Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2011 Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law David Luban Georgetown University Law Center,
[email protected] Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-30 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/619 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797780 Int'l Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons HANNAH ARENDT AS A THEORIST OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW David Luban* Forthcoming, symposium on “Women and International Criminal Law,” International Criminal Law Review Hannah Arendt had no legal training, and before 1960 her writings display little interest in law or legal institutions.1 Then Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf Eichmann in Argentina and brought him to Jerusalem to stand trial for the crimes of the Holocaust. In June 1960, Arendt wrote to Mary McCarthy, “I am half toying with the idea to get some magazine to send me to cover the Eichmann trial. Am very tempted.”2 Arendt approached William Shawn, editor of The New Yorker. A bit diffidently, Shawn accepted her offer.3 Her friend and mentor, the philosopher Karl Jaspers, was skeptical: “The political realm is of an importance that cannot be captured in legal terms (the attempt to do so is Anglo-Saxon and a self-deception …).”4 To which Arendt replied: I … admit that as far as the role of the law is concerned, I have been infected by the Anglo-Saxon influence.