticians in the West with quotations from rope and celebrate his attempts to dom- both far-right and far-left “independent George Orwell, and statements to the ef- inate this sphere of influence, the radical European observers” went to legitimize fect that Western European welfare states left in Europe – from Syriza through to the illegal secession referendum, in March just copied the Soviet Union’s success. the Czech Communists and Die Linke to 2014. Despite the fact that the Hungarian After the Maidan revolution, the the Dutch Socialists and Podemos – re- Workers’ Party was unable or unwilling Kremlin launched the single biggest dis- fer to the maintaining of peace, neutrality to send an envoy, the Communist Party information campaign in the last decade and self-determination when justifying, of Greece (KKE), the German Die Linke, about a Western initiated “Fascist coup” for example, the Crimean annexation. the Polish Democratic Left Alliance in Kiev. This message resonated well with When talking about Syria, the radical and Mateusz Piskorski, the founder of both the fellow Ukrainian Communist left tend to see Assad as an eternal com- the leftist-national Zmiana party, did parties, Russian compatriots evoking the rade fighter against the imperialists; the so along with scores of far-right party “Great Patriotic War” fought by Stalin, radical right, in a similarly positive light, representatives. and European left-wing parties and in- 11 EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ

tellectuals. Three years after the war ness” with CIS-EMO in the post-Soviet against Ukraine unleashed by Russia, the space, aiming at legitimising Kremlin- KSČM still warns of the “open Western backed regimes, breakaway regions and aggression against Russia,” and the emer- referenda. In 2015, the politician found- gence of “fascist, and Nazi forces”. KSČM ed Poland’s first and only openly and organized the first “Current Fascism in blatantly pro-Russian leftist party called Europe” workshop in 2014 on Russian Zmiana (Change). At the same time, foreign policy in the Czech Parliament he was pushing the “Ukraine is fascist” in cooperation with the Institute of narrative as a “geopolitical expert” on Slavic Strategic Studies (ISSS) founded in Sputnik and Russia Today. Piskorski was Prague in 2013. Again, we can obviously arrested by the Polish authorities in May see the joint far-right far-left platform. 2016 allegedly on charges of espionage The latest pro-Russian discussion titled for Russia and China. Shortly after, the “Myths about Russia” was held by the “Laundromat scandal” proved that the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy European Centre of Geopolitical Analysis party together with the ISSS in 2016 in (ECAG) led by Piskorski was – using the Czech Parliament. money coming from Russia. In Poland, obviously pro-Russian voices are usually more silent and more TACTICALLY BLIND, marginal. Still, beside the far-right, we can DEAF AND MUTE find strong proponents of Russia on the While Zmiana is rather an extreme case, left as well. A member of the post-Com- the Polish Democratic Left Alliance’s be- munist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), haviour sums up the far-left’s paradoxical Adam Krzysztof Kępiński, for example, connection with Moscow. Leftist parties, participated as an election observer at even in the centre, are usually much less the 2014 “referendum” on the secession blatant about their support for the Krem- of Crimea. Leszek Miller, the party’s for- lin as compared to their far-right coun- mer chairman and former PM of Poland, terparts. Most European leftist parties has frequently criticised politicians of rarely praise Putin or his regime openly. being too harsh towards Russia and has They call for “neutrality”, “peace” and the called for a friendlier relationship with “stopping of western aggression” instead. their eastern neighbour. The majority of European far-left parties In 2014, Miller called the Russian showcase a double-edged strategy of rhe- aggression a “fratricidal war” in Eastern- torical self-containment and the denial Ukraine, blaming the Right Sector for the of pro-Putinism with an almost uncon- crisis without mentioning Russia’s role in ditional support of the Kremlin’s core the war. In an interview given to Sputni, geopolitical goals. While the far-right the former PM later criticised the Polish is rather vocal in its ideological pro-Pu- authorities for not letting the pro-Putin tinism, the left is deaf and blind to the “Night Wolves” motorcycle gang through perceived human rights violations and “honouring the fight against the Fascist imperial ambitions of Russia, and mute Germany,” and for “Russophobia becom- when talking about these issues. But they ing the official foreign policy doctrine” of lose their inhibition when it comes to Poland. Twice the presidential candidate criticising the West – especially the US, of the SLD, Magdalena Ogórek, advocated the EU and NATO for aggression and for a stronger partnership with Russia, try- provoking conflicts. ing to put it as the European mainstream: “The world needs Russia to fight terror- Péter Krekó is the director of the Political Capital ism. Angela Merkel and Franocis Hollande Institute, a Budapest-based Central European are conducting very balanced talks with political research and consultancy firm. Russia and I am so proud of this.” The infamous and aforemen- Lóránt Győri is a geopolitical analyst at Political tioned, Mateusz Piskorski, a well-known Capital. pro-Russian political figure in Poland, personally embodies the pro-Putin coalition of the radical left and right. Piskorski started his career around extremist organizations and later became an MP of the far-right Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland in 2005. Later he became one of the organizers of the “election busi- 12 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE FIRE AND BRIMSTONE The Proliferation of Deception and Dread in Central Europe

Disinformation campaigns in the US are growing in sophistication, and many across the Atlantic are learning the same tricks

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GALAN DALL

or most of us who don’t everyday skill we have all had to quickly TRANSLATING THE PARANOIA block or unfollow those adopt. Just as we were getting hold of this The above is hardly surprising consider- with differing political fake news debacle, we have reached the ing all the recent tactics used to influence opinions, our daily news- next stage of this propaganda strategy: elections in Western Europe as well as the feeds are constantly being judgment before publishing. US, but the question at hand is if the same bombarded with spuri- To see this plan in action, we can occurrence is happening in post-commu- ous stories of politicians look back to last June when the western nist societies? from across the spectrum media world was caught in eager anticipa- The situation in Central Europe is engaged in a smorgasbord of conspiracies. tion of Megyn Kelly’s NBC interview with trickier to diagnose because many far- FThe strategy is to overwhelm the reader, Alex Jones, the founder of Info Wars (if right, nationalistic parties are currently in and the public at large, with as many arti- ever a show name was more appropriate power and, a crucial difference from the cles as possible on similar topics, so that for someone intent on disrupting coherent US, they also control many of the main- the sheer number of pieces will convince narratives and espousing, often violent, stream media outlets. people that there must be something solutions to conspiracies so far-fetched A recent report by Robert Gorwa truthful in them, after all where there’s they crossed over into the farcical realm for the Oxford Internet Institute found smoke…there’s more smoke. The pur- long ago). The content of the interview that there has been a considerable in- pose is either to undermine established was of less importance, as the ratings did crease in the use of political bots, trolling and reputable journalistic sources (many indicate, than the perception of its “fair- and fake accounts to amplify the propa- of which are producing a large number of ness” (if you tend towards conservative gation of fake news throughout Poland. credible, though controversial, articles) or beliefs) or if it was “hard-hitting” enough What is more interesting is that, while the to obfuscate the situation until no one is (if you are more liberal leaning). consequences of these operations can be certain of what is real. Apart from her previous journalistic extensive, the actual number of people dis- Take, for example, the early hours sins and signs of bias, the critical response tributing this disinformation is incredibly following the horrific Las Vegas shooting was that Kelly did a good job holding Jones small. Perhaps the critics worried about where 59 people died and over 500 were accountable for some of his more outland- giving Alex Jones a bigger microphone injured by a sole-gunman. Clearly nervous ish comments like when he claimed that were correct in their consternations. about a public cry for background checks the Sandy Hook massacre – where 26 A similar situation is playing out in and/or the implementation of meaningful people, mostly children, were killed by a neighbouring Czechia. There, a few small gun legislation, alt-right and some right- gunman at a primary school – was staged but popular sites of unknown ownership wing news agencies flooded both Google by actors. Some though were wary of giv- are peddling pro-Putin and anti-American and Facebook with fabricated stories that ing Jones a larger audience to promote his material while spreading fear about immi- the gunman was a “liberal Democrat” ideas which can aid in the spreading of dis- grants, refugees and Islam in general. But who despised Donald Trump. It took only trust and discontent in society. what has been the effect of these websites hours to disprove this fallacy because the Jones himself used the days before and yellow journalism on the Central Las Vegas Police Department had not the interview to stoke the flames of his European public? released any information on the mass “theory” that he will never be treated According to GLOBSEC, two- murderer, but during that time, enough well by mainstream media, echoing one thirds of Poland’s population do not be- articles had swamped the streams of those of Trump’s favourite excuses of “misrep- lieve the media is presenting an accurate so keen to believe that gun violence isn’t resentation”; Trump himself has been a representation of reality. This can be caused by guns that the rest of the story fan of Jones’ show, enough so to even call mostly attributed to the same methods was drowned out. in and voice his support. Needless to say, mentioned above, a barrage of stories each In today’s world, where there will most on the internet had already decided corroborating each other, but none worth be support for any sound or dubious po- the interview’s value days before its airing, their weight in salt, yet many also attrib- sition wished to be held, discerning what and this was the intended outcome, to ute this to government control of many of information is trustworthy has become an skew minds. the main media outlets. The situation has

14 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE

The situation in Central Europe is trickier to diagnose because many right-wing, nationalistic parties are currently GALAN DALL in power and, a crucial

gotten severe enough for the Czech gov- for proponents of tolerance; however, to difference from the US, ernment to set up a task force to combat those in his community (much like the they also control many these disinformation campaigns. Jones interview above), his removal from This is a laudable step in the right di- the UK is a feather in his cap; a true patriot of the mainstream media rection, but as polls closed in late October, and Christian oppressed by “liberals” and Andrej Babiš – the populist leader of the in his words “Jewish agents with British outlets. ANO party who has been on numerous passports” (original in Polish: ”żydowscy occasions compared to Donald Trump agenci z brytyjskimi paszportami”) . (businessman-turned-politician) – is set For people like Jones, Międlar, and to become the next Prime Minister of even the current president of the US, re- Czechia. porting factually what they have said is On the surface, there is nothing an act of misrepresentation worthy of wrong with a successful magnate turning retaliation. to politics. However, his unique ace in the This past September saw the un- hole is control over the Mafra media group veiling of some of the disinformation which includes the number two newspa- campaigns used in the past year when per (second only to the tabloid Blesk) and Facebook and Twitter released a trove of number three internet news portal in the accounts – mostly run by Russian bots – region. What will happen if the task force which actively promoted Donald Trump above finds issue with something associat- for president. Instead of acting responsibly ed with the likely future Prime Minister’s and attempting to secure the democracy business handlings? A rather obvious po- he now leads by acknowledging these elec- tential conflict of interest is around the toral assaults, Trump decided to exacer- corner, and if there’s anything Czechia bate the situation by attacking Facebook can learn from America, it is that potential itself and the media outlets that covered threats become dangerous realities from the story. one day to the next. As the fourth estate is far more en- trenched in the US and Western Europe, THE WOLF PLAYING SHEPHERD worries about these attacks on journal- But who is the Alex Jones of Central Eu- ists and of deceitful reporting taking over rope? Here we can look to Poland and without any oversight is less worrisome the suspended-priest Jacek Międlar. He than in places like Central Europe where has given many anti-Semitic and Islam- censorship was an unfortunate and unde- ophobic speeches and is popular with sirable but accepted way of life for many right-wing groups on both his blog and years. How easy it would be for it to return Twitter account. Previously this year, as in the name of providing safety and secu- the Guardian reported, Międlar was held rity from the “tormenting evils” of open and refused entry into Britain on at least society. two instances, in both cases he was to speak at far-right rallies. The author is a journalist and editor based in Międlar’s use of venom-filled rhet- Warsaw, Poland. oric on his blog, Twitter and Facebook page as well as his proclivity for inciting prejudice seemed to justify the authorities denying him entry in an apparent win

15 EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ FROM TWEETS TO TANKS

INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT PSZCZEL, SENIOR OFFICER FOR RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DIVISION, NATO HQ (FORMER DIRECTOR OF NATO INFORMATION OFFICE IN MOSCOW)

About NATO’s complex approach to information challenges.

Are Poland and Central Europe taking What strategy does NATO have concern- does not answer disinformation or prop- part in informational warfare? ing this hybrid warfare? aganda with its own propaganda or dis- If we take into consideration the coun- This is a very broad topic. Since 2014, information. We aim to present facts and tries which are members of NATO, then NATO has developed and initiated a hy- our arguments in a dynamic way, using they do not participate in any kind of war. brid strategy to deal with such threats. diverse platforms and tools. We do it It is true however that the security envi- It encompasses many elements ranging via interaction with traditional media, ronment has changed significantly over from a better coordination of intelligence but also through the internet and social the last few years, and therefore so has products, work on resilience of our insti- media – see for example our “Setting the the context and terms we are using to de- tutions and infrastructure, incorporating Record Straight” portal. But we also try scribe it. The elements of hybrid war like hybrid scenarios in our exercises, as well to correct many “false facts or fake news” disinformation, cyber-attacks – these are as cooperation with partner countries which target NATO and individual Allies not abstract terms, but very real threats and the European Union. – by engaging with journalists, opinion and challenges. These tools are not used NATO has 29 member states united formers and ordinary people. by the NATO states foffensive purposes, by a collective defence pledge, forming a In the NATO family, there are many but such actions or elements can be at- stable, permanent coalition that primari- so called Centres of Excellence, and two tributed to the Russian Federation or the ly looks after the security of its members. with the highest public profiles are those Islamic State. Moving to the issue of your main in- which deal respectively with cyber secu- One such operation was the terest, information policy as a dimension rity and with Strategic Communications. Crimean occupation in 2014 where we of our response to hybrid challenges, as is Both institutions help NATO and mem- could see – for the first time in modern the case with other aspects, the first stage ber states by undertaking research, history – the “little green men” being em- of our approach is analysis and situational running courses and workshops – real ployed on a large scale. We all know who awareness. educational work. they were and what they did, so let’s not Comparing to where we were a few This long-term effort does not hap- forget that their first acts involved taking years ago, our awareness of, for example, pen solely within NATO borders. The over and occupying local media centres. how social media are used for aggressive fact that Sweden, a non-NATO country, There was also a disinformation cam- aims of disinformation has improved a has already trained thousands of its civil paign, and a military exercise seemingly great deal. NATO’s situation awareness is servants on how to deal with the problem used as a decoy which preceded the op- an essential starting point because if we of disinformation shows that the threat eration in Crimea. So, the answer from lack the tools to identify the problem, it has an international character. People the Allied side is no, we do not engage in is hard to devise optimum countermeas- who work in specific spheres are likely information warfare, but if we talk about ures against it. to face certain kinds of disinformation the negative and aggressive actions in the The second question is what can be attacks, and if they are made aware of informational sphere, then there is plenty done in a particular situation. We, first of this then they will know how to react and of evidence to suggest that others may see all, need to stick to our mandate and our would hopefully share their knowledge it differently. principles. This means simply that NATO among their communities. 16 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE

One paradoxical advantage we ing next to the EU’s Federica Mogherini, Does Poland at all need to be ready to have in NATO is that we have been the described hybrid threats as “a combination react and resist such kind of threats? target of disinformation for many years, of covert and overt operations and meas- What is the priority action for Poland? only the methods have changed some- ures: everything from propaganda, from On the one side, the Polish society is very what. Recognizing this, NATO’s Public disinformation to actually the use of regular resistant towards any misinformation Diplomacy Division (PDD) and other forces – from tweets to tanks.” campaigns directed by foreign countries. NATO representatives and experts are Returning to the challenges posed It is not easy to persuade Poles in believ- very active in organising and participating by Russia, it is interesting to compare our ing something which is not true as they in a variety of seminars and conferences, agendas and thus approaches. For NATO have a high level of awareness following debating both cyber and disinformation a “comprehensive approach” is a concept years of communist propaganda. On the threats (which often go together). These which aims to ensure synergy of different other hand, there is no state, including topics also come up high on the list of kinds of resources – civilian, military and Poland, which can ignore fully well fi- issues discussed with parliamentarians Strategic Communications – in order to as- nanced disinformation operations, some from all member states. This last point sure stability. To illustrate: for many years of them devised on individual basis and is crucial if we are to contribute to long- now, we have been working in order to sta- targeting specific recipients. term solutions, such as for example me- bilise Afghanistan. We know that ensuring One hears of plans of the Polish dia literacy projects. security is an essential task. Without secu- MOD to create a centre to deal with cyber International cooperation is essen- rity there can be no development. But sta- threats. This certainly sounds like a very tial. It is not a coincidence that among the ble institutions, rule of law, support of the good idea, a route taken by other allies too. 42 areas which were collectively defined local population and economic prospects But one should also take into account that as priorities for joint work by the EU and are in turn factors without which long-term potential opponents are always improving NATO, one of the first agreed items was security will not be guaranteed. their methods, and they are not stingy disinformation. Unfortunately one gets an impres- with resources, so our approach should be Recently, there was the ceremonial sion that from the Russian perspective, a a comprehensive one, using a mixture of opening of the Helsinki Centre of Excellence hybrid approach applied in many regions military and civilian capabilities and insti- for Countering Hybrid Threats. While es- in Europe and beyond is serving a very tutions, at both the state and local level. tablished under the EU aegis, this Centre different purpose which has more to do A good example of work in this do- has close links to NATO. The Secretary with destabilisation. For example, we are main was a conference (co-sponsored by General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, stand- well aware that 2/3 of negative online PDD) on hybrid threats hosted in Szczecin comments on social media about NATO’s in October. It brought together represent- enhanced Forward Presence (bringing atives from the Polish parliament, aca- many Allied troops to the Baltic States demia, the military, business and media. and Poland) are generated by Russian There were a lot of presentations and dis- online accounts operated by bots. And cussions on policies, best practices from these comments have nothing to do with divergent experiences: ranging from crisis the real debate, with transparency and management systems at a city level to air- the truth: they aim to denigrate, under- port security. But participants could also mine our governments, distract soldiers take part in a specialised workshop where and destabilise the region. business expertise was shared on practical solutions to improving security of cyber space, e.g. on protection from hackers’ attacks – which is badly needed today. Not only NATO and the EU should act but also on more local levels there should be coordinated actions. This is a very long-term process when it comes to such measures as raising awareness of citizens of dangers of hybrid threats and disinformation, as teaching university students, improving resilience of critical infrastructure or honing the role of military forces. There are many good experts in Poland and their expertise should be fully utilised. But other states, including those among the Visegrad Four, have a lot of very useful experience, be it on the government level or non-governmental organisations. So, it is very impor-

Illustration: Kuczyński Paweł tant to share our knowledge, our experience and available tools among states, organisations and ordinary citizens.

17 ECONOMY SOCIAL MEDIA

WHAT ARE MEDIA CONSUMPTION TRENDS IN V4

Advertisement market The following data was provided by the weCAN network and compiled from three CANNUAL reports, the most recent of which was released in October already knows which 2017. The network was formed by strong and successful independent media are followed and agencies of Central and Eastern Europe. Created in 2010 by the Hungarian full service agency Café Communications, weCAN covers 16 countries from generate value Estonia to Bulgaria and from Slovenia to Russia.

3 takeaways 1 Set your revenue strategy around digital advertising. from the CANNUAL This sector is rapidly growing and has a potential to report for V4 be a larger part of the economy than in Germany and publishers and many other EU countries. editors: 2 Content marketing is more important than simple ads. The digital sector is booming in V4 and has generated a high demand for digital content.

3 You have 3 seconds to go mobile. The biggest growth in the digital sector is in the area of mobile devices. In this medium, the attention span is dramatically short though weCAN ranking 2017 It attempts to estimate the economic importance of their advertising market. Selected countries.

HUMAN GDP PER COUNTRY AD SPENDING weCAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX CAPITA INDEX PER CAPITA RANKING

CZ — 0.878 CZ — 16,700 CZ — 119 CZ — 0.71%

PL — 0.855 SK — 14,900 HU — 59 PL — 0.52%

SK — 0.845 HU — 11,500 SK — 59 HU — 0.52%

HU — 0.836 PL — 11,000 PL — 58 SK — 0.39%

RO — 0.802 RO — 8,600 RO — 17 RO — 0.18%

USA — 1.09% weCAN Ranking – a new tool for understanding prospects for advertising marked in CEE UK — 0.99% The weCAN ranking is an index that shows the percentage of the ad spending per capita within a country’s nominal GDP. We calculated both baseline data (GDP per capita and ad spending per capita) using the number of population older DE — 0.62% than 14 to ensure that the basis of the calculation only includes advertising target groups with independent purchasing power. The WeCAN ranking reveals whether the advertising market as an economic sector is stronger or weaker than what the overall economic performance of a country would suggest. source: Cannual 2017 Report

18 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 SOCIAL MEDIA ECONOMY

Trends in advertising pie in Visegrad Countries

Share of advertising budgets for different type of media Note: Hungarian numbers are unexpectedly high with advertisement campaigns 2014–2016,

2014 2015 2016

TV 29% 29% 31%

Digital 47% 48% 45% Czech CZ Press 13% 13% 15% Radio 5% 4% 4%

TV 31% 31% 30%

Digital 30% 33% 37% Hungary HU Press 21% 19% 17% Radio 6% 5% 5%

TV 47% 44% 43%

Digital 31% 35% 38% Poland PL Press 9% 8% 6% Radio 7% 7% 7%

TV 46% 44% 41%

Digital 28% 32% 39% Slovakia SK Press 13% 12% 9% Radio 5% 5% 4%

Internet penetration in the region online & ad spending per capita (EUR)

40.000 90% 82% 79% 35.000 75% 78% 74% 74% 80% 34,29 73% 69% 69% 66% 67% 67% 30.000 62% 62% 70% 25.000 60%

20.000 50%

15.000 40% 15,89 15,68 15,10 10.000 30% 11,26 11,23 9,13 5.000 5,21 10% 4,16 3,97 3,33 2,97 2,66 0 2,28 0% CZ PL HU SK SL EE RU LV LI HR BG RO RS UKR

Online ad spending/capita Internet penetration

19 ECONOMY SOCIAL MEDIA

The

More Vulnerable to Disinformation than You Might Think

MIRIAM LEXMANN

There’s no shortage of Russian “fake ublic opinion data is crucial to understanding how and why disinformation is gaining news” stories, “troll factories” and ground. “disinformation” across the media, A recent series of public opinion surveys by the International Republican yet the understanding of how this Institute (IRI) of the Visegrad Four (V4) countries and Germany revealed fascinating affects populations in Europe remains insights into areas of vulnerability and resil- relatively unsophisticated. ience to Russian disinformation. The polls were commissioned Pby IRI’s Beacon Project, an initiative that equips European It’s clear that there’s a problem, but stakeholders with the tools to counter Russian meddling and protect European democracy from the corrosive effects of less clear what can be done about it. disinformation. 20 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 SOCIAL MEDIA ECONOMY

Correlation between trust in media Correlationand perceptions between on the trust state in ofmedia the country, andoutlook“ALTERNATIVE” perceptions on the future on the MEDIA state of the country, outlook(using right on the track future / wrong track as a proxy). (using right track / wrong track as a proxy). CorrelationHUNGARY: Overall between38% trust 50% in media andHUNGARY perceptions: Overall on 38%the state50% of the country, outlook on the future (using right track / wrong track as a proxy). Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48% Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48% HUNGARY: Overall 38% 50% Among those who think media is biased 20% 64% Among those who think media is biased 20% 64% Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48% SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59% SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59% Among those who think media is biased 20% 64% Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51% Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51% Those who think media is unbiased SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59% ThoseV4 who think33% media is unbiased Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% V4Germany 33%44% Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% Germany 44% Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51% Those who get most of their news from state broadcasters CZECH: Overall 53% 45% Those who thinkget most media of theiris unbiased news from CZECH: Overall 53% 45% V4state broadcasters33%33% Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% V4Germany 57%33%44% Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Germany 57% Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Those who get most of their news from from online sources CZECH: Overall 53% 45% Thosestate broadcasters who get most of their news Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% fromV4 online sources33%23% Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% V4Germany 57% 23% 11% Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Germany 11% POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those who getread most or watch of their “alternative” news media fromsources online Every sources Day or Occasionally POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those who read or watch “alternative” media Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% sourcesV4 Every Day31%23% or Occasionally Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37% V4Germany 31% 11%14% Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37% Germany 14% POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those who readNever or read watch or watch“alternative” media sources“alternative” Every media Day or Occasionally Among those who think media is biased 16% 78% Those who Never read or watch “alternative”V4 50% media31% Among those who think media is biased 16% 78% V4Germany 75%50% Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37% Germany 14% GERMANY: Overall 42% 54% Germany 75% Those who read “alternative” media & say they GERMANY: Overall 42% 54% Those who Never read or watch “alternative”do so because media it is “fun and exciting” Among those who think media is biased 16% 78% Those who read “alternative” media & say they doV4 so because50% it25% is “fun and exciting” Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51% GermanyV4 75% 25% 16% Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51% Germany 16% GERMANY: Overall 42% 54% Those who read “alternative” media & say they Among those who think media is biased 33% 61% do so because it is “fun and exciting” Among those who think media is biased 33% 61% source: The Center for Insights in Survey Research (a projectV4 of International25% Republican Institute), Ipsos Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51% countryGermany offices in the Czech16% Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Germany, 2017. Face-to-face interviews, samples: 1,016 in the Czech Among those who think media is biased 33% 61% Republic; 1,024 in Slovakia; 1,000 in Hungary; 1,020 in Poland; 1,630 in Germany

21 ECONOMY SOCIAL MEDIA

More than 4,000 respondents from Republic; and a shocking 45% in Slovakia) whose concerns and fears are not being the V4 responded to questions includ- – heightening the risk that people are addressed by the mainstream political ing their views on Russia, the European consuming inaccurate information fil- leaders. Both foreign and domestic actors Union and Euro-Atlantic institutions. tered by the biases of their social net- have been using disinformation to erode The research also studied citizens’ atti- work. A sizeable minority also report the still fragile democratic structures in tudes toward media and revealed inter- reading alternative media (from 21% in post-communist states for at least a dec- esting correlations between public trust Hungary to 30% in the Czech Republic) ade. Such tactics—designed to exacerbate in media and patterns of consumption— because it is more “fun and exciting” than divisions and weaken democratic struc- hinting at why alternative media may traditional stories. tures and alliances—are a longstanding have an outsized effect in some countries Thus, social media is likely to trans- component of the Kremlin’s tradecraft, and segments of the population. On this mit the most “entertaining” news rather dating to the earliest days of the Soviet point, the results of the V4 polls differed than the most accurate news, and deliver Union. Yet this challenge did not begin significantly from the survey of German that news to “friends and family” who are to receive the attention it deserves from public opinion, the latter of which ap- likely to trust the source more than they either the EU or the wider international peared more resistant to disinformation. do mainstream media. Here is one expla- community until relatively recently. According to the polls, citizens of nation why alternative media messages Any effective response to these com- V4 countries have limited trust in main- “stick” better than some higher quality, plex phenomena—many of which share stream media outlets. It is true that sig- fact-checked stories. similarities across countries but have nificant minorities say their media is In contrast to the V4, Germans ex- different triggers depending on individ- “professional and unbiased” (ranging pressed far greater trust in mainstream ual circumstances—must be informed by from 27% in Poland to 38% in Slovakia), media sources. 44% of Germans believe targeted research that identifies vulnera- and a larger share says the media “tries the media is “unbiased” and only 19% bilities, tactics and sources of resilience to be unbiased” but that their biases af- believe it is biased. Germans also turn to to disinformation. In 1971, Zygmunt fect their coverage (ranging from 36% state media for their news at a much high- Nagorski observed that “Frustration in Poland to 46% in Czech Republic). er rate than residents of the V4 (57% in and doubts are the prime targets for But roughly 25% of respondents believe Germany compared to around one-third Soviet propaganda, and simplification is the media is totally biased—a sentiment in the V4 countries), and fewer Germans their instrument.” The same is true for which appears to correlate with nega- consume alternative media (just 25% of Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin; it has always tive views of the country’s trajectory. Germans compared to between 39% and been the nucleus for any totalitarian re- Respondents who felt that the media is 55% of V4 citizens), and only 16% of the gime in the country. It is vital that pol- “biased” are much more likely to say the few Germans who read alternative me- iticians understand the frustrations and country is on the wrong track or that dia do so because it is “fun”, entertaining fears of their voters and craft policies young people do not have a good future or sensational. Additionally, only 11% of that take these views on board, as disin- in the country. While such a correlation Germans report consuming news from formation thrives when populations feel does not in itself indicate a susceptibility social media (as opposed to a quarter of disaffected and disconnected from their to disinformation, it does suggest a poten- V4 respondents). political representatives. tially vulnerable target. The results of the V4 polls certainly The polls also reveal interest- raise questions about the vulnerabilities The author is a former Slovak diplomat and cur- ing insights into the manner in which to disinformation in these societies, and rently the EU Program Director for the Interna- non-mainstream or “alternative” media reinforce a fear that this will stoke a rise tional Republican Institute, where she oversees spreads and becomes influential. When of extremist sentiments and some fear the Institute’s Beacon Project – an initiative ded- respondents were asked how they learn that this will stoke extremist sentiments icated to documenting, analysing and combat- about major news stories and who they that play into the Kremlin’s hands. In ting disinformation and Russian soft-power and trust to inform them about what is go- designing appropriate policy and civic their erosive impacts on European democracies. ing on, a significant proportion reported responses to these challenges, it would that they relied on “friends and family” be unwise to blame those who are vic- for their news rather than to traditional tims of long-term and very well-tar- media (27% in Poland; 36% in the Czech geted disinformation efforts and those

22 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER MEDIA,

& POWER

The section was prepared in cooperation with Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V., Office Prague. The opinions expressed in the contributions are those of the authors and do not reflect the positions of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

23 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

CASSANDRA CURSE

DANUTA DOBRZYŃSKA-SCHIMMER

nce summer ends, law is to decrease and limit non-Polish thewe’re coming after ownership. Jaroslaw Kaczynski – the de you” – this is what facto leader of PiS and hence the govern- the MP Krystyna ment – said this “de-concentration” law Pawlowicz from the was “good for Poland and good for the Law and Justice (PiS) citizens”. There have been ruling party told one The Swiss-German Ringier Axel journalist from the Springer Media (the owner of onet.pl many loud warnings most popular private news websites in website, “Fakt” {the most popular daily} OPoland. and the Polish edition of Newsweek) as for the fourth estate Since that time, all news reporters well as the Bauer Media Group, Burda, among the Visegrad in Warsaw have been waiting for this the American Scripps Network and the new proposed law that will affect private, Discovery Network (the owner of TVN, countries, but non-Polish media outlets. This right- which broadcasts “Fakty” – an inde- wing government has, for more than a pendent and popular news program) whether they will year, subordinated public media – not – all of them are at risk. And the extent lead to action is yet only disturbing public television and ra- of this risk is not yet known because the dio but also the press agency PAP. The de-concentration act’s details have been to be seen. management has been replaced by loyal discussed but are not to be officially pre- sycophants, journalists have also been sented until mid-October. The media made redundant and many of those who speculate that the level of foreign own- have stayed work in conditions similar to ership will not be allowed to exceed 20%, those under communism; their coverage or perhaps even 15%. To acquire such a being restricted to that which follows the shareholding structure, the state funds party narrative. – directly or indirectly – will buy a large Though there’s no official state -cen stake in non-compliant firms. sorship, the pro-government propaganda Freedom House has already ex- and auto-censorship is simply the new pressed its concern over the activities communication strategy from the public of the ruling party in Poland. Poland media outlets. Concisely, the meaning of was assessed as a country following high “being objective” has just been redefined. standards of journalism and caring for Is this what PiS wants to do with the pri- the freedom of speech. The “Freedom of vate outlets? the Press 2017” report describes Poland The party’s politicians say that for- as a “partly free country”, marking it with eign-owned media in Poland is a mo- the colour of warning, yellow. This same nopoly. That’s the reason why the new yellow colour was also given to Hungary. 24 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

CENTRAL EUROPE

DANUTA DOBRZYŃSKA-SCHIMMER

Neither of these ratings are surprising – a popularity of Andrej Babiš, the owner of and understanding the media’s role in Hungarian model of governance is ofthe the “Mlada Fronta Dnes” daily. He is one the countries, a task similar to compre- role model for Jarosław Kaczyński (a con- of the richest Czechs; he is also a hero hending their political interests, requires cept he expressed in many interviews). of political scandal. Political instruc- a nuanced perspective. However, Warsaw The Hungarian prime minister tions given by him to a journalist of his is pressing the other Visegrad Group’s Viktor Orbán controls regional papers daily has been recorded and published. governments to create a common tele- through his close, informal advisors and However, this incident did not ruin his vision project. The Polish public broad- friends. Quite recently, the last independ- political career; he is still a serious can- caster (TVP) has started to promote ent titles were bought by loyal oligarchs. didate for prime minister. But even if this Visegrad TV, but the Czech and Slovak This media business is the only one bring- populist politician will rule in Prague, it governments have decided not to join it. ing in profits, and at the same time, the is no reason to expect that the Polish and “V4TV’s” grand opening is planned to press is very influential in the province, Hungarian way of media controlling is launch in November, 2018. an important tool for the ruling party, possible in Czechia in the near future. The Polish and Hungarian public Fidesz. Earlier, the Hungarian Parliament The Slovak history is riddled with stations have declared that they work created new media controlling struc- cases of populist governments putting together to broadcast material for the tures, allowing them to impose a penal- pressure on the media, but the independ- network. Orban’s and Kaczynski’s narra- ty for “non-objective, politically biased” ent press has survived. The most impor- tive (political propaganda) looks similar, publications. The fine can reach €700,000 tant in the last years was the founding but their foreign policy is defined in to- while public media are financed directly of Dennik N – a news website created tally different ways. Viktor Orban is get- from the budget. by editors and journalists who wanted ting closer and closer to Vladimir Putin. In the aforementioned report, it to be independent from the influen- Jaroslaw Kaczynski is convinced that the Czechia and Slovakia are green islands tial Penta group. Penta and J&T control Kremlin is behind his brother’s death, of freedom. In Czechia, tv stations are a large number of media outlets and a tragic plane crash in Smolensk which the most influential – the public Česká the history of both companies is murky. claimed many lives. Of course, Kaczynski Televize and private Nova lead the mar- Penta was a sponsor of the foundation profits from Orban’s achievements in ket. The public one is perceived as objec- led by Robert Fico, the records published controlling the press, but this could be tive, not supporting any political party. in 2011 showed evidence not only of the the last benefit – right before the broth- Both compete in the news, but the private Penta owner’s friendship with politicians erhood ends. broadcasts a more infotainment variety. but it also pointed to the illegal winning In 2005, Česka Televize created of state tenders. Last year, Prime Minister The author is a Polish broadcast and print jour- CT24 the first news channel in the coun- Robert Fico called reporters “dirty, an- nalist and project manager of New Europe 100. try. The number of Czech daily press ti-Slovak prostitutes”, and this year he ac- readers is declining though newspapers cused a public TV station of supporting still matter to the politicians, because the opposition. they are aware of the press’ impact on The Polish, Hungarian, Czech and the voters. This is one reason for the huge Slovak media markets are each unique, 25 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

THE CZECH ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF MEDIA INDEPENDENCE A FORECAST FOR STORMY WEATHER

VÁCLAV ŠTĚTKA

n the immediate aftermath of the Czech Parliamenta- ry elections (20-21 October 2017) which witnessed a stunning success for anti-system parties – led by the populist ANO movement that claimed nearly 30% of the vote – many commentators have forecasted dark clouds gathering on the horizon of Czech democracy. However, even the most pessimistic ones probably did not expect that just a couple of days after the closing of the polling stations, one of the key democratic institutions Iwould become a target of open attack. The dust from the campaign battle had barely settled when Tomio Okamura, the Chairman of the radical right-wing Party for Direct Democracy (SPD), which received 11% of the vote and which many have seen as a potential coalition partner for ANO, publicly called for bringing the public service media, Czech television and Czech radio, under direct state control. The mere idea was certainly nothing new; after all, it was part of SPD’s election manifesto. It was rather the way the plan was presented – shouting angrily at a journalist during a live interview on Czech Radio, following a question about his financial scandals – that sent shivers down the spine of anybody who cherishes the concept of politically independent public service media and who is, at the same time, familiar with the fate of 26 these institutions in other countries of the Visegrad region.VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

While the Czech public service TV and radio have and Eastern European acquisitions – Slovenian Pop TV long maintained a reputation of keeping a reasonable level and Croatian Nova TV – to the American investment fund of autonomy from the government of the day – measured, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in July for €230m Following that, of course, by Central and Eastern European standards – the other stations in CME’s possessions will allegedly follow suit, prospect of them following the path of their counterparts in including Slovak TV Markíza as well as stations in Bulgaria Hungary and Poland has become suddenly and disturbingly and Romania. realistic after the October elections. For it is not just Okamura This commercially lucrative bundle has allegedly attract- and his EU- and refugee-bashing followers, emboldened by ed several powerful bidders from regional business tycoons: their surprising election success, who they have to fear now. Petr Kellner, the richest Czech who already has had ownership Andrej Babiš, the leader of ANO and the most likely contender experience with TV Nova from the 2000s, and who has been for Prime Minister, has not exactly been known as a friend of developing telecommunication and media business under the public service media either. brand O2; the Slovak investment company Penta that owns a Having publicly criticised the Czech television for an chain of local daily newspapers in the Czech Republic and half alleged bias against himself and his company Agrofert – the of the shares in the Slovak publishing house Petit Press; and source of his estimated $3.4bn wealth – he proceeded to is- – none other than Andrej Babiš. Even though his interest has sue a formal complaint against the TV station to the Czech not yet been confirmed, such an acquisition would correspond Broadcasting Council earlier this year, while publicly calling well with his media purchasing strategies (always going for the station’s reporters “corrupt vermin”. Babiš has hinted more the market leader) and would complete the ring of his media than once that the idea of nationalising Czech television is cer- outlets, already containing two national newspapers, a chain tainly not alien to him, and his first steps after being declared of local street papers, the Nr1 commercial radio station and the winner of the 2017 elections reinforced the fears that he the most visited online news server. might want to retaliate against the broadcaster for its investi- A television station – especially one with the highest gative reporting about his business affairs, particularly about audience shares on the market – would certainly be a fitting the financing of his holiday resort “Stork’s Nest” which is cur- jewel on the crown for the biggest media mogul in the coun- rently under police investigation. try (and possibly the region) which this purchase would un- Instead of joining the other parties’ leaders for a tradi- doubtedly secure for him. The fact that he is not an official tional post-election late night debate on Czech television, he owner anymore, as he was recently forced to place his Agrofert opted for a solo appearance on TV Barrandov, where he gave holding (including its media divisions) into an independently a triumphant interview to the station’s owner, Jaromír Soukup. managed trust fund for the time of his involvement in politics, Snubbing Czech TV on the election night was broadly viewed would hardly change anything on this status and his ability to not just as his attempt to seek exclusive airtime, rather than influence these media outlets. There would be no regulatory sharing the podium with the nine other party leaders, but also barriers either, as there are no laws prohibiting this kind of as a symbolic gesture, demonstrating his discontent for the cross-media concentration in the Czech Republic. public service broadcaster and breaking its status as the tradi- It is, of course, too soon to predict the likelihood of such tionally hegemonic provider of post-election coverage. a scenario, as it might take many months before any deal There are good reasons to believe that even if the des- is announced, and there is no guarantee that Babiš would ignated Czech Prime Minister will not take steps to strip the emerge victorious out from this battle of business giants. broadcasters of their formal independence, his mere threats Nevertheless, combined with the pressures on public service to potentially do so – loudly supported by the extremists from broadcasters, including explicit plans for their nationalisation, SPD as well as other political actors, including President Miloš it is difficult not to picture this business opportunity for the Zeman – will be enough to put pressure on the public service future Prime Minister as a “perfect storm”; one which could media, so they tone down on criticism and practice a similar potentially wash away some of the last remaining islands of kind of self-censorship that his own media, especially the dai- independence on the mainstream media market. We can only lies Mladá fronta DNES and Lidové noviny, have been repeat- hope it won’t come to that, especially knowing that just like edly accused of ever since he purchased them in 2013. with weather forecasts, gloomy political predictions often end Some argue that this has already begun – and that spe- up way off the mark. cifically Czech radio has been cosying up to Babiš a little too much before the elections, in an apparent attempt to keep The author is a lecturer in Communication and Media Studies at Lough- the spectre of nationalisation and direct state control at bay. borough University. After all, the examples from Hungary and Poland where public service – now state – media has become no more than government mouthpieces; a worrying augur for their Czech counterpart. However, Andrej Babiš’s appetite for control of the news media environment – already well indicated by his ownership of the biggest media house in the country, Mafra – might not stop at taming the pesky public service broadcasters. In September, business news servers showed that the leading Czech commercial television station, TV Nova, is for sale. The owner, the U.S.-based CME (itself partly owned by Time Warner), has already sold two links in its chain of Central 27 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA MEDIA IN CENTRAL EUROPE

From Independent Observer to Political Tool and the New Enemy

ZSELYKE CSAKY

épszabadság had This phenomenon is most visible It is exactly a year started out as the in Hungary but present in all countries ago this October state mouthpiece un- across the region. Following successful der communism but privatisations in the 90s, the heyday of that the journalists turned into a quality the media was in the early 2000s when the of Népszabadság, political daily follow- market was profitable enough to sustain a ing its privatisation plethora of outlets. This, however, did not Hungary’s most- in the early nineties. last long. While the departure of foreign read political daily, For many years, it was a newspaper that owners after the 2008 global economic Ndepicted as well as represented the sta- crisis was not completely unexpected, it announced that they tus quo of politics in Central Europe. It had far-reaching consequences. Just as in- published articles on day-to-day events vestors started selling their shares, the old had had to close that were reassuring yet a little bit bland business model came crashing down, giv- shop. The story of the and boring; it ran op-eds by intellectuals ing way to the uncertainty of online jour- emphasizing the importance of catch- nalism and ridding papers of any hope of paper and its eventual ing up to the “West,” and it operated in profitability in the foreseeable future. a media sphere dominated by left-liberal This period—besides laying bare demise serve as the voices. Above all, it helped broadcast the globally the media’s inability to adapt to perfect parable, as well elite consensus of the day that there is no the new situation—revealed problems alternative to the policies implemented— locally that had not been visible earlier. as a timely warning, characterising those policies often not as Similar to other institutions in Central for the state of the “good” but rather “necessary.” Europe’s newly built democracies, such as As Ivan Krastev and others have ar- the judiciary or civil society, the press had media in Central gued, this meant taking the politics out of fulfilled its functions reasonably well by the politics in the region, which in turn the early 2000s. Yet, it became clear when Europe. helped prepare the ground for the even- the good times ended that it lacked the tual, angry return of ideologies, mostly firm support of society and that low pay those of nationalism and reactionary along with increasingly uncertain work- conservatism. ing conditions have destroyed solidarity Now that politics is back with a among journalists. While there were pro- vengeance in Central Europe, the media tests and expressions of camaraderie after are no longer independent observers ei- the closure of Népszabadság, they quickly ther. They are tools in a political fight and, died down, and on the first anniversary of more often, convenient enemies for pow- the event only a few dozen people gather-hungry populist leaders. ered to demonstrate in Budapest. 28 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

Just like civil society—a significant owns a significant share of the media But the country where the media percentage of which has relied on exter- market, has just won elections. Andrej are both used as a tool and are gradually nal grants and has developed weak con- Babiš’ 2013 acquisition of Mafra, the being turned into an enemy is Hungary. nections with local groups and actors most influential press group in the coun- Nearing its eighth year in power and cer- (the reasons for this are complex and go try, was a watershed moment for Czech tain to be re-elected next year, the govern- beyond the scope of this article)—the media. It came following the departure ing Fidesz party has not only overhauled media increasingly serve as easy and of German investors and was comple- the legal framework, it has also overtaken convenient targets for populist govern- mented by other local oligarchs buying the media market through sheer political ments. Political parties, which are also outlets. A similar process, with less polit- will. With a subdued and weak opposi- poorly embedded in society in the re- ical involvement, has also taken place in tion ahead of the elections, it is running gion, with practically non-existent and Slovakia. These investments were hardly out of enemies to blame and—besides inactive membership, have tried to co- profitable at the time; their real value was George Soros and NGOs—is increasingly opt and capture media outlets from the in furthering the oligarch’s other business targeting journalists. This summer, Prime very beginning. Yet, these attempts have interests. We could observe this in action Minister Viktor Orbán’s regular Baile grown in frequency and have become already during the election campaign— Tusnad speech identified “Soros support- more aggressive recently, as the collapse scandals connected to Babis’ businesses ed” media as the next target. Since then, of the old business model has provided made it to the first page of all papers, ex- smear campaigns have started to spread an opening and as governments in the re- cept for the ones owned by Babis himself. and some have even claimed the country’s gion are gradually turning illiberal. The press has been less of an easy “foreign agents” legislation should be used In Freedom House’s annual reports, target in Poland, where the size of the to crack down on the press. this process is reflected in a series of first market has so far largely guaranteed the If we accept that Hungary is ahead slow but later accelerating declines. In independence and profitability of out- of the curve in the region, there is plen- Freedom of the Press, which is a global lets. Yet, the Law and Justice (PiS) party ty to worry about. The foundations for a survey focusing on the media, Hungary, has already turned the public media into truly independent press were never really Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic a propaganda arm for the government present in Central Europe, and the past all suffered declines in the past decade, and is intent on destroying private me- few years’ structural transformation as with Hungary and Poland dropping by dia critical of its actions. It has deprived well as changes in consumption habits double-digits. In Nations in Transit, several outlets of advertising funding and have put the media in a very vulnerable which evaluates democratic governance is working on a draft that would break position. Now, with populist and illiberal in Central Europe and Eurasia, independ- the back of critical outlets by drastically voices on the march, the fate of the press ent media in the region has deteriorated limiting foreign ownership. Besides such seems to depend only on the goodwill of more sharply than any other indicator, plans, the government is not hiding its politicians. For the future of the region, including corruption. deep hostility toward the press; over the that is certainly not the place where we The capture of the media by inter- summer, the defence minister threatened want to be. ests other than the public interest is very to launch criminal proceedings against a visible in the Czech Republic, where the journalist who had written about alleged The author is a senior researcher for Nations in country’s richest businessman, who also links between a minister and the Kremlin. Transit by Freedom House.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS SCORES

CZ HU PL SK

2007 2007 2007 22 2007 20 2008 2008 21 2008 2008 22 18 2009 2009 2009 24 2009 23 2010 2010 23 2010 2010 22 2011 2011 30 2011 2011 25 2012 19 2012 2012 2012 21 36 2013 2013 2013 26 2013 22 2014 20 2014 35 2014 27 2014 23 2015 2015 37 2015 26 2015 24 2016 21 2016 40 2016 28 2016 24 2017 2017 44 2017 34 2017 26

29 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA THETHE SHADOWSHADOW OVEROVER MEDIAMEDIA

This autumn, the media world in Warsaw and those tangentially connected have been anxious to see if the government will implement the hinted at restructuring of the industry.

30 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

MICHAŁ KOBOSKO

ournalists, media executives, all those issues are immersed in a deep mediators, political scien- and dense political environment: you are tists, politicians, diplomats, either for the current government (PiS) the advertising industry and or against it. There is no third option, the even big business are dis- shades of grey have almost been com- cussing only one issue: will it pletely erased. happen or will it not? Firstly, the PiS authorities took If the answer is yes, then over the public media. Those which af- how, when, and what are the costs? That ter 1989 were the loots of the successive Jfever caused a discussion of the so-called government teams. PiS did the same as all deconstruction of the market for private predecessors – but they did it to a much newspapers, radio stations and big web larger extent, far more brutally and with- portals, which have so far developed out any hesitation. Today, a large segment thanks to the unrestrained power of the of the population has been sentenced to free market. public electronic media consumption (in The media has ignited a conscien- many parts of Poland it is the only option) tious segment of society though to a less- where they get large, and repetitive doses er extent than in the past summer when of propaganda, which follows closely the independence of the judiciary was at the rule of law under the Polish People’s risk. At that time, dozens of thousands of Republic and other totalitarian regimes. people spontaneously went out into the It is not journalists but political officers streets of Polish cities. They did not, nec- who are responsible for the public media essarily, go to defend the existing system in Poland. of the courts. Even though the courts in The so-called truth does not seem Poland have never worked well – cas- to matter anymore, it may even become es last too long, judges are drowning in harmful. The government is telling the paperwork – they are still free. People, people that it has the well-being of the however, recognised that even being far Poles in mind while others (the oppo- from perfect, the courts and judges must sition, intellectuals, the cultural world, be protected from the direct, ideologised Germany, the European Union, NGOs) control of politicians. are trying to harm the Polish people and, Similarly intense, but more diver- thus, the government is demonising any- sified, emotions are being projected to- one who opposes them. wards the media. There are voices that This became the tipping point even object to the general state of media where the party that governs Warsaw believing that they are of poor quality, po- could not stop. The government, whose larised and increasingly staffed with in- primary focus is the concentration of experienced journalists. Commercials are power in all areas of public life, has now being mixed in with the journalistic mis- turned their “Sauron’s eye” towards the sion, advertisements are pretending to private media. Taking a page from a fel- be serious articles and fake news is being low Central European with totalitarian presented as fact. Playing to the basest of aspirations, Jarosław Kaczyński is using our emotions, sensational journalism has Viktor Orbán as the source and inspira- become the headlines and main stories tion for this latest power grab as Orban of the day, replacing the well-researched was able to successfully put the media pieces which had been the norm. And under his shoe in Hungary. 31 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

In fact, independent private media of Poland. Some of the most susceptible in Poland are easy targets because of their are the German media groups who are ownership structure. Bauer, Axel Springer accused of “intervening in Polish inter- (now the Swiss-German Ringier Axel nal affairs” because many are critical of Springer joint-venture) and Polska Press the current Polish government. These (Passauer Neue Press) play the biggest role groups are presented as even wanting a in the printed press and internet markets. coup d’etat and are painted as generally American programming is the most pop- anti-Polish and, therefore, hostiles. ular in the television market (Discovery Exactly the same narrative took FIRST OF ALL, holds the largest private television) while place from 2005-7 when PiS was first in the French have a command over the radio power. At that time, the party of Jaroslaw THE COUNTRIES market. The issue of the ownership by for- Kaczynski was much weaker and did not POLAND IS eign shareholders both helps and harms manage to bring their plans into reality. the media. Today it is much stronger, its support REFERRING In times when nationalist and xe- reaching 50% in some polls. This is why nophobic tendencies are increasing, it is PiS feels empowered to launch a revolu- TO HAVE HAD easy to criticise “foreigners” for their will- tion against the media. THESE RULES ingness to influence the domestic issues FOR DECADES, AND IT HAS BECOME PART OF THEIR TRADITION

32 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

Their first step was taking away participation criteria, combining a posi- Particularly in Washington, the plans funding (the ad sales and newspapers tion measured by audience or readership of the Polish government have been subscriptions), which had come from with a position in the advertising market frowned upon, causing protests and fears companies and state institutions. The to revenue and the country of origin. among the political decision-makers and second step was the “repolonisation of Furthermore, the legislation might be the administration of President Trump. the media”: an operation to increase the introduced retroactively – so it could im- Due to this, Poland should not depend share of Polish capital in the media – pose penalties on those who have been al- on tightening relations with our key po- which is parallel to what they did in the ready active in Poland for a considerable litical, economic and military allies. banking sector. PiS ultimately (which is length of time. The law was supposed to The question remains: when will plus!) departed from the repolonisation be working in order to push out specific the time come for Poles to go out into the rhetoric and has now replaced it with “de- foreign media groups from Poland. If this streets to defend the media as effectively concentration”: a process that, according sounds familiar that might be because as they were defending the judiciary? The to official statements, would lead to -in this is reminiscent of Putin and his law problem is that foreign media would be creased pluralism in the market, wider from 2015 which frightened all western harder to shield. Many tend to think that media ownership and a greater variation media companies from Russia. the common-sense answer to the ques- of content providers. Here, to justify their In Poland, there is a fairly simple tion (do you want the media in Poland to actions, PiS refers to trends from the larg- operation: the taking over of the most be German or to be Polish?) would be of est EU countries. popular newspapers, portals, news sta- course domestic ownership. “We do not do anything different tions, companies and publishing houses Although the problem was, is and than the French and Germans. They also by those officially or quietly linked to will be completely different. Poles in a limited the ceiling of market shares in the authorities. Instead of deconcentration street referendum will have to answer media and did not let foreign broadcast- there will be media concentration in the the question whether they want the me- ers and publishers in,” PiS authors say. hands of PiS and the acolytes of the party. dia in Poland to be pluralised, diverse, This is partially true, but they are mis- It is mostly about money, power and the multicoloured or for it to be dependent representing the situation dramatically. supposed leap in diversity of the media on a party and unified in ideology. It is First of all, the countries Poland is in order to cement the political power not about the freedom of the media, but referring to have had these rules for de- of the country for years to come. The about those basic tenants of modern so- cades, and it has become part of their language of “increasing media freedom” ciety: the freedom of the speech and the tradition. These rules were created when used by PiS is a classic use of Orwellian freedom of press. the media market was just taking shape, “doublespeak”. in the aftermath of the World War II and In October 2017, when I write these The author is the head of the Polish office in the as part of the creation of new Europe. The words, the fate of the deconstruction law Washington think tank Atlantic Council. For over history of Poland – decades spent behind is unknown. Perhaps there will be no 20 years, he was co-creating the Polish media the Iron Curtain, with a fully functioning law, instead the state-owned companies market, among others as editor-in-chief of the system of political censorship – is very and specially-appointed “independent” Polish editions of “Forbes”, “Bloomberg Busi- different. Foreign investors entered the investment vehicles will start offering nessweek” and “Newsweek”. Polish media market when there was a foreign publishers and broadcasters lack of Polish capital – and Polish cus- “unrefusable proposals”, the redemption tomers were hungry for Western models, of individual newspapers and television pluralistic opinions, attractive packaging channels. It is believed that the primary and diverse products. goal of PiS will be the consolidation of 20 Secondly, antimonopolistic law is strong regional newspapers published in enforced in Poland. It is acknowledged the largest Polish cities by Polska Press that 40% of the market shares give a group. Before the local elections in au- dominant position and anything above is tumn 2018, such a loot would be ex- blocked. PiS was considering to reshape tremely tempting for the ruling party. this restriction in their draft of the de- Both the EU institutions and the construction law, lowering the thresh- United States have spent enormous dip- old to 20%-25%. It was also planning lomatic effort to discourage the Polish au- to introduce a mix of different market thorities from monopolising the media. 33 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

JOURNALISM’S GROWING PAINS IN VISEGRAD

BEATA BALOGOVÁ

decade ago, traditional publishers in the Visegrad region had thought that their major challenge was going to be keeping their print editions on life support until they found an ideal online model to sustain their business. Yet, the escalating state pressure on media in Hungary and Poland as well as the shopping gluttony of oligarchs buying up media outlets in Slovakia and the Czech Republic has Aintensified the struggle of critical independent media in the region while simultaneously keeping freedom-of-the-press watchdogs on alert. Viktor Orbán turned Hungary into a laboratory for dis- mantling liberal democracy with free press becoming the first victim of this experiment, which ended up being successful for Orbán’s Fidesz and disastrous for the power balance, media pluralism and the civil society.

34 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

State interventions and the shopping gluttony of oligarchs strangle independent media

35 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

ANDREJ BABIŠ, A SLOVAK OLIGARCH WITH THE HIGHEST At first, foreign investors were most likely to abandon POLITICAL their investments in print media, due to the dropping circu- AMBITIONS IN lation numbers and absence of viable online business plans. When Penta, an investment group with a bad-reputation CZECH POLITICS, in Slovakia, started buying media in the region, the official explanation for going into this challenging segment was that MAINTAINS they wanted to consolidate the media and seek new business INFLUENCE plans for the newspapers. Only very few journalists in the purchased publishing houses actually believed that Penta was OVER A NUMBER buying media to help finance their critical watchdog role. OF KEY MEDIA In fact, oligarchs have been buying media to redistrib- ute influence and balance the power of other oligarchs who THOUGH TRUST already owned media. They looked at media as a so-called FUNDS. “nuclear suitcase” as a Penta top manager described it in an interview, which presumably should discourage all who might want to harm Penta business interests. The redrawing of the Czech and Slovak media map has On a similar track of illiberal democracy, Poland has tak- often made ownership non-transparent as some oligarchs did en a lot of inspiration from Orbán and waged what it calls not finance the media directly but through different media- the “repolonisation of media,” riding on the notion that do- tors and even trust funds. Back in 2015, more than 90% of mestic owners are better suited to informing the Polish public Slovaks were unable to name the correct owner of top media because critical, foreign-owned media is working on under- in Slovakia, according to a survey by the Focus polling agency mining the government. An amorphous foreign adversary to done for the Transparency International watchdog. harm Polish, Hungarian and even Slovak interests has been important ammunition of populist governments. A SHORT GUIDE TO THE SLOVAK MEDIA Yet, the so-called new “domestic” owners are often not OLIGARCHY the traditional publishers, but rather oligarchical groups tan- The most influential media abandoned by traditional pub- gled in a cobweb of power interest while seeking a redistribu- lishers in Slovakia are mostly owned by financial groups or tion of influence over politics. businesspeople with power interests, who are already spon- Public media in Hungary and Poland have relapsed to soring parties. The two major competitors are two oligarchical often serving as external PR departments of their govern- groups: Penta, which have built the News and Media Holding ments when it comes to news reporting. In Hungary, many (NMH) company to shelter its media acquisitions, and J&T, privately owned stations either replaced political news re- which is entangled with the second most popular commercial porting by jolly entertainment or simply joined the govern- TV channel TV Joj. mental chorus line. J&T also assisted in 2010 in the sale of the heavily The governments in Slovakia and the Czech Republic pro-governmental daily Pravda, when it was bought by busi- have not made the notion that the state is the best master for nessman Karol Biermann. However, who actually feeds Pravda public media an official media doctrine, but are not ready to with cash remains greatly unclear. give up their influence over the public media channels. For Penta’s NMH has digested media houses Spoločnosť example, the Radio Television Slovakia (RTVS) has seen more 7Plus, Centrum Holdings, Trend Holding and Trend than 15 directors since the independent Slovakia emerged Representative now controlling a number of newspapers and in 1993. Directors have changed more frequently than gov- internet websites including one of the best-selling weeklies ernments, an indicator that Slovakia has never managed to Plus 7 Dní, the daily Plus Jeden Deň, and the economic weekly achieve a truly independent public media. Trend. It employs approximately 450 people. Andrej Babiš, a Slovak oligarch with the highest political DOMESTIC DOES NOT NECESSARILY ambitions in Czech politics, maintains influence over a num- MEAN BETTER ber of key media though trust funds. Babiš has a file in the Murky businesses tried to buy themselves into important media archives of the communist secret police ŠtB as collaborator, even before the oligarchic shopping fever started a decade. The which he has denied. He is tied to media house Mafra, which global financial crisis further tightened the grip on many news- officially owns the Slovak economic daily Hospodárske noviny. papers that saw their advertisement revenues sinking. In the Czech Republic, Mafra publishes the dailies Mladá fronta Dnes and Lidové noviny.

36 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

The information that additional private broadcast media er pressure on media co-owned by oligarchs to remain in the – specifically one of the largest private broadcasters, Markíza black as their ability to make money for their own operation TV (owned by American CME) – might be for sale excites sometimes draws limits to their freedom. the oligarchs. Local media relying mostly on unconfirmed Thus today, investigative journalism focusing on busting information already reported that those standing in line for high-level government corruption as well as critical voices Markiza might include Penta, Czech oligarchs Peter Kellner explaining the true nature of illiberal democracies are gain- and Andrej Babiš as well as a group of Chinese investors. ing even more significance. New innovative online projects Even if so far there is only speculation, the prospect of that can swim around nets of state control and oligarchs are a any Chinese ownership keeps media watchdogs rather edgy source of hope. A huge responsibility lies with the remaining as this would bring a completely different control “culture” to traditional media, which serves a wider readership, to main- the media market with an unpredictable outcome for media tain their critical voice and independence, regardless of their freedom. Nevertheless, Penta cannot buy Markíza directly as ownership structure. It eventually distils down to the integrity Slovak laws do not allow cross ownership of print and broad- of editors and journalists and their commitment to independ- cast media. But the law never really stopped oligarchs from ent, fair and critical work. combining ownership of any media through mediators and investment funds. The author is the Editor-in-Chief of SME. The most closely watched media acquisition of Penta came in 2014 when the oligarchs, using a mediator, purchased considerable shares in Petit Press, home to the daily SME, one of the flagships of critical reporting in Slovakia. In response to Penta’s unfriendly and rather non-transparent entry to the publishing house, a large part of the SME newsroom left to establish an independent daily Denník N, which has since then become an important critical voice to the media market. After a series of complicated negotiations, Penta withdrew to a minority position in the publishing house. Petit Press’s publisher, Alexej Fulmek, relies on the majority owner PSIS – one of the very few remaining traditional media owners – to guarantee the conditions necessary for independent journalism. Over the past three years, SME has resisted oli- THE PAST DECADE garchical influences and remained a decisive critical and inde- HAS SHOWN THAT pendent voice on the Slovak media market as well. Moreover, earlier in 2017, Penta sold back an additional THE PRESENCE 5% of its share to Petit Press. However, as part of the deal, OF OLIGARCHS IN Penta acquired the ethnic Hungarian daily Új Szó, which raises concern if some bulky cash might not persuade the oligarchs MEDIA HOUSES to sell the daily to Viktor Orbán’s buddies. HAS OFTEN THE CHALLENGES AND THE HOPE ELIMINATED Oligarchs often fail to understand that they simply cannot run media as real estate investments, bakeries or meat processing MEDIA companies. Turning news production into an assembly line INDEPENDENCE often demoralises journalists as their integrity can be easily interpreted as a hindrance to running a successful business. AND The past decade has shown that the presence of oligarchs CHALLENGED in media houses has often eliminated media independence and challenged the reputation of even previously trusted media. THE REPUTATION When the ownership structure allows editors and reporters to remain independent, it might still take a while to produce ev- OF EVEN idence that the respective media has remained a critical voice PREVIOUSLY by exposing any doubtful activities of the in-house oligarch. Editors have to eliminate mechanisms that might prompt TRUSTED MEDIA. self-censorship in the reporters. Also, there is a much strong- 37 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

When journalists and publishers are confronted with the reality of declining revenue streams, they had to become creative in finding solutions.

ZOSIA WASIK

he journalists of SME Daily, Denník.N is one of the new media the biggest broadsheet Slo- projects that have emerged in CE Europe vak newspaper, for years in recent years which have turned down did their best to cover the advertising as the main source of funding. corruption scandals in Instead, they choose to create variations their country. One of them of existing business models that rely more involved an alleged link on communities around their media. between the country’s gov- Data gathered by the World ernment and Penta Investment, a finan- Association of Newspapers and News

making Tcial group operating throughout Central Publishers show that the vast majority of Eastern (CE) Europe – a charge that the private news publishers still choose ad- company denies. vertising as the main source of their rev- What was to the journalists surprise enues. But at the same time, 73% publish was when, in 2014, they found out that more sophisticated forms of promoted Penta had bought 45% of the stocks in the content, like brand or native advertising, Petit Press publishing house which owns and more than a half rely on alternative their newspaper. In an act of protest, 50 ways of funding, such as events, or read- journalists, including the editorial board, er-generated revenue in the form of sub- left the paper. scriptions and crowdfunding. “People from this company [Penta] Grzegorz Piechota, researcher at were open about the fact that this acqui- the University of Oxford and Harvard sition was their ‘nuclear suitcase’. They Business School, says that the main did it to protect their interests,” says reason why media business models are Tomáš Bella, one of the deputy editors of changing is the fact that the previous SME who left. “We did not want to work paradigm which publishers have always for them”. relied on to earn money – via monetising Those leaving SME, which counted advertisement – is not working as well as Mr Bella as one of the leaders, decided to it used to. set up their own publication – Denník.N, Traditionally, while public media where “N” stands for “nezavislost”, “ inde- have been financially backed by govern- pendence”. To maintain it, they decided ments and have never worried about not to rely on funding from advertising money, private publishers have had to and base their revenues on crowdfunding base their business models on adver- and subscriptions. tising. But recently, that safe stream of Three years later, in the relatively money they had got from advertisers has tiny Slovakia (5.3 m inhabitants), they changed direction towards internet plat- have 23,000 active subscribers who pay forms such as Facebook and Google. a nominal monthly rate for the content Even though the Silicon Valley gi- they produce. In July, they made their ants call themselves “technology com-

lemonade first small profit. panies”, in reality they have the same 38 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

business model as many digital publish- Foundations and Rockefeller Brothers content open to the wider public. Jakub ers – they aggregate audiences and mon- Fund. “It is still vulnerable,” Mr Sáling Górnicki, the founder of Outriders, a etise their attention with advertising. In says. “All institutions have an agenda and new non-fiction project, says that access 2016, Google and Facebook captured be- they try to push for it. But it is nothing to quality content for everyone is a key to tween 60% and 77% of all digital-adver- like the pressure of the politicians,” he a well-educated society. tising spent in the USA, and between 89% adds. His next goal is to reduce the share Outriders aims to tell interactive and 99% of the market’s total growth. of institutional funding in his project’s stories from all around the world: they al- What is more, studies show that the revenues from 50% to 30%. ready cooperate with foreign correspond- share of money that goes to publishers is Shrinking revenues and the increas- ents in Mexico and Ukraine and will soon divided by various intermediaries who ing necessity to reach as many users as include stories from the Middle East. The create complex digital advertising ecosys- possible to improve advertising numbers articles are translated into English as well. tems, such as agencies or data providers. usually cause a decrease in the quality of They managed to gather what Mr Out of every 1$ spent by an advertiser, content. “They [publishers] invest more Górnicki calls “funding capital” – 83 526 a publisher receives on average 29 cents, and more in mass and shallow content of zł – to keep the project rolling on a Polish according to the European Magazine mediocre quality, they do not compose crowdfunding site, wspieram.to. Media Association. anything unique,” says Michał Kreczmar, Taking a more long-term perspec- digital transformation director at PwC. tive, they want to keep the website free PRINCIPLED CONSEQUENCES Consequently, the information that for readers. Instead of subscriptions, Groups of interest can influence the media reaches the readers can be politically bi- they wish to create a community around not only via acquisitions but also adver- ased, unresearched or an incomplete pic- their project – they need 5,000 – 7,000 tisement. If the biggest share of advertise- ture. And the readers know it: only 46% people who will voluntarily support their ment in a country comes from state-owned of the Polish audience trusts the political journalism. This is the aim they want to companies, then a government can easily messages in the media, according to a achieve in a maximum of three years. pressure publishers not to produce content survey carried out for Press Club Poland. Apart from the supporters’ money, inconvenient for the party. In a world with open-access media, Mr Gornicki is looking for funding via This is what happened to Gergő the more unreliable the content, the more cooperation with various brands, the or- Sáling, who was an editor-in-chief of readers are willing to pay for quality con- ganisation of conferences and journalis- Origo, one of the biggest Hungarian news tent. Some new media projects use that tic grants. He is also planning to set up portals. He got dismissed after he had pub- as a way to earn money: they promise another crowdfunding campaign – this lished a story on alleged misuse of public the content of the highest quality, and time internationally. funds by the head of the office of Victor in return they expect monthly subscrip- Mr Górnicki says Outriders focuses Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister. tions. The widely mentioned example is on foreign reporting and features because “Every time we wrote something Polityka Insight, a Polish analytical pub- what happens abroad often influences negative about the government’s politics, lishing house, which offers daily analysis public debate in Poland. “For example, there was a pushback. The government and briefing on business and politics to its the refugee crisis that has been a very hot put a lot of pressure on what we should clients, which is fully subscription-based. topic in Poland but in fact, the actual flow and should not write. As a result, the whole Experts notice that this model can has bypassed the country,” he adds. political section left, and we decided to set be tricky because the Visegrad market At the same time, the country’s me- up something new”, says Mr Sáling. is limited. “It is different with media like dia have been decreasing spending on in- This is how they created Direkt36, an the New York Times – they publish in ternational news and dismissing foreign analysis portal with news from Hungary English, so the client range is much wider. correspondents. “We have to start to heal that focuses on what Mr Sáling calls “hard- How many people would be willing to pay the media. I miss some rebellion, I miss core journalism” – the one that requires for content in Poland, in Polish? A few journalists that rebel – a rebellion creates a lot of research and investigation. “We thousand, tops,” says Mr Kreczmar. That initiatives. And Outriders is one of them,” knew we could not rely on advertisers, so is why publishers in the region who de- he says. we started to rely on people. Many of them cide to put their news behind the paywall, heard of what happened in Origo and did such as Polityka Insight, often decide to The author is a journalist based in Warsaw who not agree with it,” Mr Sáling adds. translate their content into English, to previously worked for the Financial Times in War- They get half of the funding from reach audiences abroad. saw, London and Paris. crowdfunding and the other half from But there are also those who rely on private institutions, such as Open Society money from readers, maintaining their 39 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA THE PITFALLS OF CENSORING FAKE NEWS

40 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

Government propaganda, media concentration, self-censorship and the failure of the democratic left are more of a threat to democracy in Central Europe than the global “fake news” phenomena

ALEKSANDRA ERIKSSON

he election of Donald Trump as US president with “Postfaktish” politics, are a completely futile exercise that last year unleashed widespread concerns that divert us from addressing the real issues at hand, which are people could take important decisions such as much more specific and manageable. whom to vote for on the basis of lies, hoaxes and fictitious news stories circulating on social You don’t agree that it’s a problem that people are taking media. decisions based on the wrong information? In America and elsewhere, it became fash- Misinformation can be dangerous. During the 2013-2016 ionable to fight against “fake news”, an ambigu- Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa, for instance, there were ous term used frequently by the US president himself when claims that people could be cured if they drank water from a Tdismissing criticism from American media outlets. Fact- special well. This was a real problem because people could die checking start-ups mushroomed, and so did anti-Russian if they didn’t follow scientific advice. propaganda initiatives as disgruntled candidates claimed they There have also been cases where people spread rumours had lost votes because of Russian interference. about another ethnic group by ways of inciting violence and Germany went even further and passed a law that fines pogroms. In such cases, the government has a responsibility to internet platforms up to €50 million if they fail to prompt- step in and calm the situation. Only in very specific situations ly remove slander or racist content, which had exploded on are they obliged to limit free speech, in particular cases which German-speaking websites in the wake of the country’s recep- incite violence. They can also limit free speech in narrow cir- tion of over a million Syrian refugees. cumstances when protecting public health, public order or Visegrad Insight asked Barbora Bukovska, a lawyer and national security. human rights activist at the London-based free speech or- Of course, the situation is different when “fake news” ganisation Article 19, how she valued such efforts in both a is coming from the government, when it in fact is a form of Visegrad as well as a global context. government propaganda. At Article 19, we are in particular After all, Hungary and Poland have some of the worst concerned with the situation in Hungary, where anti-EU and track records in the EU according to the 2017 World Press anti-migrant messages have been actively promoted through Freedom Index that is compiled by Reporters Without official government campaigns in the wake of the arrival of Borders, with fears that the Czech Republic – where voters many refugees to Europe. massively backed the media mogul Andrej Babiš in recent par- Last year, more than 98% of the Hungarians voted liamentary elections – could follow. against EU refugee quotas after the government launched a According to Bukovska, however, the problem in billboard campaign claiming relations between migration and Visegrad is not so much “fake news” as government propa- terrorism and criminality, though the vote was considered in- ganda, media concentration and self-censorship as well as a valid as more than half the electorate decided to stay home. failure of the democratic left – and that it would be helpful to (FOOTNOTE: According to Transparency International, it talk about these issues instead. was the largest advertising campaign in Hungarian history, with 5,888 of Hungary’s 20,000 advertising hoardings being What means do we have to fight misinformation? used for the referendum campaign.) Barbora Bukovska: Misinformation exists, and it is not some- Moreover, Hungary has introduced a hierarchical media thing that should be promoted. But international standards on regulatory system under direct control of the government. free speech define quite clearly what restrictions are possible Poland has similarly initiated a series of actions aimed at plac- to put in place. The problem is governments and corporations ing public service media broadcasters under its close watch. deciding what is “fake” and what is “news”. This is very diffi- The Czech Republic, on the other hand, allowed a Berlusconi- cult to define in public policy and legal terms, and practically type businessman to become the most influential person in impossible to regulate. In my opinion, the ongoing attempts to Czech media within the span of just a few years. Here we are regulate what is truth, as Germany is doing in attempt to fight dealing with states breaking their obligations to their citizens 41 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

to create an enabling environment for free speech, media plu- that Facebook should not be liable for potentially unlawful ma- ralism and diversity. terial posted on its servers by its users – that is, until it comes However, they are not the only ones failing to live up to to have actual knowledge of the unlawfulness. On the other its commitments. The EU could launch an investigation to see hand, we need to ensure that Facebook and other digital giants whether what is happening in Hungary is in line with European should respect international freedom of expression standards values as enshrined in the EU treaties, but so far, I haven’t seen in their terms and conditions. They should also be consistent any political appetite for launching the procedure. in application of these terms and conditions and be transpar- Similarly, the European Commission was initially con- ent about the content they delete. cerned over Polish reforms which led to the dismissal of the heads of public radio and TV and gave the treasury minis- So, what do we do with misinformation pestering our soci- ter power to choose their successors. Vice President Frans eties? Timmermans wrote to the Polish government that “freedom First of all, we should protect human rights, which are set and pluralism of the media are crucial for a pluralist society” down in the international standards. before launching a probe into the rule of law in Poland, the Second, if we think that it’s problematic that people first time the commission made such an investigation of an EU live their lives in online echo chambers, we should find ways country. But we don’t hear much from Timmermans on the of bringing them back to society, instead of trying to force Polish media anymore. The topic has vanished while the Polish Facebook to show them left-wing news stories or filter their government is using public TV to broadcast anti-EU messages. views because we don’t agree. In most European countries, including Visegrad, there is Could grassroots fact-checking initiatives help in this regard? already a legal framework which sets out a pyramid for restric- Fact-checking initiatives have limited impact. There have tions. At the very top, we find incitement to genocide, which been ideas that Facebook should allow for users to flag false is heavily restricted. Then there is the prohibition of inciting information and send the disputed news to big media out- violence and discrimination. Further down, there are possi- lets for verification. Journalists could perhaps be interested bilities to restrict freedom of speech on the basis of rights of in finding out what happened in large-scale events of global others, for instance in the workplace or schools where it would importance. But imagine someone in a remote Slovak village lead to harassment. writes that the local mayor has embezzled money – and this There is, however, a broad range of “hate speech” which should be sent to New York Times for verification? What is problematic, offensive and shocking but legal; besides there should a fact checker do with Ztohoven, the Czech art group are more effective ways to fight it by other means than cen- that managed to hack a live panoramic broadcast and insert sorship. We should promote more platforms to oppose such pictures of a nuclear explosion that allegedly took place in the views, rather than try to ban it because such efforts often fail. country? (FOOTNOTE: The performance was called “Media One such example is the case of pastor Terry Jones, a US Reality” and aimed to show how easily media can be manipu- evangelical Christian who said he planned to burn Qur’ans lated and make people question the validity of what they see and was banned by the British government from entering the on TV. It worked: Ztohoven were indicted for scaremongering UK. Nobody had heard of him, he had 27 followers on Twitter, but were acquitted after Czech judges found that nobody had and then he became a hero and a celebrity. been scared and that people were rather amused of how easy Limits to free speech beyond the international frame- it was to break into broadcasting.) work tend to backfire. Russia, for instance, has adopted very strong anti-hate speech laws but these are only used against What could the media do instead? LGBT people, artists and human rights activists. They could start by acknowledging that people are frustrat- This is why I was very concerned to hear Mark ed with the current state of politics; they want change, and Zuckerberg say this autumn that Facebook had “ensured the this is why they are refusing to support certain candidates integrity of the German elections” by taking down thousands and vote for others. It’s complicated because the media also of fake accounts. We have no clarity of what they removed and has an agenda in this debate. They have lost the trust of the if it was under pressure from the German government. What public; their readership is declining, and now they hope that is “fake news” for the German Christian Democrats could be fact-checking will help them win this audience back. But their legitimate information for others. Furthermore, many activists claims to be objective and own the truth only make the situa- from non-European countries say they fear that their coun- tion more complicated. tries will take the opportunity to label any criticism of the gov- Would it help to treat Facebook like a publisher? This is ernment as fake news and use such laws to repress critics. We a proposal put forward by Konrad Niklewicz, a Polish social shouldn’t set bad examples for authoritarian leaders to follow. scientist, in a paper for the Wilfried Martens Centre, a cen- But overall, we cannot address the problem without ad- tre-right European People’s Party think-tank. dressing ownership of the media, the role of advertisements The issue whether Facebook should be treated as a “pub- and commercialisation of the public sphere. What is really lisher” is a red herring. We need to recognise that, on one missing from the debate is a discussion on alternative media hand, it is in a dominant, even quasi-monopolistic position models. How do we promote pluralism and a diversity of the which allows them to decisively influence what is available on news so that people are exposed to different beliefs and ideas? their platform. Intentionally or not, Facebook and other social We haven’t discovered those models yet but I am confident media are in a position to influence the public agenda, trends they are coming. in public opinion, and the topics and arguments of public debates. But international standards on free speech stipulates The author is a Polish-Swedish journalist based in Brussels. 42 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER IMBALANCE AND GLASS CEILINGS The State of Media in the Visegrad countries

GRETA GOBER

n 1995, during the Fourth The Beijing Declaration set an World Conference on Women ambitious goal to challenge and change in Beijing, 189 State represent- the structures of the global media sys- atives adopted unanimously Gendered aspects tem. Objective J.1 of the declaration was the Beijing Declaration and meant to increase the participation and Platform for Action. With this of the media access of women to expression and de- step, the international commu- cision making in and through the media nity reaffirmed that women’s landscape in the V4 and new technologies of communication, access to expression and participation reveal inequality and Objective J.2 portended to promote Iin decision-making in all forms of media a balanced and non-stereotyped portray- and communication processes, including is rife. al of women in the media. As global re- digital, are fundamental to free, diverse, search shows, some 20+ years after the plural and democratic media systems. declaration was signed, there remains a Achieving gender equality in the media lot to be done in moving from these dec- was equal to “good journalism”. larations of support to actually achieving All the countries from Eastern and their stated goals. Central Europe have joined this call for the democratisation of the media and JOURNALISM CULTURE IN THE have become signatories of the Beijing VISEGRAD REGION Platform for Action. The quality of the International literature suggests that journalistic cultures that would emerge there are some common experiences in the process would eventually testify to shared by journalists from the Czech the success of the democratic transfor- Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. mation. Defined as the “character of per- The normative vacuum that was creat- formance of journalism as an institution, ed after the collapse of the communist/ profession and discourse in a concrete socialist regimes, in regard to what role economic, political and cultural context”, the journalists should play in the new journalism culture is believed to possess reality, was expected to be filled by the explanatory power over the performanc- “Anglo-American liberal model” of jour- es of media products and media systems. nalism or “the social-responsibility media The democratic transformation doesn’t, model.” Journalists in this model act as a after all, happen only in the formal struc- bridge between the government and cit- tures and regulations of state institutions. izens, providing objective information, Cultural changes in the area of “informal necessary for the public to form opinions. limitations” of media workers, the values For this to happen, freedom of the me- they respect, the principles and norms dia must be protected by the law, and, in they accept, their attitudes, are just as im- return, media must promise to use their portant in the democratic transformation power responsibly and regulate and con- as the formal structures. trol their own behaviour and institutions. 43 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

The normative “social responsibil- ganisation exists that could monitor the ity” theory of journalism was officially functioning of the media system from the supported by the international commu- perspective of media workers. In effect, nity, but was never really sustained by the the working conditions and the status of western investors who flooded the region the profession has gradually weakened after the fall of communism. Expectations over the years. Journalists have less time that the western know-how would bene- to develop their stories, due to the de- fit the development of journalistic profes- velopment of online media, staff reduc- sionalism and democratic culture in the tions and financial restrictions. The fact region were thus never fulfilled. Quite that women constitute a significant pro- the contrary, there is evidence suggesting portion of the labour force in the media that aggressive commercial policies were “requires an adapted response from the pursued “at the expense of journalistic unions”. However, without strong un- standard[s].” Investors exerted influence ions, the challenges that women face in on the content, through the way news- the media: “the extra job precariousness, rooms organised and how, how staff was the unyielding gender pay gap, the strug- recruited and paid for their work. gle to reconcile work and private life and Tabloidisation and commerciali- the blocked access to leading roles in the sation had important consequences for media” remain unaddressed. women’s position in the media. What happened in the region was similar to CONCLUSION what happened in the Western European Women’s position in the media in the media systems back in the 1980’s. Grave Visegrad region seems to be particularly changes in the marketing strategies and journalist associations are members of weak. Due to the historic developments media advertising were later branded as the IFJ: Polish Journalists Association of the media systems in the region, the a “feminisation” of the media; more ac- (SDP) and Association of Journalists of autonomy of the journalistic community curately, it should have been termed as a the Republic of Poland (SDRP). is constrained and at the moment, the re- “sexualisation” of the media. Journalism However, neither the SDP, SDRP gion does not have a single “full democra- increasingly became consistent with nor the Media Charter adopted by the cy” established. Recent developments in the stereotypical, commercial and even broader media environment in Poland Poland and Hungary have further weak- sexualised perception of femininity, but makes any reference to this point that a ened the democratic score of the region. there were important differences between journalist should be aware of the dangers Despite the struggles to achieve Western European media systems and the of discrimination in the media. It seems gender equality in the media, none of the developing systems in the Visegrad region. that after the political transformation, es- countries in the Visegrad region have de- First of all, the media’s self-regu- pecially the new generation of journalists veloped any measures to promote gender latory institutions were never really de- in the “mental sphere’ became propo- equality in its media organisations (EIGE, veloped in the region, while they have nents of the purely liberal XVIII. media 2013: 100-108). Leadership/management played an important role in mitigating doctrine, where all attempts to impose training for women or equality awareness the consequences of the commercial ethical norms on the media were treated training for staff hasn’t been introduced wave that swept the media in Western as a threat to freedom of expression and in any of the surveyed organisations. Europe. Press Councils were eventual- democracy. Neither were there any committees rely established and Journalistic Codes of Secondly, an important difference sponsible for gender equality policies, Conduct adopted in most post-commu- between the western countries and the anti-harassment advisors, equality or nist countries. Visegrad region in regard to women’s po- diversity officers or departments present However, these self-regulatory bod- sition in the media is that, in the western in the organisations. Similarly, policies ies in the region remain without real au- countries, trade unions played a huge role to promote gender equality, including thority and the adopted Codes of Conduct in the development of the media system. gender equality policy, equality/diversi- lack practical meaning. For the media In the post-communist countries, the ty policy or policy on sexual harassment organisations to effectively self-regulate new generation of journalists, who now remain scarce and were only developed themselves, the system needs to be “ready dominate the profession, are less likely to in Hungary and in public service RTVS to discuss media quality and ethical prob- become members of professional associ- in Slovakia. For there to be real progress lems openly and publicly”. ations. They don’t understand nor see the in the region, policies, like those men- The question what is good jour- need to join. tioned above, should be implemented, so nalism is essential in this process and For example, in Poland before that the next generation of journalists has the example of Poland is quite telling in 1981 most journalists belonged to the the opportunity to work in more fair and this context. The most known interna- Polish Journalists Association. In 2009, balanced conditions than those present tional Journalistic Code of Ethics is the less than 20% of journalists belonged to today. International Federation of Journalists a professional association, and most of Declaration of Principles on the Conduct them were 60+ years old. The journal- The author is a researcher at University of Oslo’s of Journalists. This declaration is well istic community in the region remains Center for Gender Research with a Ph.D in cul- known in Poland, as the two largest Polish fragmented, no strong professional or- tural studies. 44 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER GENDER EQUALITY in Central-Eastern Europe Media

HELENA CHMIELEWSKA-SZLAJFER

A Balancing Act ike all other factors of social life in the region, twenty-eight years after the fall of the Iron Curtain the media landscape in Central Europe re- between a Communist mains strongly influenced by its communist past. Media content has become Westernised in the sense that it is more consumption-oriented, Heritage and which entails objectifying and sexualising bodies – female in particular Westernisation – in order to sell products. However, the inside of the media industry tells a different gender story. Although comprehensive studies focusing on gender in Central European media are scarce, some general reports – such as that by the International Women’sL Media Foundation (2011) and the European Institute for Gender Equality (2013) as well as local case studies – have been published in the recent years. They all point at a somewhat ironic pattern that is specific for the region: gender equality is not the effect of adopting Western standards (i.e. free-market democracy) but a holdover from the communist period. In fact, what the reports point out is that in Central Europe, the process of Westernising media has brought about a decline in gender equality. This has been achieved by targeting women, the former tractor-driving sexless workers – as Elza Ibroscheva put it – and shifting their role into that of objects of sexual desire. This translates into the commodification of female bodies in media content, especially advertising, where they serve as vehicles intended to drive up sales. Secondly, for women the contemporary shift toward the Western world has signified both less pay and, equally important, the solidifying of glass ceilings, which women have increasingly had to struggle with in the upper echelons of media companies. 45 POPULISM & POWER MEDIA

(with the exception of Ukraine, where men in top governance (Against) stereotyping positions in media earn twelve times as much as women). Nevertheless, in Hungary, for example, women make up gender roles only 13% of those in governance and one third of top-level management positions; in Lithuania the figures are, respec- On a global level, three out of four people mentioned in print, tively, around 31% and 29%; in Poland nearly 30% and 25%. radio and television news are male, and a similar pattern can Interestingly, in Poland women earn slightly more than men be found in online news. Furthermore, in four out of five in- in middle management positions. Overall, the lower the rank stances men are the focal point of the news. Women are twice and the more marketing or human-resources oriented the as likely to have their age mentioned than men, and they are job, the more women can be found in media companies. In also twice as likely to be portrayed as victims and survivors. all the Central-Eastern European countries surveyed, women This also points at another major trait, namely that in most are offered paid maternity leave and (at least theoretical) job instances both genders are shown in stereotypical roles: the security after returning to work. man as active, forceful and rational; the woman as passive, nurturing and emotional. Still, both genders share similar screen time as news presenters. However, hard news (i.e. news concerning politics, the Communist heritage: a economy and finance) is still the dominion of male reporters, while women, for the most part, report on topics considered gender equality (of sorts) soft such as social issues, health, culture and entertainment. In Central-Eastern Europe, the picture is somewhat dif- As Mojca Pajnik writes, the “capitalist mode of media produc- ferent. Paradoxically, the sexless (at least ostensibly) commu- tion seems to have forced women out of their jobs and away nist past has been working in favour of women in the media. from relatively equal positions – relatively, since equality was According to the EIGE report, the optimistic reason may largely limited to the sphere of labour, while inequality in the be that media organisations have been implementing wom- private sphere persisted.” Yet, the strong position of women en-friendly policies. In a less rosy version, media as an indus- in media organisations in the region compared to those in try is becoming increasingly feminised, which also translates Western Europe is a result of their communist heritage. The into lower pay. Nonetheless, the IWMF report points at the communist economic system required a large workforce and relatively high numbers of women in management roles in thus had to incorporate women. However, this did not mean media in Central-Eastern Europe—higher than in Western equal jobs for all since, as the author emphasises, women had European countries—ranging from over 21% in Estonia to to work a second shift at home, working in total about fifteen nearly 49% in Russia, while also noting a general wage parity hours per week more than women in Western Europe.

46 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 MEDIA POPULISM & POWER

This toil is particularly noticeable in the powerful image EXHIBIT B: ADVERTISING of the resourceful “Polish Mother”, sacrificing her own well-be- The importance of appearance and stereotypical gender roles ing for the sake of men; a trope that has existed ever since the is even more magnified in advertising. In their study of ad- Polish uprisings in the 19th century and which still continues vertisements in Poland, Twardowska and Olczyk (2000) show in today’s free-market democracy. Still, higher gender equality that while on the one hand women are presented as responsi- in the workforce and state-sanctioned maternity leave have ble for taking care of the household and of other people (most remained staples of the region even after the fall of the Iron often children and a husband), the ads focused on their looks Curtain, and in this particular respect Westernisation has been or portrayed women as sexual objects for the pleasure of men; mostly detrimental. For example, gender mainstreaming pro- on the other hand, men are depicted as experts who like to moted by the European Commission is not particularly visible spend time with other males (drinking beer). Thus, despite the when it comes to wages throughout the European Union, with gender-equalising communist heritage, in this context, adver- men generally earning more than women in the media sector. tising has quickly become Westernised. In this respect, Central-Eastern Europe has been clearly more One of the reasons may be that television commer- successful. cials especially of household goods were translated copies of German ads. However, a recent Czech example shows that gender stereotyping does not necessarily require direct Western influence: in June, the Temelín nuclear plant decided Screen time to search for candidates for an internship by creating a swim- suit contest. Further South-East, a language school in Croatia’s Women are more often television than radio presenters, looks capital advertised English courses with billboards of Melania playing a factor in attracting audiences. Yet, at the same time, Trump captioned “Just imagine how far you can go with a little they are five times less likely to act as experts. Instead, women bit of English”. Both ads caused international media outrage are usually presented either as celebrities or as “ordinary” cit- and were quickly taken down. izens. As for women in power, they have to prove their “mas- culinity” such as creativity, but even if they do so (all the while looking impeccable) it is at the cost of failing in the household. According to the 2015 Global media Monitoring Project, Who is Western? the highest parity in the news in Central-Eastern Europe is noted in Belarus (44% women to 55% men), and the lowest It is an irony that in terms of gender equality the communist in Poland (31% women to 69% men). Interestingly, the vast past in Central-Eastern Europe has shown to be in many ways majority of television and radio presenters are women (95%) more Western than Western Europe itself. These traditions of in Belarus, the second highest ratio can be found in Poland equality in the work force, even if limited, continue to be im- (64%), while Hungary and Estonia favour male presenters (61% portant shapers of the region’s media reality today and should and 63% respectively). On the internet, the biggest gender par- be used to further foster gender parity. At the same time, given ity is noted in Belarus with preference given to women (55% the undeniable influence of Western-European countries on compared to 45% men), while in Hungary male online report- Central-Eastern Europe, the more effort is put in the West not ers clearly dominate (88%). In addition, the people who are merely to promote but to implement gender parity in media mentioned online in the region are, too, overwhelmingly male, organisations’ back- and front offices, the better the chances from 71% in Hungary to 88% in Poland. A similar pattern can for gender balance all over Europe. also be found on social media in the Czech Republic, where men are far more likely than women to make political com- The author is a sociologist, an assistant professor at Koźmiński Univer- ments on politicians’ and political parties’ fan pages. sity and a visiting fellow at London School of Economics and Political Science. EXHIBIT A: POLITICS Two instances of screen time are particularly worth mentioning in the context of gender and media in Central-Eastern Eu- rope: one is advertising, the other politics. In their study of Czech and Slovak elections, Kovář and Kovár (2014) found that Slovakian women who are more likely to have higher positions on the ballots have a higher chance of getting elected to the European Parliament rather than national elections because the former is considered less important. Lühiste and Banducci (2016) confirm this as a pan-European trend, namely that women are nominated for these political positions to make them less threatening to male candidates. The result is that media focus on the more viable candidates who tend to be men. At the same time, if women are in fact elected, they are judged both by their “masculine” performance (e.g. ambition, negotiation skills) and “feminine” traits (e.g. appearance). 47 SECURITY CYBER

BOTOND FELEDY

egislation, the business Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and by the above legal steps like GDPR, but sector and the structur- the directive on security of network and in no way are we ready. ing of life in our national information systems (the NIS Directive) The official summit document also cyber spaces is extremely are pillars of legislation assuring specif- mentioned measures and actions which dynamic in all four Viseg- ic layers of security while, economically might well be taken up the V4 states in rad countries. While it is a speaking, action was taken by the Eu- advance, as a pilot programme of sorts chance for early platform ropean Commission in May 2015 when for the eventual EU introduction. This building to create more it adopted the strategy to complete the will involve building joint standards and common path dependence for the future, Digital Single Market by 2018. The latest joint operational capacities – a com- Lthe speed of change and the multiplicity most important document is the conclu- mon CERT set up for one industry, like of institutions are hindering this process. sion of the European Digital Summit in telecoms where most ISP providers are EU-level legislation is one of the driving Tallinn. Heads of member states met in similar in Visegrad countries – or joint forces behind the organisational evolu- late September 2017 under the auspices preparedness exercises with more and tion of cyber structures in public admin- of the Estonian EU-presidency. more extensive scenarios involving offline istration, but so too are national-level The summit reiterated several ear- elements, moving further from table-top administrative cultures and political lier common EU objectives, but, most exercises, featuring critical infrastructure games which also play their part. significantly, it declared that “Europe break downs on larger scales. National- [will be] a leader in cybersecurity by level incidents which are publicly report- EU-LEVEL DYNAMICS 2025”, an extremely ambitious goal given ed might be analysed on the V4 level with Activism stems from the proliferation the current status of yet fragmented cy- a moving common task force; while the of cyber warfare all around us. Not only ber security and defence developments information sharing and cooperation of are there multiple threats, but all kinds in Europe. Later it concluded, “Europe CERTs is already developing, we need of legal, military and organisational re- needs a common European approach to more confidence building in person. sponses as well; however, the European cybersecurity. Europe has to function as Nevertheless, technical questions Union is taking more and more meas- a single European cyberspace and a single cannot and should not dominate the EU- ures to combat these issues. The General cybersecurity market”. This is facilitated discourse. The Brussels discussion is also 48 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 CYBER SECURITY

about tax reform regarding GAFA com- The general trend shows that paral- panies, where V4 states cannot really be lel to the high priority that cyber security forerunners; however, when it comes to gained on the public agenda, its centralisa- rewriting the competition law to reflect tion is happening in real-time: chanceller- The promising, the realities of digital economies, many ies and prime ministers’ offices claim more proposals may come from the V4, just like and more insight, as finally it is understood but quickly waning, new pilots for common IoT certifications how much influence cyber yields. or strategic discussions about the rule of This is well reflected in Beata cyber cooperation engagement in offensive operations when Szydlo’s recent announcement at the it comes to military aspects. CyberSec conference in Krakow early niches among in October 2017 that the Polish Prime WHAT CAN WE BUILD ON? CYBER Minister’s office would also give place the V4 countries. SECURITY RELATED STRUCTURES to a cybersecurity staff and department. IN THE V4 Poland still has the Ministry of Digital Cyber security is a horizontal policy. This and Administrative Affairs ruling the cy- means that it does not only need a de- ber domain of civilian affairs, besides the partment in one of the ministries, but it well-supported govCERT institution. must be at the forefront in all public in- While CERTs/CSIRTs exist under stitutions, whether that be education (e.g. (or inside) different bodies in the V4, his- teaching cyber hygiene and digital skills), torically the Slovak Ministry of Finance energy security (e.g. protecting the grid) has had a large say in cyber issues, so path or data protection (of citizens or of public dependency is linked with this ministry, interest). Hence, the Visegrad countries releasing its competences to other ad- have all come to grasp with the cyber re- ministrative units as the network of cyber alities and have launched legislation on bodies increases. the delegation of competences in their Interestingly, Hungary has entirely public administration of cyber security. reshaped its cyber landscape during the This is the big-bang moment for early wave of administrative reorganisa- all cyber security organisations: it does tion done by the 3rd Orban government, matter where competences and responsi- though without completing the cyber se- bilities were first planted, how the organ- curity strategy review. This means that the isational structure evolved and whether reforms were more of a political nature, in-house or intra-administration con- providing examples of intra-administra- currence for competences is strong or tive competition for competences. Now, weak. All of this has contributed to the the Special Service for National Security colourful and diverging structure that V4 (SSNS) together with the National Cyber countries show in this regard. Security Centre (NCSC) are under the While in every member of the V4 control of the Ministry of Interior and the military (and intelligence units of the through the state secretary for law en- military) get their fair share of the budget forcement. The new NCSC competences for cyber defence, this is exactly the type involved the GovCERT-Hungary man- of silo-thinking one must avoid: of course, agement, uniting earlier competences it is not exclusively a military exercise. from the National Electronic Information However, the V4 countries have Security Authority (NEISA) and the delegated their civilian responsibilities Cyber Defence Management Authority to different bodies. The Czech Republic (CDMA). reorganised somewhat its structure very Most probably the only way to over- recently by introducing the powerful come the costly burdens of silo-thinking NÚKIB (National Cyber and Information in the public administration of cyber se- Security Agency {NCISA}), which is in curity is to create central competences at charge of education, research, cryptogra- the prime ministerial level, directly under phy and a plenty of other cyber affairs. The government control. One major chal- head of the agency is nominated and ap- lenge all EU countries face is the growing proved by the Czech Government while lack of human resources. While Germany the Security Committee of the Chamber has just opened (September 2017) its new of Deputies has the right to preliminary Cyber Command in Bonn, with the set discussion. The NCISA head is directly purpose to recruit 12,500 staffers (so far responsible to the Prime Minister and only a couple of hundred are employed), has its own line of budget outside of the Poland has also openly called for 1000 cy- ministerial structures. ber security public employees, after the more-humble initiative of the “golden 49 SECURITY CYBER

hundred”. All administrations are striving for one or two years; we cannot overes- views, from interview techniques to third to find legal solutions to pay near mar- timate enough the potential added-value parties helping the evaluation after public ket-level salaries for IT specialists, other- once they are in operative positions. This procurement, from comparability of data wise all these cyber quests would remain might be translated as a real confidence from civilian and military branches of impossible to solve. building measure, next to the existing cyber security and numerous other as- NATO-level cyber exercises. pects might be extremely helpful for the V4 PROJECT OPTIONS IN If such a V4 undertaking is open for Visegrad countries to set up a common LOW-RISK DOMAINS transatlantic partners, or builds on the scientific body for perfecting the review The Tallinn conclusions also put respon- Finnish and Baltic experience, the more mechanisms. sibility on the states as model actors of the better. Nevertheless, higher education Such a multi-national academic or- the cyber space: “[O]ur public sector is not the only venue for collaboration. V4 ganisation could also run a with higher should facilitate the digital transforma- countries could try to pilot successful, na- chance of success for the funding provid- tion of our societies by leading in the use tional-level awareness raising campaigns ed by the European Union Research and of electronic and innovative procurement for targeted groups, ranging from the Innovation Programme “Horizon 2020”, and making all communication between retired (those susceptible to the growing where apparently €450 million will be public authorities, businesses and cit- threat of attacks like ransomware, IoT, available for cyber related projects. izens digital, and introducing digital etc.) to high-level decision-makers. This Plenty of other venues are wide practices and services as default options latter group is an extremely valuable tar- open on which this article will not elab- (e.g. e-invoicing, digital mailbox). Public get for attackers while their mindset, in orate, such as common elevated security administrations should lead the way by part due to generational differences and standards for hardware procurement, becoming enablers and (early) adopters a lack of management practice, as well as common NATO DEEP or other missions of new and breakthrough technology.” their vulnerability is crucial in most of and eventually a common centre of ex- Seemingly, the national capitals are our public policy sectors. So simple ques- cellence, but these need more political seeking their own niche in the sector: who tions as setting up the culture of travel dedication and further CBMs apparently. will organise the most recognised interna- phones among leading decision-makers Poland is key in all these questions tional conference, who will host the best is a cornerstone. due to the size of its economy and the higher education institutes, whose CERT We rarely talk about regional mu- dedication with which it has refocused on or CSIRT will serve as a model for others nicipalities, though in January 2017 one cyber security. If Poland does not provide in third partner countries, not to mention might have witnessed in Poland that this incentives for cooperation for the other NATO centres of excellence. One might level of public administration cannot be three Visegrad members, then another say that there is a feeling of competition left behind as an Achilles heel easily prone serious fracture will be born. There is the among the Visegrad governments, despite to attacks. Several Polish municipalities risk that Warsaw will turn to Finland – all the rhetoric of mutual understanding. suffered serious incidents while hosting just like the newly signed cooperation However, cyber security offers an the U.S. troops for NATO operations. agreement – or to the Baltic states while excellent platform for cooperation where Again, the V4 best practice for sharing and the Czech Republic would fall into the path-dependency might have less im- mutual comprehension of threats at the sphere of interest of German partners. pact – unlike in classical public policy level of municipalities might turn out to From the point of view of the V4, domains. In this area, procedures and be very useful. Why not organise a special however, the best option would be to fol- structures are still – and will be for the CyberSec for Municipalities and Regions, low on the trails of the Central European coming years – in the making, and this especially that these are running the phys- Cyber Security Platform (an earlier vehi- means it should be easier to harmonise, ical infrastructures of general elections, cle developed by Hungary together with engage and reach out to trusted partners. when voting booths are set up in schools the V4 and Austria) and to create further Neither the EU nor NATO would and other municipality facilities. Just im- agreements with potential V4+ partners. be against any enhanced cooperation of agine a black-out during election time. After which they could involve Finland, the Visegrad countries related to cyber Finally, there is one particularity of contributing together at the European security. It offers plenty of potential not cyber legislation which presents an asset Centre of Excellence for Countering only to give some substantial institution- for cooperation. All assemblies and pub- Hybrid Threats in Helsinki for example, alised level of cooperation of the four lic authorities have realised, in the last to build more and more personal rela- CEE states, but it might well serve as best few years, that the technical development tionships among our cyber security staff. practice and as a pilot project for future is far too quick to follow up on it with While all the NATO member states larger enterprises. President Macron just timely regulation. Hence the importance are feeling the urgent pressure to advance proposed in his Sorbonne speech a mili- of the review process, enshrined in all their cyber security and simultaneously tary academy for the EU. Starting a new our cyber security strategies and action EU-member state governments are driv- common education platform centred on plans. Impact assessment has become a ing fragmented regulation further along, cyber security, where the V4 could share cornerstone of effective and successful it is fundamental to plant the seeds of scarce teaching resources, actually poses cyber legislation, but not only a prelim- cooperation at this early stage of institu- the least amount of risk even if connect- inary assessment is done, but a regular tion building because it will require much ed with national security. Not to men- retrospective evaluation as well, which more effort later on. tion the enormous potential if certain should, in principle, drive the next round parts of the national cyber security staff of legislation and fine-tune cyber security The author is foreign policy expert and analyst. are working and training side-by-side strategies. The methodology of such re- 50 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 CYBER SECURITY

the reason companies like Microsoft put out patches every so often. So, the only measure which should be taken here is “to Michael make sure that the patches are up-to-date”. As well as, making sure to secure your email box while entering different websites. Thus, a “big part of cyber security is actually educational and good practice for the everyday user of any computer or Chertoff electronic device. Just good old habits.” about As for the government’s role: if hundreds of smaller attacks can be simply prevented or solved at the private level, au- the June 2017 thorities have the opportunity to tackle the more sophisticated attacks. The role of the government is to share the information cyber-attack about the ongoing attacks and/or possible defensive measures. The private sector is developing widely and might be in Ukraine more flexible in fending off a cyber-attack. However, one cannot underestimate the role of government in this case. Particularly, Michael Chertoff thinks, that governments can Visegrad Insight spoke with warn about the attack that may be coming or share some tech- the former United States Secretary of Homeland nical possibilities which are not widely shared. In addition to that, governments can provide guidance and direction from Security, Michael Chertoff. Earlier this year, where the threats are coming and set up the legal structures at GLOBSEC 2017, Secretary Chertoff introduced which will encourage private enterprises to share the informa- the latest report of GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform tion among themselves. The best examples to follow, in this case, is New York and the US in general. The system there Initiative talking about the strengthening enables the private sector to respond more quickly as the fi- of international cooperation of intelligence nancial sector and banks share information about potential cyberattacks. agencies. Though there is a big opportunity for Central Europe to develop in the sector of cyber security, leading to a situation where the transfer of knowledge will not come from the US and the UK to the Central European states but the other way around. Major investments in this sector might be quite n June 27th of this year, Ukrainian officials valuable. The major western companies which have offices in confirmed that a major cyber-attack took Central Europe, like Aki and Scheiber, already have provid- place in the country. The attack was so ex- ed opportunities for the Europeans to engage directly in the tensive that it spread through the region process in cyber security sphere. “Cyber security is a partly striking government institutions, media defence related topic but, at the same time, it is about to be- organisations, Ukrainian banks, the main come an important part of the economy, perhaps, for Central airport in Kyiv, post offices and mobile Europe”, concluded Michael Chertoff. providers within a few hours. One of the leading countries in cyber-security in Central Michael Chertoff, the former US Secretary of Homeland Europe has recently become Poland. This can be observed Security,O has commented on the nature of the cyberattack and from the newly released draft Cyber-Security Strategy for the the changes it might possibly bring to the cyber world as well years 2017 to 2022 by the Polish Ministry of Digital Affairs. as the ways of protecting oneself from similar attacks. The Strategy aims to improve cyber-security capabilities un- The nature of the cyberattack, which not only affected til 2022 as well as to create the separate fund for the devel- Ukraine but also Central Europe and the rest of the world, opment of the cyber-security capabilities. Besides, Poland is was not as predictable as it may have seemed at first glance. the only country from Central Europe which hosts one of the Despite the fact that similar instances have already taken place global ecosystems from Ecosystem Platform in Innovation and before, the reaction of people was still unpredictable consider- Cybersecurity. The project consists of 14 global ecosystems ing that there are those who benefit from the vulnerability of involving 10 different countries from 3 different continents the operating system said Mr. Chertoff. which co-work together to adopt world-changing solutions to Other issues which are quite new, from the point of view cyber-security challenges. One of the meetings took place in of Michael Chertoff, are the precise motivation which is not Krakow on 9-10 October, 2017 that was called the European entirely clear from this particular attack, and the fact that it is Cybersecurity Forum (CYBERSEC). CYBERSEC was the first one of the very few attacks recorded globally that has exten- conference of its kind which gathered people from different sively damaged a country’s economy and infrastructure. backgrounds and countries to discuss the strategic issues of However, there are some basic, quite available methods cyberspace and cyber-security in Europe. of protection from cyberattacks. It is possible for people to defend themselves from the cyberattacks as some of them are “not terribly sophisticated”. Malware often affects computers which have not updated their systems or software, which is 51 SECURITY CYBER HOW VULNERABLE IS THE POLISH CYBER WORLD TO ATTACKS?

INTERVIEW WITH TOMASZ MATUŁA

Is the internet in Poland seriously threat- a lock of an institution or company’s web- most important aspects is cooperation, ened? And, if so, in what way? site. For a bank or company that run their and a good example of this is the coopera- TM: There are no borders when it comes business online, this means serious losses tion of national cybersecurity units – both to online threats. We can see it even when and damage to their image. commercial and from the public sector we look at two attacks only from this year – launched in 2016 under the National using malware – WannaCry and Petya How can we improve Internet users’ Cybersecurity Centre (NC Cyber). which spread rapidly affecting compa- safety? nies and institutions in many countries. By educating Internet users consistently What are the key trends for 2017/2018? Cybercriminals’ activities are supported and by increasing their awareness. We It’s hard to expect that the number of by the development of popular and mass often install malicious software ourselves, attacks through the ransomware or mal- communication systems, such as email or due to our unawareness or carelessness. It ware on mobile devices will decrease. We social media. They often become a con- is enough that the attacker appropriate- have observed a constantly growing trend venient medium for malware. ly formulates a message or poses as our of smartphone infections, but also DDoS In recent times, the scale of some of friend. I believe that it is worthwhile to attacks on mobile devices infrastructure. the threats has increased dramatically. In invest in protection tools. This applies to We expect further development of both the first half of 2017, in Orange Polska, both individual users and companies or security and new attacks when it comes we have recorded more than double the institutions. In Orange Polska, we have to the Internet of Things (IoT). The num- number of attacks using ransomware and introduced free CyberShield for our cus- ber of infections associated with legiti- over four times as many attacks on mo- tomers. It allows each Orange internet mate software and with its use as a source bile devices than last year. user to check the status of their home net- of transmission to both government in- work and in the event of a serious threat, stitutions, companies and individuals is In what way do you categorize the they are immediately informed of the fact. also growing. threats and what is the biggest one? Only in the first half of 2017, A dangerous trend is the growing The largest category of incidents (40%) – Cybershield protected almost 400 thou- market of “Cybercrime as a Service”, in- handled by CERT Orange Polska, which sand customers against data loss or con- creasing availability of services that al- is our specialised unit caring for online necting to an infected network. The activity low to “hire” attacks using ransomware, security – concerned the distribution of cyber-criminals is forcing companies to botnets and DDoS. The market of cy- of offensive or illegal content, including increase their competence. CERT Orange bercrime is becoming increasingly bold; spam. It is junk mail that is the main Polska participates with the greatest or- therefore, we have to learn, educate oth- source of the most dangerous, malicious ganisation associated with the largest ers and work together – these are the key software such as bank Trojans, ransom- CERT teams across the world – the Forum aspects in the fight against criminals. ware or malware that steal corporate of Incident Response and Security Teams. data. An important group of threats are This gives us access to the most up-to-date Tomasz Matuła, director of ICT Infrastructure “denial of service” attacks which result in knowledge and good practices. One of the and Cybersecurity at Orange Polska. 52 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 CYBER SECURITY

Increase in attacks registered by Orange Glossary:

Polska network from January-June 2017 Botnet – a network of infected computers remotely controlled by the attacker. Botnets are used mainly for DDoS attacks and spamming.

Ransomware attacks 230% DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service; increase Year to Year a network attack consisting of flooding the targeted system with such a volume of data which the system is unable to handle. The aim of the attack is to make network resources unavailable. In the Mobile malware attacks 460% case of DDoS, a number of computers increase Year to Year and network connections are used for the attack. This differentiates it from a DoS, which involves one computer and Monthly one internet connection. Ransomware – a type of malicious software that encrypts files on the drive after being installed in the user’s system. Decrypting involves paying ransom to the cybercriminals. 11 120 1100 billion thousand security Malware – software characterised with registered analyzed incidents malicious intent with respect to the user’s network alarms computer, including computer viruses, computer worms, Trojans or spyware. events Phishing – a type of online scam aimed at stealing the user’s identity, i.e. such confidential information as passwords or personal data, that will allow the Type of security incidents handled by CERT cybercriminal to impersonate the victim. In most cases, victims are lured Orange Polska from January-June 2017 into providing information as a result of opening a malicious attachment or clicking a fake link. illegal / abusive gathering data content (i.e. phishing) (i.e. spam): Data presented in partnership with 13.7% Orange Polska 45.5%

resource malicious availability software: (e.g. DDoS): 4.5% 17.5%

other: CERT Orange Polska – a special Computer attempted Emergency Response Team unit within the break-ins 3.6% largest Polish telecom, established in 1997, (i.e. brute forcing responsible for the operator’s network passwords): security and safety of its users. In 2006, it became the third unit in Poland and the only 15.2% telecom to hold the right to use the CERT name. It is the first unit in Poland with the “Trusted Introducer Certified Team” status and one of 22 such units across Europe.

53 INTERVIEW EU ON THE EDGE

54 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 EU ON THE EDGE INTERVIEW

TREMORS IN EUROPE’S FOUNDATION

ROLAND FREUDENSTEIN FOR VISEGRAD INSIGHT

At the third Prague European Summit, Visegrad Insight talked to Roland Freudenstein – Deputy Director and Head of Research at Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, a think tank of the European People’s Party – about the current mood among politicians in Brussels, the difficult choices regarding Viktor Orbán and about what really matters in the debate about the future EU budget. 55 INTERVIEW EU ON THE EDGE

and I think people with sober heads in Berlin and Brussels know this; in Paris, I’m not so sure. So, the idea of a multi-speed Europe is that you will have different groups of countries going forward in these three different areas. I think for Central Europe, and especially for Poland, that should be good news because it is a deliberate negation of the principle of a two-speed Europe, one at the core and the other (VI): What does the future of Europe look on the periphery. I think Poland can be sure that countries like like now, and how is it connected with the Germany would be happy to see Poland as a core member in eurozone? one or two of these three groups. It all depends on what kinds (Roland Freudenstein): First of all, the atmosphere in of groupings you will have in Europe. Brussels and amongst those in Berlin, Paris and other capitals who deal with Europe has changed 180 degrees. At the The Polish view, coming from the public debate, is unsurpris- beginning of this year, it was all doom and gloom; it was the ingly simple when it comes to Europe. This has been sold to lowest point in what I would call a 12-year depression. the Polish public as a cash cow. It started in 2005 with a referendum in the Netherlands True, but, in the deep strategic sense, the EU is in Poland as- and France about the constitutional treaty: that was the begin- sociated with soft defence compared to the hard defence of ning of a roller-coaster ride where it went from low to even NATO. The eurozone table is also going to be the place for a lower. I would say the lowest point was after the Brexit referen- discussion about the European budget and Poland for the time dum and the US election. Trump, Brexit, Orbán, Wilders and being. It is a pity that Poland’s current government does not Kaczynski, these were the factors that brought optimism to a want to sit at this table. I hope in a differentiated structure, the standstill. We have recovered suspiciously fast, I don’t really eurozone table is going to be integrated within the EU. There believe this is going to last, but it’s certainly a more construc- should definitely be a parallel table at which those countries tive atmosphere. The European Union looks strong, like it is which are not members and are less interested in majority vot- capable of acting, and within this the eurozone – or perhaps ing are going to sit. a smaller grouping within the eurozone – will attempt to play the role of the avant-garde. To what extent that is going to work Do you think that a scenario where a two-speed Europe, with out is a different question, especially after the German election. the eurozone as a core, is realistic? But this is the mood at the moment; it’s springtime in Brussels. If you define a core group as a group that would like to go ahead and make decisions without the others, then these Will the future of Europe be about the future of the eurozone would be countries that have a clearly defined common inter- much more than the future of the EU? est as opposed to the rest. That’s an open question, but I don’t think we are there yet. I think if you look at the eurozone and the governments Even when the mood slightly picked up at the start of the year, of different political parties that are in there, I do not see such treaty change was still a no-go area. an easily-defined core interest in that group which would 90% of politicians at the national level were still saying be different from the interests of the periphery, or whatever “no way”. Even Juncker, even Timmermans were ruling out you want to call them. We need to really look at exactly what treaty change. After the first round of the French parliamen- countries are in there, and how these countries imagine the tary elections, there was, for the first time, serious talk and future of Europe, as we are now talking about economics and intellectual effort to go for some kind of treaty change, but this finance. There are such fundamental differences in economic is the beginning of a process and there are still numerous ob- thinking and economic philosophy between the political class stacles. So, I would say the official line of governments is: let’s of Germany and the political class of France that there is very do what we can within the framework of the existing treaties. little common vision between those two, and there is a lot of Strengthening of the eurozone – yes. New institutions – common interests that each one of them has with countries there is a big question mark. Perpetuating a two-speed model outside, especially Germany. of the EU? I think many people would view this as a problem, Germany – when it comes to trade and when it comes to including Angela Merkel. One should distinguish between open markets, particularly the four freedoms – has a lot of in- multi-speed and two-speed. terest in common with countries outside the eurozone. It will, If you look at the European Commission’s White Paper, therefore, consider their interests, too, before meetings with it deliberately talks about smaller groups of countries going the EU group. I’m not trying to claim everything is sweet here. forward in specific areas. Basically, this would happen in three I can see there is a problem, but it is not as black and white areas: financial and economic co-operation – which is almost as it is sometimes presented in the media. It is a complicated equivalent to the economic and monetary union, i.e. eurozone matter that is sometimes hard to explain to the public. – the second would involve institutions dealing with Justice If I were Polish, I would look at what’s in it for us, where and Home Affairs and Counter Terrorism; and the final would can we directly co-operate? Where can we make our voices revolve around defence. heard? Where can we use Slovakia to represent the Visegrad But let’s be clear, EU defence is not about defending group? Where can we bilaterally talk to Berlin, as the strong- Europe from Russian aggression or deterring Russian nuclear est member of the euro group, without forgetting about the weapons. This is not on the cards, NATO takes care of that interests of the other countries: essentially, Poland should take a constructive approach. 56 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 EU ON THE EDGE INTERVIEW

Would you then advocate the position of Poland, Hungary Do you think there is a split? and Czechia becoming eurozone members? Of course, there is a debate. It hasn’t started very intensively It is the straightest and safest way to have Polish, Czech and yet. I think the real debate will start after the 2019 elections Hungarian interests represented in the eurozone, of course. and after Brexit. In 2019, I think we will see a really big budget Logically, if in a sandbox a group of kids start playing amongst debate. What we see now is preliminary comments, but there themselves, the easiest way for others to not feel left out is to is no co-ordinated debate. join them. Of course, for the “in” group, there is the question: how are those kids outside the sandbox behaving? Are they go- There was a lot declared with the previous commission or ing to play nicely and peacefully – because that behaviour has an are there new ideas in Brussels about how to move Europe effect on all of us. If the kids outside say, “we want to be able to forward regarding defence, security… hit each other but still be part of the peaceful kids group,” there Yes, security is a buzzword. Within the council, anti-terrorism is a paradox. It seems to me that there is a tendency among the and defence at the start of this year were considered the only outsiders – in terms of Poland and Hungry – to assume that light at the end of the tunnel. Now, we have some other fresh they can behave according to different rules, politically speak- developments, but to me the battle lines seem unchanged ing, and yet be part of the core group. That just won’t work. compared with the past couple of decades. We still have two opposing philosophies. One side be- What is the EPP’s strategy towards Hungary and Viktor Or- lieving in the huge investment possibilities such as the Juncker bán? Up to a point, the EPP seemed to contain Mr Orban, Plan with 360 billion euros, most of it coming from member but now it is more problematic. What is the EPP’s strategy states but some coming from the EU budget itself. towards this kid who doesn’t play by the rules? You know I heard a very courageous proposal com- To paraphrase an old and slightly vulgar proverb [Lyndon ing from, I think, a Green member of the EU Parliament, a Johnson speaking about J. Edgar Hoover] which I have heard German named Mr. Sven Giegold, who said we should double used verbatim in this regard, “it’s better to have a bad guy in the Juncker plan. Now, I’m impressed. He must have thought the tent pissing out than outside pissing in.” It’s an American about this for a long time, But it’s still complete nonsense. saying but you know what I mean. As long as Fidesz is within Why not triple or quadruple, to be even more courageous! the EPP, there will always be some kind of compromise, also from Fidesz’s side; that’s the guiding philosophy. As far as de- So, what is at the heart of the budgetary debate then? tails are concerned regarding deadlines and membership red You can see I belong firmly to the other side which believes lines that can’t be crossed, I can’t say. I’m afraid there is no any centrally distributed funds, whether it is on agriculture, on coherent plan for this among the others. entrepreneurship, on jobs, on digital, would be of very limited From the EPP in the European Parliament, there were value. I’m trying to be diplomatic here. It’s not always useless, 50% who voted against the resolution asking the council to but it is of very, very limited value. I think this money is usually begin a procedure which could potentially end in levelling much better spent according to the time-honoured principle sanctions against the Hungarian government: 25% abstained of subsidiarity: as low as possible within the hierarchy of na- and 25% were in favour. Interestingly, if you look at Fidesz’s tional, regional and local governments. Our prosperity should as well as the Hungarian government’s websites in the weeks be used to cut taxes in certain areas, to increase other incen- after this vote, there was no mention of the fact that half the tives and, especially, to cut red tape. EPP group refused to support Orbán. There was only talk of an Maybe the latter is the most important point of all: If you alleged leftist majority in the European Parliament. make it easier to fire, you also make it easier to hire. That is the core of the French debate on the labour market now, but it The future of the EU budget (yes, it comes to us again) is takes leadership. I’m afraid that Macron is now willing to pay present in public debate in Poland – and I hear it in other the price for reforming France, and this will actually lead to a arenas as well, especially with the Nordic countries – they strong limitation on the freedom of movement just in order have a hard time explaining to their taxpayers why they to pacify French public opinion vis-à-vis his labour market should contribute to the development of Central Europe, reforms. especially when concerning the positions of the current gov- So, what the British government initially, pre-Brexit, ernments in power. We know that, with Brexit, this budget tried to achieve (which was a total reversal of what they did in will shrink while simultaneously there are countries that do the 2000s) is actually now becoming a reality without Britain’s not match the criteria set by the rules of cohesion. The aver- involvement. This is because other countries, suddenly, seem age prosperity level in these countries is increasing, but do to be thinking along those same lines: that the eastern enlarge- you think beyond these two obvious factors what else can ment was probably a mistake, and that the worst aspect of the change that will affect the structure of funding? eastern enlargement is the proverbial Polish plumber. I think the EU budget will probably shrink for the first time. The I’m sorry, I cannot buy this line. I find it terrible, and I first obvious reason is Brexit, so the EU budget for after 2020 is am afraid that some in Paris are playing geopolitical games going to be smaller. I think we are precisely at the beginning of with this because ultimately, they are undoing part of the east- a debate: there is no masterplan, there is no clear strategy. There ern enlargement of the European Union. They want to drag are individual statements from individual politicians saying this Germany to the West. They want to shut the gates to Central or that, but yes, in the end, I think politics will play a role in the Europe, and they are depriving Central Europe of the only sec- allocation of European funds in the future. tor in which it can really compete economically for the benefit The idea has been around for some time that countries of everyone, ultimately. should return to self-funding agriculture, for instance. 57 TYTUŁ DZIAŁU ROZWINIĘCIE TEMATU

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The end of convergence

hile many have seen the inauguration of President Donald Trump in Washington DC as the turning point in this year’s political calendar, it is fair to say that the elections in France and Germany have unmade this trend, at least for now. Don- ald Trump holding the president’s office of a country which to many was a guarantor of the European order has put Euro- peans on edge. As much as his electoral success empowered nationalist and isolationist trends, the victories of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel has brought about a belief that Europe can defend and Wredefine itself against the rise of these radicalisms. Numerous European elections this year were nervously considered as potential doomsdays for the established institutional order. Political apocalypse has not yet ar- rived. Nevertheless, the level of experimentation with institutions of democratic systems, especially in Central Europe, has been unprecedented and is not likely to stop unless the EU is infused with new energy that would lay down tracks for the future. 2017 may not be the end to the political and social turbulence unfolding, but it definitely has marked the end of the democratic transformation paradigm. Countries of the Visegrad Group are ready to discuss the path set forth 28 years ago not in terms of pure speculation but also by casting their ballots. To the peoples in Central Europe, the driving factor of change has been convergence – catching up with the West. Today, this fuel is nearly depleted and it is manifested by many political leaders from the left to the right. Although enormous progress has taken place, as measured by any possible index, the political debate is moving away from past achievements to future challenges. This includes a new institutional order in Europe and a European method of economic development with the expected reforms of the eurozone. In this context, we present analysis and reflections of several distinguished experts and politicians from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Poland and Slovakia on the role the countries of the region will play in shaping the future of the EU. Next to political motives, it is hard to overlook the economic interests of German companies in all Visegrad countries. The economic exchange between each of the V4 economies and Germany accounts for roughly 40% of the trade and is one of the defining factors in the future political developments. Articles for this section were written over the summer and autumn of this year by authors who took part in a conference organised by Visegrad Insight and the Polish- German Cooperation Foundation. The meeting was initiated by Dr Rita Süssmuth, former President of the Bundestag, and to whom we are thankful for the idea and for her remarks at the conference. While we prepare for the follow up meeting in 2018, we present our readers with the opinions and analysis inspired by the Warsaw meeting.

Cornelius Ochmann, Member of the Board – Director, Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation Wojciech Przybylski, Editor-in-Chief, Visegrad Insight

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he strong and restrictive deepened and completed their accession, Visegrad has become position of the group with and as a testament to their integration, a visible and, for many, regards to the EU migra- Slovakia joined the eurozone in 2009. tion crisis has drawn con- Each successful turn at EU coun- a controversial factor siderable attention to the cil presidencies – the Czech Republic in European affairs. four countries. In a simi- (2009), Hungary (2011) and Poland (2011) lar vein, developments in – proved that the countries were de jure domestic affairs, notably members of the European communi- KAI-OLAF LANG far-reaching reforms in Hungary and ty and not just de facto affiliates. More TPoland have sparked discussions about importantly, after the financial and sov- the state of democracy in the region. Of ereign debt crises had severely hit many

Faces of Visegrad Different The course, there has been a Visegrad group EU countries (including Hungary), the V4 before the squabbles around asylum and supported Germany’s approach of fiscal migration policies – and it is worthwhile conservatism and tough economic ad- to envision the different and changing justments. In the eyes of many Western image and self-perceptions of the Cen- European observers and also reflecting a tral European quartet. With the benefit change in their own self-image, Visegrad of hindsight, it is possible to distinguish moved away from the old East and became four unique stages of Visegrad. part of the new North in the EU during First, there was a highly value-driven, this period of development. a sort of “idealistic” Visegrad. Of course, Finally, the refugee crisis of 2015 the initial meetings of the (then) three brought about a restive and restrictive states had a manifest political component. Visegrad. The four countries have been But the essential message was to show adamant about rejecting the idea of oblig- that in a situation of change and uncer- atory mechanisms for the redistribution tainty these countries want to decouple of asylum-seekers in the EU. According from the disintegrating East and want to to their concept of “flexible solidarity”, re-join the West, to which they felt a be- migration and asylum are common chal- longing – according to their traditions lenges for the EU; however, it should not and identity. The Visegrad countries, be solved by distributing refugees among their political leaders backed by their so- member states but by improving border cieties, then translated this idealistic and security and assistance on the hotspots normative yearning for the West into po- in crisis regions. At the same time, the litical and economic reforms. Apart from governments in power in Hungary (since Slovakia’s detour between 1993 and 1998, 2010) and in Poland (since 2015) have the Visegrad countries became the para- stressed their willingness to push through digm of post-communist transformation. domestic agendas of fundamental change With the enlargement of the EU and to defend national sovereignty con- in 2004, the old members – especially sistently. Budapest and Warsaw have also Germany – witnessed a new, unexpected signalled that they would not allow the EU version of Visegrad. The Central European to interfere in matters which they regard

“reform states”, which hitherto had always to be the core of their statehood (i.e. the adapted to European laws and principles political system or the control of migra- and which appeared to take German lead- tion from non-EU countries). ership for granted, now started saying “no”. In sum, Visegrad has run through For example, still standing at the doorsteps various stages since its existence, and of the Union, the countries of the region the region will certainly change its action sided with the US during the Iraq war. plans and its self-perception in the future. Poland tried to block Germany and others In any case, Visegrad will remain multifac- in their attempt to introduce a new system eted. Its partners in the EU will encounter of voting for the EU council – a project a denying and defying Visegrad as well as that was regarded by Berlin as a key insti- a cooperative and innovative Visegrad. For tutional change to make the EU suitable Germany, as the closest and most impor- for the accession of new members. tant neighbour of the V4 and the country However, after these first disagree- which is burdened to keep the Union to- ments, Visegrad continued its successful gether, the varying faces of Visegrad mean pre-2004 path of reforms and modern- both a chance to intensify contact as well isation. A huge and continuous influx of as accept the inherent differences within foreign direct investments and EU fund- the region. ing made the region an economic power house. In the EU, the Visegrad countries 60 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU The Hurdles Ahead THE HURDLES The Report Card AHEAD FOR CENTRAL Their European for CentralEUROPE Europe Foil

The challenges facing the CE region are the continuing market reforms, the attempts to build and solidify democracy and the struggle against corruption.

IVETA RADIČOVÁ Their European Foil efore considering the current and future buyers in East Germany had to place their orders 15 years in options for the post-communist societies advance. In Romania, the dictator Ceausescu put all citizens of Europe, it is important to be reminded on a low-calorie diet to save money for repaying the country´s of the circumstances facing the group dur- foreign debt. He limited lighting to one 40-watt bulb per room, ing the old regimes. heating in public buildings to 14 degrees and television pro- Politically, all the countries were de gramming to two tedious hours per day. facto authoritarian states governed by a When the communist systems collapsed in 1989, infla- single ruling party. Each one had propa- tion hit 640% in Poland and 2700% in Yugoslavia. The need gandists to tell the people what to think, secret police to detect for reforms was inevitable, such as: deregulating prices, un- Bdissidence, prison camps to house regime critics and all staged leashing trade, balancing budgets, cutting inflation, creating farcical elections in which the party won more than 95% of competition, privatising state enterprises and constructing the vote. With the exceptions of Yugoslavia and post-1960 social welfare programs. Albania, each took orders from Moscow, which collectively Reforms reshaped the countries into market friendly sent tanks to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to economies where state-owned industrial dinosaurs gave way crush popular uprisings. to private firms. In no other region has international trade ex- Besides having a centrally controlled economy, most if panded so fast, being reoriented to foreign markets with the not all property belonged to the state, prices were set up by lion share heading to the EU. planners and heavy industry dominated as services languished. The countries transformed their militarised, over-indus- Satisfying consumers, to say the least, was not a priority: to get trialised and state-dominated systems into service-oriented a flat in the 1980s applicants in Bulgaria had to wait up to 20 market economies based on private ownership and integrated years, in Poland up to 30 years, and a quarter of the people into global commercial networks. filling the Soviet waiting lists were already pensioners. Car

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THE REPORT The rise in consumption was equally dramatic. From 1990 to 2011, household consumption per capita in the post-communist countries grew, on average, by 88% com- CARD pared with the average increase of 56% elsewhere in the world. So too, these countries witnessed considerable improvement in living standards: Despite the initial contraction, the number of passenger cars climbed from one for every 10 people to one for every the median post-communist country four. Information technology in the region evolved from being a backwater bumpkin to in terms of growth expanded slightly a practiced overachiever (in 2013, the region´s cell-phone subscriptions per person had faster between 1990–2011 overtaken the rate in West). The post-communist world now boasts a higher percent- than median countries elsewhere age of internet users than any other region except North America and Western Europe.

The Report Card Report The The citizens travel more than ever before,HURDLES andTHE they occupy larger flats. in the world. FOR AHEAD Their European Their When it comes to the environment, communismCENTRAL had left behind a forest of smoke- EUROPE Foil stacks, but since 1990, the 11 countries that joined the EU have slashed their emissions by more than half. The average life expectancy has risen from 69 years in 1990 to 73 in 2012. Significantly, infant mortality fell faster in % terms than in any other region. However, the most fundamental transformation was political. Governments are more free and open today than at any point in their history; the extent of political change is remarkable. Today, the average post-communist country is exactly as free as one would expect it to be, given its level of income. Though problems still exist, and the countries are far from perfect: the level of corruption is higher than their western partners. There is a lower standard of living coupled with higher unemployment, the weak rule of law, a low trust in justice, and a lamentable level of civic participation as well as the diminished trust in democratic institutions in general, and this is not to mention the often criticised state of public and social services. Their European Their All of this is reflected in the important factor of citizen happiness. Residents express Foil dissatisfaction with their jobs, governments, educational and health-care systems.

THEIR Northern Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK) This fortunate EUROPEAN group is comprised of the richest economies worldwide, with a fairly equal income distribution, relatively low unemployment and highly developed institutional frame- FOIL works. (Crisis impact – average GDP contraction of 4.4%, which was largely due to high involvement in global trade, low inflation rates and an increase of unemployment,

There are significant differences about 2% on average. Card Report The HURDLES THE AHEAD FOR AHEAD Their European Their among the countries and The reaction included distinctively Keynesian measures with large fiscal stimuli CENTRAL Foil EUROPE regions of the EU. and several rescue packages for troubled banks, which lead to a pronounced increase in public debt of on average 27% of GDP since 2007. The recession is still being felt by many countries, but Germany, Austria and Switzerland have managed to return to their pre-crisis level of GDP per capita. Juxtaposed with these powerhouses, Ireland has had to face severe difficulties. Specifically, Ireland has a highly stressed banking sector, exploding private and public debt and a sharp rise of unemployment. Ireland was the first country to use the credit line offered by the EU via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and engaged in harsh austerity policies to offset the loan. Ireland exited this rescue program in late 2013 and is now showing the first signs of recovery. Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) This region is beset by the worst economic problems with negative growth rates, extremely high Their European Their levels of unemployment (20% in average) especially for the young generation and sus- Foil tainably high public debt. The reasons for these developments came between 2000 – 2007 where the steady increase in income, production and the inflow of foreign capital led to a prolonged period of economic growth which was accompanied by increasing real wages and prices. This resulted in real appreciations (since nominal depreciation which would cushion these effects was impossible due to eurozone-membership) and ultimately in a loss of productivity and competitiveness. This combined with unsound fiscal policies resulting from low interest rates (again due to eurozone) led to the current situation and inability of these countries to overcome the crisis. Therefore, the only possibility for these eurozone countries was a policy of austerity with institutional reforms and severe cuts in spending which should lead to an internal depreciation in order to regain competitiveness on the world markets. This

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policy was accompanied by large financial aid via the ESM in order to avoid debt cuts and expansive monetary policy by the ECB in order to stimulate economic activity. Portugal and Spain are now showing the first signs of recovery and have left the ESM scheme, while Greece is still in a desperate situation. The spending cuts led to severe losses in living standards and were coupled with a strong increase of emigration as well as political tensions which manifested in the successes of political forces that oppose further austerity measures. Worryingly, the most crucial case for the future of the eurozone seems to be Italy. Central Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) This block of countries had between 2000 – 2007 an average increase in per capita GDP of 52%. The reliance on foreign capital and heavy involvement in international trade is one explanation for the extreme immediate crisis reaction in these countries: in 2009 GDP contracted with more than 8% on average, in the Baltic States even with 15 – 18% in one year. Production fell as well due to the collapsing world markets and the international capital flow which stopped abruptly because of general uncertainty on financial markets. (Poland constitutes an exception here without GDP contraction.) The Baltic States answered via strong austerity measures with deep spending cuts, especially at pensions and unemployment benefits. The group of South Eastern Europe consists of relatively poor countries and are much less developed than other countries of wider Europe. They are facing several institutional weaknesses (corruption, deficient legal systems, low level of socioeconomic development) as well as economic problems such as consistently high unemployment of an average around 18%. These countries are less integrated into the world economy, so the crisis did not hit them as hard in terms of GDP growth as it did elsewhere. Croatia constitutes a special case, since it clearly is the most advanced country of the group and, since 2013, an EU-member state. The Croatian economy faced strong contraction of GDP in 2009 and sluggish growth since then combined with soaring unemployment.

THE ROAD Europe will have to concentrate on a few major tasks: to develop a unified strategy for the main socio-economic challenges currently facing Europe, namely globalisation and AHEAD an ageing population. The second task will be to make ground in areas of research and development as well as the establishment of trans-European information networks. There is a scenario where Third, we will need a single European system of justice and security if we are to fight Europe will be comprised of two crime more effectively. Finally, we need to set up joint armed forces and conduct uni- concentric circles: a political core, fied foreign policy through which Europe could speak with one voice. a “United States of Europe” Europe is at a crossroads: either we allow Europe to atrophy into a mere free trade based on the eurozone, and area in which member states compete with each other to see who can come up with the surrounding it, a confederation best response to globalisation, or we take up the European thread once more and create a close-knit political Europe that is capable of playing a role at the global level and THE HURDLES THE HURDLES The Report Card The Report Card of countries or “Organization of AHEAD FOR AHEAD FOR CENTRAL fashions for itself the instruments required to modernise the European economy, and CENTRAL Their European Their European EUROPE European States”. EUROPE Foil Foil thereby respond to the very phenomena which breathe fear into the continent today . The citizens of Europe have several fears, a fear of job loss, the erosion of social protection and also the fear of losing their identity. Finally, there is the fear of organised crime growth. On the top of various terrorist attacks perpetrated both inside and outside Europe, peoples’ feelings of insecurity and fear of foreigners have deepened. What do the people want? People want a decisive Europe that develops foreign policy and a credible security and defence policy and, above all, comes up with comprehensive economic and social strategies. Europe can be constructed in line with the previously mentioned two main models, the first being a “Europe of Nations” as advocated by Charles De Gaulle. Namely this would constitute an intergovernmental model that primarily takes account of national interests. The second would be a federal Europe, a union of citizens not just Member States, seeking to act in the general interest of the European Union as a whole. Their European Their European Some see the union primarily as a free trade area, and others want to continue Foil Foil building Europe into a fully-fledged political union. The author is former prime minister of Slovakia, currently professor of sociology at the Bratislava International School for Liberal Arts.

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MICHAL KOŘAN

Let me begin ndeed, you can tell times are difficult when you see Polish TV airing a slogan with a disclaimer: “Reparationen machen frei”, when you witness the French President Emma- nuel Macron purposefully meeting with his Central European counterparts I realize that it takes in the so called “Slavkov Format” and spit in anger at the Polish government more than a healthy afterwards, when you are surprised by the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico miraculously fishing out a fiery sentiment for Slovakia belonging to the Euro- dose of foolishness to pean core, when you cannot escape noticing how eloquently the Hungarian lump Germany and Prime Minister lashes out against Germany and the EU or when you watch the Czechs sheepishly paving the way for an unpredictable oligarch to take over the the Visegrad countries reinsI of their own country after the October 2017 parliamentary elections. together into one The scale of tensions, differing and mutually exclusive views, perceptions, interests, mistrust and apathy have been on the surge across the Central European region (including future-oriented article Germany), and there is little to suggest a positive change. On the contrary, there is a strong without appearing tendency to believe that a new rigid division of the continent will form; leaving open the possibility that the future of Europe might include a new boundary, one running between a little gloomy. Germany and the V4 countries. So why bother thinking against this tide? Without a cooperative, multifaceted and trustworthy relationship among the Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks, there is no real future for Europe to speak of. We tried to live in a divided Europe in the past, and it is not an experiment worth of repeating. Before moving to the set of questions that could lead us to creating a deeper sense of regional cooperation, there are a few critical remarks to be addressed towards the expert and journalist community. The reason is that we have fallen prey to three broad sets of fallacies concerning the Central Europe relationship to the EU. These fallacies are – tempocentrism, presentism and determinism. Tempocentrism is the belief that our own time represents the norm and that all other times are to be judged by it. In other words, it is a tendency to believe that we know better than anyone that has ever lived before. Therefore, we tend to think that our wisdom and analysis of the past and present is the best mankind has ever achieved. Next is presentism which is the inclination to use past developments and events selectively to validate one’s recent belief and political standpoints (presentism is the “history of the winners”). 64 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU

Finally, determinism is an illusion How to engage in a dialogue and cooperation that the present state of affairs has been between Germany and the V4 countries determined by clearly identified caus- despite the fact that there is little agreement es (usually outside of one’s reach), thus it Path and how to escape dependency on the most pressing issues of the day? leading to the conclusion that the future A recent piece in the Economist showed what enor- has been more or less already chosen and mous challenges lay ahead of the next German Chancellor. will look like a further projection of the Apart from the obvious topics, like integration of migrants, immediate past trajectories. This leads a troubled relationship with Turkey and Russia, a fraying to rejecting alternative futures to smirk- transatlantic partnership and an ever more technologically ing at people that argue that things can competent China, there are even more demanding domestic change. tasks for the future German representation. Underinvestment To put these three fallacies into one in infrastructure, lagging behind in hi-tech research and de- simplified example, we can use the Eastern velopment and innovations, demographic challenges, un- EU enlargement. In December 2006, the derinvestment in education and low educational mobility, Financial Times ran an editorial proclaim- education and employment gender gaps and a slowing transi- ing that the “EU’s (Eastern) enlargement tion to non-carbon energy production: all these are structural has been its biggest achievement”. Things domestic problems that – if not tackled soon and properly were good in Europe and the future was – will make Germany less competitive, weaker and as a re- looking rosy. We had just accomplished a sult more fragile and vulnerable. Of course, no one wants to great triumph of humanity and there was see Germany weak, fragile and vulnerable, but – more im- nothing that could possibly derail this portantly – the list of challenges is strikingly similar to what sparkling linear future of Europe. haunts – albeit on a much more urgent and extensive level Following the disillusionment with – the Visegrad countries themselves. Central Europe in 2015, the same news- The solutions to the dilemmas facing a multispeed Europe, paper argued that the enlargement was possible treaty changes, Eurozone governance, Russia, China or a “big mistake that ruined Europe”. The even migration – on which Germany and the V4 countries truly actual act of enlargement did not change do not see eye to eye – will be derived and dependent on the a bit, yet, its account has been acquir- competitiveness and social stability of European countries and ing a fascinating charge of negativism. not bickering about who gets what, specifically. The prevailing narrative is that there One practical example where the refocusing might help are structural societal reasons while the is the expected EU budget talks. Most of us expect fierce fight- Central and Eastern Europeans cannot ing over the cohesion funds. There are those who argue that really change, and with our recently the Central and Eastern Europeans did not show enough soli- acquired wisdom, we finally know that darity during the migration crisis – which is a fair assessment their European future is once and for all – and so they will feel the consequences as the next EU budget sealed, leaving the idealism of the 1990s cuts their cohesion money. The CEE countries snap back that finally behind. a large part of the cohesion money goes back to the wallets Let us not dwell into the actual as- of the West Europeans anyway. This quid pro quo mentality sessment of the EU enlargement. I believe is not only childish but extremely unhelpful in the long run. the main message is clear: no matter what People in Europe have become lost and even afraid of the actual impact of the enlargement the future. There is a growing frustration stemming from the might have been, we need to realise that it feeling of being left behind, neglected, under-represented and is the future that matters, and we should unprepared for what the future might bring. These are not stop using past events to legitimise our only – not even predominantly – political issues. These are current political views or future actions. issues of social preparedness, resilience and competitiveness. We have a habit of changing our accounts If we agree that instead of mere economic convergence and of the past in such a way that it corre- cohesion, the structural funds should be used so that they sponds to our current perceptions, beliefs tackle – in a very focused way – the key questions of physical and even political interests. If the expert mobility, social mobility, educational mobility, research and community, media and politicians do not development, fair access to information and data, a consensus at least try to strip away these three falla- would be much easier to find. cies, we will be caught in vicious circles. These are issues that knit Europe together by their severity, Consider this article as an attempt urgency and excessiveness. Germany and the V4 countries are to escape the presentist and determinist actually best suited to serve as an opening of this avenue be- approach to contemporary Europe. What cause of their geographical and economic proximity. Such a di- follows is a list of pertinent questions, alogue would not only bypass the topics that they cannot agree the answers to which the author does not on, but, more importantly, it could lay down the foundation for pretend to have. If a debate is provoked a new pan-European narrative of solidarity and progress that is by these questions, that is all the article more powerful and long-term oriented than the recent political can hope for. skirmishes about who pays whom for what and when.

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Quite frankly, the nature of the dialogue usually gives an impression that it is the German representatives trying to explain how things actually are and convince the room accordingly. But the Central Europeans have begun to ask questions: are we actually part of the “we” that defines the future of Europe? If not, how can we become part of this “we”? Does the EU want the Central and Eastern Europeans to emancipate and become truly equal partners in dialogue? “Are you actually ready?” Could be the response from the Germans and the EU Commission itself. There is a widespread feeling that Central Europeans lack a sense of joint ownership regarding the recent spree of initiatives in the EU, of which most comes from Germany. It is not really important whether this feeling among Central Europeans is based on real or imagined causes. There is a real risk of al- ienation – the Hungarian government, closely followed by its Polish and sometimes Slovak counterparts interpret the “new” Visegrad Group as a maturing sub-regional pressure group that finally got rid of its shyness as it is finally able to speak up for -it self and safeguard the region against the oppressive practices of Brussels. This is a very dangerous narrative, owing its existence to toxic political ambitions, prejudices and misunderstandings on the side of the Visegrad countries, but also by a lack of will- How to help the Central Europeans ingness to listen and engage in a genuine dialogue on the side understand better what enormous challenges of their Western European partners. and responsibilities Germany bears on its shoulders and, ideally, think about their own How to tap into the pro-democratic and pro- policies with this understanding in mind? EU energy that resurfaced after the series of Unless the Central European leaders will be capable of populist bursts in the last two or three years? looking at the world, at least partly, through the lenses of the Looking for something positive that has emerged out of German leadership, there is little hope for a genuine dialogue the recent political bedlam in the developed world is not an and trust. For example, the dramatic weeks that unfolded in the easy task. But there is definitely a silver lining embodied in the summer of 2015, when the refugee and migration crisis was at fresh feeling of frankness, engagement and energy. True, there its height, was not meant to demonstrate any German asser- are large parts of societies – especially in Central and Eastern tiveness or lack of respect for other partners in Europe, nor Europe – that actually grew more apathetic to what is happening was there any sense of German overconfidence as it was mostly around them but the overall atmosphere has changed. Only a interpreted in Central Europe. Instead, these weeks and the few years ago, intellectual debates in the European conferences ensuing German actions were merely desperate cries for help. halls were running on autopilot and were lacking any genuine ef- But the Central European perception of Germany is such fort to push the limits of our critical understanding of the world. that it does not allow for viewing Germans as being in need. This is not the case anymore. There are political move- We need to find ways of helping Central Europeans to real- ments in Central Europe (like NEOS in Austria, Nowoczesna ise that Germany needs their input, effort and help, and that in Poland, Progressive Slovakia or Momentum in Hungary) Germany’s potential has its well-defined limits. So too, the that try to politically frame such an energy. Central Europeans need to lower their level of suspicion and, The crucial question is, how to tap into this resurfaced also, to understand that the Germans have plenty on their plate vigour without causing further divisions among and within to be considerate to everyone at every turn and step they make. the European societies. To start with, the emerging clash between the progressive, open-minded and globalised parts of How to help the Germans really listen to the European societies on the one hand and the defensive, anxious Central Europeans and to actually consider and perhaps intolerant ones on the other should not be viewed what they have to say? and depicted as a clash between some ultimate good and evil Despite the previous question, the Germans have their – which is, unfortunately, usually the case. bit to do, as well. Having witnessed several debates about Let us take an off-spring of the pro-EU and progressiv- Germany and the V4 countries in recent months, I couldn’t ist energy – French President Emmanuel Macron – as an ex- help but notice a particular trait that just does not seem to go ample. His victory was celebrated throughout Europe, yet his away: there is a very low level of ability to really listen to what political and progressive drive is poised to touch significant the other party has to say. It seems that each side of the aisle and negative sentiments among those members of European sees a completely different world and no one bothers to try to societies that feel ill prepared for the globalised, borderless hear out the other. and tech-driven future. 66 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU

The Central Europeans are among those that feel – rightly or not – perhaps most vulnerable and least confident. President’s Macron trip through Eastern Europe was, sadly, a demonstration of his incapability to understand that blaming those who do not necessarily share his progressivist vision of Europe was about the worst possible political choice. If the future of Europe is what lies close to his heart, instead of driving a wedge between those who support his views and those who do not, his message should have been that as Europeans, we need to work together to create conditions where as few as possible should fear the open and globalized future he proposes. This is where Germany might step in. Angela Merkel – provided she will form a coalition after her party won the largest portion of seats in the most recent election – is much better positioned, individually, socially, politically and cultur- Conclusion ally to, to moderate the emerging social clash. And again, the This article purposefully tried to shift away from the daily geographical, historical and mental proximity of the Visegrad political and policy questions facing Europe today. Instead, I countries and Germany should serve as a natural platform for attempted to refocus our attention to broader European and such a debate. regional questions with the underlying notion that there is no positive European future without a more trusting relationship How to communicate to the Central European between Germany and the Visegrad countries. public that a full economic convergence with Present day Europe does not offer many reasons for opti- Germany and the other developed European mism about this relationship. Too often the mutual prejudices countries is unlikely to take place? and misunderstanding are actually provoked and utilised by Much of the “European dreaming” of Central Europeans the political representatives with the aim to score important was – and still is – based on the promise that through EU domestic political points. The problem is, however, that the membership, their respective countries will be able to catch expert community reproduces and even amplifies the general up not only politically, but also economically with the West. trajectories offered by these politicians. That is why the expert The farther away such a convergence lies, the more frustration community needs to think reflectively and critically about our seems to follow. The regional political leadership, including inclination towards presentism, tempocentrism and determin- Germany, should find the courage to carefully pass the mes- ism. Then, perhaps, we will see that the conditions are actually sage that EU membership is not about the mirage of full eco- quite suitable for trying to build a more genuine dialogue about nomic convergence. the European future between Germany and the V4 countries. EU membership offers a wide variety of instruments to The economy is recovering, unemployment is low, posi- improve political, social and economic conditions – through tive dynamism in Europe is resurfacing and there are political common regulations, the single market and basic freedoms movements that are already able to frame this dynamism in and rights. But arranging policies so that we can attain an ev- political terms. The risk of not recognizing this as an oppor- er-closer convergence with the most developed countries in tunity is nothing less than allowing new divisions of Europe Europe will only fuel further outbursts of anger. to creep in. 67 FUTURE OF EU V4 ABROAD

THE EURO, ALWAYS ON THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN

EDIT INOTAI

Hungarians would embrace the euro but politicians are cautious

n a hot summer day, Mr. István Újhelyi, an MEP from Hungary’s Socialist Party, published an online petition on his per- Hungary fulfils all but one criteria set by the sonal website (ujhelyi.eu) urging a debate Maastricht Treaty. Since it was our indepen- on Hungary’s accession to the eurozone. dent monetary policy which helped the coun- He even ventured to the Sziget Festival, try overcome the financial crisis, Hungary one of Europe’s biggest outdoor parties, does not wish to enter the fixed exchange rate to convince young partygoers that the mechanism. But taking such a step depends future of the country lies in the eurozone and not on the pe- only on our own decision. The introduction Oriphery where the current government would like to position of the euro can become relevant if Hungary’s Hungary. Some media reported on the initiative, but – partly economic development approaches the aver- due to the summer vacations – a truly ground-breaking public age of the eurozone, otherwise the country debate has not followed. A public debate has been launched may fall victim to the accession, just like some by the conservative daily Magyar Nemzet with prominent Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the eu- economists and former politicians, arguing for and against rozone has to reform and stabilise itself, to re- the common currency, but it has stopped short of becoming gain its previous appeal. Only the fulfilment a real public debate. of these two conditions could lead to seriously The governing party, Fidesz, once a keen supporter of considering the accession. Momentarily, the the idea of early eurozone accession, is refraining from all introduction of the euro in Hungary is not on public debates. The official line, promptly sent to Visegrad the agenda – reads the official statement of Insight from the Ministry of National Economy, argues that the ministry. the government is proud of its successful economic record of the last few years, which would enable Hungary to join the eurozone. However, its sovereign decision is not to do so. Paradoxically, the government, which never tires of boasting about the miraculous figures of the Hungarian economy, acknowledges that there is still a lot of work ahead. Hungary’s catching up with the EU should be a matter of real concern. No other country in the CEE region has produced such sluggish development since the transi- tion as Hungary. Starting off as an eminent student in the end of the 1980s, Hungary’s per capita GDP stood at 43% of the EU average in 1993 and has since climbed only to 63% by 2015, due to a prolonged stagnation.

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At the same time, countries like Estonia, which start- Nevertheless, the common ground ends here since ed off at 29%, has overtaken Hungary, and the often looked the opposition itself is even split on the euro. Jobbik, the down upon Slovakia became a country of envy (reaching radical right-wing party on a course of Europe-friendly 71% of the EU average GDP/capita); even Romania is on metamorphosis, started a campaign on the somewhat un- track to catch up with Hungary in the near future. realistic European wage union but would not touch the One might ask where it would all end without the gen- national currency. The smaller, left-leaning (globalisa- erous EU transfers, amounting to 3-5% of the GDP every tion-critical) LMP is also sceptical whether the adoption year? Would there be any growth at all, or an outright re- of the euro could be beneficial for the society, rather than cession? If the decision about the Hungarian euro would only for the multinational companies. As László Heltai, be based exclusively on real convergence of the Hungarian spokesperson for economic affairs of the party explained GDP, the date of the entry would be relegated to the very to Visegrad Insight: distant future. Mr György Matolcsy, the President of Hungary’s National Bank, already indicated that he saw no urgency at all and forecasted the date of accession no sooner than 2031. Yet real convergence and successful euro accession are not necessarily interlinked: many countries (the Baltics and Slovakia) joined the eurozone as relatively poor The symbolic effect of the euro should not be members of the community and – although undoubtedly overemphasised. There are many other fields there was a price to pay – have been considered successful where our commitment to the EU could be members ever since. The question is how competitive and strengthened, like the harmonisation of taxes, flexible an economy is since once inside the eurozone, it is environmental policies or labour laws – they no longer possible to devalue its currency to boost growth. would all offer more benefits to the society. “It is not an economic, but a geopolitical pressure Adopting the euro, however, would entail a lot which should push Hungary into the eurozone,” explained of risks and would deprive the country of the István Újhelyi, a Hungarian MEP. From his Brussels- necessary instruments for fighting back a po- perspective, each European political debate of the last three tential financial crisis, says the LMP politician, years has ended with the conclusion that there should be voicing similar arguments as the government. a change of pace in the EU. Brexit and the rise of the two illiberal states, Poland and Hungary, suddenly opened new perspectives: if no significant amalgamation of the entire EU is possible, it is the eurozone which should offer a path of deeper integration. “And” – says Újhelyi – “Hungarians have the right to decide where they belong.” Support comes from intellectual circles as well: while Interestingly, despite the anti-Brussels rhetoric of the mainstream economists bother little with promoting the Fidesz government, the European Union is still popular euro (it will come someday, they shrug), a well-known in Hungary and even the euro enjoys support. A growing left-leaning economist from the University of Western list of prominent Hungarians, including conservatives, are Hungary and fierce critic of austerity programs, Zoltán supporting an initiative to launch a national referendum Pogátsa, warns that adopting the euro would only lead on the adoption of the euro in Hungary, and according to to low growth, and without real convergence, it is akin to the latest polls, 52% of Hungarians would prefer the com- a suicide mission. He would go halfway: “fixing the ex- mon currency (more than in Italy and in Cyprus), which is change rate – entering the ERM – would be just enough close to the EU average of 54% with only 41% opposing it. as a stability anchor”. In a way, this is like having your A certain type of wishful thinking prevails in the opposi- cake and eating it too: stability is provided but the country tion that a stronger commitment to Europe – vis a vis to would still have the chance to devalue should a crisis hit. the Moscow-friendly attitude of the current government – According to other experts, however, the Hungarian forint could unite and rally voters behind them in the upcoming is momentarily overappreciated which makes the economy election in spring 2018. less competitive.

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Talking about a crisis: things could have turned out This is apparently not the intention of the Hungarian quite differently if Hungary had entered the eurozone as government as the official statement of the Ministry of early as it was originally planned. The accession was once National Economy has implied. But it would be difficult on the agenda of both the Fidesz and the Socialist govern- to ignore the threat of Visegrad falling apart due to their ment right after joining the EU. Even the dates were set various approaches to the future of Europe. The visit of for 2008 or 2009. However, in 2003, the social-liberal co- French President Emmanuel Macron to the CEE region alition, led by former finance minister Péter Medgyessy, – and leaving out the two “rogue states”, Hungary and decided on a massive wage increase in the public sector Poland, also signals that there is a growing intolerance to- instead of a strict budgetary policy, and blew off the chanc- wards countries which do not play by the European rules. es of a rapid integration. When Fidesz wants to strike back There is a rumour that Hungary will receive an ir- against the socialists in the euro-debate, it never forgets to refutable offer from Brussels this fall, but nobody knows mention this “eternal sin” of the party. The irresponsible whether there will be more carrots or sticks in it – and expansionist monetary policy contributed to the vulnera- whether it would have any effect on the Hungarian gov- bility of the Hungarian economy and the Swiss franc loan ernment. For Újhelyi, the talk about the economy is just crisis, which could have been avoided should the country an excuse. He thinks there is a strong political reason for already belong to the eurozone. As most socialist politi- staying out of any deeper integration: the illiberal state is cians, Újhelyi finds himself in an uncomfortable position, incompatible with the idea of a having a common finance but defends the controversial wage policy as a necessary minister and a common budget, which would not allow to step. “Otherwise social tensions would have exploded the pay projects like building grandiose soccer stadiums nor country,” he said, “now we face a different situation”. enriching companies run by the Prime Minister’s friends For some politicians, the adoption of the euro is like and relatives. This would be incompatible with the essence a race. Romania and Bulgaria, which have vowed to enter of the system, transferring more competences – especially the waiting room of the eurozone, the ERM, would not like in the economic and business sectors – outside their cli- to remain on the periphery. Many see the current revital- entele. The usual argument about the Hungarian curren- isation of the French-German tandem as a push for deeper cy anchored in the constitution is just a pretext: with the integration in Europe, and there seems to be a rush to join necessary political will (meaning the two thirds majority) the so called “core-Europe”, built on the current eurozone. it can be amended any time. Slovakia already stated that it wants to sit at the Brussels/ Frankfurt table where vital decisions on the future of the The author is a senior fellow at the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and EU are to be taken. This would clearly weaken the Visegrad Democracy (CEID). project. Even the traditionally Eurosceptic Czech Republic is eyeing the euro and announced their intention to seek observer’s status at the eurozone meetings.

Are you setting any special conditions that need to be met? ADDITIONAL There are numerous conditions. The eurozone has to deal with a number of issues by itself, first. CONDITIONS The President of the Hungarian National Bank enumerated several conditions.

On October 13th, 2017, Zoltán Kovács, Secretary Yes, but those are the perspectives or figures enumerated by of State for Public Diplomacy and Relations him. The ones he mentioned represent more the position of of the Ministry of Administration and Justice the parliament than of the government. of Hungary, was asked by the Visegrad Insight Does the government set any additional conditions? about the adoption of the euro in Hungary. We believe that, in many respects, the idea of the euro should It seems that the government has a bit different position be a little bit refurbished. There are not only monetary condi- than the National Bank of Hungary. Is there a position of tions that matter. There are other issues as well, and if you do the Hungarian government on the euro adoption now? not adjust other issues like competitiveness, capital income Yes, we are not going to introduce it in the nearest future de- and the unnatural tensions within the system, it is going to be spite the obligation, as it is up to the country to decide when ripped apart. to introduce the euro. Our past experience shows that we can better cope with our economic problems without the euro. We Provided that there is a reform of the eurozone, will you have signed the Maastricht Treaty in which it is stated that we change your position? should adopt the euro, but it is up to the candidate when to do We will see, we shall see what the changes are going to be. it. We are not ready to make that step because we are better Under the existing treaty that we signed, it is the end of the by our own standards, at the moment. game. We’ll see. 70 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU

In Hungary, despite popular support, the government EUROZONE MEMBERSHIP stresses that Hungary will not join the eurozone. The President – Visegrad Insight is Spurring the Discussion of the Hungarian National Bank listed a number of his own The 2017 State of the Union address by Jean Claude Junker outlined criteria next to the Maastricht treaty. the future of European integration that will allow for a further integration around the core of the EU, effectively members of the eurozone. THE DEBATE: Meanwhile the question of eurozone membership becomes an important Visegrad Insight has followed and continues to stir the debate issue in national public debates. on the eurozone in the V4. Here is a selection of our coverage so far between 2015-2017: THE FACTS Three out of four countries of the Visegrad Group have not Luděk Niedermayer, former deputy chairman of the Czech adopted the common currency. Slovakia adopted the euro in National Bank “countries like the Czech Republic should sup- 2009 and popular support for membership in the eurozone is port the club instead of questioning it, which might ultimately one of the highest in all EU countries – over 80% (August 2017). bring the date of our joining the eurozone quite a bit closer.” As Flash Eurobarometer 453 (May 2017) noted on the popularity of the euro in member states that have not yet Mojmír Hampl, from the Czech National Bank said, “despite adopted the currency, the majority of the population in the its geographical proximity o and close trade links with the aforementioned countries do not feel informed enough about euro area, the degree of spontaneous euroisation within the the euro (from 50%–59% feeling ill-informed). Czech economy is low and is not growing.” In Central Europe, popular support remains high in Romania (64%), Hungary (57%), Croatia (52%) and Bulgaria Ádám Balog, the CEO-Chairman of MKB Bank Ltd criticised (50%). At the same time, in Poland (41% for; 56% against) and that the “whole euro system was based on a delusional idea.” the Czech Republic (29% for; 70% against) the eurozone is not popular. And while the demand for quick membership is low, Balázs Romhányi, from the Fiscal Responsibility Institute in it slightly increases over time. Budapest, espoused that “Hungary should join the eurozone, Interestingly, Hungary and Poland are the only countries more specifically its further integrating part because it would where a majority of respondents disagree that adopting the be a better, more consistent economic policy package than euro will mean that their country will lose control over its eco- what we have now.” nomic policy (58% and 52% respectively). Leon Podkaminer, from the Vienna Institute for International THE GAME: Economic Studies, warned “There is no reason to believe that The Czech Republic: the outgoing socialists in Czech Republic Poland’s eventual euro area membership could bring about highlighted the euro in their electoral campaign, going against sustainable and fast growth.” the popular sentiments of voters. The new majority in parliament has campaigned against the euro in the 2017 elections. Lajos Bokros, the former Hungarian Minister of Finance 1995– In March, the Czech National Bank decided on a new policy 1996, took a pragmatic approach saying, “If we don’t join now, to not intervene on currency exchange – essentially taking one in 20 years when we will have to, we will be rule takers not step closer to joining the eurozone. rule makers. So, in my humble view it will be much better to This October, the Polish Finance Ministry official pro- participate still in this incipient stage.” claimed that Poland does not exclude adoption of the euro after the future of eurozone reform is known, which is a move Krzysztof Blusz, from the WISEuropa think tank in Warsaw, from NEVER to MAYBE in the PiS government’s position. looked past the binary nature of the question and focused on While in June 2017, the president of National Bank outlined its feasibility, saying “It is pertinent for Poland to reflect be- his arguments against joining the eurozone. yond the decision to enter the eurozone or not, and ask: what kind of eurozone would Poland be willing to join and what sort WHEN WOULD YOU LIKE THE EURO of structure would best foster Polish aspirations?” TO BECOME YOUR CURRENCY?

73 73 70 HUNGARY CZECH REPUBLIC 65 67 63 67 59 49 47 47 47 42 42 40 39 42 39 35 35 36 32 36 34 33 36 36 35 30 32 29 29 30 30 37 28 29 27 23 16 16 19 18 18 17 29 29 14 15 14 13 27 28 24 26 25 8 7 9 21 24 22 24 22 24 25 22 21 22 7 3 5 5 6 19 16 11/2011 11/2011 04/2017 04/2017 05/2011 05/2011 04/2014 04/2014 04/2014 04/2016 04/2016 05/2010 09/2010 05/2010 09/2010 04/2015 04/2013 04/2013 04/2012 04/2012 04/2007 09/2007 04/2007 09/2007 09/2004 09/2005 04/2006 09/2006 05/2008 05/2009 09/2009 09/2004 09/2005 04/2006 09/2006 05/2008 05/2009 09/2009

As late as posssible / Never As soon as possible

71 FUTURE OF EU V4 ABROAD The Parisian Mirror

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Reactions to the BY MILAN NIČ

The Parisian lthough the main attention is now on the recent French Austrian and Czech elections, it is worthy looking back at the Central European responses to a more assertive France in the EU. With perfect timing at the end of September, two days after the German elections and two days before the informal EU summit in Tal- initiatives confirm linn, President Emanuel Macron stole the spotlight. At the Sorbonne on September 26th, he presented Mirror Athe most ambitious French proposals and ideas on the future of the European Union in more than a decade. In sharp contrast to Berlin’s limited vision and ambitions, Macron reclaimed the leading role of Paris in shaping the future of the EU. that the V4 has The momentum for EU reform is now with France, not with Germany, goes the popular argument. After Macron’s tour to Central and Eastern Europe some weeks ago, I wrote a critical piece about his plan to limit the “social dumping” from poorer member states while pushing become a region of for protectionist measures in the EU directive on “posted workers.” Among other things, I argued that the issue of “posted workers” is two-sided, given how painfully and slowly the process of economic convergence between the EU’s East and West has been moving. Pushing too hard to limit the rights of Polish construction workers or Romanian truck drivers – convergence which comprise only a fraction of foreigners in the French labour market – might play into the cards of anti-EU political forces in Central Europe; it is a notable risk which should not be underestimated in Brussels, Berlin or Paris. Now, after President Macron’s big speech on the future of the European Union, I’d like to shift focus to the broader for various EU picture and the political dynamics in Europe, looking critically at the short-sighted response from some of the Visegrad countries. My argument is similar but with the opposite twist: Macron’s drive and momentum on the EU level should not be underestimated. President Macron achieved at least three things by his vectors functioning Sorbonne speech: First, he framed the agenda for substantive debates on EU reform in six policy areas from defence to development. Second, he increased pressure on Berlin by offering Germans a partnership to further take the lead in some of these initiatives. And thirdly, he outlined a plan of how to sustain momentum behind his EU reform agenda – by organising at different “democratic conventions” in some EU member states, pushing for “transnational list” for the EU Parliament and teaming up with grass-root, progressive movements across the EU for a joint campaign in the European elections in 2019. It’s a formidable workload. As a centrist and political novice, President Macron is not part of any relevant EU polit- integration speeds. ical grouping. All that enthusiasm and symbolism around his Sorbonne speech could not hide a simple fact: on the EU level, Macron is hostage to others, in particular to Germany. When it comes to the eurozone, Berlin still calls the shots. Germany also carries most of the weight in most other EU policy areas. 73 FUTURE OF EU V4 ABROAD

Compounding all of this, German Chancellor Angela widely assumed to be the next Czech Prime Minister after the Merkel was just re-elected to her fourth mandate but her new upcoming elections (October 20-21), remarked that President government with liberal FDP and Greens will be weaker and Macron should focus more on reforming France rather than internally more diverse than all previous ones. It will face loud the EU, warning that a drive for deeper integration could lead opposition in the parliament – led by the increasingly populist for more members following the U.K. in leaving the EU. SPD and the xenophobic Alternative for Germany (AfD). As In contrast, most reactions of political leaders in Daniela Schwarzer observed, “given the Bundestag’s central Germany on President Macron’s speech were either politely role in shaping Germany’s EU policy, this could weaken the sceptical or outright positive. As expected, the Greens and capacity of Merkel’s government to provide the kind of lead- FDP, two smaller parties likely to form the new coalition gov- ership Europe now needs.” ernment with Merkel’s conservative CDU-CSU block, showed The process of post-Brexit reconstruction of the EU is different approaches. While the co-leader of the Green Party, now expected to move in the coming months. It was formally (and potential new German Foreign Minister) Cem Özdemir, started a year ago at the Bratislava summit but then never re- welcomed Macron’s “strong speech” and called for closer col- ally took off. The main actors were waiting for the European laboration with Paris on the EU reforms, FDP’s leading candi- political calendar to clear up, and only after the French and date for that position, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, was more German elections is the EU political scene finally set for se- reserved. He also welcomed the Sorbonne speech as “brave rious talks and decisions. In the following months, we will and refreshing’ but criticised the French proposals on tax har- probably witness intensive attempts to shape the direction monisation and the eurozone budget. Europe takes over the coming years. It was confirmed at the Seeing it from an optimistic angle, the Central European informal EU summit in Tallinn on September 28th as leaders reactions mostly fell within the same range as in the post-elec- held a frank debate on future common policies concerning, tion Germany. However, I believe that there’s a huge underlin- though not limited to, budgets, defence, migration, economic ing issue. As the German democratic establishment is coming issues and the eurozone. to terms with the shock of having the extremist AfD as the Based on this discussion, which had a significant French third largest group in the new Bundestag, it will be more sensi- overtone due to Macron’s Sorbonne speech, the EU Council tive to extremist language and behaviour from other EU part- President Donald Tusk was tasked to consult his partners in ners, and the language of Central European populists sounds, the EU’s capitals and propose how to take the process forward. in the German political context, very much like the AfD. An intensive “special period” of formulating and negotiating What I hear in Berlin is not encouraging for the current new policies for deeper EU cooperation is expected to start Polish and Hungarian ruling parties: a prospective Jamaica in earnest only in early 2018 when Germany will have a new coalition could be a tougher partner to the Central European government. The window of opportunity for hard decisions governments than the grand coalition used to be. Both the could last until the next European Parliament elections in Greens and FDP will be more outspoken when it comes to any Spring 2019. Around that time, talks about the next EU budget disrespect of EU laws and values, including media freedoms, (or Multiyear Financial Framework – MFF), ahead of the next human rights and democracy. 2020-2027 period, should also be closing down. Some V4 leaders and governments might be naive to think that they can continue to rely on Berlin while dismiss- President Macron knows perfectly well what he needs from ing the new wind for the EU future blowing from Paris. If they other EU leaders. In spite of being in the Elysee for only a few are suspicious about the new wave of French protectionism months, he has already held talks with 22 out of the 28 EU creeping into EU policies on the back of the President Macon’s leaders, some of them repeatedly (with Chancellor Merkel, al- enthusiasm for Europe, they better be busy coordinating with ready nine times!). These intensive consultations allowed him the Dutch and Nordics about defending the rules of the single to get an overview of the interests as well as potential flexibil- market. Yet, there are few signs from Warsaw and Budapest ities of his EU partners. about such considerations. Macron’s long list of new initiatives was a deliberate tac- At this decisive moment in Europe, the long-term inter- tical choice to make sure that each EU country or constituency ests of Central Europeans also depend on the realignment of can find something there to support. There was a number of Europe as a whole – and therefore also on their bilateral rela- issues that the V4 countries could be satisfied with, including tions with France and Germany. By casting themselves as the their own agenda of food quality or Macron’s inclusive ap- main opponents of the French-driven reform agenda, Poland proach to EU security and defence. It means that the French and Hungary are very likely to lose even more influence in agenda for EU reconstruction is not only based on the eu- the EU; further weakening the whole Visegrad Group and the rozone but also on several other EU policy areas, in which combined negotiating power of all four countries before talks Paris might take the lead, not Germany. On the other hand, about the new EU budget have even started. Visegrad capitals are rightly cautious about French proposals In the meantime, because of Slovakia’s eurozone mem- for converging corporate tax rates (rather than living stand- bership and constructive approach to President Macron’s ini- ards), raising labour standards and scaling down the number tiative as well as the Czech’s pragmatism (which might to some of commissioners in the next EU executive body. extent continue under Babiš) coupled with their strong bilater- Yet most reactions to Macron’s speech in the Visegrad al relations with Berlin and Paris, both countries will become countries were timid at best, and some even outright dis- more influential in the post-Brexit EU than their Visegrad missive. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Péter Szijjárto, told neighbours. After the French and German elections, Central Al Jazeera that, in his country and across the whole region, Europe continues to evolve into a region where different EU Germany is much more important than France. 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After having been rather divided on the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions against Russia, the Visegrad Group managed to unite over the migration crisis – which has shaken any developments of European integration as well as the EU’s core values. Still, they might end up in different positions after the post-Brexit EU transformation due to their differing economic-political preferences.

EDIT ZGUT

ven the seating arrange- selves. The French president did not nec- obviously wished to have a say at one of ments had a symbolic essarily sit down with Fico and Sobotka the most important fora, unless, to par- significance during the because he could not garner the qualified aphrase Viktor Orbán, “they want to be first meeting of the V4 majority’s support for the reform of the served for dinner”. and Emmanuel Macron: EU directive on posted workers in the While Viktor Orbán successfully the recently elected council (16 member states) without any channelled the frustration of anti-estab- French president was Central or Eastern members. It was rath- lishment voters towards international followed by Slovakian er a message to the Hungarian and Polish actors and the EU, the Hungarian govern- Prime Minister Robert Fico and then his leaderships who are unwilling to cooper- ment seems to be unprepared for changes ECzech counterpart Bohuslav Sobotka, ate, and, at the same time, it is an effort to to the macropolitical environment or to while Viktor Orbán and Polish Prime detach Bratislava and Prague from their the EU’s transformation with the associ- Minister Beata Szydło were seated to- renitent neighbours. ated political and economic challenges gether on the other side of the table. therein. Macron’s win does not bode well THE CURRENT V4 CONUNDRUM Unlike the Czech social democrats, for the Hungarian and Polish leader- The fact that Fico clearly declared, early the Hungarian conservative Fidesz gov- ships because, among other reasons, the in 2017, that Slovakia’s interests coincide ernment even declared that it does not new French premier believes the Central with those of the eurozone is indicative want to try to get an observer seat in the European (CE) countries are failing to com- of the current state of the V4. The EU has Eurogroup, which could lead to the con- ply with EU regulations and should face po- been overwhelmed by an integration- clusion that Budapest is simply not in- litical consequences; this is not to mention al paradox for more than two decades: terested in the economic and monetary Macron’s plan of further developing the while there is an increased stress on union. This is especially short-sighted two-speed model of Europe by deepening member states to find community-level behaviour in light of the fact that there is cooperation within the eurozone. solutions for migration issues as well as a large number of economic regulations Then, in August, Macron only met general job creation, they would like to that could be important for non-euro- with Fico and Sobotka (excluding their refrain from handing over new compe- zone member states, and most of these Polish and Hungarian counterparts) to tences to Brussels. are decided on in the Eurogroup meetings raise another sensitive issue affecting the The comprehensive economic-polit- preceding ECOFIN sittings. The most im- CE countries, namely the posted work- ical crisis of the EU and Brexit has turned portant questions affecting the Eurozone ers directive dating back to 1996 which the questions of multi-speed integration will be decided on at this intergovern- allows for European companies to send and the subsequent transfer of sovereign- mental platform, and it is unknown what employees to work in other EU member ty into a practical affair. In this changing effects such decisions will have on non-eu- states while continuing to pay benefits situation, Slovakia does not only want rozone members in terms of taxes, the and taxes in their own home country. to belong to the core Europe aiming for banking sector, the investment fund, etc. Although Hungary and Poland had pre- closer integration, but it is showing more Despite all this, the Orbán gov- viously objected to the idea rather loud- and more willingness to agree to Brussels ernment seems to be solely focused on ly, in this meeting the Slovak and Czech taking further competences away from the “stopping Brussels” campaign; the leadership proved to be open to discuss eurozone members. Hungarian PM alleges that the EU is the reform. Similarly, the traditionally trying to gain strength at the expense Macron’s meeting with the Slavkov Eurosceptic Czech Republic announced of member states through legislation. Triangle also signalled that the leftist that Prague wants to get an “observer Moreover, Orbán said that the issue of Austrian government might want to try seat” in the Eurogroup, even though it migration is the main reason for the at- and weaken the Visegrad Group them- does not aim to join the eurozone. They 76 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 V4 ABROAD FUTURE OF EU

tacks on Hungary, and “everything else is components it wishes to include in its tically they even play into the hands irrelevant”. policy shopping cart, the German chan- of Fidesz that has remained the most However, Orbán and Jaroslaw cellor said she generally agrees with the popular party in Hungary. Moreover, it Kaczynski missed their window of oppor- French president, and she is happy that remains to be seen if the EU will have tunity for their “cultural revolution”. On Brussels is exerting pressure on reluctant tools to manage the situation in Poland the contrary, the recent decision regard- member states. in the long run. Merkel and Macron are ing migration quotas taken by the EU’s This is in line with a German posi- among the Western EU leaders who have court gave impetus for the Hungarian tion paper published in May which sug- thrown their weight behind the European government’s anti-EU campaign, which gests that there should be a connection Commission in the dispute with Poland. shifted into high gear with the national between the compliance with the rule of consultation entitled “Let’s stop Brussels,” law and projects financed through the EU BERLIN BACK IN THE GAME and even more so after the resolution ap- budget. This definitely shows a shift from The real question is whether Berlin will proved by the European Parliament on Merkel’s previous, more cautious ap- show more willingness to discipline non- the preparations for the Article 7 proce- proach. As a point in fact, in just this past compliant member states with economic dure against Hungary. As a sign of this, spring, the chancellor did not support the tools, or to explain the economic necessi- the Hungarian government will shift into idea that reluctant member states should ty derived from Brexit and the migration an even higher gear by launching a new be disciplined by measures involving fis- crisis for considering the interests of net National Consultation in autumn 2017, cal tools. contributors even more seriously at the which claims that if Fidesz wins for a The governments of the V4 need expense of reluctant members during the third time in next year’s general election, to keep this in mind as the European budget negotiations. “Brussels won’t be able to beat Hungary Commission’s discussion paper pub- It is telling that despite Commission and the Soros-plan will fail”. lished on June 28th confirmed that the President Jean-Claude Juncker’s previ- While the two governments are EU, partly due to Brexit, is getting ready ous objections, “enfant terrible” member running highly visible anti-EU cam- for the most comprehensive European states could for the first time feel the ef- paigns, Polish and Hungarian socie- Union budget reform ever, potentially in- fect of their destructive approach on their ties are overwhelmingly pro-European. volving setting tougher requirements for pockets. According to the Chatham House re- the distribution of EU funding. Berlin seems to be engaged in the port, Warsaw and Budapest are aiming The German government came up debates on the possibilities of economic to transform the pro-EU public attitudes with a number of proposals unlikely to pressure, such as tying cohesion funds to of their citizens. be supported by the Visegrad Group: requirements, and the post-2020 financial for example, the German administration framework, focusing especially on actors UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS OF suggests that more developed regions urging to bind structural and cohesion THE NOT SO YOUNG REBEL should be allocated funding to meet funds to certain requirements. In relation The most important source of the Hun- new challenges such as the integration to this, some actors might propose intro- garian prime minister’s political capital of refugees and solving demographic ducing a comprehensive set of consider- was that he looked like a successful rep- problems. Additionally, it was suggested ations based on a combination of several resentative of the new wave of right-wing that the country-specific recommenda- criteria (e.g., respecting the rule of law populists. In fact, his political stunt failed tions issued within the framework of the and joining the EU Prosecutor’s Office). with the new wave of energy for main- European Semester should be tied even In the end, the V4 (currently more stream politics. Although Germany has more closely to structural funds, which of a V2+2) will not be able to represent voiced its concerns and reservations nu- has since been confirmed by the German their interests in a unified manner around merous times about Hungarian processes European Commissioner for Budget and a solidified position against the refugee negatively affecting the rule of law, it has Human Resources, Gunter Oettinger. quota system. The question is only when refrained from intense, open criticism Clearly Germany does not believe the cracks will become too obvious to and diplomatic offensives. This behaviour Hungary plays an important enough role ignore. is underpinned by rational economic and on the European stage for Berlin to sup- political reasons. Germany is fundamen- port the Article 7 procedure against the Edit Zgut is foreign policy analyst at Political tally interested in political and econom- Orbán regime, which was exemplified by Capital. ic stability in the region, and from the the European Parliament’s vote on this is- German perspective, Hungary currently sue where only two out of the 34 German seems to be stable: Fidesz must be seen as EPP representatives voted for the reso- a safeguard against the far-right Jobbik, lution condemning Hungary, while five the country generally follows the German abstained. line in the EU and internationally and the What we have seen so far is that image of economic stability is presum- Brussels holds no effective legal tools to ably mirroring the opinion of German use against Hungary. The hearings and companies. debates in the European Parliament, the But when Angela Merkel was asked infringement procedures, OLAF’s inves- what she thought about Macron’s meta- tigations, the temporary suspension of phor of the EU not being a supermarket EU payments, the rule of law and Article for CEE to freely pick-and-chose what 7 procedures do not work, and domes- 77 FUTURE OF EU V4 ABROAD

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PAWEŁ KOWAL, WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI

WP: In Germany, the party of resentment took a very high Paweł Kowal, former deputy position, which is a turning point for the post-war history of Europe and particularly important for Central Europe. Minister of Foreign Affairs, PK: Personally, I think that dark, potentially bleak, scenar- discusses the results of the ios might be waiting for us in Germany, but this is not yet that dark scenario. After those elections, I, myself, am asking German elections in the context whether the worst is yet to come, or because of its character, its polity, its political culture and its prosperity, Germany is of the Visegrad Group with softly experiencing the trend sweeping the world.

Wojciech Przybylski editor-in- There is this world trend, but there is also a regional aspect, chief of Visegrad Insight. which is the Visegrad Group countries that have spoken very strongly and directly against Angela Merkel. When refugees suddenly were standing on the borders of Austria and Hun- gary, we had the problem of what to do; the answer from An- gela Merkel was “We can do it!”, and she invited in the emi- grants. Then, because of the very strong opposition from the Visegrad Group, she quietly withdrew from her statement, without any grand pageantry. I think, she withdrew in a very characteristic, for herself, way of political governing. This is the so-called “politics of the small steps”. It can be misunderstood by Polish politicians because there is a big blast in Poland with every political change – it is noticed, every step is announced, and often the blast at the announcement does not mean any efficiency in the implementation.

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Angela Merkel, from this point of view, is at the opposite end. We do not know her big political declarations when, for instance, have you heard her say that tomorrow something will be considerably different from what was yesterday. That is why she did it in her own way. I think she was under pressure from her own party, which was the real reason why she decided to withdraw. And she did it in such a way that the moment of withdrawal was invisible for observers and even for her political competitors.

She had to take those few steps back and several to the side for her historic win – entering a fourth term as the Chan- cellor, which equates her to Kohl and Adenauer, and that is, in some way, her time to be written in history. Indeed, In such a situation, is it possible to predict what the German Europe and Germany’s relationship to Europe are facing a influence on European policy will be? historic moment. Will Merkel be a prisoner of her own small The question is, when will Germany realise that the European steps, or will she try to change the direction of Europe? There Union is not to be rescued. In my opinion, even though the is Brexit, France seems pivoted for change, and they are a economic union is doing well, there is also a generally positive partner who wants to work with Germany. Thirdly, there is economic trend – like what we have in Poland – but this is- the danger of a growing authoritarianism from their eastern sue is politically impossible to raise. Catalonia will be another neighbours. Germany once again has to face the policy is- trauma for a year or maybe several years, and these “non-cre- sues of Central-Eastern Europe. ative” crises connected to Brexit, Catalonia, Central Europe After the elections, we always think about the outcome of the should finish the EU. election: where the elections give legitimacy and where not. If no one finds a way to stop this, then it will end the Obviously, these elections give Angela Merkel a legitimacy to political union. That does not mean that there will not be any govern in Germany and decide when to leave the stage. If we other “union” created immediately, because, I think, it will were to tell the story of Angela Merkel, this is certainly not the happen right away. Although, I have an impression that still peak of her career, it is rather the end of her career. And I do one or two deep crises like these will occur in larger European not say it meanly as it is a very natural situation. She won in states, and the leaders themselves will recognise that this for- these elections something which is not the privilege for every, mation of states, in its current shape, does not have any reason even well-deserving, politician. to exist. Thus, she will probably be able to decide when and in There is even an illusion, especially coming from the which way to leave the political stage, but the fact that we are Polish right, that there might be no European Union, but if we approaching this point is probably clear for everyone. On the know anything about the European continent, we know one other hand, it seems to me that the support she received in the thing – another union will arise immediately. elections does not give her legitimacy for such an intensive change to the situation in the European Union. Neither is it The issue which is now being discussed is based on the euro, definitive that Macron will continue his support and remain a even if the project of Macron is not fully implemented, what strong French partner, which was previously certain. Everyone will be the eurozone scenario as a political project? expected, even Macron himself, that he would succeed in gar- This is the question of the outcome of the AfD and whether nering enough support in France for a Bonapartist govern- Germany will not identify the situation at some point, and in ment, but today that optimism is outdated. such a way, that the union will not be protected and even the eurozone will not be saved. This new union will emerge in a soft way based on the eurozone, or at least this is the most likely scenario. However, I am talking about something else. I think there might be a moment when Germany will see the situation on the ground as something impossible to build anything else. Then, after withdrawing from building the union (on the basis that they want to focus on the eurozone), they will weaken the European Union and will look for a completely new solution.

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Perhaps, the solution will be found even within the same states but based on some completely different set of principles or for some time based on similar values. And this question will depend on whether the AfD is at the top of its power; as it is difficult to exclude the fact that any postponed demand for Germany’s own ascension to superpower status might fall on deaf ears. If that is the case, it will not make much sense to spend time on developing a two- or three-speed Europe because Germany has the potential to try to go another way.

I also recall a slogan which said that the German power, including their economic power, would not exist if it was not for the eurozone and staying in the good relations with all its neighbours, especially those in Central Europe, which better position of his country within this puzzle of forces in boosts the economy while simultaneously serving as pro- Europe. Meanwhile, the main beneficiary of such changes duction lines for the region. may be Russia. But here we are already talking about a completely different Therefore, I am very sceptical of Poland’s support of the Germany, more focused on the military production. Let’s say policy of Victor Orban, I am no longer speaking of Russian openly and sincerely, if there are any resentments from 70–100 policy because it is not happening now. I think we are dealing years ago – we can mostly observe it in the UK and Catalonia. with three states – Russia, Hungary and Turkey – which are Since Catalonia is the story of the Catalans who did not take looking for some historical revenge and return to a state that is from the table what was easy to get after the First World War. perfect from the perspective of their historical memory. Thus, we have some sort of delayed problem that has broken Let’s not hide this, in Hungary it also applies to territory. out today. Hungary is also a very profound historical problem I think that, in this way, Polish politics differ from Hungarian, that was not solved in the 20th century. and their interests vary as well. No one in Poland is interested So, we have several of such cases and, therefore, we can- in anything that might lead to a revolt in Europe or which will not easily assume that this will not happen in Germany. We can bring the situation to a point where changing borders would discuss how it might happen and when. We have so much expe- be possible or necessary. rience with different elections lately that we cannot talk about On the other hand, I think that in Hungarian politics, the prospect for the next few years. It seems that the most likely gently speaking, there is an element of their doctrine that I scenario is that it will last longer and, eventually, drift apart. would call the “what if” – of which nobody, of course, is speak- There is no regularity here. I am just emphasising that this turn ing openly about. Although listening, reading and, especially, back to the 20s and 30s, in various forms, is very strong. analysing Hungary’s minority policy abroad, I think that in these elements of politics the “what if” is present. I hear from you the echoes of Victor Orban. In March, he Of course, the key is to understand the difference be- wrote in the Hungarian Quarterly an essay about a year of tween Poland and Hungary. Hungary lost its empire in 1918. revolutions in Europe. Orban naturally ties it with a chance The Austro-Hungarian Empire is one of the best periods of to improve, in his view, the radically ugly, unequal situation Hungarian history; the proof that a small nation is better for of Hungary in Europe. Precisely, the use of revolution and the interests of the nation than being part of a larger construc- Brexit should bring Hungary into wider waters, which, un- tion. For everybody – Hungary was better off as the Kingdom fortunately, can also mean some border revisionism, and, of Hungary within the Austria-Hungary Empire than as a small thus, a political conflict with its neighbours. It was about the Hungary without the possibility of developing on such a scale. At the same time, thanks to the disintegration of this empire, Poland became a relatively large country, though clearly less than its Polish ambitions, and regained its independence. Hence, our situation and the situation of Hungary – I cannot comprehend that some of the political elites do not understand this – is not just different, but they are completely opposed to one another. This means we should make sure imperialism is not re- born. While for Hungary, it depends on what kind of leadership they have. Hungarians can imagine themselves in different scenarios. In our case, a scenario involving the return to nineteenth-century imperialism, even in a liberal version, is a bad scenario.

The author is former Director of the Polish Institute for International Af- fairs and senior associate at Visegrad Insight.

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MARCIN ZABOROWSKI Illustration: Kuczyński Paweł

lthough the German likely by a coalition of the Christian- elections returned An- Democrats with the liberal FDP and the gela Merkel to power Green party. This will be a considerably for the 4th consecutive weaker coalition than the CDU-SPD gov- term, the overall re- ernment that ruled Germany for the last sults of these elections four years. The FDP and the Greens agree show more rapture with each other on practically nothing, than continuity. Clear- and they both should be worried about ly the biggest electoral upset is the better being eclipsed by the CDU and possibly Athan predicted result for the far right- sharing the fate that befell the SPD, end- right Alternative for Germany (AfD) ing in their worst result since 1945. There party, which managed to attract voters is also no doubt that the SPD will lead a from all the other parties and came up strong opposition; it will be emboldened as the third force in the Bundestag. In by its defeat that it blames on its co-op- area encompassing the former GDR, the eration with Merkel’s CDU. AfD attracted the second largest share of What does this rather confusing votes, and regarding regional elections, it result mean for Central Europe? Several took first place in Saxony. As long as the things are already clear. First and fore- AfD will not weaken itself through inter- most, by voting for the AfD the elec- nal divisions – which is likely to be the torate showed a yellow card to Merkel’s case – it could emerge as a serious force European and immigration policy. She in German politics. will have to reckon now with an existence As of now, however, Germany will of a violently Eurosceptic force inside the be ruled by mainstream parties, most Bundestag, which no German chancellor 82 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 ROZWINIĘCIEV4 ABROAD TEMATU FUTURETYTUŁ DZIAŁU OF EU

has had to contend with since the mid- hide their glee at the success of anti-im- From Central Europe’s point of view, 1960s. Merkel has never been bold in her migration AfD. it is difficult to see a better outcome than approach towards European integration This may seem contradictory since the so-called Jamaica coalition of CDU/ but she will be forced to be even more the resentments stirred up by German CSU-FDP-Greens taking the reins of the cautious now. In particular, Merkel will Eurosceptics have also referred to nega- government. Such a coalition would be have to counter the perception of the tive stereotypes about Central Europeans, more Atlanticist and firmer on Russia. EU as a “transfer union’, which has been in particular about the Poles. The AfD The participation of the Greens would the impetus behind AfD’s momentum. has also been known for questioning bring into the coalition a force sceptical Central Europeans can therefore expect a Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak about Russia and hostile towards the far tougher German position on all issues of the Second World War. It is at best rath- NordStream2 project. All three parties that have budgetary implications. er odd that the Central European political are clearly pro-European and have in the Perhaps even more significantly, the factions that have called for Germany to past supported the Eastern enlargement drop in Merkel’s popularity is attributed pay war reparations to Poland are also of the EU. None of them have yet sup- to her stance on the migration crisis when seemingly pleased about the good per- ported the notions that would split the she declared that Germany would be able formance of the revisionist AfD. EU around various speeds of integration. to accommodate the flood of refugees in However, the pro-AfD sentiments Whilst such a coalition would be the summer of 2015. Central European that were expressed by right-wingers in most beneficial for Central Europe, there governments were always critical of this Poland, Hungary and elsewhere in the re- is no denying that a considerable part of statement, seen as an encouragement for gion are first and foremost the expression ruling elites in Hungary and Poland do further migration and then refused to ac- of their disdain for the European main- not wish to see it coming into fruition. cept the quotas of refugees in the system stream, which clearly runs deeper than agreed by most member states. Following their views on history or their attachment the elections, right-wing politicians and to national interests. commentators in Central Europe did not 83 INTELLIGENT MIND SLOVAKIA

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One afternoon this past summer, Visegrad Insight interviewed HE Rastislav Káčer, Ambassador of Slovakia to Hungary and the Honorary Chairman of the Board for Globsec. We spoke about Slovak attitudes to regional groupings and the EU.

RASTISLAV KÁČER, WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI

How does Slovakia see the future of the EU? What is your Is Slovakia for a fiscal union? strategy for the future? Again, I would quote PM Robert Fico’s answer from an inter- For Slovakia, the European Union has been a successful pro- view: “We have to complete the eurozone. We have to finish it. ject though it’s not perfect. Human creations are never perfect, We cannot have a common currency for a long period without maybe God’s creations are perfect, but those built by humans having a banking union.” definitely are not. They are as perfect as we make them and Our position is that there is no alternative for the euro- the EU has got one strength: it is a living creature. It is not an zone. So, to us the creation of a core around the eurozone is authoritarian regime; it is not an illiberal autocracy which you a natural process that will occur within the EU, and we want can’t reform. This is a system which evolves, and it is evolving to be part of this, but we want it to be a very transparent pro- into a success story. cess. Whatever will be done, must be done transparently and The EU needs to go deeper in some areas that need more consulted with the rest of the EU. There should be a balance integration and in others where it needs less regulations to between eurozone and non-eurozone members. keep flexibility and a more competitive edge. So, the Slovak strategy is focused on making the EU better. But this balance does not exist with the V4. The countries This spring in Warsaw, at a meeting with all four Visegrad of Visegrad – and Visegrad has always played an important prime ministers as well as their Belarussian equivalent, Robert role for Slovakia –today it has manifested that they are not Fico said at one point: “We should stop talking in ideologi- interested, in the short term at least, in joining the eurozone. cal terms of ‘federalisation’ or ‘stronger nations’ because this Hungary says that it is not ready for the euro, and the euro- is a senseless debate. We need to cut the debate into ration- zone is not ready for Hungary – whatever that would mean. al chunks, into which areas we need to be more efficient, in Similarly, Poland has declared that it would not be beneficial which we need to integrate closer and in which not.” to join. What is the role of Slovakia in the Visegrad Group He stressed, for example, the importance of internet se- which members do not want to integrate further? How do curity. We cannot cope with the threat of terrorism without you imagine your role here? Once alienated, you now have working much closer in this area. He mentioned as well the become the most integrated EU country in the region. importance of the eurozone. He said clearly the eurozone is I agree with you. In Slovakia we are not frustrated nor con- a cornerstone of European integration. We are enthusiastic cerned because of those differences within the V4. We respect about the reforms within the eurozone which will make it other countries choices, whether it’s made for ideological or a stronger and more competitive framework for the future, for economic reasons or as the combination of both. That’s the which will include the fiscal union and a much closer cooper- choice of each individual member, and we have chosen our ation in budgeting and planning. So, these are the areas where way. Let me say that the Visegrad countries have already prof- we see a future for Europe. ited a lot from Slovakia being part of the eurozone. We meet the other countries more often and in different formats. But 85 INTELLIGENT MIND SLOVAKIA

Visegrad only benefits from that because Slovakia was never have to curb and limit illegal migration, which will require shy to share our views which we exchange within the euro- the efficient sharing and use of data, so we know that there is zone. So, our neighbours only profit from that. Additionally, no risk of double or multiply identities of the asylum seekers. you never know when one country will change its politics or We need to curb down the abuse of social benefits for economy. Whenever a V4 country will choose to become a migrants and asylum seekers. We need to have more efficient member of the eurozone, then Slovakia is here, ready to share expulsion mechanisms for those who are not eligible for asy- all the experience and practical knowledge we have. lum seeking. There is a whole array of measures we need to do but the last thing which would help would be to create hysteria Let’s focus again on the Visegrad Group. Is it united and and create xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments because does it have a strong voice that matches its current bad this will solve nothing; this will only bring tension to society. reputation? It often seems that the only policy position on The solution to migration is a long-term solution. We which all the V4 countries agree is illegal migration. need to take external measures which are out of the EU which We think that the problem of illegal migration it’s a real prob- will stabilise the system, either in terms of security or defence, lem. We think that the problem of homegrown terrorists in or to development assistance, etc. But, as I said, we also need Europe is a real problem that we all need to deal with. On internal measures – internal security, an expulsion procedure, the other hand, we don’t think that one should build hysteria and a more unified asylum procedure for every country. There around these issues. is a whole set of very practical measures, but the last thing we We think we should approach those two problems calm- need is populism and cheap fixes associated with such ideology ly and efficiently. We need to, first of all, tackle the sources of because those fixes don’t really exist. And populism will only migration and sources of terrorism, and work on long-term unleash the devil – the devil of nationalism and xenophobia. solutions of how to curb them. What we were critical about, And once it’s unleashed it’s very hard to get him back on chain. and then we shared the opinion with the rest of the Visegrad countries, was the mechanism of relocation by quotas. Here Couldn’t agree more. Let’s step away from this particular is- Slovakia has the same view as the rest of the Visegrad. We sue and come back to the different aspects of groupings in simply don’t think that this mechanism will work. We are not the region. The Visegrad Group, Benelux, the Nordic Council, against the principle of solidarity, we are against the principle the Slavkov Triangle and recently the Three Seas Initiative, of relocation. have I forgot any important grouping in the EU? Slovakia is During the Slovak presidency, we offered, I think, a much part of three of the above mentioned, how important do you more flexible solution to show that countries like Slovakia are see these different groupings for Slovakia? ready to be in solidarity with the rest. We offered the principle Out of those formats you mentioned, the Visegrad format is of flexible solidarity. It means that a contribution by the states the most important. Slavkov is more supplementary and with will be more efficient if you can contribute in the way which is another set of neighbours with whom we share a lot of our efficient for all and which is feasible for you. common history. We even think that the mechanism for relocating refu- The Three Seas project: we don’t see this is a grouping gees is simple fantasy. It’s been proven that it doesn’t work, at all. For us it’s more like a one-time event; there is just no even countries that were critical but accepted some number political context. The Three Seas meeting can have a single of relocated migrants or asylum seekers, they were gone very purpose, discussing how to improve North-South practical quickly. We have the free movement of people within the EU. communication in terms of interconnectors, gas oil connec- It’s very difficult to have a hard relocation. Are you going to tion, energy flows and other sub-regional projects on infra- keep them on chain or lock them up? So, we are not against structure, but only in the way we could support. It’s better to the principle of solidarity; we understand we should share the work with Europe as a whole. Traditionally, in Europe, most of burden, and we absolutely support that notion. We just want the interconnectors we made were in the East-West direction, to share the burden in the way which will work and not in the so we do lack a more efficient North-South interconnectors way which will be just dreaming that it will work. system. But beyond that, there is no political, no security component; there is no political dimension for us. Can I ask you what would work in your opinion? Because The last thing I would like to see is anybody interpreting there is a real problem where two EU countries are heavily this initiative as Central and Eastern Europe uniting against burdened, Italy and Greece, and the rest is not so willing to the West. This would be a complete tragedy and misconcep- help. tion, a completely distorted, false perception. We don’t look There is no miraculous fix. I know that there is temptation on at it like that, at all. the side of politicians who think that there are quick fixes, but We will never accept a situation where we are positioned there are no quick fixes at all. This will require a lot of moving against the EU. We are part of the EU and Visegrad. The mem- parts; this will require a reworking of Schengen. Schengen will bership of Visegrad, for us, was only a vehicle for better inte- 86 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 INTELLIGENT MIND SLOVAKIA

gration in the EU, nothing else. And this will remain for us so. This is a very hard question because the world is evolving in Prime Minister Fico, in one of his interviews, said: “Should a way where the leadership we used to see in the past, like I be forced to choose between V4 or EU I choose EU.” Mitterrand, Kohl, De Gaulle or Adenauer or even Reagan and But we are lucky, we are not in front of any dastardly Thatcher, that type of leadership is harder and harder to find. choice like this. For the Slovak perception, Visegrad is and will This is not that we have less courageous and more stupid peo- remain, as far as I can see, an instrument for a better cooper- ple, that’s not true. But the world is changing and the way we ation within the EU, and it is part of our contribution to make interpret news, the impact of social media, is just changing the EU stronger. There is no other inspiration for us in this the world. And it’s making leadership much harder than it was nor in any other grouping which you mentioned. There will before, that’s the first thing. The second is that it is encourag- be no policies which Slovakia will support which would help ing short term views which is a temptation for populism and to create any new dividing lines within the EU. We don’t want manipulation. this, and we will not support it. Previously, we were in a different era where there was much more responsibility in politics, where people had a more Well that is good to hear, and it is reassuring. Nevertheless, noble attitude towards politics, when they isolated certain a general sense of suspicion towards the EU is taking hold types of politicians who were perceived simply as not accept- in Central Europe. During Globsec, there was much discus- able. And these types of politicians who were too populist or sion revolved around fake news and the disinformation too extreme, they were put into quarantine, in isolation by the campaigns in the region directed at undermining Western rest of the political spectrum. That’s not happening anymore. alliances. We see more temptation and false assumptions. We see It’s not only in Central Europe. This is all part of the hybrid the growth of political extremism, and our reaction is that war which does contain propaganda. We call it in Globsec De- mainstream parties will take some part of that extremism say- fending Democracy in the Digital Domain were propaganda is ing: “but this will help to weaken the extremism” which is com- only a part of the cake. So, we see that there is Russian-driven plete lunacy. It’s just helping extremism and once extremism propaganda. It’s clear who is behind it, here in Central Eu- takes over, they’ll be more credible on the message. rope, but not only in Central Europe. We saw it in Brexit, the I think what we need is to bring personal responsibility referendum in the Netherlands on Ukraine, and we saw the into every communication. We need to have more clarity in less successful attempts during the French elections. It was where our news is coming from. Who is making these claims? also readily noticeable in the campaign in the United States. Who is behind the news, whether this is true or whether this is So, nobody is immune. I think the target is to bring about an fake? We are confronted with the warfare of fake news, which imbalance. The whole system is set by the EU and NATO, the is a warfare. We should name it, label it as the hostile activity whole web of liberal democracies working together on a unit- and contract against it. We should not let the democracy be ed project. killed by its own weapons because it can lead to illiberal and The aim of this disinformation campaign is to loosen up intolerant systems. European integration and to create a lack of trust into the sys- We should not let democracy be killed by those who say tem of which it is all based. These, or similar, tactics have been “we just have different views”. These are not different views, used before, not only for political purposes but also for com- these are extreme views. “We just have different policy” but mercial campaigns. I think the technique is called “merchan- this is not different policy, this is a prologue for an authoritar- dise of doubt”. We’ve seen these doubts in people, “God knows ian, non-democratic system. what is true”, “all is equal”, “either the domination by Russians We should not tolerate this, and if we don’t, then true or the Americans, it’s all equal, and Brussels is just another… leadership will emerge. We need to bring personal responsibil- Warsaw treaty,” which it is not. We simply should admit it’s ity back into politics, and we should not tolerate things which not, but the aim is to merchandise doubt and to soften up the go against the substance of democracy in our European world. union, to weaken people’s dedication to the values which are We have to stop it. beyond NATO and the EU. Transcribed by: Gabriela Rogowska

The last question then. It seems like the political leadership is one of the essential points on how to counteract this, and also how to drive through the country in a difficult moment for the European Union or the West in general. I see in the pictures that we’ve got here two outstanding leaders: George W. Bush and Vaclav Havel. Who do you see as the statesman of today?

87 BOOKS FICTION WE LOVE Illustration: Kuczyński Paweł

88 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 FICTION WE LOVE BOOKS

In Literature

JULIA SHERWOOD

entral Europeans recognized the corrosive influence of Russian propaganda well before the West woke up to disinformation campaigns aimed at swaying the outcome of crucial elections. As early as February 2015, one of the first to connect the dots between various conspiracy theories spreading across local social media and the fake news emanating from Russia was Juraj Smatana, a history teacher and activist in Považská Bystrica, Slo- vakia,C who compiled a list of 42 Czech and Slovak conspiracy websites. The dark world of Russian troll factories is also the setting of the novel Troll by popular Slovak writer and columnist Michal Hvorecký, reviewed here by translator Magdalena Mullek. The fake news phenomenon is a by-prod- uct of globalisation, a theme explored in Love in the Time of Global Climate Change, a novella by Czech writer Josef Pánek. Czech critic Michal Mareš reviews this story of a scientist struggling to find his place in our hectic globalized world. Ecological issues and curiosity about the natural world are at the heart of the short story collection Close Countries by the rising star of the ecopoetics movement, Polish writer and poet Julia Fiedorczuk, reviewed by translator Anna Zaranko. And finally, Slovak-Hungarian literary critic Emőke Szabó Lovas’s essay introduces the most recent works by two giants of contemporary Hungarian literature: Pancreatic Diary, the late great Péter Esterházy’s swan- song describing his odyssey from hospital to hospital, from chemotherapy to radiation treatment and László Krasznahorkai’s latest novel The Return of Baron Wenckheim.

89 BOOKS FICTION WE LOVE

EMŐKE SZABÓ LOVAS ON

Pancreatic Diary by Péter Esterházy The Return of Baron Wenckheim by László Krasznahorkai

Picking out the top books of the 2016–17 publishing year is discern any kind of outline of this literary mosaic.” Here, I will no easy task. In the words of the noted critic István Margócsy: review two pieces of this mosaic: outstanding works by writ- “Thankfully, this year’s crop quite spectacularly frustrates any ers I believe to be of international significance. They are Péter attempt at a comprehensive critical reckoning. Criticism was Esterházy’s Pancreatic Diary and László Krasznahorkai’s The always, and remains, fragmentary in nature, and the only se- Return of Baron Wenckheim. rious question is whether this fragmentation permits us to

It’s hard to tell a story without simultaneously The Story of My Death), stories of his own family, and events of commenting on it Hungarian public life and politics, such as the migration issue Péter Esterházy, Pancreatic Diary for example, but making it plain that his cancer too is a fact of public life. In his obituary, the critic Sándor Radnóti points Even a year after the publication of Pancreatic Diary, which out that Esterházy’s oeuvre “was a convoluted response to the appeared just a month before the author’s death in June 2016, Kádár dictatorship, namely the radical separation between the it is difficult to approach it from a critical perspective. Most private and the public: though you cannot be free in the politi- Hungarian reviews were either purely descriptive or com- cal sphere, no one can interfere in your private sphere.” This is prised a collection of extracts from the book. One reason for clear in Pancreatic Diary, which is a radical literary intertwin- this is no doubt that the Diary is in a form located on the ing – “interwriting” – of the story of his family, of his illness, cusp of writing addressed to the public and and of the nation. of a very personal “death diary” certainly not The entries begin on Sunday, May 24th, intended for publication. 2015 and conclude on Wednesday, March “Maybe I have to choose some other 2nd, 2016. The last fragment is a meditation kind of perspective – but I remain wedded on the final, closing sentence (“I have crossed to writing. For example, it’s rather disturb- out “always’ and improved it to “forever’ “), ing that the quality of this piece of writing yet it none the less carries within it the possi- depends on the prospects of its author’s sur- bility of completion, of a kind of rounding off. vival. Think what a sentence that is, in itself. In the textual terrain of Pancreatic So, once again: this has traction if my ‘fairy’ Diary there is continuous interplay be- kills me.” tween the love story of the gorgeous blonde [Esterházy uses the name of the witch bombshell Pancreata (Muci) and Esterházy, Mirigy, from the great Mihály Csokonai’s and then the ravishment and murder of the A Midsummer Night’s Dream-like classic author by the Pancreas Fairy, as well as the Csongor és Tünde (1831), which happens to Péter Esterházy: watercolour diary entries and murderous be the final element of the Hungarian word Pancreatic Diary histories in one of his recent books with the for “pancreas’ (hasnyálmirigy, calqued on Budapest: Magvető, 2016. painter Miklós Szücs, The Sinner: “There are the German Bauchspeicheldrüse), to refer no new words. A. groaned, his bulk steadily to his pancreatic cancer as his “Pancreas increasing, blocks of cement in the region of Fairy’-trans.] his stomach, dull aches alternating with sharp stabs of pain, “You have to finish at some point and, of course, keep on like shafts of light, shafts of light and shade.” “Love is not the writing.” Péter Esterházy’s Pancreatic Diary is in fact a book same thing as happiness, but there are no colours, forms, or of non-writing. The story is in essence, one might say, a cancer shifts of paint that treat of this.” Nor is there any point discuss- patient’s odyssey from hospital to hospital, from chemother- ing the passage of the mortally ill from hope to hopelessness, apy to radiation treatment, amidst a welter of data on blood or precisely how far and how many pancreatic cancer patients pressure measurements and the continuous diminution of are needed for the world to be more sympathetic. Eventually weight – and time. The writer does offer the reader quite a few the words: “I’m dying” and the doctor’s “This isn’t something reference points (chiefly Harold Brodkey’s This Wild Darkness: you recover from.” 90 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 FICTION WE LOVE BOOKS

A (chorus) masterly warning to a dictatorship asserts that it can have no conceivable relationship to contem- László Krasznahorkai, The Return of Baron Wenckheim porary reality – The Return of Baron Wenckheim apprehends society at its most fundamental, basic level. As a matter of fact, In László Krasznahorkai’s latest book, we encounter again the with its comprehensive account of the various kinds of the leaden skies, the music and almost the same frozen, isolated rhetoric of power, and the precise and colourful notating of moments that we first met in his Satantango (1985). It is in this contemporary (and not merely Hungarian) reality, the book is timelessness that the terrifying nature of this apocalyptic satire extremely timely. resides. The Return of Baron Wenckheim – and this is something It opens with words of Warning: the orchestral command that all the reviews agree on – sums up and brings closure to tutti, in other words the conductor’s direction for the whole or- something: whether to the (hopeless) metaphysical yearning chestra to start up after the solo. Accordingly, everyone whose that began with Satantango, or to the gigantic reckonings of name is given in the list of scores at the end of the novel, joins War and War, Seiobo There Below, and his short story collection in. Yet the picture of the world that emerges from these virtually The World Goes On (English translation scheduled for 2018). documentary-like “witness statements” is extremely, and hope- The story is a kind of distant homage to the expanses in, lessly, dark. The city powers are allowed to speak, and although inter alia, Beckett’s Waiting for Godot or perhaps Marquez’s they compulsively claim that their own speech is straightfor- Macondo in One Hundred Years of Solitude. ward, they are, in fact, obscure in the extreme. An unnamed town (but recognisably Gyula, The overarching motif of the novel Krasznahorkai’s birthplace in south-east is undoubtedly fear, which tends to mani- Hungary) awaits and welcomes “the end of its fest itself as a deathly face seen behind the democracy” in the form of the homecoming of dark-tinted windows of a convoy of Rolls- its local Baron. The citizens’ exclusive source Royces, Mercedes, and BMWs as it sweeps of information about this is the archetypal through the town. This passing convoy, which tabloid Blikk, which claims that he is coming also stops time in its tracks, followed by the in order to distribute among them his untold tankers that swamp the town and then dis- wealth. Accordingly, a celebration is organ- appear overnight, the aliens, and finally the ised (within the space of 24 hours) with the explosion that destroys the town – these all aim of dispelling the Baron’s melancholia: it recall the atmosphere of permanent menace is a parade of unalloyed political kitschiness. in War and War. This condition of being en- The local enforcers of order have klaxons fit- dangered permeates the entire novel, yet it is ted to their motorbikes to play “Madonna”, not simply political or related to public life, or the women’s choir tries its damnedest to László Krasznahorkai: a symbol that obliterates everything evoking a learn “Don’t cry for me...Armengita”. A The Return of Baron Wenckheim comprehensive apocalypse, but it is also some “sneezing-while-shrieking” competition is Budapest: Magvető, 2016. kind of assault on the central nervous system, organised, and another for “throwing chicken a mixture of humour, satire and tragedy that is backs”. The theme of the welcoming speeches almost unbearable in its unpredictability. at the railway station is, naturally, how each speaker intends to Krasznahorkai’s long, undulating sentences, and indeed spend the Baron’s fortune. Even the orphans are made to move Krasznahorkai himself, have an elemental relationship to music. out of their home in the castle, in case the Baron should wish The orchestra, i.e. all the characters in the novel, these typical- to reclaim it. ly Krasznahorkaian maniacal persuaders tell their own stories, In reality, however, it is the Wenckheim family that has but ultimately it is out of these contrasting movements that the rescued the Baron from Buenos Aires, thus also rescuing the universe is born, that very much finite but of course inconceiva- reputation of the family since the Baron has lost everything at bly vast agglomeration of events that lead from one scene to the the gambling table. The Baron’s sole driving-force is the memory next. In this universe, the most profound sentiment, penetrating of a love from forty years earlier: Marietta: now Marika, a lady the entirety of nature, just happens to be fear. It is “the terrifying in her sixties employed in the tourist office. Yet Hungary today power of fear that brings culture into existence”, and this is the is hardly a place anyone, even the Baron, could or would want “general force field whence the gods, in their vapours, arise.” to escape to. On the other hand, resettling in the land of one’s Thus, Krasznahorkai’s novel goes on and on; there is no birth, bringing money and expressing one’s gratefulness to the way of stepping out of it nor out of our own situation. We can motherland is a most welcome notion. The endless, if finite, wait step away only in so far as the rules of the Argentine tango for the Baron, the picture-postcard quality of the locations, the permit (that is, in the way that the chapter title Arrepentida filmic cutting, the frozen images, the set-ups, the suspicion that suggests): minimally in terms of space and in order to avoid a all this forebodes something dreadful – none of this allows us collision. And perhaps this lasts just until we manage to concre- for a single moment to fail to recall the black-and-white mise- tise the context in which that certain Greatest can exist for us. en-scène of Béla Tarr’s films. But until then we have to keep on dancing. Da capo al fine. When Satantango was first published in Hungary, the author, who is famously attracted to the culture of the Far East, (Parts of this text first appeared in Hungarian on the Slovak cultural por- did not want even his own name on its dust-jacket, as a further tal dunszt.sk. Translated by Peter Sherwood and edited by Peter and Julia indication of his wish to deny that this story was about anything Sherwood) real – other than human existence in general. In contrast to the radical nature of the conception of art characteristic of Far The author is a graduate in Hungarian and aesthetics of the Comenius Uni- Eastern cultures that appears in, for example, Seiobo, – which versity of Bratislava (Slovakia). She is currently an editor with dunszt.sk. 91 BOOKS FICTION WE LOVE

MAGDALENA MULLEK ON

Troll by Michal Hvorecký

Michal Hvorecký, a well-known Slovak writer, commentator and They spoke of courage, but to me they were cowards, paralyzed translator, takes the reader into the world of paid Internet trolling by fear of living in a world full of threats and uncertainty. They in his latest novel, Troll (Trol). were looking for sacrificial lambs.” Reading Troll is like stepping into quicksand. While the At the heart of the story is a friendship between an obese first few pages give the appearance of a solid surface, offering young man who has spent more than a year in a hospital that de- the backstory of its young protagonist, the book quickly collaps- stroyed his health, and Johana, a drug addict who loves Russian es into a massive web of information control, scandal and data literature. Together they decide to take on the entire machinery manipulation, leaving the reader questioning everything he has of misinformation. They want to expose the endless web of lies, ever read on the web, seen in the news or even heard spoken in but to do so they must become part of it. They get hired by a a public venue. large trolling firm, headed by a man named Valys, and turn into This fictitious world is all the more frightening because, cogs in the very machine they seek to destroy. In the process, with every passing day, it resembles more and more closely they nearly lose their own identities through the natural assim- the world we live in today. When I attended a book reading of ilation which occurs when pretending to become proponents of Troll at Christiania in Poprad, Slovakia, Michal the same system they want to expose, eventu- Hvorecký said that when he started writing the ally competing at who can produce more rep- book two to three years ago, he felt like he was rehensible lies, losing a grasp on what is real writing science fiction, but by the time the book and what isn’t. went into print, it was as if reality had gotten In the end, they succeed in bringing down ahead of him. Indeed, the idea of paid troll the organisation they work for, and perhaps factories that influence the outcome of elec- even shed a little light onto a truth, shocking tions is becoming part of the mainstream dis- the citizenry into a moment of lucidity. But like course, with Facebook’s recent announcement an octopus, the trolling machine regenerates its on September 7th that it had unwittingly sold arm – it sets up in another country to wreak $150,000 of advertising to a Russian troll-farm havoc on another unsuspecting populace. during the US presidential campaign season While the ending offers a glimmer of hope, it being only one such example. also points out that any chance of freeing our- The book’s setting, a fictitious small coun- selves from the web of lies and misinformation try under the sphere of influence of the also rests entirely on our own shoulders and re- fictitious Reich, is loosely based on contem- Michal Hvorecký: quires a tremendous amount of effort. It is so porary Slovakia and Ukraine although it could Troll, much easier to succumb to the stream of false just as easily be anywhere in Eastern Europe. Marenčin Media, 2017. information than to battle for even a single A hybrid war, a combination of armed conflict grain of truth. and information warfare, has destroyed many During the aforementioned discussion, of the country’s institutions and all of the population’s hope. In Michal Hvorecký said that “real violence is born of language.” a dictatorship headed by the Leader-Son, who has succeeded his Indeed, in his book, filled with strong language, words have the Leader-Father, power is no longer secured by weapons or mon- power to destroy. Verbal violence readily transcends the page, or ey: it is gained and lost through misinformation and media main this case, the computer screen, and turns into physical vio- nipulation. Professional trolling organizations make and break lence. Hate envelops its victims like quicksand. And while it may leaders, governments, and private individuals. Hate campaigns not be possible to drown in quicksand, the danger of both the can be unleashed in a matter of minutes and have the force of a literal and the literary varieties is that panicked motion results hurricane, destroying everything in their path, quickly moving in becoming ever more trapped. The only way out is stillness. In from the Internet to the real world, and destroying lives and rep- the case of our information-overloaded world, this stillness trans- utations built over decades. lates into careful evaluation and thought. Wading through the “Men and women spoke about the information war as if endless stream of misinformation is nearly impossible, increas- they were expecting it to bring them everything they desired and ingly impracticable, and yet absolutely imperative. Troll stands believed in. Their favourite phrase was that duty and honour as a warning against the lull of succumbing to the complacency demand that they bravely defend their country. I thought they of blindly trusting any source. It is a cutting-edge piece of writing were trolling because they were bored with their everyday rou- which takes some time to get used to, but it is enlightening and tine. The conflict had ripped them out of an organized existence. well worth the read. 92 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 FICTION WE LOVE BOOKS

ANNA ZARANKO ON Close Countries by Julia Fiedorczuk

Julia Fiedorczuk, based in Warsaw where she teaches Amer- spider’s web to a fatal accident; from cruel, taunting children ican literature at the university, is a prize-winning writer, to sickness, decay and suicide. translator, and essayist, and well known for her poetry: her In all the stories, Fiedorczuk’s interest in ecological is- collection Oxygen: Selected Poems (trans. Bill Johnston), sues and curiosity about the natural world is always evident appeared earlier this year – the first full-length volume of and many of her metaphors use scientific knowledge to great her work to appear in English. The 22 stories which make poetic effect. Fiedorczuk is particularly connected with a up the collection Close Countries (Bliskie kraje) range from movement or critical school known as ecopoetics, a genre extended narratives to brief, two-page forays. Written with in Anglosaxon literature which foregrounds and examines the same restraint and simplicity that mark her poems, these relations between man and “nature”, probing the opposition stories are studded with startling images and sudden insights, between “objective” scientific knowledge and the “spiritual” emerging from unexpected points of contact – of both recog- remit of the arts. Taken directly from the Greek (oikos, and nition and confrontation – between one being, or one world, poesis), ecopoetics means “home-making” and examining it and another. The characters are often located on the margins is no optional extra, but an urgent necessity when the world of society, both metaphorically and literally in which we make our home finds itself in a – their stories unfolding among the things, state of crisis induced, in part, by our very memories, even people, that have been left manner of inhabiting it. behind or hidden, along the uncomfortable Though ecological issues do not take limits of affluence, old age, dislocation, pain, obvious centre stage in Fiedorczuk’s fiction, it anxiety – other “countries” existing along- is nevertheless, profoundly informed by her side our own. engagement with ecopoetics. In a sense, this The devoted secretary of a writer de- engagement is less deliberate than accidental; cides after his death that she must requisi- as a poet, she observes the world around her tion his papers and finish his magnum opus, in a way that is reminiscent of the late John assimilating his identity like a starfish absorb- Berger, stepping in close to look – and then ing its prey; a girl plants a hidden garden on bringing back what she has seen. Indeed, it top of a Warsaw block of flats, secret until was precisely for this practice of “bringing the roots of the trees start to prise apart the back” that Berger wanted to be remembered building; a professor copies the Song of Songs most. He maintained that the questions by night, one Hebrew word at a time, onto Julia Fiedorczuk: found him rather than the other way around, slips of paper and folds each one into an ori- Bliskie kraje (Close Countries), identifying “migration” as his own central gami crane; a girl addresses us in a startling Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Marginesy, preoccupation. In this understanding, ques- monologue, voicing a profound revulsion 2016. tions of “ecology” are something that appear towards the matter of which she herself is to have “found” Fiedorczuk; one issue all too constituted. visible throughout Close Countries is “stuff”, There are stories which touch on the vulnerability of and lots of it: humans own things. In fact, more humans own women who find themselves in places of acute social depri- things than make things. vation: Ewka who sleeps rough and whose days are measured In the wry “God made of plastic”, a woman hopes to from beer to beer; the adolescent naïve and neglected misfit transform her life with the help of a relentless life coach who Maria, whose agony at not fitting in leads to a day of playing promises enlightenment, fulfilment and freedom with the truant, is only one of the characters for whom the appear- help of black plastic sacks into which she urges and assists ance of other human beings, three boys in this case, provokes her clients to deposit all superfluous possessions (seemingly an instant intuitive and well-founded alarm, deafened by her oblivious to the sacks’ subsequent destination). By the time the profound urge to belong. The tenderness of understanding client has filled eleven sacks, she finds herself without glasses between children and grandparents; the enchantment of an- and obliged to drink straight from a tap. One can’t help specu- imals who speak; magical grandmothers who grow into the lating whether the content of these sacks constitutes the litter landscape and tame death; little girls who suffer agonies over which drifts persistently through other stories… Zetka lives addressing the wrong saint for the wrong reason, or for tug- from hand to mouth, suppressing memories and collecting ging a worm apart, are placed alongside moments of anguish objects from the woods, taking them back to a decrepit home and violence: from a deliberate sudden lunge at an intricate which then burns down. “On the Road”, in which a woman 93 BOOKS FICTION WE LOVE

travels in India, is punctuated by snippets of information: how characteristic detachment can be formulated as a democratic much fuel to fly from Warsaw to Delhi; how much clean water generosity of attention which favours no particular creature to produce enough cotton to make her jeans and t-shirt; how and, like Old Testament rain, falls on the just and unjust alike. much wood to burn a single body on the banks of the Ganges. Moving beyond concepts of human responsibility and stew- Yet, despite these facts which overwhelm her (and us), in the ardship (which retain the privilege of deciding – and trumping traveller’s eyes the most important thing she brings back is a – priorities), perhaps even beyond empathy (and any temp- sudden understanding of a single line of poetry. tation toward sentimentality or anthropomorphism): ecopo- Fiedorczuk doesn’t work on our outrage; she is more for etics as reflected in these stories challenges the imagination, planting seeds in the imagination than igniting fireworks in through the experience of fragility, to formulate new questions the conscience to deal with mountains of frankly insurmount- in order to engage with the world above all through the reali- able “stuff”. And so, without sacrificing the vitality of individ- sation of a profound kinship. ual characters, the stories take on the contour of fables whose

MICHAL JAREŠ ON

Love in the Time of Global Climate Change by Josef Pánek

Though Josef Pánek’s first short story collection, The Opal Dig- Pánek’s protagonist Tomáš is brilliant at ranting about ger [Kopáč opálů] (Triton, 2013) appeared four years ago, its the ways of the world, his job and the global academic estab- author has yet to make his mark on the Czech literary world. lishment, with its impact factor journals and grant funding. He Born in 1966, he has lived in Norway and Australia, and this also relishes discussing and analysing the Czech national char- experience is reflected in his new novella Love in the Time of acter and xenophobia, or pondering the various guises taken Global Climate Change [Láska v době globálních klimatických by racism in today’s global village. His sarcastic comments of- změn] Argo, 2017). ten eschew political correctness: “There’s a good reason why, The plot is fairly straightforward: the protagonist, Tomáš, before going to India, you’re told that black females are dirty. travels to a conference in Bangalore. He is a man struggling to Those who tell you this are the same people whose parents pull himself together after a divorce, a scientist forced by our grew up during the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.” hectic, globalised world to learn to work with others and sup- Despite this undiplomatic language, Tomáš suggests that rac- press his individuality for the sake of research. A more or less ism is outmoded, that notions of homeland, nation and race are chance encounter with an attractive Indian participant at the vestiges of past centuries. Pánek’s character defies pigeonhol- conference leads to a night of intense passion, both in terms of ing: he has lived in South Australia, his ex-wife is Colombian, sex and conversation. While the ending may seem predictable, one of his best friends is Chinese, and during the conference the author’s playful treatment leaves it to the reader’s imagina- he goes drinking with a Hungarian and sleeps with an Indian tion to decide what has really happened. woman. Can he still be regarded as being “just” Czech or is he But one ought not to dwell on the plot too much, since more of a “European”? Tomáš is aware that he is doomed to re- what is more important in Love in the Time of Global Climate main an outcast, a loser, a psychologically deprived individual Change is that Pánek’s writing continues a tradition of Czech typical of this day and age. He doesn’t really know where home literature that started with Bohumil Hrabal and can be traced is, since in our globalised era of globetrotting lifestyles people to more recent writers such as Emil Hakl. This pedigree is ap- like Tomáš are more at home in hotels or various temporary parent in the author’s relentless verbosity, story-telling for the abodes. And although he’s not lacking in make it any-thing sheer pleasure of story-telling, the verbal deluge sustained for (or precisely because of that: take your pick) he is ultimately pages on end, alternating between outright bragging and mas- discontented. Uprooted and unhappy with himself, he is left ochistic (self-)denigration. At the same time, Pánek’s writing alone with his phobias and memories. The phobias prevent shows a kinship with writers such as Josef Škvorecký, particu- him from getting a proper night’s sleep in India (because of the larly in the portrayal of life “elsewhere”, i.e. outside the Czech incessant noise and smog) or having a drink of water (for fear environment. of falling ill). At the same time, he is annoyed by the contented 94 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 FICTION WE LOVE BOOKS

and placid nature of the people of Bangalore what makes Pánek’s book stand out is that who go about their business smiling and have he doesn’t stop at taking his character on a found peace of mind in their karma, some- journey to a distant place to open his eyes thing that Tomáš fin to reality. Halfway into the novella, he does While he can’t really communicate something unexpected: loosened up by the with the people he meets in India, he also “conference sex”, Tomáš discovers in him- has problems communicating with his ex- self a dormant desire to recount stories that wife, who lives in Australia with their two- may seem trivial but are actually crucial. At year-old son. He is dismayed to learn that this point, we are suddenly taken back to the son’s first word wasn’t “Daddy” but “id- the 1990s and follow Tomáš as he hitchhikes iot”, but he can never be sure if his ex-wife is his way through Iceland. A greater contrast telling the truth or not. Her sinister, spiteful between the permanently teeming Indian messages only exacerbate his general sense megalopolis and the quiet, deserted northern of unease. And while globalisation facilitates Josef Pánek: landscape would be hard to find. By acknowl- physical contact, the constant connectedness Love in the Time edging his nomadic condition and retrospec- also leads to misunderstandings, as people of Global Climate Change, tively making sense of things that happened no longer listen and everything carries the Argo, 2017. over thirty years ago, he is able to find his own same weight, whether it is fact or fiction. inner peace, akin to the karma of the Indian Everything unique is disappearing, erased by culture but which had eluded him hitherto. things that are shared. Admittedly, this sudden finding of peace doesn’t last The combination of a homeless nomad with a mildly long, if for no other reason than Tomáš’ propensity for iro- autistic commentator on world affairs creates an explosive ny and seeing everything as relative, especially the great, mix. Pánek’s character relishes in self-denigrating accusations, enduring notions such as love, truth, happiness and even, self-pity and nostalgic reminiscence. If it weren’t for Tomáš’ ultimately, replace with home. Readers should take note of one-night stand, the book might offer just an interesting but this novella, which takes Czech literature into the European one-sided look at our world and an individual in it, another league despite an intentionally misleading title that may make example of what has become known as expat fiction. However, it sound “unbearably heavy”.

Understanding Central Europe edited by Marcin Moskalewicz and Wojciech Przybylski

Series: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies

“Central Europe” is a vague and ambiguous term, more to do with outlook and a state of mind than with a firmly defined geographical region. This book explores the concept and the meaning of the term and casts a great deal of light on the complex nature of the region. % november 2017: 234 × 156: 528pp, £92.00 Discount 20% Discount Available – enter the code FLR40 at checkout* with this flyer!

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Illustrations by Pawel Kuczynski. VICE wrote about his political cartoons: “they stick in your mind as much as your social media feed. Kuczynski’s work is constantly circulating Reddit, Facebook, and Insta- gram.” His illustrations were already on our cover twice before in 2016 and 2017.

96 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017 PROSPERITY — SOLIDARITY — INNOVATION Focus on Central Europe