Standing Athwart History, Yelling Stop: the Emergence of American Movement Conservatism, 1945-1965

Standing Athwart History, Yelling Stop: The Emergence of American Movement Conservatism, 1945-1965 Niels Bjerre-Poulsen University of Southern Denmark Abstract: The article analyzes the emergence of the American conservative movement as a postwar reaction to the New Deal order and the new role of the federal government. It discusses the different concepts, and the sometimes conflicting aims of the various strains of the conservative movement, as well as the inherent tension between political populism and the quest for intellectual respectability. It also takes a comparative view of the “Radical Right” of the 1960s and the current “Tea Party movement,” and discusses how the conditions for “ideological gatekeeping” have changed. Keywords: The Conservative movement—Traditionalism—Libertarianism—The New Deal—Anticommunism—Senator Joseph McCarthy—William F. Buckley, Jr.—Barry Goldwater—The Radical Right—The John Birch Society—The Republican Party— Tea Party Movement There have always been conservatives in the United States, but they have not always called themselves “conservatives.” Nor have they always made up a movement. Since the founding of the nation, there have been stal- warts, reactionaries, traditionalists, social conservatives and temperamental conservatives. There have been laissez-faire liberals, who did not want the federal government to do much, except keeping taxes low, tariffs high and business regulation as lax as possible. Today we would probably call them 16 American Studies in Scandinavia, 45:1-2 conservatives, but that was not how they described themselves. Further- more, their activities tended to be parochial and they had no sense of being part of a national movement.1 Such a national movement did not emerge until conservatives felt that they were being culturally and politically displaced and marginalized, and the thing most responsible for that happening was Franklin Delano Roos- evelt’s New Deal. Thus, the emergence of an American conservative movement was first of all a reaction to the new political order that emerged during the 1930s, and to the new expanded role it gave to the federal government. If the state had previously been viewed as a potential transgressor of indi- viduals’ liberties, it was now to a much larger extent seen as a promoter and guarantor of social rights. The connotations of liberalism clearly changed during the 1930s. That created the desire for both a new political brand and the organizing of a principled opposition. However, it was not until after the end of World War II that the contours of a conservative movement began to emerge. This article surveys this emergence in the early postwar years, and how the creation of a “counter-establishment” outside the established party system eventually enabled conservatives to conquer the GOP.2 It also analyzes some 1 Some may contest the idea of a national “movement” and argue that there have simply been a number of conservative organizations at any given time. I base my claim, however, on organizational continuity, a will to cohere, and a deliberate intent to counter most parts of the alleged “liberal establishment” with conservative counterparts. 2 The defining work on postwar American conservatism is still George H. Nash,The Conservative Intel- lectual Movement Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976). The commonly accepted description of the movement as a marriage of convenience between separate strains—traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti- Communism, comes from Nash’s book. Other valuable introductions to postwar American conservatism include Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001); Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhow- er to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). The organizational effort made to create a conservative “counter-establishment “prior to the ultimate plunge into partisan politics is the subject of Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement, 1945-65 (Copenha- gen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002). With her fine bookInvisible Hands: The Making of the Conserva- tive Movement from the New Deal to Ronald Reagan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), Kim Phillips-Fein has broadened the scope of American conservatism by focusing on the business community’s substantial contributions to the movement. Other historians and sociologists have to a greater extent viewed modern American conservatism as a social movement—finding its sources of recruitment in opposition to “open housing ordinances,” busing, urban unrest, affirmative action, sex education in schools, and other alleged assaults on traditional American values. Among the works taking such an approach in analyzing the rise STANDING ATHWART HISTORY, YELLING STOP 17 of the enduring ideological tensions within the movement and the limits they have imposed on its ability to present a positive political vision, hold “political territory,” or win over new constituencies, in the absence of a larger conceptual framework such as the Cold War or the “War on Terror.” Finally, it draws some lines from the conservative movement of the 1960s to the so-called “Tea Party Republicans” of the Obama era. It notes the ideological continuity, but also the diminished importance ascribed to intellectual credibility. Accepting the Conservative Label In American political culture, the label of conservatism had traditionally been associated with feudalism and aristocracy—with a rigid European class system, devoid of any appreciation of social mobility. After World War II, however, many laissez faire-liberals felt compelled to accept it any- way, since the term “Liberalism” had been appropriated by the New Deal- ers, with their alleged faith in “collectivism” and social engineering.3 The very idea of laissez faire—the belief that markets would be self- regulating—had been politically discredited during the early years of the Great Depression. When a group of businessmen founded the American Liberty League as a vehicle for opposition to the New Deal, the Republican National Committee actually asked it to refrain from endorsing the Repub- lican candidate Alf Landon in the election of 1936.4 Occasionally, books advocating conservative/laissez-faire ideas would be published, but they were like lonely cries in the wilderness.5 By the end of the right are Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right Wing Movements and Politi- cal Power in America (New York: Guilford Press, 1995); Janice M. Irvine, Talk About Sex: The Battle Over Sexual Education in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), and Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). For an excellent historiographical essay of the postwar conservative movement in America, see Jennifer Burns, “In Retrospect: George Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945,” Reviews in American History 32 (2004), pp. 447-462. 3 The semantic battles of the labels of “liberal” and “conservative”—small or capital “C”—occasionally broke out throughout the 1950s. However, by the 1960s, most of the American right proudly used the label “conservative.” 4 For a history of the league, see George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the Ameri- can Liberty League, 1934-1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962). 5 Among them were Albert Jay Nock, Our Enemy, the State (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1950 [1935]); William Henry Chamberlin, Collectivism; A False Utopia (New York: Macmillan, 1937) http:// mises.org/books/falseutopia.pdf. 18 American Studies in Scandinavia, 45:1-2 of World War II, however, such books seemingly resonated with a new au- dience. Among the new books that seemed to have an impact were Rich- ard M. Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences and F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom.6 Particularly the latter managed to successfully link the notion of the welfare state to the growing fear of international communism. The argument was that there was a philosophical affinity between all “collectivists.” When Hayek’s book was first published in the United States in 1945, the reaction was surprising—not least to Hayek himself. Helped by a strong promotional effort by a couple of conservative funds, an abridged version of the book was distributed by Readers Digest in more than a million cop- ies. Hayek soon found himself on a national book tour, speaking to large audiences. In New York City, some 3,000 people showed up to hear him.7 Several conservative intellectuals would later refer to their reading of the book as a crucial event in their political awakening. Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom was that countries such as Great Britain and the United States were most likely to be taken down an unforeseen road to “totalitarianism” by well-meaning democrats adopting “planning” in their attempt to promote the general welfare of the nation, rather than by dedicated communists or fascists. Thus, “totalitarianism” would be an unintended consequence of the way in which economic planning would ultimately change the social and moral values of the nation. While this argument was not new on the American political scene, Hayek’s book now became essential reading for American conservatives.8 Perhaps it was due to his status as an economist. Perhaps it was simply a matter of timing. In any case, there was a certain irony in the fact that much of the intellectual firepower for an emerging conservative movement in America came from European émigrés such as Hayek, his fellow Aus- trian economist Ludwig von Mises, and Leo Strauss, as well as from the “rediscovery” of European conservatives such as the Anglo-Irish politician and political thinker Edmund Burke.9 6 F.

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