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A Conversadonwith ThomasAdmiral B Hayward NavalPreparedness in the1980 s

Held on July 24, 1980 at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D.C. ISBN 0-8447-3430-6

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 81-65381

AEI Studies 313

© 1981 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., and London. All rights reserved. No part of this publi­ cation may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without per­ mission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.

The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI.

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Printed in the United States of America Introduction

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, a non­ profit, nonpartisan, educational research organization, is devoted to improving the quality of discourse and deliberation on matters of public policy through the "competition of ideas." As one part of that competition, AEI periodically presents, and then publishes, conver­ sations with outstanding public figures, both in and out of govern­ ment. This discussion is part of that program. Admiral Hayward's range and depth of experience give him a view of the navy, the nation, and the world that is afforded to only a few. From fighter pilot to ship captain, from commanding officer to chief of his service, from shore to sea, Admiral Hayward not only has gained expertise, but also has been able to translate his knowl­ edge into leadership and direction for the navy's programs. In ad­ dition he has been able to express clearly and concisely his views on the problems that face the navy. We are fortunate in having Admiral Hayward share his views with us in this conversation.

COMMANDER WAYNE ARNY American Enterprise Institute

1 A Conversation with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

I cannot begin to cover all the issues that properly influence the navy's role today, but I would like to discuss three concerns: the inability of the navy to meet its peacetime commitments; the increas­ ing global presence of the Soviet navy; and the lack of trained per­ sonnel that would ensure our naval preparedness, a problem I ob­ served recently in visiting our fleet in the . These topics, of course, do not include another major concern, and that is the lack of basic credibility accorded the service chiefs. This country lacks confidence in its leadership, whether military or political. It troubles me greatly, but I am not going to dwell on that. I just want to mention it briefly in the hope that the credibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be higher for this audience than for others in the nation, and that you will accept what I say as coming from someone who understands what he is talking about. My basic concern is that the navy cannot meet its peacetime commitments today. No prior chief of naval operations has made that statement, or has had to make it; and I do not make it with any satisfaction. But the navy's inability to meet commitments is a fact, and it needs to be better understood. Since World War II we have had a foreign policy built around a global strategy and global alliances, although oriented principally toward Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), perhaps too much so. Nevertheless, foreign policy has had a global cast. It has included such commitments in this hemisphere as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) because we have vital interests in this area and, I am glad to see, these interests are presently expanding. Our commitments worldwide are also expanding and are realized in alliances with Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and in the Australia, New Zealand, and United

3 States Pact (ANZUS). The demise of the Treaty Or­ ganization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) has not lessened the essence of our commitment; the interest of our country in those areas remains as vital as when the treaties were in effect. And now the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and a changing relationship with Taiwan have continued to expand and reshape our interests in Asia. In sum, our policies have been, and remain, global in nature. The navy views its responsibilities very much in a global context; our commitments, both in peace and war, are global. Now let's take a look at what the is doing today. A month ago I was in the Mediterranean, visiting the Sixth Fleet. It took me less than three days to visit every ship there, a graphic illustration that the navy in the Mediterranean today is half the size it has been during most of the time since World War II. It is a very important fact to recognize, because we are unable to meet our peacetime naval requirements for NATO in Europe today, and the NATO nations, of course, realize that. When I visited the Seventh Fleet, as I was flying over the South China Sea from the Indian Ocean to Hawaii it struck me that the U.S. Navy is no longer the dominant navy there. More Soviet ships operate out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang-bases that, ironically, we have provided for them-than we now have ships operating in the South China Sea. We have had to reduce dramatically our force in traditional areas-the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea or off Korea and Japan-in order to operate in the Indian Ocean, where present circumstances dictate our presence. Certainly, the U.S. Navy will be where it is needed most. But it will no longer simultaneously be in all areas where it is required by our strategy and our commitments. Those commitments have increased over the past year-very much so in the Indian Ocean, and also in the , where quite a number of U.S. Navy ships operate today. Responsibilities continue to in­ crease; and I do not think they will decrease in the foreseeable future. The decade of the 1980s will not be easy. In fact, I suspect there are many surprises in store for us; and our record shows that we are not particularly good at anticipating surprises in areas where tension and conflict might arise. I hope that in the decade of the 1980s we will pay more attention to events in southern Africa, and in South America-Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the adjoining sea areas. But doing so will inevitably put more demands on the navy. Meanwhile, the navy has experienced general reductions in total size. Commit­ ments and capabilities are now out of balance; and not much can be

4 done about that. Ships are not built quickly, and the United States has no current wish to put the necessary money into rebuilding the navy. A second, and related, major concern must be considered: the Soviet navy is coming onto the seas of the world in a way we thought impossible only a few years ago. Consider what the Soviet navy has done this past year. Many of us analyze numbers, tonnage, and types of ships, and capabilities of airplanes, missiles, tanks, and guns. The individuals operating our fleet are not analyzing. They are preparing tactics and strategy for the force they see; and over the last ten or fifteen years they have observed a steadily improving Soviet naval force. This past year the Soviets introduced the Alfa­ class nuclear-powered attack , with torpedo, anti-ship, and anti- weapon systems. They are manufactured from titanium alloy, which allows them to go perhaps twice as deep as any other submarine. This capability makes our tactical problems much more difficult; we must improve our weapons to make sure we can kill a submarine at that depth. And then we have only begun, because this submarine runs much faster than any other in the world. Within the last month the Soviets have impressed the world with still another class of nuclear-powered attack submarine-one with cruise missiles, that can be launched under water and go several hundred miles. Such developments truly complicate naval warfare, which is already changing at a dramatic pace. This submarine is going to make the problem of operating surface ships much more demanding than it was twenty years ago. Last year the Soviets launched their second , and added it to their Pacific fleet; the first is operating with their northern fleet. A third will soon become operational, and the fourth is under construction. They are also operating vertical short takeoff and land­ ing (VSTOL) aircraft, and gaining a great deal of experience with them, while we are still debating whether we ought even to proceed with VSTOL development. None of the armed services has even determined whether vertical lift is a sensible option. Submarines and VSTOLs are part of the same pattern of indecision. While the Soviets proceed, we debate. We bicker over whether we should build another class of submarine, how fast it should be, how much it should cost, how it should be armed. We should instead use the knowledge, the talent of this country, to produce the best we can, if we can afford it. Again, the navy and marine corps like to believe we are the preeminent amphibious force in the world. We need to understand, however, that the Soviets can lift more than we can, that they are

5 developing an impressive amphibious capability, and that they have introduced a new class of amphibious ship, which is now operating in the Indian Ocean. They have also just completed an exercise in the Baltic Sea in which they used a number of air-cushion assault vehicles. Meanwhile we are analyzing the roles and missions of the marine corps, and whether or not we really need amphibious lift. We are not building air-cushion vehicles with any alacrity, or looking toward new, inventive, and imaginative ways of employing this kind of weapon. You have all heard of "paralysis by analysis." That syn­ drome has become so evident that "arrogance of analysis" is a better phrase. I feel strongly that such arrogance deflects the professional military advice badly needed in the decision-making process. If we look at the Soviets' long-range naval air arm, we will find that the Backfire bomber is now operating in their Pacific fleet for the first time (they have long been able to operate out of their Kola Gulf and Black Sea bases). The Backfire bomber brings with it the threat of the AS-4 missile; it can carry at least two, and maybe three of them. This missile has a range of 200-300 miles, travels at Mach 3 or Mach 4, and is very tough to handle. They are working hard on such cruise missiles to provide additional capability and to add a new dimension to the air threat for land- and sea-based forces. So whether we analyze tonnages or numbers or whatever, we have to pay attention to what the Soviets are actually accomplishing, what our forces and commanders must be prepared to face. We see a difficult threat. Finally, let me comment on the preparedness of today's navy. To the degree that I seem to contradict what I said earlier, I may seem to be talking with a forked tongue, but there is really no contradiction. The right kind of navy has been brought on-line as a result of my predecessors' efforts and the support of the Congress. We have the right kind of balance in our forces. We are producing the right sorts of things, even though we are not building enough of them. Our navy is modern; it is capable; it is effective. It is being operated by competent people; they are well trained; they know what they are doing. My observation last month, both in the Med­ iterranean and in the Indian Ocean, reenforced my conviction that the navy today is as good as I have ever seen it in peacetime. It is very professional, and it is ready to go. Professionalism, however, cannot cover some weaknesses that need to be corrected. The weakness in the fleet today is not in the ships, not in the airplanes, not in the weapons systems-they work well. It is in maintaining adequate numbers of people to make every­ thing work. Readiness is the most critical issue that we have to

6 address. That is why I have been so outspoken on the issue of compensation and why I talk about reviving the draft. We must do something about these personnel issues and do something soon. The readiness of the U.S. Navy today is the lowest I can remember in terms of people, not materiel. We need qualified technicians, adequate numbers of senior leadership, experienced people who can make it all work. We are deploying to forward areas, in support of our alliances and our policies, forces that do not have the necessary breadth and depth. They do exceedingly well for short periods of time, but under high stress they will quickly become exhausted. We can cover that to some degree by keeping track of the deficiencies and being prepared to fly people out to ships and into aviation squadrons on short order. We are prepared to do that. But that is not the right way to run our organization. When I commanded the Seventh Fleet, no unit reported that was not fully staffed and trained. That is no longer true. Almost every unit we deploy in forward areas today is marginally ready because of inadequate numbers of trained, competent personnel. We must recognize, however, that the people who are there perform awfully well. Part of our personnel problem, of course, stems from inadequate compensation. In speaking out as I have on pay, I sometimes get flak from retired personnel. Pay cannot possibly be the issue, they say: "It was not when I was in uniform." Perhaps not, but they do not understand today's problems. I wish I could take them to the Indian Ocean and have them see what our people are doing, see how committed they are to their tasks. We are operating that fleet at a pace we have never achieved before, even in wartime, and the navy is now at a wartime operational tempo. Ships stay in the Indian Ocean for three, four, and five months without ever going into port or sighting land. People work fourteen hours a day, seven days a week, talking to the same people all day, with no time for themselves. There is no place for a quiet moment aboard a ship. Yet, I never heard a complaint about operational tempo; they know why they are there. I want you to know that the people in the navy today are good people. They are competent and they are doing what is required of them because they are dedicated. They are there because they under­ stand that the job is a service to their country; they are there because they believe the country cares and supports them. If their sense of being supported is ever eroded, the current retention problem will become much worse. But there is no current morale problem in the navy. There is no lack of commitment. The people are working because they want to; they are certainly not working because they

7 are being paid for it. They are grossly underpaid for what they are being asked to accomplish. So those are three basic problems for us to think about. I have not talked about strategic systems, Trident II, essential equivalence, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), or other issues that might be of interest. I have said nothing about whether we should be building carriers or small ships, or about the problem of technical sophisti­ cation in our armed forces, or about women in the navy. These are other issues interesting to explore, but what I have said might be sufficient to start a discussion. Questions and Answers

HERBERT STEIN, American Enterprise Institute: Admiral, what would you say is the main limitation on our developing the naval strength so obviously needed? What is holding us back?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: It is really a question of investment. The country must invest more in national security. Although funding levels look high, because inflation keeps pushing costs up, we are still not buying enough national security; and if we continue at the same funding pace, we might see absolute improvement, but we will still lose capability relative to the Soviets. The navy has only a slim margin of superiority over the Soviets. That is a very subjective judgment, but our balance with the Soviet navy is not a comfortable one. And if we continue the level of support that we have seen recently, I will not be able to talk about our navy's "slim margin" many more years. My successor will not be able to talk about it. We will clearly be number two by anybody's analysis. We are not build­ ing enough ships; we are not building enough airplanes; our pro­ duction rates for weapons are inadequate; and we are not paying our people enough to keep them in. We simply must put a fair amount of additional money on the block. If we fail to do that, we are not going to be competitive.

MR. STEIN: Are there high policy officials in this government who think we are in a risky situation but that we cannot afford to devote another 1 or 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) to national security?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: I think many people hold the view that other national priorities are of overriding concern, and that we must hold down our security investment. I recognize other national needs. I

8 know what inflation does. I know that the economy has to be brought under control, and that limits on federal expenditures are part of that process. If we continue our present investment policy, however, the navy will soon lose relative capability. We are not buying enough airplanes right now to replace the ones we lose annually.

WILLIAM FELLNER, American Enterprise Institute: How much could we spend usefully within the next three or four years?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: Well, I am not in a position to speak for the administration or the Department of Defense. But if we are really going to correct the balance, we have to invest at least 6 percent of our GNP for several years; and we will probably have to make large first- and second-year increments. That would mean $20 billion more than what we are already talking about in order to get things moving. We could then keep going at about 6 percent of GNP. In broad terms that appears to be what it takes. We are spending today about 5 percent, or a little less.

ROBERT MOST, American Enterprise Institute Project on National Defense: I have no trouble believing that the navy needs more money; everyone does. I guess mine is a hindsight question. For almost ten years now the navy has had the largest share of the defense budget. Looking back, would you have used the money any differently in terms of your fleet investment?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: First with respect to the argument that the navy has the largest share, let me set the record straight. You must re­ member that the navy includes the marine corps. If marine corps dollars are extracted from what we characteristically think of as navy money, we find the air force has always had the largest percentage of the pot. Defense agencies, by the way, are growing fastest in terms of funding. But with regard to your basic question, navy fund­ ing is properly balanced today. The problem is the size of the force we have-twelve carrier battle groups. That force is insufficient for adequate global distribution to meet potential tasks at sea. When we fell below sixteen carrier battle groups, we increased the risk of force imbalance. With our present twelve battle groups, the risk becomes very high. I could not support a policy of allowing our total strength to fall further. We have been building submarines at the right pace relative to the number of carriers; they are in balance with the rest of the force. We have also built a host of surface ships- and frigates,

9 capable of anti-submarine action-and they are necessary. One major threat that we face at sea is the submarine; the Soviets now have over three times as many as we do, and twice as many nuclear­ powered ones. We must be able to handle such a major threat. The threat of missiles that can be launched from submarines, surface ships, and airplanes is also important. The problem is how to handle very small objects coming at very high speeds and still destroy most of them. In fact, we have to get them all. Because the Soviets are carrying nuclear weapons, we cannot allow even one missile to get through. Warfare has become very complex. We have to use space systems to counter their targeting capability. We want to include deception to mislead them about what we are doing. All that requires electronic warfare, capabilities far more important today than they were fifteen years ago. I findno area in which I would say we have made a big mistake. For a time, when the F-14 was coming in, I felt that we were asking for too much sophistication. I no longer feel that way. It takes the sophisticated technology of the F-14 and Phoenix Missile System to reach out and knock down an enemy airplane that is moving close to Mach 2 and is prepared to launch a missile in a jamming envi­ ronment. In retrospect, the F-14 was the right airplane to bring along. Had we not built it, we would be in much worse shape today. In fact, we are in good shape for anti-air warfare because of the so­ phistication of three systems-the F-14 with Phoenix missiles; the E- 2C early warning airplane, which is quite expensive and complicated, but very good; and the EA-68, a jamming airplane which is also very good and very expensive. If we had chosen low-cost alternatives for those systems, we would not have air defense competence today. Fortunately, the people who pushed hard for that sophistication won out. So I do not find an area where we really made a mistake.

WILLIAM E. COLBY, American Enterprise Institute Project on National Defense: What is the future for the marines in relationship to the army elite forces? How able are they to confront the kinds of chal­ lenges they may have to face?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: There is some talk today, more than I would like to see, about competition between the army and the marine corps over roles and missions. I do not see the need for that com­ petition; they both have important roles to play. We have always presumed the marines are a part of a naval force that we can position and move quickly wherever we want. That force is not "rapid" in the same sense as air-lifted forces, but it is rapid in the sense that

10 we can pre-position it as tension increases in any given area. The Indian Ocean is a good case in point. The total marine force we can deploy there is not sufficient in itself, but our ability to reenforce it rapidly with other means does give it credibility. We do not need to think of it as competing with the army's 82nd Airborne, for in­ stance. Whether or not today's navy-marine amphibious assault capa­ bility will maintain the same character in the future is a legitimate issue. The navy and the marine corps have a group constantly as­ sessing and reassessing that capability. We do not want to build the same kind of amphibious ship simply because we have to replace an old one. We are always looking for better ways to do the job. For instance, one new strategy includes vertical envelopment; our am­ phibious ships increasingly have that capability. The rapid delivery of marine forces on the surface, which would probably mean some kind of air-cushion vehicle, seems another right way to go. We ought to be developing that capability so that we can test it out one way or the other; we are being too slow about that. We also have some developmental vehicles with which we could be doing more. Then, too, the concept of a rapid deployment force in the Middle East is logical. The distance of that area-12,000 miles from either of our coasts-makes the difficulty of sending reinforcements there consid­ erable. Right now, by pre-positioning equipment in the Indian Ocean, we have the ability to put a brigade of marines into whatever area we choose in less than a day after the final decision is made. Some­ time this month, at Diego Garcia, we will have completed pre-po­ sitioning seven ships which have sufficient capability to support a marine brigade and an air force tactical fighter wing for fifteen or twenty days with all necessary combat equipment. We hope that capability will allow us to hold long enough to have the air force and the army enter the area, and to have rapid sea lift bring in the necessary heavy support. We will continue to modernize the amphibious capability of the marine corps along lines that will anticipate future requirements. Our anticipations are not oriented only toward NATO concerns; they are also heavily oriented toward third world areas.

ROBERT J. PRANGER, American Enterprise Institute: Are you satisfied that planning concepts and our defense policy, whether for the navy or other services, are proceeding satisfactorily in terms of coordi­ nation with and assistance from our allies and other states? Since the end of World War II we have always projected using conventional

11 force in cooperation with allies. We would not be on Diego Garcia without British assistance; it is British territory. But consider such third world contingencies as the . Are you satisfied that our allies are being taken into account in consultation, that they are doing enough, contributing enough, being asked to lend bilateral military assistance in this area? Are our ships alone in the Arabian Sea? And should they be? ADMIRAL HAYWARD: I will provide only a partial answer to your question; those decisions belong to the State Department. But from my observation of progress made during the last three years, the administration has been reasonably successful in getting our NATO allies to contribute more to our mutual defense. Most of them have increased the percentage of their GNP that they have put into de­ fense. They are not all meeting the 3 percent objective because in­ flation has struck them all in difficult ways; but there has been progress, and they have been more aware of the need for everyone to work better together (I am now talking about confrontation with the Warsaw Pact rather than about third world operations). There has, then, been general progress. We are cooperating to make certain that we do not duplicate research and development investments. We try to complement each other's efforts as much as possible. There is also more appreciation of the U.S. Navy's role in the Middle East. NATO countries, and Japan as well, realize the im­ portance of our contribution to NATO presence in the area. When the U.S.S. Midway and its associated ships returned to Japan after having been in the Indian Ocean for four or five months, the group was greeted at Yokosuka, its home base, by thousands and thou­ sands of Japanese. The Japanese leadership-the mayors, the prov­ ince governors-- gave speeches saying, "What a great thing you did for us, supporting our interests." Cooperation continues to increase. Right now the British are in the Indian Ocean. Both the French and the British have done more in the Mediterranean to help compensate for the forces we had to withdraw from that area. In fact, at the time we sent the U.S.S.Nimitz out of the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, the British had a task group headed toward the Caribbean for an exercise. When they learned our plans, they immediately sent their group into the Med­ iterranean as a compensatory signal. Therefore, I think we can be fairly positive about the lines of cooperation, particularly in naval affairs. JERRY FRIEDHEIM, American Newspaper Publishers Association: Part of the navy's challenge is how the American public perceives the

12 present situation. I know you are working on that; but as a matter of curiosity, did you take any U.S. newsmen when you went to the Indian Ocean, or did you find U.S. correspondents with the fleet or at Diego Garcia?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: I do not take them with me personally, but we do try to keep the media involved. We did not include the press in the Indian Ocean for other reasons; and we quite specifically ex­ cluded them at the time of the rescue attempt in Iran so that we would not have an inadvertent security breach. Since that time we have invited them to the Indian Ocean several times, and I think we could respond to their requests if they wanted to go back.

MR. FRIEDHEIM: In the past there was something called the Joint Chiefs Orientation Conference OCOC). I realize it was abolished for various reasons. Might we not be back in a time when the Depart­ ment of Defense would want to reconsider something similar to keep civilian opinion leaders informed?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: I believe the Department of Defense currently has such a program. The more often we military leaders can expose what we are doing, the better the situation. I am not aware that we hold back at all. We do a great deal of local work through our commanders, and the Navy League assists in helping us organize groups going aboard ships or spending a day or two at air stations. There is no reluctance on our part to try to keep the public aware.

GENERAL LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR., U.S. Marine Corps (retired), American Enterprise Institute Project on National Defense: The pic­ tures you have painted emphasize the need for strategic warning so that we can move ships around and allow marine amphibious forces to act in a timely way. Within the limits of security, could you comment on how good our strategic warning capabilities are these days?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: First, Soviet doctrine emphasizes surprise. We try to build our thinking around ways to counter that. Therefore, strategic warning is a major responsibility. Our strategic warning capabilities have been getting better every year. We were surprised that the Soviets made the political decision to invade Afghanistan, but we knew in advance that they were preparing for a military move. And if they are going into Iran, we will know in advance. Certainly, if they intend to do something in Europe in a way that

13 might precipitate a major conflict, we will know well in advance. Our technology has improved in the last decade or more, and it gets better all the time. The brilliance of the people involved in strategic warning gives me a fair amount of confidence that we will not be surprised by World War III. In fact, we ought to be able to project a deterrent force in such a way that we can prevent World War III. By moving the navy, or strengthening our defense, or reinforcing combat forces someplace, we can signal our understanding that the ante is getting high and that we are prepared.

WAYNE VALIS, American Enterprise Institute: What are the main weaknesses of the Soviet naval forces? Where are they vulnerable?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: They are certainly vulnerable geographically. Look where their navy is and how it has to operate; every place is bad. In the Pacific, they are boxed in by the Sea of Japan. They must get out before a war starts or they are in to stay, a.,d they know that. That necessity is an important source of strategic warning for us because we will be able to observe any significant movement there. On the Kamchatka Peninsula, at Petropavlovsk, they have another major naval base-principally submarine. There is no railroad into the peninsula; everything comes by ship or by air, and it is fairly easy for us to cut that off. The Black Sea fleet must come through the Dardanelles; the Baltic fleet must come through the Kaggerak. The northern fleet must come through the Barents, where it is ex­ posed to Norway, a NATO ally. Finally, the Soviets must come through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap to get into the Atlantic. Geography is their biggest problem. We need to have our whole tactics and strategy designed to make that problem even more difficult. We used to know some major warfare areas in which the Soviets had weaknesses, but they have compensated for most of them. They have been investing in their navy now at a tremendous pace for about twenty years, and, as a consequence, they are presenting a very complex problem for us. They have overhead surveillance sys­ tems that we have to take into account because we have no advantage there. In long-range missiles they are particularly impressive. But they do not have air superiority afloat, and that is their major tactical weakness. We have it, and we should never forget it. Whether a battle is going to be over land or sea, the nation that controls the air controls the battle. We control the battle today with our carrier battle groups. Lacking an effective air defense capability at sea threatens their entire surface navy, and they know it. They cannot steam their

14 surface navy anywhere safely, so long as we have carriers in the area. Initially they tried to compensate for that vulnerability with missiles and long-range bombers; now they are building carriers. They have under way replenishment ships that can keep their fleet at sea for long periods. They are building repair ships that can be deployed to advance bases. They are at work on a worldwide net­ work of bases so that they no longer need to return to Soviet ports through narrow geographic straits. There are, then, fewer weak­ nesses than there were, but the two key ones remain.

MR. VALIS: A brief follow-up question. What logistics do they require to maintain, for example, their Cuban surrogates and their own people in Africa?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: They are doing that mostly by ship. The Soviets have an enormous merchant marine that is integrated with the mil­ itary structure. We often observe their merchant marine in amphib­ ious warfare, for instance. The Soviets have more amphibious lift today because their new merchant ships have been expressly de­ signed with that in mind. They can be quickly converted for support of warfare, and we have watched them used in amphibious exercises.

COMMANDER ARNY: What do you think of the effectiveness of the new rapid deployment force, and what is the navy's role in it?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: Pre-positioning forces gives us the ability, with tactical warning, to get ships under way and put them where we want them. If the situation is appropriate, we could offload a fully prepared division/air wing team, and that is a good deterrent ca­ pability. Beyond that, rapid deployment, especially with the tremendous ranges involved in the Middle East, requires using C-Ss as well as commercial aircraft. But we need an airplane that can operate from airfields that are not as good as one might wish; and that problem leads us to the CX program. The CX is a cargo aircraft with capa­ bilities not yet fully defined; but it would operate off lesser airfields and still carrytanks, artillery, and things of that sort. The CX program has not even started; it will be years before we have optimum de­ velopment. In the meantime we will use the airlift capability devel­ oped principally for reinforcement in Europe. Sea lift also deserves more emphasis, and historically that has been difficult to achieve. The navy emphasis on sea lift has always run against frustrating obstacles. Now we see the price we have paid

15 for that, because with half a dozen large cargo ships we can match what days and days of flying every airplane this country owns can lift into an area. We have that capability available today with the SL- 7. There are eight of those ships. They weigh over 30,000 tons and are capable of thirty-three knots. Because of the high cost of petro­ leum, they are no longer economical to use commercially; but they make good sense in a military sea lift role. They can reach Europe in four-and-a-half days, and the Middle East in fifteen. Seven or eight of these ships would make a major improvement in our ability to reinforce. We are now asking Congress for authorization to pur­ chase them.

MR. MOST: Can you put them to productive peacetime use?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: Probably not. They would compete with com­ mercial interests, and we do not want to create that problem. Instead, we should pre-position them where we want to load, and contract for small crews to be kept on board, in much the same way we keep certain ships today on ten days' alert. They are manned, and we can have them loaded and out in ten days.

BRETTONScIARONI, American Enterprise Institute: How do we main­ tain equipment on ships pre-positioned in the Indian Ocean? And what are the merits of having base facilities in the area, such as we will have in Oman and Kenya, relative to having permanent bases? In peacetime, countries may agree to give us facilities; but in a crisis, it is a lot less desirable for them to have the U.S. fleet visiting them.

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: Right now, in order to get on with pre-posi­ tioning, we have simply put the equipment aboard. Because the ships are not hermetically sealed, we will start a rotation program in six months, taking equipment off, giving it periodic maintenance checks, and reloading it. What we strive for in the long term is to seal both the ship and the equipment. There are a number of effective ways to seal it so that we will be able to leave the equipment there virtually forever and know that when we need it, we can turn the switch and it will work. As for the facilities, we are not striving to establish any U.S. bases in the Middle East. Instead, we are trying to arrange a program in which we work with our friends to determine feasible ways to expand infrastructure and use it quickly if needed, and perhaps so that we could pre-position equipment in some of those areas and occasionally stage exercises to demonstrate our capability and to learn

16 more about the area. We are proceeding sensibly, which means cooperation will come gradually. But we are not trying to build up major base structures in the area. Diego Garcia does need some expansion. It was initially built to handle about 700 people, with facilities limited to storage of a little fuel and ammunition, and with some ramp space to allow operation of patrol planes. That limited capability has been demonstrated inadequate. We now have a pro­ gram before Congress to further develop Diego Garcia.

COMMANDER ARNY: You have supported a return to active service of the U.S.S. New Jersey and the U.S.S. Oriskany. What do you see as their role in today's navy?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: I support bringing them back as an option if we decide to invest more in national defense. I do not see bringing them back instead of what we are doing. We have another old carrier, the U.S.S. Bonhomme Richard, which could also be reactivated. So we have two old carriers and four old battleships that still have some life left. If we want to build up the navy faster than new procurement would do it, the investment we made in the past can be intelligently reemployed. Clearly we do not have enough carriers today. Those older carriers are not as large as we would like, but we operated them in very effectively. We could still put an attack-ori­ ented air wing aboard and operate those ships in conjunction with today's fleet. Of course, these ships are not operational now; we would have to take a year and a half, and really overhaul them. But they would be able to go out and operate for at least five more years. The four battleships are a different proposal. If we brought them back, I would favor bringing them back into service for the full remaining life of the ships-fifteenor twenty years-bymodernizing them. They are great ships in terms of hulls and speed and the damage they can take. I would take the after sixteen-inch turret gun off and install a platform from which we could operate helicopters or Harriers, the vertical-lift airplanes the marines have. I would leave the two forward turrets. The sixteen-inch gun has about a range of 22 miles and with just a bit of research and development we could get 40 to 50 miles out of the sixteen-inch round. We could put a laser head on it, fire it 30 or 40 miles, and hit the target. We would also place our present surface-to-surface missile, Harpoon, with a range of 60 miles, on deck to replace old guns. Eventually we could put on Tomahawk, our newer cruise missile with a minimum range of 300 miles.

17 We could generate a lot of offensive capability with these war­ ships. It takes, however, about half a billion dollars to overhaul and thoroughly modernize a battleship. But that is hardly expensive for the capability acquired; our Spruance-class destroyers cost half a bil­ lion dollars a piece.

THOMAS JOHNSON, American Enterprise Institute: It appears then that the large carrier will continue to be preferred to the small carrier.

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: If you ask that question of someone in uniform, and you impose no financial constraints, and if you really believe cost effectiveness is worthwhile, a large carrier is always a better buy. Politically it is very difficult to swallow two billion dollars for one ship; so people look for cheaper alternatives. But the cheaper alternatives buy less effectiveness. Always buy the big carrier.

MR. PRANGER: Admiral, on any given day when you get up in the morning and look at the oceans' map, how many Soviet attack sub­ marines, diesel and nuclear, do you see?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: The Soviets have roughly 225 attack submarines. About one quarter of them are at sea at any given time. In the Mediterranean, for example, on a given day, there might be any­ where from 8 to 15.

MR. PRANGER: So, they could close down sea lanes quickly, couldn't they?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: Sure, but let's recognize that most of the time we know where they are. They do not know where ours are. That makes a lot of difference.

WILLIAM J. BAROODY, JR., president, American Enterprise Institute: Another piece of our total force is the Naval Reserve, the active duty forces. Are we gaining or losing ground in regard to the Naval Reserve?

ADMIRAL HAYWARD: In the last few years, we have made major strides in putting the Naval Reserve back on its feet. For several years prior to that, we had a serious debate within the Department of Defense as to what the size of the reserve should be. The navy wanted it to be 90,000 troops. Defense would cut it to 45,000 or 50,000; then Congress would restore it to 90,000. We did that for

18 four straight years, and it had a detrimental effect on the Naval Reserve. Units would be told that they were going to be decommis­ sioned, and then, at the end of the fiscal year, Congress would put the money back to keep these units going. So, the Naval Reserve really did not know where it stood. The Department of Defense and Congress now agree on a strength of 87,000, however, and it looks like the argument is behind us. As a result, people are returning, morale is high, and we are effectively modernizing the reserve. A particular concern now is for modernization of the surface reserve. When most people think of the Naval Reserve, they think of ships; but most of the selective reserve has nothing directly to do with ships. It has to do with specialized skills in such areas as electronics, communications security, and engineering. Those re­ serve personnel who are actually associated with hardware, with the reserve ships in port, constitute only a few thousand people. And the ships they man are World War II vintage. I have been trying hard to get rid of such ships because they are ineffective and a drain on resources. What I would like is to buy the Naval Reserve a new ship. It would be fairly simple, and easy to maintain with minimum numbers of active duty personnel. It would be meant for anti-sub­ marine warfare, and for escorting shipments of war munitions and combat consumables. It would be relatively cheap to build-about 100 million dollars a ship. There are a number of such ships now in design. Our allies own a number of them that are very good anti­ submarine warfare ships. That is the program I am trying to sell for the surface naval reserve, and I have a lot of people believing in it. If I can get money, I would like to build fifty of these ships, turn them over to the Naval Reserve, and have them operated in the same way the Air National Guard operates new airplanes. They have A-7s that go right to them, A-lOs go right to the Air National Guard; and those units are very effective, prepared forces. I think we can do the same thing with the Naval Reserve surface ships.

COMMANDER ARNY: Thank you, Admiral.

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,'nces

\E' (" )CIATES I The American Enterpns ition in the competition of ideas through its .r1,.r-:1 A f < am has two objectives: The first is to brc. .• s, conferences, forums, and reviews, and t� · ,..· ity with the issues. AEI Associates receive r· r,-h and programs, and they can order publicatic ,.4 The second c bjec -· ...... " t:..... prise lnstitult nd ' the academic �om:.-c· titudes. Your contr,' elp ensure that decision . ,.,rac­ tical options to be cons,..,eredbeforL pro, '"· inulated. 1 he issues studied by AEI include: • Defense Policy • Health Policy • Economic Policy • Legal Policy • Energy Policy • Political and Social Processes • Foreign Policy • Social Security and Retirement Policy • Government Regulation • Tax Policy For more information, write to: .AMERICANENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 A Conversation with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward: Naval Prepar­ edness in the 1980s is an edited transcript of a discussion with the chief of naval operations. In his remarks and in his responses to the scholars and guests of the American Enterprise Institute, Admiral Hayward discusses his three major concerns regarding the current and future roles of the U.S. Navy: the inability of the navy to meet its peacetime commitments, the increasing global presence of the Soviet navy, and the lack of trained personnel to man the fleet. His comments include the following:

" ...the navy cannot meet its peacetime commitments today. No prior chief of naval operations has made that statement, or has had to make it; and I do not make it with any satisfaction. But the navy's inability to meet commit­ ments is a fact, and it needs to be better understood."

" ... the Soviet navy is coming onto the seas of the world in a way we thought impossible only a few years ago. ...The individuals operating our fl.eet ...are preparing tactics and strategy for the force they see; and over the last ten or fifteen years they have observed a steadily improving Soviet naval force."

"The weakness in the fleet today is not in the ships, not in the airplanes, not in the weapons systems-they work well. It is in maintaining adequate num­ bers of people to make everything work. Readiness is the most critical issue that we have to address."

ISBN 0-8447-3430-6

� American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research � 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036