Military Modernization in India and China

Military modernization in India and China

Charles F. Bingman

Abstract The two great powers of Asia are arming. And it is not clear why.

1. The Indian Military sions, new training objectives and new communications technology. It faces problems of 1.1. Introduction money, uncertain political backing and a lot of With the almost universal preoccupation confusion over who they may be fighting and with the Chinese expansion and moderniza- why. tion of its armed forces, it is easy to overlook Traditionally, the great opponent of the In- the major modernization of the military forces dian military has been seen as Pakistan, and of India. Yet India has 1.3 million troops on conflict with the Pakistani army is constant, active duty, backed by 2.3 million reserve forc- ranging from small border insults to threats es, making it the second largest standing army of nuclear holocaust. India and Pakistan in the world in terms of personnel. The Indian have been in major conflict with each other Navy, which may be the most important of the over Kashmir for almost 60 years. Wars were military services, has already been significant- fought in 1948 and 1965, and again in 1971 ly expanded, and its 65,000 personnel on ac- when India supported East Pakistan in the 70s tive duty makes it the fifth largest navy in the with both diplomatic and military assistance world. Similarly, the expansion of the Indian against Pakistan, to help it become Bangla- Air Force to about 170,000 personnel makes it desh. India is still fighting three anti-terrorist the fourth largest air force in the world. wars in Kashmir, the Maoist Naxalites in north The Indian government, at great cost, is east India, and against Pakistan and Bangla- pursuing a major modernization program in- desh which support rebel groups in Assam. volving all aspects of its forces from command In November, a large, well organized group of and control to force structural modernization, terrorists attacked targets in Mumbai killing major upgradings of weapons, new unit mis- many, destroying property, and terrorizing the

© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 5 Published by the Washington Institute of China Studies. All rights reserved. Military modernization in India and China population. India is convinced that this attack tries are marginalized, and their main roles was sponsored and supported by the Pakistani are defensive and internal. In addition, the in- Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), and ternational community would bring enormous it once again seriously damaged some hopeful pressure against all three countries if insanity peace negotiations at the time and is regarded threatened to take over. as a mortal insult that will not soon be forgot- ten. The great fear for the future seems to be 1.2. Indian Ministry of Defense China, and the more the Chinese rattle their sa- Responsibility for national defense lies with bers, the more hysterical the Indians become. the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, But one of the dominating problems which the chaired by the Prime Minister. India’s military Indians are reluctant to discuss is the fact that command has no joint defense staff or unified they have never been able to develop a satis- command apparatus. The Minister of Defense factory “military/industrial complex” and they and the ministry provide management and are heavily dependent on the Russians, the operational control over the three main ser- Americans and others to provide them with vices1. There are important inter service orga- modern weapons. In the last analysis, India’s nizations such as the Services Headquarters, strategy seems mostly internal and defensive, Production Establishments, and R & D orga- and it is hard to see its military as ominous or nizations—plus a Finance Division. A major threatening. India’s political and military pre- study in 2000 resulted in recommendations occupation continues to be Pakistan, and this – being implemented – to establish a Defense relationship has made little sense for 60 years. Procurement Board, a Defense Intelligence All other foreign players – Russia, China, the Agency, the National Defense University, a U. S. and even Japan – are first and foremost Strategic Forces Command, and an integrated measured by their relationship with Pakistan, headquarters in the Ministry of Defense. To and then, collaterally, with India itself. It is enhance military planning, the Ministry of De- a game which nobody seems to know how to fense (MOD) has created the Defense Coordi- play, and each has its own set of rules. nation and Implementation Committee, and India’s strategic situation makes it hard to the Defense Planning Staff. All of these steps conceive of a major land based conflict with seem highly desirable, but what one wonders China over the mountain barriers that sepa- is why they have been so long in coming. rate them. First of all, it is hard to conceive The Union Ministry of Home Affairs con- why China would ever consider invasion at all. trols the nationwide Indian Police Service, Second, the mountains make such an invasion most of the paramilitary forces, and the inter- very difficult, with impossible supply lines, nal intelligence bureaus. It includes the Cen- and terrain relatively easy to defend. An op- tral Bureau of Investigation (reporting to the tion for invasion might be for China to come Dept. of Personnel), the Central Industrial Se- through Pakistan, but this would be impos- curity Force, and the Indo-Tibetan Border Po- sible if Pakistan were not an ally. Even if it lice. The separatist insurgencies, drug inter- were, the first point still applies – what could diction problems, and community unrest have China hope to achieve even with a successful led to a stronger role for paramilitary forces invasion of India? The same realities apply in under the direction of the Home Ministry. reverse for India versus China and Pakistan. Unfortunately, these paramilitary forces have It is also probably true that the deterioration a bad reputation for civil rights abuses. Each of Pakistan and its own internal conflicts have state has its own police force, reporting to a substantially reduced the likelihood of any se- 1 rious offensive against India. In the end, of- Wikipedia: Indian Army; Indian Air Force; In- fensives by the land forces of all three coun- dian Navy; Paramilitary Forces of India. See also Global Security, Ministry of Defense.

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Director General (Police), and state forces are the political parties who had been very slug- provided in the districts. The prison system is gish about the cost of modernization, and as entirely state operated. a result, the military asked for and got a 34% A Department of Defense Production was increase in its main operating funds for 2009. set up in 1962 after the disastrous war with India is the second largest weapons importer China to shape up all defense procurement, after the Chinese, which is a reflection not and it was later merged with the Department only of the desire to upgrade equipment, but of Defense Supplies in 1984. The basic policy also the inability to produce high technology is to move almost completely to domestic pro- weaponry domestically. Recent purchases of duction of all needs. Presently 39 ordnance new items include the Adm. Gorshkov aircraft factories and 8 Defense Production Service carrier purchased from the Russians, plus an- Units (DPSUs) are in operation, but much is other new carrier now being built by a Russian purchased from civilian suppliers. The Ord- shipyard. India is also purchasing upgraded nance Factories (OF) are government owned versions of Sukoi strike fighters from the Rus- and run by the Ministry of Defense. They sians, plus Mirage fighters, Hawk trainers, produce ammunition, explosives, weapons, submarines, multiple unit rocket launchers, vehicles both regular and armored, and other light helicopters, long range artillery, plane- ordnance equipment and maintenance. The based radar, and increased funding for R & D. 8 DPSUs are: Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.; Funds are also included in the budget for the Bharat Electronics; Bharat Earth Movers; start of deployment of short range – 700 km Mazagon Dock Ltd.; Garden Reach Shipbuild- Agni – I surface-to-surface missiles, and the ers and Engineers Ltd.; Boa Shipyard Ltd.; intermediate range - 2,000 km Agni – II mis- Bharat Dynamics Ltd.; Mishra Dhatu Nigam siles. The Army is also seeking development Ltd. of a “weapon locating “radar. The military is The government has only recently begun also seeking new “anti-terrorism” weapons to urge the private sector into the armaments – whatever that means. One of the most sig- market, presumably to try and split the costs, nificant ways to redirect military expenditures but so far, the private sector has been permit- would be to do what the Chinese did: radically ted only marginal participation through the cut back on the very large numbers of infantry provision of raw materials, semi-finished troops and reinvest the money saved into high parts, components, services and some mainte- technology weaponry. This is especially true nance, which means that they contribute little because, as a result of a recent Sixth Pay Com- to more sophisticated weapons systems R & D. mission report, major increases in pay, ben- FDI in any defense activity is limited to 26% efits and pensions will add large sums to an The size of the budget is difficult to assess. already tight budget. India can scarcely afford The official military budget excludes military its very large standing army and paramilitary pensions (15% of actual total outlay), the Coast forces, but it seems extremely hard to reduce Guard, the nuclear weapons arsenal, and the units with such grand traditions. huge paramilitary forces. All things consid- The Iraq war proved to be a great surprise ered including PPP calculations, the military to military planners and procurement officials budget is about $ 100 billion2. The terrorist because of it demonstrated the great supe- attacks on Mumbai in 2008, also terrorized riority of U. S. vs. Russian weapons systems which are heavily relied upon in the Indian 2 OpenSalon.com. Report of the Indian Defense armed forces. There is a growing feeling that Budget, Feb. 7, 2010. See also GlobalSecurity scarce military funds will be better spent on U. “Military Budget”. See also Medhani in The Tra- S. and other western country weaponry. This jectory, “India’s Defense Spending: Facts Beyond fits in with other tides running in Indian for- the Figures”, July, 2010.

© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 7 Military modernization in India and China eign affairs – the decline of the Soviet Union and 1999) of which it can be said it won three. as a potential ally, the surge of concern over It has fought one war against the Chinese in the rise of China and its military moderniza- 1962, which was a military disaster, and led tion program, the decline of Pakistan, and the to a new emphasis on military modernization fact that the “on again, off again” relationship that is still progressing slowly. It usually fields with the United States seems again to be “on”. about 36 divisions, 97 armored regiments with This is especially true because the Indian R more than 3,200 main battle tanks, 3,200 ar- & D community which was supposed to key tillery pieces, 1,500 aircraft, and more than the development of Indian domestic weapons 2,000 battle field ballistic missiles. The Chi- development capability seems to have prom- nese realized, in the post Maoist period that ised much, but delivered little. Soviet weap- its huge army was far larger – and far more ons systems were often disappointing, lacking expensive – than the country needed or could promised performance and often proving to support, and it has spent 25 years reducing be of poor quality and reliability. Many Soviet the size of its standing army and re-equipping suppliers have gone out of business and been the remaining forces. It is felt that perhaps replaced with post Soviet owners and manag- India is facing the same problems, and they it ers, but some sources of replacement/repair may need to decide to trim back its standing parts have been lost, and it seems hard for forces, so that the money saved could be used Indian enterprises to fill these gaps. But still, to finance modernization. As with the other the major purchases being made remain heav- services, most of the Army’s weapons are im- ily oriented toward Russian sources which are ported, but there are more small arms and am- still said to supply over 50% of India’s military munition being produced domestically. hardware. 1.4. The Indian Navy 1.3. The Indian Army It may well be that the most important ser- The Indian Army numbers over 1.4 million vice in the Indian military is not the Army, troops on active service plus more than two with its huge forces and glorious traditions, million reserve troops, making it the second but the Navy because it has a series of contem- largest standing army in the world and it is porary missions to perform, and more flex- almost all volunteer and has long been able to ibility in its deployment. It would be the first maintain a large number of permanent long line of defense if any country attempted either serving troops as its core (Global Security invasion or attack against the homeland. It 2009). But pay is low, morale is often poor, would be the only feasible weapon of offense discipline is often weak, and there is a growing against another county if needed. It can and pattern of accusations of corruption. It also will play a critical role in either blockading or seems true that fewer young men are enlisting, keeping open vital shipping lanes in the whole more are opting out, and even appointments to of Southeast Asia. And it has already estab- the Indian Military Academy are less sought. lished a solid record of offering help to other But still, the government is attempting to find nations in the area such as its excellent record ways to modernize Army weaponry. Indian against Indian Ocean pirates operating out of armored units, which have performed well East Africa. against the Pakistan Army are being beefed The Indian Navy currently has about 65,000 up with the purchase of more than 1,600 new personnel on active duty, and that makes it T-90 main battle tanks from Russian sources, the fifth largest navy in the world in terms of along with more than 4,000 Milan 2T anti- personnel. It has about 150 ships, including tank guided missiles. It has been involved one aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 15 subma- in four wars with Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971, rines, 37 frigates and corvettes, and about 250

8 © Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 Military modernization in India and China aircraft of all kinds. It operates mainly out of are diesel powered and obsolete by interna- three naval bases at Goa and Karwar on the tional standards. Half of these subs are ap- west coast about 400 miles south of Mumbai, proaching 22-23 years old, with a supposed and at Visakapatnam on the east coast about life cycle of 30 years. General plans seem to 400 miles north of Chennai. be to start to replace these at the rate of 2 per The Indian Navy has always had one aircraft year, and six are already scheduled, but it not carrier in service starting with one purchased certain that this schedule can be maintained. from the British in 1963 and running thru Training, refitting, maintenance and upgrad- three replacements or retrofits. The current ing capabilities all seem very limited and dif- INS Vikrant has been in service since 1987, ficult. India keeps saying that it wants to be and is due for retirement in 2012 – but may self sufficient in weapons systems production, be kept in some adapted role. But in direct re- but in fact they seem technically to be another sponse to constant Chinese rumblings about generation away, and meanwhile it keeps buy- building a carrier, the Indians have done two ing ships from the Russians, with more frig- things: ates and submarines to be purchased soon. In They purchased the aircraft carrier Adm. fact, one of the Navy’s most serious problems Gorshkov from Russia and it is currently be- is the talent shortage, both in the service and ing refitted in India for service “soon” (this is in its supporting military industrial complex. a valuable learning process for Indian techni- The Navy has been very dependent on mili- cians) tary state owned enterprises because of long The Indians signed a contract in 2005 for standing government policy of import sub- design and construction of an entirely new stitution, and the domestic private sector has modern carrier which is being built by the been largely excluded from the more techno- Russians. logically sophisticated systems3. When these actions are completed, India This may change. India is trying to build up will have two and possibly three carriers in its skill base, the Russians are increasingly re- operation and they will be the only carriers luctant to supply its top level technology, and possessed by any Asian nation. The key to the the U. S. and other countries such as France, military balance of power in S. E. Asia will then Israel, Japan and Brazil are ready to step into lie with the ability of the Indian Navy to oper- any gap, and appear more willing to share ate three powerful aircraft carrier groups car- their technology knowledge. rying the best military aircraft in the region, and contracts have been signed for purchase 1.5. The Indian Air Force of 16 more MiG 29s, and there are apparently India’s air force is the world’s fourth largest plans for purchase of an additional 29. This is with about 170,000 personnel and over 1,300 very important; it represents the kind of force aircraft, including over 600 combat aircraft projection that the Chinese do not have. The and more than 500 transports and helicop- capacity of the Indian Navy to disrupt supply ters operating out of more than 60 airbases lines and blockade the ports of other countries around the country4. Its newest plane is the is very great, and could be devastating. The multi-role Sukhoi 30 which are obtained from Navy has 8 destroyers, 13 frigates and 24 cor- Russia, and are capable of delivering strategic vettes which are capable of independent op- weapons. It now also operates a large number erations but are critical as the carrier escort of MiG 29s and Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft vessels in aircraft carrier groups. which have advanced electronics permitting The Indian Navy has 16 submarines only night operation. MiG 27 aircraft are deployed one of which is nuclear powered– but at any 3 given time only about 6 are operational. They Wikipedia, “Indian Navy”. 4 Wikipedia, “Indian Air Force”.

© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 9 Military modernization in India and China for ground attack and ground support mis- tion Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) is sions. The air force has many older MIG 21s being formed under the CRPF specifically to which it wants to replace with a domestically deal with the Naxalite Maoist insurgents in produced light combat aircraft. Hindustan northeast India. Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) is major domestic air- At a next level are the Central Paramilitary craft manufacturer and it currently produces Forces which are linked more closely with many of the Russian aircraft in India under the Indian Army, and during wartime, would license. It also produces several helicopters, serve directly under the armed forces chain of and is designing the HAL Tejas domestically command. It includes such units as the Coast as the replacement for the obsolete MiG 21s. Guard, the Border Security Force, the Central The Indian Air Force is also responsible for Industrial Security Force, the Tibetan Border the defense of the country against air attack, Police, and many other special purpose units. and it is moving to upgrade its land-based de- The total population of all of these units ex- tection electronics and its ground to air mis- ceeds 8.7 million troops. All of these organi- sile systems, including the use of mobile mis- zations are headed by a senior Indian Police sile trailers. It is also deploying three of the Service Officer apparently to provide some co- Phalcon Airborne Earl Warning radar system herent leadership to a very complex array of obtained from Israel Aerospace Industries military and police establishments, which are considered among the best in the world. The hugely expensive. Air Force also operates a large number of India’s military modernization is about a lot transport aircraft which gives it superior air- more than weapons. The military establish- lift capability. ment suffers from weak planning, lack of coher- ent command and control, obsolete structure 1.6. Paramilitary Forces of India both of fighting units and support commands, The military capability of India is support- and a lot of disagreement and uncertainty as ed by an extraordinary complex of police and to who “the enemy” really is, and what strate- semi-military organizations grouped under gic objectives should be followed. There is a the general heading of the Paramilitary Forces genuine but highly dysfunctional difference of of India (Global Security, 2010). The first and philosophy between an assertive military and most important level of such forces is the Cen- national leadership that has long believed in tral Police Organizations which function as a a more peaceful and passive national posture. national police force for the State, dealing with There is a strong movement in the country that a whole range of law enforcement matters sees the military as overly aggressive, unduly ranging from insurrections to parades. These expensive, and largely misdirected. Thus, the organizations include the State Armed Police, civilian leadership favors “strategic restraint”, which is highly mobile and well armed force of a defensive stance and the hope of a nuclear more than 450,000 troops, and functions in- umbrella, with a “no first strike” philosophy, dependent of the military, reporting to civilian as precluding the possibility of any real war. bosses. It is supported and reinforced by the One role that both can agree on is the growing Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which is importance of the need for counter insurgen- a volunteer force with more than 300,000 ac- cy. But this has been largely the responsibility tive members, plus a Home Guard and Civil of the police, and only recently has the army Defense forces with almost one million more stepped in, but with unsavory accusations of members. The Central Reserve Police Force excessive brutality. also maintains a Rapid Action Force and the Anti-Riot Police to deal with particularly vio- lent threats, and a new 10,000 man Rapid Ac-

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2. The Chinese Military The strategic thinking of the CMC and the PLA has been almost entirely defensive ex- 2.1. Introduction cept for Taiwan. Its major stated policies are The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) holds a first and foremost to defend the CCP, then to special place of honor in China as its liberator, defend industrial centers, defend the capitol its protector, the stalwart defender of the Chi- of Beijing, guard the borders and potential nese Communist Party (CCP) and the guard- avenues of attack, protect key elements such ian of the Revolution. Despite this honored as transport routes, lines of communication, position, the PLA has suffered from a strange- harbors, and power sources; and to secure key ly rocky history of alternating support and ne- locations providing internal security. None of glect, and has spent the last 20 years attempt- these policies specifically emphasize the de- ing to recoup its position from the mistakes fense of the Chinese people. of it’s past. It was both neglected and ill-used But the new leadership of China has now for 20 years by the Maoist regime. It’s strate- fully committed itself to genuine and compre- gies were muddled, its equipment obsolete, its hensive modernization and expansion of its funding has been uncertain, its officer corps is military capability. The authority of the PLA is underpaid and under trained, and its troops wide open and its role is defined at any given are a non-professional transient population. time by the views of the political leadership. It In the 80s it was authorized to create or ac- is pursuing several major modernization pro- quire state owned enterprises (SOEs) and oth- grams: reduction in troop numbers, creation er businesses in the hope that it could largely of medium and long range missile capabil- finance itself and save the political leadership ity, an expanded and updated Air Force and from the necessity of raising more taxes. This Navy, creation of “multi-role” military units policy was a disaster for both the PLA and the with rapid deployment capability, an upgrad- Chinese economy from which both are still la- ed command/field communications network, boriously recovering. and an air defense system, and a coastal de- Military affairs are naturally highly politi- fense capability with naval and shore forces. cal, and they are under the direction of the But troop concentrations seem not to have Central Military Commission (CMC), an ex- changed much in 20 years and they are still traordinarily powerful body that is chaired deployed opposite Taiwan, along the Russian by the CCP General Secretary, who is also the border, and in Tibet and Xinjiang. head of the CCP and formal leader of the gov- As with so much else in the modern history ernment and the country. The CMC has three of the Chinese, the death of Mao in 1976 broke vice chairmen, one of whom is the prime min- the pattern of neglect and stagnation and per- ister, plus seven other members who are the mitted the CCP leadership to initiate a long, most senior military officers. It has four gen- complex and multi-faceted reform of the PLA eral departments: General Staff, Logistics, Ar- which, 30 years later, is still under way. maments, and Political Affairs. The country is Essentially three major arenas of reform divided into 7 Regional Military Districts, and were therefore considered vital: the PLA itself has five field Commands: Army First, the whole military establishment had (PLA), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), the to be “downsized” on a grand scale in terms Second Artillery (which is the nuclear mis- of personnel, and its organizational structure sile command), and the Peoples Armed Police had to be simplified and made more efficient (PAP), which is officially under the dual com- and productive. It had to get rid of old obso- mand of the State Council and the CMC, but is lete types of forces, mainly massive ground generally considered to be an integral part of units, so that it could afford new units more the military establishment. relevant to the nature of modern warfare.

Second, every aspect of PLA operations es of mind. Only in the 90’s did the Chinese had to be modernized from new field com- appear to discover systems management and munications, to weapons systems design and competitive bidding, and it is not clear how far acquisition, to logistics, supply and transport they have advanced. and even to financial responsibility and con- Despite years of hand wringing, it was not trol. An important policy was enunciated by until 1999 that the political leadership finally Deng Xiaoping in 1985: the military should got serious about this elaborate mess. The concentrate on modernization through R & D; point had been reached where both the mili- but it was not necessary to then manufacture tary and the political leadership realized that new weapons unless the actual military situa- this PLA commercial activity was a failure. tion requires them. This is the same pattern The essence of the agreement that emerged that makes sense in the U. S. since R & D is was that the government promised to substi- relatively cheap, and manufacture is very ex- tute regular appropriated funds for the loss of pensive, especially with technologies that tend SOE revenues, and the newly acquired wealth to become obsolete quickly. The difference from the market economy made it feasible for China is that, in many disciplines, Chinese to promise the PLA adequate funding for the education and technological development had future. The PLA leadership recognized this never really developed, and this limits the was a good face saver, since most of its SOEs skills available for military upgrades. were operating at a loss, despite their subsi- Third, the government made a decision dies. Therefore they could dump the failed about 1985 that probably seemed smart at the commercial enterprises, return their officers time, but which ultimately proved to be a di- to military roles, clean up much of the corrup- saster. The PLA was authorized to enter into tion, and assure a reasonable flow of funds for business in a big way to create or acquire state modernization. So the deal was struck. owned enterprises (SOE) and other business- But it is clear from subsequent events that es. The political reasoning at the time was that the PLA and the rest of the government nev- the central government budget could not af- er really got out of the enterprise game. At ford both the PLA and funds for economic de- present, it appears that there are still about velopment, so the PLA was largely cut loose to 10,000 enterprises employing 700,000 work- finance itself. The basic intent of authorizing ers under PLA control. There are about 2000 PLA business activities was very quickly per- SOE’s that are genuinely defense related, but verted. At its peak, the PLA controlled 30,000 there remain many others that are for mixed SOEs employing 3 million workers. There was military/civilian production. For example, the almost no accounting for either income or ex- Aviation Industries of China, which produces penditure, and these commercial operations both civilian and military aircraft is in fact a were a serious cause of corruption, including large holding company that includes more the diversion of military assets (such as trucks, than 200 enterprises and trading companies fuel, food and labor) to its businesses. In many and employs more than 500,000 people, of cases such as electronics or certain minerals, whom 200,000 are engineers and technicians the PLA enterprises dominated whole sectors (Shambaugh, 2004). of the economy. The whole complex structure The other big source of PLA revenue is continues to suffer from the usual sins of cor- weapons sales. The PLA is reported to still ruption, patronage and incompetence, and it own or control dozens of major SOEs that pro- is likely that any development of major weap- duce weapons for export (Shambaugh 2004)5. ons systems, will take 12-15 years to complete, 5 even if it is pursued steadily and not interrupt- See also Frankenstein, John, and Bates, Gill, ed with funding shortages or political chang- “Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries”, in Shambaugh, David, and

Most of the weapons sales have been to inter- troops) units to add flexibility. There are 13 national “bad guys” in the eyes of Western na- infantry, 20 artillery, and 20 tank brigades. 59 tions: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Cuba, divisions including 44 infantry, 10 tank and Sudan, Pakistan and of course N. Korea. But 5 artillery are still active. Efforts have been predictions that Chinese aid would allow Iran made to create at least one Rapid Reaction to have nuclear weapons by 2000 were obvi- Unit (RRU) for each of the seven military re- ously exaggerated. In fact, the Chinese seemed gions, but airlift is scarce, and there are only to have been aiding Iran for 25 years to little about 130 transport helicopters in the whole effect. PLA. Thus, most rapid deployments would In the fall of 2002, the State Council and the still be by rail or truck. There are an estimated Central Military Commission directed local three RRUs actively deployed. Artillery is a big governments at all levels to include provision strength, with 30-35,000 pieces of ordnance of “rear services” costs for the military estab- of many types, including 14,000 self propelled lishment which allowed the PLA to reduce its howitzers of 120 to 203 mm caliber. There are own budgets. In addition, local governments more than 6,000 tanks of varying age with 85- bear some/all of the cost of military reserve 125 mm guns (Karmel, 2000, pp. 123-154). units. The PLA has about 8,300 main battle tanks Adequate accounting procedures were not of different ages, but all of them, even the new available until well into the 90s when the T-90s under development, are obsolete by in- Ministry of Finance (MOF) developed stan- ternational standards, and those sold to Iraq dards which the PLA is required to use. Also, were no match for the U. S. tanks. The his- the MOF began serious budget reviews with tory of tank design and production is a good a Zero Based Budgeting approach requiring illustration of how weak the Chinese military/ more line item information and more account industrial complex really is. A tank designated auditing. Thousands of PLA accounts were off the T-69 was the first tank domestically pro- budget, and much of the PLA budget was (and duced. It was designed about 1970, but took still is) concealed in other types of accounts. another 10 years to reach production, and was Huge debt levels were revealed – so substan- not deployed in any numbers until the mid tial that they endangered the banks and local 80s by which time it was obsolete. The main governments that had been coerced into back- battle tank is now considered to be the T-85, ing the loans. Thus, it was clear in retrospect introduced in 1989, but it did not enter pro- that the PLA had access to huge amounts of duction until 1995, and not many have yet ac- money, and it is a puzzle why they got so little tually been deployed to the troops (Karmel, real military capability out of these funds for 2000, pp 252-255). more than 40 years. The PLA has two very capable artillery pieces: the 155 mm and 203 mm mobile how- 2.2. Military Reforms itzers. The 203 mm howitzer has, at 50 km, When all is said and done, the PLA seri- the longest range of any weapon in the world ously wants to be a lot smaller but a lot more but again, neither has really been built in any sophisticated, versatile and more technically numbers. advanced. Therefore, one major reform has Even before these reformed unit align- been to shift the mix of units away from large ments, there was a serious reduction in troop ground units to more compact and multi-mis- numbers, over a 20 year period. Reductions sion units. The number of divisions has been have so far totaled 1.8 million from its peak of reduced in favor of more brigade (1,000-2,500 4.5 million as recently as 1985 (5.5 million in 1950), and the active Army ground troops now Yang, Richard H., Editors, Oxford University number about 1.6 million. But in fact, many of Press, 1997.

© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 13 Military modernization in India and China the people “reduced” have been simply rede- ization funding is going to the PLA Air Force ployed. A Reserve component has been cre- (PLAAF) and the PLA Navy (PLAN). While ated, largely for Army forces, and some active ground forces are being upgraded, only a lim- duty personnel have been transferred to the ited number of units will be improved; the rest Reserves which now number about 800,000. of the Army units will be low quality. There Some have been moved into civilian jobs in is an annual conscription program which is the PLA and others have even been assigned to dysfunctional. 25% of all forces are one year other government ministries. There are about people, and many of the rest have three year 4 million military dependents and “several terms of service in a profession that is poorly million” civilian employees of the PLA. paid and not very promising. All services suf- Taiwan has been the keystone to military fer from a lack of capable NCOs. The Navy policy. The conflict with Taiwan is the only has no aircraft carriers, no heavy capital ships, external situation that can be used to justify only about 25 capable subs (only one nuclear the high cost of the PLA. There is no credible powered nuclear missile capable sub and that land threat, now or in the foreseeable future. is in its development/testing cycle. All 6 of the The major strategic posture is one of coastal nuclear powered subs are obsolete)6. defense. The military has virtually no force The Air Force has about 420,000 personnel projection capability, beyond Taiwan. China and a growing number of planes, but most are wants to become the dominant regional pow- based on 20 year old technology. It has about er, and it is acting to enhance its force projec- 150 first line planes including two fighter types tion capability. About 82% of the PLA total bought from Russia, and one domestic plane forces have been 3 year conscripts. The goals based on good but 20 year old Israeli designs, are to cut the conscript period to two years, but it has languished because of major tech- but to reduce the percentage of conscripts to nical problems with design, metallurgy, avi- less than 65%. onics, engine technology, and generally low Many personnel have been transferred manufacturing skills and quality control. The to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), created engines for the new J-18 fighter are actually in 1983, including 14 PLA divisions more or being supplied by Sugat – a Russian compa- less intact. This reflects a significant change ny. More than 3,000 older aircraft (built in in policy following Tiananmen Square; the 1979 or earlier) of all types are so obsolete that leadership wants a far larger and more heav- they are being decommissioned. The Russian ily armed internal security force to deal with SU-27 is a good but old trainer that has been potential civil insurrections but wants to avoid upgraded. The SU-30 is a good modern multi- the visibility of using the army. The PAP force task fighter-bomber with a range of 1600 nau- which was about 400,000 in 1982 and around tical miles. There are about 120 old but good 900,000 in the late 90’s has climbed to what Russian “Badger” heavy bombers with a range is estimated to be about and 1.5 million today of about 5,900 KM, and nuclear capability. (the official number is just 660,000). Its ma- None of these aircraft compare well against jor roles are border control, internal security, American and other country aircraft. The past civil unrest, customs and anti-smuggling and 6 The Chinese Navy has fewer than 10 nuclear sub- facilities protection. But it is still not clear who marines, only one of which is armed with strategic really controls the PAP. The CCP wants it both ballistic missiles, and it is not operational. It now ways; they appear to want it linked to the mili- has one aircraft carrier, built as an upgrade of its tary establishment, but want it to appear to be original ‘80s capability. Although the PLAN keeps run as a civilian function. announcing plans for the new ships, even if true, Major modernization of forces has occurred the actual development cycle for such systems to reach production continues to be more than 12-15 in all of the services. Recently, most modern- years.

14 © Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 Military modernization in India and China reliance on Russian sources is now in ques- so far been identified. Submarine missiles tion. Increasingly, the Russians are reluctant are old and limited in numbers. The JL-2 to part with new designs or production tech- has a range of 7,200 km, but apparently has nology, fearing China not necessarily as an yet to be deployed for fleet operations. It has enemy but rather as a competitor as well as a only one full range nuclear powered ballistic customer, and they are now insisting on cash missile sub, plus 5 “attack” boats with ballis- rather than bartered goods (Karmel, 200, pp. tic missile capability. China has a very large 158-161). The PLAAF also operates a formida- merchant marine, but many of the vessels are ble Air Defense System with 220,000 air de- coast or river based. It has two guided mis- fense personnel in 100 sites, with surface to air sile destroyers based on a 1990 Soviet design, missiles and about 16,000 anti aircraft guns. and carrying 8 anti-ship cruise type missiles. There is a large early warning radar network It also has 2 smaller guided missile destroy- with ranges up to 100 km. ers and 8 smaller frigates. All other ships in Missile forces are perhaps the strongest arm the Chinese navy are from the 1950’s and are of the PLA, but they are still almost entirely obsolete (Shambaugh, 2006). ballistic. Seven ICBM missile systems entered The current budget is estimated at about development, but four have been cancelled $36 billion, but much of the funding for the and one is an old liquid fuel system. There are military establishment remains concealed. Al- two modern systems: the DF-31 with a range most all R & D is carried in a separate nation- of about 7,200 km; and the DF-31A with a al R & D budget category. The costs of some range of 11,200 km, but the inventory for each arms imports are budgeted separately and is very small – less than 10. There are about mostly off budget. The PAP is largely funded 1000 air-to-air missiles, and another 1000 out of civilian accounts. The Reserve is funded land based cruise type missiles, but the maxi- from provincial budgets. A lot of the cost of mum range for any of them is about 85 NM. military SOEs including deficits are covered These are Russian designs that are being up- by government subsidies and forced “loans” graded and switched to domestic production. and the PLA has always had huge bank debts, The Chinese produce several short range at- much of which is not realistically expected tack missiles, has sold a lot to Iran, and wants to be repaid. Many of the prices of military to sell more to developing countries. There is goods are deliberately understated. There is a consolidated missile force with longer range a serious and deliberate lack of reliable data, missiles named “The Second Artillery”. Long and most of the statistical comparisons with range missiles are really upgraded middle world prices lack a Purchasing Power Par- range missiles shifted from liquid to solid pro- ity (PPP) assessment. In fact, there is serious pellants. There are at least ten theater mis- doubt that the Chinese themselves know how siles with ranges from 180 to 4,700 km. Most much they spend on their military establish- remain ballistic; and some are now equipped ment. The budget in 2000 was double that of with upgraded guidance systems, but they re- 1978, but it has had persistent ups and downs main scarce. China has 8-900 nuclear weap- – up for Korea and then down; up for the Viet- ons, the third largest inventory in the world. nam War and then down. In effect, financing The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for the military establishment as a percent of has a total of about 250,000 personnel. It has the national budget is not much better than in been trying hard to upgrade its submarine 1978. A substantial part of the recent increase fleet as an attack force. It initiated five types is to bring pay for both officers and men up of subs, of which two – the Type 92 Xia and to some reasonable standard after decades of the Type 94 Jin are nuclear capable, but nei- underpayment. The quality of personnel has, ther is fully operational, and only 9-10 have for 30 years or more been poor since the mili-

© Business and Public Administration Studies, 2015, Vol. 9, No. 1 15 Military modernization in India and China tary is not an attractive career. In addition, GDP, while the US spends at 4.6% and Britain there is a track record of bad maintenance, a spends 3%. He also stated that much of the shortage of spare parts, and low performance increase was for higher military salaries, more reliability. training and rising oil costs rather than new “China’s reported 17.5% increase in its de- weapons. However the Pentagon still manag- fense budget still leaves it a fraction of what es to brood about nuclear force modernization the US spends each year on its armed forces. and new high tech missiles. President Bush’s last budget requested $515 Here again, as with India, the Chinese gov- billion for FY 2009 – a 7.5% increase – plus ernment is utterly preoccupied with prepara- $70 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghani- tions for a war that will never happen, against stan.” The Obama Administration DOD bud- an enemy that does not exist. None of the get for 2014 is $526 billion, down slightly from conflicts that seem to drive military policy – its peak of $530 billion in 2012. against the U. A spokesman for the Chinese National Peo- S.; against Japan; against Pakistan; against ple’s Congress said that defense spending has Russia; seem even remotely probable. Military increased at an annual average of 15.8% in the leaders in both countries ominously overstate last 5 years, and while this seems ominous to the risks because such overstatements are some observers, it is actually less than the in- hypocritically accepted by the political leader- crease in general government revenues which ship as justification for authorizing more re- have increased an average of 22.1%. He noted sources for their military establishments. that the defense budget is equivalent of 1.4% of

References GlobalSecurity, July, 2009. Karmel, S.M., China and the People’s Liberation Army, St. Martins Press, New York, 2000. Shambaugh, D., Modernizing China’s Military, University of California Press, 2004. Shambaugh, D., Modern China’s Military, University of California Press, 2006.