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Herbicide Company “Genealogy” February 2018

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Herbicide Company “Genealogy” February 2018 Herbicide Company “Genealogy” February 2018 The following chart is intended to show the history of the major U.S. herbicide companies. The information depends largely on people’s memories, which sometimes can be inexact, on records from the headquarters of major companies, and from histories on the internet. No guarantees are made for accuracy, although I think it is pretty close. The dates of the founding of companies or of acquisitions and mergers sometime vary slightly from one reference to another, so they should not be considered as solid historical facts. Only U.S. companies are listed. International companies are listed only if they had subsidiaries in the U.S., such as Bayer or BASF. I have tried to include mergers or acquisitions of entire companies or the ag divisions of companies, but acquisition of individual products are mentioned only occasionally. In many cases, the major company continues in existence and it is the agricultural division that becomes part of another company. Example: Aventis sold its ag products division to Bayer while the pharmaceutical portion of Aventis continues. Acquisitions of seed companies are not included. The major companies included are those with a history of synthesis, screening, and development of herbicides in the U.S., even if their parent company is overseas. This excludes marketing companies, post-patent distributors, and those companies dealing only with non-herbicide pesticides. Some companies have a distinguished herbicide history but no longer develop new herbicides. These are so noted. Numerous companies and individuals have been consulted and have been very helpful. But I have not always followed suggestions exactly if I felt I had more accurate information from a different source, so all the errors and omissions are mine. E-mail me and I can send you a chart directly. Arnold P. Appleby, Prof. Emeritus Crop Science, Oregon St. University Corvallis, OR 97331-3002 Phone: 541/737-5894 [email protected] History of the U.S. Herbicide Companies February 2018 Arnold P. Appleby, Oregon State University Cela Angel Pharmacy Celamerck 1972 EMD 2003 EM Indust. Merck KgaA 1668 U.S. Divis. of Merck) 1986 Shell International American Cyanamid (subsid. of American Home) 1994 American Cyanamid 1907 (Home & Garden to Rhone Poulenc in 1990;Celamerck in Ger.; sold to Scotts in 1998) J.B. Ford Co. Glassworks late 1880s 2000 Wyandotte Chem. Corp. 1943 Michigan Alkali Co. 1893 1969 Hoechst Hochst 1863 BASF Corp. 1986 BASF-Wyandotte 1969 BASF Colors & Chem. I.G. Farben 1925 BASF 1865 Bayer Bayer 1863 (plus other companies) (BASF comes from Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik) (I.G.Farben dissolved in 1945 and 12 companies emerged in 1951 including the original three major ones.) (BASF acquired Sandoz corn herbicides and some personnel-1996 when Sandoz merged w/ Ciba) Towa Agrochem. Citrus Grower’s Cooperat. Assoc. 1928 1968 1949 Kumiai America 1970 Kumiai Chemical Industry Co, Ltd. 1968 Ihara Agrochemical Co., Ltd. Ihara Chemical Industry Co, Ltd. (joint venture) 1965 Nippon Soda 1920 1978 (joint venture) K-I Chemical USA Upjohn Co. 1902 Upjohn Pill & Granule Co. 1886 TUCO (div. of Upjohn) Boots 1883 Brit. & Amer. Botanic Estab. 1849 Boots/ Hercules America 1979 BFC 1981 (BHA) Hercules 1912 DuPont) 1985 1983 (DuPont spun off Hercules and Atlas–antitrust) Prentice 1856 Edward Packard & Co 1843 Fisons 1942 Fison, Packard, & Prentice 1929 James Fison & Son 1808 1947 Whiffen & Sons 1912 Whiffen-Hull 1854 NOR-AM NOR-AM Chem Co 1984 Schering US 1929 Schering 1871 Richmond & Co. 1848 (subsidiary of Schering AG Note: Schering Corp. was barred from US in 1952 Morton Salt Co 1910 1965 AgrEvo 1994 NOR-AM Ag Products 1969 Morton Internat. Morton-Norwich 1969 Hoechst-AG 1951 Hochst Meister, Lucius & Co. 1863 Norwich 1887 (see BASF for I.G. Farben period) 1987 Aventis Crop Science 1999 Celanese 1927 American Cellulose and Chem. Mgr. Co 1918 Wittmann et Poulenc Jeune 1858 1860 (Sedagri marketed mature R-P herbicides) Mobil May & Baker 1834 Poulenc Freres agric. division 1981 1934 Rhone-Poulenc Rhodia Division Rhone-Poulenc 1928 1987 1964 Societe Chimique des usines du Rhone 1895 Chipman 1926? Gilliard & Cartier 1854 Union Carbide Ag. Products 1898 2002 1977 Amchem 1959 American Chemical Paint 1914 Amchem Products Rorer-Amchem 1968 1977 Rorer Pharmaceutical (Note: History of Rhone-Poulenc varies with reference. Encl. Brittanica says R-P originated in 1801 as Maison Debai-Extraits Tintoriaux) (Everest to Arysta) Pittsburgh Coke and Chem. 1929 Subsid.of Bayer Chemagro 1950 to 1955 1977 1/3 shares to Bayer 1953 Geary Chem. Co. Bayer licensee 1949 Miles Lab. 1935 Miles Medical Co. 1884 1978-79 all shares to Bayer 1967 Bayer Crop Science Miles Mobay Baychem Chemagro Bayer Friedrich Bayer Co. 1863 (Bayer regained the rights to the company name in the U.S. in 1994) (Bayer and Monsanto formed Mobay in 1954 to make polyurethanes. 1995 1992 1974 1971 In 1977, Bayer bought out Monsanto because of anti-trust actions.) (see BASF for I.G. Farben period) 2014 AgraQuest 1995 Montecatini 1888 Montedison 1966 Montedison 1991 1989 Edison 1884 Isagro USA 2003 Isagro 1992 Enichem Agricoltura 1991 Entimont Enichem 1953 (temporary) subsid. of ENI-1953 Echigoya 1673 Mitsui 1920 cotton division Tomen Agro US 1995 Tomen Corp 1970 Toyo Menka Kaisha 2002 (life sci. divis. ) Arysta Life Sci. No. Amer. Corp. 2005 Arvesta Arysta Life Sci. 2001 (subsid. of Arysta) life sci. divis. (Nichimen Agrimart) Nichimen Corp. 1982 Nichimen Co., Ltd 1943 Nippon Menka Kaisha 1892 (Japanese Cotton Trading Co. Platform Acquisitions Holding 2013 Great Lakes Chem. Corp 1960 Great Lakes Chem. Co. 1936 2013 McDermid 2005 Witco Corp. 1944 Wishnick-Tumpeer 1920 C.K. Witco 1999 (briefly) Crompton Co. 1851 Platform Speciality Products Crompton-Knowles 1879 2014 LJ & FB Knowles Co. 1856 Chemtura AgroSolutions Corp. 1996 Wittichen Chem. Co. 1930 Duphar Thompson-Hayward 1966 (subsidiary of Philips) Dominion Rubber Co. 1983 Naugatuck Chem. Co. 1904 Crompton Corp. Uniroyal Chem. Co. ~1980 Uniroyal, Inc. Chemical Div. 1967 U.S. Rubber 1892 National India Rubber Co. 1888 National Rubber Co.-Bristol ag. products 1983 (U.S. Rubber formed in 1892 from consolidation of 9 small companies.) Squibb 1968 1952 Squibb Mathieson Chem. Corp. Mathieson Alkali Works 1892 Olin Corp. 1969 Olin-Mathieson 1954 Olin Indust. Equitable Powder Co. 1892 2017 1898 Western Cartridge Co. M & T Chem 1962 Metals & Thermite 1918 Goldschmidt Detinning Co. 1908 (acquired by Elf-Aquitaine 1977) TotalFina 1989 Atochem 1984 Elf-Aquitaine 1976 ERAP 1989 (subsidiary of E-F) 1966 Cerexagri 2001 Atofina 2000 Elf-Atochem N.A. 1992 Atochem N.A. SNPA (subsidiary of AtoFina) 1989 Sharples Cotton Poisons 1951 1940s Elf-Aquitaine Pennwalt Pennsalt 1957 Pennsylvania Salt 1850 1969 Wallace-Tiernan 1911 Elanco Products Co. 1960 Eli Lilly 1876 Sanachem S.A 1997 (ag chemicals) Dow AgroSciences LLC 1998 Dow-Elanco 1989 Murphy Chem. Midland Chem. 1890 ~1982 1900 2001 remaining shares 1998 1996 55% Dow Dow 1897 Mycogen 1982 ~1984 Wacker Chemie (regional-ag chem) Rohm & Haas Ag. Chem Rohm & Haas-U.S. 1917 Rohm & Haas (Germany) 1907 Dow/DuPont 2016 Shell Development, division of Shell Oil 1986 (agricultural portion) Shell Ag Chem Co. 1986 Shell Ag Chem Divis. of Shell Chem. Co. DuPont DuPont 1802 (Hercules and Atlas formed from DuPont in 1912 anti-trust action) Niagara Sprayer & Chemical Co. 1904 Westvaco Chemical Corp Sprague-Sells (before 1905) 1948 1943 John Bean Spray Co. 1883 FMC Corp. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp Food Machinery Corp. (FMC) 1928 1961 1948 2017 Anderson-Barngrover DuPont Ag Products Tokyo Jinzo Hiryo 1887 Nippan Kagaku Kogyo Dainippon Jinzo Hiryo 1937 Nissan Chemical America Corp.__1989______Nissan Chemical Industries, Ltd.___ Syngenta (See following page) More than 100 state-owned chemical companies Syngenta/ChemChina ChemChina (State-owned) Bluestar Co. Makheshim Agan (Israel) Velsicol 1985 Velsicol 1965 Velsicol Co. 1931 (subsid. of Farley Indust.) (subsid. of NW Indust. ) 1965 (Michigan Chem. Divis. closed in 1978) Michigan Co. 1935 Oldbury Chem. 1906 1956 1986 Hooker Chem. Co 1906 1968 Zoecon Hooker Subsid. Occidental 1920 of Occidental 1977 Merck Crop Prot. 1983 Zoecon 1968 (Estab. as US division of Merck KgaA in 1891. Became independent in 1917) 1997 Sandoz Crop Zoecon Crop Prot. Sandoz 1895 Kern & Sandoz Co 1886 Protection of Sandoz 1973 Novartis Crop Protect. 1996 Internat. Minerals & Chem. (pesticides) Basel AG was a cartel of Ciba, Sandoz, and Geigy from 1918 to 1951 Clavel 1859 1873 R. Maag Ag. 1844 Ciba 1884 Bindschedler & Busch ~1990 (In 1884, Bindschedler & Busch became Ciba 1992 Ciba-Geigy 1970 “Gesellschaft fur Chemische Industrie Basel”.The abbreviation‘Ciba’ became so common it became Ciba in 1945) (agricultural products) 1971 J.R. Geigy 1914 Ardsley Co. 1758 Esso Res. & Engineering 1955 Standard Oil Devel. Co. Victor Chem. Works 1903 ? 1959 (C-P bought by Unilever,PLC) Stauffer (subsid. of Chesebrough-Pond’s) Stauffer 1895 Syngenta 2000 1987 1984-85 Stauffer ag chemicals 1987 Canett Corp United Alkali (sold acetachlor to Dow) 1941 Stuart 1971 Nobel Industries 1961 Atlas 1912 (from DuPont) Imperial Chem. Ind. 1926 (In 1987-88, ICI sold Stauffer basic chem.. production to Rhone-Poulenc) Brunner,Mond & Co. 1972 1968 Brit.Dyestuffs Astra ICI America, Inc 1971 ICI United States 1999 (merged, then demerged in 1993) 1963 AstraZeneca Zeneca Ag Products Chipman of Canada 1928 (1937-Plant Protection Ltd. formed as a 50-50 joint co. between ICI and Cooper McDougall & Roberson.1953-PPL becomes wholly owned by ICI. 1964-PPL becomes part of ICI Ag Div. 1973-PPL becomes fully independent from ICI Ag Div.) 1998 (except Asia/Pacific) G.B. Biosciences (sold Dacthal to AMVAC, 2001) Ishihara (purchaser) 1916 Shamrock Oil 1910 Diamond Alkali Chem. & Gas 1929 1990 ISK Biosciences Fermenta ASC Fermenta Pl. Prot. 1986 Fermenta AB 1967 Ansul 1990 1985 ag prod 1915 1970s Diamond Shamrock 1915 SDS Biotech 1983 Bastol Sales Co.
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