RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER in RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE and the RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH by Robert C

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MAY 2021

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS | BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

GEOPOLITICS OF RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER POLICY BRIEF #5 RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH By Robert C. Blitt

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Kremlin continues to deepen its reliance on the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as a lever of soft power in Russian foreign policy. Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 suggest that this church-state partnership is poised to grow stronger in the coming years. Recognizing that the ROC’s international undertakings function to echo Kremlin objectives, policymakers should consider scrutinizing church activities and interactions with civil society and government interlocutors, with an eye toward identifying and minimizing opportunities for Kremlin influence and interference.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The ROC has served as a steadfast soft power echo for Russian foreign policy interests during the Putin era, particularly as the Kremlin seeks to project an outsized vision of the “Russian world” beyond its national borders.

This brief is a product • Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 are likely to bolster Kremlin foreign of the Geopolitics of policy priorities in key areas: sovereignty and noninterference, the falsification of history, Religious Soft Power the rights of compatriots, and traditional values. (GRSP) project, a multi- • The ROC is poised to play an enlarged role in promoting these foreign policy year, cross-disciplinary objectives by conducting international outreach and advocacy, marshalling like-minded effort to systematically constituencies, exporting traditional values worldwide, and reinforcing key Kremlin study state use of religion narratives. in foreign affairs.

The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars. INTRODUCTION foreign policy are provisions that entrench: a muscular vision of state sovereignty, a state- In January 2020, President Putin surprised sanctioned historical truth, the obligation to Russians and the world by proposing a protect Russian compatriot rights abroad, sweeping set of constitutional reforms. and traditional values as a core component of Despite an emphasis on domestic policy and Russian national identity. the welfare state, the push for amendments signaled a distinct preoccupation with Russia’s Boosting State Sovereignty international standing. Putin’s proposed Russia’s Constitutional Court is now reforms began by asserting that “Our nation’s authorized to render unenforceable any sovereignty must be unconditional…Russia international ruling against Russia—including has returned to international politics as a from the European Court of Human Rights country whose opinion cannot be ignored.”1 (ECtHR)—where it deems the decision to be Propelled by this outward-facing orientation, contrary to Russia’s constitution and public Putin’s first suggested amendments sought 5 order. In addition, by requiring that Russia to curb the domestic impact of any decisions “tak[e] measures to…prevent interference taken by international bodies regarding Russia’s 6 in the internal affairs of the state,” the international obligations. constitution now provides fresh cover for the Putin’s traditional allies were quick to embrace Kremlin’s global promotion of multipolarity. his invitation to propose further amendments. Among others, Patriarch Kirill, head of the Prohibiting Falsification ROC, suggested believers should “pray and work Another amendment prohibits the spread so God would be mentioned in our foundational 2 of information questioning Russia’s official law.” President Putin answered these prayers by narrative regarding WWII. This prohibition endorsing Kirill’s proposal and bundling it into has clear outward-facing implications for the the list of revised amendments delivered to the 3 projection of Russian power and civilization State Duma in March 2020. Within a matter on the international stage. As Putin has of days—and with virtually no opposition— cautioned, tarnishing Russia’s historical Putin’s package of amendments secured the reputation is nothing less than “a threat to the approval of various government bodies. In July fundamental principles of the world order.”7 2020, citizens overwhelmingly endorsed the 4 This newly constitutionalized imperative amendments in a public vote, thus blessing to combat falsification augurs a raft of the largest overhaul of the Russian constitution international challenges, including condoning since its original ratification in 1993. crimes committed under the Soviet occupation The approved constitutional amendments and amplifying the Kremlin’s ongoing 8 cover wide ground, ranging from social and disinformation campaigns. welfare benefits to reorganization of the state’s Supporting Compatriot Rights political power structure. But lost in this torrent of reform are certain key amendments that also An additional amendment expanding harbor significant implications for Russian government support to “compatriots living foreign policy. abroad in the exercise of their rights”9 can FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE also be linked to Russia’s projection of power abroad. The definitional fluidity attached to 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS the term “compatriots” strengthens the case for a larger “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) outside Central among the constitutional amendments of Russia proper that demands active Kremlin with potential implications for Russian protection. This framing in turn amplifies

2 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University Kremlin opportunities for expanding its political and economic actions.”16 Kirill further political influence and intelligence-gathering asserted that: “Orthodoxy in international abroad.10 politics [could facilitate] the building up of a multipolar world.”17 Nearly a quarter century Enshrining Traditional Values later, the church’s framing of noninterference The traditional values-centric amendments has led it to reject decisions emerging from serve to reinforce the Kremlin’s civilizational the ECtHR and other human rights bodies as being alien and harmful to Russian identity-building project and its related 18 multipolarity campaign. Anchoring Russia’s sovereignty. The ROC’s contemporary national identity in these religiously steeped devotion to multipolarity remains equally conservative values burnishes Russia’s bona undiminished, with one church leader recently fides as the vanguard of an anti-West coalition speculating that the COVID-19 pandemic could help bring about “the real emergence of committed to contesting international human 19 rights norms.11 a multipolar world.” According to this narrative, only Russia can Most tellingly, however, the ROC’s wholesale thwart the West’s effort to impose global embrace of Kremlin policy surrounding “ultra-liberalism.” In Putin’s words, “efforts are sovereignty and noninterference is revealed in being taken today to…destroy the traditional the occasions when both actors appear willing values….”12 And this “clash of civilizations” to jettison principle in the name of realpolitik. poses a strategic threat to Russia’s geopolitical Consider the Kremlin’s interventionist interests: “[P]romoting…LGBT [rights] and stance regarding Montenegro’s recently enacted Law on Freedom of Religion or spreading the ideas of radical feminism… 20 dilute[e] the values of family and marriage…. Beliefs. To validate its abandonment of [such a] society…is a perfect target for so- non-interference, Russia’s Foreign Ministry called coloured revolutions.”13 proffered impressive verbal gymnastics: “We are categorically against any interference CEMENTING THE ROC’S ROLE AS in internal affairs. [But this law]…could FAVORED SOFT POWER TOOL affect the interests of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro…[Therefore], it goes beyond The ROC has long rallied around advancing national boundaries and concerns the unity 21 the now constitutionally enshrined vision and cohesion of the Orthodox World.” outlined above. In embracing this mission, it In this instance, Kremlin intervention cloaked has fortified the Kremlin’s campaign against in ostensible concern for the Orthodox world the perceived civilizational threat posed by coincidentally seeks to diminish Western 14 the West’s “mindless multiculturalism” and influence and advance Russia’s push for peddled a vision of Russia “predestined to be multipolarity. This decidedly secular motive the guardian of global balance, not merely in has not deterred the ROC from reiterating 15 geopolitical but…in a moral/ethical sense.” the Kremlin’s temporal concerns and fueling ROC Advocacy of Noninterference, the tension in Montenegro. In fact, the Sovereignty, and Multipolarity church has dutifully mobilized its various channels to echo Kremlin attacks on the new ROC diplomacy attests to an enduring religious freedom law and the Montenegrin commitment to the Kremlin’s preferred government more generally. international order. In 1999, then From Patriarch Kirill’s perspective, events in Metropolitan Kirill lamented “new forms of Montenegro are akin to a “Ukrainian scenario” confrontation in which…interference in the that encroaches “on canonical Orthodoxy.”22 life of nations have been realized through As such, the matter is exempted from the

Brookings Institution 3 niceties of noninterference. Revealingly, the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov renewed this patriarch’s invocation of a “Ukraine scenario” vow in 2020, proclaiming that “the diplomatic ties back to the Kremlin’s larger concern over service will continue to do its best to counter Montenegro’s political alignment to the West. attempts to falsify history [through] close In the church’s words: “The current authorities cooperation with the Russian Orthodox of Montenegro do not conceal that they are Church.”28 active supporters of eurointegration and With falsification rendered constitutionally isolation from Serbia and for this reason they anathema, the church is poised to continue seek to discredit [our] common historical consecrating the Kremlin’s international push spiritual and cultural heritage.”23 The prospect to brand as fascist any critic of Soviet glory. As of a loss of Russian influence within this part of this effort, the church advocates within tiny country augurs so deep a blow to the the compatriot community abroad to nurture Kremlin that the patriarch has gone as far as 29 a shared vision of historical memory. to insinuate that Montenegrin officials have subjected Orthodox faithful to torture.24 The church also wields the Kremlin’s historical narrative as a carrot and stick, both to build The ROC’s eagerness to intervene in potential alliances and to exert pressure on Montenegro’s internal affairs directly serves less cooperative foreign governments. For Kremlin foreign policy by fueling Montenegrin example, the church recently lauded Croatian political and social instability. On a still officials for restoring a memorial to Soviet more sinister note, it also sows the seeds for soldiers, calling it “one of these profoundly potentially more egregious intervention from symbolic actions which help preserve Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s 30 historical memory.” In contrast, Patriarch declaration that Russia “will always defend Kirill directed a six-minute long harangue the interests of Orthodox Churches,”25 at the Bulgarian president for remarks Kirill coupled with the freshly minted constitutional deemed “outrages” of historical revisionism imperative to protect “compatriot” rights, that depreciated the primary role of Russian leaves open the possibility of expanding the 31 state power and sacrifice. Kremlin’s compatriot umbrella to include non-Russian ROC-aligned believers. Through actions like these, the church energetically reinforces the Kremlin’s view The case of Montenegro signals that, like the that Russia’s reputation is sacrosanct, and that Kremlin, the ROC will vociferously defend any perceived slight against it—including sovereignty to shield Russia and its allies from 32 the “criminal war on monuments” —is international scrutiny, but quickly discard tantamount to the glorification of Nazism. the norm in the service of Russia’s foreign In this context, as with the compatriot policy interests. The Kremlin’s decision to intervene discussed below, the church can act without in Syria provides another case in point. The the diplomatic fetters that might otherwise church’s deafening silence in the face of bind Russia’s Foreign Ministry. Thus, Patriarch credible reporting of war crimes linked to Kirill’s remarks in Bulgaria “aggressively Russian military operations26 in that country push[ed] the Russian nationalist agenda…in betrays the full extent of its unflinching a way that even the Russian Foreign Ministry support for the Kremlin’s selective grasp of avoids when dealing with what it considers international norms. 33 ‘friendly’ nations.” The ROC as Guard Dog for Kremlin Truth The church’s readiness to echo the Kremlin’s party line on the international stage extends Over a decade ago, Russia’s Foreign Ministry beyond Russia’s WWII legacy. According to and the ROC pledged to continue “joint 27 Sergei Lavrov, Russia “had accumulated great efforts to combat the falsification of history.”

4 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University experience in ensuring the co-existence of two significant advantages: First, the church people of various creeds” and “protect[ing] promotes Kremlin messages without the true religious values.”34 This statement baggage attached to more overtly state- expunges a checkered history of state- backed outlets such as RT and Sputnik. sanctioned religious persecution and ongoing Second, given the global breadth of church discrimination for the purpose of holding diplomacy, the Kremlin can access more Russia out as an export-ready civilizational diverse constituencies that transcend the alternative to the West. narrow realm of compatriots. With the ROC operating as convenor of compatriots, other The church has embraced this disingenuous clergy, and foreign government officials,38 the narrative unreservedly. In a speech delivered Kremlin gains a seemingly neutral channel at the 2011 International Ecumenical Peace for actively informing and influencing global Convocation, Metropolitan Hilarion set opinion on Russia. aside Russia’s role in the production and dissemination of The Protocols of the Elders of The onset of a constitutional obligation to Zion and the forcible expulsion of Muslim protect compatriot rights and interests also Tatars from Crimea to boast: “In Russia raises the possibility of passportization being there have been no religious wars or religious extended to include to non-Russian Orthodox confrontations in our history. People in our believers.39 If defending Russian civilization country have been able to find a language includes the protection of Orthodoxy, and the of mutual understanding…despite their definitional fluidity of compatriots can flex to differences in faith.”35 include “individuals who make the free choice of a spiritual, cultural, and legal link to the The ROC as Global Nexus for Cultivating Russian Federation,”40 it may not be too great Compatriots a leap to suggest that Moscow might seek to render Orthodoxy a basis for passportization Foreign Minister Lavrov has also lauded the to justify further foreign interventions in the church’s cooperation “helping the Russian name of Christian communities expressing diaspora and protecting the rights of Russians affinity and support for Russia.41 who have found themselves far away from the Homeland.”36 The church’s global network On a less extreme level, church outreach to and deep involvement with other compatriot- other Orthodox “compatriots” hints at regions focused organizations confirms its pivotal and countries where the Kremlin may seek role in echoing Kremlin messaging to this to expand its influence using Orthodox ties constituency. For example, the World Russian as a bridgehead.42 From this perspective, the People’s Council (WRPC), essentially a constitutional amendment on compatriots church-directed NGO, functions as a linchpin may signal additional fuel for Russian compatriot-networking organization that messianism and the Kremlin’s framing of advocates Russian interests abroad, including the country and its civilization as the last through UN lobbying. Similarly, the church bulwark against a godless world overrun by maintains formal cooperation agreements the corrupting influence of the ultra-liberal with a range of governmental organizations West.43 engaged in compatriot outreach and efforts to augment international support for Russian The ROC’s Crown Jewel: Spreading policy, including the Federal Agency for Traditional Values Everywhere Compatriots Abroad and the Russkiy Mir If the constitutional amendments discussed Foundation.37 above merely infer an enlarged role for Tapping into the ROC’s religious and the ROC as a chief soft power exporter of cultural terroir provides the Kremlin with the Kremlin’s foreign policy priorities, the

Brookings Institution 5 amendments entrenching traditional values evangelical, Mormon…and Muslim faith render this role inescapable. At least in part backgrounds” to “[attempt] to revert feminist directly attributable to the ROC’s lobbying,44 and sexual rights gains at the international the traditional values amendments enshrine level.”47 the church’s function as guardian of Russia’s The 2016 Havana Declaration, signed by spiritual and moral identity. the ROC and the Vatican, exhibits this Infusing these values with newfound latter type of outreach, while illustrating the constitutional status reinforces the likelihood ROC’s use of traditional values to validate that they will be disseminated globally Kremlin foreign policy. Among other things, to oppose Western “ultra-liberalism” and the declaration laments secularization; shore up the Kremlin’s campaign for greater calls attention to endangered Christian international influence. Notably, the church communities in the Middle East; and offers has portrayed traditional values as under siege up generic pleas for peace in Ukraine, Syria, for longer than the Kremlin, and without any and elsewhere.48 But it painstakingly avoids pretense of diplomatic nicety: “It may well any direct criticism of Russia. Instead, the be…that the entire Western civilization…is declaration promotes a view of the ROC and becoming radically anti-Christian and anti- Kremlin as neutral peacemakers committed religious. In this case there is a need of not to protecting endangered Christians, and only a pan-European but also of a universal positions the Vatican as condoning Russia’s common front formed by traditional religious foreign adventurism. confessions in order to repel the onslaught of The church’s ability to invoke traditional values militant secularism.”45 as a vehicle for garnering support for Russian To help strengthen Russia’s global position, policy is similarly reflected in its outreach to the church has reached out to a range conservative civil society groups, leaders from of religious constituencies and courted across Europe, and “their comrades from the conservative activists, compatriots, simpatico American heartland.”49 For example, C-Fam, foreign governments, and political operatives. a U.S.-based “pro-family” NGO, has fawned Through these efforts, the ROC staunchly over the ROC’s rejection of a UNICEF brief opposes any perceived encroachments on calling for the elimination of discrimination traditional values while simultaneously based on sexual orientation and gender promoting the Kremlin’s international identity.50 Elsewhere, the International leadership as the most effective guardian of Organization of the Family has sought to these values. boost ROC and Kremlin policies, accepting Kremlin-connected Orthodox oligarch For example, the church’s engagement with funding,51 endorsing “a very prominent other “fraternal” churches often seeks to role [for Russia]…on a global scale,” 52 and undercut Western institutions from within. celebrating Russia as “the Christian saviors of In one visit to Bulgaria—an EU member the world.” 53 state—Patriarch Kirill used a meeting with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to urge CONCLUSIONS Bulgarians to reject the EU for imposing “behaviours believed to be sinful by Christians 46 The amendments discussed above provide and ethically unnatural.” The ROC similarly constitutional cover for reenergizing the invokes traditional values to build common Kremlin’s global efforts to challenge democratic ground with other non-Orthodox religious values, supplant the international human faiths. As one human rights organization rights system, and destabilize institutions concluded, this “unholy alliance” unifies and societies through misinformation and “traditionalist actors from Catholic,

6 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University disinformation campaigns. Given the ROC’s 12. Vladimir Putin, “Putin Address to World Russian People’s Council,” Presidential Executive Office longstanding willingness to serve as a spear tip (November 1, 2018). http://lilin.ru/events/president/ for the soft power advancement of these efforts, news/59013. the constitutional amendments are likely to 13. Sergey Naryshkin, “Statement by Director of the usher in an even tighter era of church-state Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia Sergey Naryshkin,” Russian Foreign Ministry ( June 18, integration. Policymakers should take note of 2019). https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ the ROC’s burgeoning foreign policy role and international_safety/regprla/-/asset_publisher/ make necessary adjustments to account for the YCxLFJnKuD1W/content/id/3704728. 14. Madeline Roache, “‘Liberalism Is Obsolete,’ Russian church’s increasing proximity to the Kremlin President Vladimir Putin Says Amid G20 Summit,” and its ongoing influence campaigns unfolding Time ( June 28, 2019). https://time.com/5616982/ among governmental and non-governmental putin-liberalism-g20/. 15. Alicja Curanović, “Russia’s Mission in the World,” interlocutors alike. Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 4 (2019): 259. 16. Metropolitan Kirill, “Report by Metropolitan NOTES Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate,” ROC Department for External Relations (December 6, 1999). 1. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Presidential Executive Office ( January 17. Metropolitan Kirill, “View from Russia: The 15, 2020). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ Orthodox Church, State and Europe,” ROC news/62582. Department for External Relations (October 3, 2005). 2. “Patriarch Kirill Proposes Adding Reference to God to Russian Constitution,” Orthodox Christianity 18. Kristina Stoeckl, “The Russian Orthodox Church as (February 3, 2020). https://orthochristian. Moral Norm Entrepreneur,” Religion, State and Society com/127683.html. 44, no. 2 (2016): 134. 3. AFP, “Putin Proposes to Enshrine God, Heterosexual 19. “The Russian Orthodox Church Foresees the Marriage in Constitution,” France 24 (March 2, Collapse of Globalization and the Emergence of 2020). a Multipolar World due to the Pandemic,” World Russian People’s Council (April 30, 2020). https:// 4. Law of the Russian Federation on Amendment to the vrns.ru/news/5430. Constitution of the Russian Federation of March 14, 2020 No. 1-FKZ, “On Improving the Regulation of 20. Law on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs and Legal Certain Issues of the Organization and Functioning Status of Religious Communities (December 24, of Public Authority,” Pub. 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Brookings Institution 7 27. Robert C. Blitt, “One New President, One New Citizenship,” Interfax (October 16, 2013). http:// Patriarch, and a Generous Disregard for the www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=10818. Constitution: A Recipe for the Continuing Decline 42. “His Holiness Patriarch Kirill Meets with the Head of Secular Russia,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational of Armenian Catholic Church,” Moscow Patriarchate Law 43 (2010): 1363. (April 29, 2015). https://mospat.ru/en/news/50451/. 28. Sergey Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s 43. Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Christ-Loving Diplomats: Remarks at the Opening of the 28th International Russian Ecclesiastical Diplomacy in Syria,” Survival Educational Christmas Readings, ‘The Great Victory: 61, no. 6 (2019): 51. Heritage and Inheritors,’” Russian Foreign Ministry ( January 27, 2020). https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_ 44. 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8 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University ABOUT THE PROJECT

The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power (GRSP) project represents a multi-year, cross- disciplinary effort to systematically study state use of religion in foreign affairs. Through a global comparison of varying motivations, strategies, and practices associated with the deployment of religious soft power, project research aims to reveal patterns, trends, and outcomes that will enhance our understanding of religion’s role in contemporary geopolitics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This policy brief was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars.

The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University seeks a more just and peaceful world by deepening knowledge and solving problems at the intersection of religion and global affairs through research, About the Author teaching, and engaging multiple publics. Two premises guide the center’s work: that a comprehensive examination of religion and norms is critical to address complex global challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace.

Robert C. Blitt is a professor of law at the University The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit of Tennessee College of organization devoted to independent research Law. His research interests and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct include issues related to the high-quality, independent research and, based right to freedom of thought, on that research, to provide innovative, practical conscience, and religion or recommendations for policymakers and the public. belief. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.