The 27Th Canadian Armoured Regiment and the Battle of Authie a Case Study Into Manning , Training, and Equipment Failures

Sean Summerfield 117 TH THE 27 CANADIAN ARMOURED REGIMENT AND THE BATTLE OF AUTHIE: A CASE STUDY INTO MANNING, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT FAILURES Sean Summerfield Bishop’s University Abstract The paper challenges contemporary historiography regarding the Canadian Army in Normandy, particularly John English’s, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, and Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. The 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment is used as a case study to analyze Copp’s and English’s positions finding both to be inconsistent with the Regiments experiences. The 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment received inadequate training and experienced manning decisions which severely affected unit cohesion. The training received prior to entering battle, and the endless transferring of soldiers out of the Regiment, ensured that the unit was not properly prepared for combat operations. Résumé Cet article conteste l’argumentaire de l’historiographie contemporaine sur l’armée canadienne en Normandie, plus particulièrement les monographies de John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, et de Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Une étude de cas du 27e Régiment blindé du Canada permet d’analyser les arguments des deux auteurs et de constater des divergences avec les témoignages des expériences vécues au sein du Régiment. En plus de recevoir un entraînement inadéquat, les soldats du 27e Régiment blindé du Canada ont dû composer avec des décisions en matière d’effectifs qui ont sérieusement entravé l’esprit de cohésion de cette unité. L’entraînement inadéquat et les transferts incessants de soldats ont entraîné une préparation inadéquate du Régiment pour le combat. 118 JOURNAL OF EASTERN TOWNSHIPS STUDIES ontemporary historiography regarding the Canadian Army in C Normandy has been dominated by two schools. One championed by John English in The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, which, as the title suggests, finds the high command to be inadequate. English concludes, “the Canadian field force was from its inception compromised by a military leadership that had for too long concentrated on bureaucratic, political, stratego- diplomatic, and technical pursuits to the neglect of its operational and tactical quintessence.”1 Central to English’s work “is the premise that success and failure in operations of war can be understood only in the light of those preparations made in the ten to twenty years before hostilities began.”2 Ultimately English finds “it was a failure on the part of the army institutions specifically the division commanders, that led to the lackluster performance in Normandy.”3 Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, 1944 takes a less critical view of the Canadian Army and its commanders during the Second World War. Copp argues that none of the three Canadian division commanders passed the test of battle, but it did not matter because “the major responsibility of the division commander and his staff was to ensure that the formation was prepared for battle, and from a logistical and administrative perspective, the Canadian armies were well served.”4 Copp largely blames Lieutenant-General Simmonds for many of the army’s failures. The General “is taken to task for his overly elaborate plans which, while evidence of his innovative approach to war, were often far too complex for his troops to carry out.”5 Copp’s central premise, however, is that formations were prepared for battle, both administratively and logistically, largely due to the work of Division Commanders. Copp’s claim that the Canadian Division commanders adequately prepared units for battle will, through an analysis of the 27th Armoured Regiments experiences, be shown to be problematic. The training received prior to entering battle, and the endless transferring of soldiers out of regiments ensured that those units deploying were not adequately prepared for combat operations. English is right to criticize the Division Commanders but fails to investigate smaller commands. Not only should the actions of Division commanders be explored, but also those of Brigade, Regimental, and Squadron Commanders and their Sergeant Majors. English claims that many of the army’s failures to prepare in the decades preceding the conflict account for the difficulties in Normandy. This research will show that some of the greatest errors in preparation were conducted in the months just before invasion. Sean Summerfield 119 The paper will use the experiences of the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment) as a case study to examine, and identify, the difficulties experienced by soldiers participating in the Overlord operation. When analysing the experiences of the 27th it becomes clear that the Regiment’s effectiveness was severely retarded by the manning, training, and equipment policies implemented by the Canadian Army when preparing for the Normandy Campaign. The effects of these policies contributed to the Canadian defeat at the Battle of Authie, a battle in which the North Nova Scotia Highlanders and the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment suffered 308 casualties. Had different policies been in place in the lead-up to Normandy, the outcome of the battle of Authie might not have been so costly. Throughout the 27th’s stay in Britain, from their arrival in late 1942 to their deployment to Normandy in June of 1944, the unit was plagued by equipment procurement problems. What was especially troubling was an inability to gain access to the types of tanks used on operations.6 Instead, having only a handful of vehicles, the Regiment formed composite Squadrons to conduct training with infantry units until a more sizable number of tanks, 49, could be delivered in May 1943.7 Often the vehicles being used were not the tanks that were crewed throughout the campaigns on the continent, but RAM and Crusader Tanks acting as placeholders to facilitate training. The Canadians’ final training exercise before Operation Neptune, Exercise Fabius III, was no different.8 The 27th found themselves equipped with a tank force, the majority of which, they would not use while in theater.9 The first time the Regiment operated entirely with Sherman, Firefly, and Stuart tanks would be on the 6th of June 1944. The celebrated Sherman Firefly was not issued to the Regiment until the 16th of May 1944, when a total of twelve arrived for inspection at Heath Range.10 Troubles with the tanks were soon apparent, something which continued into Normandy. Of particular concern were the deficiencies noted in the main armament.11 Of the twelve tanks given to the 27th, four experienced significant problems with the Quick- Firing 17pounder, all were missing gun tools, and of the eight vehicles found to have serviceable guns, zeroing could not take place due to unmodified link bars. Without the correct link bars, the periscopes and telescopic sights could not be aligned with the main armament.12 Lt Fitzpatrick, of ‘C’ Squadron, experienced the deficiencies described in the inspection firsthand when under fire just south of Authie, Normandy, on the 7th of June 1944. The 27th, spending their first night in France on high ground overlooking Villons les Buissons, began advancing south at dawn towards the towns of Buron and Authie, hoping to reach the airfield 120 JOURNAL OF EASTERN TOWNSHIPS STUDIES at Carpiquet by last light.13 The initial advance was slowed as the Regiment passed les Buissons finding German Infantry occupying the forward edge of a field. Obscured by long grass, targets were difficult to spot in the cramped quarters of a Sherman, forcing crews to resort to charging the position, crushing resistance under the treads of their tank.14 As the Regiment pushed through Authie, they were, for the first time, met by a force of Panzers intent on attack.15 The violence of the action forced the withdrawal of Canadian Infantry, leaving only the 27th to fend off the advance of the panzers of the Schutzstaffel.16 ‘C’ Squadron, despite the best efforts of the defenders, pushed through the right of the German line threatening the enemies’ flank. The Germans, well drilled, greeted this new threat with a swift assault. In 60 seconds, two of Fitzpatrick’s three tanks were destroyed leaving the Lieutenant with only the use of his Firefly. With no support, he maneuvered to a nearby orchard in an attempt to engage the enemy on more favourable ground. From this position he witnessed the advance of the German force, noting, “it consisted of two waves of infantry and then the tanks moving forward with determination.”17 Observing the attack, Fitzpatrick opened fire only to discover “that his 17pr would not work due to the failure of the breech mechanism.”18 Fitzpatrick, unable to effectively engage the enemy, watched as the assault rolled through the Canadian lines. The German infantry upon re-occupying Buron used their position to fix bayonets and attack ‘D’ Company of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders who, beginning to waver, were reinforced by the tanks of the 27th.19 Lt Fitzpatrick, alone and without the use of his 17pr, was no doubt relieved when the Regiment took up position in his orchard and provided a base of fire to repel the advancing force.20 The attack subsiding, but still under artillery and mortar fire, the 27th began to consolidate, counting their losses. The assaults by the 12th SS Panzer Division had left 63 dead, wounded, or missing. Fifteen tanks had been lost, primarily to fire from 88mm Flak Cannons, and 41 enemy tanks of all types had been destroyed. Adding to the German material losses were countless selfpropelled guns, half-tracks, light transport, and small arms both captured and destroyed.21 Despite the Regiment’s material success, the advance towards Carpiquet Airfield, via the towns of Buron and Authie, was a tactical failure.

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