ELEVATING BLACK EXCELLENCE REGIONAL SUMMIT SERIES a Showcase for Black Partners
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Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Congressional Investigations: What Congress, Witnesses, and Lawyers Can Learn from the Irs Scandal
N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy Quorum JASON KORNMEHL WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: WHAT CONGRESS, WITNESSES, AND LAWYERS CAN LEARN FROM THE IRS SCANDAL May 8, 2015 Abstract: “I have not done anything wrong. I have not broken any laws. I have not violated any IRS rules or regula- tions, and I have not provided false information to this or any other congressional committee.” These few sentences uttered by Lois Lerner, the former head of the IRS Tax Ex- empt Organizations Division, ignited a debate among crimi- nal law scholars over whether Lerner waived her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This Article analyzes what constitutes a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of congressional investiga- tions and asserts that Lois Lerner likely waived her right to remain silent. An examination of Lerner’s testimony before the House Oversight Committee illustrates that the issue of Fifth Amendment waivers in congressional hearings is com- plicated and highly fact-specific. Thus, this Article proposes measures that Congress should adopt to ensure that com- plex questions regarding waiver do not arise in future con- gressional hearings. In addition, this Article offers guidance to lawyers who represent clients in congressional investiga- tions by suggesting how witnesses should invoke their right to remain silent in congressional hearings. Author: Jason Kornmehl is a 2014 graduate of The George Washington University Law School. © 2015 N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy Published by the 2014–15 Editorial Board of the N.Y.U. -
Executive Branch Enforcement of Congressional Investigations
TROUBLE AHEAD, TROUBLE BEHIND: EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS Michael D. Bopp,* Gustav W. Eyler,** & Scott M. Richardson*** INTRODUCTION ................................................. 454 I. CONGRESS’S POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND ENFORCE INVESTIGATIVE REQUESTS ............................... 455 A. Congress’s Investigative Power ..................... 455 B. Congress’s Contempt Powers ....................... 459 1. Inherent Contempt Power ....................... 459 2. Criminal Contempt Power ...................... 461 3. Civil Contempt Power .......................... 464 C. Congress’s Use of Its Contempt Powers ............. 466 II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS ........................................ 467 A. Relevant Criminal Laws ............................ 468 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 .............................. 468 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 .............................. 470 3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1519 .................... 472 4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1622 .................... 473 5. 18 U.S.C. § 371................................ 474 B. Executive Branch Enforcement Proceedings ......... 474 1. Executive Branch Actions Punishing Obstruction of Congressional Investigations ................. 475 2. Executive Branch Use of Congressional Investigation Findings .......................... 479 III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS ...... 481 A. A Shift of Power from Congress to the Executive Branch ........................................... -
Entire Issue (PDF)
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 112 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION Vol. 158 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2012 No. 88 House of Representatives The House met at 10 a.m. and was THE JOURNAL 6401. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, called to order by the Speaker pro tem- The SPEAKER pro tempore. The pore (Mr. THORNBERRY). transmitting Transmittal No. DDTC 09-087, Chair has examined the Journal of the pursuant to the reporting requirements of f last day’s proceedings and announces Section 36(c) and 36(d) of the Arms Export to the House his approval thereof. Control Act; to the Committee on Foreign DESIGNATION OF THE SPEAKER Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Jour- Affairs. PRO TEMPORE nal stands approved. 6402. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- f fore the House the following commu- transmitting Transmittal No. DDTC 12-004, nication from the Speaker: PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE pursuant to the reporting requirements of The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Section 36(c) and 36(d) of the Arms Export WASHINGTON, DC. Control Act; to the Committee on Foreign June 12, 2012. Chair will lead the House in the Pledge Affairs. I hereby appoint the Honorable MAC of Allegiance. 6403. A letter from the Assistant Secretary, THORNBERRY to act as Speaker pro tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore led the Legislative Affairs, Department of State, on this day. Pledge of Allegiance as follows: transmitting Transmittal No. -
The IRS Harassment Scandal
The IRS Harassment Scandal: A Timeline of “Reform” Documenting Efforts by the Regulatory Community to Police Political Speech Timeline Events Current as of December 7, 2015 In May 2013, reports surfaced and investigations began into the revelation that the Internal Revenue Service had been scrutinizing groups applying for 501(c)(4) status using politically biased criteria. Beginning in March 2010, groups with names containing the words “Tea Party” or “patriot” were singled out for greater IRS scrutiny. Later, in an attempt to change from overtly partisan to more general criteria, the IRS shifted to targeting organizations with the goal of “teaching about the Constitution.” In addition to using these outrageous criteria, IRS officials were dishonest about their actions, repeatedly testifying before Congress that there was no targeting program. After admitting that the targeting had occurred, the IRS suggested that it was merely the result of a rogue group of agents in its Cincinnati office – a claim that has since been debunked by Congressional investigators. After submitting applications for nonprofit status, conservative-leaning social welfare groups waited years to hear back from the IRS. When they finally did hear back about the status of their application, the responses came in the form of demands for additional information. In many cases, the IRS required that groups send the agency their donor lists, names of board members, copies of minutes from all board meetings, resumes of individuals involved in the organization, and copies of all social media postings. Some organizations were asked to provide reports about the books their members had read as a group.