Appendix: Keynes, the Transfer Problem and German Reparations

Keynes’s 14-year campaign against the Versailles Treaty (1919) lasted twice as long as the time he spent trying to understand the causes of mass unemployment. For economists, this period of Keynes’s profes- sional activity is remembered chiefly for the 1929 Keynes-Ohlin debate on German reparations and the analytical contributions to transfer theory it stimulated, with the result that modern transfer theory is now firmly established as a basic component of the theory of international monetary adjustment. Ten years earlier Keynes launched his denunciation of the economic clauses of the Treaty with his Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), described by one recent biographer as ‘one of the most influential books of the twentieth century’ (Skidelsky, 1992, p. 384). Keynes soon followed up his mordant critique of the peace settlement with A Revision of the Treaty (1922) and other numerous occasional and journalistic pieces on reparations in the following year – see Keynes, CW, vols 17 and 18. The aim of this Appendix is (a) to review a sample of some modern writings relating to Keynes’s handling of the German reparations question and (b) his treatment of the transfer problem in the 1929 debate, which became the technical/theoretical focus for the reparations controversy. Since Keynes’s early polemics against reparations led up to the 1929 debate with Bertil Ohlin when he was provoked or finally challenged to discuss reparations in terms of transfer theory, that is to say, challenged to provide theoretical underpinnings for his view, we shall start with that famous debate which Donald Moggridge calls ‘... one of the classic controversies in the literature of international economics’ (Moggridge, 1992, p. 476).

A.1 The transfer problem: The Keynes-Ohlin debate

Early in 1929, after the apparent success of the Dawes Plan, the Young Committee started work on plans for definitely fixing Germany’s reparations liability in an agreed annuity schedule. The huge flow of foreign loans that masked a foreign-debt crisis had evaporated since the previ- ous year, and Germany now faced the prospect of having to make real

228 Appendix 229 transfers to pay reparations and service its foreign debt. For Keynes, who never missed a chance to propagate his anti-reparations views, the new initiative provided such an opportunity. For that purpose, he used the pages of the Economic Journal, March 1929, of which he was editor, to restate his warning that Germany faced a deep transfer crisis, together with another airing of his pessimistic views about the intractability and futility of the whole reparations business. The reply from Ohlin (with a contribution from the French economist, Jacques Rueff) and the ensu- ing disagreement over the price effects of a unilateral transfer has been known ever since as the Keynes-Ohlin debate.1 The central question in contention was whether the reparations being demanded from Germany would lead to a ‘secondary burden’ on account of induced price effects – a terms of trade deterioration, or a cheapening of Germany’s export products relative to its imports – in addition to the primary burden of the transfer itself. If the terms of trade deteriorate for Germany, the country must also pay more than before for imports. The country’s welfare is further reduced, as it suffers a loss of real income. Keynes asserted that Germany was bound to suffer such a loss. Ohlin questions whether that is necessarily the case. He argues that if income effects are fully taken into account, Germany can develop an export surplus precisely matching the financial (reparations) transfer, so that a real transfer will take place through an outward movement of real resources (commodities) from Germany to the rest of the world. This can occur without any change in relative prices (or the terms of trade), solely by spending adjustments in Germany and the receiving countries. Ohlin contended that the raising of reparation taxes in Germany would automatically reduce the domestic demand for foreign goods. At the same time, the redistribution of the reparation receipts in the receiving countries through tax reductions or government spending would increase aggregate demand, part of which would be for German goods. Therefore, as expenditure falls in Germany and rises abroad, foreign residents will spend as much of their incremental income on German goods as the reduction in German spending on these goods – thereby creating the German trade surplus needed to effect the real transfer. In that case, Germany could continue to make annual reparation payments through recurring trade surpluses equal to the transfer payments with continuous balance-of-payments equilibrium and without having to bear any extra income loss through terms of trade deterioration. In modern transfer theory involving a two-country, two-commodity model, the terms of trade can move in either direction, or not move at 230 Appendix all. This result depends on the familiar marginal propensity to import in both countries, m in the paying country and m* in the receiving country. According to the transfer criterion, the terms of trade would be unaffected by the transfer payment when m + m* = 1.0. The terms of trade deteriorate for the paying country when m + m* < 1, or move in favour of the paying country if m + m* > 1. The general transfer criterion confirms Ohlin’s contention that there is no substance to the belief (held by Keynes) that the paying country inevitably suffers a ‘secondary burden’.2 Ohlin was methodologically on the right track in emphasising the crucial importance of income effects. However, the smooth adjustment just described could be just one way (the optimistic way), among others, that the paying country and the receiving country might adjust to the income changes. Other outcomes are possible (notably Keynes’s pessimistic forecast based on relative price effects) – as Ohlin himself recognises and admits. Ohlin’s example of frictionless and full adjustment is based on the assumption of identical spending patterns in the paying and the receiving country. If, however, spending patterns differ between the two countries, for instance, if each country has a high propensity to spend on domestic than on foreign products – a home bias in spending – then an effective transfer requires a terms of trade deterioration or a real exchange rate depreciation in the paying country. This is precisely Keynes’s position, but the difference with Ohlin is that he sees that as the only outcome, whereas Ohlin recognises that the terms of trade may be affected, but with no inevitability of an ‘excess’ burden on Germany. Keynes grants that reparation taxes will reduce German expenditure on foreign goods; but since expenditure on foreign goods is only a small proportion of total German expenditure, that is, Germans tend to pre- fer their own tradable goods to imports (a home bias), the benefit to the German balance of payments from the cut in imports will be slight. The fall in imports by itself will be insufficient to make the export surplus equal to the financial transfer, which is the condition for equilibrium. To fill the gap, a massive increase in exports will be required – an export drive, in fact. The value of German exports, Keynes estimates, will have to increase by 40 per cent (Keynes, 1929a, pp. 2–6). Germany will have to undergo a severe deflation of prices and costs. In particular, there would have to be a massive reduction in the money wages of German workers. German export prices would have to fall. Taking an extreme case to emphasise his point – elasticity of demand for German goods less than 1.0 – Keynes claims that Germany would be unable by any Appendix 231 expansion of her exports to make the requisite real transfer – as Keynes puts it: ‘In this case the more she [Germany] exports, the smaller will be the aggregate proceeds. Again the Transfer Problem will be a hopeless business’ (Keynes, 1929a, p. 2). In his reply (Ohlin, 1929, pp. 172–8), Ohlin agrees that in each country there is a bias in spending (say, 80 per cent) towards domestic or non-traded goods, so that only 20 per cent of the transfer will be made in real terms, automatically. But, says Ohlin, Keynes ignores further repercussions on the two countries’ trade balances of the 80 per cent of the transfer spent on non-traded goods (Ohlin, 1929, p. 174). Ohlin continues with a concise but clear account of how these indirect effects complete the real transfer in ‘a magnificent passage’, as Robert Mundell describes it (Mundell, 2002, p. 241). At the end of it, Ohlin asserts that it is not necessary for the paying country’s export prices to fall – no terms of trade deterioration – and hence, no secondary burden. But successful adjustment may nevertheless involve a ‘transfer effect’ (though not of the terms-of-trade variety), only one requiring a change in the relative price of traded to non-traded goods.3 We may briefly summarise Ohlin’s conclusion as follows: Adjustment in the paying country comes about through a reduction of the real exchange rate (a fall in the relative price of non-traded goods). Real depreciation leads to shrinkage of the non-traded goods sector, a correspond- ing expansion of the tradable sectors (export and import-competing) and the generation of an equilibrating export surplus. Opposite changes take place in the receiving country. In his rejoinder to Ohlin, Keynes repeated his opinion that there were only two ways in which Germany could improve its trade balance: (1) reduction in German money wages to increase competitiveness, and (2) a cut in real earnings of the German people (Keynes, 1929b, pp. 179–82). Jacques Rueff’s contribution to the debate appeared in the September 1929 issue of the Economic Journal (pp. 388–99). He supported Ohlin’s contention that there was no transfer problem by producing evidence refuting Keynes’s assertion that trade flows were insensitive to monetary flows such as reparation payments and capital movements. Rueff’s empirical evidence that trade balance adjustments occur without excessive strain and stress was obviously convincing to transfer optimists like Ohlin and Rueff; but apparently failed to impress Keynes, with his exaggerated fear of transfer difficulties caused by ‘sticky-mass’ trade balances. As we have seen, Keynes’s conclusion that sizeable reparations would create impossible problems for Germany and the whole world economy 232 Appendix rested on three suppositions: (1) he ignored the income and expenditure effects of a transfer; in effect, he assumed that m + m* was close to zero; (2) his elasticity pessimism, and (3) his rejection of an adjustment mechanism founded on the transfer of purchasing power. Keynes was, of course, wide off the mark. He was wrong in his assess- ment of Germany’s ability to effectuate the transfer and in the theoretical arguments used to support his pessimistic prognostications. He was resistant to Ohlin’s unorthodox interpretation of the adjustment mechanism – in particular, the point that price elasticities have little or nothing to do with the analysis. Was it perhaps Keynes’s intuition, responding to the interwar economic environment, rather than any rigorous deduction from orthodox theory that disposed him to favour the ‘classical presumption’? There was, then, the perception that the correction of balance-of-payments disequilibria was actually severely impeded by monetary instability, rigid national cost structures, sticky money wages, tariffs, financial uncertainty, fiscal imbalances and unemployment. Did that perception colour his attitude to the feasibility of transfer? Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk recently analysed transfers in an analytical framework incorporating the assumptions and assertions of Keynes and Ohlin. The results are not easy to interpret. However, the findings suggest that Keynes’s concern about the unemployment effect of the reparations transfer is valid; but perhaps weak- ened where unemployment and non-traded goods coexist. The results support Ohlin’s contention under all circumstances. By the same token, this implies that ‘Keynes presumption that a transfer worsens the donor’s terms of trade is not valid.’4 Some early critics saw Keynes as being trapped in an obsolete model, out of which he was soon to break loose. But it was, after all, a model that, at the time, served his critical and polemical purposes well enough. As Howard Ellis and Lloyd Metzler expressed it in 1950: ‘The paradoxi- cal aspect of the controversy is that Keynes, who later laid the ground- work for the modern theory, adopted an extremely classical view in his discussion of German reparations.’5 Reviewing the debate in 1981, Paul Samuelson referred to the inter- change as ‘one which pitted the unknown David from Sweden against the world-famous Goliath’, and concluded: ‘Goliath’s rhetorical bluster and political resentment against the Treaty of Versailles were not able to upset the neutral rationality of the youthful David.’6 In 1975, Harry Johnson, noting that Keynes’s contribution to the debate was ‘technically incompetent’, went on to deplore Keynes’s ‘standard “ploy” ... of Appendix 233 claiming not to be certain of the meaning of technical terms used by others and pointing out at length the nonsense they could be made to mean by semantic interpretation divorced from concern with reach- ing truth about the scientific problem in hand.’7 More recently, Nobel laureate, Robert Mundell referred to Keynes’s claim that because of inelastic demand for German exports, Germany could not effect the transfer (whatever the reparation bill) as an ‘astonishing argument’, and added: ‘It will for a long time go down as one of the great puzzles of the history of economic thought why Keynes let himself fall victim to such an absurd position! The editor of the Economic Journal – Keynes himself – should have had it properly refereed.’8 In another comment on the Keynes-Ohlin debate, Mundell wrote: ‘Keynes’s practical insight was vindicated perhaps but not his logic, and it was a pity that he allowed his personal inclinations and advocacy to weaken his scientific objectivity.’9 Joseph Schumpeter, the celebrated historian of economic doctrines, in an obituary notice, referred to Keynes’s 1929 article as having been ‘dictated by the most generous motives and by unerring political wisdom’; but added that ‘it was not good theory and Ohlin and Rueff found it easy to deal with it. It is difficult to understand how Keynes can have been blind to the weak spots in his argument’.10

A.2 Keynes’s anti-reparations campaign

At this distance in time, it seems a far cry from the din and clamour of the running battle over German reparations, but we must return to that political battleground to assess the role of Keynes as an active partisan in that struggle. Keynes’s objections centred on what he regarded as the excessive Allies’ reparations demand, and which he judged was beyond the capacity of Germany to fulfil.11 He therefore urged the cancellation of all inter-Allied war debts, a drastic reduction in reparations and an American-funded reconstruction loan (Keynes, CW, II, chapter 7). The Americans saw that they would have to provide most of the resources for these remedies, and Keynes’s scheme was rejected. Now, Keynes was not opposed to reparations as such; but he objected to the sum demanded and so, as Sidney Pollard said, ‘he turned what was a question of quantity into a matter of principle’.12 As mentioned earlier, in a Treasury memorandum of October 1918, Keynes himself suggested that Germany could pay a total of £3 billion to cover the ‘material damages of war’, as defined in the armistice terms, though £2 billion was con- sidered a more realistic figure. At the Peace Conference, however, all the official figures suggested by the Allies were much larger than those 234 Appendix put forward by Keynes. What infuriated Keynes was the acceptance in April 1919 by President Wilson (however reluctantly) of General Smuts’s suggestion that separation allowances and military pensions could properly be added to the total. For this more than doubled Germany’s liability at a stroke and in Keynes’s opinion imposed a crushing burden well beyond Germany’s capacity to pay. In June 1919, shortly after the Treaty was signed, Keynes resigned in disgust from the British delegation to the Conference, wrote Economic Consequences of the Peace during the summer and had it published on 12 December of that year. The book was a runaway success with British and American readers. Overnight Keynes became an international celebrity, hailed as a profes- sional writer of outstanding ability, an economic guru and polemicist of great promise. It is claimed that his work helped to shape British European policy in the direction of appeasement during the later interwar years: that Keynes more than any other person helped to create a climate of opinion in Britain and in other countries highly critical of the Treaty of Versailles.13 The book added to the bitterness in Anglo-French relations through much of the interwar period. Many still consider that it had a part to play in the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the Treaty, and that it helped to fasten isolationist views on a whole generation of Americans.14 In Germany, it is reckoned to have strengthened resistance to the half-hearted Erfüllungspolitik of early 1920s German governments. In the book, Keynes insisted that the salvation of European civili- sation and capitalism depended on giving primacy to economics over politics. The peacemakers, however, had done the opposite. By crippling the German economy (the central pillar of the economy of Europe) the provisions of the Treaty would stunt the revival of economic life on the continent. Despite his claim that his main preoc- cupation was with Europe’s ‘means of livelihood’ and that economic reasoning was the basis of his dissatisfaction with the Versailles settlement, Keynes objected to the Treaty quite as much on political as on economic grounds (Felix, 2004, pp. 58–62). Economic Consequences is, in fact, a thoroughly political work. He denounced Allied reparation claims as vindictive and immoral; they were impracticable and moreo- ver, could not be carried out. The reparation demands, Keynes claimed, took no notice of economic realities. The attempt to extract tribute from the vanquished would not only ruin Germany, but would also impose severe hardship and unemployment on the victors themselves. He painted a picture of a destitute Germany laid low by the reparations burden. His polemic was liberally laced with doomsday scenarios, Appendix 235

Malthusian crisis in Germany and other equally frightening apocalyp- tic imagery, for example, the grave danger of rampant inflation which could destroy the whole European economy by undermining business confidence and encouraging wild speculation. The immediate effects of the Treaty would be to degrade the lives of millions and deprive a whole nation of happiness – in Keynes’s words, the Treaty ‘will sow the decay of the whole civilised life of Europe ... If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp ...’ (Keynes, CW, II, p. 170). Keynes firmly believed that French reparations policy, by keeping Germany down, was very damaging to Britain’s long-run economic interests. There is much to be said, therefore, for Mark Brawley’s thesis that Keynes was critical of French proposals for high reparations, ‘not because they were irrationally high, but precisely because they were based on a strategy of balancing German power’ (Brawley, 2009, p. 85). Students of the reparations question find it puzzling that there was no critical response from economists at the time to so influential an economic tract when its economics was generally reckoned to be undistinguished and technically defective at certain crucial points of the argument, especially in its treatment of the alleged difficulties of ‘transfer’ of reparations. Keynes’s economic analysis and assessments remained largely unexamined. A quarter of a century had to pass before Economic Consequences of the Peace was subjected to a full-scale, detailed public critique by the young French economist, Etienne Mantoux who argued that Keynes’s objections to reparations were grossly exaggerated and that payment of the full amount was a reasonable request to make;15 but even then, Mantoux’s counter-arguments did not go down well, generally – the exception being a brief but sympathetic review in 1947 by the eminent historian of international economics, Jacob Viner. Viner first gave the answer – now standard – to the question why there was such a public silence by economists on Keynes’s tract: ‘... the political views which Keynes expounded with great force of exposition were those which Anglo-Saxon liberals of the 1920, including the economists, shared almost to a man, and I suppose there then seemed little point in exposing technical flaws in an economic argument which had the virtue of leading to the desired political conclusions.’16 A typical reaction to Mantoux’s thesis was its treatment in Sir Roy Harrod’s authorised biography of Keynes. Whilst appreciating that Mantoux’s indictment of Keynes is not extremist and that some sta- tistical criticisms are well founded, he finds that Mantoux’s argument 236 Appendix reaffirming the ability of Germany to effect in full the real transfer of reparations is ‘... feeble in the extreme’, and that the part of the Frenchman’s work that directly challenges Keynes’s main thesis ‘cannot be taken seriously’.17 For Mantoux, the peace settlement was no ‘Carthaginian peace’, for Germany did recover. During the industrial boom of 1920–22, GNP reached 80 per cent of the pre-war level, and by 1927 Germany regained her pre-war national income – and thereafter an increase in economic power more rapid and considerable than Keynes had anticipated. By 1930, Germany had forged ahead of Britain to become the world’s second biggest exporter, after the United States. Mantoux would have agreed with Stephen Schuker’s observation that ‘as Germany became more prosperous, Keynes kept lowering his estimates of what it could pay’ (Schuker, 1980, p. 125). Keynes’s prediction, that the reparations burden was going to be excessive and would destroy German indus- try, proved to be wrong, said Mantoux. But when he goes on to claim that the enormous expenditure on armaments during 1933–39 proves that reparations could have been paid in full, his argument is less convincing. Germany did achieve an impressive surplus of wealth and income, internally, but Keynes would have answered that one cannot assess a country’s capacity to make external payments by reference to its internal production. Mantoux next questions Keynes’s data and evidence. One example, dealing with Keynes’s estimate of German national income, is worth mentioning. Keynes wanted to convey a vivid picture of Germany’s hardship to his British and American readers and came up with an absurdly low figure of 5000 paper marks for per capita income in 1921, out of which taxation for reparations would absorb 2170 paper marks (a tax bite of 43 per cent) leaving the average German with an absolute (weekly per capita) disposable income, equivalent ‘in purchasing power of about five shillings in England’ (Keynes, CW, XVII, p. 247). A truly dolorous picture of grinding poverty! Keynes concluded with this rhetorical appeal to readers of the Sunday Times: ‘Would the whips and scorpions of any government recorded in history have been potent enough to extract nearly half their income from a people so situated?’ (Keynes, CW, XVII, p. 248). But was this absolute figure the result of an arithmetic trick? Mantoux suggested that it was. Mantoux’s criticism was justified, but because of Keynes’s roundabout method of calculation, Mantoux somehow missed the point by tracing Keynes’s error to his faulty method of estimating German 1921 real income. But Keynes’s method (although cumbersome and unnecessary in this context) did, Appendix 237 in fact, approach a reasonable estimate for 1921 GNP by adjusting for the 60 per cent fall in the German price of gold between 1913 and 1921. It was Keynes’s subsequent steps in his calculation that were faulty and which produced the bogus equivalent figure of five shillings per capita, per week.18 After 1919, Keynes continued to churn out numerous occasional and journalistic pieces on reparations until 1932. He was in regular con- tact with influential bankers in Hamburg (including his friend Carl Melchior), made frequent trips to Germany and met privately with German leaders, including Cuno and Brüning. Turning to Keynes’s more personal role and stance in these matters, we note that his recent biographer, Robert Skidelsky acknowledges: ‘It would be fair to describe Keynes, on balance, as anti-French and pro-German.’19 André Tardieu (chief aide to Clemenceau at the Peace Conference, and later prime minister of France) dismissed him as ‘the pro-German scribe from Cambridge’ and the Morning Post newspa- per elevated him to the status of ‘Herr Johann von Keynes’ (Schuker, 1980, p. 126). In 1995, Niall Ferguson remarked that his research revealed that ‘Keynes’s critique of the Versailles Treaty was based on anything but dispassionate economic analysis ... [T]he ideas contained in The Economic Consequences of the Peace ... were actually inspired by members of the German peace delegation at the Versailles conference.’20 Now there is no doubt that Keynes was Germany’s publicist-in-chief, unofficial principal financial adviser and lobbyist. He combined these roles in a singularly breathtaking and audacious act – a secret journey to Berlin (1 June 1923) to write a key German diplomatic note to the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin – the famous Note of 7 June 1923 – which, on his return to England, he promoted among organs of the British Press and praised for its fairness in his own weekly, the Nation.21 But this is not surprising, since Keynes, in Sir Austin Robinson’s words ‘was in fact two men – the economic statesman and the creative pioneer in economic theory ... and that throughout his life Keynes was essentially a political economist’.22 Everyone agrees that in the final part of his life – during the Second World War, from the designing of Bretton Woods to his death – Keynes’s international statesmanship was of the highest order of distinction. But whilst all tribute to Keynes for his later contribution to the restoration of financial and economic order to the world after 1945, ‘... the earlier part of the record remains’, as Stephen Schuker regretfully reminds us. ‘Not only did Keynes do much to shift Germany’s just reparation burden to the Allies and to prepare the way for the resurgence of the Reich, 238 Appendix but, on the evidence [of his own writings and activities] he did not act wholly in good faith’ (Schuker, 1980, p. 126). One final point concerns the supposedly enduring influence of Keynes on later attitudes to reparations. It was widely believed that Keynes had thoroughly convinced the political and intellectual elites of the Anglo-Saxon countries of the folly of demanding reparations, and that magnanimity rather than vindictiveness should be the watch- word in the post-1945 treatment of Germany. But it is patently evident that Keynes’s message failed to register with the big players in the plan- ning and policy of the post-war settlement. How else can we explain the proposals by the US Treasury, known as the Morgenthau Plan for the de-industrialisation of Germany – truly a Carthaginian peace, if ever there was one since 200 BC! Also, why did the United Kingdom back the ‘Demontagepolitik’, that is to say, the proposal to extract reparations from Germany purely by the dismantling of industrial plant, factories and equipment – a policy which would have resulted in Germany becoming, in effect, one vast ‘cabbage patch’. However, for reasons that everyone knows, no such thing happened. The abandon- ment of the policy of dismantling in 1950 did not stop the Allies from taking ‘hidden’ or intellectual reparations in the form of technological and scientific information, ‘know-how’ and patents from their zones of occupation.23

Notes

1. Much, though not all, of the Keynes-Ohlin debate can be found in Keynes, CW, vol. XI, pp. 451–80. 2. For a clear, brief explanation of the transfer criterion, see Wilfred J. Ethier, Modern International Economics (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 268–70. 3. Substantial empirical evidence now supports a significant ‘transfer effect’ – relative price effects or real exchange rate changes. The transfer effect oper- ates through changes in prices of non-traded goods adjusting to fixed or exogenously given prices of traded goods (or terms of trade) – exactly as Ohlin surmised. Consequently, economists are now convinced that a fall in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods (in the paying country) is required to effect a transfer. See M. Obstfeld and K. Rogoff, Foundations of International Macroeconomics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 255–6. 4. See Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk, ‘Transfers, Nontraded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes-Ohlin Debate’, History of Political Economy, 39 (2007), p. 138. 5. H.S. Ellis and L.A. Metzler, ‘Introduction’ in H.S. Ellis and L.A. Metzler (eds), Readings in the Theory of International Trade (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. x–xi. Appendix 239

6. See P.A. Samuelson, ‘Bertil Ohlin (1899–1979)’ in John Cunningham Wood (ed.), Bertil Ohlin: Critical Assessments, vol. 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 1981 [1995]), pp. 109, 112. 7. Harry G. Johnson, ‘The Classical Transfer Problem: An Alternative Formulation’, Economica, 42 (1975), p. 30. 8. See Mundell (2002, p. 245). 9. Robert A. Mundell, ‘Introduction: Latin American Debt and the Transfer Problem’ in Philip L. Brock, M.B. Connolly and C. González-Vega (eds), Latin American Debt and Adjustment (New York and London: Praeger, 1989), p. 5. 10. Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Keynes the Economist’ in Seymour E. Harris (ed.), The New Economics (New York: Knopf, 1949), n. 10, p. 81. 11. Daniel Arce M. analyses the reparations problem in game theory terms, and finds that although Keynes was right that reparations would ultimately have to be scaled down, the Allies’ initial decision to impose heavy reparations on Germany was ‘strategically rational’ in conditions of uncertainty about Germany’s capacity to pay. See Daniel G. Arce M., ‘The Economic Consequences of the Peace: Keynes and Correlation’, Mathematical Social Sciences, 29 (1995), pp. 263–76. 12. S. Pollard, ‘Review Article: New Light on an Old Master’, Economic Journal, 104 (1994), p. 143. 13. See W. Carr, ‘John Maynard Keynes and the Treaty of Versailles’, in A.P. Thirlwall (ed.), Keynes as a Policy Adviser (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 80. 14. Bernard Baruch, the American financier and former adviser to President Wilson, mentioned to Winston Churchill in 1950 (four years after Keynes’s death) that Keynes ‘was the man who did more to destroy America’s steps toward international cooperation after World War I, than all the others put together. It was his devastating, unfair criticism of Woodrow Wilson that caused America to turn its back upon Europe.’ See, Jordan A. Schwarz, The Speculator: Bernard Baruch in Washington, 1917–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 154. 15. Etienne Mantoux was the son of Paul Mantoux, official interpreter at the Peace Conference and himself the author of a well-known text on the Industrial Revolution published in 1928. Etienne Mantoux, who did post- graduate studies at Harvard, was killed on active service with the French air force near a Bavarian village on 29 April 1945, hardly a week before the war ended. His book, The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr Keynes, was published posthumously by Oxford University Press in 1946. One would like to have heard Keynes’s own rejoinder to Mantoux. But of course he never lived to see the book. Keynes however never publicly regret- ted his stand, and the only expression of his thoughts on the matter comes from Sir Austin Robinson who wrote (in 1946) that Keynes ‘certainly said more than once in my hearing during the last war that the fault of Versailles was that it had failed either to be sufficiently Carthaginian or sufficiently liberal.’ See, Sir Austin Robinson, ‘John Maynard Keynes 1883–1946’, in J. Cunningham Wood (ed.), John Maynard Keynes: Critical Assessments (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 106. According to Kingsley Martin, the editor of The New Statesman (recalling his correspondence with Keynes in 240 Appendix

the summer of 1937) Keynes ‘supported [appeasement] even after Munich’, with the objective of ending ‘the injustices of Versailles.’ See Kingsley Martin, Editor: A Second Volume of Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 241–2. A year earlier, however, when Elizabeth Wiskemann, a German-born journalist, academic and former Cambridge student met Keynes at a party in London and impulsively said to him, ‘I do wish you had not written that book’, Keynes simply and gently replied, ‘So do I.’ See Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Europe I Saw (London: Collins, 1968), p. 53. The book in question was, of course, Economic Consequences of the Peace, ‘which the Germans never ceased to quote’. 16. See Jacob Viner, ‘Review of Etienne Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace’ [1947] in J. Viner, The Long View and the Short (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), p. 427. 17. See R.F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 276–7. 18. See Moggridge (1992, p. 371); also, Douglas C. McIntosh, ‘Mantoux versus Keynes: A Note on German Income and the Reparations Controversy’, Economic Journal, 87 (1977), 765–7. 19. See Robert Skidelsky, ‘Discussion’ in A.P. Thirlwall (ed.), Keynes as a Policy Adviser (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 112. 20. Niall Ferguson, ‘Let Germany Keep Its Nerve’, The Spectator, 22 April 1995, p. 21. 21. For details, see Giuliano Ferrari Bravo, ‘ “In the Name of Our Mutual Friend ...” The Keynes-Cuno Affair’, Journal of Contemporary History, 24 (1989), 147–68. 22. Sir Austin Robinson, ‘John Maynard Keynes: Economist, Author, Statesman’, Economic Journal, 82 (1972), 537. 23. See John Gimbel, ‘Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany’ in J.M. Diefendorf, A. Frohn and H-J. Rupieper (eds), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 175–96. Gimbel estimates that a figure of $10 billion as the amount of intellectual reparations taken by the United States and the United Kingdom is ‘probably not far from the mark’ (p. 193). Adam Tooze, noting that, in fact, ‘both halves of Germany paid substantially higher reparations after 1945 than the Weimar republic ever did’, referred to the belief that the Allies had learned a lesson not to demand reparations again, as ‘one of the most persistent myths in post-war history ...’ (Tooze, 2006, p. 673). Bibliography

Adams, R.J.Q. (1999) Bonar Law (London: John Murray). Aguado, I.G. (2001) ‘The Creditanstalt Crisis of 1931 and the Failure of the Austro-German Customs Union Project’, Historical Journal, 44, 199–221. Ahamed, L. (2009) Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World (New York and London: The Penguin Press). Antonucci, A. (1935) Le Bilan des réparations et la crise mondiale (Paris: Berger- Lavrault). Artaud, D. (1978) La question des dettes interalliées et la reconstruction de l’Europe, 1917–1920 (Lille: Université de Lille III). ______(1998) ‘Reparations and War Debts’ in R.D. Boyce (ed.) French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940 (London and New York: LSE and Routledge). Baechler, C. (1996) Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929). De l’impérialisme à la sécurité collective (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg). Balderston, T. (1982) ‘The Origins of Economic Instability in Germany, 1924– 1930: Market Forces versus Economic Policy’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 69 (4), 488–514. ______(1994) Review: ‘Gerald Feldman Analyzes the German Inflation’, Central European History, 27, 205–17. ______(2002) Economics and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ______(ed.) (2003) The World Economy and National Economies in the Interwar Slump (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Bariéty, J. (1977) Les relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale (Paris: Pédone). Barnich, G. (1924) Le bilan de la Ruhr et les réparations (Bruxelles: Editions du “Flambeau”). Baruch, B.M. (1958) Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston). Bell, P.M.H. (1996) Britain and France 1900–1940: Entente and Estrangement (London and New York: Longman). ______(1997) The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, 2nd edn. (London and New York: Longman). Berg, M. (1993) ‘Trade, Debts and Reparations: Economic Concepts and Political Constraints’ in H.-J. Schröder (ed.) (1993). Bergmann, C. (1927) The History of Reparations (London: Ernest Benn Ltd.). Blancheton, B. (2001) Le Pape et l’empereur (Paris: Albin Michel). Blum, L. (1955–1972) L’Oeuvre de Léon Blum, vol. 2 (Paris: Editions Albin Michel). Boemeke, M.F., G.D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds) (1998) The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University). Born, K.E. (1983) International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Leamington Spa: Berg).

241 242 Bibliography

Boyce, R.D. (1989) ‘World Depression, World War: Some Economic Origins of the Second World War’ in R. Boyce and E.M. Robertson (eds) Paths to War (Basingstoke: Macmillan). ______(ed.) (1998) French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940 (London and New York: LSE and Routledge). ______(2000) ‘ “Breaking the Banque”: The Great Crisis in Franco-British Central Bank Relations between the Wars’ in P. Chassaigne and M. Dockrill (eds) Anglo-French Relations 1898–1998: From Fashoda to Jospin (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Brawley, M.R. (2009) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the World Wars (1919–1939)’ in S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman and J.W. Taliaferro (eds) Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Bresciani-Turroni, C. (1937 [1931]) The Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-war Germany (London: Allen & Unwin). Broadberry, S. and M. Harrison (eds) (2005) The Economics of World War 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Buckingham, P.H. (1983) International Normalcy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc.). Burnett, P.M. (1940) Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation, 2 vols (New York: Columbia University Press). Carls, S.D. (1993) Louis Loucheur and the Shaping of Modern France, 1916–1931 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press). Carlton, D. (1970) MacDonald versus Henderson (London: Macmillan). Castellan, G. (1969) L’Allemagne de Weimar 1918–1933 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin). Castillon, R. (1953) Les Réparations Allemandes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). Chastenet, J. (1960) Histoire de la Troisième République, vol. 5 (Paris: Hachette). Chernow, R. (1990) The House of Morgan (London: Simon & Schuster). Clarke, S.V.O. (1967) Central Bank Cooperation 1924–31 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York). Clavin, P. (1995) The Failure of Economic Diplomacy (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Clement, P. (2004) ‘ “The Touchstone of German Credit”: Nazi Germany and the Service of the Dawes and Young Loans’, Financial History Review, 11, 33–50. Clingan, C.E. (2001) Finance from Kaiser to Führer: Budget Politics in Germany 1912–1934 (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press). Costigliola, F. (1976) ‘The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s’, Business History Review, 50, 477–502. ______(1984) Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press). Cross, C. (1966) Philip Snowden (London: Barrie & Rockliff). Davis, J.S. (1975) The World between the Wars, 1919–39: An Economist’s View (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press). Dawes, C.G. (1939) A Journal of Reparations (London: Macmillan). Dayer, R.A. (1988) France and Europe: Sir Charles Addis, 1861–1945 (London: Macmillan). Bibliography 243

Delmer, S. (1972) Weimar Germany (London: Macdonald/American Heritage Press). Depoortere, R. (1997) La Question des Réparations allemandes dans la politique Étrangère de la Belgique, 1919–1925 (Belgium: Académie royale de Belgique). Dulles, E.L. (1932) ‘The Evolution of Reparation Ideas’ in E.F. Gay (ed.) Facts and Factors in Economic History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Eichengreen, B. (1992) Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press). Epstein, K. (1971) Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (New York: Howard Fertig). Eyck, E. (1962) A History of the Weimar Republic, vol. 1, trans. by H.P. Hanson and R.G.L. Waite (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Feldman, G.D. (1985) ‘Weimar: From Inflation to Depression: Experiment or Gamble?’ in G.D. Feldman and Müller-Luckner (eds) (1985). ______(1993) The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). ______(1998) ‘A Comment’ in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds) 1998. ______(2005) ‘The Reparations Debate’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 487–98. Feldman, G.D and E. Müller-Luckner (eds) (1985) Die Nachwirkungen der Inflation auf die deutsche Geschichte, 1924–1933 (München: R. Oldenbourg). Feldman, G.D. et al. (eds) (1989) Konsequenzen der Inflation (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag). Felix, D. (1971) ‘Reparations Reconsidered with a Vengeance’, Central European History, 4, 171–9. ______(1981) Review of M. Trachtenberg’s ‘Reparation in World Politics’, Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 578–9. ______(2004) ‘Keynesian Consequences’, Society, 41, 58–62. Ferguson, N. (1995) Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897–1927 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ______(1998) ‘The Balance of Payments Question: Versailles and After’ in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds) (1998). ______(2000) ‘How (Not) to Pay for the War: Traditional Finance and Total War’ in R. Chickering and S. Förster (eds) Great War, Total War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ______(2001a) ‘Public Debt as a Postwar Problem: The German Experience after 1918 in Comparative Perspective’ in C. Levy and M. Roseman (eds) Three Postwar Eras in Comparison: Western Europe, 1919–1945–1989 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). ______(2001b) ‘The German Inter-war Economy: Political Choice versus Economic Determinism’ in M. Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth-Century Germany (London: Arnold). Ferguson, N. and B. Granville (2000) ‘ “Weimar on the Volga”: Causes and Consequences of Inflation in 1990s Russia Compared with 1920s Germany’, Journal of Economic History, 60, 1061–87. Ferguson, T. and P. Temin (2003) ‘Made in Germany: The Currency Crisis of 1931’, Research in Economic History, 31, 1–53. Ferrell, R.H. (1957) American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929–1933 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). 244 Bibliography

Fink, C. (1984) The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921–1922 (Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press). ______(2006) ‘Revisionism’ in G. Martel (ed.) A Companion to Europe 1900–1945 (Oxford: Blackwell). Fink, C., A. Frohn and J. Heideking (eds) (1991) Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Fischer, C. (2003) The Ruhr Crisis, 1923–1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ______(2005) ‘The Human Price of Reparations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 499–514. ______(2006) ‘ “A Very German Revolution”? The Post-1918 Settlement Evaluated’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London, 28, 6–32. Fourgeaud, A. (1926) La Dépréciation et la Revalorisation du Mark Allemand (Paris: Payot). Fulda, B.D. (2006) ‘Misgivings about Versailles: Lloyd George and the Weimar Republic’ in M. Görtemaker (ed.) Britain and Germany in the 20th Century (Oxford: Berg). Furst, G.A. (1927) De Versailles aux Experts (Paris: Berger Lavrault). Gerwarth, R. (2005) The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Glaser, E. (1998) ‘The Making of the Economic Peace’ in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds) (1998). Hardach, G. (1976) Weltmarktorientierung und relative Stagnation: Währungspolitik in Deutschland 1924–1931 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot). Heiber, H. (1993) The Weimar Republic, trans. W.F. Yuill (Oxford: Blackwell). Hetzel, R.L. (2002) ‘German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, 88 (1), 1–35. Heyde, P. (1998) Das Ende der Reparationen, Deutschland, Frankreich und der Youngplan 1929–1932 (Paderborn: Schöningh). Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1986) The German Inflation 1914–1923, trans. Theo Balderston (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter). ______(1990) Review of S. Schuker’s ‘American Reparations to Germany, 1919– 33’, Historische Zeitschrift, 251 (August–December, 1990), 468–71. Hudson, M. (2003) Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of US World Dominance (London: Pluto Press). Hughes, M.L. (1988) Paying for the German Inflation (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press). Jacobson, J. (1972) Locarno Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). ______(1989) ‘The Reparation Settlement of 1924’ in G.D. Feldman et al. (eds) (1989). James, H. (1984) Review article, ‘The Problem of Continuity in German History: The Interwar Years’, Historical Journal, 27, 513–24. ______(1985) The Reichsbank and Public Finance in Germany, 1924–1933 (Frankfurt am Main: Knapp). ______(1986) The German Slump: Politics and Economics 1924–1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ______(1999) ‘The Reichsbank 1876–1945’ in Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.) Fifty Years of the Deutsche Mark (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Bibliography 245

James, H. (2001) The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (London: Harvard University Press). Jeanneney, J.-N. (1977) Leçon d’histoire pour une gauche au pouvoir (Paris: Seuil). Jeannesson, S. (1996) ‘Pourquoi la France a-t-elle occupé la Ruhr?’, Vingtième Siècle: revue d’histoire, 51, 56–67. ______(1998) Poincaré, la france et la Ruhr (1922–1924): Histoire d’une occupation (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg). ______(2005) ‘French Policy in the Rhineland’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 475–86. Johnson, H. Clark (1997) Gold, France and the Great Depression, 1919–1932 (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press). Kedward, H.R. (2006) La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London: Penguin). Keiger, J.F.V. (1997) Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kent, B. (1989) The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918–1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Kerstingjohänner, H. (2004) Die deutsche Inflation 1919–1923: Politik und Ökonomie (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang). Keynes, J.M. (1971–89) The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, (eds) E. Johnson, D. Moggridge and Sir Austen Robinson (London: Macmillan). Cited as Keynes, CW, followed by volume number. ______(1929a) ‘The German Transfer Problem’, Economic Journal, 39, 1–7. ______(1929b) ‘A Rejoinder to “The Reparation Problem: A Discussion” by Professor B. Ohlin’, Economic Journal, 39, 179–82. Kindleberger, C.P. (1993) A Financial History of Western Europe, 2nd edn. (New York: Oxford University Press). ______(1994) ‘The Great Disorder: A Review of the Book of That Title by Gerald D Feldman’, Journal of Economic Literature, 32, 1216–25. King, J.C. (1960) Foch versus Clemenceau (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Knox, MacGregor (2007) To the Threshold of Power, 1923/33, vol. 1 (Cambridge: University Press). Kolb, E. (1988) The Weimar Republic (London: Unwin Hyman). ______(2005) The Weimar Republic, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge). Krüger, P. (1973) Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918/19 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt). ______(1981) ‘Das Reparationsproblem der Weimarer Republik in fragwürdiger Sicht’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 29, 21–47. ______(1985) Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft). Lamont, T.W. (1921) ‘Reparations’ in E.M. House and C. Seymour (eds) What Really Happened in Paris (New York: Hodder and Stoughton). ______(1930) ‘The Final Reparations Settlement’, Foreign Affairs, 8 (3), 336–63. Leaman, J. (2001) The Bundesbank Myth: Towards a Critique of Central Bank Independence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Lee, M.M. and W. Michalka (1987) German Foreign Policy 1917–1933: Continuity or Break? (Leamington Spa: Berg). Leger, A. (1923) Le chômage Britannique et l’occupation de la Ruhr (Paris: Société d’Etudes et d’Information Economiques). 246 Bibliography

Lentin, A. (1990) ‘What Really Happened at Paris?’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1, 264–75. ______(1998) ‘A Comment’ in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds) (1998). ______(2001) Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Liberman, P. (1996) Does Conquest Pay (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Lochner, L.P. (1960) Herbert Hoover and Germany (New York: The Macmillan Co.). McFadyean, A. (1964) Recollected in Tranquillity (London: Pall Mall Press). MacMillan, M. (2003) The Peacemakers (London: John Murray). McNeil, W.C. (1986) American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: Columbia University Press). ______(1989) ‘Could Germany Pay?’ in G.D. Feldman et al. (eds) (1989). ______(1993) ‘Weimar Germany and Systemic Transformation in International Economic Relations’ in J. Snyder and R. Jervis (eds) Coping with Complexity in the International System (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press). Maehl, W.H. (1986) The German Socialist Party (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society). Maisel, E. (1994) The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1926 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press). Marks, S. (1969) ‘Reparations Reconsidered: A Reminder’, Central European History, 2, 356–65. ______(1972) ‘Reparations Reconsidered: A Rejoinder’, Central European History, 5 (2), 358–61. ______(1978) ‘The Myths of Reparations’, Central European History, 11, 231–55. ______(1991) ‘Reparations in 1922’ in Fink, Frohn and Heideking (eds) (1991). ______(1998) ‘Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galerie des Glaces’ in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds) (1998). ______(2002) ‘Poincaré-la-Peur: France and the Ruhr Crisis of 1923’ in K. Mouré and M.S. Alexander (eds) Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918–1962 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books). ______(2003) The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918– 1933, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Martel, G. (ed.) (1992) The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered, 2nd edn. (London and New York: Routledge). Martin, B.F. (1999) France and the Après Guerre 1918–1924 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press). Mierzejewski, A.C. (1995) ‘Payments and Profits: The German National Railway Company and Reparations, 1924–1932’, German Studies Review, 18, 65–85. Moggridge, D.E. (1992) Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography (London: Routledge). Mommsen, H. (1991) From Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History, trans. P. O’Connor (Oxford: Polity Press). ______(1996) Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). Morgan, K.O. (2006) ‘Lloyd George and Clemenceau: Prima Donnas in Partnership’ In A. Capet (ed.) Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Moulton, H.G. (1924) The Reparation Plan (New York: McGraw-Hill). Bibliography 247

Mundell, R.A. (2002) ‘Keynes and Ohlin on the Transfer Problem’ in R. Findlay, L. Jonung and M. Lundahl (eds) Bertil Ohlin: A Centennial Celebration (1899–1999) (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press). Myers, D.P. (1930) The Reparation Settlement, 1930 (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation). Nadler, H.E. (1987) The Rhenish Separatist Movements during the Early Weimar Republic, 1918–1924 (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc.). Neville, P. (2006) Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum). Newton, D. (1997) British Policy and the Weimar Republic 1918–1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Nicholls, A. J. (2000) Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, 4th edn. (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Ohlin, B. (1929) ‘The Reparation Problem: A Discussion’, Economic Journal, 39, 172–8, 400–4. Orde, A. (1990) British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ______(1993) ‘Britain and European Reconstruction after the Great War’ in P. Catterall with C.J. Morris (eds) Britain and the Threat to Stability in Europe, 1918–45 (London and New York: Leicester University Press). O’Riordan, E.Y. (2001) Britain and the Ruhr Crisis (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Passant, E.J. (1962) A Short History of Germany 1815–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Patch, Jr, W.L. (1998) Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Peukert, D. (1992) The Weimar Republic, trans. R. Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang). Preparata, G.G. (2005) Conjuring Hitler: How Britain and America Made the Third Reich (London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press). Pruessen, R.W. (1982) John Foster Dulles (London and New York: Collier Macmillan). Pulzer, P. (1997) Germany 1870–1945: Politics, State Formation and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Quigley, C. (1966) Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The Macmillan Co.). Rain, P. (1945) L’Europe de Versailles 1919–1939 (Paris: Payot). Ritschl, A. (1996) ‘Sustainability of High Public Debt: What the Historical Record Shows’, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 3, 175–98. ______(1999) ‘Les Réparations Allemandes, 1920–1933: Une Controverse Revue par la Théorie des Jeux’, Economie Internationale, 78 (2), 129–54. ______(2002) Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur 1924–1934 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag). ______(2003) ‘ “Dancing on a Volcano”: The Economic Recovery and Collapse of Weimar Germany, 1924–33’ in Balderston (ed.) (2003). ______(2005) ‘The Pity of Peace: Germany’s Economy at War, 1914–1918 and Beyond’ in Broadberry and Harrison (eds) (2005). Robertson, D.H. (1929) ‘Discussion – Reparations: The Young Report’, Royal Institute of International Affairs (September 1929), 477–80. 248 Bibliography

Roosevelt, N. (1925) ‘The Ruhr Occupation’, Foreign Affairs, 4, 113–22. Rose, I. (1999) Conservatism and Foreign Policy during the Lloyd George Coalition (London: Frank Cass). Rosenbaum, E. and A.J. Sherman (eds) (1979) M.M. Warburg & Co., 1798–1938 (London: C. Hurst and Company). Rosenberg, E.S. (1999) Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Roth, F. (2000) Raymond Poincaré: Un homme d’État républicain (Paris: Fayard). Rupieper, H.J. (1979) The Cuno Government and Reparations 1922–23: Politics and Economics (The Hague, Boston, MA and London: Martinus Nijhoff). Sauvy, A. (1969) Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard). Schnabel, I. (2004) ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931’, Journal of Economic History, 64 (3), 822–71. Schröder, H.-J. (ed.) (1993) Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States (Providence and Oxford: Berg). Schuker, S.A. (1976) The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). ______(1978) ‘Finance and Foreign Policy in the Era of the German Inflation’ in O. Büsch and G.D. Feldman (eds) Historische Prozesse der deutschen Inflation 1914 bis 1924 (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag). ______(1980) ‘Review of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes’, vols. 17 and 18, Journal of Economic Literature, 18, 124–6. ______(1983) ‘American Foreign Policy and the Young Plan, 1929’ in G. Schmidt (ed.) Konstellationen Internationaler Politik, 1924–1932 (Bochum: N. Brockmeyer). ______(1985) ‘American Reparations to Germany, 1919–1933’ in Feldman and Müller-Luckner (eds) (1985). ______(1988) American ‘Reparations’ to Germany, 1919–33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). ______(1991) ‘American Policy toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922’ in Fink, Frohn and Heideking (eds) (1991). ______(1992) ‘The End of Versailles’ in G. Martel (ed.) 2nd edn. (1992). ______(2003) ‘The Gold-Exchange Standard: A Reinterpretation’ in M. Flandreau, C.-L. Holtfrerich and H. James (eds) International Financial History in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Self, R.C. (2006) Britain, America and the War Debt Controversy (London: Routledge). Seydoux, J. (1921) [article signed “Y ...”] ‘La Question des Réparations depuis la Paix’, Revue d’Economie Politique, 35, 673–712. Sharp, A. (1979) ‘Britain and the Channel Tunnel 1919–1920’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 25, 210–15. ______(1991a) The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (Basingstoke: Macmillan). ______(1991b) ‘Lloyd George and Foreign Policy, 1918–1922. The “And Yet” Factor’ in J. Loades (ed.) The Life and Times of David Lloyd George (Bangor, ME: Headstart History). Bibliography 249

Sharp, A. (1995) ‘Standard-Bearers in a Tangle: British Perceptions of France after the First World War’ in D. Sutton (ed.) Statecraft and Diplomacy in the 20th Century (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press). ______(2008) David Lloyd George: Great Britain (London: Haus Publishing Ltd.). Silverman, D. (1982) Reconstructing Europe after the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). ______(1994) ‘A Review of G.D. Feldman (1993), The Great Disorder’, American Historical Review, 99, 1713–15. Skidelsky, R. (1992) John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour 1920–1937 (London: Macmillan). Slocombe, G. (1936) The Memoirs of George Slocombe (London and Toronto: Heinemann). Soutou, G.-H. (1976) ‘Une autre politique? Les tentatives Françaises d’entente économique avec l’Allemagne, 1919–1921’, Revue d’Allemagne, 8 (1), 21–34. Steiner, Z. (2005) The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919– 1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Stevenson, D. (2004) 1914–1918: The History of the First World War (London: Allen Lane). Suarez, G. (1938–1952) Briand: sa vie, son oeuvre, vol. 5 (Paris: Plon). Taylor, A.J.P. (1991) The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin Books). Tipton, F.B. (2003) History of Modern Germany since 1815 (Berkeley: University of California Press). Toniolo, G. (2005) Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Tooze, A. (2006) The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books). Trachtenberg, M. (1980) Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press). ______(2000) ‘Review Essay; Versailles Revisited’, Security Studies, 9 (3), 191–205. ______(2003) ‘The Question of Realism: A Historian’s View’, Security Studies, 13 (1), 156–94. Turner, A. (1996) ‘Anglo-French Financial Relations in the 1920s’, European History Quarterly, 26, 31–55. ______(1997) ‘Keynes, the Treasury and French War Debts in the 1920s’, European History Quarterly, 27 (4), 505–30. ______(1998) The Cost of War: British Policy on French War Debts, 1918–1932 (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press). Unger, G. (2005) Aristide Briand: le ferme conciliateur (Paris: Fayard). Voth, H.-J. (2003) ‘With a Bang, not a Whimper: Pricking Germany’s “Stock Market Bubble” in 1927 and the Slide into Depression’, Journal of Economic History, 63, 65–99. Wasserstein, B. (2007) Barbarism and Civilization (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). Webb, S.B. (1986a) ‘Fiscal News and Inflationary Expectations’, Journal of Economic History, 46, 769–94. ______(1986b) ‘Government Revenue and Spending in Germany, 1919–1923’ in G.D. Feldman and G. Ambrosius (eds) Die Anpassung An die Inflation = The Adaptation to Inflation (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). 250 Bibliography

Webb, S.B. (1987) ‘The German Inflation and Foreign Business Cycles, 1920–1922’ Explorations in Economic History, 24, 409–33. ______(1988) ‘Latin American Debt Today and German Reparations after World War I – a Comparison’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 124 (4), 745–74. ______(1989) Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Weimar Germany (Oxford: (Oxford University Press). Weill-Raynal, E. (1947) Les réparations allemandes et la France (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines). Weitz, E.D. (2007) Weimar Germany: promise and tragedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. (1933) The Wreck of Reparations (London: Allen & Unwin). Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. and H. Latimer (1930) Information on the Reparation Settlement (London: Allen & Unwin). Widdig, B. (2001) Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press). Williamson, D.G. (1991) The British in Germany, 1918–30 (Oxford: Berg). ______(2005) Germany since 1815: A Nation Forged and Renewed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Winkler, H.A. (2006) Germany: The Long Road West, vol.1, 1789–1933. trans. A.J. Sager (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Wright, J. (2002) Gustav Stresemann; Weimar’s Greatest Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Zanden, J. van (1997) The Economic History of the Netherlands, 1914–1995 (London: Routledge). Zuckerman, L. (2004) The Rape of Belgium (New York: New York University Press). Index

Allied sanctions, 34, 53, 59, 60–2, 64, at Peace Conference (1919), 14–16, 71, 80, 114–17, 153, 155–7, 178, 186 22–5, 29–30, 33–9 Allied war debts, 2, 6, 108, 165, and reparation negotiations, 47–66, 171–2, 211–12, 225, 233 104–6, 108–17 cancellation proposals, 6, 69, 116, and Ruhr occupation, 124–6, 138 208, 216, 173, 208–9, 211–12, war debts, 5, 16, 24, 116, 212–16 216, 233 Brüning, Heinrich, 195–6, 197–200, as unresolved problem, 192, 212–17 202–4, 207, 210, 212, 222–3 Alsace-Lorraine, 11–12, 18, 40 deflationary policy, 197–200, appeasement, 16, 29, 32–3, 234, 240 204, 222 Austro-German customs union crisis, diplomatic initiatives, 200–3 201, 204, 223–4 emergency decrees, 198, 202 balance of power, 16, 50, 235 Clemenceau, Georges, 7, 9, 13–14, 22, Balderston, Theo, 89, 93, 131, 198, 221 28, 30, 34, 38–9, 42 Balfour Note, 108–11, 112, 135, Conferences: 175, 189 Cannes (1922), 79, 92, 104–5 Bank of England, 57, 105, 112, 115, Genoa (1922), 105–7 154, 186, 203, 206–7, 224 The Hague (1929, 1930), 175–7 Bank of France, 124, 206, 224 Lausanne (1932), 1, 4, 192, 208, Bank for International Settlements 211–13, 215–16 (BIS), 174, 183, 203, 205, 207, Locarno (1925), 160, 187, 188 211, 249 London (1921), 59–60 Bankers’ Committee, 109–10, 142 London (1924), 150–6 Belgium, passim Paris (1921), 81 priority for reparations, 21, 88, 112, Paris (1923), 113–17 115, 128 San Remo (1920), 55, 78 and Ruhr occupation, 117–20, 127–9 Spa (1920), 55–7, 78, 117 wartime experience, 20–2 conference diplomacy, 53–65, 78–9, Berg, Manfred, 74, 76, 82 106–7, 137 Blum, Léon, 8 Cuno, Wilhelm, 99, 113, 117, 122, Bonar Law, Andrew, 42, 113–16, 125, 138, 237 129, 136–7 Bonar Law Plan, 114, 116–17, 128, Dawes Loan, 146, 153–4, 157–61, 136, 173 163–4, 171–4, 179–80, 182–3, Borchardt, Knut, 193, 221, 222 186, 188, 218–19 Bradbury, Sir John, 52, 64, 109, 114, Dawes Plan, 84, 95, 125, 128, 131–2, 116, 136–7 141, 143–6, 148, 150 –3, 155–8, Briand, Aristide, 52–3, 59–65, 80–1, 161–4, 166, 176, 184–5, 188 104–6, 134, 177, 187–8, 202 destabilising incentives of, Britain, passim 162–6 economic problems, 16, 48, 57, 64, genesis of, 141–5 94, 106, 125–6, 139, 143 as Ponzi scheme, 161–2

251 252 Index

Dawes Plan – continued Banking crisis (1931), 202–6, 222 transfer protection, 141, 147–9, 164, capacity to pay, 14, 23–4, 27, 29, 166–7, 169–71, 174, 183–5, 198 48–9, 53, 62, 67–8, 73–6, 81, 84, debt burdens, 71, 73, 87 87–8, 92, 109 comparisons of, 71–3 capital flight, 76, 82, 91, 94, 96–8, Depoortere, Rolande, 64, 80, 128, 129 133, 150, 185, 196 capital inflows, 78, 94, 133, 164, Erfüllungspolitik, 82, 88, 111, 113, 117, 182–3, 194–7, 225 221, 234 under Dawes Plan, 153, 157–66 as tactic, 88, 103 Erzberger’s taxes, 90–4, 132–3 Wirth-Rathenau policy, 82, 88, exports, 51, 58, 60, 62, 68, 74, 77, 93, 117 79, 86, 110, 149, 198 fiscal/budgetary problems, 75, 85–7, Feldman, Gerald D., 44, 69, 75–7, 82, 91–3, 98–102, 160, 195–6, 202 88, 94, 98, 102, 110, 131, 134, foreign debts, 73, 88, 141, 149, 136, 138, 220–1 161–2, 163–5, 179, 180–3, 190, Ferguson, Niall, 75, 96, 100, 101, 197–201, 205–6, 217–19 133, 237 monetary/currency stabilisation, Fink, Carole, 93, 105–6, 137 87, 94, 98, 100, 103–4, 107, 129, First World War, 1, 8, 138, 225 135, 159 Armistice (1918), 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 17, moratoriums, 67, 92, 96, 105, 25, 233 108–17, 128, 134–5, 141, 146, legacy of, 4–22, 71 192, 203, 206, 218 Fischer, Conan, 43, 96, 120, 126, at Peace Conference (1919), 17–20, 137, 227 27–30, 32–7 France, passim repayment of Weimar’s debts, and Britain, 9, 10, 47–53, 62–3, 79, 218–19 112–17 Standstill agreements, 204, 206, reconstruction, 8–9, 12, 26, 38–40, 208, 224 51, 106, 116, 124, 168 unemployment, 90, 110, 160, 170, Rhenish ambitions, 13–14, 16, 193–4, 199–200, 222 129–31 Versailles Treaty provisions, 18–19, and Ruhr occupation, 4, 84, 104, 26–8, 30, 32–3, 95–6, 98, 227, 117–31 234–5 sanction initiatives, 53, 60–4, 153, German inflation (1922–3), 84–104 155, 157 and bankruptcy, 84–6, 88–9, 103, security concerns, 10, 13, 32–6, 39, 114, 136 50, 52–3, 104, 106–7, 129–30, causes of, 84–93 139, 152, 217 consensus on, 86–91, 98–102 security guarantees, 14, 34, 36, 39, and distributional conflict, 86–7, 90 42, 46, 134 domestic and international war damages, 4, 8–9, 10–11, 24, 26, constraints, 87–9 41–2, 81 and fiscal problems, 89–93 war debts, 4, 114, 117, 167, 206, hyperinflation, 5, 78, 94, 96, 213, 215 99–100, 103, 122, 160 and reparations, 98–102 Germany, passim German railways, 169, 175, 184 and American money, 84, 141, 151, Gilbert, Seymour Parker, 147, 159, 161, 217 165–9, 177 Index 253

Great Britain, see Britain and conference diplomacy, 53–65 Great Depression, 2, 37, 133, 141, 190, Fontainebleau memorandum, 192, 194, 199–201, 210–11, 214, 33, 46 221, 225 and German reparations, 30, 37–8 Great War, see First World War war pensions claim, 22–5 Locarno treaties, 41, 160, 187, 188 Herriot, Édouard, 152–6, 185, 210, 215 London Schedule of Payments (1921), Hitler, Adolf, 2, 123, 137, 162, 217 2, 51, 64–5, 95, 108–9, 112–13, beer hall putsch, 123, 137 116–17, 128, 170, 177, 184 Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, 72, 74, 76, burden of, 70–3 82, 131, 221 feasibility of, 71–8 Hoover, Herbert, 77, 142, 203–5, significance of figures in, 68–71 207–9, 212, 215 Loucheur, Louis, 12, 51, 57, moratorium, 77, 204–5, 207 79–80, 106 Hughes, Charles Evans, 62, 141–2, 151, 183 MacDonald, James Ramsay, 151–2, 154, 156, 175, 177, 185, 202, inflation tax, 87, 100, 131 209–10, 215 Mantoux, Étienne, 235–6, 239 James, Harold, 85, 100, 221, 224, 227 Marks, Sally, 23, 27, 69–70, Jeannesson, Stanislas, 63, 112, 129, 75, 105, 110, 116, 128, 137, 131, 137, 138 211, 220 Johnson Act (1934), 216, 225 Mellon-Bérenger agreement, 168 mésentente cordiale, 113–17 Keynes, John Maynard (Lord Keynes Millerand, Alexandre, 49–50, 53, of Tilton), 2, 14–15, 29, 33, 37–8, 55–6, 70, 105 42, 59, 62, 65, 69, 78, 80, 131, Mommsen, Hans, 28, 33, 197, 203 136–7, 228, 230, 232, 235, 237–40 Morgan, J.P. (bankers), 109, 124, anti-reparations campaign, 233–8 151, 154, 156, 158–9, 185–6 Economic Consequences of the Peace and Dawes Loan, 154–9, 186 (1919), 33, 42, 136, 228, 234–5, 237, 240 Nazi debt default, 2, 22, 217–18 on German reparations, 14–15, Norman, Montagu, 154, 156, 186, 37–8, 228–38 215, 224 Keynes-Ohlin debate (1929), 228–33 Ohlin, Bertil, 228, 229–32, 238 on transfer problem, 228–33 Keynes-Ohlin debate (1929), 228, Krüger, Peter, 20, 82, 201 229–32

Lamont, Thomas, 22, 25, 144, 154, 186 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 2, 4, 7, Lausanne Conference (1932), 1, 4, 22–31, 33–5 192, 208, 211–12, 216 British peace plans at, 14–16 Lausanne Convention (1932), 211–12 estimates of war damages, 9, 11, Laval, Pierre, 207–9, 224 41, 81 Lentin, Antony, 3, 33, 37–8, 46 French claims at, 7–8, 10–11, Lloyd George, David, 9, 13–15, 22, 13–14, 34 24–5, 30–8, 42, 45, 47–9, 53–66, German counterproposals at, 78, 80–1, 104–7, 109, 112, 28–31, 70 117, 134–5 reparations at, 22–8, 234 254 Index

Poincaré, Raymond, 22, 54, 78–80, fixes reparations bill, 63–5 100, 105–6, 109, 111–17, 119, powers of, 115, 152 123–5, 129–31, 134, 137, 139, 143, restriction of powers, 115, 151, 153, 152, 160 155, 157 and productive pledges reparation crises and Allied disunity, (guarantees), 111–17 104–6, 111–17 Ruhr occupation, 104, 114, 117, Reparations (Recovery) Act 1921, 51, 123, 124–6, 129–31 60, 80–1 ‘priority’ of payments question, 21, Rhineland, 13–14, 29, 33–6, 116–17, 23–4, 52, 88, 112, 115, 136, 155, 129–31, 146, 152, 169, 175, 158–9, 163–4, 171, 187–9, 198, 183, 187 209, 218 evacuation of, 14, 152, 169, 175, 177–8, 187 Rapallo, Treaty of, 107 occupation of, 14, 29, 33–5 Rathenau, Walther, 50–1, 76, 79, separatism, 111, 129–31 81–2, 88, 93, 111 Ritschl, Albrecht, 72, 73–4, 89, 102, Reichsbank, 79, 85–6, 91–3, 98–9, 164–5, 221 104, 111, 136, 145, 147, 159–60, Ruhr, 2, 11–12, 36, 41, 49, 61, 63–5, 171, 196, 199, 203–5, 218 67, 80, 84, 104, 116–35, 142–3 foreign-exchange reserves, 162, Ruhr occupation, 2, 4, 63–4, 84, 99, 166, 171, 182, 196, 199, 202 103, 117–25, 139 reparations, passim balance sheet of, 126–9, 139–40 Allied claims for, 3, 5, 7, 27, 41, 81 evacuation of, 151–5, 157 amount paid (net), 78, 211–12 passive resistance, 99, 117–22, 126, Anglo-French disagreements on, 130, 137 3, 24, 47–50, 52, 62–3, 111–13, 115–16 Schacht, Hjalmar, 156, 159–60, ‘capacity to pay’ vs ‘willingness to 165–6, 169–72, 178, 184–6, pay’, 73–6, 87–8, 184 217–18, 222 cash payments, 49–51, 66–7, 92, 5, Schuker, Stephen A., 70, 74–5, 103, 98, 105, 108, 111–12, 132, 146 107, 132, 134–5, 161, 166, 188, ‘Clearing Payments’ regime, 95–6, 212, 225, 236–8 132, 146–7 Schwabe, Klaus, 17, 216–17, 226 deliveries in kind, 49, 50–2, 57, Seydoux, Jacques, 57, 63, 106 66–7, 113, 127, 129, 163, 176 Seydoux Plan, 37, 57 end of, 77, 190, 208–12 Sharp, Alan, 8, 30, 34, 37–8, 40–2, and inflation (German), 98–104 48, 54, 65, 67, 227 mobilisation /commercialisation of, Snowden, Philip (Viscount), 154, 156, 152, 156, 158, 167–8, 173–4, 177 175–7, 189 as political problem, 73–4, 76–7, Steiner, Zara, 53, 74, 107, 110, 116, 95, 182 137, 227 after Second World War, 238, 240 Stresemann, Gustav, 122–3, 130, and other Treaty expenses, 95–6, 138, 143–4, 152–5, 169, 175, 181, 98, 146 187, 201 see also Dawes Plan, Young Plan Reparations Commission, 3, 26, 28, Thoiry meeting (1926), 187 37, 41, 51, 54–7, 61–4, 69, 92, Trachtenberg, Marc, 36–7, 40, 45 108–10, 111–12, 115–17, 128, 142, Transfer problem, 2, 48, 57, 77, 147, 150–3, 159, 177 164, 181, 228–33, 238 Index 255

United States, passim Weimar Republic, 19, 76, 79, 82, 86, and Allied war debts, 4–5, 143, 89, 107, 138, 178, 240 167–9, 172, 174, 208, 211, 212–17 distributional conflicts, 82, 86–7, 89 loans to Germany, 141, 159–62, economic and social problems, 76–7, 183, 194, 228 86, 91–5, 97–100, 102, 192–5 at Peace Conference (1919), 5–8, weakness of governments, 76, 86, 12–13, 22–6, 30–1, 33–4 194–6, 210 rejection of Versailles Treaty, 3, 13, see also Germany 34, 234 Wiesbaden accords, 50–1, 57, 79 Upper Silesia, 29–30, 59–60, 62, Wilson, Woodrow (US President), 5, 81–2, 98 7, 9, 13, 20, 23–5, 30, 33–4, 36, 39–40, 234, 239 Versailles Treaty (1919), 1–3, 7, 13, Fourteen Points, 7, 20, 33, 39–40 18, 32, 34–5, 46, 50, 73, 95, Winkler, Heinrich August, 19, 31, 46, 106–7, 116, 156, 158, 177, 188, 82, 223 228, 234, 237 Wirth, Joseph, 64, 69, 81–2, 92–3, execution and enforcement of, 3, 105, 109, 111, 113, 117, 135 31–2, 36, 47–50, 53, 59–63, 78, 227 Young Loan, 179–80, 200, and ‘German Problem’, 31–9 217–19, 226 revision of, 47–50, 157 Young, Owen D., 170–1, 188, 190 severity vs mildness of, 36–9 Young Plan, 75, 141, 166–72, Treaty terms and Germany, 18–19, 173–83, 189, 192, 198, 200, 32–3, 95, 98, 227, 234–5 205, 208–11, 223 ‘war guilt’ clause, 26–8, 44–5, 178 and commercialisation of reparations, 173, 185, 189 war costs and finance, 4–6, 7, 9, 23–5, conditional /unconditional 27, 38–9, 209 annuities, 171, 173–4, 176, war damages, 2, 7–8, 23, 54, 63, 66, 178–80, 189, 205 81, 171 German nationalists’ attack on, war pensions, 5, 22–6, 44, 87, 101, 234 174, 177–9 Webb, Steven B., 95, 101, 110, 132–3 Young Report, 172–6