Sunni's and Shias

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Read the Text: Sunni’s and Shias Sunni When he died, Muhammad didn’t leave behind a clear leader of Islam. As such, there was a debate between different Muslim groups over who should control Islam between the Sunnis and Shias The debate led to 3 large battles between Sunnis and Shias. At the final battle, Karbala in 680, the Sunnis won and executed the Shia leader Hussein. As a result, Sunnis became the dominant denomination and now over 85% of all Muslims are Sunni. The differences are below: • Sunni: Muslims who follow only the example of Mohammad’s death. • Shia: Muslims who follow the example of Ali, Mohammad’s son –in-law, as well as Mohammad. Sunnis have 6 main articles of faith which they use to structure their faith. These are: Article Meaning Five holy books Tawrat, Zabur, Injil, Scrolls of A, Qur’an Angels Angels do the work of Allah Tawhid Oneness of Allah Prophets Prophets are chosen to deliver messages Order (Qadr) Everything is ordered by Allah’s will Day of Judgement All humans must answer for their actions These articles of faith are very important for Sunni Muslims. They influence Muslims to live a good life as Allah is all-knowing and angels are writing down everything that they do. Muslims want to reach heaven in the afterlife and so they follow Allah’s rules. Shia Islam Shias – a smaller denomination at around 15% of all Muslims, have the five roots of faith called Usul ad-Din. Many of these are similar to Sunni belief with some key differences. Act Meaning Prophethood Allah sent messengers to guide people to the right path Resurrection There will be a day of judgement where all humans are judged Adalat Justice – Allah is wise and commands respect from all creation Tawhid Allah is one, the creator who stands above the world Imamate Leadership. Muhammad left 12 followers to lead Islam after 632* The roots of Usul ad-Din are very important for Shias. The belief in tawhid encourages Muslims to have faith in the structure and order of the universe. Furthermore, the Day of Judgement means that Shias will be required to answer for their actions before God. Finally, the belief in adalat means that Shias trust that Allah always has a purpose and that His actions are based on wisdom. Questions 1. What happened after Muhammad died? 2. What is the main difference between Sunnis and Shias? 3. What are two similarities between the ‘articles of faith’ and ‘Usul ad-Din’? 4. What are two differences between the ‘articles of faith’ and ‘Usul ad-Din’? 5. Why might there be conflict between Sunnis and Shias? .

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