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A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia by Nicolas Santi Gabriel Quartermaine-Bragg

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A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia by Nicolas Santi Gabriel Quartermaine-Bragg THE QUIETIST POSIT: A METHODOLOGICALLY AGNOSTIC RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF QUALIA BY NICOLAS SANTI GABRIEL QUARTERMAINE-BRAGG A thesis Submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In Philosophy Victoria University of Wellington 2020 Quartermaine-Bragg 1 Abstract This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”. I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa. I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language. Quartermaine-Bragg 2 Acknowledgments: I would like to extend my acknowledgments to my postgraduate supervisor, Dr Justin Sytsma, who has helped me to expand and refine certain of the ideas contained in this thesis. In addition, I would like to extend my gratitude to the members of my family who have supported me in the production of this thesis paper, and in particular to my father, Martin Quartermaine, who has been there every step of the way. Quartermaine-Bragg 3 Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1: Historical Foundations of Methodological Verificationism .............................. 6 Section 1: Wittgenstein and Verification ......................................................................... 6 Part 1: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ............................................... 7 Part 2: Meaning and Wittgenstein .............................................................................. 10 Header 1: From the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations ................................................................................................................ 10 Header 2: Verificationism in Early and Late Wittgenstein ..................................... 10 Header 3: The Private Language Argument ........................................................... 13 Section 2: Quine and Methodological Naturalism ......................................................... 15 Header 1: Quine and Wittgenstein .............................................................................. 16 Sub-Header 1: The Elimination of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction ................. 17 Header 2: Quine’s Naturalistic Epistemology ............................................................ 19 Header 3: Epistemology as a “Chapter of Psychology” ............................................. 20 Header 4: The Charge of Circularity .......................................................................... 20 Header 5: Observation and Introspection Sentences .................................................. 21 Chapter 2: Dennett and Qualia Eliminativism ................................................................... 23 Part 1: Dennett’s Arguments against Qualia .................................................................. 24 Header 1: Characterizing Qualia ................................................................................ 24 Header 2: Against an Infallibilistic Characterization of Qualia ................................. 25 Header 3: Against a Fallibilistic Characterization of Qualia ...................................... 26 Sub-Header 1: Dennett’s “Quining Qualia” ........................................................... 27 Sub-Header 2: Dennett’s Consciousness Explained ............................................... 28 Part 2: Evaluation of Dennett’s Arguments ................................................................... 29 Header 1: Dennett’s Success and Failure ................................................................... 29 Quartermaine-Bragg 4 Chapter 3: The Methodological Underdetermination of Qualia ........................................ 31 Part 1: The Dialectical Stalemate ................................................................................... 32 Header 1: Dennett’s Methodological Assumption ..................................................... 32 Header 2: The Methodological Assumption of Qualia Defendants ........................... 34 Sub-Header 1: Thomas Nagel ................................................................................. 34 Sub-Header 2: David Chalmers .............................................................................. 35 Sub-Header 3: John Searle ...................................................................................... 36 Sub-Header 4: The Phenomenalistic Position......................................................... 37 Chapter 4: The Resolution to the Methodological Problem of Qualia .............................. 40 Header 1: A New Terminological Proposal ................................................................... 41 Header 2: A Positive Resolution to the Methodological Problem of Qualia ................. 42 Objections and Responses.................................................................................................. 43 Thesis Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 45 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 46 Quartermaine-Bragg 5 Introduction A set of arguments which I refer to as “methodological verificationist” has generated a motivation for the denial of what has been considered by another set of arguments, which I will call broadly “phenomenalistic”, an epistemically primitive posit. The conflict between these two sets of arguments, I will argue, stems from a conflict surrounding the basic methodological assumptions espoused in each set of arguments. For this reason, the conflict between these sets of arguments I will refer to as a conflict concerning the “methodological problem of qualia”. In this thesis, I will examine the methodological verificationist argument which is proposed against the existence of qualia and then evaluate it against several arguments which utilize a phenomenalistic methodology in defence of qualia. I will first begin by describing the set of historical arguments which propose the denial or the meaninglessness of a reference in language to intrinsically private experiences such as qualia. These historical arguments propose this denial on the basis of certain methodologically verificationist principles, and form the contextual framework for a contemporary critique of the concept of qualia proposed by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), which I will then seek to examine and evaluate. I will, after this, compare this critique with several broadly phenomenalistic arguments in defence of qualia, which I will employ to demonstrate a key flaw shared by both sets of arguments. My thesis will seek to show that the set of arguments purporting to demonstrate either the denial, or meaninglessness, of the term “qualia” on the basis of methodological verificationist principles do so on a basis which cannot be supported by the very arguments they employ against qualia. These arguments proposed against qualia, I will claim, are premised on a methodological standard which cannot be justified independently. For this reason, I will argue, the arguments proposed against qualia are therefore unable to demonstrate the meaninglessness of the term “qualia” without the arbitrary assumption of a methodological standard. This thesis will centre on an argument proposed by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who, following Wittgenstein (1953) and Quine (1951; 1969), argues on the basis of a form of methodological verificationism,
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