Transarmament: a Jewish Nuclear Strategy Arthur Waskow
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ogy, human beings will have developed weapons really accurate), we tend to divide into two camp* so well that they become useless. Perhaps, by the One sees the issue as a question of life or death; end of the century, society will bring down die the other, as a question of freedom or repression. curtain on the final act of a half century of nuclear It is in fact, both-, and we must begin to see it thai ballistic missiles. way. The Quality of Nuclear Peace The present policy of the U. S. government is a policy of "Both Red and Dead." That is, it tends? Our expectations for nuclear peace cannot and will to increase both Soviet repression of Jews and not share the expectations of conventional peace—a other people, and the danger of a world-wide nu- tranquility that arrives after the cessation of fire. clear holocaust. , Nuclear peace will always be a time of tension since all sides have the ability to totally destroy the If the present policy is that self-destructive why it enemy and the ability to produce the bomb will be the American public allowing the U. S. govern- easily available. ment to pursue it? The main reason is that most at us are addicted to an incorrect belief: that having Jews are very much at home with a tension-filled more nuclear "weapons" than the Soviet Union 1 peace. True Isaiah and Micah speak of beating makes us stronger than the Soviet Union, and thsfl swords into ploughshares, of the wolf living with the more we have, the more "stronger" we are,»' the lamb. But another Prophet who .dreams of the future is Joel. He writes: "Proclaim ye this among We are addicted to this incorrect belief because w» the nations, prepare war;/ Stir up the mighty men;/ remember that through most of human history, Let all the men of war draw near,/ Let them come having more and more powerful weapons than up./ Beat your ploughshares into swords/ And your your adversaries made you more likely to win a pruning-hooks into spears;/ Let the weak say: 7 war against them—and therefore politically more am strong'." (Joel 4:9-10) powerful even without war. If you were stronger enough, it might even make war less likely, and The peace prophecy of Isaiah is not contradicted peace easier to keep. So you were more likely to by the war prophecy of Joel. According to the get what you wanted in the world and more likely Amora Samuel (Shab. 63a), Isaiah speaks of the to stay safe and at peace if you had weapon su- future in Olam Haba, the Next World, posited by periority. the tradition as totally and qualitatively different from anything we know in Olam Hazeh, This The crucial flaw in this belief is that nuclear World. Joel, however, speaks of the "days of "weapons" are not in fact weapons. Why do we . Messiah," a historical vision, a preliminary stage think they are? Pardy because they entered human of the glorious future. Joel addresses himself to the history in the guise of weapons, at Hiroshima. BuJ first step of the future, and speaks to the Jewish we are now far beyond the Hiroshima bomb—nott people. Isaiah addresses himself to the final step in only in numbers, not only in fury of each the redemption, and speaks to the whole world. "weapon," but in the elaborate systems to delivetf them—more and more fully automated and orchesi- In our unredeemed world we will have to setde for trated. So now, if they are used they will create | the Joel prophecy, a world of tension, Auschwitzes (not victories or defeats), and if not j miraculously still capable of being a Messianic era. used they do not overawe the adversary as real I pray that the God of the Noahide covenant will weapons used to do, and in fact still do. shine through His rainbow that hangs in the sky, and may that be the only thing in the sky until the The way the incorrect belief in weapon superiority Mashiach comes. • is carried into U. S. strategy and military budget* is through various theories of "counterforce nu- clear war," now usually combined with Star Wafl Transarmament: a jewish nuclear strategy (Strategic Defense Initiative). Arthur Waskow These counterforce strategies have a lucky by- When Jews address what to do about nuclear product: they require the constant multiplication co "weapons"(each one is potentially an instant port- amounts of money to buy more and more, newer' able Auschwitz, so the word "weapon" is not and newer, weapons systems. These strategic the* ories are thus very helpful to those interests- ARTHUR WASKOW heads The Shalom Center, governmental, military, industrial, or scientific— which works to prevent a nuclear holocaust, and he that are already involved in making, planning, teaches at the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, building, justifying, buying or deploying such both in Philadelphia. weapons. 132 The "Both Red and Dead" policy of the present might really try to win military superiority—and 'U. S. government is also vigorously supported by use it to threaten the Soviet Union. When the ja few specific American Jewish leaders and organi- U. S. acts more parity/deterrence oriented, swing ' cations because it feels to them like a strong anti- people pursue more accommodative/commercial in- Soviet stance. It is vaguely opposed by most terests, because these are more likely to benefit is a i lews—about 80% of whom (along with most of their own institutions and Soviet interests in the teufo, their major organizations) support a bilateral nu- world. clear freeze and say that any nuclear "war" would be horrendously destructive; but few have a clear Of course these vicious and virtuous cycles work kinderstanding that present U. S. policy is built on in the other direction, too—a Soviet occupation of counterforce strategy; and few oppose it with vigor Afghanistan strengthens American hard-liners. And and consistency. outside factors—like rising and falling Soviet fears of China—have their own effect. If American Jews were to act on their values, ex- Counterforce Strategy Self-destructs periences, and interests, they would be vigorously mon pushing for "big carrot; adequate stick" policies Now let us look at my assertion that counterforce id aimed at shifting Soviet policy away from repres- strategy is more likely to kill us than minimum- are sion of Jews and others, away from militarization, deterrence strategy. How can this be so? Counter- toward a strategy of "adequate deterrent" leading force strategists claim three things: that American luse *if Co mutual nuclear disarmament. The American counterforce superiority will keep the peace be- ly. strategy most likely to push the Soviets in this cause the Soviets will be afraid to attack us; that if lan direction is one that on our side moves toward an they did attack us, a nuclear war could be carried fin a "adequate deterrent," takes the enormous amount on between the military forces of both sides- lof money and brain power now put into the coun- leaving most civilians, both societies, and life on terforce weapon superiority strategy and instead earth relatively safe; and that American counter- ^ directs it toward the much more clever use of po- force superiority could be used to threaten a first :lyto ;Utical, economic, and cultural weapons—which are strike against the Soviets to make them back down IiH|j now die most effective weapons for actually chang- if, say, they helped Syria in a war with Israel or su-1 ing the world. sent arms to Nicaragua or invaded Iran. At its most extreme, counterforce strategy suggests that r ! The Practicality of Negotiation such threats might be used to paralyze the Soviets from even non-nuclear responses if the U. S. took lo wet True, we know that what we feel toward Soviet aggressive action—e. g. invaded Cuba, or sent Mipolicy is disgust, rage and frustration. So we seek troops to aid an East German rebellion. If these iB. fy jto express those feelings in national policy the way counterforce arguments are true, aren't we all safer Hflf we often express them in interpersonal affairs—by with counterforce? tiventing our emotions and—if we are bigger— W1 forcing our opponent to back down. In interna- All of this is based on the notion that a counter- irchfl tional affairs it used to do this; smaller powers force nuclear war can be started in a coolheaded reate; once backed down when bigger ones exploded, way and then can be fought in a controlled way. if not The fact that now it is not working just feeds our But counterforce strategy forces both sides toward real rage and frustration the more. a first strike, even if each side knows that a first strike will leave retaliatory forces untouched on the Evidence that this national strategy doesn't work? other side. For the whole point of a counterforce :rioiit When the U. S. exploded more and ran the attack is to weaken the other side's forces. Waiting "weapons" race harder, the Soviets clamped down to be struck makes no sense, especially now that nil- on emigration of Soviet Jews. When the U. S. (un- missiles have MIRVs (multiple warheads). der Nixon, Ford, and Carter) negotiated more and more nearly accepted rough nuclear-weapons par- Listen to the conversation of the Ministers of De- ity, the Soviets eased up. fense and Trade in the Kremlin... or is it the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce in the Penta- itioM Why did this happen? Sheer perversity? One gon?.