Sean Summerfield 117

the 27th canadian armoured and the battle of authie: a case study into manning, training, and equipment failures Sean Summerfield Bishop’s University

Abstract The paper challenges contemporary historiography regarding the in Normandy, particularly John English’s, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, and Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. The 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment is used as a case study to analyze Copp’s and English’s positions finding both to be inconsistent with the experiences. The 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment received inadequate training and experienced manning decisions which severely affected unit cohesion. The training received prior to entering battle, and the endless transferring of soldiers out of the Regiment, ensured that the unit was not properly prepared for combat operations.

Résumé Cet article conteste l’argumentaire de l’historiographie contemporaine sur l’armée canadienne en Normandie, plus particulièrement les monographies de John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, et de Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Une étude de cas du 27e Régiment blindé du permet d’analyser les arguments des deux auteurs et de constater des divergences avec les témoignages des expériences vécues au sein du Régiment. En plus de recevoir un entraînement inadéquat, les soldats du 27e Régiment blindé du Canada ont dû composer avec des décisions en matière d’effectifs qui ont sérieusement entravé l’esprit de cohésion de cette unité. L’entraînement inadéquat et les transferts incessants de soldats ont entraîné une préparation inadéquate du Régiment pour le combat. 118 journal of eastern townships studies ontemporary historiography regarding the Canadian Army in C Normandy has been dominated by two schools. One championed by John English in The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, which, as the title suggests, finds the high command to be inadequate. English concludes, “the Canadian field force was from its inception compromised by a military leadership that had for too long concentrated on bureaucratic, political, stratego- diplomatic, and technical pursuits to the neglect of its operational and tactical quintessence.”1 Central to English’s work “is the premise that success and failure in operations of war can be understood only in the light of those preparations made in the ten to twenty years before hostilities began.”2 Ultimately English finds “it was a failure on the part of the army institutions specifically the division commanders, that led to the lackluster performance in Normandy.”3 Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, 1944 takes a less critical view of the Canadian Army and its commanders during the Second World War. Copp argues that none of the three Canadian division commanders passed the test of battle, but it did not matter because “the major responsibility of the division commander and his staff was to ensure that the formation was prepared for battle, and from a logistical and administrative perspective, the Canadian armies were well served.”4 Copp largely blames Lieutenant-General Simmonds for many of the army’s failures. The General “is taken to task for his overly elaborate plans which, while evidence of his innovative approach to war, were often far too complex for his troops to carry out.”5 Copp’s central premise, however, is that formations were prepared for battle, both administratively and logistically, largely due to the work of Division Commanders. Copp’s claim that the Canadian Division commanders adequately prepared units for battle will, through an analysis of the 27th Armoured Regiments experiences, be shown to be problematic. The training received prior to entering battle, and the endless transferring of soldiers out of regiments ensured that those units deploying were not adequately prepared for combat operations. English is right to criticize the Division Commanders but fails to investigate smaller commands. Not only should the actions of Division commanders be explored, but also those of Brigade, Regimental, and Squadron Commanders and their Sergeant Majors. English claims that many of the army’s failures to prepare in the decades preceding the conflict account for the difficulties in Normandy. This research will show that some of the greatest errors in preparation were conducted in the months just before invasion. Sean Summerfield 119 The paper will use the experiences of the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment ( Fusilier Regiment) as a case study to examine, and identify, the difficulties experienced by soldiers participating in the Overlord operation. When analysing the experiences of the 27th it becomes clear that the Regiment’s effectiveness was severely retarded by the manning, training, and equipment policies implemented by the Canadian Army when preparing for the Normandy Campaign. The effects of these policies contributed to the Canadian defeat at the Battle of Authie, a battle in which the North Nova Scotia Highlanders and the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment suffered 308 casualties. Had different policies been in place in the lead-up to Normandy, the outcome of the battle of Authie might not have been so costly. Throughout the 27th’s stay in Britain, from their arrival in late 1942 to their deployment to Normandy in June of 1944, the unit was plagued by equipment procurement problems. What was especially troubling was an inability to gain access to the types of tanks used on operations.6 Instead, having only a handful of vehicles, the Regiment formed composite Squadrons to conduct training with units until a more sizable number of tanks, 49, could be delivered in May 1943.7 Often the vehicles being used were not the tanks that were crewed throughout the campaigns on the continent, but RAM and Crusader Tanks acting as placeholders to facilitate training. The Canadians’ final training exercise before Operation Neptune, Exercise Fabius III, was no different.8 The 27th found themselves equipped with a tank force, the majority of which, they would not use while in theater.9 The first time the Regiment operated entirely with Sherman, Firefly, and Stuart tanks would be on the 6th of June 1944. The celebrated was not issued to the Regiment until the 16th of May 1944, when a total of twelve arrived for inspection at Heath Range.10 Troubles with the tanks were soon apparent, something which continued into Normandy. Of particular concern were the deficiencies noted in the main armament.11 Of the twelve tanks given to the 27th, four experienced significant problems with the Quick- Firing 17pounder, all were missing gun tools, and of the eight vehicles found to have serviceable guns, zeroing could not take place due to unmodified link bars. Without the correct link bars, the periscopes and telescopic sights could not be aligned with the main armament.12 Lt Fitzpatrick, of ‘C’ Squadron, experienced the deficiencies described in the inspection firsthand when under fire just south of Authie, Normandy, on the 7th of June 1944. The 27th, spending their first night in France on high ground overlooking Villons les Buissons, began advancing south at dawn towards the towns of Buron and Authie, hoping to reach the airfield 120 journal of eastern townships studies at Carpiquet by last light.13 The initial advance was slowed as the Regiment passed les Buissons finding German Infantry occupying the forward edge of a field. Obscured by long grass, targets were difficult to spot in the cramped quarters of a Sherman, forcing crews to resort to charging the position, crushing resistance under the treads of their tank.14 As the Regiment pushed through Authie, they were, for the first time, met by a force of Panzers intent on attack.15 The violence of the action forced the withdrawal of Canadian Infantry, leaving only the 27th to fend off the advance of the panzers of the Schutzstaffel.16 ‘C’ Squadron, despite the best efforts of the defenders, pushed through the right of the German line threatening the enemies’ flank. The Germans, well drilled, greeted this new threat with a swift assault. In 60 seconds, two of Fitzpatrick’s three tanks were destroyed leaving the Lieutenant with only the use of his Firefly. With no support, he maneuvered to a nearby orchard in an attempt to engage the enemy on more favourable ground. From this position he witnessed the advance of the German force, noting, “it consisted of two waves of infantry and then the tanks moving forward with determination.”17 Observing the attack, Fitzpatrick opened fire only to discover “that his 17pr would not work due to the failure of the breech mechanism.”18 Fitzpatrick, unable to effectively engage the enemy, watched as the assault rolled through the Canadian lines. The German infantry upon re-occupying Buron used their position to fix bayonets and attack ‘D’ Company of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders who, beginning to waver, were reinforced by the tanks of the 27th.19 Lt Fitzpatrick, alone and without the use of his 17pr, was no doubt relieved when the Regiment took up position in his orchard and provided a base of fire to repel the advancing force.20 The attack subsiding, but still under artillery and mortar fire, the 27th began to consolidate, counting their losses. The assaults by the 12th SS Panzer Division had left 63 dead, wounded, or missing. Fifteen tanks had been lost, primarily to fire from 88mm Flak Cannons, and 41 enemy tanks of all types had been destroyed. Adding to the German material losses were countless selfpropelled guns, half-tracks, light transport, and small arms both captured and destroyed.21 Despite the Regiment’s material success, the advance towards Carpiquet Airfield, via the towns of Buron and Authie, was a tactical failure. By dusk the Regiment and the Infantry of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, who had accompanied them throughout the action, retreated to the positions which they had left that morning.22 The 27th suffered relatively few casualties, 63, when compared to the 245 sustained by the Highlanders.23 These casualties would, however, despite the arrival of reinforcements, be enough to force the Regiment Sean Summerfield 121 to reduce its strength to two composite squadrons the following day.24 The action around these small Normand towns was the first large-scale fighting the Regiment had experienced during the war. Although it met with some success, the day ended with little territorial gain. The end result would have been different had it not been for the poor training and manning policies in place in the months preceding Overlord. Combat operations are dependent upon a high-level of coordination at the tactical level to succeed. Patrols, Troops, and Squadrons require long training periods in order to familiarize themselves with the procedures unique to each subunit. They must practice maneuvering, formations, and actions upon contact; rehearsals must be done in the event of casualties and breakdowns; and, soldiers must be cross-trained in order to fill the roles of others. Above all, soldiers must spend a great deal of time working amongst the same people, day in day out, in order to achieve the level of familiarity and intimacy required to sustain a tactical unit in the field. The manning policy adopted by the Regiment, and Brigade, ensured this was never achieved as soldiers were transferred in and out of their units in the weeks before the invasion.25 There were a total of 130 transfers, of all ranks, into and out of the Regiment in the month of May alone.26 This figure is only representative of personnel entering and exiting the unit, and does not include those moved between Squadrons and Troops. These transfers were implemented well after the final pre-invasion exercises of the months previous. Many troops went into action with members they did not know. These individuals would have been unfamiliar with their unit’s standard operating procedures as they had never trained together. The transfer of personnel following pre-deployment training exercises fundamentally undermines the tactical effectiveness of all subunits within the Regiment. Soldiers’ first attempts to operate with other members of their team should not be while under contact with the WaffenSS. While replacements to a unit in theater are unavoidable, transfers before entering theater should only be done in exceptional cases. All the transferred served to do was undermine the months of drill and field exercises conducted to prepare units for Normandy. Those serving within the Canadian Army understood the effect these policies would have on a unit’s ability to operate in the field. On the 15th of May a message was sent to all units within the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade: “No officer will be posted or transferred from any unit of 2 [Canadian Armoured Brigade] unless a specific instruction on behalf of the [Brigade Commander] has been issued to do so; unless in case of serious sickness or accident”.27 122 journal of eastern townships studies The order only asks that officers be prevented from leaving, unless under exceptional circumstance, but does nothing to prevent the movement of Non-Commissioned Officers and soldiers, persons who are instrumental in ensuring Regiments are successful during engagements. Those in the Brigade and Regimental Headquarters were attempting to ensure the effectiveness of the army operationally when issuing their directive. They, however, failed to account for the devastating effect transfers would have on tactical subunits. Sound operational commanders are invaluable in ensuring success in a campaign, but the basic tactical unit, and its ability to close with and destroy the enemy, forms the foundation of any advancing force. The failure of Patrols and Troops, led by Corporals and Sergeants, will fundamentally undermine an army’s ability to wage war, regardless of the quality of officers. The message demonstrates that there was at least some understanding of the importance of cohesion within units. The attempt, however, came 21 days before the invasion and did little to retard movement into and out of the Regiment as 6 Officers and 69 other ranks were moved after the directive is issued.28 The total strength of the unit landing in Normandy was 37 officers and 661 other ranks, meaning 18.2% of the force had been transferred in the month previous and 10.74% after the Brigade message of the 15th of May. Amongst the officer corps, a group that Brigade specifically attempted to prevent from being transferred, 32.43% had moved in and out of the Regiment throughout May and 16.22% after the 15th of May. These numbers do not include those struck from strength because of medical issues. Manning issues were not the only obstacle that served to undermine the Regiment’s operational effectiveness once in theater, as training exercises were conducted on obsolete vehicles not used on operation. While in Normandy, the 27th made full use of Stuart, Sherman, and Firefly, tanks which were never used uniformly throughout training. Fabius III, and the countless other exercises in the spring of 44, saw the armoured regiment making use of Crusader and RAM tanks.29 For the 27th, their first experience operating with the new tanks at the regimental level was during their action in Normandy. Those crewing the tanks met very different interiors upon entering the American- made vehicles. The position of critical instruments used in combat were no longer located where, after months of training, they now reached for involuntarily. Drills that had been committed to muscle memory, allowing crew to operate their tank while under fire, were now useless. When exposed to the stresses associated with combat conditions, these soldiers would have experienced surges in adrenaline, elevated Sean Summerfield 123 heart rate, as well as vision and hearing loss due to fear.30 This fear response would have been coupled with the deterioration of motor skills, all of which severely retard the crews ability to operate effectively. As their heart rates rose above 175 beats per minute due to the influx of adrenaline in the system, vasoconstriction allowed less oxygen to the brain. Eventually their cognitive abilities would have degraded to a point David Grossman calls “condition black,” a state in which the soldier loses the ability to think rationally.31 It is because of the paralyzing effects of combat that armies drill continuously. Every action, no matter how small, is practiced until it becomes involuntary. When these drills are practiced in different vehicles, they serve little practical use. In fact, they further compound the difficulties of combat as troops are required to think through basic actions in the tank, something, if in the black, they are unable to do. Under fire, with strangers, and in unfamiliar vehicles, the Regiment stood little chance of reaching the airfield at Carpiquet once confronted by an SS Panzer Division. Although they sustained only 63 casualties, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, a Regiment they were tasked with supporting, suffered a loss of 245 persons. The decisions in manning and training made throughout the months previous limited the combat effectiveness of the 27th and contributed to the casualties sustained by the two Regiments. Had different policies been in place in the lead-up to Normandy the outcome of the battle of Authie may not have been so costly.

ENDNOTES 1. John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, New York: Praeger Publishers (1991). 2. David Hall, “Review: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command by John A. English.” The International History Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Nov. 1992), pp. 834836. 3. Commander Canadian Army’s Reading List. Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2015, p. 118. 4. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (2003), pp. 266. 5. Tim Cook, “Book Review: Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy.” International Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 994-996. 124 journal of eastern townships studies

6. Return of “A” & “B” Vehicles, 30 Apr 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke , Sherbrooke (QC); A Short History of the 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R), 27 October 1943, Unpublished Material, Archives of the , Sherbrooke (QC). 7. A Short History of the 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R). 8. Exercise Fabius III, 10 May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC); Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). 9. Census War Office Controlled Stores as of 25 Apr 44, 25 April 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC); Return of “A” & “B” Vehicles. The Quartermaster reporting the return of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadron tanks declared 6 Crusaders and 41 RAM tanks, to only 24 Sherman and 9 Stuarts. 10. Captain M.H. Bateman, “Shoot In” of Fireflys at Heath Range – 16 May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). 11. Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) June 1944, Sheet 5. 12. Captain M. H. Bateman, “Shoot In” of Fireflys at Heath Range – 16 May 1944. 13. Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) June 1944, Sheet 4. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid, Sheet 5. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Petch, War Diary of North Nova Scotia Highlanders June 1944, RG 24-C-3 Vol. 15122, RG 24, The Department of National Defence Fonds, 9. 20. Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) June 1944, Sheet 5. 21. Ibid. 22. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Petch, War Diary of North Nova Scotia Highlanders June 1944. 23. Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) June 1944, Sheet 5; Lieutenant- Colonel C. Petch, War Diary of North Nova Scotia Highlanders June 1944, Fonds 10. Sean Summerfield 125

24. Lieutenant-Colonel M.B.K. Gordon, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) June 1944, Sheet 7. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. Twelve Officers and 118 Non-Commissioned members. The document is unclear how many of the 118 were NCO’s. This number excludes those transferred out for medical reasons. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. David Grossman and Loren W. Christensen. On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace. Warrior Science Publications, 3rd edition (2008). 31. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY A Short History of the 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R), 27 October 1943, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). Bateman, M.H. Captain, “Shoot In” of Fireflys at Heath Range – 16 May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). Census War Office Controlled Stores as of 25 Apr 44, 25 April 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). Commander Canadian Army’s Reading List. Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2015. Cook, Tim. “Book Review: Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy.” International Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 994–996. Copp, Terry. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. University of Toronto Press, 2003. English, John. The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. Exercise Fabius III, 10 May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). Gordon, M.B.K. Lieutenant-Colonel, War Diary of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R) May 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC). Grossman, David, and Christensen Loren W. On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace. Warrior Science Publications, 3rd edition, 2008. 126 journal of eastern townships studies

Hall, David. “Review: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command by John A. English.” The International History Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Nov. 1992), pp. 834–836. Petch, C. Lieutenant-Colonel, War Diary of North Nova Scotia Highlanders June 1944, RG 24C-3 Vol. 15122, RG 24, The Department of National Defence Fonds. Return of “A” & “B” Vehicles, 30 Apr 1944, Unpublished Material, Archives of the Sherbrooke Hussars, Sherbrooke (QC).