By P. T. GEACH by Pooling Independent Information That It Is Good and That It Is a Car

Home , Duty, Good, Good and evil, Peter Geach

GOOD AND EVIL 33 34 ANALYSIS

that a distant object is a red car because I can see it is red and a GOOD AND EVIL keener-sightedbut colour-blind friend can see it is a car; there is no such possibility of ascertainingthat a thing is a good car By P. T. GEACH by pooling independent information that it is good and that it is a car. This sort of example shows that ' good' like ' bad' is MY first task will be to draw a logical distinction between essentiallyan attributiveadjective. Even when ' good ' or ' bad ' two sorts of adjectives, suggested by the distinction be- stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammaticallypredi- tween attributiveadjectives (e.g. 'a red book') and predicative cative, some substantivehas to be understood; there is no such adjectives (e.g.' this book is red'); I shall borrow this termi- thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or nology from the grammars. I shall say that in a phrase 'an bad so-and-so. (If I say that something is a good or bad thing, A B' ('A' being an adjective and 'B' being a noun) 'A' is a either 'thing' is a mere proxy for a more descriptive noun to (logically) predicative adjective if the predication 'is an A B' be suppliedfrom the context ; or else I am trying to use ' good ' splits up logically into a pair of predications 'is a B' and 'is or 'bad' predicatively,and its being grammaticallyattributive A'; otherwise I shall say that 'A' is a (logically) attributive is a mere disguise. The latter attempt is, on my thesis, illegiti- adjective. Henceforth I shall use the terms 'predicative adjec- mate.) tive' and ' attributive adjective' always in my special logical We can indeed say simpliciter'A is good' or 'A is bad', sense, unless the contraryis shown by my inserting the adverb where 'A' is a proper name ; but this is an exception that proves 'grammatically'. the rule. For Locke was certainlywrong in holding that there There are familiarexamples of what I call attributiveadjec- is no nominal essence of individuals; the continued use of a tives. ' Big' and' small' are attributive; ' x is a big flea' does proper name 'A' always presupposes a continued reference to not split up into 'x is a flea' and 'x is big', nor 'x is a small an individual as being the same X, where ' X ' is some common elephant' into ' x is an elephant' and ' x is small '; for if these noun; and the' X ' expressesthe nominal essence of the indivi- analyses were legitimate, a simple argument would show that a dual called 'A'. Thus use of the proper name 'Peter Geach' big fleais a big animaland a small elephanta smallanimal. Again, presupposes a continuing reference to the same man; use of the sort of adjectivethat the mediaevalscalled alienansis attribu- 'the Thames' a continuing referenceto the same river; and so tive; 'x is a forged banknote' does not split up into 'x is a on. In modern logic books you often read that proper names banknote' and 'x is forged', nor 'x is the putative father of y' have no meaning, in the sense of' meaning' in which common into ' x is the father of y' and ' x is putative'. On the other nouns are said to have meaning; or (more obscurely)that they hand, in the phrase 'a red book'' red' is a predicative have no ' connotation'. But considerthe differencebetween the adjective in my sense, although not grammaticallyso, for 'is a understandingthat a man has of a conversation overheard in red book' logically splits up into ' is a book' and' is red'. a country house when he knows that ' Seggie' stands for a I can now state my first thesis about good and evil : ' good' man, and what he has if he is uncertainwhether ' Seggie ' stands and 'bad' are always attributive, not predicative, adjectives. for a man, a Highland stream, a village, or a dog. In the one This is fairly clear about 'bad' because 'bad' is something case he knows what ' Seggie ' means, though not whom; in the like an alienansadjective; we cannot safely predicate of a bad other case he does not know what ' Seggie ' means and cannot A what we predicate of an A, any more than we can predicate follow the drift of the conversation. Well, then if the common of a forged banknote or a putative father what we predicate noun ' X ' expressesthe nominal essence of the individual called of a banknote or a father. We actuallycall forged money' bad' ; 'A'; if beingthe sameX is a condition whose fulfilment is pre- and we cannot infer e.g. that becausefood supportslife bad food supposedby our still callingan individual'A'; then the meaning supportslife. For' good' the point is not so clear at first sight, of 'A is good/bad' said simpliciter,will be 'A is a good/bad X '. since ' good' is not alienans-whatever holds true of an A as E.g. if' Seggie' stands for a man,' Seggie is good' said simpli- such holds true of a good A. But consider the contrast in such citerwill mean 'Seggie is a good man', though context might a pair of phrasesas ' red car ' and' good car '. I could ascertain make it mean ' Seggie is a good deer-stalker', or the like.

The moral philosophers known as Objectivists would admit thought to escape the force of Frege's arguments that the all that I have said as regards the ordinary uses of the terms number 7 is not a figure, by saying that it is a figure, only a ' good' and 'bad'; but they allege that there is an essentially non-naturalfigure, and that this is a possibility Frege failed to different, predicative, use of the terms in such utterances as consider. ' pleasure is good' and' preferringinclination to duty is bad ', Moreover, can a philosopher offer philosophical utterances and that this use alone is of philosophical importance. The like 'pleasure is good' as an explanationof how he means ordinary uses of'good' and 'bad' are for Objectivists just a 'good' to be taken in his discussions? " Forget the uses of complex tangle of ambiguities. I read an article once by an 'good' in ordinary language" says the Objectivist; " in our Objectivist exposing these ambiguities and the baneful effects discussionit shall meanwhat I meanby it in such typical remarks they have on philosophers not forewarnedof them. One philo- as ' pleasure is good'. You, of course, know just how I want sopher who was so misled was Aristotle ; Aristotle, indeed, did you to take these. No, of course I cannot explain further: in sense is a and un- not talk English, but by a remarkablecoincidence aya0cd. had don't you know that 'good' my simple ambiguitiesquite parallelto those of' good '. Such coincidences definableterm ?" But how can we be asked to take for granted are, of course, possible; puns are sometimes translatable. But at the outset that a peculiarlyphilosophical use of words neces- it is also possible that the uses of dya0o' and 'good' run sarily means anything at all ? Still less can we be expected at parallel because they express one and the same concept; that the outset to know what this use means. this is a philosophically important concept, in which Aristotle I conclude that Objectivismis only the pretenceof a way out did well to be interested; and that the apparentdissolution of of the NaturalisticFallacy: it does not really give an account this concept into a mass of ambiguities results from trying to of how 'good' differs in its logic from other terms, but only assimilate it to the concepts expressed by ordinary predicative darkenscounsel by words without knowledge. adjectives. It is mere prejudice to think that either all things What I have said so far would meet with general approval called ' good' must satisfy some one condition, or the term by contemporary ethical writers at Oxford (whom I shall 'good' is hopelessly ambiguous. A philosopher who writes henceforth call the Oxford Moralists); and I now have to off most of the uses of' good' as trivial facts about the English consider their positive account of' good'. They hold that the language can, of course, with some plausibility, represent the features of the term's use which I have described derive from remaining uses of 'good' as all expressing some definite its function's being primarilynot descriptiveat all but commen- condition fulfilled by good things--e.g. that they either contain, datory. ' That is a good book ' means something like ' I recom- or are conducive to, pleasure; or again that they satisfy desire. mend that book' or 'choose that book'. Clearly, though, Such theories of goodness are, however, open to well-known even if the primaryforce of' good' is commendationthere are objections ; they are cases of the NaturalisticFallacy, as Objec- many cases where its force is purely descriptive-' Hutton was tivists say. The Objectivists' own theory is that 'good' in the batting on a good wicket ', in a newspaper report, would not selected uses they leave to the word does not supply an ordinary, mean 'What a wonderful wicket Hutton was batting on. May ' natural', description of things, but ascribes to them a simple you have such a wicket when you bat'. The Oxford Moralists and indefinablenon-natural attribute. But nobody has ever given account for such cases by saying that here ' good' is, so to say, a coherent and understandableaccount of what it is for an in quotation marks; Hutton was batting on a ' good' wicket, attribute to be non-natural. I am very much afraid that the i.e. a wicket such as cricket fans would call 'good', i.e. would Objectivists are just playing fast and loose with the term commend and choose. ' attribute'. In order to assimilate' good' to ordinarypredica- I totally reject this view that 'good' has not a primarily tive adjectiveslike'red' and'sweet' they call goodness an attri- descriptiveforce. Somebody who did not care two pins about bute; to escape undesired consequences drawn from the cricket, but fully understood how the game worked (not an assimilation, they can always protest, 'Oh no, not like that. impossible supposition), could supply a purely descriptivesense Goodness isn't a naturalattribute like redness and sweetness, for the phrase 'good batting wicket' regardless of the tastes it's a non-natural attribute'. It is just as though somebody of cricket fans. Again if I call a man a good burglaror a good

This content downloaded from 130.49.198.5 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 10:12:59 AM This content downloaded from 130.49.198.5 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 10:12:59 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GOOD AND EVIL 37 38 ANALYSIS cut-throatI am certainlynot commending him myself; one can of 2 ' means the same as ' the double of 2 '. This mathematical imagine circumstancesin which these descriptionswould serve analogy may help to get our heads clear. There is no one number to guide another man's choice (e.g. if a commando leader were by which you can always multiply a number to get its square: choosing burglars and cut-throats for a special job), but such but it does not follow either that 'square of' is an ambiguous circumstancesare rare and cannot give the primarysense of the expression meaning sometimes 'double of', sometimes 'treble descriptions. It ought to be clear that calling a thing a good of', etc., or that you have to do something other than multi- A does not influence choice unless the one who is choosing plying to find the square of a number; and, given a number, happens to want an A; and this influence on action is not the its square is determinate. Similarly,there is no one description logically primary force of the word 'good'. 'You have ants to which all things called 'good so-and-so's' answer; but it in your pants ', which obviously has a primarily descriptive does not follow either that 'good' is a very ambiguous ex- force, is far closer to affectingaction than many uses of the term pression or that calling a thing good is something differentfrom ' good '. And many uses of the word ' good' have no reference describingit ; and given the descriptiveforce of'A', the descrip- to the tastes of a panel of experts or anything of the sort; if tive force of' a good A' does not depend upon people's tastes. I say that a man has a good eye or a good stomach my remark " But I could know what' good hygrometer' meant without has a very clear descriptive force and has no reference to any knowing what hygrometers were for; I could not, however, panel of eye or stomach fanciers. in that case be giving a definite descriptive force to 'good So far as I can gather from their writings, the Oxford hygrometer' as opposed to ' hygrometer'; so ' good' must Moralistswould develop two lines of objection against the view have commendatorynot, descriptive force." The reply to this that' good' has a primarilydescriptive force. First, if we avoid objection (imitatedfrom actualarguments of the Oxford Moral- the twin errors of the Naturalistic Fallacy and of Objectivism ists) is that if I do not know what hygrometersare for, I do not we shall see that there is no one description, 'natural' or really know what 'hygrometer' means, and thereforedo not 'non-natural ', to which all good things answer. The traits really know what 'good hygrometer' means; I merely know for which a thing is called 'good' are different according to that I could find out its meaningby findingout what hygrometers the kind of thing in question; a knife is called ' good' if it is were for-just as I know how I could find out the value of the UVW, a stomach if it is XYZ, and so on. So, if ' good' did squareof the numberof the people in Sarkif I knew the number have a properly descriptive force this would vary from case to of people, and so far may be said to understandthe phrase,' the case: 'good' applied to knives would express the attributes square of the number of the people in Sark'. UVW, 'good' as applied to stomachs would express the attri- The Oxford Moralists' second line of objection consists in butes XYZ, and so on. If' good' is not to be merelyambiguous first asking whether the connexion between calling a thing 'a its primaryforce must be taken to be the unvarying commen- good A' and advising a man who wants an A to choose this datory force, not the indefinitelyvarying descriptiveforce. one is analytic or empirical, and then developing a dilemma. This argument is a mere fallacy; it is another example of It sounds clearlywrong to make the connexion a mere empirical assimilating' good' to ordinarypredicative adjectives, or rather fact; but if we make it analytic, then 'good' cannot have it assumes that this assimilationwould have to be all right if the descriptiveforce, for from a mere descriptionadvice cannot be force of' good' were descriptive. It would not in fact follow, logically inferred. even if'good' were an ordinary predicative adjective, that if I should indeed say that the connexion is not merely empiri- ' good knife' means the same as ' knife that is UVW', ' good' cal ; but neither is it analytic. It belongs to the ratioof' want ', ' and and other means the same as 'UVW'. '.Triangle with all its sides equal' choose',' good ', ' bad', that, normally, things means the same as 'triangle with three sides equal', but you being equal, a man who wants an A will choose a good A and cannot cancel out 'triangle' and say that 'with all its sides will not choose a bad A---or rather will choose an A that he equal' means the same as 'with three sides equal'. In the case thinks good and will not choose an A that he thinks bad. This of' the is even it is like that holds good whetherthe A's we are choosing between are knives, C good' fallacy grosser; thinking squareof' means the same as ' double of' because ' the square horses, or thieves; quidquidappetitur, appetitur sub specieboni.

Since the qualifyingphrase, 'normallyand other things being Now indeed a man may be got by training into a state of mind equal', is necessaryfor the truthof this statement,it is not an in which ' You mustnot ' is a sufficientanswer to ' Why shouldn't analyticstatement. But the presenceof these phrasesdoes not I?'; in which, giving this answer to himself, or hearing it reducethe statementto a mererough empiricalgeneralization: given by others, strikes him with a quite peculiar awe; in to think this would be to commit a crude empiricistfallacy, which, perhaps, he even thinks he 'must not' ask why he exposedonce for all by Wittgenstein. Even if not all A's are 'must not'. (Cf. Lewis Carroll's juvenile poem 'My Fairy', B's, the statementthat A's are normallyB's may belongto the with its devastating 'Moral: You mustn't '.) Moral philo- ratioof an A. Most chess moves are valid, most intentionsare sophers of the Objectivist school, like Sir David Ross, would carriedout, most statementsare veracious; none of these call this 'apprehensionof one's obligations ' ; it does not worry statementsis just a rough generalization,for if we tried to them that, but for God's grace, this sort of training can make a describehow it would be for most chess moves to be invalid, man 'apprehend' practically anything as his ' obligations'. most intentionsnot to be carriedout, most statementsto be (Indeed, they admirea man who does what he thinks he mustdo lies, we shouldsoon find ourselvestalking nonsense. We shall regardlessof what he actuallydoes; is he not acting from the equallyfind ourselvestalking nonsense if we try to describea Sense of Duty which is the highest motive?) But even if ad people whose customit was, when they wantedA's, to choose hominem'You mustn't' is a final answer to 'Why shouldn't A's they thoughtbad and rejectA's they thoughtgood. (And I? ', it is no rationalanswer at all. this goes for all interpretationsof 'A'). It can, I think, be shown that an action's being a good or There is, I admit, much more difficultyin passing from bad human action is of itself something that touches the agent's 'man' to ' good/bad/man', or from 'human act' to ' good/ desires. Although calling a thing 'a good A' or' a bad A' does bad/humanact', if these phrasesare to be taken as purely not of itself work upon the hearer'sdesires, it may be expected descriptiveand in sensesdetermined simply by those of' man' to do so if the hearerhappens to be choosing an A. Now what and 'human act'. I think this difficultycould be overcome; a man cannot fail to be choosing is his manner of acting; so but even so the OxfordMoralists could now deploya powerful to call a mannerof acting good or bad cannot but serve to guide weapon of argument. Let us supposethat we have found a action. As Aristotle says, acting well, e rpaa, is a man's cleardescriptive meaning for ' good humanact' and for 'bad aim simpliciter,&As, and qua man; other objects of choice human act', and have shown that adulteryanswers to the are so only relatively, rrpds rn, or are the objects of a parti- description'bad humanact'. Why should this consideration cular man, lrtvol; but any man has to choose how to act, deteran intendingadulterer? By what logicalstep can we pass so calling an action good or bad does not depend for its effect from the supposedlydescriptive sentence 'adultery is a bad as a suasion upon any individual peculiaritiesof desire. humanact ' to the imperative' you mustnot commitadultery '? I shall not here attempt to explicate the descriptive force of It is uselessto say 'It is your duty to do good and avoid doing 'good (bad) human action': but some remarksupon the logic evil'; either this is much the same as the unhelpfulremark of the phrase seem to be called for. In the first place, a tennis 'It is good to do good and avoid doing evil ', or else 'It is stroke or chess move is a human act. Are we to say, then, that your duty' is a smugglingin of an imperativeforce not con- the description ' good tennis stroke' or ' good chess move' is veyed by the terms 'good' and 'evil', which are ex bypothesi of itself something that must appeal to the agent's desire? purelydescriptive. Plainly not; but this is no difficulty. Although a tennis stroke We must allow in the first place that the question,'Why or a chess move is a human act, it does not follow that a good should I'? or 'Why shouldn'tI'? is a reasonablequestion, tennis stroke or a good chess move is a good humanact, because which calls for an answer,not for abusiveremarks about the of the peculiar logic of the term 'good'; so calling a tennis wickednessof asking; andI thinkthat the only relevantanswer stroke or a chess move good is not eo ipso an appeal to what an is an appealto somethingthe questionerwants. Since Kant's agent must be wanting. time peoplehave supposedthat thereis anothersort of relevant Secondly, though we can sensibly speak of a good or bad reply--an appealnot to inclinationbut to the Sense of Duty. 1E.N. I139b 2-4.

This content downloaded from 130.49.198.5 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 10:12:59 AM This content downloaded from 130.49.198.5 on Mon, 3 Mar 2014 10:12:59 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GOOD AND EVIL 41 42 ANALYSIS humanact, we cannot sensiblyspeak of a good or bad event, respectingthe rightsof those who have respectedthe rightsof a good or bad thing to happen. ' Event ', like ' thing ', is too others".1 (We must charitablyhope thatfor him the words of emptya wordto conveyeither a criterionof identityor a standard Caiaphasthat he quotesjust had the vaguelyhallowed associa- of goodness; to ask' Is this a good or bad thing(to happen)?' tions of a Bible text, and that he did not rememberwhose is as uselessas to ask 'Is this the samething that I saw yester- judicialmurder was being counselled).2 day?' or' Is the sameevent still going on ? ', unlessthe empti- I am well awarethat much of this discussionis unsatisfying; ness of' thing' or' event' is filled up by a specialcontext of some pointson whichI thinkI do see dear I havenot beenable utterance.Caesar's murder was a badthing to happento a living to developat properlength; on manypoints (e.g. the relation organism,a good fate for a man who wanteddivine worship betweendesire and good, and the preciseratio of evil in evil for himself, and again a good or bad act on the part of his acts), I certainlydo not see clear. Moreover,though I have murderers; to askwhether it wasa good or badevent would be arguedthat the characteristicof being a good or bad human senseless. actionis of itself boundto influencethe agent'sdesires, I have Thirdly,I am deliberatelyignoring the supposeddistinction not discussedwhether an actionof its naturebad is alwaysand betweenthe Right and the Good. In Aquinasthere is no such on all accountsto be avoided,as Aristotlethought. Butperhaps, distinction.He findsit sufficientto talkof good andbad human though I have not made everythingclear, I have made some acts. WhenRoss would say that thereis a morallygood action things clearer. but not a right act, Aquinaswould say that a good human intentionhad issued in what was, in fact, a bad action; and Universityof Birmingham. whenRoss wouldsay that there was a rightact but not a morally would that there was a bad human 1The Right and the Good, p. 61. good action, Aquinas say S Holding this notion of theright act, people have even held that some creativeact act performedin circumstancesin which a similaract with a would be theright act for a God--e.g. that a God would be obliged to create the best differentintention would have been a one of all possibleworlds, so that either this world of ours is the best possibleor there is no good (e.g. giving good God. I shall not go furtherinto this; it will be enough to say that what is to be moneyto a beggarfor the praiseof menrather than for the relief expectedof a good Creatoris a good world, not theright world. of his misery). Sincethe Englishword ' right' has an idiomaticpredilection for the definitearticle-we speakof a good chess move but of theright move-people who thinkthat doing rightis something other than doing good will regardvirtuous behaviour as con- sisting,not justin doinggood andeschewing evil, but in doing, on everyoccasion, the right act for the occasion. This speciously strictdoctrine leads in fact to quitelaxist consequences. A man who just keepson doing good and eschewingevil, if he knows that adultery is an evil act, will decide that (as Aristotle says) there can be no deliberatingwhen or how or with whom to commit adultery.1 But a man who believesin discerning,on each occasion,the right act for the occasion,may well decide that on this occasion, all things considered, adultery is the right action. Sir David Ross explicitlytells us that on occasionthe right act may be the judicialpunishment of an innocentman "that the whole nation perish not ": for in this case " the primafacie duty of consultingthe generalinterest has proved more obligatorythan the perfectlydistinct prima facie duty of 1E.N. 110o7a6.