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RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER in RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE and the RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH by Robert C

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RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER in RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE and the RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH by Robert C MAY 2021 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS | BROOKINGS INSTITUTION GEOPOLITICS OF RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER POLICY BRIEF #5 RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH By Robert C. Blitt EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Kremlin continues to deepen its reliance on the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as a lever of soft power in Russian foreign policy. Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 suggest that this church-state partnership is poised to grow stronger in the coming years. Recognizing that the ROC’s international undertakings function to echo Kremlin objectives, policymakers should consider scrutinizing church activities and interactions with civil society and government interlocutors, with an eye toward identifying and minimizing opportunities for Kremlin influence and interference. KEY TAKEAWAYS • The ROC has served as a steadfast soft power echo for Russian foreign policy interests during the Putin era, particularly as the Kremlin seeks to project an outsized vision of the “Russian world” beyond its national borders. This brief is a product • Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 are likely to bolster Kremlin foreign of the Geopolitics of policy priorities in key areas: sovereignty and noninterference, the falsification of history, Religious Soft Power the rights of compatriots, and traditional values. (GRSP) project, a multi- • The ROC is poised to play an enlarged role in promoting these foreign policy year, cross-disciplinary objectives by conducting international outreach and advocacy, marshalling like-minded effort to systematically constituencies, exporting traditional values worldwide, and reinforcing key Kremlin study state use of religion narratives. in foreign affairs. The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars. INTRODUCTION foreign policy are provisions that entrench: a muscular vision of state sovereignty, a state- In January 2020, President Putin surprised sanctioned historical truth, the obligation to Russians and the world by proposing a protect Russian compatriot rights abroad, sweeping set of constitutional reforms. and traditional values as a core component of Despite an emphasis on domestic policy and Russian national identity. the welfare state, the push for amendments signaled a distinct preoccupation with Russia’s Boosting State Sovereignty international standing. Putin’s proposed Russia’s Constitutional Court is now reforms began by asserting that “Our nation’s authorized to render unenforceable any sovereignty must be unconditional…Russia international ruling against Russia—including has returned to international politics as a from the European Court of Human Rights country whose opinion cannot be ignored.”1 (ECtHR)—where it deems the decision to be Propelled by this outward-facing orientation, contrary to Russia’s constitution and public Putin’s first suggested amendments sought 5 order. In addition, by requiring that Russia to curb the domestic impact of any decisions “tak[e] measures to…prevent interference taken by international bodies regarding Russia’s 6 in the internal affairs of the state,” the international obligations. constitution now provides fresh cover for the Putin’s traditional allies were quick to embrace Kremlin’s global promotion of multipolarity. his invitation to propose further amendments. Among others, Patriarch Kirill, head of the Prohibiting Falsification ROC, suggested believers should “pray and work Another amendment prohibits the spread so God would be mentioned in our foundational 2 of information questioning Russia’s official law.” President Putin answered these prayers by narrative regarding WWII. This prohibition endorsing Kirill’s proposal and bundling it into has clear outward-facing implications for the the list of revised amendments delivered to the 3 projection of Russian power and civilization State Duma in March 2020. Within a matter on the international stage. As Putin has of days—and with virtually no opposition— cautioned, tarnishing Russia’s historical Putin’s package of amendments secured the reputation is nothing less than “a threat to the approval of various government bodies. In July fundamental principles of the world order.”7 2020, citizens overwhelmingly endorsed the 4 This newly constitutionalized imperative amendments in a public vote, thus blessing to combat falsification augurs a raft of the largest overhaul of the Russian constitution international challenges, including condoning since its original ratification in 1993. crimes committed under the Soviet occupation The approved constitutional amendments and amplifying the Kremlin’s ongoing 8 cover wide ground, ranging from social and disinformation campaigns. welfare benefits to reorganization of the state’s Supporting Compatriot Rights political power structure. But lost in this torrent of reform are certain key amendments that also An additional amendment expanding harbor significant implications for Russian government support to “compatriots living foreign policy. abroad in the exercise of their rights”9 can FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE also be linked to Russia’s projection of power abroad. The definitional fluidity attached to 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS the term “compatriots” strengthens the case for a larger “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) outside Central among the constitutional amendments of Russia proper that demands active Kremlin with potential implications for Russian protection. This framing in turn amplifies 2 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University Kremlin opportunities for expanding its political and economic actions.”16 Kirill further political influence and intelligence-gathering asserted that: “Orthodoxy in international abroad.10 politics [could facilitate] the building up of a multipolar world.”17 Nearly a quarter century Enshrining Traditional Values later, the church’s framing of noninterference The traditional values-centric amendments has led it to reject decisions emerging from serve to reinforce the Kremlin’s civilizational the ECtHR and other human rights bodies as being alien and harmful to Russian identity-building project and its related 18 multipolarity campaign. Anchoring Russia’s sovereignty. The ROC’s contemporary national identity in these religiously steeped devotion to multipolarity remains equally conservative values burnishes Russia’s bona undiminished, with one church leader recently fides as the vanguard of an anti-West coalition speculating that the COVID-19 pandemic could help bring about “the real emergence of committed to contesting international human 19 rights norms.11 a multipolar world.” According to this narrative, only Russia can Most tellingly, however, the ROC’s wholesale thwart the West’s effort to impose global embrace of Kremlin policy surrounding “ultra-liberalism.” In Putin’s words, “efforts are sovereignty and noninterference is revealed in being taken today to…destroy the traditional the occasions when both actors appear willing values….”12 And this “clash of civilizations” to jettison principle in the name of realpolitik. poses a strategic threat to Russia’s geopolitical Consider the Kremlin’s interventionist interests: “[P]romoting…LGBT [rights] and stance regarding Montenegro’s recently enacted Law on Freedom of Religion or spreading the ideas of radical feminism… 20 dilute[e] the values of family and marriage…. Beliefs. To validate its abandonment of [such a] society…is a perfect target for so- non-interference, Russia’s Foreign Ministry called coloured revolutions.”13 proffered impressive verbal gymnastics: “We are categorically against any interference CEMENTING THE ROC’S ROLE AS in internal affairs. [But this law]…could FAVORED SOFT POWER TOOL affect the interests of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro…[Therefore], it goes beyond The ROC has long rallied around advancing national boundaries and concerns the unity 21 the now constitutionally enshrined vision and cohesion of the Orthodox World.” outlined above. In embracing this mission, it In this instance, Kremlin intervention cloaked has fortified the Kremlin’s campaign against in ostensible concern for the Orthodox world the perceived civilizational threat posed by coincidentally seeks to diminish Western 14 the West’s “mindless multiculturalism” and influence and advance Russia’s push for peddled a vision of Russia “predestined to be multipolarity. This decidedly secular motive the guardian of global balance, not merely in has not deterred the ROC from reiterating 15 geopolitical but…in a moral/ethical sense.” the Kremlin’s temporal concerns and fueling ROC Advocacy of Noninterference, the tension in Montenegro. In fact, the Sovereignty, and Multipolarity church has dutifully mobilized its various channels to echo Kremlin attacks on the new ROC diplomacy attests to an enduring religious freedom law and the Montenegrin commitment to the Kremlin’s preferred government more generally. international order. In 1999, then From Patriarch Kirill’s perspective, events in Metropolitan Kirill lamented “new forms of Montenegro are akin to a “Ukrainian scenario” confrontation in which…interference in the that encroaches “on canonical Orthodoxy.”22 life of nations have been realized through As such, the matter is exempted from the Brookings Institution 3 niceties of noninterference. Revealingly, the Foreign
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