Socio-Economic Impacts, and an Analysis of the 2019
SOCIO-ECONOMIC MONITORING REPORT FOR THE MARY RIVER PROJECT
IN RELATION TO THE
ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT MARY RIVER PROJECT – PHASE 2 PROPOSAL (August 2018)
SUBMISSION TO THE NUNAVUT IMPACT REVIEW BOARD January 17, 2021
Hamlet of Pond Inlet
Joshua Arreak Mayor
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Prepared by Dr. Frank Tester, B.Sc., D.Phil, M.E.Des., M.S.W., Technical Advisor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Population Demographics …………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
1.1 Employee and contractor origin ………………………………………………………………………….. 1
1.2 Employee migration and housing status ……………………………………………………………… 2
1.3 Regional and community migration and population …………………………………………… 3
1.4 VSEC Effects assessment ………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
2. Education and Training …………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
2.1 Investments in school-based initiatives ………………………………………………………………. 4
2.2 Secondary school success …………………………………………………………………………………… 5
2.3 Training and advancement programs …………………………………………………………………. 5
2.4 Employee education and pre-Mary River employment Status ……………………………. 9
2.5 VSEC Effects assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 10
3. Employment and Livelihood ………………………………………………………………………………… 11
3.1 Mary River Inuit and LSA employment ……………………………………………………………….. 11
3.2 Mary River employment by gender …………………………………………………………………….. 12
3.3 Employee advancement …………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
3.4 Employee turnover ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
3.5 VSEC Effects assessment ………………………………………………………………………………….. 14
4. Contracting and Business Opportunities …………………………………………………………….. 15
4.1 Employee payroll by Inuit status, scale ………………………………………………………………. 15
4.2 Contract expenditures to Inuit firms ………………………………………………………………….. 17
4.3 Registered Inuit firms ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
4.4 VSEC Effects Assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 17
5. Human Health and Wellbeing ……………………………………………………………………………… 19
5.1 Income and social assistance ……………………………………………………………………………... 21
5.2 Infractions and criminal violations ……………………………………………………………………… 22
5.3 Employee and public health ……………………………………………………………………………….. 25
5.4 VSEC Effects assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 26
6. Community Infrastructure & Public Services ………………………………………………………. 28
6.1 Use of community health centres ………………………………………………………………………. 29
6.2 Use of Project site physician assistants ………………………………………………………………. 29
6.3 Baffinland use of LSA community infrastructure ………………………………………………… 30
6.4 VSEC Effects assessment ………………………………………………………………………………….. 30
7. Cultural Resources ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 31
7.1 VSEC Effects assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 31
8. Resource and Land Use ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 31
9. Cultural Well-Being …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32
9.1 VSEC Effects assessment ……………………………………………………………………………………… 33
10. Economic Development and Self-reliance ………………………………………………………….. 33
10.1 Investments in community and wellness initiatives …………………………………………… 34
10.2 Project Harvesting Interactions and Food Security ……………………………………………. 35
10.3 VSEC Effects assessment ………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
11. Benefits, Royalty, and Taxation …………………………………………………………………………. 37
11.1 Payroll and Corporate Taxes Paid by Baffinland to the Territorial Government …. 38
11.2 VSEC Effects assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 39
12. Governance and Leadership ………………………………………………………………………………. 39
12.1 Governance and Leadership Monitoring and analysis ………………………………………. 39
12.2 VSEC Effects assessment …………………………………………………………………………………… 39
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40
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Socio-Economic Impacts
This submission to the Public Hearing, January 15 – February 6, 2021, is based on data and information found in Baffinland’s 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report (the Monitoring Report). It is supplemented with reference to the application by Baffinland for the Phase 2 Expansion, the Addendum to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Mary River Project – Phase 2 Proposal, (cited as the FEIS) and other relevant sources. The headings used are in reference to the 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report.
1. Population Demographics
1.1 Employee and contractor origin
On page 9 of the 2019 Monitoring Report, Baffinland introduces the topic of population demographics.
There were, in 2019, a total of 417 Inuit employees working for Baffinland.
Of these, 366 were from the 5 North Baffin Affected (LSA) communities.
There was a reported 32% increase in Inuit employees from 2018. However, a calculation of the percentage of Nunavut Inuit employed in relation to the total workforce reveals that Inuit employment dropped from 14.1% in 2018 to 13.3% in 2019.
This changes the impression given by the report which highlights the increase in numbers rather than focusing on the percentage of Inuit working for Baffinland. In its years of operation, Baffinland has not only failed to approach the 25% Inuit workforce that it committed itself to in its initial application to NIRB for the Mary River Project, the percentage of Nunavut Inuit employed has been dropping since 2015, a figure that should further be interpreted in light of an average annual growth rate in LSA communities of 2.2%.
The number of employees from each community, including Pond Inlet, is recorded. It is important to note that the majority of employees from the LSA are contracted. Contracted employees represent a majority - 56% of the total LSA employees (defined as the 5 north Baffin communities). The difference between contracted and Baffinland employees is worthy of note.
The number of Nunavut Inuit employed as a percentage of the workforce is misrepresented in figure 2 (page 9). It is given as 14%. The number of Nunavut Inuit employed (375 based on Figure 1) is only 13.5% of the total workforce (2769). It is presumed that ‘other’ refers to Inuit living in Nunavut communities other than the ones listed.
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Inuit from the LSA (282) are only 10.2% of the workforce, and those who are regular Baffinland employees (as opposed to contracted employees) are 4.5% of the workforce. Mittimatalingmiut are 16.3% of the LSA workforce (including employees from Iqaluit) and 2.2% of the total workforce. Pond Inlet is the community that would be most affected by a Phase 2 expansion.
Figure 3 (Page 10) has a visual impact, but the significance of the data is questionable. The LSA has clearly been redefined to include Iqaluit, contrary to the definition used under ‘Key findings’ (page 9), and the definition of LSA provided on page xii.
Relating the data in Table 3 (page 10) to that found on page 9 is a challenge. ‘Other’, in Figure 1, apparently refers to other Qikiqtani communities. With regard to Inuit, the definition of ‘Other Canadian’ is not clear. This appears to refer to Inuit living outside of the territory. Without the category of ‘Other Canadian’, the calculations look different.
If one is considering the benefit of Baffinland’s operations to Inuit of Nunavut Territory, the percentage of Nunavummiut employed, using data provided in this figure is 13.8%. While the increase in numbers for 2019 may look impressive, the percentage of Nunavummiut in the workforce has been dropping since 2015, and is nowhere near the 25% Inuit workforce to which Baffinland was originally committed. There is, at present, no evidence that this trend in Inuit, as a percentage of the workforce, is changing.
On page 11, a statement is made that is unsupported by any data. The fact that 16.4% of the LSA workforce who are eligible worked at Mary River in 2019 is not evidence that “the project has been successful at attracting LSA-based Inuit employment”.
If Baffinland had produced data that showed changes to the unemployment rate among Inuit old enough to be employed and with a high school (or equivalent) education, it might have been able to make this claim. The employment it has attracted may be individuals who would be employed elsewhere if it were not for Baffinland. Figure 4 (page 12) shows that out migration from the LSA has exceeded in-migration and has increased considerably in 2018 and 2019 in relation to previous years. Baffinland may constitute a drain on skills needed - and not available - elsewhere.
Baffinland has observed that “… while the Mary River mine requires a range of technical and non- technical skill sets, the Project’s labour demand is anticipated to continue to exceed LSA Inuit labour supply over the entire life of the Project”. This makes it clear that having any impact on Inuit employment (LSA taken here to include Iqaluit) will require a considerable effort at training Inuit for jobs that may become available.
The matter is of critical importance given that Baffinland has indicated that it will reduce its workforce by 13% with the proposed Phase 2 expansion. Baffinland’s track record with regard to training and promotion is important in this regard.
1.2 Employee migration and housing status
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Figure 4 examines LSA (presumably North Baffin community) migration for contract and Baffinland employees between 2015 and 2019.
According to records submitted by Community Liaison Officers, 32 contract or Baffinland employees relocated within the LSA. Of these, 26 or 81% left the LSA. Twenty six employees are 9% of Inuit Baffinland employees and contract employees within the LSA. This suggests that one impact of Baffinland employment may be that once some employees have amassed enough capital to relocate, they leave the LSA for either Iqaluit or locations out of the territory.
The results presented in Figure 5 (page 12) do little to dispel this possibility. The questionnaire about changes in address, housing status and migration intentions was completed by only 20% of North Baffin LSA Inuit staff in 2019. If the sample size were large, this response rate would have produced statistically valid results. However, the population sampled is small (presumably about 417 individuals). It is also taken from a ‘captive’ audience. Furthermore, it appears that a large number of those responding did not respond to the question about moving (21.13%).
The result has a very large margin of error, to the extent that the results are of little significance. However, even if that is the case, 11.27% of those responding indicated they had plans in the next 12 months to move from one community to another. This corresponds to the figure of 9% in the information collected by Community Liaison Officers. Of 8 respondents, only 2 (25%) planned to remain within LSA communities (p.13).
Relocation - perhaps by those with significant levels of skill - out of the 5 LSA communities, likely to Iqaluit, seems to be one of the impacts on communities of mine employment; that is, depopulation, perhaps of those with higher levels of skill. The data makes it clear that this is not offset by in-migration. Figure 4 suggests that out-migration may be increasing, although only 2 years of data are indicative of any trend.
The research done into the matter of a ‘brain drain’ or the movement of Inuit with skills, out of the region and even out of the territory, needs more and much better research. The return rate suggests a range of possible problems with the wording of the questionnaire, the data that is not being collected, and its administration. The level of skill of those who left needs to be recorded. The data suggests that Baffinland has had no impact on home ownership in the LSA. These matters have been inadequately researched.
1.3 Regional and community migration and population
Figure 7 suggests that any impact that Baffinland has on population growth is minimal, with growth rates before and after development of the Mary River Mine being within a margin of error. The same can be said for the Inuit and non-Inuit composition of communities (Figure 8, page 15), the exception being Iqaluit where the non-Inuit and Inuit population have both grown considerably. The non-Inuit population has grown by several hundred more than the Inuit population between 2013 and the 2016 census.
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As the interpretation of the data suggests, while growth rates in Inuit communities are greater than average Canadian growth rates, the increases in population are unremarkable and cannot be attributed to the presence of Baffinland. Growth in the population of both the LSA and Nunavut is increasing through natural growth.
1.4 VSEC Effects assessment
Residual effect In-migration of Non-Inuit Baffinland Employees to the North Baffin LSA
No in-migration of Non-Inuit Employees to the North Baffin LSA has occurred other than 1 person. The EIS predicted some in-migration and it can be said that none has occurred.
Residual effect Out-Migration of Inuit Residents from the North Baffin LSA
Some out-migration has occurred. Baffinland has no data or information to elaborate on reasons and the nature of the skills that these employees may have taken with them.
2. Education and Training
As noted, Baffinland’s FEIS predicted that:
“Positive residual effects on life skills amongst youth and adults are anticipated to arise from the Project through access to industrial work in a context that is supported through pre-employment preparation and on-the-job training. The Project will have significant beneficial residual effects on education and skills across the LSA. Some potential that individuals may drop out of school or forego further education in order to pursue work at the Project is recognized. However, the overall effect of the Project will be to increase the value of education and thereby the “opportunity cost” of dropping out of school.”
2.1 Investments in school-based initiatives
On page 18 of the 2019 Monitoring Report, Baffinland records that laptops were given to every secondary school student who graduated in the LSA. This means that 63 students graduated in 2017, only 38 in 2018, and 54 in 2019. The number of graduates, as determined by the number of computers donated as reported in Table 4, does not correspond to government data available for 2017. The official government figure is 51 graduates in the LSA in 2017 (Figure 11, page 19).
Only 7 scholarships were given out in 2019 of $5000 each. This is not much more than a return airfare to Ottawa, assuming that this is for students wanting to go south for further education.
How is the $300,000 for school lunch programs distributed among the 5 LSA? Pond Inlet receives $45,000 of this a year. There are 450 students in Pond Inlet. The money is used for both lunch and breakfast programs. School is for 188 days a year. This means serving 450 x 188 = 84,600 lunches. The amount available for 1 lunch is therefore $45,000 / 84,600 = 53 cents for each student’s lunch. If one
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considers that a breakfast program is also offered, the amount is a little more than 26 cents for each lunch or breakfast served.
In 2018 Arctic College in Pond Inlet received $25,000. In 2019 this was reduced to $5000. No indication is give as to why.
2.2 Secondary school success
Page 19 (figure 11) deals with secondary school graduates. While data on graduates from the LSA is not recorded for the years 2018 and 2019, if it is assumed that every graduate in the LSA received a computer from Baffinland, then the numbers reported in the previous section can be used to calculate changes in graduation rates.
In the period, pre-development (2008-2012), as indicated in Table 5 (p. 20) an average of 45 students graduated per year in the LSA. The number, as indicated, was clearly rising from the previous 2003 – 2007 period. Despite not having data for the 2018 and 2019 period, graduation rates for 2013 and 2019 are presented in Table 5.
Using the official government figure for 2017 (51) and, based on the number of computers given to graduates in 2018 (38) and 2019 (54), a total of 300 graduates or an average of 43 students graduated per year. The graduation rate has dropped by a minimum of 4.5% between the pre and post- development periods. Considering population growth , the LSA population has grown since 2013 by 13%. The graduation rate in relation to the 2013 population was 0.72%. If the same statistic is applied to a population that has grown to 6716 in 2018, there should have been an average of about 46 students graduating per year during this period. Adjusted for population growth, the graduation rate is about 11% less that pre-development graduation rates.
Contrary to the interpretation given in the 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report, (p. 21), the average number of graduates in the LSA has declined (by about 11%) in the post-Project period. Furthermore, contrary to what is reported for Nunavut as a whole, graduation rates between 2016/17 and 2017/18 declined 12.4%, a rate far in excess of any other jurisdiction in Canada.1
Contrary to what has been reported, if anything, Baffinland has had a negative impact on graduation rates in the LSA. Baffinland has not had a positive impact on school success in the LSA.
2.3 Training and advancement programs
Table 7 (page 21) deals with employee training and advancement programs. The data refers to graduates in the case of the Work-Ready program, and participants in the Apprenticeship program. The
1http://www.stats.gov.nu.ca/Publications/Historical/Education/Public%20School%20Graduates%20StatsUpdate,%202017- 2018.pdf.
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Apprenticeship program is particularly relevant to Inuit advancing to better paying jobs. It appears that to date, no Inuk has graduated from this program.2
The figure makes reference to increased numbers in 2019 because of larger workforce requirements. How many in each category were women? What is the relationship of this to the 32% increase in Inuit employment in 2019 over 2018?
Figures 13 and 14 (page 22) make it clear that commencing in 2018, considerable more time has been devoted to Inuit training. Figure 15 (page 22) indicates the type of training received by Inuit (and non- Inuit) employees. There has been considerable improvement in the attention paid to Inuit training.
Table 1. Work Ready Program Data (2019)
Employed at Mary Quarter Community Registered Attended Graduated River Q1 Arctic Bay 8 8 8 2 Q1 Pond Inlet 12 12 10 2 Q2 Igloolik 7 7 6 Q2 Sanirajak 7 7 3 Q2 Arctic Bay 3 3 3 3 Q2 Iqaluit 6 6 6 Q3 Pond Inlet 19 19 13 1 Q3 Clyde River 5 5 3 2 Q3 Igloolik 9 9 8 1 Q3 Sanirajak 9 9 8 4 Q3 Iqaluit 7 6 6 1 Q3 Pond Inlet 7 6 6 4 Q4 Arctic Bay 9 8 7 Q4 Clyde River 4 4 4 1 Q4 Igloolik 8 8 8 Total 120 117 99 21
2 Baffinland has been generous in providing us with an update on the apprenticeship program. “Since its inception, 19 Inuit have been enrolled in BIM’s apprenticeship program, 16 of whom (14 males and 2 females) were active as of the end of 2019 and 3 whom have since resigned for personal reasons. During 2019, three apprentices were off on medical or maternity leave, one of whom has been off since 2018. All 16 current apprentices at Baffinland are progressing through the apprenticeship program and will be attending technical training school for their specific trade and apprenticeship level in 2021 or when possible due to Nunavut Travel restrictions. Baffinland is coordinating the training with the Nunavut Apprenticeship Department. As the program is yet to come to a completion no one has completed the Apprenticeship Stream.”
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Baffinland also provided detailed information on the work ready program (Table 1). In reporting to the Hamlet they stated: “Detailed quarterly data on 2019 Work Ready Program registration, attendance, graduation and subsequent employment at Mary River is provided in Table 1 below. In total, 5 graduates of the Program went on to work at Mary River last year, for both Baffinland and its contractors. BIM does not have complete data on non-Mary River employment outcomes of the Work Ready Program.”
The graduation rate from the program is 84.6%. The number of Inuit subsequently hired is 18%. The text of the Socio-Economic Monitoring report (2019) states that: “Participants had the opportunity to express their interest in any of the roles, and where possible interviews were conducted. This resulted in employment for some participants.” While the Work Ready Program may improve life skills among young adults, no data has been presented with regard to outcomes, the ages of participants or the number of women in the program.
Baffinland made the following chart available and also reported that it is implementing “the Arnait Action Plan which focuses on reducing barriers to employment for Inuit women. The Arnait Action Plan was the result of 2 focus groups with Inuit women as well as a working group made up of government and NGO participants who reviewed the data from the focus groups and helped design the Arnait Action Plan. In addition, when selecting candidates for training and development, efforts are made to balance participants based on gender.” It also provided the Hamlet with data on the jobs held by women at the Mary River mine site.
Table 2. Top 15 Job Titles Held by Mary River Female Inuit Employees, FTEs (2019)
Job title Female Inuit FTE Housekeeper 27.2 Dishwasher 10 Operator 3 9 Administrative Assistant 4.4 Cook 4.3 Baffinland Community Liaison 3.2 Officer Operator 4 2.6 Operator 2 2.5 General Labourer 2.4 Intern 2.4 Guest Services Agent 1.4 Cultural Advisor 1.3 Student 1.1 Other / Unknown 1 Janitor 0.8
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An increase in Inuit in the Apprenticeship program is noted (Table 7, page 21). Baffinland has provided the Hamlet with the following information.
“Since its inception, 19 Inuit have been enrolled in BIM’s apprenticeship program, 16 of whom (14 males and 2 females) were active as of the end of 2019 and 3 whom have since resigned for personal reasons. During 2019, three apprentices were off on medical or maternity leave, one of whom has been off since 2018. All 16 current apprentices at Baffinland are progressing through the apprenticeship program and will be attending technical training school for their specific trade and apprenticeship level in 2021 or when possible due to Nunavut Travel restrictions. Baffinland is coordinating the training with the Nunavut Apprenticeship Department. As the program is yet to come to a completion no one has completed the Apprenticeship Stream.”
With regard to the Q-STEP Heavy Equipment Operator Program in Morrisburg Ontario, no figures are provided with regard to the number of Inuit enrolled, the number that successfully completed the program, and were offered (and accepted) employment as trainees. The same can be said for the Heavy Equipment Operator program.
There is considerable attention given to the number of hours of training completed in 2019 (page 23) and the effort put into training is noteworthy. However, without data on all of these efforts; enrolments, completion rates and data on hiring and an evaluation of what students learned, it is impossible to evaluate effectiveness and outcomes.
Other initiatives, including an ‘Inuit Success Assurance Team” to enhance career success, retention and advancement, and an Adult Basic Education Program and Management and Advanced Skills Training Program, are noted. In addition, work with the Nunavut Literacy Council to complete a Workplace Needs Assessment, and a Cultural Engagement Workshop for all Baffinland and contractor employees at the Mary River site, are described.
What is clearly needed is a thorough evaluation of these programs. This does not need to be a summative evaluation taking place once programs have been operating for a number of years. A formative evaluation that provides insights useful to ‘fine-tuning’ initiatives as they are offered is a more meaningful alternative. Interviews with participants and graduates are important. These need to be combined with statistics that deal with outcomes. It is otherwise impossible to measure the success of these initiatives and furthermore, impossible to modify, redesign or re-consider them should this be necessary.
It is therefore not possible to make the statement that “the Project has had a positive effect on education and skills development amongst LSA residents”. The text has only described these initiatives. It has not evaluated any of them. Furthermore, a fundamental rule in evaluating anything is that one needs before and after data – questionnaires that establish certain parameters relevant to what one hopes an educational initiative achieves administered before offering a program, followed by the re- administration of the instrument at completion in order to measure what has changed. This has not been done. 8 | P a g e
There is, regrettably, no data to support the claims that there has been a positive effect on education and skills development among LSA residents, while Baffinland’s efforts at creating different programs and initiatives is notable. One can assume that these educational experiences have been beneficial and are to some degree, effective. But without program evaluations, it is impossible to say what has or has not been learned.
2.4 Employee education and pre-Mary River employment Status
Regrettably, in this section, the sample in relation to the population surveyed is too small to produce valid results. In this case, a questionnaire was administered to all LSA employees. The response rate was 20% (71 individuals).
While there are a number of considerations that affect the validity of survey research, in this case, the sample size is so removed from what is needed to produce reliable results that we have a hard time understanding why the results have been presented here. For a confidence level of 95% + or – 5%, with a population of 300, the sample size would have to be 165 respondents. The population in this case is 355 employees with only 71 responding. The survey was voluntary with 80% of North Baffin employees declining to participate.
This further reduces the validity of the research, as there may be reasons why 80% refused to participate and those reasons may be relevant to the results. [In this case, North Baffin LSA apparently includes employees from Iqaluit, as there were only 282 employees (based on data produced earlier) from the LSA communities, exclusive of Iqaluit.] 3 The results are compared with census data (2016), and while there are some similarities, the categories from which respondents could chose are not comparable. Census data did not offer the options of apprenticeship or trades certificate, or an option of not responding (presumably what unknown refers to).
Figure 18 (page 26) of the Monitoring Report suggests that a majority of those who responded would be interested in learning more about personal finances. This may reflect the needs of a subset that chose to answer the questionnaire. How many of the sample were men and how many were women? This information – not provided - might have been revealing of the subset of Inuit employees who chose to answer the questionnaire, and help explain the results presented in Figure 19 It may have helped with their limited validity and generalizability to LSA employees.
The response rate to the questionnaire is apparently further reduced by the fact that it appears that not all questions were answered by respondents, hence the category of ‘unknown’.
3 Baffinland’s use of LSA in this document is, at times, confusing. It is used to include and sometimes to exclude the 5 most affected communities. While it is sometimes qualified with reference to North Baffin LSA communities, this is not always the case.
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If Baffinland is to continue to track the education and employment status of its Inuit employees through an Inuit Employee Survey, it needs to critically examine what it is doing, and how it is doing it. Having anyone associated with the company ask these kind of questions of Inuit employees is intimidating and this, in how a questionnaire is presented – and by whom – is an important consideration.
2.5 VSEC Effects assessment
Residual effect Improved Life Skills among Young Adults
The hours of training offered among LSA residents does not provide any answers as to whether or not life skills have been improved among young adults. No data is presented with regard to the number of youth involved in any of these programs and no definition of what constitutes ‘a youth’ has been provided.
All that has been offered in this regard is conjecture. It is stated that “… it can reasonably be assumed that some youth were included in this group” (page 28). This might be true but in terms of impact on youth, depending on what constitutes “some”, there is a big difference between 10 and 60. No data is provided. A statement like: “It is further acknowledged that life skills development for some individuals can take time to be achieved” (page 28), says nothing in support of whether or not what has been offered is effective or has achieved its objectives.
Baffinland funds a Community Counsellor Program. But no evaluation of the program has been presented and its relationship to improving life skills among young adults (the residual effect being evaluated in this case), is neither explained, documented, nor evaluated.
Baffinland has presented no indicators that “positive effects on life skills development among young adults in the LSA continue to result from the Project, as predicted in the EIS”, and there “… are indications that positive effects on life skills development among young adults in the LSA continue to result from the project” (page 28). This is entirely conjectured. Baffinland has no evidence – has done no research or evaluations – that support this statement. It also has no evidence to show that youth are using the counselling and support services that it cites with regard to this residual effect.
Residual effect Incentive Related to School Attendance and Success
There is no evidence to support a claim that the Project has had a positive effect on education and skills development across the LSA by providing incentives related to school attendance and success. The data suggests, as outlined previously, that contrary to the data Baffinland has provided, graduation rates in the LSA have declined as much as 11% in the post-development period.
As noted, the amount available for school lunch programs and scholarships is such that it is hard to image these as incentives and whether or not receiving a laptop upon graduation serves as a motive for someone who is considering dropping out of school is highly questionable. No original research has been done with students to gain insight into what factors interfere with their ability to complete
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secondary school or serve as a motivation to graduate. There is no evidence that the possibility of employment at Baffinland is a motivating factor.
Baffinland is correct in stating that the impact of the Mary River Project on graduates and graduation rates is unclear. It is reasonable to state that there are very many factors that explain graduation rates. There is no evidence to support a claim that actions taken by Baffinland affect graduation rates one way or another, but if anything, the data suggests that in the post-development period, graduation rates have declined. A well-designed piece of research that explored all the possibilities that explain what keeps young Inuit in school, or causes them to leave, would be a valuable addition to the literature on Inuit post-secondary education.
Residual effect Opportunities to Gain Skills
As noted, the EIS predicted the Project would have a positive effect on education and skills development among LSA residents
While Baffinland is providing an increasing number of training programs and learning opportunities, no research has been done to evaluate any of these programs. As previously noted, evaluation would involve before and after surveys to ascertain what, if any, changes had taken place as a result of the learning experience provided. None of this evaluative research has been undertaken. Other than observing that an individual has acquired the skills necessary to, for example, operate a fork lift or bulldozer, Baffinland has no data that provides insight into what skills have been acquired and the extent to which they have been acquired.
In the section ‘monitoring results’ (page 30) , no results are presented. This section details what has been provided by way of programs and numbers of Inuit in some programs and hours of training provided. It does not present any data in support of the claim that its initiatives have had a “positive effect on education and skills development among LSA residents, as predicted in the EIS”. There is no evidence to support this claim.
3. Employment and Livelihood
3.1 Mary River Inuit and LSA employment
On page 32, the number of Inuit FTEs4 from the 5 communities in the LSA is presented. There is an impressive increase in Inuit FTEs between 2017 and 2019 (159 to 288). However, as a percentage of the total, the number of FTEs declines from 14.1% in 2018 to 13.3% in 2019 (Table 8, page 32). The number for North Baffin LSA (a figure that, in this case, does not include Iqaluit), declines from 9.3% to 8.7%. At the same time, the FTEs for Inuit have risen substantially.
4 Full time equivalents (FTEs)have been used as a proxy for the number of employees, something that gives a more accurate picture of employment.
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These figures are important, but so is an indication of what these employees were hired to do. How many of these were contract employees?
Baffinland has emphasized the increase in Inuit FTEs. However, the understanding Inuit have is that Baffinland would work toward having Inuit be at least 25% of the workforce and, with this in mind, the more important and revealing statistic, we maintain, is Inuit as a percentage of the total workforce.
3.2 Mary River employment by gender
On page 33, Inuit FTEs for Baffinland and contract employees are presented by gender. If the number of Inuit and non-Inuit are totalled in 2019, Baffinland employed 207 Inuit men and 80 Inuit women for a total of 287 Inuit in 2019.
It is Inuit as a percentage of the workforce that is explored here, for the reasons stated above. Comparing this with the number of non-Inuit is difficult because only a percentage of non-Inuit women as a percentage of the total workforce are shown. However, 7% of the non-Inuit workforce would be 131 women. 93% of the non-Inuit workforce is 1740 men.
As a percentage of the total workforce, in 2019 Inuit men represent 207 / (207 + 80 +131 + 1740) x 100 = 9.6% of the workforce. Inuit women represent 80 / (207 + 80 +131 + 1740) x 100 = 3.7% of the workforce. Inuit are 13.3% of the total workforce. This is not made obvious from the way the numbers are reported in figures 21 and 22 (page 33), but Table 9 reports these statistics.
Compared to 2018, the situation looks like this. In 2018 there were 60 Inuit women employed and 156 Inuit men. There were 52 non-Inuit women and 1260 non-Inuit men. Inuit women were 60 / (60 + 156 + 52 + 1260) x 100 = 3.9% of the workforce. Inuit men were 156 / (60 + 156 + 52 + 1260) x 100 = 10.2% of the workforce. Inuit are 14.1% of the workforce, as noted in Table 9 (page 33).
As a percentage of the workforce, Inuit declined between 2018 and 2019 from 14.1% of the workforce to 13.3% of the workforce. Women went from being 3.9% of the workforce to 3.7% of the workforce. Inuit men went from being 10.2% of the workforce to 9.6% of the workforce.
Baffinland is correct in identifying lack of childcare in LSA communities as a major factor affecting the employment of Inuit women in the LSA. In reporting on training, Baffinland needs to pay more attention to training opportunities and the experiences of Inuit women. What is missing is data on the types of jobs performed by Inuit women and information on their aspirations in this workplace.
3.3 Employee advancement
Figure 23 (page 34) presents data on the total number of Baffinland Inuit employee promotions over time. The numbers give the impression that since 2017, progress has been made with the number increasing from 3 in 2017 to 6 in 2018 and 8 in 2019.
Three employees in 2017 are (3/160 x 100 = 2%) of the Inuit workforce. In 2018, the number of Inuit promotions represents (6/216 x 100 = 2.8%) of the Inuit workforce. In 2019, the number of Inuit 12 | P a g e
promotions represents (8/287 x 100 = 2.8%) of the Inuit workforce. As a percentage of the Inuit labour provided to Baffinland, there is no change in the percentage of Inuit being promoted from 2018 to 2019, a figure hidden by using absolute numbers rather than percentages in Figure 23, to report on promotions. Two point eight percent of the Inuit workforce receiving promotions is a low, and is a seriously unacceptable rate of promotion for Inuit employees.
What is not reported is the serious decline in the number of employees receiving promotions. Using the data in Figure 23 (page 34) and the Baffinland and contractor Inuit FTEs for the years 2014, 15 and 16 found in Figure 21 (page 33), one can get some idea of how badly the matter of promotions has unfolded since 2017.
In 2014 there were 9 promotions in a workforce of 189 Inuit FTEs, a promotion rate of 4.8%. In 2015 there were 14 promotions in a workforce of 150 Inuit FTEs, a rate of 9.3%. In 2016, there were a further 14 promotions in an Inuit workforce of 137 FTEs, a rate of 10.2%. The decline in promotions is dramatic and requires some explanation. None is offered.
The interpretation of this data is misleading, and makes observations that are only possible if absolute numbers rather than promotions as a percentage of the workforce are used. The statement: “This is the third consecutive year of growth following an initial sharp decrease from 2016 – 2017” is particularly strange.
In 2017 it is true that there was a sharp decline in promotions – from 14 to 3 – or from 10.2% of the workforce to 2%. However, to advertise 2019 as “the third consecutive year of growth” is entirely misleading as the growth is only an increase in promotions of 0.8% of the workforce, with the percentage (2.8) being a fraction of what took place in 2015 and 2016.
The project was predicted to have a positive effect on the ability of local residents to progress in their jobs and career choices. The available data does not suggest that the project has had a positive effect on the ability of local residents to progress in their jobs and career choices. In fact, compared to the years 2014-2016, the project effect has been negative. Of the eight employees promoted in 2019, only 1 was female. No gender data is provided for other years.
3.4 Employee turnover
What is not made clear with regard to the data presented is that only Baffinland employee turnover rates are provided (Figure 24). No data is available for contracted labour. This is odd, as the focus of the socio-economic reporting thus far has been on the status of Baffinland and contracted employees.
Baffinland has succeeded, in 2018 and 2019, in reducing the turnover rate for Baffinland employees from a high of 45% in 2016 and 2017, to a low in 2018 of 18%. The initiatives noted likely account for much of the change.
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3.5 VSEC Effects assessment
Residual effect Creation of Jobs in the LSA
In its summary, Baffinland keeps its reporting strictly to reporting on hours of labour. Baffinland makes reference to the 18 Mt/a phase of the project and notes that labour demand would increase to 2.9 million hours (page 37). It is not clear if this is a reference to shipping through Steensby Inlet or a future application for Milne port. The reference to labour hours in the section on monitoring of results avoids dealing with the fact that as a percentage of the workforce, Inuit labour has been in decline.
Residual effect Employment of LSA Residents
What is problematic in the reporting is that while reference to contract employees is used when it is useful to do so for the sake of statistics, in this case, reference to contract employees is dropped from the text. One can imagine a number of reasons why the turnover rate among contracted employees might be higher than among Baffinland employees. Nowhere in the text of the 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report for the Mary River Project is the percentage of the workforce that is contracted labour, and what percentage are Baffinland employees, indicated. For purposes of reporting – except in this instance – they are grouped together. How data related to labour turnover among contract employees might affect the statistics presented here is unknown.
Baffinland needs to provide more information about contract employees. The fact that these Inuit are not direct Baffinland employees does not excuse Baffinland for ensuring that there are standards and conditions related to wages and working conditions that must be met by contractors doing business with Baffinland.
This would be consistent with a commitment by Baffinland to ensure that its project does, in fact, benefit all Inuit associated with its Project, financially and in terms of personal growth, development and opportunity. In the monitoring report, no attention has been paid to contracted labour except when it is convenient to do so.
Baffinland states that the EIS predicted the Project would have a positive effect on wage employment in the LSA and reference is made to a 5%+ change in baseline labour. A keyword search of the EIS for the Phase 2 project does not turn up any reference to a 5%+ change in baseline labour. If the reference is to “percentage”, as a percentage of the labour force, this commitment has not been met.
Residual effect New Career Paths
As Baffinland notes, the Project was predicted to have a positive effect on LSA residents progressing in their jobs and careers.
In reporting on results, Baffinland notes that eight Inuit were promoted to new positions in 2019. What those positions were – from what to what – is not recorded. The EIS says “… a positive effect on the
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ability of residents to progress in their jobs and careers”. Baffinland includes in their ‘Monitoring of results’ a reference to Inuit going from unemployed to employed.
This is clearly not a consideration in dealing with the concept of progressing in a job. One has to have a job in order to be promoted in it. Suggesting that going from being unemployed to being employed is stretching the idea of promotion beyond credibility, as is a reference to career opportunities introduced in the region. This says nothing about Inuit advancing within the company. Baffinland has included hiring and the presence of job opportunities in the region in what is supposed to be observations on LSA residents “progressing in their jobs and careers.”
As noted, Inuit promotions within the company for 2019 are 2.8% of Inuit employees. Baffinland has fallen very far short of the “positive effect” predicted in the EIS.
4. Contracting and Business Opportunities
In presenting ‘Key findings’, Baffinland makes reference to “Inuit income from Baffinland and contractor employees”. It does not present a figure for Inuit income received by contractor employees. Given the subject matter of this section with its focus on “contracting and business opportunities”, this figure says nothing of relevance to the topic at hand. The reader is left with no idea of what employment as a contracted employee contributes to Inuit financial security and well-being.
Furthermore, while the number of registered Inuit firms in the LSA and Iqaluit is recorded as being 40, no breakdown of this figure that allows the reader to determine the number of contractors benefiting the 5 LSA communities on North Baffin Island.
Contracts worth $289 million were awarded to Inuit firms in 2019. An Inuit firm is defined by Nunavut Tunngavik as “… an entity which complies with the legal requirements to carry on business in the Nunavut Settlement Area, and which is: a) a limited company with at least 51% of the company’s voting shares beneficially owned by Inuit, or b) a cooperative controlled by Inuit, or c) an Inuk sole proprietorship or partnership.
Unfortunately, despite this legal definition, this is no guarantee that an Inuit firm is effectively controlled by Inuit. Forty-nine percent of ownership may be Qallunaat with benefits going to Qallunaat shareholders. Furthermore, there is no necessity for an Inuit Firm to hire Inuit. The argument that contracting with an Inuit firm is necessarily benefiting Inuit is highly questionable, depending on details that are not available or provided. While this is not an issue for Baffinland, it is something the reader needs to be aware of in interpreting the data and the benefits that are actually flowing to Inuit.
4.1 Employee payroll by Inuit status, scale
To figure out the employment benefits going to Mittimatalingmiut from Baffinland, one has to do some digging. We know very little about the extent to which contracts given Inuit firms actually benefit Inuit.
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The Baffinland and contractor payrolls for each community are grouped together in figure 27 (page 40) and reported for each community. This says nothing about the benefits that communities are or are not receiving in the form of wages paid to contracted employees. However, a few calculations made by combining data and information from different sources are entirely revealing.
The number of Baffinland and contractor employees per community is reported in Figure 1, (page 9). In 2019 it is reported that there were 34 Baffinland and 27 contract employees from Mittimatalik working for Baffinland. If the wage bill for the community is 2.72 million (Figure 27, page 40), the average wage earned by Mittimatalingmiut is $44,590.00 a year. This is an average wage. We do not know what the mean is or what the distribution of wages looks like.
There are considerations for which we have no data in arriving at this figure. It is nevertheless significant. The figure of $2.7 million provided by Baffinland (Figure 27, page 40) is the total payroll. We do not know how many of the Baffinland and contract employees may have been seasonal or part-time employees. For example, this figure would include Inuit working from the Hamlet as contracted monitors during the summer months. The number of part time employees – some of whom may be summer students – has some effect on how the average wage is to be understood. The average wage of full-time employees could be higher than indicated if a substantial number of employees are part time, but this and related effects on the average are likely negligible. Data that would throw light on this is not provided. It is assumed that the number of part-time employees, all of whom would be found in the contract category, is small.
We also do not know how income is distributed. It may be the case that owners of businesses contracting with Baffinland are receiving substantial income from their contracts, while their employees are paid considerably less than the average hourly wage for someone who is a Baffinland employee. The figure of $44,590 provides a reasonable idea of what are the salaries for Inuit from Pond Inlet (and by implication, other LSA communities).This is an average yearly salary. In Canada, the average wage for someone working in the mining industry is $84,825 a year. Entry level salaries are as low as $36,406/year, and top level salaries are as high as $144,203/year.5 It is more than obvious that the majority of Inuit from Mittimitalik are earning at the very bottom of this range.
Baffinland reports a theoretical wage of about $70,100 per year. This is a theoretical wage – what the average Inuk employee would make if they worked for a full year. It is not what is actually happening. It appears that many Inuit are part time employees, and others are opportunistic employees, working just long enough to get the money they need for a short term objective – a new snow machine. The figure of $44,590 does not capture the possibility that contractors with employees may be paying themselves well, while their employees are getting a minimum wage.
A couple with two children on social assistance will receive $30,139. a year in Nunavut (based on rates for Iqaluit) (https://maytree.com/welfare-in-canada/nunavut/). They also receive a housing subsidy; the
5 (https://neuvoo.ca/salary/?job=Mining).
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cost of housing being assumed by the Nunavut Housing Corporation. If someone is employed at a rate between $40,000 and $80,000 a year, they pay 25% of their salary for accommodation. The accommodation cost for a man or woman with two children where the family income is $44,590 a year would be $11,148 a year.
If one subtracts this amount from a salary of $44,590 a year, the amount of disposable income left is $33,442 a year. This is only about $3200 more than what one receives on social assistance. If one was making about $41,000 a year, there would be no advantage to being employed by Baffinland. And since $44,590 is an average, 50% of Inuit are working for less than $44,590. The comparative value of this wage to a single person is obviously different. The amount is still revealing.
This casts a very different light on the Interpretation given to the data, found on page 41. While there is income made available to residents to spend on consumer goods and services, the amount in excess of basic necessities is likely, for at least 50% of employees, minimal. The average salary barely replaces what the average family of 4 would receive on social assistance.
4.2 Contract expenditures to Inuit firms
The dollar amount of contracts paid to Inuit firms has varied considerably since 2015, with $387M paid out in 2017 and $289M paid out in 2019.
The issue with regard to contracts to Inuit firms has previously been addressed (above). The definition of what constitutes an Inuit firm is important with regard to this data and the concept of Inuit benefit.
4.3 Registered Inuit firms
Baffinland presents data that shows the number of Inuit Firms in the North Baffin LSA (Figure 31, page 42) increasing from 29 in 2013 to 56 in 2019. Baffinland indicates that this is “a potential indicator of the degree to which an expanded market for consumer goods and services has been created by the project.”
The language is cautionary for good reason. Baffinland has no data that proves that its activities and the money going to Inuit firms have any significant impact on a market for consumer goods and services. The best indicator that this might be a possibility is the amount of disposable income that the average Baffinland employee or contract employee receives as a consequence of working for a contractor or Baffinland. The calculation provided above in 4.1 casts serious doubt on the extent to which the claim made in this section is true.
4.4 VSEC Effects Assessment
Residual effect Expanded markets for Consumer Goods and Services
The assessment deals with an EIS prediction that the Project would expand the market for consumer goods and services across the LSA, resulting in a positive effect.
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The monitoring results do not provide any evidence that this is the case. The data on average incomes earned in Mittimitalik (something generalizable to all LSA communities), and the disposable income they make available is the best indicator of the spending power and the likely impact that Baffinland activity is having on a market for consumer goods and services.
As indicated, while there may be a portion of the workforce receiving a wage that permits relatively easy entry into a consumer market to which they did not previously have access, the average wage being received suggests that this number is comparatively small.
The cost of consumer goods and the source is also relevant to making this assessment. Baffinland has done no research or employed any existing research that indicates to what extent consumers are ordering by mail, goods from outside of Nunavut. Trends elsewhere suggest that the number of consumers meeting their needs this way is rising. As it has traditionally been a common practice in Nunavut, there is no reason to believe that this trend has not accelerated further.
Baffinland appears to have little grasp of the concept of economic multipliers. How many times does a dollar circulate in LSA communities before leaving the territory? This consideration is extremely relevant to any assessment of whether or not a local market for consumer goods and services across the LSA is benefiting the local economy, and the extent to which this might be true.
The data suggests that the impact is likely limited, given the average income. Furthermore, how this income might be spent is something that Baffinland has not considered.
Baffinland also appears to have little appreciation of how money circulates in Inuit families and communities. It appears to be operating with the concept of a nuclear family income. This is useful in noting how much Inuit are being paid, but it is a different picture when it comes to the disposal of that income.
In Inuit culture, anyone with an earned income is under some considerable obligation to share that income with family members and relatives who may not have any source of income (other than social assistance and whatever can be earned by arts, crafts and some casual employment). In this case, the distributed money both reduces and changes the nature of how the money is spent. The capacity of the giver to spend on items that they would otherwise not be able to or inclined to purchase is reduced. The person on the receiving end of this largess is now marginally capable of affording basic goods (most likely food) that they would otherwise not be likely to afford.
This does not result in much of an expansion in a market for consumer goods and services. It doesn’t generate employment at the Co-op or Northern store, for example, as anything like this is so inconsequential it is easily handled with an already present labour force. Baffinland has done no research that gives it any insight into how money circulates in LSA communities.
Another factor of relevance is the contribution that earned income makes to increased purchase and use of substances. Money spent on alcohol and drugs does not only fail to contribute anything to a local
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economy, it is a drain on the local economy in terms of damage done to capital resources, the cost of social services, policing and misdirection of the resources that Baffinland assumes are developing an expanded market for consumer goods and services.
The number of firms in the LSA and the growth of this number is not necessarily an indication of an expanded market for consumer goods and services. This is a product of how much people are paid, the extent to which paid employment replaces and super cedes social assistance, and precisely where the money goes.
There is no evidence presented to support the prediction made by Baffinland with regard to expanding the market for consumer goods and services across the LSA.
Residual effect Expanded Markets for Business Services to the Project
Baffinland reports that in 2019, $289 million in contracts were awarded to Inuit firms. No regional breakdown is included so there is no indication of how many of these businesses were based in Iqaluit (or elsewhere) and how many were based in the LSA.
There is therefore no data provided to support the statement that the Project “had a positive effect on creating market opportunities for businesses in the LSA and the RSA to supply goods and services to the Project. We know that there were 59 Inuit businesses in the LSA (figure 31, page 42) but what share of the $289 million in contracts they received is not reported. No evidence is provided to support the EIS prediction in this case.
5. Human Health and Wellbeing
Key Findings
The increase in tax filers in the North Baffin LSA is reported for the last federal census in 2016. The relevance of this to anything happening in 2019 is unclear.
The same can be said for data on the median employment income from 2015. In reporting this data, no attention has been held to changes in the cost of living – the rate of inflation in Nunavut Territory. In real dollars, incomes may have increased little, if at all. In the case of Iqaluit, (0.6%) they most likely declined.
Social assistance rates in North Baffin actually increased slightly in 2018 (from 58.4% to 59.0%). What is more revealing is that the number of recipients of social assistance in Pond Inlet has risen to levels equivalent to, and greater than what they were in 2009, (762). In the pre-development period there
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were 741 cases in 2015, 829 in 2017 and 802 in 2018. It is therefore difficult to say that Baffinland has had any impact on the number of Mittimatalingmiut receiving social assistance.6
Drug and contraband infractions at the mine site have declined slightly between 2018 and 2019.
Baffinland reports a minor increase in driving infractions in the North Baffin LSA between 2018 and 2019.
Baffinland reports that drug violations in the North Baffin LSA decreased in 20018 from 22 to 26 and in Iqaluit from 60 to 28. What is not noted is that the law regarding possession of marijuana changed in Canada on October 17, 2018. While this is late in the year in question, it is likely the case that enforcement – in anticipation of the change – likely occurred well in advance of this date.
The number of youth charged with criminal offenses increased in North Baffin in 2018 to 26 from 22 the previous year.
Criminal violations (presumably charges) in North Baffin were reported to have increased by 6% between 2016 and 2017, from 22,610 offenses to 24,169.
The Employee and Family Assistance Plan initiated by Baffinland was accessed 60 times in 2019, and increase in use of 46% over 2018.
Data is provided on health centre visits in 2016, but its relevance to what is happening in 2019 is questionable.
The relevance on some of this data is questionable. Typically social statistics are useful when they reveal trends taking place over time. Some of the information reported above is dated, and may be irrelevant to what happened in 2019. Much of it compares changes over two years (and not 2018 and 2019). Its relevance is questionable.
What is missing from these statistics is data that affects women – rates of sexual assault (all three levels as defined in law) and violent crime, particularly rates of violence directed at women. Sexual assault in Nunavut is a serious problem. The homicide rate – which reflects the outcome of violence against women – was 21/100,000 in Nunavut in 2018, compared, for example, with a rate of 2/100,000 in British Columbia.
The safety of women and the experience of women on the worksite can be explained in terms of the everyday experiences of many women in Nunavut Territory. Baffinland should pay attention to the extent of the problem of violence against women, as reflected in statistics that document this issue in
6 Income Support Division of the Department of Family Services, prepared by the Nunavut Bureau of Statistics, March 5, 2019].
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the territory, and implications for women in the work environment.7 there is no evidence in this section of the document that they have done so.
5.1 Income and social assistance
The data presented in this section needs to be understood in relation to the status of the Canadian economy in general for the time periods under consideration. Otherwise, narrowly attributing the data and changes in the data to the activities of Baffinland in the region is a mistake.
In 2008-2009 Canada suffered a serious economic recession (as was true of western European economies in general). The recession in Canada was not as serious as in the United States. Mortgage debt and banking practices were significant contributions to the recession. The Canadian economy had largely recovered by January of 2010. A short-lived recession took place in 2014.
The notable decline in the proportion of tax filers with employment income illustrated in Figure 32 (page 45) is likely attributable to this reality. What is notable in the case of Nunavut as a whole and the North Baffin LSA communities in particular, is that there has been to date, virtually no recovery from the recession of 2008-2009.
What is of greater relevance is the data found in Figure 33 (page 45). The medium employment income (2006-2016) has remained almost flat for this entire period. Figure 34 (page 45) also shows that the proportion of the population in North Baffin LSA communities receiving social assistance has not changed in the period 2009 – 2018. Throughout all of this, Iqaluit is an anomaly, with the recession of 2008 – 2009 likely playing a role in the flattening of the medium income reported. What is likely the case, is that statistics can be explained by an administration having to pay increasing salaries to attract to the territory, the public service talent needed to run an administration dealing with a growing population. Medium employment income in the capital has leveled out since 2014.
Very little, if anything, can be said about the impact of Baffinland’s activities on the financial well-being of Mittimatalingmiut and North Baffin LSA residents, based on this data. If anything, the data suggests that the impact has been minimal, with some increase in the proportion of tax filers with employment income taking place between 2015 and 2016. It is regrettable that data for 2018 and 2019 is not available, as one year of data does not establish any trend.
If there is one observation that stands out it is the fact that in LSA communities, Baffinland employment has had no impact on the proportion of the population receiving social assistance, or on medium employment income. There is no evidence to date that Baffinland has improved many household incomes in the LSA. This observation should be related to the assessment of the average wage for Baffinland employees in 2019, previously calculated.
7 See Nightingale, Czyzewski, Tester & Aaruaq, (2017) ‘The effects of resource extraction on Inuit women and their families: evidence from Canada’, Gender and Development, 26:3, 367-386. https://dol.org/10.1080/13552074.2017.1379778
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There is no evidence that Baffinland has had any impact on the number of people in the LSA receiving social assistance. Minor and positive changes taking place elsewhere are easily attributable to a mix of factors, recognizing that Iqaluit has a far larger and more diversified economy than any of the LSA communities.
5.2 Infractions and criminal violations
Figure 35 (page 46) shows numbers and increases in drug and alcohol related contraband infractions at Project sites. The data shows increases of 2 in 2015 to 28 in 2018 with a small decline to 24 in 2019. It would have been in the company’s interests to have presented this information as a percentage of the workforce in any given year, and it is hard to understand why they did not do so.
The data presented in Figures 36 and 37, other than trends for Nunavut and Iqaluit, is impossible to read. The numbers for the LSA communities are so small that the scale used does not permit them to be displayed such that they are readable.
The problem with data on this matter is that given limited resources, the enforcement practices of the RCMP in different jurisdictions, and at different times, can vary considerably; the details of which are unknown and publicly unacknowledged by law enforcement officials.
The same is true of the data on the number of youth charged by local law enforcement shown in Figure 38 (page 48). Data for the LSA communities is impossible to read. This is less true of data on crime rates shown in Figure 39 (page 48).
Interpretation
Contraband
As noted, the number of contraband infractions and Project sites would have been better reported as a percentage, in which case the number of infractions may be far more consistent than otherwise indicated. Baffinland appears to have managed this problem well. The effect is positive.
Impaired Driving
There does not appear to be any significant change in impaired driving violations in LSA communities in the period 2009 to 2017. Presumably the statistics apply to any licensed vehicle. A mine-related income for young people may result in the purchase of a truck and alcohol. It is reported that comparing the pre-development period to the post development period, violations in the North Baffin rose from 24.8 to 34.0. This is a strange statistic, as data in Figure 36 (page 47) is reported in number of cases, not as a percentage. This being the case, it is strange to see 8/10ths of a person driving through the statistics.
Contrary to what is stated in the report (pages 48 and 49), driving violations in Nunavut show a sharp increase commencing in 2015, and some increase in Iqaluit in 2017.
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The data for the North Baffin LSA suggests that alcohol consumption and vehicle ownership may be one outcome of Baffinland employment. Given salaries, it would be interesting to have a record of the age and family status of those charged. In the case of Iqaluit, there are multiple possible explanations for the statistics, with limited implications for Baffinland.
In the North Baffin LSA, it is likely the case that this is a negative Project effect.
Drug Violations
More than half of drug offenses in Canada are cannabis-related. Rates of cannabis-related offenses have been decreasing in Canada since 2013 in all territories and provinces.8
Youth being charged with possession of cannabis has declined across the country, notably in Nunavut. It was in 2013 that Justin Trudeau first started talking about the decriminalization of youth possession of cannabis. It is perhaps no surprise that statistics recording drug violations (of which cannabis possession for youth account for a large percentage of the total) start to decline.
While there is no hard evidence for this, it has been suggested by many observers of police practices in relation to policy that with stretch budgets and suspecting that major changes in the law may soon be introduced that affect charges, police divert their attention and resources elsewhere. This may offer an explanation for a trend in Nunavut that has been reported nation-wide.
The statistics on drug violations cannot be narrowly associated with the presence of Baffinland in the territory. There are multiple explanations for them.
However, the data that Baffinland has accessed is limited to 2017 and previous years. In keeping up with developments in this field, this is a serious problem, as changes in use and problems can arise quickly. Getting in touch with these 2 or 3 years after the fact is doing so, too late. Anecdotal reports suggest that access to and the use of shatter (a concentrated and crystalized form of ∆THC, the active ingredient in cannabis) is becoming a problem in North Baffin communities.
Baffinland has not done enough original research – something it could have done with the Hamlet – to get a better idea of the substance use as a problem, its relationship to paid employment, and community-specific initiatives to address the problem. Relying on dated statistics is an inadequate way of assessing project impacts.
While not easy to do, interviews and/or focus groups with young people, especially single males - and perhaps of all ages - working for Baffinland, would be useful in getting a better idea of the relationships between income, lifestyles and expenditures, including on substances. This would need to be done by a disinterested third party. Issues of consent and confidentiality would be paramount. The results could
8 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2019055-eng.htm.
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provide important insights into the relationships between industrial incomes, personal difficulties and choices made in a unique cultural and geographical setting.
Youth Charges:
Youth charges have been relatively stable in Nunavut, Iqaluit and the North Baffin LSA since 2014 (Figure 39, page 48). There have been some fluctuations in the data. As noted, the number of youth charged increased in the North Baffin region in 2018 from 22 to 26. These numbers are so small, and over such a short period of time that no discernable trends can be identified.
The distinction between and relationship of data on youth charges to drug violations has not been made clear in what has been reported. Presumably a large percentage of charges laid against youth are drug related. Increases could therefore be indicative of what is taking place with regard to substance use by youth in LSA communities. Given changes in the law with respect to possession, as of October 17, 2018, the slight increase in charges in 2018 may be more serious than the data indicates, as in anticipation of the change in the law, charges are likely largely related to other (and therefore more serious) offenses.
A much more detailed analysis of these statistics is required before any meaningful conclusions can be drawn from them. The failure of Baffinland to place developments in the region within a broader context of changes in the law and forms of substance use, and the conflation of ‘youth charges’ with ‘drug violations’ undermines the significance of what has been reported.
Crime Rate
Similar problems exist with the documentation and interpretation of the data on crime rates. The data is limited (the most recent records being for the year 2017). Taking a growth in population into consideration, there does not appear to be any dramatic change in crime rates in the post-development period, compared to the pre-development period.
Several communities (Igloolik and Arctic Bay) seem to be having more problems post-development than pre-development. The post-development statistics for Pond Inlet seem to be reasonably consistent with the pre-development situation.
Interviews with community leaders, social workers and police officers would have been useful in giving more depth and meaning to these statistics. They would have helped in updating them with impressions of what is currently happening in communities.
The perceptions and understandings of these individuals are important. A classically statistical analysis of what is transpiring is severely limited in its importance. People act on the basis of their perceptions and understandings, where nuances an details not revealed by statistics are important.
Baffinland needs to put more time and resources into exploring social impacts than what is evidenced by the content of this section of the monitoring report.
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5.3 Employee and public health
Figure 40 (page 50) indicates a doubling of the use of Baffinland’s Employee and Family Assistance Plan (EFAP) since 2016 and 2019. Again, this figure is far more meaningful if understood in relation to changes in the size of the workforce, if one assumes that use of the EFAP is in any way related to matters of employment with the company.
In 2016 Baffinland employed 138 Inuit FTEs, a figure that had risen to 288 by 2019. As a percentage of those employed, use of the EFAP was 5% of Inuit FTEs in 2016. In 2019 it was 4.9%. Using absolute numbers conveys an entirely inaccurate picture of the use of this service for Baffinland employees.
There has been no change in the use of the EFAP since its inception. This suggests the importance of an evaluation of what is a phone and on-line counselling service. It does not seem to have attracted any added attention since its inception.
Figure 41 (page 51) deals with changes in visits to public health centres related to infectious diseases. The text indicates that the Project Certificate requests that Baffinland supply information on sexually transmitted infections and other communicable diseases.
These are not the same thing. Simply put, an infectious disease is an infection. This would refer to a situation where a bacteria or fungi invades the body and starts to divide its cells and spread. All communicable diseases are infections, but not all infections are communicable. That means that they cannot all be spread to other people.
Presumably, the data presented is as labelled, meaning that what is reported are both communicable and non-communicable infections. If the intent was to focus on communicable diseases, no data is provided that would allow for an assessment of this – as in the prevalence of STDs (sexually transmitted diseases.)
What Baffinland has provided does not meet the requirement of the Project Certificate. The certificate asks for data on sexually transmitted infections and other communicable diseases. Baffinland has provided information on infections.
Interpretation
Baffinland’s Employee and Family Assistance Plan
As noted, usage of the EFAP by Inuit is low (5% of employees) and has not increased since inception of the program, contrary to the claim made by Baffinland in chosing to use absolute numbers in reporting on the programs use by all (not just Inuit) employees. No evaluation of this program has been reported. Its value is therefore indeterminate.
A community counsellor program has not been established in the North Baffin LSA communities as per article 11.7 of the IIBA. As Baffinland records, community counsellors have been hired in Igloolik, Clyde River and Sanirajak. 25 | P a g e
Noting that community counsellors have been hired in Clyde River is somewhat ingenuous. The Ilisaqsivik Society being used for this initiative was present and offering counselling services in Clyde River long before the Baffinland initiative to duplicate this service in other LSA communities. Baffinland has not been successful at hiring and training counsellors in Arctic Bay and Pond Inlet. No evaluation of this initiative has been done at this time, for obvious reasons.
Community Health Centre Visits Related to Infectious Disease
The fact remains that for all infectious diseases, there has been an increase across Nunavut Territory with increases in both Iqaluit and the North Baffin LSA between 2015 and 2018. Assuming this data includes sexually transmitted infections, then it may indicate a rise in STDs. This would be important to know and means separating the data for STDs from other infections and other communicable diseases. What is actually being displayed here and claims being made, need to be clarified. As noted, there may be a negative Project influence associated with this component.
5.4 VSEC Effects assessment
Residual effect: Changes in parenting
As noted, the data on youth charges cannot necessarily be related to parenting. In fact, the data very likely has absolutely nothing to do with parenting and is probably explained by other considerations. Contrary to the impression given here, youth charges in the North Baffin LSA communities increased slightly in 2018.
Monitoring data on the number of youths charged says nothing about the presence of positive Project effects. This is stretching the interpretation of available data beyond credibility.
Baffinland has no data that wold support the claim that the Project is contributing to the enhanced well- being of children in the LSA. No data has been provided to support a claim that parents find their employment with Baffinland and their incomes “meaningful”. In fact, data presented earlier on the average wage earned in relation to alternatives like social assistance, strongly suggest that the opposite may be true.
There is no evidence to support the suggestion that “these opportunities can help reduce the various family stresses and uncertainties associated with un-(sic) and under-employment”. Baffinland has done no research - no interviewing and no collection of data – that supports such a claim.
In fact, in the literature, there is evidence to suggest that fly-in, fly-out employment has negative impacts on the school attendance of children, that newly earned income and opportunities can lead to disagreements, disputes and family tensions that can result in break-ups,and that parents who are absent from home for two week period are missed by children.9
9 Pauktuutit, Czyzewski, K., Tester, F., Aaruaq, N., & Blangy, S. (2014). The Impact of Resource Extraction on Inuit Women and Families in Qamani’tuaq, Nunavut Territory: A Qualitative Assessment and, Pauktuutit, Czyzewski, K., Tester, F., Aaruaq, N., & 26 | P a g e
Residual effect Household income and food security
There is no evidence to suggest that monitoring data on median employment income are currently consistent with the presence of positive Project effects. We do not know what the median (amount in the middle of the range) employment income is, but the average is likely more revealing. It is, as previously noted, $44, 590/year. Taking the cost of housing into consideration, this is barely more than what a family of 4 would receive on social assistance.
The median, after-tax income of Canadian families or two or more people was $71,700 in 2019. For two- parent families with children it was $84,900. The median total family income in Nunavut in 2018 was $76,900. To suggest that the average wage earned by Inuit working for Baffinland is “consistent with the presence of positive Project effects is beyond credibility. It is interesting to note that in making this claim about “median employment income”, Baffinland does not see fit to report what that figure is.
This suggests that there are likely good reasons why the data on tax filers and social assistance levels re not positive indicators of Project effects.
Baffinland has no data or information to support the claim that there are “positive indication the Project makes contributions to improved household income and food security in the LSA”. If Baffinland is having a negative impact on country food supplies, the impact on overall food security may be entirely negative. Unfortunately, DFO data and surveys do not provide anything that can give us clear insight into the impact of shipping on narwhal, the last survey having taken place in 2016. Inuit hunters report a decline in both the health and the availability of Narwhal and seals since the mine went into operation.
It has previously been made clear that there are limitations to suggesting that employment necessarily facilitates the purchase of food and other family goods, while also providing a means to participate in harvesting if desired. While this may be true for some families with incomes in the top deciles of the bell curve of incomes earned with Baffinland, the data previously presented does not suggest that this applies to very many Mittimatalingmiut or North Baffin LSA employees.
The absence of any data on incomes earned and their distribution makes this impossible to assess. However, there is no information presented in this section that supports in any way, the claim made that the project is having anything but the most marginal of effects on increased household income, food security, and the well-being of children. The impact, taking country foods into consideration, may be negative.
Blangy, S. (2016), The Impact of Resource Extraction on Inuit Women and Families in Qamani’tuaq, Nunavut Territory: A Quantitative Assessment.
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Residual effect: Transport of substances through Project site
The evidence suggests that Baffinland has done a credible job of preventing the availability of substances such as alcohol and illegal drugs in the North Baffin LSA as a result of possible transport through Project sites.
Residual effect: Affordability of substances
The EIS predicted increased income from employment at the Project could increase the ability of LSA residents to afford substances such as alcohol and illegal drugs.
Data dealing with this element is mixed and unreliable. There are alternative and contextual explanations for the data on drug violations. The decline in drug violations may be due to pending changes in legislation and enforcement. The data used is not current. The information provided suffers from a lack of original research.
There is no evidence to support the statement that: “There are additional positive indications the Project contributes to improved attitudes toward substances and addictions in the LSA, by providing LSA residents with meaningful employment opportunities within a drug and alcohol-free environment (page 55). If there are “additional positive indications”, none of them have been presented here. The statement that: “Baffinland also has in place an MOU with the Government of Nunavut will discuss these and other issue (sic) of interest to the parties (sic)” (page 55), is anything but clear in relation to the evaluation of this element. It has nothing to do with any evidence in support of the observation being discussed.
Residual effect: Absence from the community during work rotations
There is no evidence presented in relations to this element. Baffinland has undertaken no original research that might reveal what the impact of absence from the community might be. What is presented is entirely speculative.
6. Community Infrastructure & Public Services
Baffinland predicts that the Project may affect the ability of Hamlets to hire and retain workers “as the level of competition for these works increases through project hiring”(page 57).
Baffinland argues that any effects on Hamlet hiring and retaining of workers will be insignificant because “… Project-initiated training leads to improved levels of skill and experience in the labour force”(page 57). They argue that as a result of training and experience, this “labour force capacity development effect” will have a positive outcome on the ability of Hamlets to recruit workers.
What Baffinland appears to be saying, is that the demand for labour during construction will increase, and then decline once Phase 2 is operational. There will be more trained workers available for work with 28 | P a g e
the Hamlets.
Baffinland has also stated that while it predicts that Phase 2 will result in a decrease in its workforce of 13%, no Inuit will lose their jobs. Is Baffinland saying that Inuit hired during the construction and development phase will subsequently lose their jobs and thus be available for employment with the Hamlet? If Inuit who formerly worked for the Hamlet are attracted to Baffinland, the Hamlet will have to replace them – regardless. Delivering water and sewage collection, etc. are not options.
Employees returning to the possibility of Hamlet employment would, if they were to be hired, replace Inuit who already have jobs. There is nothing to be gained in terms of employment at the community level by any of these developments.
However, this scenario is likely fictitious. Baffinland has presented no evidence that Hamlets have, or are experiencing labour problems as a result of the company’s presence. Retaining employees is likely not a problem for Hamlets given the wages being paid by Baffinland. However, it is acknowledged that if trained employees are paid at a rate competitive with those of municipal employees this could become a problem. As Baffinland has not disclosed pay rates for jobs comparable to those conducted at the municipal level, this is impossible to evaluate.
Unless Baffinland conducts credible evaluations of its training programs, it is also impossible to say whether or not Inuit will have “improved levels of skill”. If they have previously been employed by the Hamlet, they will already have experience with the labour force.
6.1 Use of community health centres
The data presented does not include statistics for the period after 2016. No data is presented for 2017, 2018 and 2019. Baffinland is understandably limited by the data that is available through the Government of Nunavut.
Project effects on per capita health centre visits (Figure 42, page 57) and number of health centre visits – for both Iqaluit and North Baffin LSA communities - do not suggest any trends that can be attributed to Project activities.
However, unless the reasons for visits is made available, there will, regardless of changes in data and given a wide range of possibilities for any increase or decrease in statistics, never be any way of associating the number of visits to community health centres with the Baffinland Project’s activities or developments.
6.2 Use of Project site physician assistants
The data presented here (Figure 44, page 59) are absolute numbers, and percent increases in those numbers from year to year. This is a strange way to handle this data, as it is more revealing if it is analyzed in relation to the percentage of the total Inuit workforce, in any given year, that is taking advantage of site physician assistants.
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The interpretation notes that “2019 saw and increase in the number of Inuit who visited the Project site physician’s assistant with 1648 total visits, up 25.3% from the 1315 visits recorded in 2018” (page 59).
In 2018 there were 216 Inuit employees and in 2019 there were 287. This is an increase of 32.9%. It could be expected that the number of visits would therefore increase by 32.9%, consistent with the increase in the number of employees. However, visits increased by only 25.3%.
Contrary to what has been reported, visits to the Project site physician assistants, taking the increase in the number of Inuit employees into consideration, actually declined relative to the number of Inuit employees by 7.6%. Why Baffinland has chosen to present its statistics in this way is puzzling.
The result is to leave a false impression of the demand for medical services on site, and doesn’t serve Baffinland’s interests. Baffinland would presumably want to demonstrate that the health of Inuit on site is improving. This makes the very awkward and unlikely rationalization that “Additional visits to the physician’s assistant may be indicative of Baffinland and contractor employees proactively maintain their health and seeking care or treatment of ailments” (page 60), quite unnecessary.
However, following up on the subsequent claim that “the role the Project may have in reducing demands placed on community health services” (page 60), and applying Baffinland’s logic to the statistics, it follows that the exact opposite may be true. The project may be increasing the demand on community health centres. As we do not have data on the use of community health centres for 2018 and 2019, this cannot be proven.
6.3 Baffinland use of LSA community infrastructure
In this section of the report, Baffinland outlines its use of community infrastructure, including airports, office space, and the short-term use of meeting rooms and other local services. The use of local facilities spaces and services is a positive contribution to local economies.
6.4 VSEC Effects assessment
Residual effect Competition for skilled workers in the short-term (page 63)
The interpretation given to the results of the survey dealing with this matter is questionable. Questions have previously been raised about the validity of a survey with only 20% response rate in a small and accessible population of potential participants, and the results and interpretation made by Baffinland has been commented upon.
It is understandable why some individuals with part-time employment might quit their community-based jobs to take a job with Baffinland. What would be interesting to know is the age and family status of those who did quit to take jobs with the company.
Baffinland does not seem to have gained much insight into why employees quit community jobs to take 30 | P a g e
a position with Baffinland. Our own investigation of this matter, suggest that the number (at least in the case of Pond Inlet) have been very few.
However there are some who have taken employment with Baffinland because they like the idea of working for two weeks and then having two week s off (with pay) to go hunting. This is revealing as it makes it clear that the interest of these employees is not so much in the job that they have, but the job as a means to provide an opportunity to do what very many Inuit would prefer – to go hunting. This will likely be true in both the short and long-term.
Residual effect Labour force capacity – ability of Hamlets to maintain staff in the medium to long-term
As noted, and for the reasons given, it is not clear that Hamlets will be (and are now) without employees that have the skills or experience necessary to those needed by Hamlets. It is therefore not clear what the implications for Hamlet workforces might be as a result of the “substantial training and experience opportunities” (page 63) offered to Baffinland employees .
Baffinland may increase the overall pool of skilled workers in the local labour force, but given the limited number of jobs available with Hamlets and an absence of alternatives, the net effect might be to contribute to migration out of LSA communities as former employees look for opportunities elsewhere. Baffinland offers no data or information that might cast more light on this possibility.
7. Cultural Resources
Very little is reported under this heading, the rationale being that archaeological sites have been dealt with in the Archeological Status Update Report.
However, the mandate – as indicated by the title of this section – was to deal with the preservation of archeological sites and other cultural resources within the North Baffin LSA.
If other cultural resources within the North Baffin LSA are also dealt with elsewhere, a note should have been made to this effect.
7.1 VSEC Effects assessment
There are other cultural resources other than archeological sites within the North Baffin LSA (historically important and currently used camp sites, for example) and the reader is left wondering how and where these have been dealt with.
8. Resource and Land Use
The FEIS prediction is was that the project would not “have a significant effect on harvesting with the land use study area as a result of project development”(page 65). The focus is on land use. This element includes issues resulting in wildlife compensation issues.
This is subject matter for the Mittimatalingmiut Hunters and Trappers Organization, and other HTOs.
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9. Cultural Well-Being
This is defined as “The influence of the Project on Inuit culture and cultural development through its interactions with Inuit cultural values” (page 67).
The following refers to material found on page 68 of the 2019 Monitoring report.
One would expect this to be one of the most significant sections of the monitoring report. Baffinland’s activities and the likely impacts of the Phase 2 Project have a very long list of potential implications for Mittimatalingmiut and Inuit cultural well-being.
What is – or more appropriately what is not - reported and dealt with here is troubling. One comes away with the distinct impression that Baffinland was simply overwhelmed and ill-prepared to address this component and the FEIS prediction that “The Project will affect Inuit culture and cultural development through its interactions with Inuit cultural values. To a large degree these interactions will be positive” (page 68).
Baffinland presents no evidence that: “To a large degree (what constitutes “large”?) these interactions will be positive” (page 68). No information is provided as to what interactions they are referring to. List them!
“The opportunities for productive livelihoods based on self-reliance and sharing of resources, learning and sharing experience through supervisory and role model functions, and for monitoring the environment are all relevant and supportive of these values” (page 68).
This sentence perpetuates a number of well-worn myths. People who are working at a rate of pay barely enough to cover basic expenses, being away from home for two week periods, possibly feeling ‘out of place’ in a work environment foreign to any experience they have previously had, are not likely having an experience supportive of cultural values.
Whether one agrees with this statement or not is irrelevant. Baffinland has not surveyed its Inuit workforce, held focus groups, or done any research supportive of the statement that an “opportunity for productive livelihoods based on self-reliance” (page 68) in the setting, and under the conditions in which people are working, supports cultural values.
One would hope that the experience is overwhelmingly positive and supportive of cultural values. But there is no evidence presented to support the claim, other than reference to “something that has also been expressed by Elders during community consultations” (pate 68). We don’t know how many Elders have expressed this, how many are of a contrary opinion, and what exactly (in context) they may have said. This is not research, and is inadequate to support claims made by Baffinland.
What is meant by “supervisory and role-model functions” (page 68)? To what does this refer? As previously noted, the number of Inuit who have received promotion in recent years amounts to 2.8% of 32 | P a g e
the Inuit workforce. What supervisory positions to Inuit hold? Do Inuit who work for Baffinland see themselves as ‘role models’ for their children – or anyone else? Where is the evidence to support this claim.
Baffinland does acknowledge that different perspectives on industrial development and its effects on culture have been heard during community engagement and that there is a wide range of concerns and opinions. For this they deserve some credit.
9.1 VSEC Effects assessment
Culture is an important topic that has received virtually no attention from Baffinland. It is a subject for survey research or focus groups or both. Asking Inuit how working with Baffinland intersects with Inuit culture in both positive and negative ways, what those ‘ways’ might be, and how Baffinland might address cultural concerns is not something Baffinland has undertaken. This is a subject they have not addressed.
It is not the case that “There were no residual effects identified in the EIS”. Baffinland has done nothing to address the topic and does not know whether or not the project has any significant impact (positive or negative) on culture.
This is presented as a stand-alone element in the Socio-Economic Monitoring Report, presumably reflecting the guidelines provided by NIRB or instructions from the Socio-Economic Environment Monitoring Committee. In the EIS, Baffinland has combined culture, resources and land use under one heading (Addendum to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Mary River Project – Phase 2 Proposal, August 2018, page 10.23).
It has given this VSEC component a rating in terms of residual effect as “not significant”. No comment on culture is made in the column “Characteristics of Residual Effect(s)” (page 10.23 of the 2018 FEIS).
Given that Baffinland has done no research, and has no data to address something as important as culture, we would expect the Nunavut Impact Review Board to find this entirely inappropriate, and that the rating of not significant is not an accurate rating for this component. Similarly, it has no grounds for indicating that cumulative effects are “not significant”.
10. Economic Development and Self-reliance
Baffinland introduces this section with the statement that: ““The overall direction of the effects of the Project on the Economic Development and Self-Reliance VSEC are assessed, with a high level of confidence, to be positive.” It goes on to state that “residual effects of the Project are assessed to be positive and significant”(page 69).
In assessing economic development and self-reliance, this valued socio-economic component builds on what has already been reported on:
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Education and Training
Employment and Livelihood
Contracting and Business Opportunities
Human Health and Well-Being and
Resources and Land Use
With the exception of Resources and Land Use, these components have previously been evaluated.
Key Findings
There is no doubt that an increasing proportion of Inuit households are experiencing problems with food security. Not having enough money for food is a problem indicated by 37% more Inuit in 2017 than was reported in 2012. Inuit have been working for Baffinland since 2013.
Food insecurity can be related to a 10.3% decline in the number of Inuit who report they have hunted, fished or trapped in 2017, compared with the number reported in 2012 (Table 15, page 71.). There was a 7.3% decline in the number of North Baffin Inlet reporting in the Aboriginal Peoples Survey, gathering activities related to food security (Table 15, page 71).
In North Baffin, the number of survey respondents with reduced food intake due to budgetary constraints is reported, through the Aboriginal Peoples Survey of 2017 as 56.4% of households, and increase from 37% in 2012. Furthermore, 44.9% reported that they went hungry because they could not afford food. This was an increase of 10.3% from 2012.
Baffinland notes that the number of land use visitor person days recorded at Mary River and Milne Port increases substantially in 2018 and 2019. This may not indicate an increase in land use for hunting. Baffinland introduced a policy of providing fuel to hunters dropping by the Mary River and Milne Port facilities. This likely explains the increased number of visitor days.
Baffinland notes that it makes contributions to food security consistent with the fact that it is a regional mineral developer.
10.1 Investments in community and wellness initiatives
In Table 14, (page 70) Baffinland outlines its health-related and recreational initiatives contributions to LSA communities. While it does not say so, it is presumed that the numbers refer to the year 2019.
The contribution to the Arctic Inspiration Prize is not explained. The Prize is funded by a charitable trust set up in 2015. If Baffinland made a tax-deductible donation to the Trust, this should be noted. If, as Baffinland claims, this was requested by community members, it would be useful to know which community requested that this donation be made. It is a strange and unusual request to come from a
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community if this is the case.
As prizes are given to applicants from across the north, it is not likely the case that this donation has anything to do with Inuit in the LSA. The proportion of the $99,235.98 in this category, going to the Arctic Inspiration Prize should be recorded. This contribution, for the reasons mentioned, should be noted in a separate category rather than being lumped together with LSA cultural and wellness initiatives.
10.2 Project Harvesting Interactions and Food Security
As is true with regard to other VESCs, Baffinland has done no original research in relation to food security in the LSA. However, it has now agreed to fund a food security study in the most affected community – Pond Inlet – through the QIA.
While, as identified in the text, food security components “are influenced by many complex factors”, it is not impossible to throw light on these factors with comprehensive and well-considered research initiatives. The Hamlet of Pond Inlet, with the backing of the Qikiqtani Inuit Association and funding from Baffinland is currently developing a food security study for the community.
There are a number of considerations relevant to explaining Inuit access to country foods, some of which have been flagged by Baffinland and others that have been ignored.
Baffinland and Inuit (cited on pages 71 and 72) have identified the presence of ships and ship noise, project-related dust, as well as the effects of climate change as factors affecting Inuit access to and the availability of country foods.
Interpretation
Baffinland presents, in Table 18, a list of factors affecting the (a) availability, (b) accessibility (c) quality and (d) use of country foods.
Availability: Baffinland is correct in noting that providing employees with ample and healthy food.
Avoiding adverse effects on the biophysical environment – terrestrial, marine and freshwater, affects the availability of food.
Family size and human populations do not affect availability other than in relation to “the means to pay” (for food), and the carrying capacity of the environment from which food supplies are derived. Carrying capacity is a much debated element with technology being an intervening variable.
Accessibility: Providing LSA residents with meaningful incomes through employment that enables the purchase of food and support for participation in harvesting activities is the most
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important element affecting accessibility.
In Pond Inlet, we have calculated the average wage earned at Baffinland as $44,590 with some qualifications. This is a wage that is, taking rent into consideration, only about $3200 more than a family of 4 would receive on social assistance.
Southern Canadians have a difficult time believing the cost of food in a community like Pond Inlet. A can of mushroom soup can cost $4.49. A clamshell of strawberries that sells for $4.98 in southern Canada (at most), sells for $14.39 in Pond Inlet. Milk is $5.83 a litre, regular eggs are about $8.00 a dozen and a kg of cheese can sell for as much as $26.00. That food security is an urgent issue (and a national disgrace) is no surprise with this combination of prices and wages.
Climate change in the Canadian Arctic is extreme compared to more southerly climes and is having a serious impact on access to country foods. The length of season when resources are readily available by snow machine has declined by months over the past 20 years.
A detailed review of the literature on caribou and climate change, makes it clear that climate change is likely a significant but complicated factor in the availability of caribou in the Canadian Arctic.10
Gambling and substance abuse affect access to food by diverting income to substances and gambling. However, one’s familiarity with an earned income, budgeting and knowledge of how much things actually cost (i.e. what are interest rates and how do they work?) can also have unintended effects on family budgets. Providing Inuit with opportunities to better understand market economies and their implications for earned income is an issue that mining companies working with Indigenous communities – including in the case of Inuit and Baffinland, have neglected.
Dealing with the impacts (all of them) of earned income on Inuit quality of life should be a corporate responsibility. Offering financial management and training to individual employees that want them is not the same as sponsoring a course in the community that might be accessed by Inuit meeting together, including the partners of those who may be earning an income from employment with Baffinland.
Access to traditional hunting areas has been affected by the Tote road, and is an issue that has been constantly raised by Mittimatalingmiut hunters in relation to Baffinland’s activities. Whether or not the access provided is working and meets their needs is highly questionable, and an ongoing irritant for Mittimatalingmiut hunters.
10 Mallory, C. D., & M. Boyce, 2018, Observed and predicted effects of climate change on Arctic caribou and reindeer, Environmental Reviews, 26(1). https://doi.org/10.1139/er-2017-0032.
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Mittimatalingmiut hunters have also had difficulties with the Wildlife Compensation Fund, finding it bureaucratic and difficult to access. It needs to be evaluated with possible changes made in how it is administered.
The Harvesters Enabling Program to provide fuel to support local travel and harvesting activities has benefited the community.
Quality: While all of the roles Baffinland has noted are relevant and important to the quality of food, Mittimatalingmiut remain concerned about the impact that dust has on both food quality and availability.
When it settles in streams, dust can have a deleterious effect on the eggs of migrating fish species, notably Arctic char. Dust also settles on lichens consumed by caribou. Inuit anxiety over the implications for country foods is considerable. More sampling and monitoring of these possible effects need to take place in the study area, including tissue sampling of mammals in Milne Inlet.
Use: The roles outlined by Baffinland are important and appropriate.
The use of country foods is well understood by Mittimatalingmiut. Interest and new skills among young Inuit might be encouraged by sponsoring and event that brings a contemporary Inuit chef to the community to demonstrate and teach the preparation of meals and alternatives that involve the use of country foods.
The matter of financial literacy has been addressed above.
10.3 VSEC Effects assessment
Baffinland assessed no residual effects specific to this VSEC. It conducted an “integrated assessment of other VECs/VSECs for this VSEC. The result is to be understood in the evaluation that we have previously given to these VSECs. They do not necessarily correspond to those given by Baffinland.
11. Benefits, Royalty, and Taxation
Baffinland does not reveal figures related to income and expenses. Baffinland is currently (December 2020) shipping 6 million tonnes of ore a year worth at least $124.00 CAN/tonne, based on current world prices.11
Allowing for a wide range of factors affecting prices, including the quality of ore being shipped and day to day fluctuations in price (which can also vary considerably over the period of a year) it is likely that
11 https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/080520-europe-steel-mills-face-new- high-for-iron-ore-costs-relative-to-coking-coal
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this this tonnage is currently worth between $700 and $800 million dollars a year, if not more.
11.1 Payroll and Corporate Taxes Paid by Baffinland to the Territorial Government
Figure 47 (page 74), shows the contributions of Baffinland’s activities in 2017, 2018 and 2019 to the finances of the Government of Nunavut. These include $8.7 M in payroll tax and 7.0 M in fuel tax.
What is missing is an estimate of what the contribution might look like if Phase 2 is approved.
It is also evident that the Government of Nunavut is the largest beneficiary of the presence of Baffinland in the territory. The payroll tax for 2019 is reported as $8,674,791. This is calculated based on the total wage bill for the operation.
The total amount of wages earned by Inuit in 2019 has been reported elsewhere as $520 M. At 13.3% of the labour force, the contribution of Inuit labour to the payroll tax assessed by the Government of Nunavut is $1.16 M of the $8.7 M reported.
If Phase 2 is approved and a railroad replaces the truck haul operation, the amount of fuel used by the Project will decline considerably. What has not been presented is the impact of this on the fuel tax collected by the Nunavut Government and the subsequent contribution to government revenues. It is assumed that fuel consumption by the truck haul operation is a large percentage of the total fuel used by the Project.
If Phase 2 were to amount to a 50% reduction in fuel used by the project (an entirely speculative figure), revenues to the GN would be reduced to $3.5 M.
Baffinland plans to reduce its workforce by 13%. Using figures for 2019, this would result in a decrease in the amount of payroll tax paid of $1.13 M. to about $7.5 M. What these reduced revenues look like in relation to administrative, social and environmental costs likely to be borne by the GN is unknown. They should also be considered in relation to lost opportunities. The presence of a National Park and a marine reserve, in the setting of Pond Inlet, suggests the possibility, at some point, of developing a ‘high end’ tourist hotel in Pond Inlet. Baffinland’s Phase 2 project has negative implications for such a future development.
Using these admittedly speculative figures, the contribution to GN revenues, estimated for 2019-2010 at $2.16 B.12 Baffinland’s projected fuel and labour taxes could represent about 0.5% of government revenues.
Over time, in relation to ‘economies of scale’ introduced by Baffinland - of which the proposed railway is a prime example - the benefit to the GN per tonne of ore shipped, will drop considerably. What the GN is looking at is a diminishing return/tonne on the resource, as more ore is extracted.
12 https://www.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/2019-20_budget_highlights_-_english.pdf
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The GN’s budget is largely a transfer from the Federal Government. The federal government, in negotiating its contribution, could subtract from its contribution, the amount earned by the GN in the form of taxes paid by Baffinland. Baffinland’s contribution could be seen as part of a move toward greater economic self-sufficiency, reflected in the Federal Government’s treatment of its contribution to the GN budget. At some point it may determine its contribution based on revenues from Agnico-Eagle, Baffinland and other resource development initiatives received by the GN. It may, in fact, already be taking this into consideration in its budget negotiations with the GN.
11.2 VSEC Effects assessment
The picture painted by the data presented is simple and lacking details that would permit the reader to better grasp the full implications and factors of relevance to understanding Baffinland’s contribution to the finances of the GN. The situation is not nearly as ‘straight forward’ as Baffinland presents it.
12. Governance and Leadership
The FEIS prediction for this VSEC is peculiar. It is stated that “The Project is considered to fit well with the strategic priorities identified for both the RSA as well as for the communities of the North Baffin LSA” (page 76). No reference is made to “strategic priorities” in the Addendum to the Final Environmental Impact Statement: Mary River Project – Phase 2 Proposal, August 2018. A key word search reveals no reference to “strategic priorities for both the RSA and communities”. If they exist, what are they and who put them together? What was the role of the North Baffin communities in this exercise?
12.1 Governance and Leadership Monitoring and analysis
Baffinland makes it clear that is has not developed indicators for this component, and has not collected any data. Under ‘Need and Purpose’, in the FEIS, reference is made to the Phase 2 Proposal contributing to the “(improvement) of Northern governance”. In Table 9-1 (page 9.28 of the Assessment document), reference is made to a Guideline VEC/VSEC requirement that consideration be given to how the Project planning meets the needs of regional economy (sic) development … and notes that “proposal activities have the potential to result in a change in governance and leadership. What the latter reference means is anything but clear.
The summary of residual effects states that in line with the FEIS, the Project is considered to have a “positive and significant effect on Governance and Leadership.” Providing data to groups and organizations is no evidence of having a positive and significant effect. Depending on the content, how things are presented ,how one’s role is managed, the exact opposite can be true. The fact that Baffinland has an IIBA does not say anything, in-and-of-itself to support such a claim.
12.2 VSEC Effects assessment
There is no evidence provided to support the claim that the project is having a positive and significant effect on Governance and Leadership. That Baffinland would make this claim, having noted that it has no indicators (and subsequently, not data) to support this claim is remarkable. It is, however, consistent 39 | P a g e
with what has been true, in part, but not acknowledged in other parts of its 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report.
Conclusion
In the following, we reassess the information provided in relation to Residual Effects for Human Environment VSECs, found in Table 10.5 of the Addendum to the Final Environmental Impact Statement: Mary River Project – Phase 2 Proposal, August 2018, pages 10.19 – 10.24. As the categories are not always comparable to those used in the FEIS document, comparisons are difficult in some cases.
The importance of doing this is hopefully obvious. Baffinland is making claims in the 2019 (latest) monitoring report about the socio-economic benefits of its current Project. In order to assess what is likely to happen going forward, and should approval be given to Phase 2, NIRB needs to have in hand, an accurate picture of what Baffinland has or has not done to date. The content of the 2019 is revealing in this regard.
The revised rating is based on the critical evaluation of the evidence presented for each VEC/VSEC found in this text that looks at monitoring results in relation to the claims made in the Addendum FEIS document. Many of the findings do not agree with the significance ratings given by Baffinland. In order to convey a more accurate picture of what our evaluation has determined, we have used some terms in the Revised Ratings column that better convey these details. ‘Indeterminate’ conveys our finding that there is either no data or inadequate data to determine a rating for the component in question.
VEC/VSEC Key Indicator Significance Rating Revised Rating
Population Demographic Not Significant 1.1 Employee and contractor origin. Demographics stability Includes data on number of
Nunavummiut employed. Includes claims unsubstantiated by data. Percentage of Inuit employed declined. Significant and negative.
1.2 Employee migration and housing status. Baffinland may be contributing to out-migration. Some data presented is not statistically significant. No meaningful attention given to housing status. Indeterminate to mildly negative.
1.3 Regional and community migration
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and population. Insignificant.
Education and • Life skills Significant 2.1 Investments in school-based Training (positive) initiatives. The data suggests that the • Education and investments were negligible. skills Insignificant
2.2 Secondary school success. The data suggests that if anything, the impact on graduation rates has been Negative.
2.3 Training and advancement programs. No one has yet completed Baffinland’s Apprenticeship Program. The efforts of Baffinland to deal with matters of training are considerable and notable. If there is any weakness in their delivery, it is with regard to evaluation. It is therefore difficult to state what the effect has been on education and skills development. It is reasonable to assume that those participating have acquired some skills, but program evaluations are essential to determining the results. Indeterminate.
2.4 Employee education and pre-Mary River employment status. The response rate to the questionnaire used to provide information for this section was so low that the results are statistically insignificant. As this was intended to provide background data and information, its significance is unremarked.
Livelihood and • Wage Significant 3.1 Mary River Inuit and LSA employment. Employment employment (positive) In the text, figures on employment
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• Job progression have also been presented under and career population demographics (above). The advancement residual effect is Significant (negative) relative to the goal of 25% Inuit employment.
3.2 Mary River employment by gender. As a percentage of the labour force, Inuit women went from 3.9% to 3.7% of the workforce in 2019. Significant (mildly negative).
3.3 Employee advancement. Inuit employees are currently being promoted at a rate of 2.8% of the Inuit workforce. Significant (negative).
3.4 Employee turnover. Significant (positive).
Contracting • Land Significant 4.1 Employee payroll by Inuit status, and Business (positive) scale. The average annual wage of opportunities. • People Inuit employees working for 13 [Economic • Community Baffinland is approximately $44,590. Development economies For a family of 4, this is about $3200 and Self- dollars more than this family would reliance] • Territorial receive from social assistance. economy Significant (very negative).
4.2 Contract expenditures to Inuit firms. For reasons explained in the text, the extent of this benefit is Indeterminate.
4.3 Registered Inuit firms. While the number has increased, there is no data to support a claim that there has been a significant impact on a market
13 In the 2018 Addendum to the FEIS, Mary River Project – Phase 2 Proposal, this is covered under Economic Development and Self-Reliance. It is treated as a separate topic in the Socio-Economic Monitoring Report and dealt with below.
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for consumer goods and services. Insignificant (Indeterminate)
Human Health • Well-being of Not Significant 5.1 Income and social assistance. An and Well- children analysis of the data within a larger being economic context suggest that • Substance Baffinland’s impact is Not Significant. abuse 5.2 Infractions and criminal violations. A • Community number of elements are considered social stability under this heading including youth crime and driving offenses. The evidence suggests that impacts range from Significant (mildly) to Indeterminate.
5.3 Employee and public health. What Baffinland has presented does not meet the requirement of the Project Certificate. Indeterminate. No evaluation of counselling programs have been undertaken. Indeterminate.
5.4 (a) Changes in parenting.14 There is no evidence presented to support a claim that anything it is doing is contributing to the enhanced well-being of children in the LSA. Secondary sources suggest the impact may be negative at best. Indeterminate.
(b) Household Income and food security. The average working wage for Inuit with Baffinland is only marginally better than social assistance for a family of 4. Insignificant. Food insecurity has
14 A number of VSEC effects are listed under 5.4. They are noted here as (a), (b), (c)
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increased in the LSA. Significant (negative).
(c) Transport of substances through the Project site. Significant (positive).
(d) Affordability of Substances . Indeterminate.
(e) Absence from the community during work rotations. Indeterminate
Community • Hamlet staff Not Significant 6.1 Use of community health centres. Infrastructure recruitment and (adverse): There is no data that suggests any and Public retention in the Significant relationship between Baffinland and Services North Baffin LSA (positive) the use of community health centers. But no data is available that explains reasons for visits and whether they are work-related. Indeterminate.
6.2 Use of Project site physician assistants. Significant (positive).
6.3 Baffinland use of LSA community infrastructure. Significant (positive).
6.4 (a) Competition for skilled workers in the short term. Indeterminate.
(b) Labour force capacity. Indeterminate.
Contracting • Business Significant [Note: While this is listed as the next VSEC and Business opportunities (positive) of concern in the Addendum Opportunities document, it is not treated as such in the 2019 Socio-Economic Monitoring Report. This topic has been addressed above under ‘Economic Development and Self Reliance’
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Culture, • Cultural Not Significant 7.0 Cultural resources.15 In the 2019 [Resources, resources Socio-Economic Monitoring Report, and Land Use] Baffinland has chosen to treat this heading as a reference solely to archeological sites.
Resources and • Harvesting Not Significant 8.0 Resources and land use is treated as a Land Use separate component in the 2019 • Travel and Monitoring Report. An evaluation of camps the project’s significance for resources and land use is a huge topic, dealt with in other documents and the MHTO.
Cultural Well- As the category is The text notes that 9.0 Cultural well-being. The text is entirely Being16 not found in the “no residual effects speculative with no data presented Addendum FEIS, were identified in other than reference to a remark no indicators are the EIS.” This is made by one Elder. It is a subject that given, hard to understand Baffinland does not address other given that there is than in the form of a few no comparable generalizations and speculations. category in the EIS. There are not grounds for its conclusion that ‘there were no residual effects identified in the EIS’. There is also no evidence presented in the EIS to support this conclusion. If one takes the concerns and observations of Inuit hunters (and others) seriously, the effects are Significant (negative), and at best, Indeterminate.
Economic Significant 10. Investments in community and Development (positive) wellness Initiatives. Baffinland lists its and Self contributions to health-related and
15 This component has been addressed independently of ‘Resources and Land use’ in the Socio-Economic Monitoring Report for 2019.
16 There is no category of cultural well-being found in the Addendum FEIS document (2018), table 10.5. The subject is covered (or not covered) under ‘Human Health and Well-Being’ where effects are deemed to be not significant, and ‘Culture Resources and Land Use’ where effects are also deemed to be not significant.
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Reliance recreational initiatives. Significant (positive).
10.1 Project harvesting interactions and food security. This component has multiple sub-components. It does not, despite the heading, deal with harvesting interactions. It lists contributions to the efforts of hunters and calls these “interactions”.
(a) Availability. Some of the things that contribute to availability are Significant (positive) and some are potentially Significant (negative).
(b) Accessibility. Access is very much a function of income. Given what we have determined, this component is primarily Significant (negative). Other components – support of food banks, the Harvester’s Enabling Program, etc, are Significant (positive), others – effects on the biophysical environment are often Indeterminate, but it can be argued are Significant (negative) based on IQ and limits to western scientific studies.
(c) Quality. Not enough research has been done on the effects of dust on country food sources Indeterminate.
(d) Use. The IQ study of food security is currently in process and not yet available, and Baffinland needs to do more to assist with budgeting and financial literacy. Insignificant Country food kitchens on site are Significant (positive).
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Benefits, • Benefits, Significant 11. The amount of tax contributed by Royalty, and royalties, and (positive) Baffinland resulting from the Phase 2 Taxation taxation Project could be about 0.5% of the GN budget. The contribution is likely to decline with the advent of Phase 2. Significance is debateable. (Significant)
Governance • Governance and Significant 12. Insignificant. An unsubstantiated and leadership (positive) claim. Leadership
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