PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN MALI: THE TOUAREG REBELLION’S
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PEACEBUILDING PROCESS
By
Karin Dillon
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
In
International Development
Chair:
Davi cLHirschmann
lean of the School of International Service
"7 D e c c-vrY W<- X p x ) "T - Date
2007 American University Washington, DC 20016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 1-« °
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1459163
Copyright 2007 by Dillon, Karin
All rights reserved.
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
® UMI
UMI Microform 1459163 Copyright 2008 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 789 E. Eisenhower Parkway PO Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ©COPYRIGHT
by
Karin Dillon
2007
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN MALI: THE TOUAREG REBELLION’S
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PEACEBUILDING PROCESS
BY
Karin Dillon
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the causes of Mali’s Touareg Rebellion (1990-1996) and the
peacebuilding that brought it to an end. Using key informant interview data that I
collected in 2006 in the Tombouctou region of northern Mali, I find that causes of the
rebellion fall into two categories: factors that fostered Touareg grievances with the
Malian central government, and factors that ignited these grievances. As frustrations
boiled over, an isolated resistance movement in the Kidal region became a full-scale
rebellion across the North. After six years of conflict interspersed with negotiation, local
and sub-regional successes in peacebuilding and peace implementation have kept
northern Mali free from open warfare since 1996. Despite this success, peace is
precarious. Root causes not addressed by the Pacte National peace agreement leave open
the possibility of a return to conflict. Renewed conflict would not only affect local
populations, but would impact sub-regional and global security.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My sincere thanks go to Charles Call for chairing my thesis and providing me with
insightful critiques and suggestion throughout the research and writing process. David
Hirschmann, Fantu Cheru, and Andrew Dillon additionally provided valuable comments.
Shindouk Mohamed Lamine ould Nagim was a dedicated research assistant. The
interview respondents who so graciously gave me their time and attention were an
indispensable component of this project. Nouhou Idrissa Maiga and Leila Toure
welcomed me into their family for the full duration of the field research. The hospitality
of the population of northern Mali additionally facilitated my work. Partial financial
support for this project was provided by a Tinker-Walker Fellowship of the International
Development Program of the School of International Service at American University.
All errors remain the responsibility of the author. Correspondence may be sent to
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... vi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION...... 1
Significance of Findings
Research Questions and Summary of Findings
Methodology
Outline of Paper
2. BACKGROUND ON NORTHERN MALI AND THE REBELLION ..15
Demography and Characteristics of Northern Mali
Brief History of the Rebellion
3. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 30
Causes of Civil Conflict
Peacebuilding and Peace Implementation
4. CAUSES OF THE TOUAREG REBELLION...... 44
Introduction
Sahel Droughts
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Neglect of the North, Underdevelopment, and Marginalization
Changes to Labor Market, Social Relationships, and Class Structure
Ethnic Prejudice, Social Exclusion, and Ethnically-Driven Social Manipulation
Conclusions on Causes
5. PEACE IMPLEMENTATION AND PEACEBUILDING...... 88
Introduction
The Peace Process
Addressing Root Causes and Implementation of the Pacte
Peacebuilding Conclusion
6. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE...... 113
Appendix
1. INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN...... 118
2. TIMELINE OF MALIAN HISTORY...... 119
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 122
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
1. WEST AFRICA...... 3
2. MAJOR CITIES OF THE TOMBOUCTOU REGION...... 8
3. MAJOR CITIES IN MALI...... 16
4. MALI’S REGIONAL BOUNDARIES...... 17
Tables
1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MALI’S MAJOR
ETHNICITIES...... '...... 19
2. INTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS INTO MALIAN ARMED AND
CIVIL SERVICES...... 99
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Despite its reputation as one of the more peaceful nations in West Africa, the
Republic of Mali has not been conflict free.1 The northern part of the country has
experienced several uprisings including resistance to French colonization at the turn of
the century, a 1963 revolt against Mali’s fledgling government in the northern-most
region (Kidal), and a civil conflict spanning the years 1990 to 1996. The conflict of the
early 1990s was the most significant of these uprisings, engulfing the country’s three
northern regions (Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal - hereinafter, “the North”).
This paper sets out to examine this “Touareg Rebellion” of the 1990s.4 I explore
the rebellion’s causes, the peacebuilding efforts that brought it to an end and the region’s
prospects for continued peace. This introductory chapter presents an overview of the
significance of my findings, the research questions and methodology on which I based
this work, and an outline of the entire paper.
1 Bureau o f African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali,” U.S. Department o f State, http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm (accessed December 3,2007). This background notes states that “Malians enjoy a relative harmony rare in African states.” 2 “Tombouctou” is known to Americans as “Timbuktu.” 3 At the time of the rebellion, Kidal was not formally recognized as a separate region, but within the North, it was viewed as separate from Gao for cultural, historical, and climactic reasons. I discuss this in the body of the text later in the introduction. 4 International news and academic sources describe these events as the “Touareg rebellion,” but Malians refer to it simply as “the rebellion.” In the “Background” chapter o f this paper I explain the origins o f the “Touareg” name, which is not indigenous to Mali. 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2
Significance of Findings
There is no significant body of literature on Mali’s Touareg rebellion. The
conflict was small by global standards, and occurred in an isolated part of a country that
receives little international press, especially in Anglophone news sources.5 Despite its
small scale, much stands to be learned from study of this conflict.
From an academic perspective, the causes of the Touareg Rebellion are not easily
explained by current theories. This paper synthesizes new primary research with
literature on the causes of the Touareg Rebellion (herein after “Mali-specific literature”)
and generic literature on causes of conflict to explain the roots of the rebellion.
Furthermore, sources on the peacebuilding and peace implementation efforts that brought
the Touareg Rebellion to an end are minimal. The only substantial piece addressing this
subject, a UN publication printed just two years after the end of the rebellion, while well
researched, does not provide an entirely neutral and reflective analysis of the peace
process.6 This paper expands on this UN work, reviewing the successes and failures of
peace implementation ten years after the end of the conflict.
5 Estimates o f total deaths are less than 1,000. Department o f Peace and Conflict Research, Conflict Database “Mali,” Upsalla University, http://www.pcr.uu. se/database/conflictInformation.php?years= 1990%2C 1991 %2C 1992%2C 1993 %2C 1994%2C 1995%2C 1996&bcID=64&variables%5B%5D= 1 &variables%5B%5D=2&variable s%5B%5D=3&variables%5B%5D=4&variables%5B%5D=5&variables%5B%5D=6&variables% 5B%5D=7&variables%5B%5D=8&variab1es%5B%5D=9&variables%5B%5D=10&button=+Sear ch+ (accessed December 3,2007). Mali is a francophone country, but the geographic isolation of northern Mali makes it difficult for even French-speaking reporters and researchers to gain access to information on the region. 6 Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf,A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998). This is quite possibly the most comprehensive analysis o f the Touareg rebellion. I do not mean to imply that the work is flawed. It was, in fact, an essential starting point of my research, but time and neutrality give me a certain ability to expand on what Poulton and ag Youssouf have done here.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3
In addition to its academic contributions, my work has relevant implications for
regional and global security. Mali is one of the largest countries in West Africa and
because it has more neighbors than any country in the area, events in Mali can have a
significant impact on the rest of the sub-region.7 Mali’s porous, northern borders, which
lie in the Sahara desert, make both the country and the sub-region susceptible to banditry
and illegal smuggling, two problems which can be exacerbated by conflict.
VoWalta ini- 4 Knam m m
■ A... L Ci K K 1 A L 1 U Y:A N.
MV K! V > l\ *1 \ . I
1 » • . . v : ...... F.QtJATOldAi. (it 'lft£ A * ' * , '■ ss. i "*11 . ’h t 'I " •„ • -i Figure 1: West Africa
My Travel Guide, World Maps, West Africa Map, http://www.mytravelguide.com/travel-tools/maps/West- Africa-map.php (accessed December 4, 2007).
The vulnerability of northern Mali and its Saharan neighbors is evident in arms
smuggling that has occurred in recent years. Specifically, there are rumors that Mali
served as the connector point for arms shipped from Libya to Liberia and Sierra Leone
during their bloody civil wars. In addition, the region has become the haven for several
7 Mali shares borders with seven states: Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4
dissident groups with revolutionary and terrorist leanings. In February 2003, 32
European tourists were abducted on the Algerian side of Mali’s northern border by the
Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC - Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat).8 In 2007, the GSPC declared allegiance to al Qaeda, renaming themselves
al Qaeda in the Maghreb. In light of these events, the United States Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) sees the Sahara as a potential threat to global security, and it is actively
working with Malian and Algerian authorities to contain the capacities of these groups.9
There has also been a resurgence of counter-government activities by Touareg
groups in Kidal in 2006 and 2007. In May 2006, Colonel Hassan Fagaga, a Touareg ex
combatant who had been integrated into the Malian military at the close of the rebellion,
defected from his post in Kidal. He attacked a military base, stole arms, and demanded
the government fulfill its promises as outlined in the 1992 Pacte National peace
agreement.10 Summer and fall of 2007 also saw an increase in Touareg actions against
government interests in the Kidal, and its neighboring country, Niger (which experienced
its own “Touareg rebellion” during the early ‘90s).11 These actions included the August
26-27 capture of several civilian and military convoys on the Mali side of the Niger
border, and the September 13 attack with AK-47s of a U.S. military aircraft distributing
8 For an analysis o f this situation within the context o f Algerian Touaregs, see Jeremy Keenan, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004). 9 Keenan, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara, 245. “Warden Message,” August 29, 2007, Embassy of the United States of America, Bamako, Mali. This warden’s message described the “presence o f Al- Qaeda in the Land o f the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operatives in Mali's north.” 10 Les Evenements de 23 Mai, “L’attaque a faite 4 morts, selon Fagaga,”Le Democrate, Special Juillet 2006. 11 BBC News, “Tuareg conflict spreads to Mali,” August 28, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/6966754.stm (accessed December 3, 2007); Salif Sanogo, “Mali: liberation de soldats enleves,” BBC Afrique, Bamako, August 30, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/news/story/2007/08/070830_malirebel.shtml (accessed December 3, 2007); BBC News, “Tuareg leaders discuss Mali peace,” November 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/affica/7078573.stm (accessed December 3,2007).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5
food supplies to Malian troops in Tin-Zaouaten, a border town in Kidal.12 Events such as
these reveal the region’s risk of the falling into conflict again. Should this happen, it
would not only be devastating for citizens of northern Mali, but could have far-reaching
effects on West African and global security. It is my hope that, this analysis of the
Touareg Rebellion will be used to prevent this possibility.
Research Questions
In exploring the Touareg Rebellion’s causes, consequences, and peacebuilding
process, I ask the following research questions:
What were the causes of Mali’s Touareg Rebellion of the early 1990s?
Was post-conflict peacebuilding in northern Mali successful? Did it address the root causes of the conflict?
Is northern Mali at risk of falling into conflict again?
Within this exploration, I review relevant academic literature (on the causes of conflict,
peacebuilding, and peace implementation) and ask if existing theories reflect the reality
of Mali’s rebellion. To this end, I ask:
Are the factors that contributed to Mali’s Touareg Rebellion included in the academic literature on causes of conflict? Does the case of Mali contribute something to these theories?
- Did peacebuilding in Mali follow a standard used in other post-conflict settings? Were successes and failures in Mali in-line with the norm, as outlined in the academic literature? Does the case of Mali contribute something new to peacebuilding theory?
12 “Warden Message,” August 29, 2007; BBC News, “Mali boosts army to fight Tuareg,” September 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/6999669.stm (accessed December 3, 2007); Alert News, “ANALYSIS-Tuareg rebels in southern Sahara no Islamist threat,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L23592459.htm (accessed December 3, 2007).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6
- How does my assessment of the prospects for peace in Mali compare to existing theories on Mali’s stability specifically?
Methodology
I base my findings on both primary and secondary research, including first-hand
qualitative interviews; primary documents; French and English academic sources; and
American, European, and Malian media sources.
Selection of Interview Respondents
From February to December 2006,1 conducted a total of 89 qualitative interviews
in Mali. These included 35 interviews with rural residents in northern Mali, 46
interviews with urban residents in northern Mali, and 8 interviews with staff from non
governmental organizations (NGOs), unilateral aid agencies, and multilateral aid 1 3 organization in Bamako, Mali’s capital.
Financial and logistical limitations forced me to focus my work in one of the
northern regions. Security concerns prevented me from travelling to the Kidal region. I
selected Tombouctou over Gao, because the Tombouctou region arguably suffered more
during the rebellion.14 I do not assume that the experiences and opinions of residents of
Tombouctou are representative of those from Gao and Kidal. Regional dynamics,
specifically regarding Kidal, were significant in causing the rebellion as I will explain in
subsequent chapters. While differences remain between the Tombouctou and Gao
131 provide demographic breakdowns of the interviewees by ethnicity, occupation, gender, and location of residence in Appendix 1. 14 This assertion is based on my own in-country research and observation, as well as an interview with a very knowledgeable director of a unilateral aid organization working in northern Mali. Interview with the director of a unilateral aid organization working in northern Mali, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, 2006, interview VIII.3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7
regions, there are more similarities than differences, and, therefore, some conjecture is
appropriate. Gao’s diverse ethnic make-up, geographic diversity (encompassing river
and desert territory), and the variety of livelihoods in Gao are more similar to
Tombouctou than Kidal.15 Like Tombouctou, residents of Gao remained predominantly
outside the rebellion until military reprisals and Kidal rebel influence pushed them to join
the movement. My work focuses on the region of Tombouctou, and always makes
distinctions when discussing Kidal, but for the above reasons I feel comfortable including
Gao in some generalizations about Malian Touaregs, and the rebellion.16
Within the region of Tombouctou, I chose to focus on the cercles (districts) of
Tombouctou and Niafunke (roughly 150 kilometers southwest of Tombouctou, on the
Niger River). Within these cercles, I gave special attention to the commune of Lere.
These cercles and communes were selected for their diversity of ethnicities, ecology, and
livelihood strategies, as well as the fact that each was deeply touched by the rebellion. I
conducted less extensive interviewing in the cercle capital of Goundam (between
Tombouctou and Niafunke).
15 As noted previously Kidal lies predominantly in the desert. It is also inhabited predominantly by Touaregs, with less ethnic diversity than Goa and Tombouctou. 16 My interviews are additionally complimented by academic sources. Charles Grdmont, Andre Marty, Rhissa ag Mossa and Younoussa Hamara Toure,Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali: Entre fleuve et Dunes (Paris, France: Editions Karthala et IRAM, 2004) focuses entirely on Gao’s experience during the rebellion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8
M A L I Tin Afcha Tombouctou
Lac Fagulbine E ssak an e Nigdf Goutma-Rharous O Mandiakoy • Tin Zongho orioume Hanzakoma Ras El Ma fi'B ouna ^
/ Lk R* A Dangha G argando M ^ j<< GoundarrP3^ Lerneb -— Lac Fat! j a —i n YTiencniir A ratSne r tao/teo ^ MAURITANIE t e / QHatbortgo
Niafunko O Sar^yamou Bamkan Lac Kabar, Bassikounou Saraf6r6 C SoumpiO M Bambara- Maou nde Koumaira N'Gouma Lac Tanda Attara # N'Gorkou
Gathi-Loumo O Youwarou Konentze Hombori Nampala LacDebo
• Kara) tO 30 50km 01/2002 Oioura Figure 2: Major Cities of the Tombouctou Region
Illustration adapted from the Program Mali Nord, GTZ.
After selecting a focus region and cercle concentrations for interviews, the next
steps included selection of interview towns, villages, and individuals. I made these
selections with the help of three local assistants - one for Tombouctou (a Touareg 1 7 Maure), one for Niafunke (a Songhai), and one for Lere (a black-Tamashek).
Combining my own knowledge of the region and the rebellion with the local knowledge
of these assistants, we used “purposeful selection” (also known as “criterion-based
1 H selection” or a “purposeful sample”) to choose interview villages. “Purposeful
selection” is a qualitative research technique whereby key-informants are consciously
chosen based on specific knowledge they possess, or their ability to represent a certain
viewpoint relevant to the research. As with my selection of cercles and communes, we
17 Ethnicity played a significant role in the rebellion, so selection of ethnically diverse assistants reduced the possibility o f any systematic bias in interviews. Black-Tamasheks are the former slaves o f the Tamashek Touaregs as I explain in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 18 Joseph A. Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005), 88. Regina Scheyvens and Donovan Storey,Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2003), 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9
made an effort to choose a sample of villages representing the region’s major ethnic
groups, the population’s variety of experiences during the rebellion, and the diverse
standards of living and livelihood activities found throughout the region (including that
dictated by the region’s geographic diversity).19 Within each village, we made an effort
to interview three people: the village chief, the head of the women’s association, and the
youth president.20 In some cases, one or more of these people was not available to
interview. Where possible, an equivalent person was substituted. In other cases, these
individuals opted to be interviewed as part of a group with other prominent members of
their community.21
We selected the cities of Tombouctou and Lere as the primary sites for urban
interviews, because they were deeply affected by military reprisals during the rebellion.
Less extensive urban interviewing was conducted in the city of Niafunke. Urban
respondents in these towns were selected based on their professional or personal
knowledge of the rebellion. These individuals included ex-combatants, several retired
local-level government officials, a national-level civil servant, a Touareg retired from the
Malian military, two founders of the Front Islamique Arabe de I Azawad (FIAA) rebel
movement, two Touaregs that had worked for the post-rebellion Support Program for the
Socio-economic Re-integration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali (PAREM), tourist
guides, regional-level NGO staff, as well as many others. I also interviewed local-level
19 The Tombouctou region includes everything from riverbank Sahel villages to villages surrounded by desert with no water source for miles. 20 The “youth” president in Mali is generally a male aged 30-50. He is youthful relative to the village elders. 21 When these interviews are cited, the group interview format is noted, i.e “Tamashek elders from rural village.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10
government officials from several communes, and I tally these individuals with the urban
interviews, because they operate between urban and rural environments.
Interview Questioning Methodology
Interviews for this research followed a “semi-structured format.”22 In this
interview methodology, the researcher uses an “interview guide,” that includes topics or
approximate questions that must be raised during every interview. Questions were open-
ended, leaving room for the respondent to supply any information they deemed relevant
to the topic. Based on the respondents’ answers, additional follow-up questions were
asked to delve deeper into key topics. In pursuit of my research questions, I included
similar versions of the following questions in most village-level interviews:
Provide a brief history of the village and its citizens.
- What were the causes of the rebellion?
What was your reaction to the start of the rebellion?
How did the rebellion affect you/ this village? o If the respondent mentioned any specific events that occurred during the rebellion (such as military reprisals, rebel attacks, Ganda Koy actions etc.), I posedfollow-up questions to gain more information.
How did the rebellion come to an end? o Follow-up questions probed the respondents ’ knowledge o f the peacebuilding initiatives and their opinion on the success or failures of these initiatives.
22 This research plan was reviewed and approved by American University’s Institutional Review Board For The Protection Of Human Subjects. All respondents gave oral consent to be interviewed anonymously (where names are used, these respondents gave permission for the use o f their names) following an explanation of the project. Along with anonymity of sources, I maintain anonymity o f village names, as this could provide identifying information (because for example, there is only one chief per village). I also took other precautions to ensure that participation in this research in no way jeopardized the physical or mental safety of the respondents.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11
Is the region/ northern Mali stable now? o For those who indicated that the region/ northern Mali was not stable, I asked a follow up question, usually, What is needed to stabilize the region?
Describe ethnic/ community relations in the area, o Is this different than before the rebellion?
What were the biggest needs of this community before the rebellion? What are the biggest needs now?
Other frequently asked questions included:
What were the positive and negative impacts of the rebellion?
How is this village different now than it was before the rebellion? Before the droughts?
What was your reaction to the events the transpired in May [2006] in Kidal?
What development projects have been implemented in this village? o When? Before or after the rebellion?
I used many of the same questions for interviews with local government officials
and urban residents, but tailored questions to suit their particular knowledge. Interviews
with NGO employees in both Bamako and the city of Tombouctou focused largely on
their project work before, during, and after the rebellion, as well as how the rebellion
affected their work, the standard of living in the region, and community relations.
For both urban and rural interviews, questions were not always asked in the same
order. I tailored my questioning based on my knowledge of the sensitivity of certain
topics in different communities.23 I conducted all interviews in French. The three local
231 left some interview questions out, or dramatically reworded them in environments, or with individuals, that I deemed to be particularly sensitive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12
assistants acted as interpreters for respondents that did not speak French.24 Most
interviews lasted from 30 minutes to two hours.
In addition to semi-structured interviews, “direct observation” contributed to my
qualitative research. This informal data collection method involves conscious analysis of
casual conversations, interactions between others, and events unfolding around the
researcher.25 For my research, observation was particularly useful in two ways. First, in
the initial phase of research, I used casual conversation and attentive third party listening
to gain a sense of people’s openness to talking about the rebellion, and which rebellion-
related topics they found particularly sensitive. I used this knowledge to formulate my
interview questions. Observation also became of critical importance in May of 2006,
following Colonel Fafaga’s attack in Kidal. To protect my assistants from harm and my
own safety as a foreigner probing into issues relevant to the situations unfolding, it was
imperative that I closely monitor public sentiment towards the events and any changes in
community relations. In addition to keeping me safe, these observations had a secondary
benefit of contributing to my knowledge of regional dynamics and people’s attitudes
towards past and present conflict.
Primary Documents and Secondary Sources
In addition to using information gained from these primary qualitative interviews,
I base this work on primary documents and secondary sources. Primary documents
24 Rural respondents often spoke only Songhai or Tamashek. To eliminate any tension and ensure accuracy, I avoided, whenever possible, using a assistant to interpret an interview with a respondent of a different ethnicity. 25 Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, 79-80. Maxwell describes the value of observation in qualitative research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13
included: the text of the Pacte National peace agreement, Malian newspaper articles
following the May 2006 events in Kidal, and the text of the Accord d ’Alger signed
following these events.
While there is not a significant body of academic literature written on Mali’s
rebellion, I was able to uncover several sources. As Mali is a francophone country, more
sources are available in French, and living in Mali for ten months facilitated access to
these sources, which are published in Mali or shipped to Mali from publishers in
France.26 A full bibliography of written sources is available at the end of the paper.
Outline of Paper
This paper begins with a background chapter, including the demography and
characteristics of northern Mali and a brief history of the rebellion. Within the
demography section, I give special attention to ethnicity, because ethnic divisions became
one of the central characteristics of the rebellion, and resulting ethnic animosity lingers to
this day. A brief history of the rebellion sets the stage for my analysis of the conflict’s
causes and peace implementation process. This history includes some detail on the
events of the rebellion not included in the body of the paper.
Following the background chapter, I provide a literature review on the generic
sources addressing causes of conflict and peace implementation. The substantive
chapters o f the paper make reference to this literature to ground the Touareg Rebellion in
a broader context. I do not discuss Mali-specific literature in this chapter.
261 self-translated quotations from these sources from French into English for use in the body o f this paper.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14
The two substantive chapters of the paper include one on the causes of the
rebellion and one on the peacebuilding and peace implementation that brought the
rebellion to an end. I conclude with a brief analysis of northern Mali’s prospects for
peace.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND ON NORTHERN
MALI AND THE REBELLION
Demography and Characteristics of Northern Mali
The Republic of Mali (with a current population of approximately 12.5 million) is
racially, ethnically, geographically, and economically diverse, with significant difference
between northern and southern characteristics. Given the significant influence of
ethnicity, class, social make-up, and geography on Mali’s rebellion and the region’s
prospects for peace, I now present an overview of the demography and characteristics of
northern Mali.
Administrative Structure and Populations
Spanning an area roughly the size of Texas and California combined, Mali is
divided administratively into eight regions (Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou, Mopti,
Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal) and a capital district of Bamako. Kidal was included in the
region of Gao until August 1991, marking the slow start of decentralization.27 Along
with separating of Kidal from Gao, decentralization, which began more actively in 1998
reorganized Mali’s governing structure, granting more decision making power to the
local-level. The Touareg rebellion is universally credited with speeding up the
27 Kidal was separated from Gao on May 8, 1991 by government Ordinance 91-039/P-CTSP. Despite being administratively part of Gao prior to this time, it was publically considered a separate region by both those within and outside the region. 15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16
decentralization process in the country. Under the new system, each region is divided
into five to nine districts (cercles). Cercles are then sub-divided into communes. Several
towns and villages or nomadic fractions make up each commune. Regional capitals
share the name of the region.
The population of Bamako is roughly 1,000,000, and the next largest regional
capital (Segou) is approximately 200,000.29 The three regions of northern Mali
TO (Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal) are less populated, with the city of Tombouctou at
roughly 38,000; the city of Gao at 65,000; and the city of Kidal well below both of these
cities.31
.1 If A • M.-’OJCC;
Tessas Mai iari* ' 1 Araouane • Mali | •ir-’frjw/iis ■*
"" " ' ' 1 roniho.i<_tr?ij• lOUnTlii • ft-iit.-tr S' : .. 'yKl'Ji:.:" • Him.* , __ -y ■...... n*., ■■Wrt . . J * Kampala k cib * *L)cu.-rtt£3 y — — ' •Knyi.il Vojidvili.f/.i uri-al:. " •Mimr. . laser ■ M-ihim nj-.rijrrKi .Mjrrahi Me- He**. Bamako oOuaeadougot BGUaotinj• •kotiaid MOTMEHo^Hii B l Figure 3: Major Cities in Mali Infoplease, “Map: Mali,” http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/mali.html (accessed December 3,2006).
28 Bureau o f African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali,” U.S. Department o f State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm (accessed December 3, 2007). 29 Bureau o f African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” 30 Tombouctou is known as “Timbuktu” to Americans. 31 Bureau o f African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” Statistics for the population of the city of Kidal were not available. The 2001 population for the region o f Tomboucotu is 445,614; for the region of Gao is 335,976; and for the region of Kidal is 27,521. Republique du Mali and UNICEF, “Mission de Decentralisation et des Reformes Institutionnelles,” fromCartographie des infrastructures communales du Mali, (Meylan, France: Fox Media and ARP Developpement, 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17
--$
Mali
\
MAURITAN
>gow ^ ^ y
w' GUINEA13”- * "-Ac"
Figure 4: Mali’s Regional Boundaries
Intute, Science, engineering and Technology, “Mali: Geography and Maps,” Intute, http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/worldguide/html/95 l_map.html#map2 (accessed December 3,2007).32
Climate and Geography
Northern Mali; which borders Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso;
spans the northern edge of West Africa’s arid Sahel and the southern edge of the Sahara
desert. Poor soil quality, excessive heat, and limited access to water make both
32 Regional maps o f Mali are difficult to find, thus the regional boundaries are somewhat difficult to make out in this map. The regions are demarcated by a hashed line, with the name o f the region written in all capital letters within the boundaries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18
agricultural cultivation and pastoralism difficult. Northern Mali is susceptible to drought
and famine. The Niger River is the major artery of the country. It originates in the
Dajallon Mountains of Guinea and flows north through Mali’s capital, Bamako, and up
into two of Mali’s three northern regions: Tombouctou and Gao. At the city of Bourem,
in Gao, the river begins its south-eastern descent out of Mali and into the country of
Niger. It bypasses, Kidal, which remains largely encased in desert sand. While vital to
economic livelihoods throughout the country, the river is of special importance in the
North, because the area’s low rain-fall levels makes farming possible only near the river.
The area also lacks paved roads making the river an essential trade route by which the
North can access goods from the more prosperous South.
River volume is determined mostly by rainfall in Guinea, which pushes up the
riverbed into Mali. In the South, the river remains full year-round. In Tombouctou and
Gao, however, the river level dwindles, or dries completely during off-months, arriving
only between July and December. 'The North’s limited access to year-round farming
irrigation and trade (especially in Kidal) significantly affects the livelihoods possibilities
and capabilities of citizen’s in the area.
Ethnicity
Malians tend to group regionally by ethnicity. 52% of Mali’s national population
is Mande (usually Bambara or Malinke), 11 % are Fulani (also called Peulh or Peul), 7%
are Songhai, 7% Saracole, 5% Maure (Moor) and Touareg (Tuareg, Tamashek, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19
Tamacheq), 4% Mianka, and 14% are other ethnicities.33 The Bambara and Malinke live
predominantly in the southern and western regions of the country; while the Songhai,
Maures, and Tamasheks predominately populate the North.34 The Touareg population in
Mali is approximately 621,000, with the global Touareg population reaching roughly a
few million in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (as well as Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, and
other North African countries).35
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Mali’s Major Ethnicities Ethnicity Percentage Race Religion Predominant Primary of Livelihood Regions of Population Residence Bambara Black Muslim Farmers South & West (Traditionally held 52% gov’t power) Malinke Black Muslim Farmers South & West (esp. peanuts) (esp. Kayes) Songhai 7% Black Muslim Farmers North & Mopti Peulh Black Muslim Non-nomadic North & Mopti (Fulani) 11% herders (close to river) Tamashek Arab- Muslim Nomadic herders North complexion Maure 5% Arab- Muslim Nomadic North complexion herders,37 traders, merchants
Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” The World Fact Book: Mali.
33 Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” The CIA World Fact Book reports similar, but slightly different numbers: Mande 50% (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke), Peulh 17%, Voltaic 12%, Songhai 6%, Tuareg and Moor 10%, other 5%. Peulh are the same as the Fulani. The World Fact Book: Mali, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ml.html (accessed December 3, 2007). 34 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Conflict Summary: Mali;” Poulton,A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 2. 35 Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 6. 36 The Sahel droughts and the rebellion have, however, prompted many Tamasheks and Maures to sedintarize. 37 The Sahel droughts and the rebellion have, however, prompted many Tamasheks and Maures to sedintarize.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20
Origins of the Touaregs
The ethnography of the Touaregs is somewhat confusing. The name “Touareg” is
not indigenous to northern Mali or its neighbors. This term has Arabic language origins
meaning, “those abandoned by God.” Islamic crusaders who invaded Mali in the
eleventh century gave the Tamashek ethnic group this designation, because the group
initially resisted conversion to Islam.38 The term was popularized by the French after
several explorers ventured to northern Mali in the 19th century. The Tamasheks are
descended from the Berbers of North Africa, and thus have a lighter skin tone than most
other Malian ethnicities, including the predominant Bambara and Songhai who are black.
These so-called “Touaregs,” with their elaborate indigo turbans, have achieved a
somewhat mystical reputation among tourists to Tombouctou.39 With much of the
current livelihood of Tombouctou tied to tourism, many Tamasheks have adopted the
“Touareg” name to capitalize on this tourist appeal. For the same reasons, the
Tamasheks’ cousins, the Maures, have also adopted the Touareg name, despite the fact
that they are partially descended from the Arabs that first gave this name to the
Tamasheks.40
When interacting with members of their own communities, Tamasheks and
Maures tend to refer to themselves by their actual ethnicity, or as “light-skinned” or
“white-skinned.” The Songhai often refer to Tamasheks as “red-skinned,” revealing an
38 Michele Pietroski and June Angole, “Cessation o f Touareg Repression: Respite or Resolution?”Africa Today 38, 1 (First Quarter 1991): 42; Jeremy Keenan, The Tuareg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 6. Now all Tamasheks are Muslims. 39 Traditional Tamashek dress includes a long indigo turban that covers virtually the entire face. The dye from the cloth tends to leech into the proprietors’ skin pigment literally dying his skin blue. For this reason, Tamasheks have become known as the “blue men o f the desert.” 40 The Maures are the ancestors of Islamic crusaders who settled in the Sahara and married local Tamasheks and Berbers. Jeremy Keenan, The Tuareg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21
ethnic animosity I will discuss later in the paper. Non-Maures (including Tamasheks,
Songhai, and other northern ethnicities) sometimes refer to Maures as “Arabs,”
referencing their ancestry. Many sub-groups exist within these ethnicities, chief among
them being the Berabich, who are members of the Maure ethnicity. Tamasheks
outnumber Maures, but it is difficult to say by how much, because population statistics
lump these two groups together, as demonstrated in the previously presented statistics.
Members of both the Tamashek and Maure ethnic groups participated in the “Touareg”
Rebellion.41
In much of this paper I refer to Tamasheks and Maures by their individual names.
When discussing the rebellion, I sometimes use “Touareg” to refer to both Tamasheks
and Maures. I do this for two reasons. 1) Although the name “Touareg” is not
indigenous, and does not technically include the Maures, this name has become an
acceptable way to refer to the two groups. This is true in both Malian and international
circles (including in the academic literature). The reason for this stems from the fact that
Tamasheks and Maures share similar ancestry, race, cultural practices, and livelihood
strategies. 2) Both groups participated in the rebellion, in places where this ethnic
distinction is not relevant, the one term “Touareg,” facilitates ease of reading. The
ambiguous nature of the “Touareg” name does make it difficult to decipher some
academic references, as some scholars use “Touareg” to refer to Tamasheks only, while
others use it to refer to both Tamasheks and Maures. I do my best to be aware of these
41 The Maures formed a rebel faction the Front Islamique Arabe de I ’Azawad (FIAA) separate from the Tamashek movements, as I explain the peacebuilding chapter of this paper.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22
distinctions when citing others, or where the ethnic difference is relevant to my
arguments.
Religion, Language, and Livelihoods
Despite the origins of their name, Touaregs today practice Islam, as does 90% of
the national population.42 Levels of devotion vary, and indigenous practices are often
interspersed with Muslim practices. Northern Malians tend to practice a more devote
form of Islam, including praying five times daily 43 The rebellion was in no way based
on religious differences.
As a former colony of France, French is the official language of Mali, with
Bambara (the predominant local language) spoken by 80% of the population.44 The
Tamashek speak Tamashek, and in this language they refer to themselves as the “kel
Tamashek” (speakers of Tamashek). As the predominant ethnic group in the country, the
Bambara (from whom the language originates) have traditionally controlled political
power. As I will explain, this contributed to Touareg grievances prior to the rebellion.
Along with influencing political power, ethnicity also typically dictates citizens’
livelihood. Living in the relatively fertile South, most Bambara and Malinke are farmers,
and agriculture makes up 70% of the national workforce.45 Farming in the North is also
done by Bambara (who settled in the area in previous centuries) and Songhai. During the
months that the river flows freely in the North, farmers cultivate grains (such as sorghum
42 Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” 43 Based on personal observation after living two years in western Mali and one year in northern Mali, as well as travelling extensively throughout the country. 44 Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.” 45 Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Mali.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23
and millet) along the flooded banks of the river, in various small lakes that fill with
rainwater, and (more recently) in irrigated canals diverted from the river.
Some Bambara who came to the North were captured by Tamasheks and Maures,
and became their slaves. These people came to be known as “black-Tamasheks,” and
“black-Maures,” (or in the pejorative, “Bellahs,” for Black-Tamasheks, or “Harratin,” for
Black-Maures). These slaves typically farmed, cooked and cleaned for their noble
masters. Vassals of the same ethnicity as the Touareg nobles paid dues to this aristocracy
and carried out services for them.46 The caste-like system was officially abolished
shortly after independence, but aspects of it linger to this day through patron-client work
relationships 47
The Tamasheks, Maures, and Peulh are traditionally herders. The Peulh typically
circulate with goats close to the river. They work in isolated areas, and are not travelling
nomads. Tamasheks and Maures typically live further from the river, and were
traditionally nomadic herders moving with their animals for weeks or months at a time.
The Sahel droughts and the rebellion have prompted many Tamasheks and Maures to
settle in new sedentary villages, or in larger cities. As the descendants of the Arabic
crusaders, the Maures are also the ancestral caravan traders of Mali. Even today, some
continue to conduct the trans-Saharan trade route by camel to sell salt mined from
Taudeni (in the far north of the country) in Tombouctou. In recent history, they have
46 Jeremy Keenan, The Tuareg'. 10. 47 It is worth noting that slavery in Mali was not as violent and degrading as North American slavery, as the slave families lived alongside the noble families, and were rarely reprimanded violently. The relationship was probably more similar to indentured servitude, but none-the-less involved an imbalance of power and rights, with the light-skinned nobles controlling finances and family decisions. In interviews with both Touaregs and former slaves described how slaves considered part of the master’s family. Many former slaves even continue to use the Touareg naming structure of “son of.” However, as I will show in the body of the paper, there was also frustration within the system.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24
begun transporting other goods from North Africa by automobile, and many are
merchants in Tombouctou.
Brief History of the Rebellion48
Background, Causes, and Early Events
Typically, foreigners refer to the uprising that occurred in northern Mali in the
early 1990s as the “Touareg rebellion” because it was started by members of the
Tamashek and Maure ethnic groups called “Touareg” by foreigners. Within Mali, it is
simply called “the Rebellion,” or occasionally “the Second Rebellion,” in reference to the
smaller uprising that occurred in 1963. Similar to the isolated revolt of 1963, the
activities of 1990 began with small, guerilla-style attacks against government and
military interests in the farthest northern portions of Mali. Unlike 1963, the violence of
the ‘90s spread throughout the North. Widespread northern discontent with the central
government, active and violent military attacks against civilian Touaregs, and more
expansive rebel organizing were responsible for this increase in scale.
A series of factors caused these Touareg grievances against the government.
Touaregs were particularly dissatisfied with the government’s socialist policies during the
1960s (which had negative economic effects on their communities and altered traditional
Touareg social and class structures). The administration’s abandonment of the region
during the droughts of 1970s and ‘80s, chronic northern underdevelopment, and limited
representation of northerners in the government and the military also contributed to these
frustrations.
48 A timeline of key dates in Malian history, with attention to the rebellion, can be found in Appendix 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25
Despite this widespread dissatisfaction with the government, the initial attacks in
the towns of Menaka and Tidermene on June 28, 1990 were carried out by the small
Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de I ’Azaouad (MPLA - Popular Movement for the
Liberation of the Azaouad) and launched from (what is now) the northern-most region,
Kidal.49 These were two isolated attacks that were not yet part of a wide-spread
movement. Most citizens of Tombouctou (the southern-most region of the North)
assumed that the violence would start and end similarly to the 1963 rebellion, remaining
isolated in the far north and having little impact on their lives. The military, however, did
not treat the attacks as regionally isolated events, and responded by killing hundreds,
possibly thousands, of civilian Touaregs throughout the North. These indiscriminant
massacres, based on ethnic prejudice within the military, forced the internal displacement
and exodus abroad of thousands of Touaregs.50
Along with prompting physical displacement, the military’s actions additionally
turned the grievances of young, male Touaregs into a more rebellious spirit. Despite
frustrations at persistent economic problems and governmental neglect, most Tamashek
and Maure youth outside of Kidal had previously been uninterested in conflict with the
government. The attacks by the military, combined with some manipulation by Touareg
49 The “Azaouad” (or “Azawad”) is the traditional homeland o f the Tamasheks and Maures. It spans northern Mali, the northern parts of Niger and the southern parts o f Algeria. Keita,Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 5. Even before Kidal became an officially recognized separate region, it had a separate identity recognized in the North. 50 Rob in-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998), 154. This French version of Poulton and ag Youssouf s work has more recent statistics than the English version. They state here that as of December 1997, 123,340 refugees had returned to northern Mali. These figures represent refugees who fled to Mauritania, but not Algeria, thus the exact count is likely higher than this estimate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26
leaders from Kidal, ended these reservations, and Touaregs across the North entered the
rebellion.
Rather than containing the rebellion, the military’s actions increased regional
violence and insecurity. Hostilities in the North grew further with the creation in 1994 of
the Ganda Koy,5] a Songhai, “civilian” militia designed to “protect” their population from
rebel attacks. Despite claims that the Ganda Koy was a civilian movement, there is
evidence indicating that the group was formed, armed, and trained by the military. The
military’s previous provocation of civilian Songhai to retaliate against Touaregs
immediately following the initial attacks out of Kidal lends credibility to this theory of a
military involvement in the Ganda Koy. Opinions vary regarding the level of military
involvement with the Ganda Koy, including the theory that the military created the
movement as a legitimate mechanism to control the growing rebellion, as well as the
theory that the military supported this civilian movement to perpetuate a government
agenda of ethnic-cleansing.
Growth in the organized rebel groups around 1994 further to the violence at this
time, with the fracture of the MPLA into four movements comprising the Mouvements et
fronts Unifies de I Azaouad (MFUA - Unified Movements and Fronts of the Azaouad).
Scale of the Rebellion and Negative Impacts
Despite this escalation, Mali’s rebellion was still quite small compared to the civil
conflicts in other nations, such as Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo. No
51 Ganda Koy means “master’s of the land” in the Songhai language.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27
more than a few thousand combatants were active at any one time,52 and estimates
suggest that the rebellion was directly responsible for fewer than 1,000 deaths. Despite
this relatively small-scale movement, the escalation of the rebellion from an isolated
uprising originating in Kidal to a full-blown conflict in all the regions of the North
severely impacted all northern civilians.
One of the primary negative effects of military escalation of the rebellion was the
dislocation of thousands of innocent Tamasheks and Maures. At least 123,000 fled
across Mali’s northern borders with Algeria, and particularly Mauritania. On the heels of
the disastrous effects of the Sahel droughts of the ‘70s and ‘80s, this dislocation ruined
livelihoods. As traditionally nomadic herders, Tamasheks and Maures hold their wealth
in animals. In flight, many of these nomads ate their animals to survive or lost them to
starvation and thirst. Those animals that made it to Mauritania had to be sold below
market value, or they were shared among other displaced people for survival before the
formalization of refugee camps. Five years of life in refugee camps added to the misery
and suffering of this population that was still reeling from the droughts.54
As the rebellion grew, herders who remained in Mali were unable to access local
markets (to sell animals and buy grains) in Ganda Koy controlled towns. As a result,
many of these IDPs, like the refugees in Mauritania, ate their animals to survive, losing
52 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 15. 53 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Conflict Database “Mali,” Upsalla University, http://www.pcr.uu. se/database/conflictInformation.php?years=1990%2C 1991 %2C 1992%2C 1993 %2C 1994%2C 1995%2C 1996&bcID=64&variables%5B%5D=l &variables%5B%5D=2&variable s%5B%5D=3&variables%5B%5D=4&variables%5B%5D=5&variables%5B%5D=6&variables% 5B%5D=7&variables%5B%5D=8&variables%5B%5D=9&variables%5B%5D=10&button=+Sear ch+ (accessed December 3, 2007). 54 This is not a criticism of UNHRC, or the other organizations involved in running the camps, but rather a reflection of returned refugee sentiments about the “great shame” of life in a refugee camp.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28
their only wealth. Urban merchants (mostly Maures) also lost their savings as their shops
were looted and burned.
The Tamasheks and Maures were not alone in their suffering. The Songhai and
other northern ethnicities felt the effects of the rebellion as well. Rebel combatants
attacked their villages, stealing animals, supplies, and even people. They burned houses
and killed innocents.55 North-South trade came to a virtual standstill, as it became unsafe
for southern transporters to enter the region for risk of robbery and theft. This limited the
availability of necessary staples. Farming was also reduced, as the risk of physical attack
in isolated rural locations increased. With fewer goods to buy and sell, and higher
insecurity en route between villages, many local markets ceased to function. This
diminished the standard of living for those civilians not already displaced by the violence.
Widespread infrastructure damage was also a problem. Already behind the South
with regards to access to potable water, electricity, schools, and healthcare; the rebel
attacks damaged government buildings, reducing effectiveness. Some government
officials abandoned their posts out of fear for their safety.56 Schools suffered a similar
fate, as many teachers and students fled, leaving the buildings to decay. Interruption of
schooling during the rebellion and delay in a return to school as a result of the
infrastructure destruction left many youth of this generation with sub-standard education
levels. The reduction of North-South trade also had a negative effect on infrastructure.
55 There is some debate (between Touareg communities and non-Touaregs, to include civilians and academics) as to whether theft during the rebellion was carried out by combatants or criminals profiting on the regional insecurity. Some interviewees went so far as to claim that no rebels robbed anyone during the rebellion, as this was not part of their philosophy. Most probable is that thefts were conducted by both combatants and criminals respectively. Regardless of who conducted the thefts, these acts were facilitated by the rebellion, and had a negative effect on the sedentary, civilian population. 56Interview with a Songhai school director in Lere, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV.7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29
As transport diminished, lack of use caused roads (which were predominantly tracks in
the sand and through the brush) to become invisible or impassable. These damages to
regional infrastructure increased the inequality between North and South both during the
rebellion and for years following the cessation of hostilities.
Ethnic relations also deteriorated as a result of the rebellion. The Bambara-
centered government had exhibited prejudice against the Touaregs since independence,
but in interviews, Tamasheks and Maures, and Songhai described their relationship prior
to the start of the conflict as amicable and symbiotic. Many of the factors that escalated
rebellion violence were, however, ethnically-driven. Military reprisals, the creation of
the Ganda Koy, and social manipulation by Kidal-based rebel leaders caused the situation
to devolve into an ethnic, rather than a rights-based, conflict. While some underlying
animosity did actually exist between these groups prior to the rebellion, I found that the
conflict heightened distrust, leaving a lasting impact on northern society.
These dynamics impact northern Mali’s future prospects for peace, and my
analysis of the rebellion. I now review the academic literature on causes of conflict and
peace implementation. This will provide further background before turning to my in-
depth analysis of the causes of the Touareg Rebellion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents the generic literature on causes of conflict and peace
implementation. I will return to these sources, as well as the relevant Mali-specific
sources in the substantive chapters that follow.
Causes of Civil Conflict
Theories on the causes of civil conflict fall into three main categories: systemic
causes, national causes, and social, cultural, and environmental causes. Systemic causes
are those that stem from forces outside the country itself (such as regional relations or
global economic factors). National causes pertain to the national government of the
country in question. Social, cultural, and environmental causes can be rooted in factors
such as ethnicity, religion, or land scarcity.
Systemic Causes
Within the literature on causes of civil conflict that has emerged in the last 15
years, systemic causes are popular. Common among these theories is the idea that
colonization, and the divvying up of territories along arbitrary borders, has led to many
civil clashes. Others argue that the events o f the Cold War andits end have contributed
57 Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, “Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92,”Journal o f Peace Research, vol. 37, No. 3; May, 2000: 275. 30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31
CO to current conflicts. Samuel Huntington’s seminal piece “The Clash of Civilizations”
claims that “the end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore.”
The shift from loyalty to the Soviet national identity towards alignment with “cultural
characteristics” will increase conflict according to Huntington.59
While these authors argue that the legacy of previous interactions between
societies contributes to modern-day conflict; others argue that contemporary interactions
between groups and economies are the determinant of civil conflict. Some scholars, for
example, cite the “spill-over” phenomenon, in which conflict in one nation leads to
conflict in another, as a common cause of conflict. Michael Brown argues that political
or economic issues internal to one country may push them to become “bad neighbors,”
instigating conflicts in nearby states.60
Interactions in the global economy can also influence conflict according to some
of these systemic-minded scholars. They argue that macro-level economic changes; such
Alberto Alesina, Amaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”Journal of Economic Growth 8, 2003: 155-194; Robert Blanton, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow, “Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa,”Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Jul., 2001): 473. Errol Henderson and J. David Singer note that since 1945, most wars are intra-state, rather than inter-state conflict, and most take place in the “former colonies of the imperial powers.” Blanton and Mason argue that the decentralized British system o f colonial rule fostered competition between ethnic groups, contributing to future ethnic conflict. 58 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg give figures indicating a rise in conflicts from 1989 to 1992, immediately following the fall of communism. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96,”Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Aug., 1997): 339. 59 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,”Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 25-32. 60 Michael Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Brown etNationalism al and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 4, 13-16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32
as drops in world commodity prices or foreign aid can prompt conflict.61 Paul Collier,
among others, has noted how the new ease of global trade has driven an increase in
conflicts driven by greed for natural resource wealth rather than grievances over social or
political repression. fO Some argue that an increase in global communication and
exchange leads to conflict. This is contrary to the older “contact” theory of conflict. As
summarized by Hugh Donald Forbes in Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the
Contact Hypothesis, the “contact” theory argues that more interaction between divergent
groups and societies should reduce conflict by increasing awareness and tolerance.63
Samuel Huntington refines the globalization theories and also addresses the
contact hypothesis. Without using the word “globalization,” Huntington notes that “the
world is becoming a smaller place.” This, he says, leads to more interactions between
“different civilizations.” As this contact increases, so does “civilization consciousness
and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within
civilizations.” This new civilization self-awareness, and post-cold war ethnic loyalty,
that emerges from globalization will lead to conflict, says Huntington.64
National Causes
National policies and politics can also cause civil conflict according to some
scholars. Kalevi Holsti argues in The State, War, and the State o f War that “new and
61 Idea cited by, but not original to, Brown, “The Causes o f Internal Conflict: An Overview,” 13. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,”Oxford Economic Papers 1998, vol. 56, pp. 563-573. 62 Collier, “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” 63 Hugh Donald Forbes, "Toward a Science of Ethnic Conflict?"Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 2003): 172-177. 64 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 25-32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33
weak states” are prone to war. This, he claims, is because in many new states there is a
“lack of political legitimacy between rulers and the communities over whom they rule.”65
Political illegitimacy, he says, leads to war.66 Others in the political school of thought
argue that the democratization process can cause conflict. Roland Paris makes this claim
in At War’s End. He argues that poorly timed and implemented democratization and
market liberalization, can cause civil war. During the 1990s, international policy makers
felt that political and economic liberalization would replace “the breaking of heads with
the counting of heads ... and sustainable economic growth.” This goal was not always
achieved because the liberalization process intensifies “societal competition ... at the
very moment. . . when states are least equipped to contain such tensions.” These
unchecked tensions, says Paris, can fuel the very flames of conflict that the peacebuilding
missions hoped to quell.67
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder reiterate this point in their 2005 article
“Democratization and War.” Adding to Paris’ 2004 argument, they claim that the United
States government’s current push for global democracy is flawed. Using the logic that
democracies do not fight each other, the U.S. claims that democratization of foreign
states will lead to a more peaceful world. The authors, on the other hand, feel that
countries undergoing the democratic transition are “more aggressive and war-prone, not
less, and [that] they do fight wars with democratic states.” Thus, according to Mansfield
65 Kalevi Holsti,The State, War and the State o f War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi- xii 13-14. 66 Holsti’s argument also falls into the cultural and ethnic arguments on the causes o f conflict. On the whole, however, his argument is rooted in political issues. 67 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5-6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34
and Snyder, the push for democratization can actually lead to more conflict, not less, at
least in the short-run.68
Other scholars argue that states suffering from governmental collapse are more
prone to conflict, as are states suffering from the effects of ineffective or corrupt leaders.
Michael Brown notes the problem of “bad leaders” as one determinant of conflict in the
first chapter of his book Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict ,69
Social, Cultural, and Environmental Causes
Many scholars now feel that Huntington’s 1993 hypothesis on the pending causes
of modem conflict has proved tme. Following his example, other academics have
described the influence of social and cultural factors on conflict. As described above,
Holsti’s 1996 work claims that weak states fall easily into conflict. This argument for a
“national” level cause of conflict is, however, based on social factors. Leaders, he says,
try to “establish mle over single communities of believers or communities of blood,
language and religion.” “[SJtates today are, [however,] comprised of multiple
communities” and thus do not fit into the mono-cultural approach to leadership. As a
result, he says, states become weak and susceptible to conflict.70
68 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” inConflict after the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes of War and Peace, ed. Betts, Richard K. (New York: Pearson Education, 2005), 318-330. Note, neither Paris, nor Mansfield and Snyder claim that democracy in itself is a cause of conflict. They focus specifically on the transition to democracy and its impact on conflict. William Easterly et al. confirm that there is no correlation between “democracy and probability of mass killings.” William Easterly, Roberta Gatti and Sergio Kurlat "Development, Democracy, and Mass Killings," Journal of Economic Growth, forthcoming; DRI Working Paper No. 10. 69 Michael Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Brown etNationalism al and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 4, 13-16. 70 Kalevi Holsti, The State, War and the State o f War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xii.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35
Other scholars highlight the role that ethnicity can play in fostering conflict. Paul
Collier, and William Easterly and Ross Levine argue that national ethnic diversity is not
correlated with conflict,71 Collier et al. later note that in ethnically diverse societies where
one ethnicity dominates, the risk of civil war increases by 50%.72 Collier et al. likewise
argue that ethnicity can combine with other factors to create conflict. Rebel leaders often
play up ethnic divisions to prolong war for personal reasons.73 V.P. Gagnon applies a
similar argument to Slobadon Milosevik.74
David Lake and Donald Rothchild present a modified ethnic explanation of
conflict in their 1998 compilation The International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict. Ethnicity,
they say, cannot cause conflict in isolation. “But when [it] is linked with acute social
uncertainty, a history of conflict, and ... fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as
one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture.”75 Thus - like Huntington -
Holsti, and Lake and Rothchild argue that ethnic and cultural identity can motivate
conflict, but only when awareness of, or allegiance to, this identity is heightened by
external factors.
71 Miguel, Edward, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,”Journal of Political Economy vol. 112, no. 4 (2004); James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”American Political Science Review 97 (March 2003): 75-90; William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 12,4 (1997): 1203-1250; Collier and Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” 72 Paul Collier, V.L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Mart Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy(Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 57-63. 73 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 57-63. 74 V.P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,”International Security vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 130-166. 75 David Lake and Don Rothcild eds.The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36
In contrast to those who argue that conflict is caused by ethnicity and culture, are
those who argue that land and the environment are the underlying factors in many civil
wars. Robert Kaplan feels that it is the media that drives this idea of ethnically and
religiously motivated conflict, when in reality the environment is the “national-security
issue of the early twenty-first century.” He claims that deforestation, soil erosion, and
over-populated river areas will lead to mass migration. These environmental strains can
prompt social unrest and conflict, which often deceptively manifests itself in ethnic
animosity.76 Another example of how the environment can impact conflict is Philip
Verwimp’s 2005 piece on the Rwandan genocide. Amidst his more complex argument,
he notes that in this small, land-scarce country, many “rank and file” perpetrators of the
genocide saw participation as a means of acquiring farm land from those killed.77 Collier
et al.’s explanation of the rebel leader driven by natural resource greed, who manipulates
ethnic hatreds to continue instability for personal gain, is another example of how
environmental factors can contribute to seemingly ethnic conflicts.
The existing literature on the causes of conflict covers a wide range of topics
including governmental, political, and economic factors. Other cross-discipline theories
stress the affects of globalization, trans-national contact, past historical events, ethnic and
cultural identity, and environmental strains and greed over natural resources. These
theories go a long way towards explaining the causes of these new civil conflicts.
76 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,”The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994). 77 Philip Verwimp, “An economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide Micro-level evidence from Rwanda,”Journal of Development Economics 77 (2005): 320.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37
Peace Implementation & Peacebuilding
When the causes of conflict are not mitigated in advance, violence breaks out.
The challenge then becomes how to end the hostilities, foster peace, and prevent future
conflict. Three genres of literature address these topics: Conflict Resolution, Peace
Implementation, and Peacebuilding. Review of the literature from each of these three
genres is too vast for the scope of this project. I will instead present only a few relevant
highlights from these three genres of literature.
Mechanisms for Ending Conflict
Collier et al.’s World Bank report, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy, presents a useful summary of current thinking on the most effective
mechanisms for ending conflict. They first argue that when rebel financing is reduced,
the warring party no longer has the means or the incentive to keep fighting. This
reduction can be achieved by strategies such as reducing diaspora group contributions to
wars, or reducing rebel access to commodity markets (in cases where natural resource
greed is fueling the conflict). In addition to cutting off rebel financing, international
intervention can effectively bring violence to an end. Intervention can be executed via
military, economic, or diplomatic means. Finally, they argue, negotiating a peace
settlement is a useful mechanism in conflict resolution.78
Analysis of an earlier article by Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg in
1997 shows how practitioners have become more nuanced in their approaches to ending
conflict over the last 10 years. Like Collier et al., Wallensteen and Sollenberg categorize
78 Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 140-150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38
three ways that conflicts end: peace agreements, victory, or “other outcomes” (such as
ceasefires).79 While useful categories, these divisions do not reveal the non-traditional
avenues that contribute to a reduction in violence, such as cutting off rebel financing.
Despite the differences in these two pieces, it is significant that they both include
negotiated peace agreements as one of the primary means of conflict resolution. This
remains a central component of the conflict resolution tool-kit.
While negotiating and implementing settlements remains a staple in conflict
resolution, the literature on peace implementation reveals the many challenges of
negotiating a peace agreement.
Challenges to Reaching an Agreement
According to the literature, one significant challenge to reaching a peace
agreement is deciding who is best suited to negotiate the settlement. Unfortunately, most
literature focuses exclusively on the role of the international community in negotiating
peace. Stephen Stedman notes that peace in Zimbabwe in 1987 and South African in
1994 were examples of “insider” peace initiatives,80 but most scholars focus the role of
“outsiders” in peace negotiation. This is not surprising given that the scholars writing
about implementation tend reside outside of conflict zones, and thus have an outsiders
mentality. While most of these scholars promote the benefits of outside negotiation,
some scholars note the potential pitfalls of using third-parties in mediating peace.
Matthew Hoodie and Caroline Hartzell, for example, argue that third parties can
79 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96,”Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Aug., 1997): 339-358. 80 Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds.Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riennier Publishers, 2002), 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39
contribute positively to peace settlements and implementation by encouraging the parties
to agree to concessions. This beneficial coercive power, however, may create doubt as to
alternate parties’ commitment to the peace process. One party may assume that the other
party (or parties) is only agreeing to change out of desire to appease the third party
negotiator. According to Hoodie and Hartzell, this can corrupt the peace process.81
The Type of Agreement
Yet another complicating factor in negotiating peace is the decision of what type
of agreement will be most effective. Wallensteen and Sollenberg describe three typical
agreement types. A “full agreement” is one in which all of the warring parties agree to
settle the “incompatibility” (ie government imbalance or territory dispute). A “partial
agreement” is one "between some of the [warring] parties, but not all.” These more
limited agreements rest on the assumption (or hope) that the signatories can regulate the
“incompatibility” despite lack of participation from all parties. Wallensteen and
Sollenberg’s third category of agreement type is the “peace process agreement.” This
model “outline[s] a process whereby the issue will be settled," rather than attempting to
resolve the incompatibility at the moment of mediation. They find, not surprisingly that
partial agreements often lead to continued fighting, as the party not involved in the
agreement sometimes continues fighting.82
81 Matthew Hoodie and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," Journal of Peace Research vol. 40, no. 3 (May 2003): 303-320. 82 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96,” 342-343.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40
Agreement Components
One of the most debated aspects of peace implementation is what exactly to
include in the peace agreement to ensure maximum success. Stedman notes that these
decisions are of the utmost importance, because failed peace agreements often cause
more damage than no agreement at all (take Rwanda in 1994, and Angola in 1993 as the
two worst examples of this).83 Agreement “vagaries, silences, and contradictions,” he
says, can contribute to these failures. While lack of clarity in a settlement may be the
result of political balancing between the warring parties and the agreement
constituencies, it sometimes stems from the fact that “mediators may have stronger
incentives to preside over the signing of a peace agreement, than to preside over the
signing of a comprehensive peace agreement.”84 For these reasons, selection of
agreement components is of the utmost importance.
Scholars still do not agree on the most important agreement components, but
provisions for establishing security appear high on most scholars’ lists. Stedman argues
that “demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics” should be the most
important sub-goal of any agreement. Also of high priority, he says, is civilian security,
including judicial reform and “capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation.”85
Susan Woodward notes that an assurance of sufficient employment is essential in
convincing combatants to put down their arms.86 Hartzell, Hoodie, and Rothchild also
emphasize the need for security provisions in peace agreements. Like Woodward, they
83 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 668-670. 84 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 10. 85 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 668. 86 Susan Woodward, “Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation,” in Stedman et al.,Ending Civil Wars, 668.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41
put their emphasis on combatants (rather than civilians) in establishing security. They
find that security assurances for former combatants by third-party state or regional or
international organizations are one of the most successful ways to foster durable peace
settlements. They additionally find that agreements that “include provisions for the
territorial autonomy of threatened groups” tend to be more successful.87 While scholars
disagree on which components to include in peace agreements, it appears that provisions
for establishing security are widely recommended.
The Conflict Environment
Some aspects of the conflict environment can make reaching an agreement
challenging, but others can facilitate the implementation of agreed upon provisions.
Some scholars posit that regional characteristics can favorably influence peace
implementation.
Elizabeth Wood presents four contextual challenges to reaching peace
settlements. She explains that when warring parties have access to natural resources
negotiation is more difficult. Natural resources wealth can be more appealing to leaders
of warring parties than peace itself. She goes on to explain that when conflicts
characterized by “ethnic polarization” negotiation is more difficult. This, she says, is
because ethnic cleansing is harder to mitigate than other forms of violence, and ethnic
fears can be manipulated by political parties. This relates to another cause of conflict.
As explained by V.P.Gagnon and Collier et al., leaders have been known to manipulate
87 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoodie and Donald Rothchild, “Stabalizing Peace After Civil war,” An Investigation o f Some Key Variables,”International Organization vol. 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 202.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42
ethnic sentiment to pursue personal war-time goals. Wood additionally sees recent
increases in the ease of the global arms trade as an inhabitant to peace negotiation.
Lastly, she notes that conflicts that have not received immediate response from regional
and international parties become harder to negotiate.88 In recognition of influencing
factors such as these, Stedman advocates for the use of peace implementation strategies
that recognize the differences of each conflict environment.89
Peace Implementations
Mark Peceny and William Stanley in their 2001 International Organization article
claim that certain characteristics of Central America, have made peace implementation in
this region more successful than other regions.90 Stanley has, however, refuted this
regional explanation, arguing that it does not address “more basic, general variables,”
such as “number of parties, size of armies, war aims of parties, [or] interest of great
powers. „91
Hartzell, Hoodie, and Rothchild’s view on the influencing potential of the conflcit
environment falls somewhere between these scholars. They argue that some
environmental characteristics can positively impact peace implementation, although these
characteristics are not necessarily regional. States that had stable, democratic
governments prior to conflict have a better chance at successful peace implementation,
they say. This is because citizens who have participated in democracies have experience
88 Elizabeth Wood, “Civil Wars: What We Don’t Know,”Global Governance 9(2003): 247. 89 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 664. 90 Mark Peceny and William Stanley, “The Resolution o f Civil Wars in Central America,”International Organization 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 149-182; cited in Stedman, Ending Civil Wars, p. 14. 91 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43
with balancing of interests and inclusion of different parties. These traits lend themselves
favorably to peace implementation. Hartzell, Hoodie, and Rothchild additionally argue
that civil conflicts of “low intensity” that have lasted for “extended periods of time,” are
also more amenable to peace implementation. According to the authors, “as wars
become longer and opponents can do no better than fight each other to a standstill, they
are increasingly likely to come to believe that they cannot prevail."
In the case of Mali, this negotiation and implementation environment was
influenced by the root causes of the rebellion. I now turn to my analysis of these causes.
92 Hartzell et al., “Stabalizing Peace After Civil war,” An Investigation of Some Key Variables.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4: CAUSES OF THE TOUAREG REBELLION
Introduction
Several factors fostered Touareg frustration with the Malian government during
the years leading up to the rebellion. These factors included government mismanagement
of the Sahel droughts of the 1970s and ’80s, northern underdevelopment, changes to the
northern labor market, alterations to Touareg social and caste structure, government
prejudice against Touaregs, and Touareg social exclusion. These factors did not,
however, directly cause the Touareg Rebellion. Following the initial, small-scale attacks
launched from Kidal on Menaka and Tidermene, the military began a violent reprisal
campaign against innocent Touaregs throughout the North. They additionally pushed
Songhai to turn on their Touareg neighbors as a means of “containing” rebel actions.
Ironically, these factors pushed frustrated but peaceful Touaregs to join the rebels,
causing the movement to grow into full-scale conflict. Touareg leaders played up these
new ethnic divisions to spread the rebellion out of Kidal and across the North.
The Sahel Droughts
Droughts in the Sahel from 1968 to 1974 and 1980 to 198593 were a primary
cause of the Touareg rebellion. Drops in rainfall destroyed crops and reduced nomad
93 Sources vary on the exact dates of the Sahel droughts. Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf describe droughts as spanning the years 1973 to ‘74 and 1983 to ‘84, while Kalif Keita describes droughts spanning ’68 to ’74 and ’80 to ’85. Carolyn Somerville describes the early ‘80s drought 44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45
access to water sources. These climactic changes caused human suffering as food supply
was reduced and herders lost their animal wealth. Government neglect and drought aid
mismanagement exacerbated this suffering, prompting mass migrations of Touaregs.
While previous droughts had caused migrations, these droughts pushed Touaregs to
Libya at a time when Colonel Mu‘ammar Qaddafi was recruiting soldiers to fight for his
Islamic Legion. The combination of deep human suffering, abandonment by the Malian
government, and external Libyan influences pushed Mali’s Touaregs closer to rebellion.
Reduced Rainfall
The damaging effects of the Sahel droughts are evident in data on rainfall and
livestock losses during these periods. In Tombouctou, precipitation fell from 200mm in
1963 to 104mm in 1973 and to 74mm in 1983. Similar declines were documented in Gao
and Tessalit.94 From June to August 1984, rainfall levels in the Sahel region were 40-
60% below normal. This decrease in water supply caused com production to drop one-
third between 1969 and ’71. During this same period, livestock losses were close to
as occurring from ’82 to ’85. This paper uses the wider time period estimate, because the limited rainfall in these years had a negative impact on agricultural production and livelihoods in northern Mali. While each year may not qualify as “drought” in the strictest sense o f the definition, the damage caused was severe and the conditions in these years are, therefore, applicable to our discussion. [Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf,A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998), 33; Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 12; Carolyn M. Somerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).] 94 Tessalit is north of the city of Kidal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46
30%.95 By 1984, livestock losses in Mali were 40-50%, and the region was less capable
of feeding itself than it had been during the ’68-’74 drought.96
Herders (Tamasheks, Maures, and Peulhs)97 suffered disproportionately more than
farmers during the droughts. Loss of livestock cut into nomadic food supply and income.
Even those nomads who could afford to buy food could not always find it because the
droughts damaged cereal production more severely than cash crop production. As a
result, nomads became particularly susceptible to increased malnutrition and disease. A
1973 Center for Disease Control (CDC) survey of Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Burkina
Faso found malnutrition levels of 75% in children in nomadic groups, compared to 10-
25% in children of sedentary families.98 The CDC also found death rates among nomads
during the ’68-’74 drought to be higher than their sedentary counterparts.
Interviews corroborated the suffering of nomads. Before the droughts, these
nomadic herders “were totally dependent on [their] animals.”99 They were at the "mercy
of [their] tents and [their] animals."100 Their only needs before the droughts were
“animals” and “rain.”101 With all their wealth held in animals, the drought-induced herd
losses caused severe human suffering within the Touareg communities. When asked to
describe a brief history of their lives, 13 Touaregs interviewed (including two women, a
95 Somerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 24-25, 31. Poulton, A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 36-39. 96 Somerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 35-36. Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 36-39. 97 Remember that Peulhs herd close to the river, as opposed to Tamasheks and Maures, and therefore have better access to water sources and grazing grasses. 98 Somerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 25 & 27. 99 Interview with commune-level government official, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.12. 100 Interview with a Touareg village chief, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.15. 101 Interview with commune-level government official 11.12; Interview with a Touareg village chief, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview, II.6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47
former mayor, two commune-level government officials, a village chief, a nomadic
fraction chief, and at least one ex-combatant)102 independently described how they had
“lost everything”103 during the droughts, or how “the droughts totally destroyed [their]
herds.”104
The elderly chief of a nomadic fraction described how during the droughts their
animals starting dying right before their eyes. “We had nothing to eat or drink. People
were thirsty, hungry, and tired, and so they had to flee, leaving what animals they had
behind. Others sold their animals for pitifully small compensation, only about 100
CFA.”105 The former mayor summed up the droughts as “a true catastrophe for [their]
race.”106
Reduced rainfall caused much suffering, but environmental change was not the
only cause of this devastation. Government mismanagement and neglect exacerbated the
severity of the droughts, turning environmental disaster into cause for rebellion.
Government Drought Mismanagement and Neglect
When the ’68-‘74 drought hit, northern Malians were devastatingly poor, even
relative to their southern neighbors. Following independence, the nation had suffered
under the ill-conceived policies of its first president Modibo Keita, who served from 1960
102 Interviews interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 1.5,1.7,1.10,1.14,1.15, I.18,1.20, II.3, II.4, II.5, II.6, 11.12, VII. 1. 103 Interview with village women north of Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.18. 104 Interview with a former mayor, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.5. 105 Interview with a nomadic fraction chief, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.10 - Today, 100 CFA is worth roughly $2, and goats cost roughly 35,000 CFA. 106 Former mayor interview II.5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48
to ’68 until he was deposed by General Moussa Traore.107 Traore was equally
ineffective as a national leader, continuing with many of the inefficient and segregationist
policies of his predecessor. The country continued to suffer under his rule,108 and as
drought and famine spread across northern Mali in the 1970s and ‘80s, the government
did not move quickly to mitigate the situation. Confronted with northerners’ economic
and personal disaster, Traore and his government were either incapable of, uninterested
in, or consciously opposed to famine alleviation.
Throughout the region’s history, black, Bambara farmers had remained largely
segregated from the Arab-complexioned Touareg herders. Independence had pushed
these regionally and ethnically diverse groups together into one nation, forcing increased
interaction. The Bambara-centered government, however, developed negative stereo
types of the Touaregs as bandits and smugglers.109 The government’s negative opinion of
Touaregs affected their approach towards drought management, causing wide-spread
suffering.
Carolyn Sommerville argues that when the droughts hit, the government ignored
the problem because it predominantly affected the Touareg nomads. She states that only
as the problem spread to sedentary populations did the government begin to intervene.110
Even then, not all of the designated aid arrived in the North. Edward Poulton and
107 Keita’s economic policies and the underdevelopment in the North will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 108 Guy Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,”Canadian Journal o f African Studies X, no. 1 (1976): 23-47; John N. Hazard, “Marxian Socialism in Africa: The Case of Mali,”Comparative Politics (October 1969): 1-15; R. James Bingen, “Overview - The Malian Path to Democracy and Development,” inDemocracy and Development in Mali eds. R. James Bingen, David Robinson, and John M. Staatz, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 245-269._Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 13, 27. 109 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in, 7.Mali 110 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49
Ibrahim ag Youssouf claim that army colonels stole international aid designated for
famine alleviation in the North and sold it overseas, using the proceeds to build personal
villas (or “castles of the drought”) in the capital.111 Even the food aid that did arrive in
the North was apparently not properly allocated. According to Sommerville, the
government used aid to “punish groups and areas hostile to their authority,” giving
preferential treatment to supporters.112
Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita113 takes a more tempered view of the
government’s inability to protect its citizens from the affects of drought. He states that,
Outside interest groups have accused the government o f Mali o f ... withholding] food relief in order to destroy the Tuaregs or drive them out o f Mali.. . . However, M ali’s economy during this period remained very weak, a condition heightened by the drought. .. . M ali’s resources were very limited and the options o f the national government were severely constrained.114
While these governmental constraints are worth considering, Keita’s defense of the
government is likely biased because he is a black Bambara who was educated by, and
served in, the Malian military during the droughts. In his deference to the government’s
innocence, he implies that critics expected money for famine alleviation to come from the
financially strapped government. He fails to mention the large quantities of international
aid given to the country for this purpose.115 While criticisms of the government’s actions
111 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 13, 26. 112 Sommerville,Drought and A id in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 31-32& 43. 113 Kalifa Keita has no relation President Modibo Keita that I could determine. Keita is one of the most common Bambara surnames. 114 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 12. 115 Later in the piece, he mentions the prevalence of international aid, but he ignores the government’s responsibility for distribution.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50
during the drought vary in severity, Keita stands alone in his defense of the
administration’s actions.
On the far end of the criticism spectrum, some observers accused the
government’s relief efforts of being an attempt at “cultural genocide” against the Touareg
northerners. Somerville takes this tone in her critique of the government. She writes that
rather than working to alleviate famine amongst its citizens, the government of “Mali...
used drought to break the strength of nomadic groups opposed to [its] rule.” “By
withholding aid,” she says, “nomads were brought into submission.”116 This piece,
written in 1986, before the outbreak of the rebellion, reveals the brutal policy of the
Malian government, but not its ultimate effect. In reality, the government’s actions did
not bring the nomads into “submission,” but instead planted the seed of conflict that
would grow until 1990.
Interviews corroborated the government’s negligent drought response, and how
this contributed to the rebellion. Urban, Touareg politicians, and rural, Touareg
subsistence farmers echoed the sentiment that the government had abandoned them in
their time of need. A current Maure government official described the response as “poor
117 and corrupt.” One of the financers of the rebellion noted that the aid designated for the
North “never arrived,” 118 and one of the first members of the FIAA movement told me
that the government’s actions during the drought were “like an extermination campaign.”
116 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 31-32 & 43. 117 Interview with a Maure government official, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.4. 118 Interview with a notable Touareg financer of the rebellion, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51
He went on to stress that these events were conscious acts. “The government wants to
exterminate us,” he repeated.119
This negligence caused mass suffering within the nomadic communities of the
i on North. Deaths attributed to the drought reached at least 66,000. Those that survived
had no choice but to migrate away from their homes, losing livelihoods, traditional
customs, and economic and emotional security along the way. Grievances over this
mistreatment would contribute to the start of the rebellion less than a decade after the
’80-’85 drought.
Migration
One of the most significant impacts of the drought was the resulting migration of
Touaregs. These migrations were the primary way that the droughts contributed to the
rebellion.
With their livelihoods effectively ruined by the droughts, many Touareg herders
began to migrate longer distances to find grazing pastures for their animals.121 Others
abandoned herding altogether and travelled in search of food-aid distribution sites or
alternate work.122 The UN reported that by September 1985; 200,000 Malians (3% of
population) had been displaced.123 According to the CDC 40,000 Malian “Touaregs”
119 Interview with one o f the first members of the FIAA movement, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.3. Other interviews who described the government’s corrupt drought response included: 1.10, II.7, and II.4. 120 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 29. 121 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 29. 122 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, Poulton, 29; A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 39-44. 123 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 39 & 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52
migrated to Niger and 35,000 to Burkina Faso.124 Many others went to Libya.125 The
founders of the rebellion came from this group of migrants to Libya.
Migration to Libya
Employment on the Libyan oil fields, in the Libyan military, and in the Libyan
Islamic Legion made migration to this country an appealing option for young Touareg
men fleeing the droughts. Signing up with these fighting forces gave men the benefit of
food, shelter, and employment. In the Islamic Legion, men were trained in military arts,
armed, and sent to fight in places as far as Palestine and Afghanistan. Interviews
revealed that in this new environment, far from their nomadic, herding roots and
traditional family structure, these migrant men began thinking in a new way which would
lead to rebellion. Men from one rural Tamashek village described how the young men
who fought with the Islamic Legion learned “a military mentality” that was different
from the traditional Touareg attitude.126 A Touareg Deputy Mayor likewise described
how the migrants to Libya “embraced new cultures and a new civilization. They saw that
people could have more rights. This created a revolutionary movement.”127 This new
mentality soon spread to other frustrated young men who had not migrated to Libya.128
This shift in mentality made young Tamasheks and Maures returning from Libya, along
124 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 30. 125 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 39-44. Exact numbers not provided. Interview with a elder men in a Tamashek village, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.4. 127 Interview with a Touareg Deputy Mayor, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.5. 128 Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53
with their peers, less willing to accept the disrespect from the central government.129
When the spark of rebellion lit, with the small-scale Touareg attacks on Menaka and
Tidermene these young men were mentally ready to join the movement. Harsh military
reprisals and manipulations by Touareg leaders from Kidal pushed these men to cross the
threshold from frustrated observers to revolutionaries, as I describe in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
Qaddafi’s Influence
There is some debate as to whether Mu‘ammar Qaddafi consciously fostered this
new revolutionary mentality in his Islamic Legion recruits. The division mostly lies
between scholars, who claim that Qaddafi did consciously meddle in Touareg affairs in
North and West Africa, and local citizens, who tend to deny this claim. Jeremy Keenan,
an anthropologist who has studied the Algerian Touaregs for decades, claims that
Qaddafi “has long promoted the idea of some sort of Tuareg political entity or Libyan
satellite state encompassing the traditional Tuareg regions in Libya, Algeria, Niger and
Mali."130 Kalifa Keita similarly cites evidence of Qaddafi’s active attempts to destabilize
Mali in the 1980s and ‘90s.131 Poulton and ag Youssouf describe Qaddafi’s 1980
declaration that Libya was the homeland of the “Touaregs” and his offer of Libyan
citizenship to all Touareg immigrants.132 They also describe Qaddafi’s choice of
traditional Tamashek dress during the first attempt at rebellion mediation in Algeria.
129 This disrespect included the government mistreatment during the drought, as well as ethnic prejudice and social exclusion that will be described in greater detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. 130 Jeremy Keenan, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 90. 131 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 13-14. 132 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 55-57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54
This, they claim, is as an example of his attempts to exert power over the events in Mali
by presenting himself as the leader and spokesperson of the Touareg population.
Despite this scholarly evidence, most every Tamasheks and Maure interviewed
refuted the claim that Qaddafi encouraged Tamasheks and Maures to rebel. Several, in
fact said that Qaddafi had “abandoned” the Malians who had fought for him, never
following through on promises he made to them.134 The uniformly consistent and
adamant opposition to the idea that Qaddafi had supported or funded any aspect of the
rebellion did, however, make this interviewer question the Libyan leader’s neutrality.
Regardless of Qaddafi’s intentions, Malian Touaregs’ experience with the Libyan
Islamic Legion contributed to their desires to rebel against the Malian government.
i-ir Returning to Mali in the late 1980s, these migrants found that their families were still
suffering from the aftershocks of the poorly managed Sahel droughts.136 Many of them
were armed, they had no jobs, they were frustrated at their situation, and they blamed it
(with good reason) on the Malian government. They were primed for rebellion.
133 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 55-57. Qaddafi’s (failed) attempt to annex Chad and his known involvement in gun smuggling to Liberia during their civil war are additional examples o f his divisive intentions within West Africa. 134 Those that refuted Libya support during the rebellion included: Interview with one o f the first members of FIAA, interview 1.3; Interview with a Touareg Deputy Mayor, interview 1.5, Interview with a Touareg employee o f the PAREM socio-economic reinsertion program, interview 1.9, Interview with a Touareg former Mayor, interview II. 5. 135 The reasons for their departure are disputed. Keita, (13-14) states that the Libyans laid off many migrant workers during this period due to their own economic losses as the result of a drop in oil prices and the disbanding o f the Islamic Legion. Some interview respondents claimed that the migrants left Libya with the express intent of returning to Mali to begin a rebellion. [Interview with a Touareg Deputy Mayor, interview 1.5; Interview with a former combatants, interview 1.20.] Keenan gives the best summary o f the reasons for the Touareg’s departure form Libya, explaining that it was a combination o f factors including the global oil crisis that prompted Libya to lay-off oil field workers; the Soviet pull out o f Afghanistan, which ended the Islamic Legion’s plight, and "Qadhafi's humiliating failure to annex Chad." See, Jeremy Keenan,The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 263-264, n.53. 136 Later in this chapter, I also discuss how social tensions experienced by communities reabsorbing these returning migrants contributed to the rebellion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55
Intentions of the Migrants to Libya
Despite this predisposition for rebellion, the returning migrants did not revolt
immediately upon return. Further exploration of the migrants’ initial motives helps
illuminate how the Libyan experience translated into rebellion in Mali.
Some scholars and interview respondents argue that the Touareg migrants left
Mali with the conscious intention of receiving military training in Libya in preparation
for a rebellion back in Mali.137 In reality, most Malian Touareg migrants to Libya
embarked on this journey as a drought survival strategy, with only a small subset
migrating to Libya with the revolutionary intentions. According to Tombouctian « 1TR
Touareg interview respondents, those that migrated to Libya with revolutionary
intentions were descendants of the Touaregs from Kidal who had fought the 1963
rebellion. This small uprising, which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent
sections of this chapter, resulted in massive military reprisals against the Touaregs in the
region, many deaths, and no gains for the Touaregs. In the 1980s, the descendents of the
’63 revolt still harbored the frustrations that had led their ancestors to revolt, and
additionally had personal interests in winning the fight their parents had lost.139
137 Charles Gremont, Andre Marty, Rhissa ag Mossa and Younoussa Hamara Toure, Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali: Entre fleuve et Dunes (Paris, France: Editions Karthala et IRAM, 2004), 35. This piece paints participation in Islamic Legion as conscious action in preparation for rebellion. 138 Tombouctian’s are citizens of the region of Tombouctou. 139 Interview with a Touareg Director o f a local NGO, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.9; Interview with a Black-Tamashek intellectual, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview III.7; Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.1; Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II. 11. These interview respondents stated that the rebellion of the 1990s was started by the descendants of the 1963 rebellion. The only respondent who openly admitted to having fought with the Libyan military did claim that he and other colleagues had migrated to Libya with the express intention of preparing militarily for a rebellion. More likely is the probability that some of his compatriots in the Islamic Legion and later from the rebellion had consciously pursued training in Libya with rebellious intents, while he had not. The Libyan experience of migrants from the Tombouctou
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56
Government mismanagement of the droughts likely pushed these sentiments to a
breaking point, driving these descendants to prepare for rebellion.
Despite these apparent preparations by some Touaregs, Tombouctian migrants to
Libya seemingly knew nothing of these plans. They had not been involved in the ’63
rebellion, and had little to no contact with their ethnic brothers in Kidal. They returned
from Libya frustrated and prepared for rebellion, but inactive.
It was these Kidal-based descendants of the ’63 rebellion that carried out the
initial attacks on Menaka and Tidermene in 1990. Even then, most residents of
Tombouctou were not drawn to revolt. Only as the military began its reprisals against
innocent Touaregs throughout the North, and the Kidal leaders began to use racial
manipulation of their fellow Touaregs,140 did migrants returning from Libya to
Tombouctou enter the rebellion.
Relating to the Literature
Drought as a cause of conflict should fall into a sub-group of the “social and
cultural causes” literature that focuses on environmental factors. Existing literature is
aware that environmental factors can cause conflict, however, this literature focuses on
the importance of access to land and natural resources, and does not directly address the
impact of rainfall levels on conflict. Collier et al. stress the significance of greed for
natural resources in causing conflict, but this theory is not applicable to Mali’s
region, such as this interview source, prepared them mentally and physically for rebellion, but these individuals did not join the rebellion until after its initial start in Kidal. This interview respondent likely conflated the experience o f the Kidal migrants with his own to trump up the grandeur o f the “Touareg rebellion,” for my benefit. Interview with an ex-combatant, Interview 1.20. 140 This factor will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57
environmental problems, because Touareg herders did not have access to natural
resources.141 Verwimp notes that one factor that contributed to the Rwandan genocide
was scarcity of farming land in the country.142 This relates somewhat to the case of Mali,
because drought made land in northern Mali less viable for herding, but the theory
focuses on overpopulation as the straining factor, rather than water scarcity. Kaplan’s
theory comes close to addressing the Malian situation. He claims that deforestation, soil
erosion, and over-population in river areas can prompt mass migration, social unrest and
conflict.143 While he too stresses over-population as a driving force in these
environmental problems, his description of the importance of river access shows an
awareness of how water can play a role in causing conflict. Kaplan’s assessment of how
environmental factors affect social factors and migration is also relevant to northern Mali.
In the case of the Sahel droughts, lack of rainfall was not the direct factor leading to
rebellion. Drought led to rebellion by causing frustration and migration.
There are two nuances to the Malian case that Verwimp and Kaplan do not
address. The frustration felt by Touaregs during the Sahel droughts was not the same as
Kaplan’s social unrest, and it was not (at least in the early stages of the rebellion) directed
at neighbors, as in Verwimp’s description of Rwanda. The Touareg frustration was
directed that the central government that they felt had abandoned them during the
environmental disaster. Additionally, Kaplan focuses on environmentally provoked
migration because he sees it as a cause of this social unrest that can lead to war. In Mali,
141 Paul Collier, V.L. Elliot, H&vard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, mart Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy(Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 57-63. 142 Philip Verwimp, “An economic profile o f peasant perpetrators of genocide Micro-level evidence from Rwanda,”Journal of Development Economics 77 (2005): 320. 143 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,”The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58
environmentally provoked migration not only contributed to frustration, but exposed
Touaregs to the outside influence of a third party, namely Libya. In this way, drought in
Mali was not only a “social and cultural cause” of conflict, but also a “systemic cause.”
Drought made northern Mali vulnerable to what Michael Brown describes as “bad
neighbors.”144 Bad neighbors were, however, not Mali’s only problem. The central
government’s neglect of the North left the area underdeveloped and its citizens
marginalized, further contributing to the frustration that led to rebellion.
Neglect of North. Underdevelopment, and Marginalization
When the Sahel droughts hit Mali, the country was already severely
impoverished, particularly in the northern regions. The socialist economic policies of the
country’s first president Modibo Keita drove the country into debt between 1960 and
1968, and the policies of his predecessor Moussa Traore were no better. While poverty
was practically universal during these years, underdevelopment in the North was even
more dramatic. Evidence shows that the central government’s policies were particularly
detrimental to the northern regions. Before the droughts even hit, the standard of living
in these areas was low relative to the rest of the country. This already existing poverty
exacerbated the effects of the droughts, and the population’s frustration at the
government’s response. Most literature on the rebellion concludes that this Northern
underdevelopment was a primary cause of the rebellion.145 My analysis agrees that this
144 Michael Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Brown etNationalism al. and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 4, 13-16. 145 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking; Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency Ma/^UNDP, in “The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59
stratification was significant in contributing to the rebellion. While all of the North was
indeed frustrated with their situation, I find that that the government’s policies
specifically caused economic hardship and social exclusion for the northern Touareg
populations. Existing literature on the rebellion emphasizes Northern poverty, rather than
Touareg poverty, apparently to show that the rebellion did not start on ethnic grounds.
While true that the rebellion did not begin as a division along ethnic lines, awareness of
the breakdown of northern poverty along ethnic lines is needed to understand the
rebellion.
Malian Independence and Macro-Economic Policies
After more than half a decade of colonial rule, Mali gained its independence from
France in 1960 and almost immediately formed a socialist government under the
leadership of Modibo Keita, a southern Bambara.146 Keita’s idealistic government was
characterized by a series of ill-conceived and isolationist policies that impoverished much
of the nation. The damage done by his administration is evident in macro-level economic
changes in the country during his rule. Creation of state-run enterprises and banks, the
imposition of strict price controls and trade restrictions, and attempts at the elimination of
foreign capital domination severely crippled the Malian economy.147 Keita’s policies
Malian Experience in Combating Poverty and Conflict Management,” fromthe Fifth Forum on Governance in Africa, held in Maputo, Mozambique, (May 23-25, 2002) www.undp.org/rba/pubs/agf5/AGF%20V%20Mali%20CP.pdf (accessed January 2006). 146 Immediately upon independence, the territories that are now Mali and Senegal formed the single nation, the Malian Federation. This experiment lasted only a few months, before the leaders disbanded forming their own nations. 147 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 39; Yves Bourdet, “Economic Reforms and the Malian Economy,”African Development XXVII, no. 1&2 (2002): 26. President Keita’s attempts to eliminate “foreign capital domination” included the creation of the country’s own Malian franc. This shift was introduced in 1962, shortly after the creation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60
damaged the production capability of the commercial agricultural sector, and caused a
large jump in inflation, as well as a jump in the balance-of-payment deficit from zero in
1959 to 4.6 billion Malian Francs (MF) in 1962.148
Despite early signs of economic imbalances, Keita continued to increase both the
numbers of public employees, and the scale of the state budget. Under his rule,
governmental expenditures (minus public debt) increased from MF 6.8 billion in 1959 to
11.4 billion in 1962, 18 billion in 1965, and 24 billion in 1968. This was an average
increase in administrative expenditures of roughly eleven to twelve percent annually.
The resulting deficit averaged about MF 2.3 billion a year between 1959 and 1968.149 As
further evidence of Keita’s economic mismanagement of the country, the real Gross
Domestic Product per capita fell dramatically from $991 in 1960, to $947 in 1961, and
$896 in 1962.
Northern Poverty and Marginalization of Touaregs
Keita’s unsound economic practices and general mismanagement of the country
augmented poverty throughout the country, but did so especially in the North. From
1968 to ’90 the government spent only about 17% of its infrastructure investments in the
northern regions.150
the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) and the regional CFA franc. His actions resulted in the country’s dismissal from WAMU and a near freeze on Mali’s trading abilities and economic prospects. See David Leith Crum, “Mali and the U.M.O.A.: a Case Study of Economic Integration,”Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no. 3 (1984): 469-486. 148 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 39, 31. 149 Yves Bourdet, “Economic Reforms and the Malian Economy,” 38; Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 39. 150 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 19. United Nations Development Program, Reforming Technical Cooperation and Capacity for Development, “To Make Peace, Support Civil Society and Keep Out of Sight: Technical Cooperation and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61
Along with northern poverty created via macro-economic miscalculations, Keita’s
new policies also adversely affected individual industries and micro-level livelihood
activities specific to the Touareg population in the North. According to Robin Poulton
and Ibrahim ag Youssouff, during Keita’s regime “land-use and trading patterns were
subjected to serious changes which did not work in favor of the North.”151 While the
authors describe these changes as affecting “the North” as a whole, in reality they most
significantly impacted the Touaregs. Upon establishing colonial control of northern Mali
at the very end of the 19th century, the French set up three fixed trading posts through
which all goods passed before transport to the rest of the country. Not only were the
fixed posts impractical for the mobile nomads, but the French system economically
exploited the nomadic traders. Under the new system, the French colonial power fixed
• 1 ^9 • • unfavorable purchase prices for local goods. French restrictions on nomads’ trade
options and economic livelihoods caused frustrations within the Touareg communities
that extended to Mali’s central government when it chose to continue these policies
following independence.
In addition to the challenges of trade with the South, these policies negatively
impacted trans-Saharan trade. The Maures have traditionally conducted the trans-
Saharan trade from Mali, bringing salt from Taudeni (in the far north of the Tombouctou
region) and goods from North Africa to the city of Tombouctou. The fixed borders of the
new nation disrupted many o f these trade routes, causing lose o f profits. Competition
Peacemaking in Mali,” United Nations Development Program, http://mirror.undp.org/capacity/cases/insights/mali.htm (accessed December 3, 2007). This UNDP source describes the severe poverty in northern Mali leading up to the rebellion. 151 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 32. 152 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62
from government officials equipped with cars, as opposed to the nomads’ traditional
1 c i camel transport, further reduced Maure trade profits.
Keita’s land reform policies also caused problems for Touaregs. Under his plan,
most land was nationalized and existing (local-level) resource-sharing agreements were
altered. Often the new policies left changes up to the discretion of government civil
servants, who were notoriously discriminatory against Tamashek’s and Maures. Changes
to existing agreements reduced nomads’ access to grazing land, hindering their
livelihoods.
New laws instituted in 1983 and 1986 by Keita’s successor, Moussa Traore,
further reduced both farming and herding capabilities in the North. These laws allowed
the state to appropriate any land left unused for a lengthy duration and privatize it for
their own use. Due to the infertile quality of northern land, farmers traditionally rotate
plot use, which allows minerals in the earth to rejuvenate. Herders, likewise, leave
pastures vacant for long periods of time allowing for feeding grasses to grow back as they
rotate with animals throughout the year. To protect land from government take-over
following these new laws, farmers began reseeding plots without allowing time for
rejuvenation. This reduced the quality of agricultural output and, therefore, economic
gains from farming. Touareg herders, whose mobile lifestyle prevented them from being
everywhere at once, had no defense against this government appropriation of grazing
land, and they consequently suffered more than farmers under this policy. As herding
land was privatized, nomad “freedom of movement” was restricted, and their ability to
153 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63
adjust to “environmental demands” diminished.154 These changes increased economic
hardship and reduced social freedom.
Relating to the Literature
Underdevelopment of Mali’s North falls primarily under what I have called
“national” causes of conflict, but it relates also to existing systemic theories.
Specifically, Keita’s and Traore’s actions are examples of what Michael Brown calls the
problem of “bad leaders.” Keita’s and Traore’s detrimental policies make them
ineffective leaders, but not corrupt leaders, which Brown also includes in this category.155
The macro-economic problems and local-level hardships created by these leaders were
contained entirely within Mali’s borders, and thus are not “systemic” cause of conflict.
Touareg dissatisfaction with this situation does, however, shed some light on Collier et
al.’s systemic argument that conflicts are more often driven by economic greed than
grievance. In the case of Mali, economic grievances (or as I have described them,
“frustrations”) were a cause of the Touareg rebellion, showing that despite Collier et al.’s
argument, greed is not a universal cause of conflict.
Changes to Labor Market. Social Relationships, and Class Structure
Some of the primary causes of the Touareg rebellion have thus far gone
undocumented in the existing literature. Chief among these overlooked causes are the
154 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 32. Quotes: Poulton, 32 citing Gunnar Walzholz. 155 Brown, Michael, “The Causes o f Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Brown etNationalism al and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 4, 13-16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64
progressive labor, social, and class changes that occurred in northern Mali over roughly
the last century. Some of Keita’s social and land reform policies additionally altered the
labor market by prohibiting the use of “slave” labor. Despite the objective value in
eliminating indentured servitude, Touaregs were not prepared for these changes and took
an economic fall as a result. This contributed once again to Touareg frustration with the
central government.
Actions by the colonizers and Keita’s regime not only changed the northern labor
market, but the Touareg class structure as well. Changes to the chief and caste structure
added another layer of frustration within the Touareg aristocracy.
Colonial Policies
Colonization of the “French Soudan,” which includes what is now Mali, was
actually relatively more peaceful, and less exploitative than the experiences of colonies
such as the Belgium Congo. Mali’s lack of resources and the harsh environment seemed
to actually protect the country from some of these atrocities. The colonial period in Mali
was not, however, without hardships for the local population. Colonial military actions
and trade policies caused both labor and class changes that the Touaregs considered a
personal affront to their way of life. These factors contributed to the frustrations that led
to rebellion in the 1990s.
As described in the background chapter of this paper, Malian society, especially
in within Touareg communities, was traditionally structured along caste lines. Most
Touaregs fell into one of three categories: the freemen, the casted people (vassals), or the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65
slaves.156 Under this system, the “warrior aristocracy,” who were members of the
“freemen” caste, controlled all of the political power.157 This caste gained its notoriety
and power by protecting the territory from invaders.
In keeping with their protectionist attitude towards outsiders, the Touareg
warriors fought impressively to keep the French out when they arrived in Tombouctou in
1893, and Gao in 1898. Even when it was clear that the French had taken administrative
control of the region, the warriors continued to resist. Firhoun, a Tamashek leader, held
the colonizers at bay until 1916, when the French slaughtered him and 750 of his people
in the Forest of Anderamboukane, on Mali’s Niger border.158 The colonial violence
enraged Tamasheks and Maures, and this was a decisive moment in forming the
Touareg’s negative attitude towards administrative control. Firhoun quickly became a
mythical figure representing the ethnicities’ independent spirit. As the myth grew, so did
the animosity between the Touaregs and the colonizers. Colonizers continued their
attempts at controlling the “rogue” warriors, and Tamashek and Maure frustration over
acts of disrespect grew.159
Tamasheks and Maures were angered by French actions not only because it
caused loss of physical life in the community, but also because their inability to keep
156 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 26; Jeremy Keenan,The Tuareg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 10. 157 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 27. Martin describes the caste structure, but does not include ethnic or racial characteristics in his analysis. 158 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 25. Amidou Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile (Mali: Editions Donniya, 2001). For more on conflicts between the French and Touaregs see, Michele Pietroski and June Angole, “Cessation o f Touareg Repression: Respite or Resolution?”Africa Today 38, 1 (First Quarter 1991): 41-47. 159 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 25. The 1954 beheading and public display o f Alla ag Albacher, a Touareg notorious for resisting the French, was one of the worse acts o f French aggression against the Touaegs. This act was designed to set an example for the public of what happened to dissidents, but these actions did not produce the desired submissive response. See also, Mariko,Memoires d ’un Crocodile.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66
these intruders out was a humiliating blow to their caste identity. Other French actions
also caused frustrating class changes. Charles Gremont, Andre Marty, Rhissa ag Mossa
and Younoussa Hamara Toure describe in their book Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali
how the actions of the colonizers altered the chief structure and, in some cases, who
controlled the position of chief.160
Colonial changes to trade policy also caused adjustments to class structure, as
well as the labor market. The previous section noted how fixed colonial trading posts
reduced the viability of trading as a livelihood for Touaregs. This livelihood loss was a
significant source of frustration for Touaregs according to Poulton and ag Youssouf. Guy
Martin, however, argues that the predominant effect of changes to trade during
colonization were social and class-based, rather than economic. Under the traditional
caste system, the warrior aristocracy controlled power out of their rural bases. During
colonialism, however, the expansion and development of cities increased the power of the
urban merchant class, who were traditionally foreigners or part of the “casted” [or Vassal,
as I have previously described them] group of people. As the country transitioned to
independence, "expansion of [the] monetary economy, the development of transportation,
and urbanization" further increased the trade capabilities for this group, taking power
away from the warrior aristocracy in the villages.161 Poulton and ag Youssouf s assertion
that colonial policies reduced the economic viability of northern trade162 is not
necessarily in contradiction to Martin’s theory that trade increased during this time. It is
likely that support of urban centers from the colonial powers and Mali’s new independent
160 Charles Gremont, Andre Marty, Rhissa ag Mossa and Younoussa Hamara Toure,Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali: Entre Fleuve et Dunes (Paris, France: Editions Karthala et IRAM, 2004), 132. 161 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 27-28. 162 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67
government caused trading power and its economic benefit to shift from the warrior
aristocracy to the foreign/ casted people.
Changes to their social and class structure during colonization and after
independence frustrated Tamasheks and Maures. This frustration was different from the
grievances they felt over social exclusion, as described in the previous section. Class
changes were frustrating mainly because they caused loss of power. While some of the
changes to the caste structure resulted in economic loss, or adjustments in the labor
market, they were not primarily economic in nature. To noble Touaregs these changes
none the less exemplified the government’s disrespect for them. It was the combination
of grievances over economic hardship and frustrations over social and class changes that
compounded to contribute to the rebellion nearly a century after the French first arrived
in northern Mali.
Land Reform and Slaves
The agrarian policies of Mali’s independent government under Keita also
produced labor and class changes that contributed to Touareg frustration. One of Keita’s
new socialist policies stipulated that farmers who worked the fields had to receive some
of profits from these plots. This altered traditional caste structure in which the noble
Touareg landowners assigned farming duties to their vassals and slaves.163 Keita’s new
restrictions meant that the aristocracy could no longer extract such severe taxes from their
slaves, effectively diminishing their social control over this lower caste.164 Keita’s
163 Dark-skinned Songhai owned the majority of farming land, but where Tamasheks and Maures owned land, this was the means o f cultivation. 164 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68
intention in making these changes appears to have been rooted in a socialist desire to
equalize rights and status, rather than a desire to stifle the Tamashek and Maure lifestyle,
and from a human right perspective is justified. To unprepared Touaregs, however, these
changes were unacceptable.
There are two schools of thought as to why the Touaregs found this class change
so unacceptable. According to Amidou Mariko, a Bambara military colonel who served
in the North during the rebellion and who is actually praised for his efforts at
peacebuilding, part of the reason was that like their imposition of other new laws, the
military forced these new land policies on the population suddenly and without
explanation or time for adjustment.165 Under this school of thought, by reducing the use
of “slaves,” the government changed the labor market without adequately preparing the
population, causing financial loss. Under this school of thought, the frustration over
changes in class structure was based on economic grounds.
One argument that falls within this economic explanation is Richard Franke and
Barbara Chasin’s. They argue that changes to the Touareg caste structure had a negative
effect on Tamasheks and Maures because these changes inadvertently caused
environmental decay that contributed to the droughts of the 1970s and ‘80s. Restrictions
on the use of slave labor, they claim, meant that Touareg “masters” had fewer hands to
assist them with animal herding. This forced nomads to circulate their animals in a
smaller radius, closer to water sources. Resulting over-consumption of grasses,
concentrated urination, and hoof-damage to land caused environmental decay around
water sources. When rainfall dropped in the ‘70s and ‘80s, this environmental damage
165 Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69
exacerbated the affects of the droughts, ultimately causing grievances among the
nomads.166 Neither Mariko, nor Franke and Chasin argue that the government should
have allowed the slavery system to continue. Their arguments, however, stress that the
government could have eliminated some of the adverse side effects resulting from this
change if they had more adequately prepared Tamasheks and Maures for the elimination
of slavery.
Departing from the literature, Songhai and former Touareg slave interview
respondents had a different theory on why Touaregs found the elimination of slavery so
distasteful. These interview respondents claimed that Tamasheks and Maures found the
abolition of slavery unacceptable, not because it caused changes to the labor market and
caused economic loss, but because it caused a loss in class status and power. Those
subscribing to this way of thinking feel that the Touareg nobles were too proud to accept
a new caste dynamic in which they were expected to do “slave labor.” Rather than be
degraded by working the land, said these respondents, many Touareg men became rogue
criminals, roving the dessert, and continuing to live off other people by stealing from
them. “Everyone was very poor,” said one Black-Tamashek villager, “but [the Touaregs]
refused to work and this made their poverty worse.”167 The rebel combatants, in the
minds of some former slaves, were nothing but criminals who disguised their greed (and
attracted followers) by claiming to act in the name of rights for their people. One Black-
166 Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin,Seeds of Famine: Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel (Montclair, NY: Allanheld, Osmun & co. Publishers, 1980), 102-104. 167 Interview with a Black-Tamashek villager outside of Niafunke, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview III.9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70
Tamashek now squatting on the outskirts of Tombouctou after being displaced during the
rebellion said,
It wasn't a rebellion. They were thieves. A rebellion is a group working for an objective. These were poor people who were armed and saw an opportunity... There are people who don't want to work, and want to get rich via other people. I f you don't want to work, you have to steal... Even before the rebellion [the Touaregs] didn't work. They exercised a physical force to get what they needed to live.168
The real reason Touaregs felt frustrated by changes to their caste structure lies
somewhere between these two theories. The sentiment that Touaregs live off the fruit of
others is to some extent a stereotype of that group perpetuated by Songhai and more
recently by former slaves. It stems from their use of slaves and indentured servants, and
from a long standing tension between Touaregs and the sedentary populations of the
Sahara region. As I explained in the introduction, one traditional means of survival for
the Touareg warrior aristocracy (the nobles) was to steal provisions from sedentary towns
and mobile trade caravans.169 The claims of Touareg laziness described above are likely
influenced by personal resentment over these past events. It is not true that the
Tamasheks and Maures are lazy, nor is it likely that they revolted only out of a desire to
avoid work. It is, however, undoubtedly true that the Tamasheks and Maures were
displeased with the class changes (at least in part) because they reduced the power and
prestige of Touareg nobles. This change was humiliating, and Touaregs blamed the
government and the military for this degradation. This degradation combined with other
factors to culminate in rebellion thirty years later.
168 Interview with a Black-Tamashek former IDP, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview III.l. 169 Jeremy Keenan, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara, 83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71
Socialist Social Policies
Along with the labor market and class changes induced by the central
government, some of Keita’s policies induced undesirable social changes as well. These
social changes were brought on by a new wave of socialist social policies. The 1962
Family Code is an example of how Keita’s attempt at social reform in the North caused
dissatisfaction among Tamasheks and Maures.
The 1962 Family Code made several changes to existing marriage practices that
affected Tamashek and Maure communities. Under the law, the state recognized only
secular marriages and fined anyone performing a religious marriage before the civil one.
Additionally, it put a financial limitation on the amount of money a husband could give to
his bride's family at marriage. It further stipulated that men entering into marriage must
choose in advance to remain monogamous or to leave the door open for polygamy. Any
man agreeing to monogamy who took a second wife later would face criminal charges.
Like the land reform and slavery laws, these policies were in many ways quite
progressive, as Keita designed them in hopes of ensuring female consent in marriage
(rather than family dowry hunting), and reducing polygamy.170 Touaregs, who since
colonization had shown their distaste for external meddling, resisted these changes. They
saw nothing wrong with the existing system, and did not respect the authority of the
central government.
Rather than fostering a unified Malian social mentality, policies such as the
Family Code created division between the northern Touaregs and the government.
Touaregs were particularly resistant to these policies because of the harsh manner the
170 Hazard, “Marxian Socialism in Africa: The Case o f Mali,” 11-12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72
military used to implement them. Rather than easing the population into the new
requirements, the military imposed the transition suddenly and without explanation. The
government had not counseled the military to use restraint in introducing these new
laws.171 As a result, Tamasheks and Maures not only felt frustrated by the changes
occurring within their communities, but blamed the government and the military for these
unpleasant dismptions. Distrust of the government and the military became a primary
reason that Tamasheks and Maures rebelled in 1990.
Drought Induced Migration
I have already described how migration to Libya caused by the Sahel droughts
induced revolutionary sentiment among Touaregs. Drought induced migration
additionally caused social changes that contributed to the start of the rebellion.
Many of the migrants to Libya were away from their families for the first time,
and they often lost touch with Touareg values stopped respecting the Touareg chief
structure. 179 Returning migrants’ unwillingness to submit to the traditional hierarchy
meant their frustrations over lack of jobs, family suffering, and government disrespect
could not be controlled via the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. As evidence
of this, some interviews reveal a rise in banditry during this time. There is some dispute 1 79 in the scholarly literature regarding the timing of this increase in crime, but it is clear
171 Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile, Chapter 7.Civilian-military tension is described in greater detail in subsequent sections. 172 Interview with men o f a Tamashek village outside of Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.4. 173 Sommerville puts this increase during the droughts. Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73
that there was an upward trend in the years leading up to the rebellion, showing a change
in youth mentality, as well as the desperate nature of their situation.
Youth disrespect for the chief structure was not the only shift in the Touareg
social structure that resulted from the droughts. Nomad sedintarization also prompted
changes. As nomads lost their herds to animal thirst, starvation, and their own need to
eat, many migrated to towns to search for work. These former nomads did not, however,
have the skills needed for sedentary jobs (such as farming or day laboring), and they
found this life degrading. The psychological degradation of sedentary work and the
inability to care for their families caused great psychological damage to these heads of
household.174 According to Sommerville, the droughts caused a social upheaval in
nomad communities. Under this strain, “survival needs replaced traditional... values,” 1 7S causing “social customs and cultural values [to] crumble...”
Loss of community and social values, along with personal disgrace within the
senior generation of Touaregs, festered into grievances against the Malian government
that had abandoned Touaregs in their time of need. While this older generation of
internal migrants did not instigate the rebellion, they sympathized with the founder’s
stated goal to attain more rights for Touaregs, making them susceptible to the pressures 1 lf\ of military reprisals and Kidal leaders’ manipulation.
174 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 39-40 & 42-43. 175 Sommerville,Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation, 30. 176 The idea that the rebellion was based on a quest for rights is disputed. As noted previously, some Songhai and black-Touaregs felt that it was motivated by personal greed. Regardless o f the purity of the founders’ intentions, many Touaregs perceived the rebellion to be rights-based, and felt loyalty to this goal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74
Relating to the Literature
Literature on the causes of civil conflict does not adequately address the influence
of social and class change on war. A great volume of work does recognize the very
negative consequence of youth unemployment on national stability, but this literature
does not describe transitions in the labor market as a root problem. This was certainly
true in northern Mali, as youth migrants returning from Libya to Mali found no
employment options available. New agrarian and social reforms, however, also had an
impact on the labor market, and the government’s failure to ease Touaregs into this new
market model is a phenomenon not directly addressed by the conflict causes literature.
Kalevi Holsit’s social-based national level theory does come close to addressing
this. He argues that national leaders often try to “establish rule over single communities
of believers or communities of blood, language and religion.” He goes on to explain that,
“states today are, [however,] comprised of multiple communities.” This miscalculation
causes national divisions and illegitimacy of the state, making the nation susceptible to
conflict.• 177 Keita’s • attempt to force uniform social policies on Mali’s diverse citizens is
an example of this type of miscalculation. In this case, the error in governance caused
labor, social, and class changes that were detrimental and distasteful to the Touaregs.
Holsti’s theory addresses one of the general causes of the Touareg rebellion in
Mali, but does not address the specific causes of transitions in labor market, social
relations, and class structure. These factors are likely not isolated to Mali, and further
study of their impact on other civil conflicts is worth pursuing.
177 Kalevi Holsti, Preface and Chapters 1,2 & 6, in hisThe State, War and the State o f War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi-xii 13-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75
Ethnic Prejudice, Social Exclusion, and Ethnicallv-driven Social Manipulation
The final causes of the Touareg rebellion that I will describe relate to ethnicity.178
The ethnic prejudice of Mali’s central government against the Tamasheks and Maures,
and the resulting social exclusion of these groups, was the most sustained factor causing
Touareg frustration against the government. Ultimately, the military’s ethnically-driven
reprisals against Touareg civilians, and the Kidal Touareg leaders’ social manipulation
along ethnic lines were the sparks that lit the rebellion in the North.
Analysis of these ethnic factors deserves special attention, because existing
literature has not properly considered them. Scholars on the causes of conflict discuss
ethnic factors, including prejudice, as a factor contributing to rebellion, but they do not
address social exclusion. The Mali-specific literature likewise ignores this factor. The
Mali-specific literature does recognize the significance of the military reprisals in fueling
the rebellion, but often paints it as a stage in an already on-going conflict, rather than the
determining moment that caused Touareg violence to expand outside of Kidal for the first
time. Existing literature completely overlooks these regional and ethnic dynamics that
caused Touareg leaders from Kidal to manipulate members of their own ethnicities as a
war tactic.
178 While the Tamasheks and Maures are ethnic groups, they are also racially different from the traditional political power holders, the Bambara, and the northern farmers, the Songhai. The government’s similar (mis)treatment of Tamasheks and Maures could lead one to make racial-based arguments about the relationship between the government and these groups. I focus on ethnicity, because the government’s pre-rebellion perceptions of Tamasheks and Maures were based on the lifestyle, cultural practices, and attitudes o f these groups, not on the color o f their skin.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76
Independence
Mali’s independence process fostered ethnic divisions and exacerbated negative
stereotypes that would lead to social exclusion of this ethnicity from the government - a
future cause of the rebellion. As we know from their reaction to colonization, Mali’s
Tamasheks and Maures were generally distasteful of any formal administration. This
attitude influenced Touareg attitudes towards independence as well. According to
Poulton and ag Youssouf, northerners felt excluded from and were suspicious of the
French Soudan’s independence process because the movement was led by southerners
“whose mandate was not based on traditional African values, but on their mastery of
1 70 colonial education and languages.” Poulton and ag Youssouf s theory reflects the
sentiments of some Touareg circles. There is, however, an interesting twist to the
Touareg-French relationship that complicates analysis of Touareg attitudes toward
independence and the relationship between the Touaregs and the new central government.
A Touareg State? The Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes
In 1957, as it became clear that France would have to grant independence to its
colonies, it presented the Saharan populations of Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Chad with a
proposal to create a separate Touareg territory. The Organisation Commune des Regions
Sahariennes (OCRS) would have functioned somewhat like an independent state, but
with guidance from France.180 In retrospect, this plan to group the ethnically similar
Touaregs together seems far preferable to the culturally-blind Saharan borders that
179 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 12. 180 Naffet Keita, “De l’identitaire au probleme de la territoriality. L’OCRS et les societes Kel Tamacheq du Mali,” inMali-France : Regards sur une Histoire Partagee (Paris, France: Editions Karthala, 2005), 91-122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77
prevailed. Indeed, many Touaregs now sorely regret the loss of this opportunity. At the
time that this option was presented, however, the Touareg communities reflected on their
contentious relationship with the French, and saw separation from France and inclusion
in the Malian Federation as a preferable option. Touareg elders in Mali voted against the
OCRS option.181
During an interview with the elderly Tamashek chief near Lere, he summed up
the rationale behind this decision. He explained that at independence, the Tamasheks
had hoped that retreat of the French would end an era of unwanted outside influence.
They wanted to return to herding and life as they knew it before colonization. They did
not want to go to school, or be involved in government, and associated the creation of
their own state with these undesirable requirements. So, they opted instead for inclusion
in the Malian Federation.182
Inclusion in independent Mali, of course, did not protect the Touaregs from a
meddlesome central authority or absolve them from government stipulated requirements.
Rather than feeling liberated from the French intruders, the Touaregs felt that the French
had simply been replaced by another meddlesome party. Despite the Touareg decision to
not to pursue the OCRS, the very idea of a Touareg territory made them suspicious of the
Touaregs. Poor civilian-military relations reflected this growing tension between the
Touaregs and the new Bambara-centered government.
181 Keita, “De l’identitaire au probleme de la territorialite. L’OCRS et les societes Kel Tamacheq du Mali,” 91-122. 182 Interview with a Tamashek village chief outside of Lere, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II. 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78
Military Prejudice and Poor Civilian-Military Relations
Post-Independence Civilian-Military Relations
At independence, French forces left northern Mali, and new Malian troops arrived
to replace them. Despite this changing of the guard, local Touaregs did not receive these
new troops with open arms. The new Malian troops were predominantly made up of
Southern Bambaras, with whom the Touaregs did not share any cultural history. This
ethnic dichotomy meant that rather than viewing the Malian troops as their comrades of
shared nationality, the Touaregs viewed them no differently than the untrustworthy
French forces that had just left.
The troops’ own actions reinforced the local Touareg perception that the
government and the military were not “on their side.” Most members of the new Malian
military had served under the French military during colonial times, and they viewed the
local Touaregs as if they were the same rebels they had dealt with in their most recent
assignments in Algeria.183 The harsh and isolated environment of the North added to the
military’s perception that the area was an untamed, foreign land. Even today, it can take
a day and a half to travel the 700 kilometers from Bamako to Tombouctou, and an
additional day and a half to travel the remaining 500 kilometers to Kidal. In the 1960s,
transportation limitations could have increased the transportation time two, three, or four
fold. Stationed in a climate much more hot and dusty than their homes in the South, in a
place with no lines of communication to their families far away, military troops did not
view the North as part of their own territory. This distaste for, and misconception of,
183 Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile, Chapter 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79
their assignment made the troops resentful and distrustful of the locals, which they
exhibited in their treatment of them.
Just as the military distrusted the Touaregs, so too were the Touaregs suspicious
of yet another external intrusion. Adding to their distrust, was the ethnic difference
between the Touaregs and the troops. As black Bambaras, the military was made up
mostly of the ancestors of the Touaregs slaves. The Touaregs thus considered the
soldiers members of a subservient caste, and they refused to take orders from them.
As a result of these misconceptions and preconceived notions, animosity grew
between the military and the northern Touaregs. 1 S iThis animosity• tainted
implementation of new government policies, as I explained previously. It also led
directly to an armed revolt in 1963, and violent military backlash against Touaregs that
fueled the 1990s rebellion.
The 1963 Revolt I The miscommunications and tensions between the military and the civilian
population boiled over in 1962 and 1963. After only a few years, the disrespect
displayed by the military had crystallized ill-will from the local Touareg population. The
’62 death of a prominent Tamashek chief in Kidal prompted a series of events that led the
local population to act on their dissatisfaction. Following the death of Attaher, a power
struggle ensued between his sons — Zeyd (the older) and Intalla (the younger). In what
Mariko describes as an avoidable error, the Malian administration supported the younger,
184 Martin, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” 26-28, Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile, 53-54, Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 28-29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80
soaring Zeyd ag Attaher against the government and the military. Around the same time,
the military put out an edict to pursue Elladi ag Alla (son of d’Alla ag El Bechir, a
notorious French resistor). Pursued and disrespected by the Malian military, ag Attaher
and ag Alla banded together in opposition to the government. With local sentiment
against the military running so high, it was not difficult for this new duo to gain support
among the population.185 Actions began first with small raids against government
interests in 1962, but by 1963, it had turned into an overt revolt against the government
and military presence in Kidal.186 Despite strong regional support for the resistance, the
revolt was short-lived, never spreading to Gao or Tombouctou. Keita’s government
viewed the actions as lingering support for the OCRS that needed to be suppressed to
maintain the stability of the fledgling nation.187 It responded with deadly force against
these insurgents and the Touareg community of Kidal.
This harsh military repression of the Touaregs did nothing to facilitate Touareg
acceptance of the central government. The military repression in response to the events
created more, rather than less, revolutionary sentiment among Kidal Touaregs.188 This
sentiment lingered throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s, mingling with resentment over
continued regional underdevelopment and government neglect during the droughts.
The initial attacks on Menaka and Tidermene in 1990 were launched from Kidal.
Several interview respondents claimed that the ‘90s rebellion was started by the sons of
185 Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile, 53-54. 186 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 10. 187 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 25. Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 11. 188 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 55. Poulton and ag Youssouf do not dedicate significant time to the 1963 rebellion, but do stress this point. Even Keita, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Malian army, notes in suppressing the 1963 revolt, “the problem o f instability in the north had simply been deferred, not resolved.” Keita,Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81
those Touaregs that had been killed in the military repression during the ’63 revolt.
According to these sources, one motivation for the ‘90s rebellion was a long-standing
desire in Kidal to settle scores with the military. To ensure that their new initiative did
not meet the same fate as the ’63 revolt, the new leaders consciously expanded the
rebellion outside of Kidal and into Gao and Tombouctou.
Prejudice within the Central Government
The 1963 revolt appeared to “confirm” government suspicions that the Touaregs
were unpatriotic and not to be trusted. This prejudice against the Touaregs had been
growing for some time, dating back at least to colonization. It was the French colonists
that first coined the idea of the “Touareg problem,”189 a mentality many black
populations of West Africa internalized. This idea, combined with misunderstanding
regarding the different lifestyle of Touaregs (including herding, use of slaves, and
traditionally caravan raiding) prompted Bambara and other black-Malians to see
Touaregs as “lazy, prone to violence and criminality, opportunistic, ethnically
chauvinistic, and unpatriotic.”190 The Bambara-centered Malian state also internalized
these ideas, prompting prejudice, social exclusion, and repression of Touaregs.
Based on these prejudices and the Touaregs apparent lack of interest in
government participation, Modibo Keita chose to exclude the “rogue,” “dangerous”
Touaregs from his fledgling administration. Instead o f creating an administration
representing the country’s diverse ethnic composition, Keita used a patronage system to
189 Keenan, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara, 68. 190 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in 9,Mali, citing his own observations of popular sentiment to Touaregs before the rebellion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82
staff his government - rewarding close friends, certain interest groups, and the urban elite
with jobs.191 Virtually no northerners were included in the government, and no Touaregs
were appointed ministers.192 Several Touareg interview respondents described the
exclusion of Touaregs from military officers’ school.193 This government restriction on
Tamashek and Maure participation in government employment, high level military
service, and higher education is a clear example of the social exclusion, as defined as an
"inadequate realization of social rights."194
Based on evidence presented earlier in this section describing the Touareg lack of
interest in government involvement, one could argue that this lack of entry into the
government was self imposed, which would not qualify as social exclusion, according to
Brian Barry.195 Despite this initial lack of interest in government participation, denial of
Touaregs from government service does constitute social exclusion, because following
initial disillusion with the central government, many Touaregs were interested in
participation government service, but were turned away. Nearly half of all Touaregs
interviewed independently cited this exclusion and lack of Touareg rights as a cause of
the rebellion.196
191 Bourdet, “Economic Reforms and the Malian Economy,” 36. 192 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 12 & 30-31. 193 Interview with Tamashek working for a unilateral aid organization, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II. 16; Interview a Touareg director of a local NGO, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.9. 194 Charles Gore, “Introduction: Markets, Citizenship and Social Exclusion,” inSocial Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses, Gerry Rodgers, Charles Gore, and Jose Figueiredo, eds. (Geneva: International Labor Organization Publications, 1995), 5. 195 Brian Barry, “Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and the distribution of Income,”Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics CASE/12 (August 1998), iv, 5. 196 Interviews by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6,1.7,1.8,1.9, 1.14,1.15,1.17,1.20, II.6, II.8,11.11,11.12, and VII.l.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83
Ethnically-Driven Military Reprisals
From June 28, 1990 until the January 6, 1991 signing of the Accords de
Tamanrasset (Tamanrasset Accords) the rebel actions remained largely isolated in Kidal.
This first attempt at peace was not, however, well explained to the military and their
distrust for the Touaregs spiraled out of control. Shortly after the document’s signing, the
military began an active campaign of violence against Touareg civilians across the North.
In spring and summer of 1991, the military killed not only Touareg men, but women, the
elderly, and youth in the cities across Gao and Tombouctou, including: Lere (May 1991),
Tombouctou (May 1991), Agouni (July 1991), Niafunke, Afouta, Tasharan, Gossi, and
Fief.197
One Tamashek artisan in the city of Tombouctou described how the military
showed up at his house in broad day light and took him his entire family to the sand dune
near their house to kill them. They shot one bullet near his head and he can no longer
hear in that ear, but when they tried to fire again, the gun would not go off and he was
saved. In surviving, however, he witnessed the execution of many of his family members
and neighbors. Following the executions, the bodies were left on the dune, but that night,
the military came back, covered the bodies in gasoline, and danced around the flames.
The next day he fled Tombouctou.198 Many interview respondents had similar stories of
the violence exerted against Touaregs beginning in 1991, including one in which a truck
197 Interview with one o f the financers o f FIAA, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 1.2. 198 Interview with one o f the financers o f FIAA, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews II. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84
of women and children fleeing a military attack on their village was fire-bombed by the
military and burned alive in their truck.199
Prior to these military attacks, most Touareg residents of the Tombouctou region
“thought [that the insecurity] would start and end in Kidal, just like the ’63 rebellion.”
They “never thought it would touch [them].” When the military began attacking
civilians, however, these innocent herders and merchants were dragged into the rebellion.
Many fled to Mauritania, others became internally displaced, and, according to interview
respondents, “all men between the ages of 18 and 45 went to training camps to join the
rebellion.” They felt that they “had no choice.” Joining the rebellion seemed to be the
only way to protect themselves and their communities.200
In addition to the military’s direct violence against Touaregs, they also encouraged
Songhai to assist in the “containment” of the “rebel” Touaregs. Capitalizing on the pre
existence of mild ethnic tensions, the military first succeeded in motivating the Songhai
to participate in impromptu attacks on Touareg individuals in large cities like
Tombouctou and Lere. In 1994, the Songhai (under the guidance of a military defect)
“independently” organized the Ganda Koy “civilian defense units.” 0C\ 1
Despite military desire to quell the rebellion, the involvement of civilian Songhai in
the rebellion only served to escalate violence and rebel activity. The military had
199 Interview with one o f the first members o f FIAA, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 1.3. 200 Interview with a Touareg youth whose father was killed by the military, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 11.15; Interview with a Touareg youth who received rebel training, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 11.13. 201 Evidence o f a military-Ganda Koy connection was verified by a Ganda Koy member. Interview with a Songhai former Ganda Koy member, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV.3. Some evidence can also be found in Poulton,A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85
consciously polarized the budding revolution along ethnic lines to pursue their own long
standing vendettas against the Tamashek and Maures populations.
Ethnically-Driven Rebel Tactics
The military was not the only party to divide the rebellion along ethnic lines.
Touareg leaders from Kidal also stoked ethnic divisions as a tactic to gain support and
broaden the rebellion. As noted previously, it is popularly accepted that the founders of
the 1990s rebellion were the descendants of the founders of the 1963 revolt. According
to interviews these men were resentful of their ancestors’ previous defeat, and saw
expansion of their movement as the key to success. During the 1963 revolt, nomads
from the Gao and Tombouctou regions had acted as desert guides for military platoons
pursuing the rebels. To ensure that they were not defeated again, the instigators of the
1990s rebellion strove to include Tamasheks and Maures from all three regions of the
North in the movement. They achieved this goal by polarizing the movement along
ethnic lines, and attracting new recruits on the heels of the ethnically-driven military
reprisals.
Interview respondents in and around Lere described this situation repeatedly. One
older Tamashek, who has worked with several international aid organizations, explained
how following the Accords de Tamanrasset, before the military reprisals began, there was
a brief period of calm. According to this and several other respondents,the central
202 Interview with a Songhai school director, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews IV.7. 203 Mariko, Memoires d ’un Crocodile', Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.1; Interview with Songhai school director, interview IV.7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86
government declared “we have signed an agreement with your brothers and you should
welcome them into your homes.” Some Touaregs from Lere had spoken out against the
initial attacks, so rebel leaders were interested in attracting their support. With this
invitation rebel leaders from Kidal were able to travel freely and infiltrate other regions
of the North. When the military reprisals began, the rebel leaders were well situated to
recruit new combatants.204
Conclusions on Causes
Existing literature on the Touareg Rebellion of the 1990s describes its causes as
underdevelopment and government neglect of the North, favoritism in the government,
harsh military interventions, and the Sahel droughts. While each of these factors did
contribute to the start of the rebellion, these sources downplay and overlook the role of
ethnicity, social exclusion, the labor market, and social and class structures in causing the
rebellion. My research shows that 1) Changes to traditional Touareg social and class
structures fostered dissatisfaction against the Malian government. Related labor market
adjustments further contributed this Touareg dissatisfaction, bringing Touareg
communities to the brink of rebellion. 2) Simultaneously, ethnic prejudice against
Touaregs and their social exclusion by the central government pushed this group still
closer to rebellion. 3) Ethnicity was a significant factor in causing the Touareg rebellion.
204 Interview with a Touareg development worker, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.20; Interview with a nomadic fraction chief, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.3; Interview with a Touareg village chief, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.19; Interview with a Touareg imam, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.17; Interview with a Touareg youth whose father was killed by the military, Interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87
Prejudice within the government and military is often misclassified as regional
favoritism, rather than ethnic discrimination. Ethnically-based military reprisals against
innocent Touaregs following small-scale attacks in 1990 pushed young Touaregs
throughout the North to rebel against the government. Most literature paints these
reprisals as an early event in a rebellion already under way, not a cause. Touareg leaders
in Kidal also used ethnicity to stoke the sparks of rebellion. These leaders encouraged
ethnic divisions throughout the North to increase the scale of the rebellion and, therefore,
their prospects for success. These military reprisals and Touareg leaders’ actions were
the catalysts that caused Touaregs to channel their frustration into rebellion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5: PEACEBUILDING AND
PEACE IMPLEMENTATION
Introduction
By 1996 the Touareg Rebellion had officially ceased. This chapter explores how
peacebuilding and peace implementation brought an end to open violence in northern
Mali, and whether these initiatives adequately addressed the root causes of the rebellion.
That the Touareg Rebellion stayed isolated not only within Mali’s borders, but
within the northern region, is impressive. Compared to protracted conflicts such as
those in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, cessation of hostilities in Mali
after only five years and roughly 1,000 deaths is a testament to the peacebuilding efforts
that occurred within the country.
Despite the “success” of peacebuilding in northern Mali, the Pacte National
(National Pact) peace agreement did not address several of the root causes of the
rebellion. Furthermore, the Pacte has yet to be fully implemented, leaving many civilian
Touaregs and ex-combatants frustrated to this day.
205 As noted previously there was a separate, but simultaneous Touareg conflict during the 1990s in Mali’s neighbor Niger. It does not appear that there was substantial collaboration between these conflicts, except for possible cross-pollination of ideas. 88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89
Sources and Research Approach
Very few sources address northern Mali’s peace process. Robin-Edward Poulton
and Ibrahim ag Youssouf s A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development
and African Peacemaking is the only source that I uncovered providing a lengthy and
deep analysis of Mali’s peace.206 Rather than recreating their detailed presentation of the
individual people and initiatives that led to peace, I instead, aim to analyze how these
initiatives addressed (or failed to address) the root causes of the rebellion. This approach
is based on the philosophy that peacebuilding must address the root causes of conflict to
successfully prevent a return to violence. Conducting my research ten years after the end
of the rebellion, I had the opportunity to re-evaluate some of Poulton and ag Youssouf s
findings, and build on what they have done.
The Peace Process
The Tamanrasset Accords
Less than six months after the first attacks on Menaka and Tidermene in 1990, the
government began searching for peace. Unrelated unrest amongst students who had not
received their scholarships was creating insecurity and uncertainty in Bamako, and troops
that had been sent North to deal with the “Touareg problem,” were needed back in the
• 707 capital. In an attempt to resolve the northern conflict, so as to focus resources on
protecting his crumbling power, Moussa Traore’s administration signed (on January 6,
206 Kalifa Keita also dedicates a Smaller section o f his paper to the peace process. Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1998). 207 Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998), 59.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90
1991) the Accords de Tamanrasset with the two primary rebel groups (at that time), the
Movement Populaire de I ’Azawad (MPA), and Front Islamique Arabe de I ’Azawad
(FIAA). The accords, so named for the Algerian town in which they were signed, were
almost immediately ignored. Rebels and government officials alike felt uncertain about
the unpublished document. Touaregs felt the agreement did not grant them enough
autonomy, while Songhai simultaneously feared the “re-establish[ment of the] Touareg
hegemony in the North.”208 The agreement was dead in the water.
Political Events
The failures of the Accords de Tamanrasset thwarted Traore’s plan to quell the
unrest in Bamako, and on March 26, 1991, the military (accompanied by General Alpha
Toumani Toure, known commonly as ATT) overthrew him. What followed was an
interim government (the Comite de transition pour le Salut du Peuple - CTSP),
democratic elections, and a peaceful transfer of power from ATT to the president-elect
Alpha Oumar Konare on June 8, 1992. Many sources are written on Mali’s democratic
transition and, again, I do not intend to repeat them. The significance of Mali’s
democratic transition for our purposes is that this shift facilitated the peace process for
the North.
One way the political transition began to ease the crisis in the North was the
CTSP’s allocation of two government spots to representatives of the MPA and FIAA
respectively. According to Poulton and ag Youssouf, this gesture recognized “that the
208 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91
rebels in the north had been the first to act against the one-party State.”209 It also began
the process of correcting the ethnic prejudice and hiring imbalances within the
government. Along with this gesture the CTSP and the new democratically elected
administration dedicated themselves to producing a lasting peace agreement that could
replace the ailing Accords de Tamanrasset. Relying once again on Algeria to mediate,
the parties sat down in December 1991, January 1992, and April 1992. At this final
meeting, the Malian government and the newly unified rebel Mouvements et Fronts
Unifies de I ‘Azaouad (MFUA), signed the Pacte National.
The Pacte National
The Pacte National outlined four major initiatives designed to foster peace in
northern Mali. First, the agreement aimed to “restor[e] confidence and eliminate[e]
insecurity.”210 To do this, a permanent cease-fire was to be implemented upon signing
the agreement. Following this, the government would implement a program for the
integration of ex-combatants “into the various uniformed forces of the State.”
Disarmament of combatants would be a necessary prerequisite for integration. A gradual
reduction of military troops in the North and the repatriation of all persons that had been
displaced during the conflict would help “restor[e] confidence.”211
Secondly, the Pacte addressed the “special status of the North o f Mali.”212 In
recognition of this status, the agreement outlined a new administrative structure for the
North, including local, regional, and inter-regional assemblies designed to (among other
209 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 61. 210 Pacte National, Mali Decree No 92-121/P-CTSP2, Title II.7.A. 211 Pacte National, Title II.7.B; Pacte National, Title II.9. 212 Pacte National, Title III.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92
duties) “promote ... economic, social and cultural development,” ensure local
participation in regional security enforcement, and facilitate technical exchanges with
other national regions and states. A new local-level administrative structure
recommended in the Pacte became the foundation for national decentralization.
Thirdly, the Pacte introduced “measures to consolidate national solidarity.”213
This was to include a special program “to redress the economic, social and cultural
inequalities between the North of Mali and the rest of the country... [, including the goal
of] improving the infrastructure on the North to render it more attractive to investors.”214
The final significant initiative aimed to encourage “sub-regional and international
cooperation in the service of peace and development.”215
In addition to outlining these peacebuilding initiatives, the Pacte stipulated
financial responsibility for these efforts, new administrative bodies and funds that would
assist in implementation, and a timeline for their implementation. Much of the funding
was to come from the Malian government itself, although exact amounts are not
specified. Some funding for the initiatives of the decentralized government structures
was to come from “the member regions [with] augmentat[ation] by the State.” In pursuit
of the goal of repatriation of displaced persons, the agreement specified that it would
request assistance from international humanitarian organizations. The goal of sub
regional and international cooperation was specifically designed to solicit assistance from
international organizations.
213 Pacte National, Title IV.A. 214 Pacte National, Title IV.A.48. 215 Pacte National, Title V.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93
The primary bodies charged with implementation included a Ceasefire
Commission, an Independent Commission of Inquiry, a Commission of Supervision, and
a Commissioner for the North. The Independent Commission of Inquiry was charged
with investigating the events and crimes which occurred during the rebellion. The
Commission of Supervision and the Commissioner for the North were charged with
advising the president on matters of the peace implementation and ensuring that the Pacte
was enforced. Most initiatives in the Pacte were to be initiated within 30 or 60 days
following the signing of the agreements, but more limited information is given on the
expected duration of each initiative.
Achieving Peace
Initial Missteps
Despite a reduction in violence in 1992 and ’93, snags in the implementation of
the Pacte and tensions (between the military and Touaregs, and between Touaregs and
Songhai) caused the peace to falter.
One snag was the new Ceasefire Commission. While the government had
honored its commitment (as outlined in the Pacte) to create the commission, lack of
funding made it non-functional. The ceasefire existed in name only, and violence
continued. According to Poulton and ag Youssouf, this failure was more the
consequence of lack of international interest than government neglect.217 Peace
implementation needed funding, and the new democracy had nothing to spare.
216 Pacte National, Title III.IV.43, Title VI.74. 217 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94
Despite the government’s apparent interest in peace, interviews indicate that the
government failed to provide forthright information to the military about the Pacte and
the mediation process. Just as government secrecy regarding the Accords de
Tamanrasset doomed them to failure, these vagaries undercut government efforts at
peace. Shortly before the first Pacte negotiation at the end of December 1991, the
Algerian mediators had called together the rebel groups218 to create the unified MFUA.
An interview with a Touareg official at the Regional Assembly in Tombouctou, indicated
that this unification was part of the mediation strategy, designed to facilitate peace
implementation.219 According to this source, the military interpreted the coalescing of
rebel power as move to strengthen power and rebuff the peace process. In response, a
large contingent of the military ignored the Pacte and worked to divide the rebel
movements once again. Aware of the military’s intention, some rebels decided to
continue fighting the military, preventing the Pacte from taking hold initially.220
In addition to these confusions within the military over the nature of the Pacte and
the mediation process, glitches in the integration of ex-combatants caused peace
implementation hurdles. While integration was one of the first implemented components
of the Pacte (beginning in 1992), the first waves of integration were not uniformly
carried out, creating confusion and tension. The European director of a unilateral aid
218 By this time, the individual rebel groups now numbered four: the MPA, the FIAA, theArmee Revolutionnaire de liberation de I ‘Azaouad (ARLA), and the Front Populate de liberation de I‘Azaouad (FPL A). 219Interview with a Touareg official at the Regional Assembly in Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II. 8. This fact is corroborated by Poulton and ag Youssouf. Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 63. 220 Interview with a Touareg official at the Regional Assembly in Tombouctou, interview II.8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95
organization working in northern Mali during the rebellion described the situation in one
northern town, Niafunke, in 1994.
There was total insecurity. ... Some ex-combatants had been integrated [into the Malian military], but some were still personally armed. You saw men on the street with Kalashnikovs [AK-47s] held together by rubber bands.... You didn't know who had been integrated and who hadn't. It was very scary.221
There was also confusion and uncertainty within the integrated forces. Some
existing members of the military were not keen to invite their former enemies into their
ranks, and some ex-combatants remained suspicious of a military that had attacked them
and their families. This mutual distrust created tension within the integrated forces, and
in at least three separate incidents in 1994 Touareg integres killed some of their enlisted
counterparts within their units. Poulton and ag Youssouf describe one of these
incidents as stemming from a “disagreement,” while Kalifa Keita describes the events as oo“\ acts of “mutiny” and “murder” on the part of the integres. These contradictory
accounts reflect the confusion and diverse opinions within the military and Touareg
communities during this time.
Evidence suggests that 1994 was the most violent year of the rebellion. Figures
r)') A on the numbers of deaths during the rebellion are virtually non-existent, especially
221 Interview with a Caucasian director of a unilateral aid organization, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview VIII.3. Details o f the integration process will be presented in the next section. 222 These events occurred in military camps in Menaka, Tonka, and Kharrous. 223 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 70. Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 18,21. The challenges surrounding the qualifications o f ex-combatantsintegres will be discussed below. 224 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Conflict Database “Mali,” Upsalla University, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictInformation.php?years=l 990%2C 1991 %2C 1992%2C 1993 %2C 1994%2C 1995%2C 1996&bcID=64&variables%5B%5D=l &variables%5B%5D=2&variable s%5B%5D=:3&variables%5B%5D=4&variables%5B%5D=5&variables%5B%5D=6&variables%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96
with any time specificity, but interview accounts, corroborated by Poulton and ag
Youssouf, indicate that rebel activity increased during this year. In this same year,
“civilian” Songhai also created the Ganda Koy, and scores of civilian Touaregs were
again sent fleeing across Mali’s borders. The violence of 1994 (be it from the military or
Ganda Koy) forced the creation of a third refugee camp m Mauritania. 29 S
Amidst the inefficiency of the Ceasefire Commission, the confusion over the
unification of the rebel movements, and the challenges of integration of ex-combatants, it
appeared that the Pacte would fail just as the Accords de Tamanrasset had before. The
afore European director of the mentioned unilateral aid organization (who has
demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to peacebuilding in northern Mali) even 996 came close to abandoning his peacebuilding efforts during this year.
Getting the Rebel Movements to Accept the Pacte
Despite these missteps, miscalculations, and errors in the initial stages of Pacte
implementation, the agreement eventually began to take hold. As I noted previously,
Mali’s newly democratic government demonstrated a real commitment to fostering peace
in the North. To make this happen, they made valiant efforts to support peace
implementation. An example of this commitment can be seen in their decision to change
and improve the process of ex-combatants following the first round of ex-combatant
integrations in 1993 (before the second round in ’96). The new system required that
integres volunteer themselves for the process (including relinquishing their arms and
5B%5D=7&variables%5B%5D=8&variables%5B%5D=9&variables%5B%5D=10&button=+Sear ch+ (accessed December 3, 2007). 225 Interview with a Caucasian director of a unilateral aid organization, interview VIII.3. 226 Interview with a Caucasian director o f a unilateral aid organization, interview VIII.3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97
undergoing some training and qualifications evaluation), rather than allowing the rebel
groups to submit lists for integration as had been done previously. The government also
committed itself to decentralization of the country, in order to grant autonomy to the
regions, as promised in the Pacte.
One interview respondent smartly summed up the government’s ability to push
the peace process forward and the combatants interest in participating by saying that the
government convinced the rebel movements that independence would not be as desirable
“now” [in the 1990s], as it would have been at independence. As I will show in the
sub-section on integration of ex-combatants, the Touaregs began to see that if they could
achieve equal rights (now possible through the peace process), the benefits of Malian
citizenship could outweigh separation or segregation from the state.
Lack of interest in the conflict from outside the country also likely pushed the
combatants to accept the Pacte. While some evidence suggests that Libya played a role
in causing the rebellion, and the movements undoubtedly bought arms via North African
trade routes, there is little evidence to suggest any substantial external influence during
the rebellion. Summarizing one ex-mayor, the rebellion was not supported by outside
sources, so the movements ran out of money, and when they did, they saw that they could
227 Interview with a Maure in Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.12. 228 Keita does claim that Qaddafi gave assistance to some rebel groups, and the Algerian POLISARIO gave assistance to others. Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 24,27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98
gain something from the Pacte, so they accepted it.229 A tourist guide in the city of
Tombouctou echoed the same sentiment.230
Along with the government maneuvering and lack of external influence in the
rebellion, the combatants’ move towards Pacte acceptance was also pushed forward by
the internal work of individual peacemakers, NGOs, and civil society groups. These
people not only made acceptance appealing to combatants, but also worked to support the
peace implementation throughout the challenging years of transition.
As the peace began to take hold, 2,681 ex-combatants, gave up their arms and
were ushered into cantonment camps between November 1995 and February 1996. To
mark the official end of the rebellion, these arms were burned in a Flame de la Paix
(Flame of Peace) ceremony in 1996 at the edge of the city of Tombouctou.
Addressing Root Causes and Implementation of the Pacte
The successful resolution of the Touareg Rebellion is to be commended. The
peace, however, is only as beneficial as it is durable. In light of this, I know examine
which aspects of the Pacte addressed root causes of the rebellion, which of these aspects
were actually implemented, and which root causes were not addressed by the Pacte.
229 Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.11. 230 Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview 11.11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99
Integration of Ex-combatants
The integration of ex-combatants into the Malian military and civil service was
one of the first and most widely implemented aspects of the Pacte, with 2,230 ex
combatants integrated by October 1996.
Table 2: Integration of Ex-Combatants into Malian Armed and Civil Services Date of Integration Integrated into ... Quantity Integrated April 1993 Army 610 October 1996 Army 701 (24 officers) October 1996 National Guard 348 (13 officers) October 1996 Gendarmerie 151 (8 officers) October 1996 Police 150 (2 officers) October 1996 Customs Services 100 (10 officers) October 1996 Water and Forest Services 50 (7 engineers) October 1996 Civil Service 120 (20 Senior Officers) Total 2,230
Adapted from Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, Appendix B, Tables 1,2,3,4.
Interviews reflected the far-reaching positive effects of these integrations.
Several interview respondents voluntarily described the integrations as either well
implemented, contributing towards peace, beneficial to the Touareg population, or all of
the above.231 Several saw the endeavor as the key factor that helped end the fighting and
“establish peace” in northern Mali Others went so far as to say that the integrations
were a “positive impact” of the rebellion,233 because as one Tamashek described,
231 So as not to bias respondents, I did not ask any of them directly about the integrations, but in questions about peace implementation, prospects for peace, and the positive impacts of the rebellion, respondent independently broached the topic of the integrations. 232 Interviews by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews IV.2, II.4,1.4,1.12,11.12, II.9. All o f these respondents echoed these words or similar variations. 233 Interview with a nomadic fraction chief, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.19, Interview with a Peulh working for and NGO, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview V .l.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100
“Touaregs never thought it would be possible to hold these jobs [before the rebellion.]”234
By granting Touaregs access to these jobs, the integrations went a long way towards
addressing the social exclusion that had contributed to the start of the rebellion.
Additionally, where Touaregs had felt undercut by changes to the labor market that
reduced their productivity and economic gains, their inclusion in the country’s armed
civil services provided them with steady jobs and salaries, and “had a positive economic
spill-over onto [the] families [of the integres]^235
The integration also had a limited positive effect on northern class structure,
returning power to some disaffected Touaregs. While this power shift could help address
some of the Touareg grievances that caused the rebellion, the transition was precarious
because the initiative did not directly consider the community-level ethnic divisions that
had been stoked to fuel the rebellion, nor did it have a positive impact on the
underdevelopment that had contributed to the conflict.
The lack of qualifications of integres was a formidable challenge to the
integration effort. The poor infrastructure in the North, and Touaregs’ own aversion to
schooling, had kept education levels in these communities low. Integration seemed a
necessary step to overcome these imbalances, yet Touareg ex-combatants were often less
skilled than their civilian, Songhai neighbors. Thus, their selection for government and
military posts seemed “unfair” to a broad swath of northerners, many of whom were also
suffering from severe poverty resulting from the North-South imbalances.236
234 Interview with a Tamashek youth, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.15. 235 Interview with a Tamashek youth, Interview 11.15. 236 A similar critique is sometimes made in the United States against affirmative action for African- Americans.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101
A Black-Tamashek interview respondent expressed his dissatisfaction over this
perceived narrow selection process. Having lived as an IDP for five years during the
rebellion after he fled his village following a rebel attack in which the majority of his
animals were stolen and his brother was abducted, he angrily told me, “If they are going
to have an integration, it has to be for everyone!” 997 Some Songhai also hold deep
resentment over the integrations. One university-educated professional went so far as to
tell me that, “the next time there is a rebellion, I’m joining in so I can get integrated 99£ too.” Another Songhai working as a chauffeur for an aid organization made an
exaggerated, disparaging reference to an integrated Touareg government officer “who
wears the clothes of a political official, but can’t even write his name.” 93Q Ten years after
the completion of the integration process, this continued dissatisfaction of Songhai and
black-Touaregs over the integration process reveals that while the integrations may have
helped overcome the exclusion of Touaregs from the government and military, the
initiative did not address the ethnic divisions that the military had stoked during the
rebellion.
Frustration over the integrations is not, however, isolated to the Black ethnicities.
Some Touaregs felt equally dissatisfied with the narrow selection process. The first
Mayor of one of the communes in the Tombouctou region felt that returned refugees
237 Interview with a Black-Tamashek squatting on the outskirts of Tombcoutou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview III. 1. 238 Interview with a university-educated Songhai, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV. 11. 239 Interview with a Songhai chauffeur for a unilateral aid organization, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV. 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102
should have been included in the integration.240 The youth president from the same
commune noted that while the integration had benefitted young men by providing them
with jobs, the initiative “has not had any impact on the rest of the population,” because
“what the [integres] get, they keep for themselves.”241 The same former Mayor
separately agreed that the integres “just want to collect their salaries,” rather than
contributing to the development of their native communities.242 A European employee
from a unilateral aid organization that pulled out of the North during the rebellion
similarly felt that the integration was focused more on appeasing individuals than
promoting regional economic development. He described the initiative as a pay-off to
keep the Touaregs happy, rather than a peacebuilding or development strategy.243 These
negative sentiments show that the integrations did little to address the underdevelopment
that contributed to the start of the rebellion.
Civilian-Military Relations
Despite some failures, another success of the integrations was its contribution to
improved civilian-military relations. Prior to the start of the rebellion the predominantly
black Malian army had numbered only 6,900. The absorption of 1,311 Touaregs into this
force dramatically changed its ethnic composition and the general public’s perception of
240 Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.11. 241 Interview with the youth president of a commune north of Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview VII. 1. 242 Interview with a Touareg tourist guide, Interview 1.11. Others expressed similar sentiments. 243 Interview with the director of a unilateral aid organization no longer working in northern Mali, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview VIII.2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103
the army.244 One Maure interviewed specifically noted that the inclusion of members of
their own communities “fostered Touareg trust in the military.” The military’s
fulfillment of the promised gradual reduction of troops in the North also reduced civilian-
military tensions. Despite these positive perceptions on the part of Touaregs, I uncovered
no evidence (either through interviews or secondary sources) to indicate whether these
actions had reduced prejudice against Touaregs on the part of Bambara military troops.
Special Status of the North
The designation of a “special status” for the North of Mali, along with political
decentralization helped address some of the social exclusion and loss of class power that
had frustrated the Touaregs prior to the rebellion. As part of the new decentralized
government structure, many political decisions are now put in the hands of locally elected
commune officials, allowing citizens to influence issues such as development priorities
and fund allocation. The rebellion is routinely credited with pushing forward a
decentralization process which was also driven by the government democratization
process that occurred simultaneously to the rebellion. Many academics and interview
respondents consider decentralization one of the most significant benefits of the peace
process.
Decentralization has not, however, been able to fully address the Touareg
frustration over stifled class power. A Tamashek chief in one predominantly Songhai
commune complained that the interests of Touaregs were still disregarded under this new
244 Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency Mali, in 39 (footnote #47).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104
structure, because Songhai dominate his commune and the local government.245 Other
Touaregs complained that while in theory decentralization gave communities control over
their affairs, the limited funds available at the commune level made implementing new
decisions challenging. The financial challenges of local governments and the ethnic
stratification of some communes show that decentralization of governance has thus far
not addressed some of the class and ethnic factors associated with the rebellion. In fact
the Pacte never mentions ethnicity at all, even when describing the “cultural,
geographical and socio-economic diversity existing in the Republic of Mali.”246 The
agreement also fails to elaborate on the cultural differences within the country, making it
difficult for implementation initiatives to address specific causes of the rebellion, such as
class-specific frustrations.
International Cooperation
In fulfillment of one of the Pacte components, the government of Mali did
succeed in attracting increased “international cooperation” following the rebellion. The
UN’s Trust Fund for Mali is one example.
One initiative supported by the fund was the Programme d ’Appui a la Reinsertion
socio-economique des Ex-combattants du nord Mali (PAREM - Support Program for the
Socio-economic Re-integration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali). The goal of the
program was to promote security in northern Mali by helping ex-combatants re-integrate
socially and economically into society. This was to be done by awarding ex-combatants
245 Interview with the chief of a Tamashek village, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.6. 246 Pacte National, preamble.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105
small grants to re-establish employment and livelihood activities.247 In awareness that
some ex-combatants would not be able to, or would not want to, integrate into the civil or
military service, this program aimed to facilitate employment of these young men so that
they would not simply take up arms again. 9,509 ex-combatants received roughly $600 -
$700 each. This money was used to buy livestock and agricultural tools, to invest in
commerce activities,• or to pursue other livelihoods of their choosing. 9 4 8
The extent of PAREM’s work is impressive, and the program has received some
worthy praise. Poulton and ag Youssouf feel that the program’s “existence has been
essential to the process of making peace.” In one interview with ag Youssouf, he
described the benefits of the program as one of three most positive outcomes of the
rebellion (along with hastening national decentralization and integrating ex-combatants
into civil and military service). The program helped demilitarize the North, he claimed,
and furthermore put money back into the economy, as recipients of the grants built
houses and bought merchandise .249 One ex-combatant told me that he appreciated the
PAREM, because he was tired of the “military life,” and this program gave him another
viable option.250
Despite this successful mobilization of international funds for peacebuilding, the
PAREM did not fulfill the Pacte request that these international partnerships “help
247 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 124. 248 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 127, Interviews by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interviews 11.14, II.2, II.3. 249 Interview with Ibrahim ag Youssouf, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.14. 250 Interview with Touareg ex-combatant, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106
redress the economic, social and cultural disadvantage of the North of Mali.”251 The
narrow focus on restoring individuals and their previous livelihoods limited broader and
more long-term benefits that could have been achieved through the program.
The lack of training provided by the PAREM is one example of its limited scope.
Poulton and ag Youssouf explain that the program decided early on that training was
relatively unnecessary considering that most grant recipients were returning to existing
work.252 The 39.1% of funding dedicated to projects relating to the “Livestock” sector,
versus the 13.2% used for the “Agriculture” sector, does indeed imply that many of these
former herders were returning to their previous lifestyle. Poulton and ag Youssouf,
however, assume two things in defending the PAREM’s decision not to fund training.
One, they assume that the ex-combatants’ return to their previous livelihoods was their
preferred livelihood choice. And two, they assume that return to these activities was
beneficial to northern stability. In fact, ex-combatants may have requested loans for
familiar work because they were aware that there was no funding for training in new
initiatives. What good is a loan for farming equipment if you don’t know how to use it?
Additionally, given that the nomadic herding lifestyle had contributed to great personal
and economic loss for Touaregs during the Sahel droughts, and that this in turn
contributed to the start of the rebellion, PAREM’s encouragement of a return to this
251 Pacte National, Title V.60. 252 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 126- 127. Indeed the program budget indicates that only . 1% o f the total budget went to training.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107
vulnerable lifestyle seems to have disregarded the need to address root causes in this
peacebuilding initiative.253
While Poulton and ag Youssouf claim that most ex-combatants needed help only
in returning to previous livelihood strategies, the choice of many Touaregs to sedintarize
in fixed villages following the rebellion is evidence that Touareg saw a need to change
their lifestyles and livelihoods to prevent future suffering. When asked in interviews
about their biggest community needs, several Touaregs told me that what they needed
most was agricultural tools and knowledge. “We are in a transition period,” said one ex
mayor,
Situations have forced us to sedintarize. ... We had to leave a life [of herding] that we knew well, and loved, and we had to start a new life that we knew nothing o f ... [W]e don ’tyet understand our lives. ... We don’t know how to farm. We need some support and supervision.25*
PAREM’s decision not to provide training was shortsighted given these changing
livelihood needs.
The program also failed to consider the ethnic tensions that had grown during the
rebellion. Despite the fact that Ganda Koy did benefit from the PAREM, (of the 3,294
ex-combatants that participated in the region of Tombouctou, roughly 1,000 were
Tamasheks, 1,000 Maure, and 1,000 Songhai - former Ganda Koy)255 several Songhai
253 While one does not need to be nomadic to raise animals, this is the traditional herding strategy known to Touaregs. Implementation o f non-nomadic herding strategies would constitute a shift in livelihood strategies, rather than a return to existing work. 254 Interview with a deputy mayor, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.5. 255 Poulton, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking, 127; Interview with Touareg nomads outside of Tombouctou, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 11.14; Interview with a former Touareg employee o f the PAREM, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview II.2; Interview with another former Touareg employee o f the PAREM, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108
felt dissatisfied with the allocation of resources to Touaregs. This stemmed from the
Songhai perception that the Touaregs feel a sense of entitlement without obligation to
work. Two Songhai interviewed together described how the residents of a near-by
Tamashek village “gained a lot [from PAREM grants and other assistance], but never lift
a daba.”256 “Their Bellahs cultivate for them.”257 “[Y]ou never see a Tamashek out in
the water cultivating his rice. ... [They] know nothing about agriculture. ... They have
fat bellies and big turbans,” but do no work.258 The sentiments these Songhai expressed
during our interview were designed to show me that development assistance was wasted
when given to Touaregs. From my perspective, however, Touareg reluctance to farm
proves the point that inclusion of agricultural training in the PAREM would have
benefitted newly sedintarized Touaregs (who even these Songhai unwittingly admit
needed technical advice). Such training would not only have improved Touareg technical
knowledge, but could have also helped reduce the on-going patron-client relationships
between Touaregs and their ex-slaves. I showed in the “Causes” chapter of this paper
that government efforts to abolish the use of “slaves” caused Touareg backlash and
frustration over loss of class power. Facilitating alternate Touareg livelihoods could
eliminate some of the caste hierarchies which are based in large part on livelihoods. This
would promote equitable community development and address one of the root causes of
the rebellion. The PAREM should have taken this approach. /
256 A daba is a crude farming tool, similar to a short hoe. 237 Interview with a university-educated Songhai, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV. 11. 258 Interview with a Songhai chauffeur for a European unilateral organization, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview IV. 13, A fat belly is a status symbol in Mali, because wealth affords people the option to eat so much that they become fat, and it exempts them from the manual field labor that keeps the poor skinny. Turbans are also a way that Touregs display their wealth, as fabric is purchased by the meter. For more on the significance of the Toureg turban, see Jeremy Keenan, The Tuareg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109
Some interview respondents also criticized the program’s inability to address the
northern underdevelopment that contributed to the start of the rebellion. They felt that
the grants constituted financial “gifts,” rather than community development. Poulton and
ag Youssouf acknowledge this point, but ultimately find that the positives outweighed
these potential negatives. The European employee from the unilateral aid organization,
however, harshly criticized the re-insertion program. The program, he said, awarded
large sums of money mainly to “elite” northern Touaregs. This “did not benefit the
Touareg people [as a whole]. ... [T]he situation for the Touareg people has not changed
at all [as a result of the PAREM]. ... [They] are still very poor.” He went on to imply
that the government continues to give these elites money under the table to this day as a
way of keeping a lid on tensions.259
A Maure who had worked with the PAREM in the distribution of grants also
criticized the program for its inability to foster deep community development. He
claimed that the influx of finances to ex-combatants helped reduce criminal behavior at
first, but when the money ran out, people returned to crime.260 Considering that these
criticisms come from prominent, well educated individuals with deep knowledge of the
peace implementation process, they call into question the success of the program. The
grants appear to have targeted the economic challenges of individuals, without addressing
regional underdevelopment. Failure to consider this larger root cause of the rebellion
259 Interview with a Caucasian employee of a European unilateral organization no longer working in northern Mali, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview VIII.2.1 frequently heard similar rumors from the Songhai population, but was unable to corroborate them. The 2006 and 2007 events in Kidal relate to this point, as I will explain in the conclusion. 260 Interview with a Touareg former employee o f the PAREM, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview 1.9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110
meant that the PAREM was not a long-term peacebuilding success.261 While the standard
of living in northern Mali has increased since the end of the rebellion, the North is still
significantly more impoverished than the South, and infrastructure is still severely
underdeveloped. To help mitigate some of the unavoidable climactic problems in the
North, more needs to be done to address underdevelopment in this area of the country.
Independent Commission of Inquiry
Despite substantial Pacte detail regarding the work, timeframe, and funding for
the Commission of Inquiry, this initiative was never implemented. Specifically, it was
intended that the commission would,
Inquire into all events which have taken place in Mali with relation to the problems o f the North, specifically: crimes committed against the civil populations in their physical and moral persons as well as their properties, violations o f the environment and destruction o f livestock, theft, pillage and every act o f vandalism and damage. The Commission will work to define the responsibility for such acts, their consequences, to evaluate the damages and compensation due to victims 262
While this mandate does not specifically address ethnically-driven violence, this inquiry
could have addressed the ethnic divisions that grew during the rebellion, fueling the
conflict. The sensitivity over these ethnic factors is likely what impeded the political will
needed to implement the commission.
Ten years after the end of the rebellion, ethnic tensions still run very high, and
despite improvements since 1996,1 found that distrust between the northern black
261 The Pacte did call for increased development attention for the North, and many NGOs began work in the area following the rebellion, but neither the Malian government, nor this UN program had a coherent approach to designed to improve the this underdevelopment problem. 262 Pacte National, Title 11.14, Mandate of the Commission. 263 While Poulton and ag Youssouf don’t touch on these ethnic factors in their discussion o f the Commission, they do note the lack of political will to implement it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I l l
population and the Touaregs is still worse today than it was prior to the start of the
rebellion.
Implementation of this Pacte initiative, even at this late date could help stabilize
the region. Several Touareg interview respondents described a lingering frustration at the
Songhai and military denial of the violence that occurred during the rebellion. “If we just
knew where our families were buried, we could have peace,” explained more than one
Touareg. For their part, some Songhai are equally frustrated by Touareg assertions that
the combatants killed no innocents during the rebellion, only attacking government and
military interests. This opinion that all Touareg thefts and killings of Songhai civilians
were perpetrated by bandits un related to the rebel groups is both unlikely and irrelevant,
because rebels’ actions were not systematically monitored by commanders (leaving the
door open to menacing acts), and acts of banditry (that clearly grew out of the insecurity
fostered by the rebellion) had an equally negative consequence on the civilian population
as did rebel violence.
Implementation of this commission would require incredible political will on the
part of the Malian government. To ensure that this initiative would promote healing,
rather than destabilizing the region it would, however, require intense government
planning and cooperation with the international aid community. If such commitment
could be garnered, the Independent Commission of Inquiry could fill a hole in the
peacebuilding initiatives implemented to date.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112
Peacebuilding Conclusions
By 1998, Mali had received $272,755,683 of $524,249,059 promised for
peacebuilding by the international community.264 These funds were successfully used to
demobilize combatants, promote northern development and governmental autonomy, and
reduce the military presence in the North. As a result, root causes of the rebellion have
been reduced. Not all of these root causes have, however, been addressed, and peace
implementation has been incomplete. These factors must be resolved to ensure future
peace.
264 Rob in-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, La Paix de Tombouctou: Gestion Democratique, Developpement et Construction Africaine de la Paix(Geneve : Publication des Nations Unies, 1998), 341, Appendix 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN MALI
This paper has addressed the causes of the Touareg Rebellion and the
peacebuilding that brought an end to this violence. Successes in peacebuilding and peace
implementation have kept northern Mali free from open violence since 1996, reducing
the probability of a return to conflict. Despite these positive signs, peace is still
precarious. Root causes not addressed by peacebuilding strategies leave open the
possibility of a return to conflict.
I have asserted that the causes of the rebellion fall into two categories: causes that
fostered Touareg frustration with the Malian central government, and causes that
transitioned an isolated movement in Kidal into a full-scale rebellion across the North.
Administrative policies altering the northern labor market and Touareg caste structure
fostered these frustrations. Government neglect for northern development and
mismanagement of the Sahel droughts also contributed to Touareg grievances. Resulting
drought-induced migrations exposed young Touaregs to new mentalities, bringing these
frustrations to a fore and altering Touareg social structure. With a new mentality and
military training, frustrated Touaregs were susceptible to revolutionary ideas.
Two factors caused these frustrations to come to fruition. When the military
began to attack civilian Touaregs in Gao and Tombouctou, Touaregs who had previously
remained neutral towards the events in Kidal, were motivated to join their ethnic cousins
in the fight against the government. Wanting to ensure victory, Touareg leaders in Kidal
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114
encouraged this new resentment against the government, and infiltrated Gao and
Tombouctou to attract new recruits. Both the military and the Kidal leaders used ethnic
divisions to fuel their causes. The military turned Songhai against their Touareg
neighbors with assertions that the former slave-holders were looking for new black
captives. The Kidal leaders chose to appeal only to Touaregs in their fight against the
government, rather than to all northerners suffering from northern underdevelopment.
These two factors expanded the rebellion from a small, regionally isolated movement, to
a full-scale rebellion. These factors also caused the conflict to shift from a Touareg fight
against the government to an inter-ethnic conflict between Touaregs and Songhai.
This ethnic division has left a scar on northern Mali that has not been adequately
addressed by the Pacte National. Initiatives such as the integration of ex-combatants into
the Malian military and civil service have helped overcome the social exclusion of
Touaregs, but have left impoverished northern Songhai resentful of the “preferential”
treatment received by Touaregs following the rebellion. Songhai additionally feel that
the PAREM socio-economic reinsertion program favored Touaregs in its allocation of
post-conflict grants. Furthermore, decentralization of government has helped to put
power back in the hands of some Touaregs disaffected by loss of caste power, but ethnic
imbalances within local-level communes continue to frustrate some Touaregs.
Peace implementation has also failed to fully address northern underdevelopment.
While conditions have improved since the end of the rebellion, includingan influx of
international development projects, the standard of living in northern Mali is still well
below the rest of the country. As Touaregs have begun to give up their nomadic ways
and settle into farming villages, the development challenges for the area become more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115
complex. Not only is citizens’ access to running water, electricity, schools, and
healthcare insufficient, but Touaregs now find they are ill-equipped to handle their new
lifestyle. The PAREM’s failure to provide training in new livelihood strategies reduced
the program’s ability to address the changing development needs of this population.
The Pacte's inability to address all the root causes of the rebellion, and its
incomplete implementation of stipulated provisions make northern Mali vulnerable
increased violence. Colonel Hassan Fagaga’s May 2006 military defection and attack,
and the 2007 attacks against the Malian and U.S. military are examples of the precarious
nature of the situation. Thus far, the military has taken a tempered approach to the
situation and casualties have been minimal.265 In response to the 2006 events, the Malian
government quickly settled on a new peace agreement with Touaregs in Kidal. Signed
July 4, 2006, the Accord d ’Alger is similar in nature to the Pacte, but focuses exclusively
on the security and social, cultural, and economic development of Kidal.
The restraint of the military indicates that the current situation may not devolve
into the same level of violence as the 1990s. The Accord d Alger's focus on Kidal also
shows an awareness of the specific needs and vulnerability of this region. The exclusion
of still impoverished Tombouctou and Gao from the new agreement could, however,
spark resentment among Touaregs of these regions.266 The attacks of 2007 indicate that
the new Accord has not been properly implemented or is possibly insufficient to address
the situation. The support of Iyad ag Ghaly and Hama ag Bibi, two former leaders of the
265 Les Evenements de 23 Mai, “L’attaque a faite 4 morts, selon Fagaga,”Le Democrate, Special Juillet 2006 ; BBCAifique.com, “Rebellion touareg: 1'Algerie soutient le Mali,” November 26, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.Uk/french/news/story/2007/l 1/071126_algeria_mali.shtml (accessed December 4,2007). 266 Interview responses were mixed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116
MPA rebel group, for the 2006 events is additionally worrisome, although there has not
yet been any indication that the current unrest is spreading to other regions.
Residents of the Tombouctou region are acutely aware of northern Mali’s
instability. While many interview respondents described their personal commitment to
peace and their realization of the detriment of war, several also noted that future
generations may forget these lessons. If regional development and employment
opportunities are not improved, they say that today’s Touareg youth risk revisiting the
frustration and violence experienced in the 1990s.
Lingering ethnic tensions must also be addressed to avoid a future return to
violence. Following the May 2006 attack in Kidal, the region of Tombouctou was
immediately polarized. Rumors of immanent “rebel” attacks circulated wildly within the
Songhai community. Despite 500 kilometers distance between Tombouctou and the
attacks, these rumors were so strong that I questioned my own safety and altered my
research schedule accordingly. Touaregs also feared for their safety, wondering if there
would be a return to Ganda Koy attacks. Several actually fled back across the
Mauritanian border as they had done in the 1990s.267 Thankfully, violence did not return
to Tombouctou, but the population’s quick reversion to rebellion-era distrust shows the
volatility of the situation.
A careful implementation of the Pacte's Independent Commission of Inquiry
could address some of the lingering ethnic distrust, but caution must be made not to
exacerbate grievances. This could be a successful peacebuilding in the North. NGOs
267 Interview with a Black-Tamashek, commune-level government official, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview III. 10; Interview with a Caucasian director of a unilateral aid organization, interview by author, Tombouctou Region, Mali, Fall 2006, interview VIII.3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117
currently working in northern Mali must also become involved peace and reconciliation
efforts. Currently, most existing projects focus on schooling, healthcare, and access to
water. While improvements in these areas will help reduce the possibility of a return to
conflict, more creative initiatives should work towards community inter-ethnic and inter
regional reconciliation. Initiatives in these areas, combined with the continued integrity
of the Malian government and local peacemakers will help ensure peace in northern Mali
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS’
DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN
(Numbers represent interview totals, not individual respondents. Group interviews are counted as one interview.)
Cercle Tombouctou Niafunke Goundam Bamako Total 51 24 (13 Lere) 5 8 interviewed Urban/ 30-Urban 12-Urban 4-Urban 8-Urban Rural 21-Rural 13-Rural 1-Rural Ethnicity 22-Maure 8-Tamashek 3-Songhai 4-Caucasian (in order of 11-Tamashek 7-Songhai 2- 2-Tamashek largest 9-Black-Tamasheks or 6-B lack-T amaskek Tamashek 1-Songhai ethnicity) Black-Maures 2-Bamabara 1-unknown 3-unknown 1-Peulh 2-Bambara 1 -unknown 1-Songhai 1-Peulh 1-Caucasian 1 -Mixed ethnicity Gender 42-Male 23-Male 5-Male 7-Male 9-Female 2-Female 1-Female Occupation 23-“Average 15- “Average 5- 8-Employees citizens”268 citizens” “Average of 7-Employees of 4-Village or Nomadic citizens” NGO/Civil NGO/Civil Society/ Fraction Chiefs Society/ Unilateral orgs. etc. 2-School Directors Unilateral 6- Intellectuals/ 1-Gov’t official orgs. etc. Prominent members 1-Intellectual/ of society Prominent member 5- Gov’t officials269 of society 5-Village or Nomadic 1- Employee of Fraction Chiefs NGO/Civil 4-School Directors Society/ Unilateral 1-Other orgs. etc.
268 “Average citizens include: herders, farmers, women’s association presidents, youth association presidents etc. 269 Government officials include commune level officials, and retired commune level officials. 118
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF MALIAN HISTORY
(Timeline focuses on northern Mali and the Touareg Rebellion)
1760s: The French travel from Senegal western Mali, arriving in Kayes 1883: The French settle in Bamako 1894: Resistance to the French in Tombouctou (Conflicts between French colonizers and Touaregs in the Sahara Desert continue from 1895 to 1917) 1898: The French occupy Sikasso and Gao (Under French occupation Mali is named the French Soudan.) 1916: French slaughter Firhoun, a Tamashek leader renowned for his colonial resistance, and 750 of his people in the Forest of Anderamboukane on Mali’s Niger border. 1957: France presents the idea of the Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS) to Touareg populations in Mali, Algeria, Chad, and Niger 1960: Malian Independence from France April - September: Initial attempt at joint statehood with Senegal (the Mali Federation) September 22: Mali separates from Senegal; Modibo Keita President 1962: Creation of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), commitment to use CFA franc Creation of the Malian franc; Mali has to cede its place in WAMU 1963: 1st Touareg rebellion 1967: Mali signs economic accord with France Mali requests, but is denied reentry into WAMU 1968: Coup overthrows Modibo Keita Moussa Traore gains control of the government Socialist, Military dictatorship 1968 - ‘74: Sahel Droughts 1974: Traore establishes one party autocracy [Democratique de Peuple Malien (UPDM)] 1979: Traore enacts new constitution 1980: Mu‘ammar Qaddafi declares Libya as the homeland of the Touaregs and offer Libyan citizenship to all Touareg immigrants 1980 -‘85: Sahel Droughts Many Malian Touaregs migrate to Libya 1984: Mali rejoins WAMU Abandonment of Malian franc, reversion to use of CFA 1985: Road opens between Mopti and Gao 1986: Libya tries (unsuccessfully) to annex Chad
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120
1988: Creation of the Movement Populaire de Liberation de l’Azawad (MPLA). Soviets leave Afghanistan, Islamic Legion disbanded Many Malian Touaregs leave Libya and return to Mali 1990: June 27: Touareg attacks on Menaka and Tidermene in northern Mali. Considered the start date of the 2nd Touareg rebellion Moussa Traore declares state of emergency and responds violently against to the Touaregs. Student protests in Bamako against the central government, (unrelated to the attacks in the North) 1991: Jan6: Accords de Tamanrasset signed by Malian government and the two primary rebel groups (at that time), the Movement Populaire de I ’Azaxvad (MPA) and the Front Islamique Arabe de I ’Azaxvad (FIAA) March 23-26: Attacks on the presidential palace in Bamako (unrelated to the events in the North) Coup d’etat by Malian military led by Alpha Toumani Toure (ATT) ousts President Moussa Traore ATT becomes president of Mali’s transitional government Violence resumes in the North, including the Dec 11 FIAA attacks in the city of Tombouctou Work to create constitution Mali’s new democracy 1992: April 11: Pacte National peace agreement signed between Malian government and the newly unified rebel movement Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de I ‘Azaouad (MFUA) June 8: Alpha Oumar Konare, Mali’s first democratically elected president, takes office December: Konare visits the North to encourage support for the Pacte 1993: Feb: First integration of ex-combatants into Malian Army 1994: Creation of the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) Devaluation of the CFA (50%) May 19: Creation of the Movement Patriotique Ganda Koy (MPGK) October: Swiss Consul and two Malian colleagues killed in Niafunke. Integrated Touareg ex-combatants kill their military counterparts in Menaka, Tonka, and Kharrous. 1995: Mali becomes World Trade Organization Member 1996: March 27: Flame du Paix arms burning ceremony in the city of Tombouctou marks the end of the Touareg Rebellion 1997: Oumar Konare is re-elected for a second term as Mali’s president March 24-27 - “Week of Peace,” Anniversary of the flame of peace. May 25 - Martin Buccumi, UNHCR delegate in Kidal was kidnapped and beaten. 2002: ATT is elected as Mali’s second democratically elected president 2004: Locust infestations destroy crops in the North 2006: May 23: Colonel Hassan Fagaga, an integrated Touareg ex-combatant defects from his post in Kidal, attacking a military base, and stealing arms July 4: The Accords d ’Alger signed between the Malian government and the Alliance Democratique du 23 Mai 2006
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121
2007: April: ATT is re-elected for a second term as Mali’s president August 26-27: Touaregs capture of civilian and military convoys on the Mali side of the Niger border and take hostages September 13: Touaregs use AK-47s to attack a U.S. military aircraft distributing food supplies to Malian troops in Tin-Zaouaten, a border town in Kidal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Touaregs and the Touareg Rebellion
Albin, Michel, Paroles de Touaregs (Paris, France: Carnet de Sagesses (1997).
Alert News, “ANALYSIS-Tuareg rebels in southern Sahara no Islamist threat,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L23592459.htm (accessed December 3, 2007).
BBCAfrique.com, “Rebellion touareg: l'Algerie soUtient le Mali,” November 26, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.Uk/french/news/story/2007/l 1/071126_algeria_mali.shtml (accessed December 4, 2007).
BBC News, “Tuareg conflict spreads to Mali,” August 28, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/alfica/6966754.stm (accessed December 3,2007). BBC News, “Mali boosts army to fight Tuareg,” September 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/6999669.stm (accessed December 3, 2007).
BBC News, “Tuareg leaders discuss Mali peace,” November 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7078573.stm (accessed December 3, 2007).
Les Evenements de 23 Mai, “L’attaque a faite 4 morts, selon Fagaga,” Le Democrate, Special Juillet 2006.
“Warden Message,” August 29, 2007, Embassy of the United States of America, Bamako, Mali.
Gremont, Charles, Andre Marty, Rhissa ag Mossa and Younoussa Hamara Toure, Les Liens Sociaux au Nord-Mali: Entre fleuve et Dunes (Paris, France: Editions Karthala et IRAM, 2004).
Hammer, Joshua, “Still here,” The New Republic Vol. 213, Iss. 20 (Nov 13, 1995): 12.
Hureiki, Jacques. Essai sur les Origines des Touaregs (Paris : Editions Karthala, 2003).
Keenan, Jeremy, The Tuareg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977).
Keenan, Jeremy, The Lesser Gods o f the Sahara (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004). 122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123
Keita (Lieutenant Colonel), Kalifa, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1998).
Keita, Naffet, “De l’identitaire au probleme de la territorialite. L’OCRS et les societes Kel Tamacheq du Mali,” in Mali-France : Regards sur une Histoire Partagee (Paris, France: Editions Karthala, 2005), 91-122.
Lode, Kare. Syntheses du Processus des Rencontres Intercommunautaires du Nord Mali (Norway: Stavanger Misjonshogskolensforlag, 1996).
Mekenkamp, Monique, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen, eds., Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview o f Conflict Prevention and Management Activities (Utrecht, Netherlands: European Platform Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999).
Noakes, Greg, “Central Sahara Fighting Pits Tuareg Rebels Against North African Armies,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs Vol. X, Iss. 8 (Mar 31, 1992): 52.
Pietroski, Michele and June Angole, “Cessation of Touareg Repression: Respite or Resolution?” Africa Today 38, 1 (First Quarter 1991): 41-47.
Poulton, Robin-Edward and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace o f Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998).
Poulton, Robin-Edward and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, La Paix de Tombouctou: Gestion democratique, developpement et construction africaine de la paix (Geneve : Publication des Nations Unies, 1998).
Sanogo, Salif, “Mali: liberation de soldats enleves,” BBC Afrique, Bamako, August 30, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/news/story/2007/08/070830_malirebel.shtml (accessed December 3,2007).
Siegel, Robert, “Tuareg Refugees Leave Mali Due to Rebels,” All Things Considered, NPR (July 20, 1992); Radio Transcript: 1.
United Nations Development Program, “The Malian Experience in Combating Poverty and Conflict Management,” fromthe Fifth Forum on Governance in Africa, held in Maputo, Mozambique, (May 23-25, 2002) www.undp.org/rba/pubs/agf5/AGF%20V%20Mali%20CP.pdf (accessed January 2006).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124
United Nations Development Program, Reforming Technical Cooperation and Capacity for Development, “To Make Peace, Support Civil Society and Keep out of Sight: Technical Cooperation and Peacemaking in Mali,” United Nations Development Program, http://mirror.undp.org/capacity/cases/insights/mali.htm (accessed December 3, 2007).
Upsalla University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Conflict Summary: Mali,” Upsalla University, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=64 (accessed December 3,2007).
Upsalla University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Conflict Database “Mali,” Upsalla University, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictInformation.php?years=l 990%2C 1991 %2 C1992%2C 1993%2C 1994%2C 1995%2C 1996&bcID=64&variables%5B%5D= 1 &variables%5B%5D=2&variables%5B%5D=3&variables%5B%5D=4&variables %5B%5D=5&variables%5B%5D=6&variables%5B%5D=7&variables%5B%5D =8&variables%5B%5D=9&variables%5B%5D=T0&button=+Search+ (accessed December 3, 2007).
Malian History. Politics, and Governance
Bingen, R. James, “Overview - The Malian Path to Democracy and Development,” in Democracy and Development in Mali eds. R. James Bingen, David Robinson, and John M. Staatz, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 245-269.
Bourdet, Yves, “Economic Reforms and the Malian Economy,” African Development XXVII, no. 1&2 (2002): 25-61.
Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Mali,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm (accessed December 3,2007).
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche pour le Democratic et le Developpement Economique et Social. Le Processus Democratique Malien de 1960 a nos Jours (Bamako, Mali: Editions Donniya)
Crum, David Leith, “Mali and the U.M.O.A.: a Case Study of Economic Integration,” Journal o f Modern African Studies 22, no. 3 (1984): 469-486.
Franke, Richard W. and Barbara H. Chasin, Seeds o f Famine: Ecological Destruction and the Development Dilemma in the West African Sahel (Montclair, NY: Allanheld, Osmun & co. Publishers, 1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125
Hazard, JohnN., “Marxian Socialism in Africa: The Case of Mali,” Comparative Politics (October 1969): 1-15.
Housouba, Mohomodou. Bagoundie Blues (Nantes, France: Librairie l’Atlante, 2003).
Jones, William, Planning and Economic Policy: Socialist Mali and her Neighbors (Washington, DC: Three Continents Press, 1976).
Klaus, Ernst, Tradition and Progress in the African Village: Non-Capitalist Transformation o f Rural Communities in Mali (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976).
Kounta, Albakaye Ousmane, Les Sans Reperes (Brinon-sur-Sauldre, France: Editions Grandvaux 2006).
Lateef, Noel V. Crisis in the Sahel: A Case Study in Development Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1980).
Mariko, Amidou, Memoires d ’un Crocodile (Mali: Editions Donniya, 2001).
Martin, Guy, “Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968,” Canadian Journal o f African Studies X, no. 1 (1976): 23-47.
Painter, Diann Holland, “Malian Socialism Reconsidered,” ASA Review of Books 4 (1978): 75-78.
Rawson, David, “Dimensions of Decentralization in Mali,” in Democracy and Development in Mali eds. R. James Bingen, David Robinson, and John M. Staatz, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 265-376.
Republique du Mali and UNICEF, “Mission de Decentralisation et des Reformes Institutionnelles,” from Cartographie des infrastructures communales du Mali, (Meylan, France: Fox Media and ARP Developpement, 2001).
Somerville, Carolyn M., Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade o f Development Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
Yengroff, Richard and Moctar Kone, “Mali: Democracy and Political Change,” in Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. John Wiseman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 45-70.
The World Fact Book: Mali, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/print/ml.html (accessed December 3, 2007).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126
Generic Literature
Alesina, Alberto, Amaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg, “Fractionalization” Journal o f Economic Growth 8, 2003: 155-194.
Barry, Brian, “Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and the distribution of Income,” Centre for Analysis o f Social Exclusion, London School o f Economics CASE/12 (August 1998).
Robert Blanton, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow, “Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa,” Journal o f Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Jul., 2001): 473-491.
Brown, Michael, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Brown et al Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 3-25.
Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, mart Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).
Easterly, William, Roberta Gatti and Sergio Kurlat, “Development, Democracy, and Mass Killings,” DRI Working Paper No. 10, Journal of Economic Growth, forthcoming.
Easterly, William and Ross Levine, “Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics 12, 4 (1997): 1203-1250.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (March 2003): 75-90.
Forbes, Hugh Donald Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997)
Forbes, Hugh Donald, "Toward a Science of Ethnic Conflict?" Journal o f Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 2003): 172-177.
Gagnon, V.P., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 130-166.
Gore, Charles, “Introduction: Markets, Citizenship and Social Exclusion,” in Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses, Gerry Rodgers, Charles Gore, and Jose Figueiredo, eds. (Geneva: International Labor Organization Publications, 1995).
Gurr, Ted Robert, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” Foreign Affairs vol. 79, no. 3 (2000): 52-64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127
Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoodie and Donald Rothchild, “Stabalizing Peace After Civil war,” An Investigation of Some Key Variables,” International Organization vol. 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 183-208.
Henderson, Errol A. and J. David Singer, “Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946- 92,” Journal o f Peace Research, vol. 37, No. 3; May, 2000: 275-299. Holsti, Kalevi, The State, War and the State o f War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Hoodie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," Journal o f Peace Research vol. 40, no. 3 (May 2003): 303-320.
Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
Kaplan, Robert, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994).
Lake, David and Don Rothchild eds. The International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes o f War and Peace, ed. Betts, Richard K. (New York: Pearson Education, 2005), 318-330.
Miguel, Edward, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal o f Political Economy vol. 112, no. 4 (2004).
Montalvo, Jose G. and Marta Reynal-Querol, “Ethnic diversity and economic development,” Journal o f Development Economics 16 (2005): 293- 323.
O’Brien, David and Arjan de Haan, Deprivation in the North and South: An Annotated Bibliography on Poverty and Social Exclusion (Brighton, Sussex, England: Poverty Research Unit at Sussex and Institute of Development Studies, 1998).
Paris, Roland. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Stephen, John, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation o f Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riennier Publishers, 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128
Verwimp, Philip, “An economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide Micro-level evidence from Rwanda,” Journal o f Development Economics 11 (2005): 297- 323.
Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96,” Journal o f Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3. (Aug., 1997): 339-358. Wood, Elizabeth, “Civil Wars: What We Don’t Know,” Global Governance 9(2003): 247-260.
Research Design/ Methods
Devereux, Stephen and John Hoddinott, eds. Fieldwork in Developing Countries Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riennier Publishers, 1993).
Joseph A. Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005).
Regina Scheyvens and Donovan Storey, Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2003).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.