DOCSLIB.ORG

Waste Management Fraud Final Project BS 325 Dustin Nystel 12/17

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Waste Management Fraud Final Project BS 325 Dustin Nystel 12/17 Waste Management Fraud Final Project BS 325 Dustin Nystel 12/17/10 Waste Management Overview Waste Management Inc. is a Houston Texas based company providing waste management and other services in North America. Yahoo financial summarizes the company as follows: Waste Management Inc. offers collections, transfer, recycling, disposal, and waste-to- energy services. Its recycling operations include collections material processing, plastics materials recycling, and commodities recycling. The company also provides recycling brokerage, and electronic recycling services, including the collection, sorting, and disassembling of electronics to reuse or recycle various collected materials. It also engages in renting and servicing portable restrooms for municipalities and commercial customers under the name Port- o-Let. An extension of this service includes its involvement in landfill gas-to-energy operations which is the capture and reuse of naturally occurring methane gas at landfill sites. Finally, the company provides street sweeping and parking services, portable self-storage, healthcare solutions services, services for third parties for construct waste facilities, and municipal, industrial, commercial, and residential trash and recycling services (Yahoo, 2010). Waste Management Inc.’s website offers a deeper look into the company’s bragging points in recent years. The company employs 45,000 employees to serve over 20 million customers. In 2009 the company generated $2.01 earnings per diluted share, reduced operating expenses by 14.5%, generated $1.4B in free cash flow, and returned $795M to shareholders (wm.com, 2010). In addition to its financial success Waste Management Inc. is ensuring future success through its continued advancement and exploration in reusable materials research and development. Waste Management Inc. uses waste to create energy for 1 million homes, and they hope to double that by 2020. The company managed 119 landfill-gas-to-energy projects producing enough energy to power 400,000 homes, and they’ve partnered with another company to turn this gas into liquid fuel for its line of 800 natural gas burning trucks (wm.com, 2010). Waste management Inc. operates in the industrial goods sector of the waste management industry. Waste management boasts an impressive $17.26B in revenue positioning it as the third highest grossing waste management company in the industry (Yahoo, 2010). The company is doing so well that yahoo financial reported it intends to raise its dividend by 8% in the first quarter of 2011. Waste Management Inc. is probably able to make this increase because its Earnings Per Share are 100 times the industry average, and revenues 300 times industry average based on yahoo financial figures. The company is a leader in its industry demonstrating continued growth ($34.43/share) since bottoming out ($13.6875/share) in March of 2000 (Yahoo, 2010). Waste Management’s boasted about its strong financial performance and went on the list some awards the company has won over the last four years, 74 awards to be exact. There was also a generous section devoted to the company’s ethics policy and its commitment to ethics at all levels. Highlighted in the ethics section of Waste Management Inc.’s website one finds three main objectives: create an environment where every employee knows what is ethical, and what is expected, training to ensure everyone understands the company’s ethical standards, and possibly most important a section on confidential whistle blowing (wm.com, 2010). This company seems to have everything in place to represent everything that success is made from. It is steadily increasing its price per share, it is continuously increasing its dividends for shareholders, it is leading the industry in green initiatives and self-sustaining practices, and it has a sound ethics program and good internal controls. But, Waste Management Inc. hasn’t always been Waste Management Inc., it used to be USA Waste Services until 1998 and those were different times. The Fraud In mid-July 1997 a new CEO took the reins at Waste Management Inc. and swiftly ordered a review of the company’s accounting practices and the rest they say is history. What they discovered was that between 1992 and 1997 Waste Management Inc.’s top executives in collusion with their audit partner Arthur Andersen had misstated pretax earnings by more than $1.7B (sec.gov, 2002). The company’s revenues weren’t growing fast enough to meet earnings targets so the colluders improperly eliminated and deferred current period expenses to inflate earnings using what the chief accounting officer called his “one-off” scheme. This scheme was really a grand form of lapping. The Principles of Fraud Examination 2ed. describes lapping as paying one account with the funds for a different account, and covering that account with the funds from a third account continuously to avoid detections (Wells, 2008). In this case the fraudsters weren’t stealing cash from an account and covering it up, they were differing liabilities to the next period. One way they balanced the extra liabilities in future periods was through netting. Netting was the practice of covering pushed liabilities with one time special gains which would offset (sec.gov, 2002). The complaint filed with the SEC charged six senior executives with the following: they avoided depreciation expenses on their garbage trucks by assigning unsupported and inflated salvage values and extended their useful lives. They assigned arbitrary salvage values to other assets that previously had no salvage value. They failed to record expenses necessary to write off the costs of unsuccessful and abandoned landfill development projects. They established inflated environmental reserves (liabilities) in connection with acquisitions so that excess reserves could be used to avoid recording unrelated operating expenses. They improperly capitalized a variety of expenses, and they failed to establish sufficient reserves (liabilities) to pay for income taxes and other expenses (sec.gov, 2002). Those involved in the fraud had absolute power and control over all of Waste Management Inc.’s operations including the founder, chief executive officer & chairman of the board Dean L. Buntrock, Phillip B. Rooney, president, director, chief operating officer & chief executive officer for a brief period, James E. Koenig, executive vice president and chief executive officer, Thomas C. Hau, vice president, corporate controller & chief financial officer, Herbert Getz, senior vice president general council, & secretary, and Bruce D. Tobecksen, vice president of finance (sec.gov, 2002). Together and with the help of Waste Management Inc.’s auditing partner, Arthur Andersen there was no means to stop or detect the fraud. Before moving on to the punishment section of the paper it is important to quantify exactly how this fraud benefited the fraudsters. Buntrock was considered the driving force behind the fraud setting the tone at the top. He set the earnings targets and personally directed certain accounting changes to meet the targeted goals. Over the course of the fraud Buntrock was revered as a philanthropic pillar of the community through his many charitable donations (i.e. tax dodges). Buntrock was estimated to have made over $16.9 million over the course of the scheme. Rooney was in charge of the company’s largest subsidiaries and made sure necessary write-offs were not made and he overruled accounting practices that would have a negative impact on earnings. Rooney made around $9.2 million (fraudlaw, 2002). Then there were the accountants making everything actually work. Koenig was responsible for keeping the scheme afloat by misleading the company audit committee, internal accountants and external auditors. Koenig cleared more than $900,000 during the scheme. Hau was the technician for the fraudulent accounting and creator of the “one-off” technique. Hau created the deceptive disclosures and benefitted in the form of $600,000. Tobecksen was Koenig’s right hand man and handled all Hau’s overflow which earned him $400,000. Then there was Getz the company’s general council who blessed the fraudulent disclosures to take home $450,000 (fraudlaw.org, 2002). Finally over the seven year period of the fraud Arthur Anderson was paid $7.5M in audit fees, $11.8M in other fees (tax, attest work), and $6 M in additional non-audit fees including $3.7M for a strategic review analysis. All together Andersen billed Waste Management Inc. $25.3M over seven years or $3.6M per year. The External Auditor Arthur Andersen was considered the best of the big five for many years, and was often looked to for their pioneering accounting practices. With great knowledge comes great power and with power comes responsibility, and Arthur Anderson developed a lousy track record for being responsible. Arthur Andersen is the firm that was made famous by its clients including Sunbeam, Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Waste Management Inc., WorldCom, and Enron. Each client being reported to have perpetuated the largest fraud in history until the next client was discovered and WorldCom finally took that title. What made this particular Arthur Andersen fraud unique was the amount of documentary evidence they produced demonstrating their acute knowledge and general enablement of the fraud. When the fraud began, Waste Management Inc. management put a cap on Andersen’s audit fees but offered the auditor the opportunity to earn additional fees through “special work.” Andersen quickly found most of the company’s improper accounting practices, but still issued unqualified reports. Andersen justified providing clean reports because they were generating PAJEs (Proposed Adjusting Journal Entries) (sec.gov, 2002). These PAJEs were the adjusting entries necessary to correct the company’s understated expenses and overstated earnings, and Andersen provided a plan for Waste Management Inc. to implement these adjustments over time to gradually correct the problem. Andersen soon realized that they had entered onto a slippery slope with Waste Management Inc. The auditor had allowed misconduct to occur, and they were responsible for helping to cover it up.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Greatest Business Decisions of All Time: How Apple, Ford, IBM, Zappos, and Others Made Radical Choices That Changed the Cour
    The Greatest BUSINESS DECISIONS of All Time HOW APPLE, FORD, IBM, ZAPPOS, AND OTHERS MADE RADICAL CHOICES THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF BUSINESS. By Verne Harnish and the Editors of Fortune Foreword by Jim Collins . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When you delve into the great decisions chronicled in these pages, you’ll find that in most instances it was the people involved that really mattered. The same holds true for producing this book. First, we want to thank Fortune managing editor Andy Serwer, who, displaying the vision and entrepreneurial spirit we’ve long admired him for, green-lighted this project in the same meeting in which we pitched it and then provided support all along the way. Fortune art director Emily Kehe, working with Time Inc.’s talented Anne-Michelle Gallero, applied their usual elegant sense of style to the design. Carol Gwinn, our copyeditor par excellence, used her superb language skills to save ourselves from ourselves. Steve Koepp and Joy Butts at Time Home Entertainment Inc., the book’s publisher, worked creatively behind the scenes to make this project a reality, and for that we’re truly grateful. And we extend our thanks and admiration to Jim Collins for providing such an insightful foreword to the book. Last, a big bow to the writers and editors on Fortune’s staff who used their in-depth knowledge of business and their nonpareil writing skills to make this book what I hope you’ll find to be a wonderful, informative read. TO DECISION-MAKERS WHO KEEP MAKING THE TOUGH CALLS . TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword BY JIM COLLINS Introduction By VERNE HARNISH Chapter 1 Apple Brings Back Steve Jobs By ADAM LASHINSKY Chapter 2 How Free Shipping Saved Zappos By JENNIFER REINGOLD Chapter 3 Why Samsung Lets Its Stars Goof Off BY NICHOLAS VARCHAVER Chapter 4 At Johnson & Johnson, the Shareholder Comes Last BY TIMOTHY K.
    [Show full text]
  • GAO-08-163 Audits of Public Companies
    United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Addressees GAO January 2008 AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES Continued Concentration in Audit Market for Large Public Companies Does Not Call for Immediate Action GAO-08-163 January 2008 AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES Accountability Integrity Reliability Continued Concentration in Audit Market for Large Highlights Public Companies Does Not Call for Immediate Action Highlights of GAO-08-163, a report to congressional addressees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found GAO has prepared this report While the small public company audit market is much less concentrated, the under the Comptroller General’s four largest accounting firms continue to audit almost all large public authority as part of a continued companies. According to GAO’s survey, 82 percent of large public effort to assist Congress in companies—the Fortune 1000—saw their choice of auditor as limited to three reviewing concentration in the or fewer firms, and about 60 percent viewed competition in their audit market market for public company audits. as insufficient. Most small public companies reported being satisfied with the The small number of large auditor choices available to them. international accounting firms performing audits of almost all large public companies raises Percentage of Companies Audited by Four Largest Accounting Firms, by Company Size Percentage interest in potential effects on (Number of companies) 98%98% competition and the choices 100 95% 92% available to large companies 90% needing an auditor. This report 80 71% examines (1) concentration in the 60 market for public company audits, 44% (2) the potential for smaller 40 22% accounting firms’ growth to ease 20 market concentration, and (3) (1,606) (794) (1,190) (907) (498) (516) (1,211) (1,513) 0 proposals that have been offered 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 by others for easing concentration <$100 million $100 million - >$500 million - >$1 billion and the barriers facing smaller $500 million $1 billion firms in expanding their market Company revenue shares.
    [Show full text]
  • World Trusts Us
    Albaraka Türk Sustainability Report 2020 World TTrustsrusts Us Contents 10 KEY SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS 12 ALBARAKA TÜRK AT A GLANCE 12 Al Baraka Banking Group (ABG) in Brief 14 Albaraka Türk in Brief 16 Albaraka Türk’s Sustainability Journey 18 Shareholding Structure AAlbarakalbaraka TTürkürk is a bank building its entire business momodeldel 19 Our Mission and Vision 20 Our Quality Policy, Core Corporate Values and Strategic Objectives in accordance with sussustainabilitytainability and working for this 22 Operational Map 24 Our Awards purppurpose.ose. 26 MESSAGE FROM THE MANAGEMENT 26 Message from the Chairman 28 Message from the General Manager WWee ccarryarry out aallll our opoperationserations by ttakingaking intintoo account an 30 Message from the Chairman of the Sustainability Committee environmenvironmentalental impacimpactt and trustrustt approach. WeWe consider 32 OUR SUSTAINABILITY ORGANIZATION 32 Al Baraka Goals (2016-2020) the sosocial,cial, environmenvironmentalental and eeconomicconomic vavalueslues we have 34 Strategic Sustainability Areas 36 Sustainability and Social Responsibility Principles within the frframeworkamework of trustrustt and we aim ttoo pass these 37 Principles of Donations and Contributions 38 Our Sustainability Organization vavalueslues on ttoo future genergenerations.ations. 39 Our Committees 40 OUR SUSTAINABILITY ACTIVITIES 40 Our Corporate Governance Approach WWithinithin the scopscopee of sussustainabilitytainability efforefforts,ts, we continue 64 Our Financial Capital 68 Our Manufactured Capital ttoo ttakeake impimportantortant sstepsteps ttoo sosolvelve various worldwide 70 Our Human Capital 80 Our Intellectual Capital probproblemslems such as globagloball warmingwarming,, ccarbonarbon emission and 84 Our Natural Capital 90 Our Social and Relational Capital wawaterter probproblems,lems, and we continue ttoo rereceiveceive the ppositiveositive 94 LOOKING TO THE FUTURE resulresultsts of these ssteps.teps.
    [Show full text]
  • Conspiracy of Fools”
    Submitted version of review published in GARP Risk Review Review of “Conspiracy of Fools” Joe Pimbley Kurt Eichenwald’s Conspiracy of Fools (Broadway Books, 2005) is a spellbinding account of the rise and fall of Enron. In nearly 700 pages the reader finds answers to “what happened?” and “how did it happen?” Based on retrospective interviews with more than a hundred primary and secondary actors in this drama, the author creates multiple, parallel story lines. He jumps back and forth between these sub-plots in a manner that maintains energy and gives the reader many natural stopping points. The great strengths of Conspiracy are that it’s thorough, extremely well- written, captivating, and, finally, it rings true. The author avoids the easy, simple conclusions that all the executives are “guilty” of crimes or plain greed and that the media-lionized whistle-blower is pure of heart. We see the ultimate outcome as personal tragedies for Jeff Skilling (President) and Ken Lay (CEO) even though they are undeniably culpable. Culpability and guilt are not synonymous, however, and different readers will have widely different judgments to render on these two men. The view of Andrew Fastow is not so murky. He and a handful of his associates did indeed lie, cheat, and steal for personal gain. Fastow’s principle “contribution” to Enron was the creation of structured finance transactions to skirt accounting rules. This one-sentence description doesn’t tell the reader much. Eichenwald gives many examples to flesh out the concept. The story of “Alpine Investors” provides the simplest case. The company wished to sell the Zond Corporation, a wind-farm operator, prior to the closing of Enron’s purchase of Portland General.
    [Show full text]
  • 1913 from the Very Beginning of the Firm, Arthur Andersen Insists That All
    1913 From the very beginning of the firm, Arthur Andersen insists that all his personnel get the “the facts behind the figures,” thus establishing the concept of a business-oriented audit. The Federal Reserve banking system is created. The 16th Amendment is ratified permitting federal income tax. 1914 The Federal Trade Commission and General Accounting Office are created. The Federal Reserve requires CPA certification of any financial statements submitted in support of applications for loans on commercial paper by member banks. 1915 Arthur Andersen takes the position that a Great Lakes steamship company had to reflect in its balance sheet the economic impact of a major post-year-end event—that is, the loss of a freighter in a storm. This was the first case of an auditor demanding disclosure of an event that occurred after year-end but before the issuance of the auditor’s report. 1916 The firm creates a formal recruitment program for college graduates. The American Association of Public Accountants (founded in 1887) changes its name to the American Institute of Accountants (AIA). 1917 The firm takes the lead in promoting tax work for industries and corporations and introduces a new concept of accounting for construction costs of public utilities, differentiating between overhead costs and direct costs. The first AIA examination is given. The Revenue Act of 1917 imposed the first excess profits tax. 1919 The first chapter of Beta Alpha Psi is established at the University of Illinois. 1921 The firm establishes a government liaison office in Washington, D.C. The American Society of Certified Public Accountants is founded in Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • Arthur Andersen Center for Financial Reporting Research Workshop
    Arthur Andersen Center for Financial Reporting Research Workshop Friday, February 14, 2020 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. 4151 Grainger Hall The Effect of Financial Reporting for Restructuring on Firm Choice of Divestiture Form Diana Weng Doctoral Candidate University of Florida FACULTY Ph.D. STUDENTS W. Choi T. Ahn M. Covaleski J. Ariel-Rohr F. Gaertner I. Baek E. Griffith A. Carlson S. Laplante D. Christensen T. Linsmeier Z. King D. Lynch M. Liang E. Matsumura B. Osswald B. Mayhew C. Partridge T. Thomas L. Rousseau D. Wangerin D. Samuel T. Warfield M. Vernon J. Wild K. Walker K. Zehms E. Wheeler The Effect of Financial Reporting for Restructuring on Firm Choice of Divestiture Form Diana Lynn Weng Fisher School of Accounting Warrington College of Business University of Florida Gainesville, FL 32611 Office phone: (352) 273-0227 February 2020 ** Do not quote without the author’s permission ** I thank my dissertation committee members Bobby Carnes, Marcus Kirk, Mike Ryngaert, and Jenny Tucker (chair) for guidance; Elia Ferracuti, Jennifer Glenn, Patrick Kielty, Jeffery Piao, and Mark Zakota for comments; and Jonathan Urbine for his assistance with the SEC filings. The Effect of Financial Reporting for Restructuring on Firm Choice of Divestiture Form ABSTRACT I examine whether financial reporting for restructuring influences managers’ choice of divestiture form. Firms have three major divestiture form options: a firm can sell a unit to another firm in a sell-off; sell a percentage of shares in a unit to new shareholders in an equity carve-out; or separate a unit and pro-ratably distribute the new unit’s shares to existing shareholders in a spin-off.
    [Show full text]
  • Here People Can Belong When They Travel by Being Connected to Local Cultures and Having Unique Travel Experiences
    ... for the implementation of sound, long-term tax policies that promote the global competitiveness of the U.S. high technology industry. Background The Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group is composed of representatives from leading high-technology companies with corporate offices predominantly located in the area between San Francisco and San Jose, California (widely known as the “Silicon Valley”). The group was formed in 1981 with current members representing the following companies: Organization Representative Autodesk SVTDG Co-Chair: Kirsten Nordlof; VP, Tax, Treasury, Risk and Procurement Cisco Systems, Inc. SVTDG Co-Chair: Robert F. Johnson; Sr. VP, Global Tax and Customs Dolby Laboratories, Inc. SVTDG Co-Chair: Grace L. Chu; Vice President, Tax and Treasurer Accenture N. James Shachoy; Senior Managing Director, Global Tax Activision Blizzard, Inc. Alex Biegert; Senior Vice President, Tax Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. Steven Kurt Johnson; Senior Director, Head of Tax Agilent Technologies, Inc. Stephen A. Bonovich; Vice President, Tax Airbnb, Inc. Mirei Yasumatsu; Global Head of Tax Amazon, Inc. Kurt Lamp; Vice President | Global Tax Analog Devices Tom Cribben; Global Tax Director Ancestry.com Edward R. Gwynn; Vice President of Tax Apple Inc. Phillip Bullock; Senior Director of Taxes Applied Materials Steven K. Shee; Vice President - Tax Aptiv, PLC Tim Seitz; Vice President Tax, Trade & Government Affairs Arista Networks Inc Jennifer A. Raney; Head Of Global Tax & Treasury Atlassian Anthony J. Maggiore; Global Head of Tax Bio-Rad Laboratories Kris L. Fisher; Vice President, Global Tax BMC Software, Inc. Matt Howell; Vice President, Global Tax Broadcom Limited Ivy Pong; Vice President, Global Taxation Cadence Design Systems, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • Read Book Conspiracy of Fools: a True Story
    CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Kurt Eichenwald | 746 pages | 15 Jan 2006 | Random House USA Inc | 9780767911795 | English | New York, United States Conspiracy of Fools - Kurt Eichenwald You can trust the others. You're at a Fortune 50 company, so don't sweat the small stuff. Just don't make me look bad. This book is soon to be made into a movie starring Leonardo DiCaprio. View all 4 comments. In it, Eichenwald does a decent job of combining the best of the three others, as if he poached some from each. Conspiracy reads as a novel, combining facts and details with presumably fictional conversations. The sometimes outrageous discussions between characters left me feeling that Eichenwald embellished a little too much, and at Conspiracy of Fools is the fourth Enron-related tale I've read Smartest Guys in the Room, Enron: The Rise and Fall, and Anatomy of Greed being the other three. He often leaves out the nitty gritty details best described by Smartest Guys in the Room, and relies too much on dramatics, like in Anatomy of Greed. And unlike Smartest Guys by far the most well written and complete chronicle of the rise and fall of Enron , Eichenwald has a definite bent to his story, almost insisting that Andrew Fastow was entirely to blame, while painting Jeff Skilling as a basket case whose emotional baggage blinded him to any wrongdoing, and Ken Lay as a social and political juggernaut with blinders on. Other former Enron executives, like Richard Causey and Rick Buy, take far too little blame for their roles in the special purpose entities that ultimately drove Enron under.
    [Show full text]
  • The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability
    LCB_10_1_PRITCHARD.DOC 3/17/2006 3:54:52 PM THE IRRATIONAL AUDITOR AND IRRATIONAL LIABILITY by A.C. Pritchard* This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Given these fundamental changes in the regulatory backdrop, I argue that the marginal benefit of litigation has been substantially diminished and in many cases that it is likely to be ineffective in promoting greater audit quality. I propose a knowledge standard for auditor liability in securities fraud cases. I. THE ECONOMICS OF AUDITING ..........................................................23 A. The Value of Auditing..........................................................................23 B. Assessing the Quality of Auditing........................................................25 II. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE REGULATION OF AUDITORS.................................................................................................28
    [Show full text]
  • The Procurement & Performance of Audits of Government
    -- 7 I -4 >I u - yT*--+- The.pn>cLre;nent & * 1 Performance Of Audits Of Government Organizations & Programs I1111ll lIlll111111111111111116289 lllll11111111 Report of Colloquium held in Cherry Hill, New Jersey November 56, and 'Z 1980 .. , This colloquium was designed to explore the views of WAS and government officials on means for improving their relationships on audits of government organizations and programs. It was conducted under the joint sponsorship of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The views expressed in this document do not represent an official position of the AICPA or the GAO. Colloquium Organization Committee and Discussion Group Leaders, Co-Leaders, and Secretaries AICPA Subcommittee on Relations with the GAO Edward J. Haller, Jr. Chairman - Price Waterhouse & Co. James S. Dwight, Jr. - Deloitte, Haskins ti Sells Fernando D. Fernandez - Sanson, Kline, Jacomino & Company Frank A. Gibson - Gibson, Johnson & Company William M. Hall - Arthur Andersen & Company Thomas R. Hanley - Touche Ross & Company David Neuman - Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Bert W. Smith, Jr. - Bert W-. Smith, Jr. &Associates Charles Taylor - University of -Mississtppi Donald L. Scantlebury - Director John L. Adair - Deputy Associate Director George L. Egan - Associate Director Robert Raspen - Systems Evaluator AICPA Staff Joseph F. Moraglio Terri S. Meidlinger Discussion Group Leaders John J. Adair - U.S. General Accounting Office George L. Egan - U.S. General Accounting Office Thomas R. Hanley - Touche Ross & Co. J. Curt Mingle - Clifton, Gunderson & Co. David Neuman - Peat, Marwick, Mitchel & Co. Frank S. Sat0 - Inspector General, Transportation and VA Cornelius E. Tierney - Georgetown University Discussion Group Co-Leaders Charles A.
    [Show full text]
  • October 22, 2018 8:30 – 9:45 A.M
    Sunday | October 21, 2018 1:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. Workshop 1: Win-Win Conversations: Transforming Conflict Into Collaboration Margie Bastolla, CIA, CRMA Principal Margie Bastolla Facilitations, LLC It’s a fact. Conflict is a part of life. Your attitude toward conflict will determine your success during difficult conversations at work and whether you achieve favorable results. Win-win conversations require that we learn why conversations fail, as well as proven methods to ensure that even our most difficult conversations have a high chance of success. In this session, participants will: • Identify key skills that underpin successful conversations and negotiations. • Discuss eight conflict triggers and five methods for managing them. • Learn how collaboration can be particularly effective when the stakes are high. • Discuss activities that lead to ongoing collaboration and trust throughout the audit. Margie Bastolla is a professional trainer and speaker who provides customized, onsite training for internal auditors on both technical and soft skill topics. She has worked in over 40 countries, conducting hundreds of seminars, workshops, and conference sessions for corporations, government entities, U.N. agencies, and IIA chapters and institutes. Bastolla draws on 30 years of leadership experience in internal auditing, international relations, association management, and public accounting. Previously, she was an executive with The IIA’s global headquarters and an auditor with Worthen Banking Corporation and Deloitte. Monday | October 22, 2018 8:30 – 9:45 a.m. General Session 1: Security in a Connected World Marc Goodman Global Security Strategist Author of Future Crimes Chair for Policy, Law, and Ethics, Silicon Valley’s Singularity University A huge proponent of technology, Marc Goodman knows that the positive aspects of the Internet are manifest.
    [Show full text]
  • A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal Liability Crisis
    Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 28 Number 3 Spring 1994 pp.867-918 Spring 1994 Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal Liability Crisis Robert Mednick Jeffrey J. Peck Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert Mednick and Jeffrey J. Peck, Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal Liability Crisis, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 867 (1994). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Mednick and Peck: Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants' Legal Articles PROPORTIONALITY: A MUCH-NEEDED SOLUTION TO THE ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL LIABILITY CRISIS* ROBERT MEDNICK" JEFFREY J. PECK- I. INTRODUCTION A fundamental precept of American jurisprudence is the apportionment of liability based on fault, with culpable parties paying their fair share of damages. As logical and fair as that proposition appears, it is increasingly the exception rather than the rule in some areas of litigation, particularly federal securities fraud litigation against certified public accountants. Achieving equitable outcomes by relating the degree of liability to the proportion of damages or settlements paid is nearly impossible in most such cases. By mandating joint and several liability, federal securities laws and some state laws encourage suits against "deep pocket" defendants, such as accounting firms, for the sole purpose of extracting settlements from those parties, regardless of their actual responsibility, if any, for the losses suffered.
    [Show full text]