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The New Politics of Contemporary Russia

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The New Politics of Contemporary Russia The New Politics of Contemporary Russia Alexander Yakovlev Chairman of the Social Democratic Party An Interview by Andrew B. Loewenstein and Minkoo Rhee Moscow, May 17,1995 Journal: Do you believe that having a small number of well-established politi cal parties is necessary for a functioning democracy? Yakovlev: There should be only two or three powerful parties at this stage in Russian development, and they should all be committed to democracy. Unfor tunately, if we simplify the current situation, there are two kinds of parties: those that wish to restore the old system and those that wish to reform it. It would be much better if there were only two or three democratic parties, but if there are dozens of parties—as there are now—they cannot truly be called par ties. The Communist and Agrarian Parties are more or less organized, but they are committed to restoration. In contrast, there has yet to be a well-organized democratic party. Journal: Will the party system stabilize into two or three parties? Yakovlev: It will stabilize, but the key question is how will it be organized. If they are organized into blocks—as they are now—then probably nothing will be achieved. Journal: Russia has almost no experience in democracy. How does this lack of experience affect politics today? Yakovlev: It makes it very difficult. For thousands of years Russia was di rected by people, not law. There were feudal lords, czars, emperors, leaders, Summer 1995 - Volume II, Issue 2 133 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alexander Yakovlev general secretaries, presidents, but not law. This makes it very difficult to es tablish a democratic system. Democracy is the dictatorship of the law, but no one here is used to that. People in Russia are willing to acknowledge a dictator ship of people, but not of law. That is our tragedy. Journal: How long will it take before a democratic mentality is instilled into the Russian people? Yakovlev: That is impossible to answer. In part, it will be possible for our chil dren, and even more so for our grandchildren. For example, my son is commit ted to democracy. However, I know some parents whose children do not hold these same ideals. Journal: What can be done to help the process? Yakovlev: Even if there is a Communist restoration, it will fail. There are too many obstacles. The Communists failed to achieve anything in seventy years; what can they do in four? However, one thing is clear—the constitution must be changed. This, however, is a very difficult effort—one which could be ac complished with the help of a referendum. On the other hand, no one can predict the results of a referendum. Journal: Do you really believe that there were no achievements or benefits from Communist rule? Yakovlev: On the surface, there were some achievements, like the successful fight against illiteracy. Before Communism, close to 80 percent of the popula tion was illiterate. My mother, for instance, she was illiterate. She attended school for just three months before becoming a nurse. My father graduated from the fourth grade of church school. But I am an acadamician. From this point of view, there were important achievements. As for industrialization and collectivization, there are different points of view. Personally, I think that the so-called "revolutionary steps" and "revo lutionary achievements" proved only to be destructive. Industrialization was monopolized by military industry while collectivization only destroyed rural life. Moreover, let us imagine what would have happened if Russia had fol lowed a democratic path. By now, Russia would be a flourishing, highly devel oped democracy. I am quite negative about the effects of Bolshevism. All was done by violence. Even the infamous concentration camps did not achieve high labor productivity because everything operated through violence. I regret that many Russians do not want to understand that it is their personal mistake. They lived an honest life and were not responsible for Stalin's evil deeds. They did their responsibilities very honestly. On the other hand, people should realize that they have other, human responsibilities. We should understand that we 134 The Brown Journal of World Affairs This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The New Politics of Contemporary Russia are all personally responsible for what has happened. Even now, if the Com munists come into power through the democratic process, we shall all be re sponsible. Journal: You talked about the gains made during the Communist period. Do you think that Russia was ready for democracy seventy years ago, or were such gains as literacy necessary before democracy could take hold? Yakovlev: On the contrary. Here in Russia we mistake democracy with demo cratic procedures. We do not have real democracy. What is democracy? It is a relationship between people—I respect your sovereignty and you respect mine. For me, my respect of your dignity is 7TT 7 7TT TT higher than my own. As a result of this, We should have neither within the democratic system I become a total governmental control «or totally liberal methods in Russia. The West has more advanced of governing. We need democratic procedures—freedom of something in between. speech, parliament, elections, a constitu tion, and so on—that is, democratic elements that reach down through various levels of society. This is what we lack in Russia. Yes, we have some of that in urban centers—in Moscow, especially, we have a parliament and elections— but real democratic procedures have not yet penetrated the whole of society. There are many people who have not yet felt any positive benefit from democ racy. To many people the changes have only brought about chaos. Journal: Do ultra-nationalists such as Zhirinovsky present a legitimate threat to democracy? Yakovlev: Of course they do. For the time being, Zhirnovsky is able to deceive people, but his support is built only upon demagoguery and conspiratorial plots. This trend has no future. Fascism in Russia can grow only from chauvinism and nationalism, so that such groups as Russian Unity are very dangerous. Now we see that even the Communists are abandoning internationalism and adopting a platform of extreme national Bolshevism. Journal: The Soviet military was traditionally not involved in politics. Do you fear that the Russian military will become more involved in Russian politics? Is this dangerous? Yakovlev: On the contrary. The military has always been involved in politics. During the revolution, the army was one of the driving forces. Together with the KGB and the military-industrial-complex, the military formed a state within the state. Now, the political influence is much less—and it should be less. In my view, the military should not have any political influence. Everybody has their own sphere. The military should insure the security of the country, politi Summerl995 - Volume II, Issue 2 135 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alexander Yakovlev dans should concern themselves with politics, artists should draw, journalists should write articles. I believe that even priests should not involve themselves in politics. Journal: Many are concerned that after his struggle with parliament, Yeltsin now owes a debt to the military because of their assistance. Will this give the military more political influence? Yakovlev: No, their influence has not changed. The Western media has a bad habit of portraying Russia in a distorted and misleading manner. When I was last in the West, I was horror-struck after watching television coverage of Rus sia. I thought that something terrible had happened. When I arrived back in Moscow and asked what had happened, I was told "nothing special." While in many respects the press is very good, sometimes it does terrible things. What does your press report about America? Scandals about the president, his wife, their marriage problems, earthquakes in California—and nothing else. It leaves the impression that the only things that happen in America are scandals and earthquakes, but in reality we know that people work, take walks, smile, take care of their children. Life is very different from the way it is reported. Journal: On the topic of the press, are you concerned that its freedom is being restricted, if not by law then by mafia? Yakovlev: The press is economically dependent, but to say that it is beginning to serve the interests of these groups is incorrect. What is dangerous is that there are quite a few newspapers now with fascist slants. Furthermore, it is dangerous when journalists are paid to write articles from a certain perspec tive. This problem has its roots in the old system of misinformation and lack of journalistic freedom. For example, Ostankino was once a government struc ture that would serve whoever was in power. Now it waits for direction. What happens if Zhirnovsky or Zyuganov gains power? Journal: Has privatization proceeded too rapidly? Yakovlev: Agrarian reform is not going very well. There will be no democracy in Russia until the question of agrarian reform is resolved. Military reform is not going very well either. The defense minister thought and thought, but the only thing he could think of was to prolong the length of service in the army. In essence, reform began at the wrong end. First, one should decide on real re form and only afterwards on the amount of time people should serve in the army.
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