The New Politics of Contemporary

Alexander Yakovlev

Chairman of the Social Democratic Party

An Interview by Andrew B. Loewenstein and Minkoo Rhee Moscow, May 17,1995

Journal: Do you believe that having a small number of well-established politi cal parties is necessary for a functioning democracy?

Yakovlev: There should be only two or three powerful parties at this stage in Russian development, and they should all be committed to democracy. Unfor tunately, if we simplify the current situation, there are two kinds of parties: those that wish to restore the old system and those that wish to reform it. It would be much better if there were only two or three democratic parties, but if there are dozens of parties—as there are now—they cannot truly be called par ties. The Communist and Agrarian Parties are more or less organized, but they are committed to restoration. In contrast, there has yet to be a well-organized democratic party.

Journal: Will the party system stabilize into two or three parties?

Yakovlev: It will stabilize, but the key question is how will it be organized. If they are organized into blocks—as they are now—then probably nothing will be achieved.

Journal: Russia has almost no experience in democracy. How does this lack of experience affect politics today?

Yakovlev: It makes it very difficult. For thousands of years Russia was di rected by people, not law. There were feudal lords, czars, emperors, leaders,

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms general secretaries, presidents, but not law. This makes it very difficult to es tablish a democratic system. Democracy is the dictatorship of the law, but no one here is used to that. People in Russia are willing to acknowledge a dictator ship of people, but not of law. That is our tragedy.

Journal: How long will it take before a democratic mentality is instilled into the Russian people?

Yakovlev: That is impossible to answer. In part, it will be possible for our chil dren, and even more so for our grandchildren. For example, my son is commit ted to democracy. However, I know some parents whose children do not hold these same ideals.

Journal: What can be done to help the process?

Yakovlev: Even if there is a Communist restoration, it will fail. There are too many obstacles. The Communists failed to achieve anything in seventy years; what can they do in four? However, one thing is clear—the constitution must be changed. This, however, is a very difficult effort—one which could be ac complished with the help of a referendum. On the other hand, no one can predict the results of a referendum.

Journal: Do you really believe that there were no achievements or benefits from Communist rule?

Yakovlev: On the surface, there were some achievements, like the successful fight against illiteracy. Before Communism, close to 80 percent of the popula tion was illiterate. My mother, for instance, she was illiterate. She attended school for just three months before becoming a nurse. My father graduated from the fourth grade of church school. But I am an acadamician. From this point of view, there were important achievements. As for industrialization and collectivization, there are different points of view. Personally, I think that the so-called "revolutionary steps" and "revo lutionary achievements" proved only to be destructive. Industrialization was monopolized by military industry while collectivization only destroyed rural life. Moreover, let us imagine what would have happened if Russia had fol lowed a democratic path. By now, Russia would be a flourishing, highly devel oped democracy. I am quite negative about the effects of Bolshevism. All was done by violence. Even the infamous concentration camps did not achieve high labor productivity because everything operated through violence. I regret that many do not want to understand that it is their personal mistake. They lived an honest life and were not responsible for Stalin's evil deeds. They did their responsibilities very honestly. On the other hand, people should realize that they have other, human responsibilities. We should understand that we

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The New Politics of Contemporary Russia are all personally responsible for what has happened. Even now, if the Com munists come into power through the democratic process, we shall all be re sponsible.

Journal: You talked about the gains made during the Communist period. Do you think that Russia was ready for democracy seventy years ago, or were such gains as literacy necessary before democracy could take hold?

Yakovlev: On the contrary. Here in Russia we mistake democracy with demo cratic procedures. We do not have real democracy. What is democracy? It is a relationship between people—I respect your sovereignty and you respect mine. For me, my respect of your dignity is 7TT 7 7TT TT higher than my own. As a result of this, We should have neither within the democratic system I become a total governmental control «or totally liberal methods in Russia. The West has more advanced of governing. We need democratic procedures—freedom of something in between. speech, parliament, elections, a constitu tion, and so on—that is, democratic elements that reach down through various levels of society. This is what we lack in Russia. Yes, we have some of that in urban centers—in Moscow, especially, we have a parliament and elections— but real democratic procedures have not yet penetrated the whole of society. There are many people who have not yet felt any positive benefit from democ racy. To many people the changes have only brought about chaos.

Journal: Do ultra-nationalists such as Zhirinovsky present a legitimate threat to democracy?

Yakovlev: Of course they do. For the time being, Zhirnovsky is able to deceive people, but his support is built only upon demagoguery and conspiratorial plots. This trend has no future. Fascism in Russia can grow only from chauvinism and nationalism, so that such groups as Russian Unity are very dangerous. Now we see that even the Communists are abandoning internationalism and adopting a platform of extreme national Bolshevism.

Journal: The Soviet military was traditionally not involved in politics. Do you fear that the Russian military will become more involved in Russian politics? Is this dangerous?

Yakovlev: On the contrary. The military has always been involved in politics. During the revolution, the army was one of the driving forces. Together with the KGB and the military-industrial-complex, the military formed a state within the state. Now, the political influence is much less—and it should be less. In my view, the military should not have any political influence. Everybody has their own sphere. The military should insure the security of the country, politi

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alexander Yakovlev dans should concern themselves with politics, artists should draw, journalists should write articles. I believe that even priests should not involve themselves in politics.

Journal: Many are concerned that after his struggle with parliament, Yeltsin now owes a debt to the military because of their assistance. Will this give the military more political influence?

Yakovlev: No, their influence has not changed. The Western media has a bad habit of portraying Russia in a distorted and misleading manner. When I was last in the West, I was horror-struck after watching television coverage of Rus sia. I thought that something terrible had happened. When I arrived back in Moscow and asked what had happened, I was told "nothing special." While in many respects the press is very good, sometimes it does terrible things. What does your press report about America? Scandals about the president, his wife, their marriage problems, earthquakes in California—and nothing else. It leaves the impression that the only things that happen in America are scandals and earthquakes, but in reality we know that people work, take walks, smile, take care of their children. Life is very different from the way it is reported.

Journal: On the topic of the press, are you concerned that its freedom is being restricted, if not by law then by mafia?

Yakovlev: The press is economically dependent, but to say that it is beginning to serve the interests of these groups is incorrect. What is dangerous is that there are quite a few newspapers now with fascist slants. Furthermore, it is dangerous when journalists are paid to write articles from a certain perspec tive. This problem has its roots in the old system of misinformation and lack of journalistic freedom. For example, Ostankino was once a government struc ture that would serve whoever was in power. Now it waits for direction. What happens if Zhirnovsky or Zyuganov gains power?

Journal: Has privatization proceeded too rapidly?

Yakovlev: Agrarian reform is not going very well. There will be no democracy in Russia until the question of agrarian reform is resolved. Military reform is not going very well either. The defense minister thought and thought, but the only thing he could think of was to prolong the length of service in the army. In essence, reform began at the wrong end. First, one should decide on real re form and only afterwards on the amount of time people should serve in the army. Reforms are proceeding, but obstacles remain. For instance, the Duma sees itself as a confrontational force. Although a legislative body should take a position in opposition, it should also try to serve the government and guaran tee democracy. In Russia, just the opposite is happening. Parliament is more authoritarian than the government.

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Journal: To what degree should governmental control be maintained over the economy?

Yakovlev: There should be no control. I hold very liberal views on the role of government in the economy. If the state controlled everything and everybody then nothing would work. All the state should do is collect taxes and enforce the law.

Journal: Is a strong central government needed during the transitional period?

Yakovlev: We are going through a very serious transition. We can have neither total control nor totally liberal methods of governing. Rather, we need some thing in between, especially since the law is so weak. Liberal economy is effi cient only as long as there is strong law, whereas centralized economy is based on totalitarianism. Hence, the transition needs something in between. At the moment, privatization needs a strong backing of power. The only question is, what kind of power and how much?

Journal: Does this make democratization difficult?

Yakovlev: One cannot say government is either good or bad. If the govern ment is flexible, it develops along with the reforms, and that is good for democ racy. If the government blocks reform, it is bad for democracy. This all de pends on the degree of control. Take productivity, for example. There should be a rigorous, iron discipline enforced, but our labor force has no discipline. Instead, many are brought up to detest honest, simple labor. We have become used to working under pressure.

Journal: Russia desperately needs foreign capital. One exportable good that Russia can market is nuclear technology. Should Russia sell nuclear technol ogy—even to countries that might use it to develop weapons?

Yakovlev: There are many aspects to this question. First, Russia was pushed into doing it. I do not understand why Russia is neither allowed into the world market nor permitted to join any economic community. What are we to do if we are not allowed to be equal partners in the international market? The West has pushed Russia into a corner, and now the West is scared. I remember when everyone blamed the for Iraq's nuclear program. Later it was revealed that the West had sold arms to Iraq. There should be universally agreed upon rules regulating the arms trade.

Journal. The former Soviet Union is troubled by ethnic separatism. is just one example. Will Yeltsin's reaction help to prevent similar experiences elsewhere in Russia?

Yakovlev: There are no potential similar crises. The Tatar separatists simply

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This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 21:46:24 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Alexander Yakovlev want more rights. No region besides Chechnya wants to break away from the federation, so I am not concerned for the future of Russia.

Journal: Do they desire greater autonomy?

Yakovlev: Yes. This is a never-ending process. There will be two tendencies in the future: first, national republics will strive for greater autonomy, and sec ond, the regional oblasts will desire equal treatment. For example, Tataria has the economic basis for more autonomy. In all the Northern Caucasian repub lics—except in Chechnya—80 percent of the population live according to the Russian pattern. When the problem in Chechnya began, everyone thought that the whole region would follow suit. In reality, nothing will happen. I am not concerned for the other republics.

Journal: What can be done to promote unity within the Russian federation?

Yakovlev: More power should be given Even if there is a Commu- to local government. When someone nist restoration, it will fail. askusfor m°re Pfwr' -v0"should 8™;,» . - to him and make him the accountable 1 he Communists tailed to on6/ make him responsible for himself; achieve anything in seventy eventually he will return the power. i . .1 1 • Many want power but few like respon years; what can they do in siblli^. Th/problem is that the Jo g0 four? hand in hand. If the republics want more autonomy, then they should accept more responsibility for social life, education, and infastructure —but no one wants to assume that responsibility. Therefore, we need not worry about unity.

Journal: Do you see Russia as a stabilizing force for the CIS ?

Yakovlev: Of course. Look what is happening in Belorussia—between 70 and 80 percent of the population voted to reintegrate with Russia. They have had enough independence.

Journal: Does the CIS have a meaningful future ?

Yakovlev: I personally think that the most effective state organization is a vol untary confederation, but only if it is truly voluntary. For now, there is only one obstacle—Russia does not want to maintain the old system. The people voted against unification. I think that Russia would vote in favor of vinification with Belorussia, but with Central Asian countries? That is another matter.

Journal: Were the ideas of initiated by Gorbachev, or was he acting on the suggestion of others?

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Yakovlev: To a great extent he was acting on his own volition, but he also took the advice of others. The was not based on democracy, but that does not mean Gorbachev was not subject to influence. Within two years of assum ing leadership, Gorbachev became influenced by the KGB. This destroyed him The KGB managed to convince Gorbachev that the destructive forces were the democrats.

Journal: What kind of society did you envision building through perestroika?

Yakovlev: I did not envision a society, but a community—one where a man could live well, where he could feel good and happy. We did not try to invent a new society. Inventing "isms" is done by politicians. Capitalism is deceptive; there is no such thing as a capitalist society just as there is no truly socialist society. In feudalism, powers and responsibilities are clear, but the same does not hold true for either socialism or capitalism. The Politburo based its activities on consensus. If one member of the Politburo was against a policy, the motion was postponed. And so a member of the Politburo very rarely demanded that his opinion be written down. For example, when the Politburo drafted a letter to send to local party organiza tions attacking the democratic reform measures, certain members were able to delay its actual transmission.

Journal: So, you had a dissenting voice.

Yakovlev: Shevernadze was also against it. But he did not participate.

Journal: When other political parties were legalized, was it imagined that the Communist Party might not remain dominant?

Yakovlev: Gorbachev acknowledged that this was a possibility. Gorbachev was like any other man; he was afraid to lose power. He though that if he partici pated in the liquidation of the Communist Party, it would mean the end of his power. In reality, just the opposite was true. If Gorbachev had resigned from his position as general secretary, he could have been more successful. He made a mistake. He thought he was a man of invincible power.

Journal: So if Gorbachev had left like Shevernadze had, then his respect among the democrats would have increased?

Yakovlev: When I visited him and told him that I was resigning, he tried to persuade me that it was a mistake. We had a long conversation. I tried to persuade him, he tried to persuade me.

Journal: You tried to persuade him to resign?

Yakovlev: No. I tried to persuade him to create a new party. And I tried to warn

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Journal: This was just before the coup?

Yakovlev: Yes. He thought that I was overestimating their cleverness and cour age.

Journal: When did you first realize that the Soviet Union would break apart?

Yakovlev: I never expected it to happen the way it did. One of the topics of my convesation with Gorbachev was the future of the state organization I sup ported the idea of a confederation because I understood that the Union, in its existing form, could not survive. He tried to preserve the federation as a state. I was behind the confederation as a union of societies.

Journal: Was the break-up desirable?

Yakovlev: It was inevitable.

Journal: Was it inevitable in the short-term?

Yakovlev: We can only guess. One could have peacefully converted the Union into a voluntary confederation under the condition of mutual assistance, but each government would have been responsible for the development of their own economy.

Journal: What made you think that a coup was coming?

Yakovlev: The reactionary forces had no way out. A coup was their only chance to preserve power. They understood that beyond the Union Treaty nothing remained of them

Journal: So you knew what might come very soon after the Union Treaty was signed?

Yakovlev: Yes, and I knew it because I have experience and can observe events well. I felt it through my own experience, and it was confirmed afterwards that I was followed by KGB agents. And then, there were the telephone recordings of Gorbachev that were later published. Everything was clear. Unfortunately, it was not clear to Gorbachev. He believed Kryuchkov, but Kryuchkov de ceived him That was the human and social tragedy.

Journal: Given the military conflicts, the migrations, and all that has happened over the past ten years, do you think that perestroika was worth the effort?

Yakovlev: Of course it was worth it. We have always had to balance between

140 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

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