Splitfs: Reducing Software Overhead in File Systems for Persistent Memory
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Upgrading Cfengine Nova a Cfengine Special Topics Handbook
Upgrading CFEngine Nova A CFEngine Special Topics Handbook CFEngine AS This document describes how software updates work in CFEngine Nova. ¨ © Copyright c 2010- CFEngine AS 1 v i Table of Contents What does upgrading mean? ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Why do I need to upgrade?::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 How does upgrading work? ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 How can I do phased deployment? :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 What if I have multiple operating system platforms? ::::::::::::::::::: 4 How do Nova policies update if I already have my own policy? ::::::::: 4 Appendix A Manual package upgrade commands ::::::: 5 3 What does upgrading mean? A software upgrade involves obtaining a new version of the CFEngine software from soft- ware.CFEngine.com and installing it in place of the old. When software is updated, the previous version of the software is retained. From version 1.1 of CFEngine Nova, CFEngine is fully capable of managing its own updates ¨ and service restarts with a minimum of manual work on the policy server. Existing users of version 1.0 will need to upgrade the software manually on the affected sys- tems, or use the existing CFEngine to assist in the manual process. Please contact CFEngine Professional Services for for assistance (see Appendix). © Why do I need to upgrade? Bug fixes and new features are included in new software releases. To gain access to these fixes, you need to upgrade the software. Changes to the standard Community Open Promise Body Library might make use of new features, so upgrading brings you access to these new methods. How does upgrading work? CFEngine packages its software in operating sytsem compatible package formats (RPM, PKG, MSI, etc). -
Trusted Docker Containers and Trusted Vms in Openstack
Trusted Docker Containers and Trusted VMs in OpenStack Raghu Yeluri Abhishek Gupta Outline o Context: Docker Security – Top Customer Asks o Intel’s Focus: Trusted Docker Containers o Who Verifies Trust ? o Reference Architecture with OpenStack o Demo o Availability o Call to Action Docker Overview in a Slide.. Docker Hub Lightweight, open source engine for creating, deploying containers Provides work flow for running, building and containerizing apps. Separates apps from where they run.; Enables Micro-services; scale by composition. Underlying building blocks: Linux kernel's namespaces (isolation) + cgroups (resource control) + .. Components of Docker Docker Engine – Runtime for running, building Docker containers. Docker Repositories(Hub) - SaaS service for sharing/managing images Docker Images (layers) Images hold Apps. Shareable snapshot of software. Container is a running instance of image. Orchestration: OpenStack, Docker Swarm, Kubernetes, Mesos, Fleet, Project Docker Layers Atomic, Lattice… Docker Security – 5 key Customer Asks 1. How do you know that the Docker Host Integrity is there? o Do you trust the Docker daemon? o Do you trust the Docker host has booted with Integrity? 2. How do you verify Docker Container Integrity o Who wrote the Docker image? Do you trust the image? Did the right Image get launched? 3. Runtime Protection of Docker Engine & Enhanced Isolation o How can Intel help with runtime Integrity? 4. Enterprise Security Features – Compliance, Manageability, Identity authentication.. Etc. 5. OpenStack as a single Control Plane for Trusted VMs and Trusted Docker Containers.. Intel’s Focus: Enable Hardware-based Integrity Assurance for Docker Containers – Trusted Docker Containers Trusted Docker Containers – 3 focus areas o Launch Integrity of Docker Host o Runtime Integrity of Docker Host o Integrity of Docker Images Today’s Focus: Integrity of Docker Host, and how to use it in OpenStack. -
Providing User Security Guarantees in Public Infrastructure Clouds
1 Providing User Security Guarantees in Public Infrastructure Clouds Nicolae Paladi, Christian Gehrmann, and Antonis Michalas Abstract—The infrastructure cloud (IaaS) service model offers improved resource flexibility and availability, where tenants – insulated from the minutiae of hardware maintenance – rent computing resources to deploy and operate complex systems. Large-scale services running on IaaS platforms demonstrate the viability of this model; nevertheless, many organizations operating on sensitive data avoid migrating operations to IaaS platforms due to security concerns. In this paper, we describe a framework for data and operation security in IaaS, consisting of protocols for a trusted launch of virtual machines and domain-based storage protection. We continue with an extensive theoretical analysis with proofs about protocol resistance against attacks in the defined threat model. The protocols allow trust to be established by remotely attesting host platform configuration prior to launching guest virtual machines and ensure confidentiality of data in remote storage, with encryption keys maintained outside of the IaaS domain. Presented experimental results demonstrate the validity and efficiency of the proposed protocols. The framework prototype was implemented on a test bed operating a public electronic health record system, showing that the proposed protocols can be integrated into existing cloud environments. Index Terms—Security; Cloud Computing; Storage Protection; Trusted Computing F 1 INTRODUCTION host level. While support data encryption at rest is offered by several cloud providers and can be configured by tenants Cloud computing has progressed from a bold vision to mas- in their VM instances, functionality and migration capabil- sive deployments in various application domains. However, ities of such solutions are severely restricted. -
Ein Wilder Ritt Distributionen
09/2016 Besichtigungstour zu den skurrilsten Linux-Distributionen Titelthema Ein wilder Ritt Distributionen 28 Seit den frühen 90ern schießen die Linux-Distributionen wie Pilze aus dem Boden. Das Linux-Magazin blickt zurück auf ein paar besonders erstaunliche oder schräge Exemplare. Kristian Kißling www.linux-magazin.de © Antonio Oquias, 123RF Oquias, © Antonio Auch wenn die Syntax anderes vermu- samer Linux-Distributionen aufzustellen, Basis für Evil Entity denkt (Grün!), liegt ten lässt, steht der Name des klassischen denn in den zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten falsch. Tatsächlich basierte Evil Entity auf Linux-Tools »awk« nicht für Awkward kreuzte eine Menge von ihnen unseren Slackware und setzte auf einen eher düs- (zu Deutsch etwa „tolpatschig“), sondern Weg. Während einige davon noch putz- ter anmutenden Enlightenment-Desktop für die Namen seiner Autoren, nämlich munter in die Zukunft blicken, ist bei an- (Abbildung 3). Alfred Aho, Peter Weinberger und Brian deren nicht recht klar, welche Zielgruppe Als näher am Leben erwies sich der Fo- Kernighan. Kryptische Namen zu geben sie anpeilen oder ob sie überhaupt noch kus der Distribution, der auf dem Ab- sei eine lange etablierte Unix-Tradition, am Leben sind. spielen von Multimedia-Dateien lag – sie heißt es auf einer Seite des Debian-Wiki wollten doch nur Filme schauen. [1], die sich mit den Namen traditioneller Linux für Zombies Linux-Tools beschäftigt. Je kaputter, desto besser Denn, steht dort weiter, häufig halten Apropos untot: Die passende Linux- Entwickler die Namen ihrer Tools für Distribution für Zombies ließ sich recht Auch Void Linux [4], der Name steht selbsterklärend oder sie glauben, dass einfach ermitteln. Sie heißt Undead Linux je nach Übersetzung für „gleichgültig“ sie die User ohnehin nicht interessieren. -
NOVA: a Log-Structured File System for Hybrid Volatile/Non
NOVA: A Log-structured File System for Hybrid Volatile/Non-volatile Main Memories Jian Xu and Steven Swanson, University of California, San Diego https://www.usenix.org/conference/fast16/technical-sessions/presentation/xu This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST ’16). February 22–25, 2016 • Santa Clara, CA, USA ISBN 978-1-931971-28-7 Open access to the Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies is sponsored by USENIX NOVA: A Log-structured File System for Hybrid Volatile/Non-volatile Main Memories Jian Xu Steven Swanson University of California, San Diego Abstract Hybrid DRAM/NVMM storage systems present a host of opportunities and challenges for system designers. These sys- Fast non-volatile memories (NVMs) will soon appear on tems need to minimize software overhead if they are to fully the processor memory bus alongside DRAM. The result- exploit NVMM’s high performance and efficiently support ing hybrid memory systems will provide software with sub- more flexible access patterns, and at the same time they must microsecond, high-bandwidth access to persistent data, but provide the strong consistency guarantees that applications managing, accessing, and maintaining consistency for data require and respect the limitations of emerging memories stored in NVM raises a host of challenges. Existing file sys- (e.g., limited program cycles). tems built for spinning or solid-state disks introduce software Conventional file systems are not suitable for hybrid mem- overheads that would obscure the performance that NVMs ory systems because they are built for the performance char- should provide, but proposed file systems for NVMs either in- acteristics of disks (spinning or solid state) and rely on disks’ cur similar overheads or fail to provide the strong consistency consistency guarantees (e.g., that sector updates are atomic) guarantees that applications require. -
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Openstack Platform on Inktank Ceph Enterprise
Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenStack Platform on Inktank Ceph Enterprise Cinder Volume Performance Performance Engineering Version 1.0 December 2014 100 East Davie Street Raleigh NC 27601 USA Phone: +1 919 754 4950 Fax: +1 919 800 3804 Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Red Hat, Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Red Hat "Shadowman" logo are registered trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. in the United States and other countries. Dell, the Dell logo and PowerEdge are trademarks of Dell, Inc. Intel, the Intel logo and Xeon are registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. © 2014 by Red Hat, Inc. This material may be distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Open Publication License, V1.0 or later (the latest version is presently available at http://www.opencontent.org/openpub/). The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Red Hat, Inc. shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. Distribution of modified versions of this document is prohibited without the explicit permission of Red Hat Inc. Distribution of this work or derivative of this work in any standard (paper) book form for commercial purposes is prohibited unless prior permission is obtained from Red Hat Inc. The GPG fingerprint of the [email protected] key is: CA 20 86 86 2B D6 9D FC 65 F6 EC C4 21 91 80 CD DB 42 A6 0E www.redhat.com 2 Performance Engineering Table of Contents 1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................ -
Firecracker: Lightweight Virtualization for Serverless Applications
Firecracker: Lightweight Virtualization for Serverless Applications Alexandru Agache, Marc Brooker, Andreea Florescu, Alexandra Iordache, Anthony Liguori, Rolf Neugebauer, Phil Piwonka, and Diana-Maria Popa, Amazon Web Services https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi20/presentation/agache This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’20) February 25–27, 2020 • Santa Clara, CA, USA 978-1-939133-13-7 Open access to the Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’20) is sponsored by Firecracker: Lightweight Virtualization for Serverless Applications Alexandru Agache Marc Brooker Andreea Florescu Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services Alexandra Iordache Anthony Liguori Rolf Neugebauer Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services Phil Piwonka Diana-Maria Popa Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services Abstract vantage over traditional server provisioning processes: mul- titenancy allows servers to be shared across a large num- Serverless containers and functions are widely used for de- ber of workloads, and the ability to provision new func- ploying and managing software in the cloud. Their popularity tions and containers in milliseconds allows capacity to be is due to reduced cost of operations, improved utilization of switched between workloads quickly as demand changes. hardware, and faster scaling than traditional deployment meth- Serverless is also attracting the attention of the research com- ods. The economics and scale of serverless applications de- munity [21,26,27,44,47], including work on scaling out video mand that workloads from multiple customers run on the same encoding [13], linear algebra [20, 53] and parallel compila- hardware with minimal overhead, while preserving strong se- tion [12]. -
KVM/ARM: Experiences Building the Linux ARM Hypervisor
KVM/ARM: Experiences Building the Linux ARM Hypervisor Christoffer Dall and Jason Nieh fcdall, [email protected] Department of Computer Science, Columbia University Technical Report CUCS-010-13 April 2013 Abstract ization. To address this problem, ARM has introduced hardware virtualization extensions in the newest ARM As ARM CPUs become increasingly common in mo- CPU architectures. ARM has benefited from the hind- bile devices and servers, there is a growing demand sight of x86 in its design. For example, nested page for providing the benefits of virtualization for ARM- tables, not part of the original x86 virtualization hard- based devices. We present our experiences building the ware, are standard in ARM. However, there are impor- Linux ARM hypervisor, KVM/ARM, the first full sys- tant differences between ARM and x86 virtualization ex- tem ARM virtualization solution that can run unmodified tensions such that x86 hypervisor designs may not be guest operating systems on ARM multicore hardware. directly amenable to ARM. These differences may also KVM/ARM introduces split-mode virtualization, allow- impact hypervisor performance, especially for multicore ing a hypervisor to split its execution across CPU modes systems, but have not been evaluated with real hardware. to take advantage of CPU mode-specific features. This allows KVM/ARM to leverage Linux kernel services and We describe our experiences building KVM/ARM, functionality to simplify hypervisor development and the ARM hypervisor in the mainline Linux kernel. maintainability while utilizing recent ARM hardware KVM/ARM is the first hypervisor to leverage ARM virtualization extensions to run application workloads in hardware virtualization support to run unmodified guest guest operating systems with comparable performance operating systems (OSes) on ARM multicore hardware. -
Introduction to Fmxlinux Delphi's Firemonkey For
Introduction to FmxLinux Delphi’s FireMonkey for Linux Solution Jim McKeeth Embarcadero Technologies [email protected] Chief Developer Advocate & Engineer For quality purposes, all lines except the presenter are muted IT’S OK TO ASK QUESTIONS! Use the Q&A Panel on the Right This webinar is being recorded for future playback. Recordings will be available on Embarcadero’s YouTube channel Your Presenter: Jim McKeeth Embarcadero Technologies [email protected] | @JimMcKeeth Chief Developer Advocate & Engineer Agenda • Overview • Installation • Supported platforms • PAServer • SDK & Packages • Usage • UI Elements • Samples • Database Access FireDAC • Migrating from Windows VCL • midaconverter.com • 3rd Party Support • Broadway Web Why FMX on Linux? • Education - Save money on Windows licenses • Kiosk or Point of Sale - Single purpose computers with locked down user interfaces • Security - Linux offers more security options • IoT & Industrial Automation - Add user interfaces for integrated systems • Federal Government - Many govt systems require Linux support • Choice - Now you can, so might as well! Delphi for Linux History • 1999 Kylix: aka Delphi for Linux, introduced • It was a port of the IDE to Linux • Linux x86 32-bit compiler • Used the Trolltech QT widget library • 2002 Kylix 3 was the last update to Kylix • 2017 Delphi 10.2 “Tokyo” introduced Delphi for x86 64-bit Linux • IDE runs on Windows, cross compiles to Linux via the PAServer • Designed for server side development - no desktop widget GUI library • 2017 Eugene -
Koller Dan Williams IBM T
An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Ahead-of-time Preparation for Safe High-level Container Interfaces Ricardo Koller Dan Williams IBM T. J. Watson Research Center Abstract as the container filesystem is already layered at the same file- based granularity as images. Containers continue to gain traction in the cloud as However, relying on the host to implement the filesystem lightweight alternatives to virtual machines (VMs). This abstraction is not without cost: the filesystem abstraction is is partially due to their use of host filesystem abstractions, high-level, wide, and complex, providing an ample attack which play a role in startup times, memory utilization, crash surface to the host. Bugs in the filesystem implementation consistency, file sharing, host introspection, and image man- can be exploitedby a user to crash or otherwise get controlof agement. However, the filesystem interface is high-level and the host, resulting in (at least) a complete isolation failure in wide, presenting a large attack surface to the host. Emerg- a multi-tenant environment such as a container-based cloud. ing secure container efforts focus on lowering the level A search on the CVE database [13] for kernel filesystem vul- of abstraction of the interface to the host through deprivi- nerabilities provides a sobering reminder of the width, com- leged functionality recreation (e.g., VMs, userspace kernels). plexity, and ultimately danger of filesystem interfaces. However, the filesystem abstraction is so important that some have resorted to directly exposing it from the host instead of Efforts to improve the security of containers use low-level suffering the resulting semantic gap. -
Debian \ Amber \ Arco-Debian \ Arc-Live \ Aslinux \ Beatrix
Debian \ Amber \ Arco-Debian \ Arc-Live \ ASLinux \ BeatriX \ BlackRhino \ BlankON \ Bluewall \ BOSS \ Canaima \ Clonezilla Live \ Conducit \ Corel \ Xandros \ DeadCD \ Olive \ DeMuDi \ \ 64Studio (64 Studio) \ DoudouLinux \ DRBL \ Elive \ Epidemic \ Estrella Roja \ Euronode \ GALPon MiniNo \ Gibraltar \ GNUGuitarINUX \ gnuLiNex \ \ Lihuen \ grml \ Guadalinex \ Impi \ Inquisitor \ Linux Mint Debian \ LliureX \ K-DEMar \ kademar \ Knoppix \ \ B2D \ \ Bioknoppix \ \ Damn Small Linux \ \ \ Hikarunix \ \ \ DSL-N \ \ \ Damn Vulnerable Linux \ \ Danix \ \ Feather \ \ INSERT \ \ Joatha \ \ Kaella \ \ Kanotix \ \ \ Auditor Security Linux \ \ \ Backtrack \ \ \ Parsix \ \ Kurumin \ \ \ Dizinha \ \ \ \ NeoDizinha \ \ \ \ Patinho Faminto \ \ \ Kalango \ \ \ Poseidon \ \ MAX \ \ Medialinux \ \ Mediainlinux \ \ ArtistX \ \ Morphix \ \ \ Aquamorph \ \ \ Dreamlinux \ \ \ Hiwix \ \ \ Hiweed \ \ \ \ Deepin \ \ \ ZoneCD \ \ Musix \ \ ParallelKnoppix \ \ Quantian \ \ Shabdix \ \ Symphony OS \ \ Whoppix \ \ WHAX \ LEAF \ Libranet \ Librassoc \ Lindows \ Linspire \ \ Freespire \ Liquid Lemur \ Matriux \ MEPIS \ SimplyMEPIS \ \ antiX \ \ \ Swift \ Metamorphose \ miniwoody \ Bonzai \ MoLinux \ \ Tirwal \ NepaLinux \ Nova \ Omoikane (Arma) \ OpenMediaVault \ OS2005 \ Maemo \ Meego Harmattan \ PelicanHPC \ Progeny \ Progress \ Proxmox \ PureOS \ Red Ribbon \ Resulinux \ Rxart \ SalineOS \ Semplice \ sidux \ aptosid \ \ siduction \ Skolelinux \ Snowlinux \ srvRX live \ Storm \ Tails \ ThinClientOS \ Trisquel \ Tuquito \ Ubuntu \ \ A/V \ \ AV \ \ Airinux \ \ Arabian -
Verifying a High-Performance Crash-Safe File System Using a Tree Specification
Verifying a high-performance crash-safe file system using a tree specification Haogang Chen,y Tej Chajed, Alex Konradi,z Stephanie Wang,x Atalay İleri, Adam Chlipala, M. Frans Kaashoek, Nickolai Zeldovich MIT CSAIL ABSTRACT 1 INTRODUCTION File systems achieve high I/O performance and crash safety DFSCQ is the first file system that (1) provides a precise by implementing sophisticated optimizations to increase disk fsync fdatasync specification for and , which allow appli- throughput. These optimizations include deferring writing cations to achieve high performance and crash safety, and buffered data to persistent storage, grouping many trans- (2) provides a machine-checked proof that its implementa- actions into a single I/O operation, checksumming journal tion meets this specification. DFSCQ’s specification captures entries, and bypassing the write-ahead log when writing to the behavior of sophisticated optimizations, including log- file data blocks. The widely used Linux ext4 is an example bypass writes, and DFSCQ’s proof rules out some of the of an I/O-efficient file system; the above optimizations allow common bugs in file-system implementations despite the it to batch many writes into a single I/O operation and to complex optimizations. reduce the number of disk-write barriers that flush data to The key challenge in building DFSCQ is to write a speci- disk [33, 56]. Unfortunately, these optimizations complicate fication for the file system and its internal implementation a file system’s implementation. For example, it took 6 years without exposing internal file-system details. DFSCQ in- for ext4 developers to realize that two optimizations (data troduces a metadata-prefix specification that captures the writes that bypass the journal and journal checksumming) properties of fsync and fdatasync, which roughly follows taken together can lead to disclosure of previously deleted the behavior of Linux ext4.