Interpreting the Constitution: the Living Tree Vs
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
IN the COURT of APPEAL of the STATE of CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT the PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. JOHN PAUL FL
Filed 3/14/16 Certified for Publication 3/25/16 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H040327 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C9890809) v. JOHN PAUL FLOREZ, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant John Paul Florez is currently serving a “Three Strikes” sentence. Following the passage of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126.1 Although he was eligible to be resentenced based on his current and past offenses, the trial court exercised its discretion to find that resentencing him “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f)) and denied his petition. Defendant appealed. For the reasons set forth below we find no merit in any of defendant’s arguments on appeal and affirm the order denying his petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1998, police officers saw defendant urinating behind a convenience store in San Jose. Officers believed defendant dropped something on the ground. Shortly thereafter, officers discovered a small bag containing 0.19 grams of cocaine near where defendant 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. had been standing. Officers also determined that defendant was under the influence of opiates and cocaine. In 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to a felony for possession of a cocaine base and a misdemeanor for being under the influence. He also admitted he had been convicted of four prior strike convictions within the meaning of the former Three Strikes Law and that he had served three prior prison terms. -
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: a Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON THE BENCH: A SURVEY OF FORTY-TWO JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1300 II. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................. 1305 A. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 1306 B. Summary of the Findings .............................................................................................. 1309 1. The Judge’s Generation ............................................................................................. 1311 2. The D.C. Circuit Is Different ................................................................................... 1312 3. Previous Experience Working in the Federal Government .................................. 1313 C. An Overarching Impression of Widespread Eclecticism ............................................ 1313 III. DO JUDGES REALLY READ THE (WHOLE) STATUTE AT THE OUTSET OF STATUTORY CASES? .................................................................................................... 1315 A. Text Versus Context ......................................................................................................... 1316 B. Dictionaries .................................................................................................................... -
Carissima Mathen*
C h o ic es a n d C o n t r o v e r sy : J udic ia l A ppointments in C a n a d a Carissima Mathen* P a r t I What do judges do? As an empirical matter, judges settle disputes. They act as a check on both the executive and legislative branches. They vindicate human rights and civil liberties. They arbitrate jurisdictional conflicts. They disagree. They bicker. They change their minds. In a normative sense, what judges “do” depends very much on one’s views of judging. If one thinks that judging is properly confined to the law’s “four comers”, then judges act as neutral, passive recipients of opinions and arguments about that law.1 They consider arguments, examine text, and render decisions that best honour the law that has been made. If judging also involves analysis of a society’s core (if implicit) political agreements—and the degree to which state laws or actions honour those agreements—then judges are critical players in the mechanisms through which such agreement is tested. In post-war Canada, the judiciary clearly has taken on the second role as well as the first. Year after year, judges are drawn into disputes over the very values of our society, a trend that shows no signs of abating.2 In view of judges’ continuing power, and the lack of political appetite to increase control over them (at least in Canada), it is natural that attention has turned to the process by which persons are nominated and ultimately appointed to the bench. -
The Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, Chief Justice of Canada and of the Supreme Court of Canada, Is Pleased to Welcome Mr
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA PRESS RELEASE OTTAWA, January 8,1998 -- The Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, Chief Justice of Canada and of the Supreme Court of Canada, is pleased to welcome Mr. Justice Ian Binnie to the Court. He stated: “I am very pleased that in the legacy of our late colleague, John Sopinka, another member of the Court has been selected directly from the legal profession. It is important that this Court always be aware of the realities of the practising Bar so that we do not lose sight of the practical effect of our judgments. I am sure that Mr. Justice Binnie, who is counsel of the highest standing in the profession, will make a very valuable and lasting contribution to this Court.” Chief Justice Lamer spoke to Mr. Justice Binnie this morning to congratulate him on his appointment. Mr. Justice Binnie has indicated that he will be available to commence his duties at the Court as of the 26th of January. However, he will not be sitting that week, nor during the two following weeks as the Court is in recess, in order that he may prepare for the Quebec Reference case which will proceed, as scheduled, during the week of February 16th. Mr. Justice Binnie’s swearing-in will take place on February 2, 1998 at 11:00 a.m. in the main courtroom. Ref.: Mr. James O’Reilly Executive Legal Officer (613) 996-9296 COUR SUPRÊME DU CANADA COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE OTTAWA, le 8 janvier 1998 -- Le très honorable Antonio Lamer, Juge en chef du Canada et de la Cour suprême du Canada, a le plaisir d’accueillir M. -
Transgressing the Division of Powers: the Case of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement
Transgressing the Division of Powers: The Case of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement Christa Scholtz and Maryna Polataiko Abstract In 1975, the Bourassa government received legal advice that the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement exceeded provincial jurisdiction. Legal counsel advised the constitutionality of the Agreement be secured through formal constitutional amendment. No such amendment was sought. Based on authorized access to Premier Bourassa’s archived dossier on the Agreement’s negotiation, this article sets out the following: 1) why the provincial government sought to encroach on federal juris- diction; 2) the strategic means employed to insulate the Agreement from s. 91(24) litigation; and 3) provincial negotiators’ views on how judges would approach the Agreement going forward. This article confirms theoretical expectations about when governments might coordinate to transgress federalism’s division of powers: a high probability that courts would find a transgression occurred, and a high political cost should governments not coordinate on a transgression strategy. Keywords: federalism, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, constitutional law, division of powers, judicial politics, bargaining Résumé En 1975, le gouvernement de Robert Bourassa a reçu un avis juridique qui stipulait que la Convention de la baie James et du Nord québécois transcendait les compétences provinciales. Le conseiller juridique a donc recommandé de garantir la constitutionnalité de cette Convention au moyen d’un amendement constitutionnel -
Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning William N. Eskridge, Jr.* Philip P. Frickey** In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an im- portant topic of academic theory and discussion.' This development is welcome, since few topics are more relevant to legal craft and educa- tion than the interpretation of statutes, now our primary source of law. The recent theoretical views, however, contrast with practicing lawyers' strategies of statutory interpretation. When practitioners give advice to clients about what a statute means, their approach is usually eclectic: They look at the text of the relevant statutory provisions, any legislative history that is available, the context in which the legislation was en- acted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense and good policy. But when law professors talk about statutory interpre- tation, they tend to posit a more abstract, "grand" theory that privi- leges one or another of these approaches as "foundational."' 2 The commentators' grand theories contrast with the more ad hoc, fact- based reasoning of the practicing lawyer. How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many com- mentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be, inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judges' approaches to statutory in- terpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, * Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. ** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. We thank Daniel Farber, Dennis Patterson, Richard Posner, Suzanna Sherry, and Peter Strauss for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. -
Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: a 10-Year Democratic Audit 2014 Canliidocs 33319 Adam M
The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference Volume 67 (2014) Article 4 Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: A 10-Year Democratic Audit 2014 CanLIIDocs 33319 Adam M. Dodek Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Dodek, Adam M.. "Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: A 10-Year Democratic Audit." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 67. (2014). http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol67/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The uS preme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: A 10-Year Democratic Audit* Adam M. Dodek** 2014 CanLIIDocs 33319 The way in which Justice Rothstein was appointed marks an historic change in how we appoint judges in this country. It brought unprecedented openness and accountability to the process. The hearings allowed Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein through their members of Parliament in a way that was not previously possible.1 — The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, PC [J]udicial appointments … [are] a critical part of the administration of justice in Canada … This is a legacy issue, and it will live on long after those who have the temporary stewardship of this position are no longer there. -
Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism As Moral Readings of the American Constitution
LIVING ORIGINALISM AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM AS MORAL READINGS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION JAMES E. FLEMING∗ INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1171 I. THE BALKANIZATION (AND BALKINIZATION) OF ORIGINALISM........ 1173 II. BALKIN’S LIVING ORIGINALISM AS A MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ................................................................ 1175 III. STRAUSS’S LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION .................................................... 1177 A. Originalism and Its Sins ............................................................ 1177 B. The Common Law ...................................................................... 1179 C. The Role of the Written Constitution: Common Ground and Jefferson’s Problem ............................................................ 1180 D. Constitutional Amendments and the Living Constitution .......... 1183 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1184 INTRODUCTION With this event – A Symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism and David Strauss’s The Living Constitution – we launch a Boston University School of Law series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two significant books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty -
Paul J. Lawrence Fonds PF39
FINDING AID FOR Paul J. Lawrence fonds PF39 User-Friendly Archival Software Tools provided by v1.1 Summary The "Paul J. Lawrence fonds" Fonds contains: 0 Subgroups or Sous-fonds 4 Series 0 Sub-series 0 Sub-sub-series 2289 Files 0 File parts 40 Items 0 Components Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................Biographical/Sketch/Administrative History .........................................................................................................................54 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................Scope and Content .........................................................................................................................54 ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... -
The Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning by Richard H
The Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning By Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Table of Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3 I. Approaches to Constitutional “Meaning”: Contrasting PMO With A Historian’s Multiple- Meanings Thesis ........................................................................................................................ 10 A. Public Meaning Originalism .............................................................................................. 11 B. Foner’s Historical Scholarship and Original Meanings: The Fourteenth Amendment ..... 17 C. A Preliminary Contrast ...................................................................................................... 20 II. Trying to Make Sense of the Idea of Original Public Meaning ............................................... 21 A. Literal or Semantic Meaning ............................................................................................. 21 B. Pragmatic (or Contextual) Enrichment .............................................................................. 23 1. The Problem of Speaker Identification........................................................................... 24 2. The Problem of Characterizing Reasonable Readers or Listeners ................................ 28 C. Reconsidering the Concept of Original Public Meaning ................................................... 33 D. Linguistic Idiosyncrasy ..................................................................................................... -
Antonin Scalia's Textualism in Philosophy, Theology, and Judicial
Antonin Scalia’s Textualism in philosophy, theology, and judicial interpretation of the Constitution* Herman Philipse** 1. Introduction In his forceful and beautifully written essay ‘A Matter of Interpretation’, Justice Antonin Scalia proposed two interrelated theses, a minor and a major one.1 The minor thesis is a causal or historical conjecture and it says that the great liberty taken by judges of the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes and the Constitution is largely due to the influence of the common-law tradition upon legal training in American law schools.2 According to the major thesis, which is normative, this liberty of interpretation is undesirable, because it infringes upon the separation of powers in a modern democracy. If, under the pretext of interpreting laws, judges of the Supreme Court in fact revise the Constitution and promulgate new laws, they are usurping the legislative power that is exclusively assigned to the legislature. For this reason, the Supreme Court, and indeed all courts, should adopt a method of interpretation called ‘Textualism’ or ‘Originalism’, according to which the aim of judicial interpretation is to establish the original meaning of a statutory text.3 As Justice Scalia urges, the question of whether ‘life-tenured judges are free to revise statutes and constitutions adopted by the people and their representatives’ is ‘a question utterly central to the existence of democratic government’ (p. 133). However, both in the United States and in Europe the vast majority of judges reject Justice’s Scalia’s methodology of Textualism, so that the issue of Textualism is a central controversy in the philosophy of law. -
The Law Society of Upper Canada Archives
The Law Society of Upper Canada Archives Paul Lawrence fonds PF39 Prepared by: Carol Hollyer, 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Biographical Sketch Immediate Source of Acquisition Scope and Content Series Descriptions: PF39-1 Photographs of lawyers, judges and events PF39-2 Photographs of Canadian Bar Association conferences PF39-3 Miscellaneous photographs PF39-4 Index Paul Lawrence fonds PF39 Biographical History Paul J. Lawrence served as freelance photographer for the Ontario Lawyers Weekly and The Lawyers Weekly from 1983 to 2000. Immediate Source of Acquisition The records in this fonds were acquired by The Law Society of Upper Canada from Paul Lawrence in October of 2001. Scope and Content 1985-[2001?]; predominant 1985-1998 ca. 63,500 photographs : b&w and col. negatives ; 35 mm and 6 x 6 cm 105 photographs : col. slides ; 35 mm 3 photographs : col. prints ; 13 x 18 cm and 21 x 25 cm 2 cm of textual records Fonds consists of photographic negatives and slides created and accumulated by Paul Lawrence while a freelance photographer for The Ontario Lawyers Weekly and The Lawyers Weekly from 1983 to 2000. The photographs depict individual lawyers and judges from across Canada, most of which are from Ontario although a substantial number are from British Columbia. His subjects include lawyers practicing in all areas of the law, from prominent lawyers in large firms to sole practitioners, judges from various courts, as well as federal and provincial Chief Justices. Subjects also include individuals from political and business circles associated with the legal profession. Also depicted are various legal events from across the country, such as Canadian Bar Association conferences and Canadian Bar Association – Ontario events.