18 June 2021

“We need a new Eastern Policy” Matthias Platzeck's courageous attitude by Marita Brune-Koch “We need a new Eastern Policy” - this is the title of Matthias Platzeck's new book1 and this was also the title of the author reading he gave at an online conference on 6 May this year. But you can't really call the event a “reading”. Platzeck, who tirelessly campaigns for good relations with Russia, spoke freely on the topic. The conference was organised by the “German-Russian Forum”.

Matthias Platzeck began his speech by quoting Wolfgang Ischinger, saying that relations with Russia are more problematic today than they were during the Cold War.2 Anyone who experi‐ enced the Cold War era, when the two super‐ The Glienicke Bridge: crossing point between East and West powers, Nato and the Warsaw Pact, were armed , between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. A border during the Cold War and a place where agents were to the teeth and always ready for war, can guess exchanged. (Photo Karen Mardahl, wikipedia) what that means. At the end of the Cold War, says Platzeck, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and Union. All this creates closeness and, no doubt, a the Soviet Union, he and his generation had great certain familiarity. hopes for a peaceful future. This hope was ut‐ terly dashed, he said, and the world had changed Bahr's principles of détente completely. Later on, he found personalities in , ar‐ chitect of the German policy of détente and con‐ Growing up in fidant of , and in ,3 who The well-known Russia expert talks about his greatly encouraged him to cultivate relations personal background and explains why he be‐ with Russia. came interested in this topic and what initiated Platzeck recalls the three principles of Bahr's his commitment. He grew up in Potsdam, near Eastern Policy: the Glienicke Bridge. During the division of Ger‐ 1. There is no peace without or against Russia. many, the border between the GDR and West Ber‐ 2. Russia is unalterably our neighbour. lin ran across the middle of this bridge. Agents 3. The driving force of policies is the pursuit of were exchanged here between East and West. interests. The bridge gained worldwide notoriety through According to Platzeck, today these principles are the third and final exchange of agents, spectacu‐ no longer taken to heart. In a speech in Moscow larly staged on 11 February 1986. A childhood in two years ago, German President Frank-Walter such an environment leaves its mark. But the Steinmeier warned of an alienation between Ger‐ good fortune, as Platzeck emphasises, of having many and Russia ” and he demanded: “we must had a good teacher who introduced him to the not allow that”. Russian language, culture, literature and music Platzeck then addresses the accusation that also influenced this. It is perhaps important to he is too uncritical of Russia. He does not deny know that Russian was a compulsory subject in this, but says that criticism of Russia is not in the GDR, just as English was in West Germany. short supply, but understanding is lacking, and And just as the West Germans had contact with he is filling a gap in the market. No two peoples Americans, the GIs, after the war, the East Ger‐ have been so interwoven over centuries as the mans lived together with the Russian soldiers in Germans and the Russians; our cultures would one country in close proximity of the Soviet not exist as they do without mutual inspiration. The “Mamayev Kurgan Memorial” in Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad, symbolises the unforgotten victims of the Russian people in World War II. The commemoration is still living today. (Picture mk)

But relations had also gone through terrible lows Margaret Thatcher, bluntly admitted to Soviet and yet again, they had always found their way to leader Mikhail Gorbachev: “I am firmly opposed get back together. to a united Germany.”4 Gorbachev’s view differed. On 10 February 1990, he made the fun‐ Russia is different, Germany too damental concession to the German govern‐ With these words, Platzeck advocates a view of ment that the Germans in East and West had to Russia that sought understanding. He warns know for themselves which path they wanted to against judging Russia by our standards and take. They had the right to strive for unity.5 Rus‐ condemning it. He recommends that one must sia also drew consequences from the conces‐ always ask oneself two questions when assess‐ sion that the two German states would once ing events in Russia: again form a single entity: in 1991/92 Gorbachev 1. What happened in Russia? withdrew all troops stationed in the GDR. 2. What happened between us? 500,000 Russian soldiers left the country. That To answer these questions, he explains that was the largest withdrawal event in history, ac‐ Russia has gone through an arduous process cording to Platzeck. This too was against the ex‐ since the 1990s. The currency system col‐ plicit will of Margret Thatcher, who appealed to lapsed, people lost all their savings. The eco‐ Gorbachev to leave the Russian troops in East nomic situation was completely desolate. It was Germany for as long as possible: “perhaps we so hopeless that many people considered send‐ will still need them one day to keep a united Ger‐ ing their children to Germany because they no many in check.”6 But above all, Platzeck contin‐ longer saw a future in Russia. How grave must ues, against the resistance of many Russian be the situation for parents to consider such ser‐ generals who were very sceptical about the with‐ ious steps? Putin had led the country out of this drawal. They felt that Germany was a bridge‐ disaster and stabilised conditions again, which head that had been hard-won in World War II and is why he had such high popularity ratings for so that it should not be abandoned without further long. ado. Platzeck also mentions that Gorbachev only agreed to the reunification in exchange for No German unification without Russia the concession that Nato would not be allowed Platzeck reports that Russian interlocutors are to expand towards Russia. It is well known that repeatedly irritated by the fact that the Germans this promise was not kept. Now, with Ukraine, do not recognise Russia's contribution to the Nato is to be extended right to the Russian bor‐ German unification. He recalls that the UKand der. France were not at all enthusiastic about the Platzeck mentions a significant procedure: idea of a united Germany. Both feared a future the Russian Foreign Minister Primakov learned dominance of Germany. On a visit to Moscow, about the bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo

2/5 war in 1999, when he was on the plane on his thousands of people who lost their lives as a res‐ way to the USA. Incensed, he had the plane ult of the war and the destabilisation of the whole turned around half way across the Atlantic and region? What about the 37 million people who returned to his home country. He cancelled the had to flee their homes? What sanctions have state visit to the USA. Serbia was a brother state you imposed on the USA for this? What about the of Russia. The belligerent states had started the attack on Kosovo, a war contrary to international bombing without even informing Russia as a law? Where are your accusations against the member of the UN Security Council. Thus, Nato's USA for the drone war, which has already cost action was a further affront. 3700 lives? Where is your outcry against the tor‐ In spite of everything, Russia under Putin con‐ ture prisons in Guantanamo and Kandahar?” tinued to extend its hand for cooperation. In Platzeck also mentions the accusations 2001, Platzeck explains, Putin gave a speech in against Russia because of its armament and the German where he formulated his puts it into perspective: the arms expenditure of offer of a common security architecture. He re‐ the USA is 10 times, that of Nato even 20 times ceived a standing ovation from all parliamentary as high as that of Russia. His Russian inter‐ groups.7 locutors are well aware of this. Now one would have hoped for cooperation, but instead the Nato East enlargement was Commemorative policy pressed ahead and in 2006 a missile defence Russia is also aware that in the West, the Amer‐ system was set up in Poland, despite objections ican landing in Normandy and their intervention from Russia. Platzeck quotes George F. Kennan, in World War II are seen as decisive for the war. one of the architects of US foreign policy, who However, the Red Army had borne the main bur‐ said that Nato's eastward expansion was “the den of the war and had also made the decisive most fatal mistake of American policy in the and greatest contribution to the defeat of Na‐ post-Cold War era”.8 tional Socialism. There was a lack of recognition of this achievement and the great number of Sanctions Russian victims. A Belarusian interlocutor refers Platzeck then turns to the currently important is‐ to a memorial service in which German Chancel‐ sue of sanctions imposed against Russia. After lor and former German President six years, he says, both sides, the West and the commemorated the victims of a East, have seen a clear deterioration in the eco‐ Nazi massacre in a village in Normandy. “That nomy and a growing alienation. He recounts a was completely correct, we have nothing against conversation with a former Russian fighter in that, he said. But in Belarus there are 629 places World War II who told him, “we were half-starved that the SS made level to the ground and where and freezing, yet we won the battle. You won't they massacred people. A German state visit bring us to our knees with sanctions.” had never been seen there.” Platzeck raises the question of the goal of the sanctions and asks whether the disintegration of Russia is aimed at. He emphatically warns against this, because that would also be a big problem for us in Western Europe. Russia is a nuclear power, and without stability there is a danger that these weapons will fall into the wrong hands and get out of control.

Double standards His interlocutors in Russia would often bring up the matter of our double standards, for example when we condemn Russia over the Crimea issue: “where is your indignation over Colin Powell's lies about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and Reception of a group of visitors from Switzerland in Nizhny- Novgorod. The picture shows more than folklore for the war of aggression in that country, thus violat‐ tourists. Traditions are alive, strangers are welcomed in ing international law? About the hundreds of many places in a heartfelt way. (Picture mk)

3/5 being, then it will be easier to find solutions in eastern Ukraine, but to tackle the following: 1. Roll back sanctions, 2. create a minimum of understanding, 3. organise a new Helsinki Conference.9 Platzeck outlines the global situation. The three poles of the world are: – Asia, which has economically grown stronger, – the USA with Canada. – Europe would like to be the third pole, but we could not solve any of the big problems without Russia. Our plans to combat climate change, for example, cannot be implemented without raw materials, but Europe, unlike Rus‐ sia, hardly has enough raw materials.

Town twinning is “gold dust” Chancellor Willy Brandt and Soviet President Leonid At the end of his speech, the speaker spoke about Brezhnev sign the joint declaration following the German- the role of civil society. It is bearing the brunt of Soviet summit conference on 21 May 1973. Behind Brandt, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko speaks with Egon the current relations between Germany and Rus‐ Bahr, the architect of the rapprochement. (Picture keystone) sia. The city partnerships are “gold dust”; without them and their work, the problems between Rus‐ Such disproportions, ignorance, not wanting sia and Germany would already be much greater. to see and not appreciating, lead to a deep alien‐ He solicits participation for the 16th German-Rus‐ ation and to a dangerous alienation of peoples sian Town Twinning Conference, which will take and nations. place from 28 to 31 June 2021 in Kaluga, Rus‐ sia.10 He emphasises the enormous importance “Change through rapprochement” of youth exchanges. The greatest importance he instead of rapprochement after change attaches to the exchange of citizens between the Where is the starting point out of this vicious countries. Civil society is also growing in Russia, circle, Platzeck asks. In this context, he again re‐ and it does not only consist of “Navalny”. As an calls Bahr's motto: change through rapproche‐ example of the developing democracy, he men‐ ment. Today, he characterises, the opposite is tions an event in Moscow. The big city had true: first change, then rapprochement. We will wanted to dump its rubbish in a certain area in only talk to Putin when human rights have been the north of the city. The people living there res‐ implemented as we see fit. Platzeck leaves no isted and were successful in their protest. The doubt that he considers this approach futile and city had considered another solution. dangerous. At this point he even quotes Angela Merkel, who has expressed that we could not Preserving peace is the most important value solve any of the world's big problems such as Finally, Platzeck returned to Egon Bahr quoting: climate change, poverty, etc. without or against Western values are essential and must be defen‐ Russia. Putin also says that if we do not achieve ded. But one value was the most important: the a security architecture with Russia, it will remain preservation of peace. That was his, Platzeck's, troubled and dangerous. Putin warns that there mainspring and is the reason why he would not are also people in Russia whose “thoughts are cease being committed. not going in a good direction”. 1 Platzeck quoted Bahr again: he had divided Matthias Platzeck is a German politician and Chairman of the German-Russian Forum. problems into those that could be solved and 2 those that could not be solved at the moment. State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office and Am‐ bassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Wa‐ One should start with the solvable ones and ad‐ shington, D.C. and London. He has chaired the Munich journ the currently unsolvable ones and tackle Security Conference since 2008. them later. In this sense, Platzeck recommends 3 Growing up in the GDR, Stolpe was a member of the putting the Crimea issue ‘in a box’ for the time GDR Protestant Church leadership. During his time as a

4/5 church lawyer, he acted as a kind of church diplomat vis- the East-West conflict, it served as a forum for consulta‐ à-vis various state agencies and officials in the GDR. In‐ tions as well as for political rapprochement and confi‐ formal contacts between state and church ran through dence-building between the two blocs. Participants in him; officially they did not exist. the conference were 35 mainly European states as well as the USA, Canada and the Soviet Union. The so-called 4 Spiegel Geschichte, 9 April 2013 decalogue of the Final Act laid down the basic rules of 5 Wikipedia, German reunification relations between the participating states, such as the peaceful and non-violent settlement of disputes, respect 6 Spiegel Geschichte, 9 April 2013 for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the territo‐ rial integrity of all participating states, non-interference 7 cf. https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/geschichte/ in the internal affairs of other states and the inviolability gastredner/putin/putin-196934 of existing borders.” In: https://www.bpb.de/nachschla‐ 8 cf. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_F._Kennan gen/lexika/das-europalexikon/177089/konferenz-ueber- sicherheit-und-zusammenarbeit-in-europa-ksze 9 “The CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] was opened in Helsinki in 1973 and concluded 10 cf. https://www.deutsch-russisches-forum.de/ueber-ns/ in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. During taetigkeitsbereiche/staedtepartnerkonferenzen

5/5