The Interplay of Ethos and Legal Issues in Certain Private Orations of Demosthenes
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DARGAN, O.P., Sister Mary Faith, 1931- THE INTERPLAY OF ETHOS AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CERTAIN PRIVATE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. EPortions of Text in Greek].
The Ohio State University, Ph.D. , 1970 Language and Literature, classical
University Microfilms, XEROXA Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
© Copyright by
Sister Mary Faith Dargan, O.P.
1970
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE INTERPLAY OF ETHOS AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CERTAIN
PRIVATE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Sister Mary Faith Dargan, O.P., B.A., A.M.
* * * * * * *
The Ohio State University 1970
Approved by
U j JP q AdvJ se-g— Department of Classics ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to acknowledge my sincere gratitude to Professor Mark P. 0. Morford for the Invaluable encour agement and assistance given to me in the preparation of this dissertation and for his kindness on innumerable occasions during the years he has served as my adviser. To Mother Francis de Sales, O.P. and the General Council of the Dominican Sisters of Saint Mary of the Springs for relieving me of all other duties in order to complete these studies, I owe a special debt of gratitude. For the moral support of many Sisters I am also grateful.
ii VITA
December 16, 1931 Born - West Haven Connecticut
1953 B.A., Albertus Magnus College New Haven, Connecticut
1960 A.M., Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts
1967-1970 Teaching Associate, Department of Classics, The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio
FIELDS OF STUDY
Latin and Greek Literature. Professor Mark P. 0. Morford
Latin Literature. Professors John B. Titchener and Kenneth M. Abbott
Greek Literature. Professors Robert J. Lenardon, Clarence A. Forbes, and William R. Jones
Linguistics and Palaeography. Professor Kenneth M. Abbott
Textual Criticism. Professor John B. Titchener
Roman and Greek History. Professor William F. McDonald
ill TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii
VITA ...... iil
INTRODUCTION ...... ^ ...... 1
Chapter
I. AGAINST SPUDIAS (XLI) ...... 9
II. AGAINST CALLICLES (LV) ...... 38
III. AGAINST EUBULIDES (LXXVII) ...... 59
IV. AGAINST CONON (LIV) ...... 86
V. CONCLUSION...... Ill
APPENDIX ...... 121
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 123
iv INTRODUCTION
The Demosthenic corpus contains a very interesting group of
private speeches^ depicting Demosthenes' work as a logographer. They
are invaluable in that they contain detailed information on Attic law
and reflect various phases of social and mercantile life in the fourth
century B.C. The standard works of Schaefer and Blass, the excellent
editions and commentaries of Paley and Sandys, and of Gernet have
dealt with certain stylistic, grammatical, and legal issues inherent
in these speeches, but virtually nothing has been done by way of
examining their rhetorical and artistic worth. Moreover, Demosthenes' 2 talent with regard to the technique of ethopoiia in these speeches
has been either overlooked or minimized. Ethopoiia was the ability
of the logographer to modify his style both in speech and thought to
For the authenticity of these speeches I accept the arguments of F. Blass as put forth in Vol. Ill of Die attische Beredsamkeit (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1877). The speeches are XXXVI-XXXIX; XLI, XLV, LI, LIV, LV, LVII. Demosthenes also wrote forensic speeches of a public nature.
2Aristotle Rhet. 1356a 1-13; 1408a 25-32; I417a 16-17; also, Dion. Hal. Lysias 8. For a discussion of the word and its different meanings in Greek authors, cf. J.F. Lockwood, "ndixfi A££ts and Dinarchus," C(£, XXIII (1929), 180-85. For ethos, cf. G.A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 91-93 and William L. DeVries, Ethopoiia. A Rhetori cal Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of Lysias (Baltimore: J. Murphy and Co., 1892), pp. 9-17. See further, Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, trans. James Willis and C. de Heer (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 595, n. 1.
1 2 suit the particular character of each litigant. In addition, the logographer saw to it that his client appeared to be a man of
Integrity who spoke the truth. This ethical appeal was a most effective instrument of persuasion, since an Athenian jury was influenced to a large extent by its opinion of the moral worth and candor of a litigant. Ethopoiia also served the purpose of concealing the identity of the writer. Although Lysias exemplifies the art at its highest development, Demosthenes' talent in this area deserves more consideration than critics have granted him. Indeed, the following quotation from Adams is representative of the traditional criticism with which Demosthenes’ ability as a writer of ethos has been dismissed:
Here Demosthenes is not at home. In any one of the numerous speeches written for clients to deliver, it is the same man who is speaking, Demosthenes himself; he cannot submerge himself in the personality of his client; it is Demosthenes' own point of view that is presented in the speech, his own argumentative style which stands out. It was only in the more serious private cases, having also something of political significance, that Demosthenes' sober and often indignant style so far fitted the char acter of the speaker and the circumstances of the case to carry conviction.!
This criticism is not justified when one considers the praise that ancient and modern critics have bestowed upon the ethopoiia in the
Conon, a non-political private speech. Indeed, Dionysius of
Halicarnassus thought this speech and the Eubulides (another private speech without political significance) worthy of Lysias.
^Charles Adams, Demosthenes and His Influence (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), p. 73. 3
In order to evaluate Demosthenes' ability as a logographer, two points must be kept in mind: first, the art of logography^ itself and secondly, the audience before whom the speeches were delivered. Since there were no lawyers per se in fourth-century
Athens, everyone, no matter how inexperienced, had to handle his own case. With the institution of large popular juries, the litigant had to face a group of several hundred who appreciated oratory and wanted to be entertained as well as convinced. Appeals to pity and prejudice were the rule rather than the exception. In order to address such a mass audience a carefully prepared and well delivered speech was a necessity. Originally the uneducated farmer or the active merchant went to someone more learned for legal advice and a sketch of what he should say. Towards the end of the fifth century, as the art of oratory became more developed, a class of professional speech-writers called "logographers" grew up. The new profession combined the functions of the writer, rhetoric teacher, and lawyer.
These men were paid for giving legal counsel and for writing a speech for a client to deliver.
The litigiousness of the Athenians in the fifth and fourth century was proverbial, and as a result the judiciary played a highly
Lavency, Aspects de la logographie judicialre attique (Louvain, 1964) contains the most recent and a very complete treatment of the subject. The profession has also been studied in its relation to cultural history by Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). 4 significant role in the daily life of the citizens.^ Indeed, the whole thrust of Plato's Republic is that the first duty of the state is the assurance of justice to its members. Magistrates were subject to multiple scrutinies on entering and leaving office, and military commanders, as well, were held accountable for their actions. In addition, law courts were often the place where political disputes were decided. Therefore, the courts were constantly "flooded" and, thus, the logographer was in constant demand.' One must not imagine 2 austere judicial bodies when considering the Athenian courts. t They were more like popular mass meetings, whose members were elected by lot from the whole body of citizens. The only requirement was that
Cf. Arist. Birds 39-41. Werner Jaeger comments on the Athenian mania for litigation in Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet, III (New York; Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 65. He points out that it was the obverse of the firm legality of the Athenian state and "produced a universal interest in agones— lawsuits and prosecutions." It is noteworthy that one of the typical scenes of Greek public life on the shield of Achilles depicts a group of elders administering justice in the market-place. Cf. Homer 11. 18.497ff. 2 For discussions on the character of Athenian courts, cf. John Lofberg, Sycophancy in Athens (Wisconsin: Collegiate Press of the George Banta Publishing Company, n.d.), pp. 10-19; Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State (2nd ed.; London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 72—74; Bonner, Lawyers, pp. 72-95; J.P. Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece from Homer to Menander (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1925), pp. 393ff; W. Wyse, "The Athenian Judicial System in the Fourth Century," in A Companion to Greek Studies, ed. by Leonard Whibley (3rd ed., rev. and enl.; Cambridge University Press, 1916), pp. 471-90; and John Lofberg, "Trial by Jury in Athens and America," CJ[ XVII (1921), 3-15. Gustav Gilbert, The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1895), pp. 376-416 may still be consulted with profit. The plays of Aristophanes teem with exaggerated criticisms of the courts. The Wasps is entirely devoted to a satire of the judicial system. 5 the jurors be over thirty years old. For economic reasons, aristo crats and successful businessmen preferred to avoid jury service.^
Further, since such service was regarded as a preserve of the litigiously inclined, wealthy conservatives developed a strong prejudice against serving on these "mob" juries. Thus the poorer 2 element served and the pay introduced by Pericles made this feasible.
The power of the vote and the flattering respect paid by the litigants to the jurors were also influential in getting people to serve, as
Philocleon so well points out:
I spring from the post to establish our claim as Best of Breed. No Crowned or Sceptred Potentate can surpass our power. W e 're Kings.
The proof is plain: what creature on earth can match the delight, the luxury, power, respect, and glory that falls to the lot of that little old man, the simple Athenian Juror? . None!
^Except for size, the composition of juries in America today is not very different. Successful businessmen still avoid jury duty with the result that jurors are more often drawn from the ranks of the less well-to-do citizens who are for the most part also less well-educated. For accounts of American jurors anxious to prolong their service for the sake of more dinners at public expense, cf. Lofberg, "Trial," p. 6. Lofberg concludes (p. 15): "That juries, both in the Athens of Demosthenes and in the America of today [1921], tend to be composed of individuals who are well satisfied with their fees and importance, but who are, by neither ability nor training, suited to the complicated task before them."
^For the deterioration in honesty of jurors after the intro duction of pay, cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.A. The poverty of the jurors, of course, accounts for the numerous appeals to poverty in the orators. Criticisms of those who depended on their jurors' fees for their livelihood are caustic. Cf. Isocrates Areopagiticus 5A, On the Peace 130, and Arist. Knights 51. For the view that the wealthy frequently sat on juries, cf. A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1966), pp. 36-37.
^Arist. Wasps 548ff. Translated by Douglass Parker (Ann Arbor: 6
The jurors were Impaneled without examination as to their attitudes
towards litigants on the question at issue and they were not held accountable for their decisions. Moreover, there was no presiding judge to instruct them as to what was relevant and what was not.
Given such a jury, the surprising thing is not that justice was sometimes unattainable, but that it was attained at all.
Naturally such bodies were impressed by eloquent speakers, but since mistrust^ of the "clever speaker" was strong among
Athenians, it was part of the logographer's art to make his clients' speeches appear natural and spontaneous. Ethos was one of the most effective devices in achieving this end. Moreover, since the logographer had to hide his own resources, if a technical knowledge of the law was shown, the speaker introduced it in an apologetic manner and pretended that he had been forced to look into the matter for the occasion. Logical argument, presented in a clear and con vincing manner, coupled with an art of narrative, highly developed, went a long way in influencing the jurors. Thus, the logographer had to know when to appeal to reason and when to appeal to psychol ogy. As a rule, simple and plausible statements filled with personal abuse against one's opponent were more effective than intricate arguments. Since many trials were of an ephemeral nature, the impassioned oratory of the assembly was out of place.
The University of Michigan Press, 1962). Cf. especially Philocleon's caricature of the jurors' "Happy Life," 559ff.
^Cf. A.W. Pickard - Cambridge, Demosthenes and The Last Days of Greek Freedom (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1914), pp. 15 (esp. references) and 19. 7
This, then, was the task that confronted Demosthenes as a logographer. His private life had brought him into contact with the law early in life since his guardians had misappropriated his inheritance. After making his first appearance before a jury in his own behalf, he chose to follow the profession of logography.
To be sure, it was a stepping-stone to his public life, but he evidently enjoyed it for he did not give it up until late in his political career.
In this dissertation I examine the rhetorical techniques in four of Demosthenes' private speeches dealing with disputes common in private litigation. The four speeches are: (1) Against Spudias, an inheritance speech; (2) Against Callicles, a quarrel between two neighbors over damaged property; (3) Against Eubulides, a citizenship case; (4) Against Conon, a case of assault. In each chapter the four major parts of each speech (prooemium, narrative, proof, and epilogue) are examined in detail with regard to the rhetorical and artistic principles used by Demosthenes to win the jury to his client's side.
Special attention is given to the use of ethos, pathos, and etxds arguments, important persuasive techniques in arousing the prejudice of the jury. Observations are then made concerning the over-all structure of the speeches. Thorough consideration is also given to the legal questions at issue. A general summary of the artistic value of each speech and its place in the development of Demosthenes' art appears at the end of each chapter. The final chapter contains conclusions about the artistic skill demonstrated in these speeches s and takes note of the Important contribution that Demosthenes’ work as a logographer made to his great political speeches where he achieved unsurpassed mastery in the field of oratory. CHAPTER I
AGAINST SPUDIAS (XLI)
This oration is the speech of the plaintiff, who is anonymous, against Spudias, in an action classified as a 6Cxn upoixds*^
^Che type of suit in which this speech was delivered has been the object of much discussion. A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 51-52 discusses various hypotheses. He correctly points out (p. 51) that the suit concerns not only the dowry but other matters connected with the inheritance. Further, although the 6Cxn itpoixds was available for enforcing the return of a dowry, it is not certain that it was available to enable the husband to enforce the promise of a dowry as is the case here. Harrison concludes that we must either suppose that there was a suit whose name has not come down to us or accept the 6Cxn npoixds. For further discussion of this problem cf. John Fine, "Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens," Hesperia, suppl. 9 (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 136ff; F. Pringsheim, The Greek Law of Sale (Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1950), p. 49; L. Gernet, Droit et societd dans la Gr&ce ancienne (Paris, 1955), p. 177; J.H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, II (Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1905-15), 496f., 653 n. 61; L. Beauchet, L ’Histoire du Droit prive de la Republique athenienne, I (Paris: Librairie Marescq Ain6, 1897), 297. Sir John Miles, "On Demosthenes, Contra Spudiam," Hermathena, LXXXV (1955), 46f.; Rudolf Burgkhardt, De causa orationis adversus Spudiam Demosthenicae (XLI) (diss. inaug. Leipzig, 1908), pp. 44-46; and H.C. Harrell, Public Arbitration in Athenian Law, University of Missouri Studies, XI, No. 1 (Columbia: Missouri University Press, 1936), pp. 37-38. Although the latter classifies this speech as a 6Cxn npoixds, he admits that the exact identification of his classifications is often purely a matter of conjecture. R.J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, II (University of Chicago: Chicago, 1938), 116 follow Harrell. L. Gernet, Ddmosthene, plaidoyers civils, II (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1957), 59 rejects the 6Cxn xpotxds and says a 6Cxn 6X 9 10 The authenticity of the work Is not questioned and, although the exact date Is unknown, it is considered one of Demosthenes' earliest orations.^ The plaintiff had married the elder daughter of an 2 Athenian, Polyeuctus of Teithras. According to him the marriage contract specified that the dowry^ was to be 4,000 drachmas (forty minae), 3,000 payable in cash at once, the balance after the death of Polyeuctus. At the time when the marriage contract was made, the payment of this balance was secured by the personal guarantee of Leocrates, adopted son of Polyeuctus and husband of his younger suggests a contamination of the suits evoixCou (for the house) and &pyupCou (for the sums borrowed by Spudias). ^Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, IIIB (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1858), 228; Blass, III, 219, 221; and Rolf Ruhling, "Der junge Demosthenes als Verfasser der Rede gegen Spudias," Hermes, LXXI (1936), 441-51. The latter shows by a word study the closeness of this speech in language and style to the guardianship speeches. o The emendation from 8pidcuos to Teidpdoios is due to the discovery by the American excavators in the Athenian agora of a marble statue base that bears the inscribed name of the sculptor Praxiteles. Cf. T. Leslie Shear, "The Campaign of 1936," Hesperia, VI (1937), 339-41. The inscription on the base is a dedication to Demeter and Kore by "Kleiokrateia, daughter of Polyeuktos the Tei- thrasian, wife of Spoudias." Since the names of the dedicator and her family appear in a column on the right side of the base, while the left side contains no names, Shear thinks that originally the left side was planned for the names of the elder daughter and her husband but was left blank as a result of the family quarrel. ^For a treatment of the institution of the dowry as a whole at Athens, cf. Harrison, pp. 1-60. He gives frequent cross references to modern authors and cites the pertinent passages in the ancient authors, especially Isaeus, and the lexicographers. See further, Fine, pp. 116ff.; Beauchet, I, 244-337; Lipsius, II, 468-99; and H.J. Wolff, "Marriage Laws and Family Organisation in Ancient Athens," Traditio, II (1944), 43-95. The latter gives a full bibliography. See also his article "npoC£" in RE, XXIII, pt. 1 (1957), 134-70. 11 daughter. Subsequently, Leocrates quarreled with Polyeuctus, his adoption^- was revoked, the younger daughter's marriage was dissolved, and she married Spudias. That left the plaintiff without any form of security for the 1,000 drachmas still coming to him. To correct this situation, at the time of Polyeuctus' death, the plaintiff induced him to make a house apotimema for this amount with horoi to mark the fact. The dotal apotimema was a distinctive type of security in the form of real property guaranteeing either the restitution or the payment of the dowry. When a prospective husband received a dowry from the woman's kyrios, he had to designate an appropriate amount of real estate as security (apotimema) for the restitution of the dowry in case the marriage was dissolved. Similarly, the kyrios, if he did not deliver the dowry at the time of the union, had to provide apotimema guaranteeing its future payment (as is the case here). One finds in Harpocration, "They of that time were also accustomed, if the relatives gave a dowry to a woman on her marriage, to demand from the husband some security equal in value to the dowry, such as a house or land." In Demosthenes' lawsuit against Onetor (XXX), the issue centers on a factual dispute over an apotimema guaranteeing the return of the dowry the latter had provided for ^Although it is not explicitly stated, the adoption seems to have been cancelled by mutual consent. Cf. Harrison, p. 94. 2 For translation, cf. Moses I. Finley, Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens 500-200 B.C.; The "Horos"-Inscriptions (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p. 44. 12 his sister, the wife of Aphobos (A: anofieCgu yap auxov ou yovov xrjv xpotx’ ou 6e6wxdxa, ?is q>ncu vOv axoxexiyfiodai xb x“Pf°v i 8: aXX* auxfis xCSpios <3v, . . . aitoxtyfiaaaBai qxSaxwv x?|v ynv e£ £xdXynaev).^ The Spudias, on the other hand, is the sole literary Instance of apotimema as security for payment of a dowry. In both cases horol were placed on the property offered as security by the dotal debtor to publicize the lien which existed on that property. If at the appointed time the dotal debtor had not fulfilled his obligations, the creditor had the right to foreclose on the apotimema. Thus, the provision of security for the return or payment of a dowry 9 by apotimema can be regarded as a special case of hypothec, the latter being any sort of mortgage. ■^The Oxford text ed. by W. Rennie and S.H. Butcher is used throughout the dissertation. 2 The term is also technically used in connection with the administration of a ward's estate. On the institution of apotimema cf. Harrison, pp. 293-303; Fine, chaps. 5 and 6; Finley, chap. A; Beauchet, III, 183f., 207, 281f.; Lipsius, II, 695ff. The texts of the horoi recording dotal apotimema are collected in Finley, Appendix I, nos. 132-65 and Appendix III, 152A. Fine, pp. 120ff. rejects the theory of apotimema as a datio in solutum, i.e., a discharge of an obligation. The latter is the theory of U.E. Paoli as set forth in Studi di Diritto Attico, "La 'Datio in Solutum' nel Diritto Attico," and "Sul Diritto Pignoratizio Attico;" full references in Fine, p. vii. Harrison, pp. 316-17, and Finley, p. 200, n. 28; 202, n. 1; and 237, n. 23 are also critical. Demosthenes' two speeches against Onetor (XXX and XXXI) preserve the fullest literary account of the axoxCynya tpoixds. Cf. also Harpocration, axoxiynxaC xai axoxCynya xat axoxiyav xal xcx ax' auxwv and I. Bekker, Anecdota Graeca. I (Berlin, 181A), A23.12ff.; 200.29ff.; 201.30. For further lexical references, cf. Harrison, p. 297, n. 1. For hypothec, cf. Finley, chap. 3; App. I, nos. 1-10; App. Ill, pp. 182ff; Harrison, pp. 25A-55; 262-71; and Fine, chap. A. 13 Since Polyeuctus died without leaving male heirs, his two daughters as enCxXnpoi inherited the estate jointly.*- The sons-in-law, acting as kyrioi of their respective wives, disagreed over the in ventory of the estate. Therefore, the plaintiff brought this suit to recover the money due to him for the unpaid dowry. In addition he demanded that: (1) Spudias should pay him half a mina as his share of the cost of a funeral sacrifice offered in memory of Polyeuctus; (2) Spudias should pay into the estate of Polyeuctus eighteen minae, which he had borrowed from his mother-in-law, and two minae, plus interest, as the cost of a slave whom he had purchased from Polyeuctus; (3) he should bring into the estate certain items which he had borrowed. Along with various depositions, the plaintiff supports his claims by the will of Polyeuctus, some papers which his widow had left sealed at her death, and the silence of Spudias when he learned the contents of these documents. In addition he deals briefly with counter-argu ments which Spudias might bring forward. The prooemium (1,2) opens with the calm ’A6eX 5v6pes 6ixaaxaC, yuvaixas eyai xal EicouSCas ou to oC, IIoXuedxTou BuyctTdpas. This statement establishes a reason for the reserve that characterizes the speaker's language throughout. However, since the relationship ^For heiresses and intestate succession, cf. Harrison, pp. ISO- 49, full references given; Beauchet, I, 398-487. Charles Savage, The Athenian Family (Baltimore, 1907), pp. 128-33; L. Gernet, "Sur L 'fSpiclerat," REG, XXXIV (1921), 337ff; and Sir John Miles, "The Attic Law of Intestate Succession," Hermathena, LXXV (1950), 69-77. For the law, cf. Dem. XLIII 51. The speeches of Isaeus are the best literary source for these topics. 14 between the two brothers-in-law could hardly be worse, the speaker perhaps is afraid that a more impassioned tone would arouse a vitu perative counter-attack from Spudias. The facts are laid before the jury immediately: since Polyeuctus died without leaving any sons, the speaker is forced to go to law with Spudias over the property that has been left (1: np&s Touxovt rep I xtov xaxaAei The use of the apologetic dvayx However, the more gentleness and consideration (itpadxepov . . . xat (jiiAavdpantdxepov) he used toward Spudias, the more contempt (xoootfxn> ySXAdv you xaxetppdvei) Spudias showed toward him. Further, he is no match for the litigious Spudias. This contrast is brought out more clearly in a sarcastic slur when he says that Spudias can take the matter lightly (oSxos ytv p ^Cf. the beginning of Dem. XXVII and XXX for similar sentiments with regard to his wish to submit to arbitrators rather than to come before a jury. 15 the jury's attention. The narrative which begins in 3 is interspersed with proofs throughout the case. Since Polyeuctus had two daughters but no male children (who could inherit his estate), he adopted^ Leocrates, his wife's brother. According to the plaintiff, Polyeuctus gave the elder daughter to him in marriage with a dowry of forty minae and the younger daughter to Leocrates, who as adopted son stood to inherit the estate upon the father's death. Sometime later— no specific time is stated— a quarrel arose between Polyeuctus and Leocrates (4: fiiaipopos 2 Yevoyfvns). The nature of this quarrel is not stated. However, its seriousness is shown by the fact that Polyeuctus took away (a ^The chief motives for adoption were to preserve the family line, the family cult and to provide for one's care in old age. Cf. Isaeus II 10ff.; V 6; VI 6f.; VII 13ff.; and IX 7. See further W. Goligher and W.S. Maguinness, Index to the Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1961), notfoyat, noCqcus, and nointds. Also see Savage, pp. 115-27; Harrison, pp. 82-96; Beauchet, II, 1-72; Lipsius, II, 508-20. Gernet, Droit, p. 129 gives a list of adoptions found in the orators. 2 # The plaintiff knew the nature of this quarrel as Kept ?is oux old’ o it 6et A£yeiv (4) shows. He either wished to conceal it or did not think it relevant. For o tc Set in the sense of "Why I should say," cf. J.E. Sandys and F.A. Paley, Select Private Orations of Demosthenes, II (3rd ed., rev.; Cambridge: University Press, 1896), 56. 3 This passage has been the subject of much discussion with regard to the rights of a woman's original kyrios. Cf. Harrison, p. 30f. and the literature cited there for a discussion of this problem and of divorce as a whole. Harrison concludes that the details of this transaction are far too confused to permit pressing the word a his daughter and gave her In marriage to Spudias. Actually, this simply meant that he induced his daughter to go before the Archon and demand a divorce. Polyeuctus did not adopt Spudias, since, in that case, the estate would have come to him alone and there would have been no cause for the present suit. After the divorce, Leocrates became angry and brought a suit against Polyeuctus and Spudias. The suit did not come about because of the divorce itself or Leocrates would have sued Polyeuctus alone. The quarrel arose over some property that Leocrates had brought into Polyeuctus' estate. Finally a settlement was reached before arbitrators (28: t o u t ' eyvuoav ot 6ioiTriTaC) stipulating that Leocrates should get back.all he had i brought into the estate. Thus, a mutual reconciliation^ was effected (4: twv xe itpBs otXXtfXous annXXdx^ai ndvxwv). Although it is not stated, a will must also have been revoked because it was tied up with Leocrates* position as heir and adoptive son of Polyeuctus. A rhetorical question (5) brings the plaintiff to the purpose of the previous narrative and his first charge against Spudias. The speaker claims that a thousand drachmas were left unpaid on the dowry of forty minae, with the understanding that he should receive them on the death of Polyeuctus (5: oxav JloXtfeuxios anoOdvq). That this was ^Cf. Isaeus II 32 for an example of a mutual reconciliation. Burgkhardt, pp. 54-56, discusses the questions raised by this statement. Cf. p. 56 for his humorous conclusion to an overly legalistic approach to these matters. Gernet, Pern. II, 51, rightly points out that custom rather than law often governed such family differences. 17 a friendly, verbal agreement can be gathered from ouoAoYnBeioiov, oupfldAaiov* (5); wMoAdYe<> (6)» omoAoyouvtos oipeCAeiv £pot (16); and rhv ouoAoYn^elaav rcpotxa (26). As long as Leocrates was Polyeuctus' heir, he was the security for the debt, o Aewxpcttns • . • *pos cxeivov fiv yoi t6 oupgdAatov (5). But once Leocrates left the family (e£exexwpn*ei), there was no security. Moreover, no attempt was ever made to secure the debt until Polyeuctus became seriously ill and the time for the payment drew near. At this point in order to secure the ten minae still owing, the speaker received from Polyeuctus the house as apotimema— t?|v oixCav Totdrnv aroTiMWMat vpds t3s 6£xa pvas (5). When the speaker tried to collect the accruing rents (no doubt the interest on the apotimema), Spudias objected. It should be noted that the plaintiff is not actually foreclosing on the mortgage. He merely wants to clear the debt before the house is brought into the estate. At no time does he ask for the house. The fact that Spudias objects to the speaker's collecting the interest on the debt can only mean (for reasons unknown) that: (1) the debt never existed; (2) the debt existed but Spudias never knew about it before; or (3) Spudias believes that the plaintiff used undue influence to extract the apotimema from the dying Polyeuctus. In 6 the speaker ^Although oupBdAcuov in its broadest sense means any legal transaction often dealing with contracts, the idea of covenant bond or security for the debt is meant here. For a discussion of the various meanings of this word, cf. W. Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge: University Press, 1904), pp. 384-85. For the frequency of verbal agreements in the first half of the fourth century B.C. despite the difficulties that might result, cf. Finley, p. 21. 18 states that he will bring witnesses that forty minae were promised to him as dowry at his betrothal^ to Polyeuctus' daughter (nyyda pot IIoXdeuKTOS t ?W dOYatfp' e*t TCTtapdxovTo pvats). By way of recapit ulation he says he Intends to prove the following: (1) he received 1,000 fewer drachmas than he should have; (2) Polyeuctus always admitted that he was in his debt; (3) Polyeuctus provided Leocrates as guarantor (xat t &v Aewxpdxnv ouvfoxnoc); (4) Polyeuctus, at his death, 2 directed by his will that horoi be set up on the property to acknowl edge the debt. Witnesses then testify to the first three statements. The horoi must not have been set up since the plaintiff does not submit these as evidence anywhere in the case. The narrative resumes with the first charge against Spudias, viz., he refuses to let the speaker collect the rents from the house. He makes effective use of the law (7, 10) which states that the mortgagor or heirs can maintain no action against the mortgagee. He points out to the jury that there is no stronger basis for bringing The CYY<3n or formal marriage contract did not necessarily involve the consent of the woman or even her presence. Originally, the woman herself was practically an object of barter between the contracting parties. For the law relating to betrothal, cf. Dera. XLVI 18. Harrison treats the subject in detail with good bibliography, pp. 1-9. Also cf. Weiss, pp. 222ff. and Wolff, "Marriage Laws," pp. 51f f. 2 The horoi, since they published the fact that there was a lien on the property concerned, were set up in the interest of the creditor and of any third party, who, thereby, was warned that the property was encumbered. Cf. Bekker, p. 285. 12-19; Fine, chaps. 1, 2, 3; and Finley, chap. 2 jet passim. Harrison, p. 257, n. 4 cites several passages from the orators concerning horoi. This passage is the only known instance of an hypothec created by a will. 19 this suit than this law. As quoted in 7, the law reads: t &v vdpov, os oux ea Siappfanv, ooa xis anexCMnaev, elvcu 6Cxas, o u t ’ auxols „ i oute tois xXnpovdpois. That this is a paraphrase rather than a verbatim quotation is evident from 10 where the speaker tells the clerk to take the law, os oux ea xfiv anoxiynSfvxiov ext 6Cxnv eTvai npds toOs exovxas. Despite the different wording, it is obvious that the meaning is essentially the same. The debtor and the one providing the security was Polyeuctus while he was alive; now it is the estate, represented by his heirs. t o O s exovxas cannot mean those in physical possession of the property, but those who "have" the apotimema in the sense of "have the contingent right to the property," i.e., the plaintiff. Spudias, representing his wife, has denied the validity of the debt and thus the apotimema for it; as previously stated, he has brought a suit against the speaker which prevents the latter from collecting the rents. In effect the speaker is saying, "Spudias, don't you realize that you are violating the law by not allowing me to collect the interest on the apotimema? You know you q can't do this!" The weakest point in the plaintiff's position is ^Fine, p. 131, suggests the speaker may have twisted the wording to suit his own purposes. However, R.J. Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 59, points out that paraphrasing was customary and it was sufficient to quote the essence of the law. ^Finley, p. 245, n. 61. 3 For further discussion about the various interpretations of this law, cf. Fine, pp. 129ff., who criticises Paoli; Burgkhardt, pp. 27-30, especially p. 27, n. 2 and the literature cited; Finley, p. 52, who says no other reference to the law is known; Gernet, Pern., II, 57f.; and Harrison, p. 300, n. 1. The latter reconstructs the 20 Chat there is no reference to his collecting interest on the unpaid portion of the dowry before the security was given, as was customary.^ Further, the speaker says that Spudias has come into court to dispute this law, whereas he has actually come to defend himself against the speaker's allegations. It is the speaker who is bringing this suit, not Spudias. Spudias would probably not dispute the law at all, but rather would simply deny the existence of the apotimema. The plaintiff now brings his second charge which concerns debts that Spudias should have brought into the estate. The first 2 debt, two minae plus Interest, is for the price of a slave whom Spudias had bought from Polyeuctus. However, he did not pay for the slave and he has not entered it into the general account (8: rrjv Tiphv o 3 t ’ exeCvi^ 6i£Auoev oute vOv eis t 6 x o i v S v avevtfvoxcv). The speaker clearly has a valuable witness to this transaction in Aristogenes who maintains that Polyeuctus on his death bed spoke of argument and points out that obviously if Spudias could not sue the plaintiff for the capital value of the house, still less could he contest his claim to draw the rent. ^Supra, p. 10, n. 3; Fine, p. 138; and Beauchet, I, 293-95. 2 When the speaker refers to this transaction again in 22, he omits the part about interest (22: ai 6 this debt. The second debt Is for 1,800 drachmas which Spudias had borrowed from Polyeuctus' wife after her husband’s death. Whether this was her own money or money from her husband's estate has been disputed.^ The loan was recorded in yP^MUaia; her brothers (perhaps even Leocrates) were present as witnesses, and maybe they were, in fact, assenting kyrioi, although this is not stated (9). The plaintiff does say that they were present at all times (9: rapdvxes axaaiv) and questioned her on every point that there might not be any repercussions (Tva pn6Sv 6uaxep£s nuiv eTrj rp6s aAAnAous). He stresses this point so that Spudias cannot deny the validity of the documents. With his statement oCxouv 6etv6v- . . . xat ax€xAiov, the speaker introduces a bit of rhetorical flourish into what has been up to now a straightforward presentation. On the one hand, the plaintiff states that he has paid for everything that he has ever received from Polyeuctus and his wife and is now bringing everything he ever owed into the general account, while on the other, Spudias has disregarded these obligations (thereby acting against the laws), the will of Polyeuctus, the records, and the witnesses. The use of negatives is especially effective here (10: t o Ot o v 6e ytfxe x<3v vdyuiv xfiv uyex£pwv ippovxCcetv vifjB’ (5v 6iddexo IIoAdeuxxos pfite x3v xctxaAeKpdfvxwv ypaPPdtTmv *Cf. Burgkhardt, pp. 31-39»for a discussion and interpretation of this whole passage. 2 This would permit her to contract business and stay within the law; for which, cf. Isaeus X 10. For another discussion of whether this was money from her dowry or her husband's estate, cf. Miles, "On Demosthenes," p. 46. 22 yfixe xwv oovetfidxwv). Then the speaker calls for the law, the records,* and the depositions of Arlstogenes. The plaintiff continues to marshal the assets of the estate (11) and comes to his third claim. Spudias and his wife had also received a bowl ( Spudias. However, although he does not mention this, Spudias may Bonner, Evid., p. 24, points out that these papers are put in without the evidence of the witnesses in whose presence they were drawn up. 2 The word literally means "tent." Harpocration takes it to mean "a parasol": eotxe 6£ oxeuds xt elvat, onep ot y£v xdoyov xiva yuvatxetov elvaC Harpocration, veydoeia: yflroxe eopxd its ffv Neydaeus, xaB’ nv xots xaxotxoydvots eitexdAouv xcl voyt(dyeva. This is also the one place where Harpocration refers to this speech as xaxa ZitouSCou. 23 have contributed something.*- The speaker ends this section with a succinct tricolon that effectively sums up his portrait of Spudias as an undesirable character (11: aAid to ji&v exet npoXagwv, tuv 6£ ufpn xopCceTai, Ta 6' ouio) ipavepCs oux aico6(6u>oiv). The clerk then reads the depositions. Thus far Demosthenes has presented a very complicated fact situation and a relatively complicated law situation, allowing little chance for the use of ethos except in the prooemium, where the plaintiff comes across as reserved, respectable, and low-keyed. Sections 12-18, however, provide greater opportunity for oratorical techniques, although the legal issues are still prominent.. After laying all his complaints before the jury, the plaintiff shifts his emphasis and concentrates on Spudias' counter-claims. He says that perhaps Spudias will not deny the charges; in fact, he will not be able to, although he is clever (12: ou6e yap e£ei, xaCwep 6eivos uv). By the use of the word 6etv6s to characterize Spudias, the plaintiff has subtly planted the seed of suspicion in the jurors' minds at a rather strategic point in the case. For what follows is an account of Spudias' objections to the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff says that Spudias will say that: (1) the death-bed action and will were invalid because extracted by undue influence by the *From supra, p. 10, n. 2,it is evident that Spudias and his wife were religious people and surely they would not casually neglect the very important duty of rites to the deceased Polyeuctus. Cf. Savage, pp. 5-16, for the Greek attitude toward the dead and religious duties of the heirs. 24 plaintiff and as favors to him; (2) he is being greatly injured in other respects;'*' (3) he has brought an action against the plaintiff. It is evident that this is what Spudias said when the case was heard 2 before the public arbitrator (12: t o u t o yap xai upos t$ 6 ictnnT§ Xfyeiv e«exc£PcO » since no new information could be introduced before the jury. The plaintiff classifies these counter-charges as oux • • • bixaCav eTvcu t?|v aitoXoyCav (13) and further asserts that it is not right for Spudias to have recourse to accusations and calumny, especially when he is manifestly (qiavepus) shown to be in the wrong. The speaker's own cunning is displayed by this last statement wherein he assumes as fact what has not yet been proved. Moreover, Spudias, despite the speaker's protests, must have had some basis for any accusations he made. The plaintiff himself acknowledges this when he says (13), "For his counter-charges, if he is suffering any wrong, he will plainly receive satisfaction, but for the claims made on him, he will give it." With a rhetorical question containing other references to his opponents' accusations (rats . . . 6ia$oXais), he comes to the narrative about wanting to submit the case to friends for settlement. The discussion in 14-15 refers to the private arbitration to which Spudias, for reasons unknown, would not submit. The plaintiff ^Bonner and Smith, II, 108, classify Spudias' suit as a dike blabes. 2Although Spudias had refused to submit to private arbitrators (1, 14, 29), the case had been heard before a public arbitrator. Cf. Gernet, Pern., II, 64. By cross-questioning his opponent a litigant could often force him to make an admission to his disadvantage or reveal the arguments he intended to use in case of appeal. 25 makes a good point when he says that if Spudias' claims were valid, he should have submitted to a settlement by their friends. Apparently many conferences were held (1A: xoAAwv A<5yu>v yevoydvwv), but Spudias must have stopped the discussions before the final settlement. The optative in oux olos fiv eyydvetv ols exetvoi yvotev (1A) proves that no actual award was given, despite the speaker's attempt to convey the opposite impression. Moreover from 12 we know that the case had, in fact, been before a public arbitrator. The plaintiff continues to vouch for the trustworthiness of such arbitrators (1A: t u v Kapayeyevnyfvwv araot t o (5t o i s , t£3v eifidtujv ou6£v ?5t t o v hyCv tSt yevdyeva, t w v xoivSv aycpofdpots xou ipCAwv o v t u v ) . It is odd that he says that these friends could have proved the baselessness not only of Spudias' claims but of his also (1A: xal t w v t o Ot o u xou t w v cywv eyxXnyctTwv yndcv ovt’ eCfiXeyCoiv). This overly apologetic attitude is part of the speaker's ethos. With cutting coolness he refers to his brother-in-law as tout^i (15) and again states Spudias' assumed conviction as fact. He continues to create the impression that an award was given (15: t 6 t t 6' ^Bonner and Smith, II, 157 and Wyse, Speeches, p. A50. For the oath of private arbitrators, cf. Isaeus V 32; Dem. XXIX 58. 26 that preceded his case. This emphasis shifts once again at 16. At the mention of the house and the charge of undue influence, one feels his deep bitterness toward Spudias. In fact his address to Spudias is filled with scornful irony (16: a \\* oo Srlrqu xat to&s ydpxupas exeiaa, 5 EvoufiCct, 4>eu6n yot yaptupeiv). This reference to false testimony is followed by a recapitulation of all the times when the witnesses were actually present. He does this quickly in four participial clauses in asyndetic sequence. Since it is fairly certain that there was no prosecution for perjury before public, let alone private, arbitrators,^ his whole argument about the risk his witnesses would have taken if they gave false witness is also specious. He dismisses this whole section about arbitrators with the pithy otq>Sjyev t o Cv u v t o Ot ’ n6n (17). The curt question to Spudias coupled with the scolding admonition has a ring of defiance about it. Since he is coming to a very important argument, he fixes the jury's attention on what is going to follow by a direct address (17). 2 According to the plaintiff when Polyeuctus made his will, Spudias' wife was present and, furthermore, Spudias himself had been *Cf. Dera. XXXIV 19 for an express statement that in private arbitration no prosecution for perjury was possible. Harrell, p'. 28 says that perjury was very common in both private and public arbi tration and that there was even less need of an immediate prosecution for false testimony in public arbitration, where the decision was always subject to appeal. Also cf. George Calhoun, "Perjury before Athenian Arbitrators," CP, X (1915) If. 2 Gernet, Pern., II, 65, n. 3 thinks that Polyeuctus' will was oral. Provisions in wills could be proved by the evidence of those who knew the contents. Cf. Bonner, Evid., p. 62. 27 invited to be present but said he was busy (17: etpnoev auxds p£v ooxoXCav ayeiv) and that it would be sufficient if his wife attended. Thus his charge of undue influence is unfounded (17: woxe pn66 t o Ot ’ elvat Xfyeiv, us X An eix6s^ argument bolsters the plaintiff's defense. When Aristogenes informed Spudias of the contents of the will, he made no comment. Moreover, Polyeuctus lived for more than five days after having revealed the contents of his will, and, during that time, whenever Spudias visited his father-in-law's house, he showed no displeasure and raised no objections; neither did the defendant's wife, who was present when the will was made (18: ou6’ n yuvri, xapouo' e£ apxns axaoiv xodxois). The eix6s here is clearly implied; if the defendant had any ground for complaint, he would not have kept silent when he heard the contents of the will. The plaintiff then gives the obvious conclusion to this argument (18: (Sax’ o u x £xi JIo XOe u x x o s auxa xecadets epot xaxtxapCcexo, us eocxev, aXX’ upets cnixoC). It is important 2 that this point be established since the charge of "undue influence" is the defense on which Spudias' case rests. With an exhortation to the jury to keep these facts in mind and another reference to possible ^This and almost all further references to the ccxds argument are taken from William Fairchild, "Demosthenes and His Use of the Argument from Probability" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Classics, Northwestern University, 1951). Cf. pp. 63-65 for discussion of this speech. ^The clause about "undue influence" is found in a law per taining to those adopted. Cf. Dem. XLVI 14: . . . n yuvcuxl net§6pevos, 0x6 xodxuv xou nopavouv, n ux’ dvdyxns n 0x6 6eopo0 xaxaXn<;6eCs. See Wyse's note on Isaeus II 13 for allusions to it in Isaeus; also cf. Savage, p. 119. 28 slanderous statements by Spudias, he asks the clerk to read the testimony of witnesses. In 19 the plaintiff merely repeats in different words what he has already said. He is careful to emphasize the fact that the house was mortgaged honestly. He reminds the jurors that, because of this, they cannot acquit Spudias. Then follows the narrative about the other debts outstanding, for which Spudias himself will be the best witness; however, not by words (20:' ou \6yy pot AC’) but by a manifest act (20: aXX' epyv repiipavet). Indeed, if one were to take seriously his statement about the declarations of the interested being mere words, the testimony of the plaintiff's own witnesses would be invalid. The question to the jurors (20) imparts liveliness to the narrative. This is followed by bidding them to pay close attention to the crucial proof that is to follow. It is implied that Spudias suspected his mother-in-law of dishonesty with regard to the records she left (20: *v’ eav apa xoXpql it xat itept xns unxp&s t w v Yuvatxwv gXaaipnuelv n *ept xwv YPayydxwv). Of course, this would give him a reason for denying these debts also. However, his supposed defense falls flat, if what the speaker says in 21-24 is true. The mother-in-law had left an account against Spudias sealed by her brothers as witnesses.* After her death the documents were 2 opened by the two litigants and their wives, who recognized the seals *Cf. sec. 9. ^Cf. R.J. Bonner, "The Use and Effect of Attic Seals," CP, III (1908), 398-407. (21: 6yoAoYouy£vuiv t w v onyeCwv xat napa rfjs t o Ot o u Yuvaix6s xat napa tfis eyhs). Then the men took copies, resealed them, and deposited them with Arlstogenes. The plaintiff claims very confidently that since the defendant joined in sealing these papers, he must be re garded as acknowledging the indebtedness of which they were evidence; otherwise, he would have protested vehemently and would not have resealed the papers. The eixds argument here appears in the form of two pointed questions of challenge, followed by a statement of fact, giving the reason for the defendant's action (22: Touxt yap ou6* av eTs finitou vft icaaiv oyoXoYwv tots Y£YPayy£vois roifiaetev). The epanadiplosis* (22: t o u t o 6fi, t o Ot ’,) and anaphora (evnoav . . . * 2 evnoav) emphasize the importance of the papers' contents. After an appeal to the common experience of the jury reemphasizing the import of the previously mentioned silence (23), he characterizes as itovnpot xat ouxo^dvrai those who later try to contest charges made against them. Scorn is evident in the slur against Spudias for coming into court so frequently (24: oacf xat rcuxvdrepov evraudot napfpxeiai). After another appeal to the jury's experience, he again says that Spudias has convicted himself on every charge (24: t o (5t *W.H. Kirk, Demosthenic Style in the Private Orations (Baltimore: Friedenwald Company, 1895), p. 10. A The debt regarding the slave is also proved by Polyeuctus' death-bed statement in the presence of Aristogenes (8). 30 wife^ and resealed by Spudias. It is unfortunate that the plaintiff did not stop here, instead of returning to a discussion concerning the dowries. What follows is an attempt to equalize the dowries. Since a father could in fact give unequal dowries to his daughters(26), these arguments make the plaintiff suspect as do the opening sentences of section 25. Since Spudias' wife had been married before, perhaps he really should have received a larger dowry under the theory of "damaged goods." The plaintiff, realizing this, may feel guilty and thus he deliberately confuses the issue. Nevertheless, custom, not law, was the usual guide in such matters. After the recapitulation (25), the plaintiff again charges that Spudias will be lying if he denies the validity of the apotimema. According to the speaker, Spudias has received more than he and even if Spudias' accusations were true, it was within Polyeuctus’ power to do as he pleased in this matter (26: ou6£ ye t & v IIoXOeuxTOV, ci t w v duyaT^pwv eBotiAexo Tij yev eAdxxw, xg 6£ wAeCw itpolx’ eiufioOvai, 6taxwAu$nv This is followed by a contradiction: all’ ou6£v eAaxxov elxes (26). ^Bonner and Smith, II, 130-31, cite this as an example of hearsay evidence from someone who could not testify in court. Cf. also Bonner, Evid., pp. 24, 25, and 33. 31 After the deposition which shows on what terms Spudias got his wife, the real oratorical jugglery begins. For the sake of clarity, it seems best to include the text^ that has been the subject of so much discussion and various inter pretations. This is what the speaker says in 27f.: Jlfis o5v oufi&v eXaxxov How can he not have received exec, *For translation and interpretation of this passage, cf. Wolff, "Marriage Laws," pp. 55-56, woman's trousseau was normally not valued in her dowry. Cf. Isaeus II 9; VIII 8; and Wolff, pp. 54ff. For an evaluation of a non monetary dowry, cf. Fine, p. 118f. and the literature cited; Finley, p. 245, n. 63; and Lipsius, II, 491f. See also Harpocration, dveTiyaxo. ^Wolff, p. 55, n. 66, supported by Finley, p. 239, n. 32, In essence what the plaintiff says here is this: Spudias received with his wife thirty minae in money, plus jewelry and apparel which Leocrates had given her, and for which Polyeuctus paid to Leocrates a little more than ten minae. In addition, he received from Polyeuctus marriage presents (rot TotiT<$> 6od£vr’) about equal in value to what the plaintiff received independently of the dowry. Even when the plaintiff gets the ten minae owing, he will still have less than Spudias, since the jewelry and apparel given up by Leocrates cost Polyeuctus somewhat more than the ten minae. Wolff makes too much of the xuPts • • • axoTiiin3€vTuv clause since the plaintiff had already excluded the whole dowry from the comparison (xwpis xns xpotxds). He further suggests that Polyeuctus neither set a value on the jewelry and apparel of Spudias' wife nor did he include these items in her dowry. He infers this from the use of the word eixdtujs which he translates as "quite likely." He feels that if the plaintiff were simply quoting Polyeuctus' evaluation, he would have expressed himself in a more straightforward way. Therefore he concludes that it was the plaintiff, not Polyeuctus,who included the jewelry and apparel of Spudias' wife in the total evaluation set for Spudias at forty minae and further that the plaintiff arrived at this estimate of 1,000 drachmas from the price paid for these goods by Polyeuctus to Leocrates. Indeed criticizes the translators, viz., Murray and Kennedy, for referring the clause to the 1,000 drachmas paid by Polyeuctus to Leocrates. Geme t , Dem., II, 68, n. 2 also misses the point and, despite the unanimous manuscript tradition, changes the text. For the technical meaning of apotimao to denote the pledging of property for a debt, cf. supra, p. 12. 33 this payment must have been part of the settlement arrived at in the law suit* filed by Leocrates against Polyeuctus and Spudias, after the latter had become Polyeuctus' son-in-law. Be that as it may, Wolff is right to point out that as the speech was heard, not carefully read, it was easy to produce the desired effect, i.e. confusion, by skillfully rendering the different parts of the sentence with different emphasis and different rapidity. Thus the speaker seeks to make the judges forget the actual inequality of the two dowries through a deliberate obscurity and since the explanation is obscure, it is also 2 unconvincing. The schema offered by Burgkhardt contains the essentials of this passage: Spudias igitur res ita computandas esse contendit: ^30 m inas mundum dona Spudias acceplt: v + ; dotem dona nuptialia 30 minas, + dona nupt.; actor accepit: dotem iniuria poscit 10 minas, tamquam dotis debitam partem. Actor autem res ita dlscribit: 30 minas + mundum 10 minarum, i i ' y " 1* ' 1 1 Spudias accepit: + dona nupt.; dotem 40 minarum 30 minas actor accepit: + dona nupt.; dotem 30 minarum suo igitur lure petit 10 minas, qulbus dos compleatur *Cf. sec. 4. ^Burgkhardt, p. 41 34 After his unclear explanation, the plaintiff calls for the Inventory of the articles just discussed and the deposition of the arbitrators. The reference to arbitrators here is also confusing. Apparently xflv xGv 6iaixnxSv yapxupCav (28) refers to the public arbitrators who heard this case, although he uses the singular fitaixnxij in 12. On the other hand it could refer to the discussions held with private arbitrators which were stopped before an award was given. At any rate his statement that the jury will see that Spudias received k o AAcJ xAeCw (28) is an exaggeration. He then says that Leocrates complained about what Spudias received and the arbitrators decided on the basis of the inventory (xat xaxSt xaOx’ eyviooav ot 6iaixnxat)« These arbitrators were the ones involved in the settle ment mentioned in 4 and Leocrates no doubt did not complain because Spudias was being short-changed but because he himself was, by Spudias and his father-in-law. In view of the obscurity of sections 27 and 28, the speaker's remarks in 29 and 30 are specious (29: * o5v ou qiavepSs . . .; 30: xaCxoi sept 3v eyxaAS, itavd’ uytv an€6ei£a aaqiQs). In the recapitulation (29) the speaker categorically asserts that he never received the ten minae owed to him and that now even his right to possess them is being questioned. He cleverly reminds the jury once again of Spudias' refusal to submit the matter to those who knew the facts (29: xacuv yelp xodxois flapayeyevriMfvoi xat oa^us cifidxes). After further "double-talk" about the fact that Spudias felt he could lie more readily before a jury than before private arbitrators, the 35 plaintiff proceeds to the brief epilogue (30)— a reminder to the jurors to keep in mind what they have heard and not to tolerate Spudias* lies and calumnies. The diffident (is olds t ’ ?iv auxds (30) brings the speaker's ethos once more before the jury and appeals to their emotions. The plaintiff ends the speech simply— with an apology that perhaps because of the time limit, he may have omitted something.* On the whole Demosthenes used good judgment in handling this 2 legalistic case in a straightforward manner. It must be remembered that at this time he himself was involved with his own lawsuits with his guardians (speeches XXVII-XXXI) and thus was well equipped for 3 this task. The influence of Isaeus, the expert in dealing with inheritance cases, is evident throughout this speech although the 4 5 sentence structure is more polished. Blass feels that this speech is more simple than the guardianship speeches and has more ethos. ^He did in fact omit the narrative on movables. However, the fact that the case involved less than 5,000 drachmas would account for the reduction in time. Cf. Gernet, Dem., II, 69, n. 2; also cf. M.C. Maltezos, "La clepsydre chez les anciens," Bulletin des Sciences Math&natiques, 2nd ser., XLVI, Part I. (1922), 313-16. 9 An interview on June 3, 1969 with Professor Earl Murphy of The Ohio State University Law School provided many insights into the legal issues of this case. 3 The tradition that Isaeus was Demosthenes' teacher is dis cussed by W.W. Baden, The Principal Figures of Language and Figures of Thought in Isaeus (Baltimore: Friedenwald Company, 1906), pp. 5-6; full references to the ancient biographies are also given. *Blass, III, 221. 5Ibid. 36 Schaefer* too finds the representation "appealing and lively" despite the "school" form. Actually the case is really rather trivial— a routine probate case, strictly private, and not involving a great deal of money. Of necessity, therefore, it is without rhetorical flourish on the whole, as would be expected in such cases. The ethos of the plaintiff lies in his vagueness, reserve, apologetic tone, and low-keyed approach. Indeed, he sets out the law and facts that are most favorable to him and concentrates on these. The weakest point in the speech comes in 25f., where he is desperately trying to equalize the dowries, and even at that he is not trying to enrich himself too grossly. Since custom played such a large part in these affairs, maybe Polyeuctus did in fact count the trousseau of Spudias' wife in her dowry. Obviously he was not a rich man, for both dowries are rather small. At any rate the plaintiff's intention in this case is simply to collect all debts owing, secured (the ten minae or in lieu of that the house) and unsecured, before dividing the estate. The strongest argument on Spudias' side is that of "undue influence." Whether or not he was able to prove this is simply not known. It is clear that he did not trust his relatives, since he would not submit to private arbitration. On the other hand, his unexplained silence at crucial times would weaken his defense. Be that as it may, it is obvious that both men were trying to milk Polyeuctus' estate for whatever they could get, Schaefer, III B, 228. 37 and Demosthenes, despite his youth, made the best of a rather weak case. This speech, like the Conon, has a timeless quality about it. Relatives still quarrel over wills in much the same way as Spudias and his brother-in-law. It is a tribute to Demosthenes' skill as a logographer that the speech does not become just another dull probate case. He is careful to play down the ethos of his client while con centrating strongly on the legal Issues in question. When the plaintiff's case is obviously weak (27ff.), Demosthenes purposely confuses the jurors and then assures them that the arguments are simple and clear (29, 30). Naturally their shame would prevent them from admitting their confusion. Demosthenes, therefore, knew (even at this early point in his career) when to appeal to reason and when to appeal to psychology. The ability to make such a distinction, coupled with his expert knowledge of law, no doubt went a long way in convincing the jurors that his client's claims in this case were justified. CHAPTER II AGAINST CALLICLES (LV) This oration was delivered by the son of a certain Teisias in defense against a dikeblabes*- brought by Callicles, the plaintiff. 2 Blass accepts it as a genuine work of Demosthenes. Although the 3 exact date of composition is unknown, A. Schaefer regards it as an early work. Callicles contends that the defendant, by walling off a watercourse, has caused an inundation on his (the plaintiff's) land. These two men were neighboring farmers in a mountainous part of Attica. A public road separated the two farms. One must keep in mind the nature of this so-called "public road." It was little better than a path, which might be used in dry weather for purposes of travel, but in very wet weather was flooded. Edmond About's account For an excellent treatment of this charge as it pertains specifically to this speech, cf. Hans Wolff, "The AIKH BAABHS in Demosthenes, Or., LV," AJP, LXIV (1943), 316-24. (Referred to as Wolff in this chap.) Wolff concludes that a dike blabes was only a common name for a number of strictly defined claims, at least most of which resulted from specific legal provisions, while all were characterized by the fact that they were based on an unlawful damaging act. Also, cf. Lipsius, II, 652-64 and Bonner and Smith, II, 115-16. 2 Blass, III, 224. O Schaefer, III B, 256. For a detailed discussion of the style, cf. Ernest Beneke, De Demosthenis quae fertur adversus Calllclem orationis authentia, (diss. inaug. Halis Saxonum, 1892). 38 39 of roads in modern Attica gives an idea of the road in question: I leaped the Cephise Eleusinien [sic] .... A hundred steps further on, the path was lost in a deep and wide ravine, worn by the storms of two or three thousand winters. I supposed, reasonable enough, that the ravine ought to be the right road. 1 had noticed, in my former excursions, that the Greeks did not trouble themselves with making roads where streams were liable to change them. In this country . . . the torrents are royal roads; brooks, are department routes; rivulets, are parish roads. Tempests are the road - constructors, and rain is the surveyor of wide and narrow paths.* To prevent his property from receiving the water from the road, the defendant maintained a wall around his plot, which his father had built years before. By doing this, the speaker claims he was only following a commonly accepted custom (17). However, one day a torrent swept over the estate of the plaintiff, inflicting some losses (24, 25). Thereupon, Callicles brought an action for damages in which he contended that the defendant's wall was the cause of this flooding. A controversy arose and finally developed into the present lawsuit. The defendant characterizes the lawsuit as a dike atlmetos (18, 25, 28), i.e., a dike in which judgment is based on a sum fixed beforehand and not according to the actual damages in the case. The Edmond About, The King of the Mountains, trans. Mrs. C.A. Kingsbury (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1897), pp. 39-40. His lively account continues (p. 45), "This path is, truly, horrible. I believe that it is good enough for the Greeks, but it was not made for the English." ^Cf. Wolff, p. 316; Sandys and Paley, II, 261; and Harpocration: QTCpnTOS ay& v xat Ttwntds* AO fixed sum in this case is one thousand drachmas (2, 25, 28). Since in almost all the other known cases of dike blabes, judgment was based on the estimated value of the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the exclusion of the valuation in favor of a legally fixed penalty in this case is unusual.^ The trial before the popular court, in 2 which the speech was delivered, had been preceded by at least two 3 awards in default given against the defendant by public arbitrators, one of them in favor of the plaintiff himself, and the other in favor of his brother who,according to the speaker (2), had been instigated by Callicles to bring suit. If the arbitrators had set the valuation at one thousand draclimas, surely the speaker would have accused Callicles of having deceived these arbitrators, since he points out (23-25, 28) that the actual damage is quite negligible and out of proportion to the penalty of one thousand drachmas. On the For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the whole problem, cf. Wolff's article. Harrison discusses the case in his chap. on "Easements," pp.249-52. He rejects Wolff's theory but offers no satisfactory solution; cf. p. 251, n. 2. The action against the slave, Callarus, was another suit. Cf. 31. The cousin's claim (1, 31, 34) was proved false. Civil actions were usually referred to arbitration before coming to court. The arbitrators were either public and appointed by lot or private and chosen by the parties involved. In cases brought before a public arbitrator the parties might appeal to a higher court. The decision of a private arbitrator was final. Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 53.2, 3. Sandys and Paley, II, 211 cite several references to arbitrators. See further, Bonner and Smith, II, 97-116; C.R. Kennedy, The Orations of Demosthenes, III (London: George Bell and Sons, 1894), 395-403; and Harrell, pp. 33ff. The latter gives a very comprehensive treatment of the topic. 41 other hand, if the judgments in default had been annulled, the lawsuit would have started over again, including the procedure of valuation if there were any. Therefore, the reason why this dike blabes was also a genuine dike atimetos must be sought in the legal principle which formed its background. More than once (1, 2, 34) the defendant asserts that the action is only one of several schemes tried by Callicles in order to get his property. In 32, the phrase t & x“PC« upoOKaxoYVuaeTai can only mean that the action, if successful, resulted in the forfeiture to the plaintiff of the estate where the cause of the damage was found.^ This answers the question why there was a fixed penalty 2 instead of a valuation of the damage. As Wolff points out, the law, which provided for the possible forfeiture of the plot also provided for a ransom which the owner might pay to avert the seizure of his 3 property. A protest on the part of the plaintiff was required to ^olff, p. 319, points out that this sheds light on the title which is found in the mss., ipbs KaXXuxXfa uept xwpC°u; also, although 32 actually refers to the action against Callarus, the information derived from it can be applied to the present trial (31), since the cases are similar. ^Wolff, p. 319. He further (p. 322) maintains that in its form as revealed in this speech, the Athenian dike blabes for damages caused by water represents a primitive mode of protecting the neighborhood community in rural districts. A more flexible system was found in the fourth century: if neighbors could not reach an agreement on the flow of water, they could call upon an official, and the party who did not comply with the latter's order was liable to the other for double his actual damage (Plato Laws 8. 844c-d). 3 Plato Ibid. makes the claim for damages dependent on the defendant's disobedience to an official's order to remove or adjust the obstacle. 42 assure the successful outcome of the suit. That Is why the defendant in this case keeps stressing the fact that his father, who had erected the wall, had never been troubled In more than fifteen years by any protest on the part of either the plaintiff and his family or anyone else (3-7, 15, 26), and in 4-6, he points out that a formal protestation in the presence of witnesses was the minimum step which his opponents should have taken as soon as Teisias built the wall. On the other hand, if Callicles had registered a protest with the defendant after Teisias died, the speaker passes over this in silence. The other point that the defendant concentrates on in this speech is the fact that no public watercourse was blocked by the wall. However, he does not explain why he never appeared before the public arbitrators to answer the charges brought by Callicles, and thus there is a number of legal problems* which the speech does not solve. De spite the confusing legalities, it is apparent that Demosthenes is not depending on legal maneuvers to convince the jury of the innocence of the speaker, but rather on the techniques of persuasion, in particular the ethoplia of the defendant. The prooemium (1-2) opens with the plaintive maxim oux fjv op’, 2 ovfipes ’ASnvaXoi, x ^ e ^ e p o v ou6£v n y e Ct o v o s rovnpoO xal rXeovfxrou xuxeiv which sets the tone for the naive and expostulatory account that is to follow and gives with refreshing novelty the common *Cf. Wolff, p. 321. 43 disclaimer of litigiousness.* A prejudicial picture to support the accusation contained in the words tovnpoO xat itAeovfxrou follows. Callicles' litigiousness is shown by the fact that he has on more than one occasion brought suits against the defendant; his inordinate greed, by the word eiiduyfiaas (1). The striking juxtaposition of the ensuing words (t w v you KaXAixAfjs) emphasizes the point the defendant wants to imprint firmly in the jury's mind: Callicles wants the defendant's property and he will stop at nothing to get it. With one word (ouxo Callicles as a man who deals in intrigue, and the clever use of ipavcpws with eSeAeyx^ets intensifies the manifest injustice of the cousin's claim. The short and simple prooemium closes with a plea for the *Kirk, Orations, p. 24. For the general sense, cf. Arist. Rhet. 1395k and Hesiod Works and Days 346. 2 Bonner and Smith, II, 39-74, clearly bring out the various implications of this word in their chapter on "Sycophants." See also C. Kennedy, III, pp. 344-45. For a fuller treatment, cf. Lofberg, Sycophancy. 3 This would seem to be a strong point for establishing his opponent's unworthiness and one wonders why he does not capitalize on it. It is mentioned again in 31 and 34. ^Surely the speaker must be concealing vital Information harmful to his defense during this speech for, as Harrell (p. 33) points out, "it was nearly always the party who expected to lose the decision who failed to appear." 44 jurors' attention and the request that they listen to him in order to learn £rom the facts themselves (2: cuSt w v t w v npayydTwv). The speaker's diffident modesty is brought out by oux “ S cxOt &s 6uvno«5uevos e i r c iv (2). The transition to the narrative is made by the emphatic vavepus ouxocpavToupot which sums up the strong sense of injury*- the speaker feels toward the malicious Callicles. Although the narrative begins in 3, it is interspersed with 2 proofs throughout due to the nature of the case. The effective opening sentence states that the defendant will answer all his opponents'^ arguments with only one argument and that a just one. The last two words are given special emphasis by being placed at the beginning and end of the sentence (3: Ev p£v o5v, Z avfipes ’Adnvatoi, rpds aravTos tov>s toutojv Adyous urdpxet yoi 6Cxaiov). This emphasizes the importance of the argument in 4, viz., a formal protestation in the presence of witnesses was the minimum step which his opponents should have taken. Undisputed facts are: (1) the speaker's father built a wall around his land when the speaker was merely an infant; (2) his opponent's father, Callippides, was still living and, adds the speaker scornfully, "surely knew the facts better than these men" (3); (3) Callicles was already grown and did not live at home; (4) both fathers lived for fifteen more years and no complaint was ever ^Kirk, p. 24. 2Blass, III, 223. 3 At times the defendant addresses Callicles alone; at other times he includes Callicles' brother in his remarks. 45 made. The first eixfis^ argument to support the speaker's claim of Innocence and the lack of a protest appears in 4. Obviously if any damage had been done as a result of the wallt the injured party would have protested and brought suit against Teisias within a short space of time and would not have waited until so long a time had passed, since the diversion of a watercourse would have caused just as much damage then as now. The negatives strengthen this argument from time (4: ev 6fc todxots rots c t c o i v araoiv o u t ’ eyxaXwv ou6eis ku>*o t * fiXdev o u t c peviipdyevos • . . ou6* exioXuoev e£ apxns, . . . oXX' ou6’ arnY<5peuoev ov6& SiEpapxdpaxo . . .). In the middle of this proof the speaker injects a bit of quiet humor which gives the speech such charm and at the same time brings out his naturalness (4: xctCxoi 6»Uov oxi xotl x6&’ u6aTa xoXXdxis eydvexo). The speaker next (5-7) expands this proof and also cleverly proves his own innocence by stating what his opponent should have done if the defendant were guilty. Liveliness is imparted to this section by the fictitious direct speech that would have taken place between Teisias and Callicles. The rhetorical questions (5) and the 2 apostrophes (5-7) are infused with expostulation which, as Kirk points out, are a part of the ethopoiia of the speech and contribute to the impression of the speaker's youthful candor and honest simplicity. In this way, the defendant again reminds the jury that *Cf. Fairchild, pp. 101-105* for a discussion of this speech. ^Kirk, p. 15. 46 Callicles should have protested when the wall was being built. If he had done this, he would now be in a position to present witnesses, but as it is, he cannot. The plaintiff should also have proved that a watercourse existed, thereby basing his case on fact not merely on word.^ The speaker becomes more emotional and scolding as is shown by the appeal (6: v?| At’), the repeated use of negatives emphasizing the absence of any protest, and the hostile language (6: upiv ouxo Callicles never would have gained an award for default if there had been witnesses to the building of the wall, for the plaintiff's 2 charges would have been refuted. The speaker subtly casts a slur on his opponents' testimony by the snide tov)s p?6Cws t o Ot ou s papTupouvxas (7). Pathos is evident in the striking contrast between these villains who are so glib with their testimony and the youthful and inexperienced defendant who has become their victim (7: avdpuKoo 6* olpcu TnXixoutou xat areCpou [t w v ] rpaypfiTmv auovtes xoTareippovfixaTf pou). The position of the last three words strengthens this antithesis which is reinforced at the beginning of the next sentence (7: aXX' eyi*> np&S anavias t o u t o u s ). Moreover, his opponents' previous actions (or lack thereof) *For the favorite antithesis between X6yos and epyov cf. Thucydides Peloponnesian War 2.81.2 et passim; Antiphon V 5, 84; VI 47; and F. Blass, att. Ber., I (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1887), 141, 218. 2 Either by a witness or Teislas. Cf. Sandys and Paley, II, 250, for a discussion of the textual problem here. 47 are the strongest evidence (7: iaxupoxfixas yapxupCas) that they are wrong. He stresses this point by an eix6s argument, filled with negatives and expressed in the form of a pointed question which is left unanswered (7: 6ia t C y&p o06ets o u t ’ ereyapxtfpax • o u t ’ ivexdAeaev, aAA’ oufi’ ey£y<|»axo raJrore, aAA’ e£tfpxei xaOx' aOxots q6ixn|i€vois repLopav;). Since no one has sought redress during all this time, the maliciousness of Callicles in bringing such charges now is clear. The speaker concludes his first argument with the confident &Y& xoCvuv ixavfr yfev nyouyai xat xaOx’ elvai rpbs T?iv xodxwv avaC6ciav (8) whereby he denounces his opponents' claims as "shameless" and at the same time arouses the jury's prejudice again. However, to win the votes of those judges who might not be convinced by this argument, he will now try^ to point out that the actual state of affairs did 2 not warrant such‘ falsehoods. He tells the jurors that they would know his opponents are liars if they had seen the land. In this way he cleverly underlines the fact that such an inspection would have been decisive in his favor. As a striking contrast to the black picture he has drawn of his opponents, his own decency is shown in that he had offered to refer the dispute to the arbitration of ^By the judicious use of such words as xeipdooyai Demosthenes keeps the speaker’s ethos before the jury. One suspects the case is weak at this point despite the speaker*8 confident words in 3 and 8. Perhaps Callicles had in fact raised a protest after the defendant had become his father's successor. Cf. Wolff, p. 320 for a discussion of this hypothesis. 48 impartial persons who knew the locality (9, 35), but Callicles, contrary to what he now asserts,^ rejected the offer. The defendant introduces his detailed description of the neighborhood by an earnest appeal to the jurors (9: np&s At&s xut BeSv) to pay close attention.' He then, in detail, describes the position of the two properties on 3 the opposite sides of the road and accounts for the building of the wall (10, 11). According to the speaker, the drainage from the hills flows partly into the farms and partly into the road. However, if anything blocks the water that usually flows into the road, it inundates the farms. On one occasion the water made an inroad into what was to be his father's property, and, because of neglect, made further inroad and damaged the land. Therefore, when his father The xab&icep vuvt Ifyeiv emxeipouaiv is an example of simulated extemporization which no doubt aroused sympathy for the speaker on the part of the jury and helped to preserve the fiction that the litigant was giving his own speech. Cf. A.P. Dorjahn, "Extemporaneous Elements in Certain Orations and the Prooemia of Demosthenes," AJP, LXXXVIII (1957), 291 and Bonner. Lawyers, p. 212. 2 This, of course, is necessary, for the remainder of the speech would be almost unintelligible if they did not understand the locality. Further, since he has just told the jurors that an actual inspection of the premises would have been favorable to him, he naturally tries to compensate for this disadvantage by giving them as clear a picture as possible of the topography. The orators in general paid little or no attention to the production of real evidence such as maps. Cf. Bonner, Evid., pp. 81-82. ^As Sandys and Paley , II, lxxi, point out, Callicles appears to have had no case, as his property did not immediately join that of the defendant but was separated from it by the public way which provided sufficiently for carrying off the water. 49 acquired the land, he built a wall to keep out the water and also trespassing^ neighbors. By mentioning the fact that neglect occurred before his hard-working father took over the land, he prevents any ill will from arising with regard to his father. His ethos as a country-fellow is shown when he says that the previous owner hated the country and, moreover, lived in the city (11: aXX’ avBpunou SuoxepoCvovTos oXws xoXs t 6k o i s xai yaXXov aaxixou). To prove that the alleged water-cours'e was part of his private ground, containing an old burial place and an orchard besides, he will provide witnesses who know the facts and evidence stronger than the testimony (12). Several rhetorical tricks— rhetorical questions and answers, antitheses, arguments, and the use of ethopoiia— are in evidence here (12-15). The introduction of the testimony is prefaced by the commonplace ws t o Ot * oXn^n X£yw (12) which engages the jury'8 attention on what is going to follow. Stylistically, the antithesis between what Callicles charges (12: KaXXtxXris y£v y<£p ipnoiv t ?)v xaP66pav anoixoboyfjoavTci BXdntetv e y ’ aut6v) and what the speaker will prove is noteworthy (12: eyw 6 ’ a*o6eC£u> xwpCov ov t o O t o , aXX’ ou xapfiSpav). This emphasizes his main point, namely, that no public watercourse had been blocked by the wall. In fact, he contends in 13 that the opponents themselves admit that the wall was on his ^The rural tenor of the speech is evident in the metaphorical use of cKiv£yeiv which often refers to turning cattle on to a neighbor's land for pasture. Cf. Plato's Laws 8.843-44 for a discussion of annoyances caused by neighbors. 50 own property (13: nydxepov Cfiiov). Since the legal Issue in the speech hinges largely on the nature of the watercourse, the defendant hammers away at this point again and again (12-19). He even accuses the plaintiff of having tampered with the road, thereby causing the Inundation himself (22). He next uses two e£x6 s arguments (13) to further his proof. Since the area in question was filled with trees, vines, and figs even before the wall was built, it is unlikely that this place was a watercourse. The eixds is in the form of a question which is characteristic of the nalvetd of the speaker: "Yet who would think of planting these in a watercourse?" This is then answered by its own absurdity, "Nobody, surely." In addition, the land contained a burial plot which had existed before the property had been acquired by Teisias. The eixds again takes the form of an absurd question which he answers in the negative: "Again, who would think of burying his own ancestors there?^ No one, I think, would do this either." The speaker concludes this section by matter-of-factly stating the importance of this evidence by another question of appeal (1A: xaCxoi . . . xCs av ext A6yos taxupdxepos, 5 avdpes ’ASnvaloi, yfvoixo;). This is succinctly answered by x6t yap epya After the depositions, he directly addresses the jury in order to fix their attention on the brief but important summary (15) of the ^The question, seriously put no doubt, is not without its humorous touch. The Loeb translation, at times slightly modified, is used in this dissertation. 51 previous proofs. The recapitulation is expressed by two rhetorical questions expecting an affirmative answer. Especially effective are the negatives which provide a conclusion to this section (15: oux opqpiognTodvTwv 6’ ouxe o xotfxwvCt * aAAou xwv yeixdvwv oudevds;). The speaker then dwells at length on the right of every owner to protect his farm from the influx of water, except for such water as is carried in a regular watercourse (16-19).^ The vivid rhetorical questions and the eix6 s arguments show the utter ridiculousness of Callicles* position. First, the speaker appeals to the jurors' own experiences when he asks if any of them has ever seen or heard of a watercourse 2 existing by the side of a road. He answers this in the negative by In sec. 19 the defendant refers to acknowledged watercourses (oyoAoyoOyevot xapfifipaO by which water was passed from the land of one.owner to that of another, just as the water from the gutter of a house might be passed on. This is apparently a praedial servitude in the full Roman sense, i.e., a right over a piece of land which was vested not in the owner of that land, but in the owner of a piece of land adjacent to it, and vested in him solely as owner of that piece of land, so that if he gave up the land he gave up the right with it. Plato (Laws 8.844c) adds the proviso that the owner of the higher property must do his best to minimize the damage from the flowing water. The epigraphical evidence from mortgage stones and leases also indicates this practice in Greece. Cf. Finley, Land, pp. 72 and 261. The horoi are: IG, II2 , 2759 (Finley, no. 2); IG, II2 , 2657 (Finley, no. 116); IG, II2 , 2655 (Finley, no. 159); the leases: IG, I2 , 94*34-37; II2 , 2494*8-11. Harrison cites these also and treats the subject, pp. 249-52. Book 8 of Justinian's Digest is wholly devoted to servitudes. For numerous references to watercourses, cf. the section on "Servitudes of Rustic Estates" (8.3). For neighbors' boundaries, cf. Gaius in Dig. 10.1.13. See further Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 381ff. and Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Phil., 1953), pp. 702-704. 2 For a discussion of mountain roads in Attica, cf. Sandys and Paley, II, 259. Also see p. lxxi for the many indications of the provisions of Athenian law respecting the rights of water in this speech. 52 the straightforward and unsophisticated oTycu yap ev sdap t$ x“P Un6cyCav etvai (16). With delightful frankness he then gives the reason for the improbability: "For why would any man make a channel through his private lands for water which would otherwise have gone rushing down a public road?" He next asks who would ever allow water flowing along the highway to enter his property or (what is even more unlikely) his house. The earnestness of this question is shown by vh AC'. He appeals to the jurors' common sense and at the same time answers the question by asking another one which shows the natural likelihood of building a wall to keep out the water. These questions, of course, serve two purposes: they intimately involve the jury in the argument and at the same time show that there was no other recourse left to the speaker but to keep the wall on his property. Callicles' selfishness and unreasonableness are next depicted. As long as the water is kept out of his property, he does not care what happens to the other farmers (17). He would like the defendant to take the water into his land and let it out when it has passed his (Callicles') farm. The defendant responds to this brash demand with the naive irony of aAASt piw el y* els Tftv o6ov oxvnow t& \j6wp etfiyeiv, ?i vou o 6app3v ets t & t o O nAnaCov xwplov a 6 fiicou pe KaAAixAhS o u t o rpoaavayxdaei (18, 19). This humorous question by which he expresses his utter bewilderment is in keeping with his youthful ethos. By the use of pathos he accentuates the baseness of his opponents (19: t o Otcx t o Cv u v eyu> vdoxmv us5 t o GTepo xat <5eivd) and in a pointed antithesis (p?| . . . av) calls attention to the extent to which he has been victimized. Two e£x6s arguments follow (19) which show that there was no watercourse on his property.*- If there had been a watercourse below the defendant's farm to receive the water, this would have been evidence (though inconclusive as rdx’ av nSCxouv indicates) that the defendant was stopping a watercourse. Further since there is neither an entrance nor an outlet for the water on the defendant's land, this land cannot possibly be a watercourse. The rhetorical question with ituis av (20) emphasizes this point. Thus far he has proved two points— (1) there was never any public watercourse on his land; (2 ) his opponents never protested (as they should have) with regard to the wall Teisias built. His emphasis now shifts as he begins to concentrate more and more on the unsavory character of Callicles and the insignificance of the actual damage, while at the same time inserting frequent repetitions of his strong ^For the type of watercourse described in 19, and the duties of neighbors in this regard, cf. Plato Laws 8.844c and supra, p. 51, n. 1 . 54 points. The indignation with regard to Callicles' inconsistency in making a wall* to protect his own property is shown in & xal nfivxaiv eotlv 6 e i v 6 t o t o v (20). Moreover, if everyone whose land had been flooded decided to sue him, he would be ruined. The pathetic ou6c voAAaxAdoia . . .pot (20) effectively reminds the jurors of his poverty. Next he resorts to generalizations which he does not support (21: xoAAuv 6 £ itoAAa xat peydAa OcBAappfvuv)and ends this section with the denunciatory autol 6 i* auTobs BeBAappfvoi ouxoipavToOaiv (21). It is the general ouxocpavTCa of Callicles that makes it hard for him (so the defendant claims) to present a case. In fact, Callicles is i using the damage really caused by his own negligence as an excuse to 2 present a malicious charge. The depositions of the neighbors are then read. The recapitulation of 21 appears in a rhetorical question filled with outrage (22: odxouv 6eiv6v . . .). The plaintiff's greed and baseness are shown by the fact that he has advanced his own wall in order to enclose the trees of the road, thereby encroaching on 3 public property. He has also made the road narrower and higher, thus making it possible for the water to be diverted from the road ^The metaphorical aya£iaCous which describes the stones coincides with the rustic tenor of the speech. ^Callicles has always played the ouxo . . .). The defendant, not Callicles, Is the one who has been wronged and yet he keeps silent (29: nouxCav exu). The speaker finally comes to the actual damages suffered by Callicles, Insignificant though they were— a few bushels of barley, some flour, and a knocked- down oil jar; for this trivial amount, he Is being sued one thousand drachmas (25). Since he Is about to Incorporate a woman's* testimony Into his narrative, he Inserts an imprecation on his own head If he is not telling the truth (24: xat Xfyw y£v Step nxouaa Tns Mnxpds, outgo pot n6XX* ayaBot yfvoixo, eC 61 3 opponents' mother and challenged them to have his own mother swear in the same terms. By calling for the depositions and challenge, he, actually though not technically, again gives evidence of what women could prove. *Cf. Bonner, Evid., pp. 31-33, 76. 2 He humorously notes that it was customary to drain water from one's property into the road, "and not, heaven knows, to let it flow in from the road. . . ." 3 For the Importance of evidentiary oaths and challenges, cf. Bonner, Evid., pp. 67-69; 74-79; and Against Conon 40. 56 Another recapitulation occurs in 28. The rhetorical question, denunciatory language (avataxuvTdtepoi . . . auxo and direct address (o x o h c i t ', 5 av6pes fiixaoTaC), coupled with the oath (2 yn xat 6 eoC), impart emotion to what had been a relatively calm section of the speech. All these rhetorical devices including the apostrophe (29) help to intensify the unusualness of Callicles1 suit and lead to a series of antitheses (29-30) of the "If the plaintiff may enclose his land, we may enclose ours” type.' In contrast to the com plaining Callicles, the defendant will not complain but will simply do his best to protect his own land. This, in turn, leads to another hutnorous statement characteristic of the same ethos in the "What shall 1 do with the water?” inquiry (18, 19). The speaker with youthful candor states that the plaintiff must be out of his mind in bringing such an action (30: 6 ixa£6yevov 6£ mol xovnp6TOT<5v t* cTvai xat 6 ie The jury's attention is again fixed on the plaintiff's daring in bringing the false charge (31: Mft SauydceTe 6 ' . . . TddXynxcv), and this provides an opportunity to digress concerning other former and present complaints brought by Callicles.^ The ouvdtfxas ou yevoyfvas (31) is a reminder of the oxeuwpCas mentioned in 2. The reason for the action against the slave Callarus is that the same 2 action could not be brought twice in the same name. However, the H h e legalities of 31-32 have been discussed earlier. ^Sandys and Paley, II, 272. 57 real motive for all their charges is brought out in 32. If the defendant gives up his property to his opponents, they will drop the charges against Callarus;^ if not, they will consider themselves grievously wronged. The "color" is apparent from xat Ch t o Oo i v xat SiaiTnthv o o t i s auxols xoi xuPCa upoaxaTOYvdjaexai, xat 6iaX<3oeis TOtavJtas U <5v xa x^i* eSouaiv (32). They want the defendant's land and will use every means possible to get it. The transition to the epilogue comes in 33 with a general statement concerning malicious plotters, followed by a specific assumption that the jurors will vote justly since they hate such people (33: et 6 * iSyets xov>s xoioCxous yioetxe, x& 66 6 Cxata (| ^For a discussion regarding the actual number of suits against Callarus, cf. Schaefer, III B, 254, n. 2; Blass, III, 222, n. 6 ; Wolff, p. 321; and Ddmosthfene, plaidoyers civils, ed. Louis Gernet, III (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1959), 119, n. 1. 2The anaphora exoipoi y£v . . . exoiboi 6 ’ (35) emphasizes his earnestness. ^For the formula, cf. Antiphon V 11. The defendant apparently offered to take the oath at the preliminary examination of the case. 58 considers the latter the strongest proof of his innocence, the speech ends with the reading of the documents and challenge that support this statement. The proofs of this speech are simple and completely satisfactory '1 2 and the layout is without flaw as a whole. According to Blass, the general style of the oration is like that of Lysias. However, some times the sequence of thought is Interrupted and confused (8 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 33, 34). In fact the speaker himself says dXX’ tva yft nfivB* aya auvTapfi^as Xfyw (21). This may be due to the youthful ethos of the speaker as well as to the youthfulness of Demosthenes when he wrote the speech. More importantly it presents a vivid picture of life in rural Attica and at the same time shows that Demosthenes can adopt a less serious tone when he wishes. There is no doubt that Callicles was using every means possible to get the defendant's land. Why the defendant never appeared at the arbitration proceedings is never stated, and this is a weak point in his defense. Be that as it may, it is Demosthenes' skill in lending grace and warmth to the rusticity of the defendant— a good-natured man who only wants to be left alone— that makes the speech admirable, and therein lies its charm. ^Blass, III, 225. 2Ibid. \ CHAPTER III AGAINST EUBULIDES (LVII) This oration dated 345 B.C.*' is the appeal of a certain Euxitheus for the restoration of citizenship. Euxitheus had been 2 ejected from the Halimusian deme and reduced to the status of a 3 resident alien when the citizen lists were revised in 346 B.C. The expulsion of Euxitheus was especially brought about by the malicious conniving of the demarch Eubulides who had presided over the voting. This speech, in reply to the one delivered by Eubulides, is addressed 4 to the Heliastic court in Athens. The deme was divided into two factions, one headed by Eubulides and one to which Euxitheus belonged. Since Eubulides as Blass, III, 428. For a detailed discussion concerning its authenticity, cf. Heinrich Wagner, Appellatio adversus Eubulidem num Demostheni abiudicanda sit (Inaug. diss. Wurzburg, 1896), pp. 5-44. 2 For some interesting details about the administration of this deme, its exact size, and location, cf. J.J.E. Hondius, "A New Inscription of the Deme Halimous," Annual of the British School at Athens, XXIV (1919-21), 151-60. 3 Lipsius, II, 415. The terms of the decree are given by Libanius in the hypothesis to this oration. For opposing views regarding the nature of this decree, cf. Aubrey Diller, "The Decree of Demophilus, 346-345 B.C.," TAPA, LXIII (1932), 193-205, and A.W. Gomme, "Two Problems of Athenian Citizenship Law," CP, XXIX (1934), 123-40. For a similar case cf. Wyse, Speeches, pp. 714-17. A Blass, III, 427 and R.J. Bonner, "Administration of Justice in Rural Attica," CP, XXIII (1928), 21. 59 60 demarch was a member of the council at the time of the revision, he and his cabal were able to control the deme meeting which voted to oust Euxitheus.^ Eubulides was a member of a rich and influential 2 family. His father, too, had been demarch and both had been members of a club at times when the club was able to dominate the deme. Euxitheus, despite his alleged poverty, had also been demarch. In fact, according to his testimony (63, 64), it was while he was carrying out the duties of this office that he antagonized some members of the deme. The latter joined with Eubulides and his club in voting to disfranchise him. 3 The demarch was the chief officer in the deme; he exercised G.M. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Legislation (Austin: University of Texas, 1913 [Reprint: "L'Erma" de Bretschneider Roma, 1964]), p. 130. Calhoun suggests that since Eubulides and his club were able to influence the action of this meeting, most likely they were able to control that year's election meeting, thereby insuring the success of their candidates. If this was so, Eubulides was among the candidates whom they elected and then was successful in the drawing of lots. 2 An excellent account of Attic demes is B. Haussoullier, "La vie municipale en Attique," Bibliotheque des Ecoles Franc, XXXVIII (Paris, 1884). Haussoullier shows (pp. 59ff.) that the majority of the deme officials, according to the inscriptional evidence, belonged to a comparatively small number of rich and influential families that dominated the political life of their respective demes. From this class, the clubs, particularly those of aristocratic tendencies, recruited their membership. Cf. Calhoun, Clubs, p. 131. C.W.J. Eliot, "Coastal Demes of Attika: A Study of the Policy of Kleisthenes," Phoenix, Supplement V (1962), provides a recent and detailed examination of ten demes in southern Attica. Haussoullier, chap. 3, has a detailed discussion of the demarch. Also, cf. Bonner, "Administration," pp. 22-24; Schoeffer's article, "Demarchoi" in RE, IV (1901), 2706ff. ; and S. Busolt and H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, II (Miinchen, 1926), 967ff. Full reference in bibliography. 61 both state functions and communal ones. In the former class, he collected the debts due to the state as well as the percentage of the crops due to the Eleusinian deities, drew up the list of demesmen for manning the fleet and kept the register of his deme. In addition, he presided over the meetings of the assembly, was responsible for good order in his deme, had to offer sacrifices at various festivals, was at the head of the entire financial management of the deme, and had to see to the burial of the dead. He further represented the deme in all legal proceedings to which it was a party and intervened* in the process of seizing the property of debtors and condemned criminals. The hatred between the parties in this case is of long duration (48: Kctlaibs uv ex$pbs eyoC). In fact their fathers were personal enemies (62: xat uv ex&P&S eu$ naTpt). When Euxitheus testified against Eubulides in a lawsuit, the feud was brought to a climax. The revision of the citizen lists in 346 B.C. provided the opportunity for Eubulides to exact revenge and resulted in the subsequent loss of citizenship for,Euxitheus. The question at issue, then, is whether Euxitheus was by birth a citizen of Athens. Since Athenian law recognized as citizens only those who were of pure Attic descent on both sides, Euxitheus must first prove that his father, despite his alleged foreign accent was really an Athenian citizen (18-29) and next, that his mother was also an Athenian citizen, despite the fact that poverty had driven her to ^The manner of this intervention is discusses by Bonner, "Administration,'* pp. 23-24. 62 assume Che lowly occupations of nurse and seller of ribbons in the market place (30-45). Euxitheus produces the testimony of his relations, members of his deme, and phratry, in addition to a variety of circumstantial proofs, to establish the legitimacy of his birth and the citizenship of both parents. The prooemium (1-7) boldly sets the tone for the whole speech and is in fact "the speech in miniature, a pathetic and anxious appeal with flashes of vehemence cautiously "restrained."^ The prejudicial picture of Eubulides is drawn Immediately (1: xoAAh xat 4>cu6n xaxnyopnxdxos nyuiv Eu8ouAC6ou). Not only has he brought many false charges against the appellant but he has also uttered unjust slanders (1). Moreover, these unjust charges have been brought with a view to greed (5: a6 Cxu>s xat xAeovexxixDs). In addition, he has 2 resorted to hearsay evidence contrary to law (4); and finally, says Euxitheus, with a scornful sneer, "he knows the laws too well" (5: e(6a>s toOs vdyous xat ySAAov n xpoofixev). On the other hand, Euxitheus presents himself as the innocent victim of a cabal (2: oi xaxeoxaoiaoyfvoi; 7: xis . . . xaxaoxaoiaodeCs) who suffers the prejudice felt by the citizens toward those justly ejected from citizenship. Despite the shame (1: xfjv atoxtfvnv) and 1Kirk, p. 25. 2 Bonner, Evid., pp. 20-25. For the law, cf. Dem. XLVI 7, 8 . 3 Kirk, p. 14, suggests that perhaps this indirectness in attack is due to nervousness in the face of the "gang." ^The shame Involved may be anything. Blass, III, 428, Llpsius, II, 415, and Diller, p. 196, say slavery would result but this is 63 ruin that conviction entails he casually dismisses concern for himself (2 ), and one is led to believe that he has only come into court because of his concern for the common good and his alarm at the dangerous precedents being set by the demes. Therefore, since he is a man of courage, he will speak out,* even though his own situation is most pitiful (3: o i «t p 6 t o t o v ndSog) and he is suffering from such dis advantages. He reminds the jury in a rather condescending fashion that it is their duty to distinguish between those who have unjustly usurped citizenship rights and those who have been unjustly evicted from them. In a pointed antithetical phrase the jury is told, mutatis mutandis, that he might be sitting in judgment with them instead of being judged by them (3). The sarcastic, "I should have thought . . . it was fitting for Eubulides," (A) introduces the previously mentioned legal issue, viz., the use of hearsay evidence by Eubulides. This point, in fact, is so important that the speaker takes care to reinforce it in 4 and 5 by a skillful reductio ad absurdum expressed in two rhetorical ques tions. For if, in the past, men who claimed accurate knowledge were disputed. Gomme, "Two Problems," pp. 138ff., points out that even in a case of graphe xenias (Lipsius, I, 87; II, 416), i.e., prosecution by any citizen of a man for knowingly and fraudently exercising citizen rights though an alien, slavery was not necessarily the penalty for conviction. He cites Lysias XIII 60, Dem. LIX 53, and Dem. Epist. 3.29 in support. The only allusion to enslavement occurs in the Demosthenic letter and that may not be genuine. *This display of nappnoCo would no doubt appeal to the Athenians. However, Schaefer, III B, 265f.,thinks this bold tone out of keeping with his position and therefore doubts its authenticity as a Demosthenic speech. Refuted by Blass, III, 431-32 and Kirk, p. 13. 64 convicted o£ falsehood, how can a person who does not have first-hand knowledge be believed? By the clever insertion of this damaging information, the speaker arouses the prejudice of the jury and casts suspicion on Eubulides' whole case before the narrative begins. The scornful accusations leveled against Eubulides in 5 are followed by the speaker's promise to tell the jury of the outrageous treatment (6 : uftpCodnv) that he has already suffered at the hands of his fellow demesmen. After the traditional plea for good will, in a contrary to fact statement, he reminds the jury that it never would have allowed such an appeal to itself if it thought that the demesmen would always act with perfect justice. Far from acting with justice the speaker cleverly implies that the deme has in fact acted through party-spirit, malice, enmity and other pretexts (6 : xat 6 t8t qiiXovt’xtav xat 6 ia q>36vov xat 6 i* ex^pav xat 6 t’ aXXas npoipfioeis). With this volley of hostile words, Euxitheus brings his exordium to a rapid close but not without a bit of flattery (6 : xfW ets upas rots aSixrtfeioiv exoifioaxe xaTacpuyfiv) and exaggeration (6 : 6 i’ nv xaXSs x o i o O v t e s , b> av6pes 'Adnvaiot, toOs nfitxnuevous aravxas oeo^xaxe). To enable the jury to judge fairly, Euxitheus promises to tell in detail all the wrongs he has suffered at the hands of his demesmen.^ This statement provides a smooth transition to the narrative. The motive for Eubulides' hatred of Euxitheus is stated immediately. Euxitheus had testified against Eubulides in a lawsuit, ^Strictly speaking this is not the subject of discussion. Cf. Blass, III, 429. 65 1 with the result that Eubulides failed to get one-fifth of the votes. This offense was not forgotten and Eubulides, aided by members of his club and others who were nursing a grudge against Euxitheus, so mani pulated the deme meeting that Euxitheus' name was erased from the citizenship lists. The narrative account here (8ff.) Is remarkable 2 for Its series of vivid and detailed pictures. After Eubulides had / convened the demesmen, he deferred the voting upon Euxitheus' status until as late In the day as possible by "filibustering." As a result Euxitheus' name was the last to be called. Moreover, since the voting took place after sunset (10: 0x 6t o s elvai n6n) when the older members had already gone back to their farms, only thirty of the seventy-three members were able to vote. That all of these were hired by Eubulides is clear from oC t o O ti*) napeoxeuctoii^vob (10). When Euxitheus' name was finally called, Eubulides jumped up, began to berate him, spoke 4 at great length, quickly, and with a loud voice (11). It is important to note that Eubulides did not produce any witnesses in support of his charges. Therefore, because it was so late and because none of his friends was present, Euxitheus asked for postponement of the voting until the following day. Eubulides refused and, without ^Eubulides had to pay a fine or forfeit his civic rights. 9 The narrative technique here is the same as that found in the Conon 3ff. and the IDe ■ 1 Corona 169ff. 3 Calhoun, Clubs, p. 113, points out that the complete domi nation of this deme meeting could not have been effected without the preliminary caucus or caucuses implied in these words. ^Such graphic details add to the £vdpY£ia of the narrative. Cf. Dionys. Hal. Lysias 7. 66 permitting Euxitheus to make a defense, proceeded with the voting. At this point, Eubulides' "men" jumped up and in the darkness stuffed the ballot box with the result that, although not more than thirty voted, sixty ballots were counted.^ In contrast to this base picture of Eubulides, Euxitheus pre sents himself as an unsuspecting, defenseless, courageous man of in ferior position. According to his testimony, he was caught so completely off guard by Eubulides' plot that, as previously stated, none of his own friends was able to come to his defense. When he realized what was about to happen, he asked for postponement of the voting until the next day. Despite the fact that he pointed out the advantages of postponement to both sides, Eubulides refused his request. He capitalizes on this point in 12 and 13 in order to contrast his fairness with the injustice of Eubulides. The result of all this is that he now has to use his enemies as witnesses. He does this by providing written^ statements that they cannot deny. The language of the narrative here (8-13) calls attention to the sinister and plotting "color" that Demosthenes is creating. Words of attack, intrigue, and denunciation are plentiful (2: ot xaTeoTctoiaoufvot; 7: tis . . . xaTaoTaoiaodeCs; 8 : exiTCdeTaC yoi; 9: em.BouXedu>v; 10: aravTEs ot xapeoxeuaayfvoi; *For the irregularity here, cf. Ddmosthfene, plaidoyers civils. ed. Louis Gernet, IV (Paris: Belles Lettres;1960), 18, note 1. Cf. sec. 58 for further acts of injustice in this deme. 2 Apparently Euxitheus is introducing new evidence at this time although this is most unusual. Cf. Bonner, Evid., p. 51; Wyse, Speeches, p. 716, and R.J. Bonner, "The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators," CP, II (1907), 416. For the practice of written statements, cf. Dem. XXIX 11. 13: ot 6fc toCti^ auveoTSxes). Eubulides and his gang almost "pounced" on Euxitheus (11: avannSffaas; 13: avaxnSfaavxes)• T^e suddenness of this attack is further emphasized by the metaphorical and emphatic uipvu xpoofteKxuxfvai (12). The repetition of the negatives in 13 (o u t *. . . o u t ’. . . ou6 fv’) drives home the point of Eubulides' complete arbitrariness and demonstrates the power he had at the meeting. An impression of spontaneity is created throughout by the rhetorical question in 9, the av 3otfAno3' ax'oOeiv in 17 and the uoxep xat vOv in 11. By the constant mention of the lateness of the hour at which the voting took place (9, 10, 12, 13), the appellant Intensifies the dark deed that was perpetrated. Although Euxitheus has not yet come to the real point at issue, i.e., whether he is really an Athenian citizen, Demosthenes has succeeded in his purpose here which is to prejudice the jury by demonstrating the candor and innocence of his client while at the same time bringing before the jury the unsavory character of Eubulides. The use of vivid pictures, de nunciatory vocabulary, and the ethopoiia of Euxitheus all contribute to this purpose. After the depositions, Euxitheus again states how sensible it would have been for the members of the deme to postpone the vote concerning him since they had to convene the next day to vote on ^ouvioxhxai really means "entering into a conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice" as Bonner and Smith, II, 10, point out. 2 The uoxep xat vOv may in fact be an example of genuine extemporization. Cf. Dorjahn, p. 290. 68 twenty more members. His bold assertion (16) that Eubulides knew that the false charges would not be sustained if postponement had occurred is in keeping with the previously established ethopoiia. The rhetorical question in 15 (tC . . . EufiouXC6i};) focuses the jury's attention on this point, and the idea of conspiracy is further reinforced by oi yexa t o O t o u auveatnxdTes (16). The statement of purpose finally c6mes in 17. Euxitheus promises to show that he is an Athenian citizen on both his father's and his mother's side. ' This he will do by producing truthful witnesses who will refute Eubulides' calumnious charges. With a direct statement to the jury and a subtle reminder of their duty (17), he begins the argument proper (17: apEoyai 6 ’ evTeOdev). The argument from 18-23 is mainly unrhetorlcal and consists of 2 "non-artistic" proofs. Eubulides and his supporters have charged that Euxitheus' father was a foreigner because he spoke with a foreign accent (18, 19). This is easily refuted since the foreign accent was 3 the result of his being sold as a slave in the Decelean War. When According to sec. 10 there were not more than ninety demesmen in Halimus. A.W. Goome, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford, 1933 [unchanged rep., Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1967]), p. 55, points out that this figure is possible but warns against possible understatement by Euxitheus. For Halimus, cf. Kolbe's article in RE, VII (1912), 2266f. ^Arist. Rhet. to Alex. 1428a . ^The latter period of the Peloponnesian War, 412-404 B.C. The transition of the status of individuals from freedom to slavery and vice-versa occurred with greater frequency after the Persian Wars. Cf. William L. Westermann, "The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity," American Philosophical Society, XL (Philadelphia, 1955), 5. Thucritus returned home, however, he reverted to full citizen status^ as Is shown by the fact that his uncles gave him his share of the family property. Furthermore, no one ever accused him of being a foreigner. The repetition of the negatives reinforces this last statement. (19: odx’ ev xots 6npdxcus oux' ev xots ippdxepaiv oux* aXAoOi ou6apou xov EevCtpvx' oufiets rdSnox* gxtdaaB* us e"n Sfvos). The depositions to the above facts are then read and the speaker proceeds to call as witnesses his father’s surviving relatives on the 2 male side. Their names are given and they testify under oath that Thucritus was a citizen. Then follow the depositions and the testimony of the relatives on the female side, members of his phratry, and 3 members of his y£v°S. Depositions proving that Euxitheus was elected president of the clan (23: qipaxpCapxov) conclude this section. The proofs of 19-23 are reinforced in 24-28 by the use of 4 eixds arguments. These remove any suspicion that he (or his father before him) had ever resorted to bribery in order to verify that they ^Cf. Harrison, p. 181. 2 For a discussion of the gratuitous nature of this oath, cf. Bonner, Evid., p. 78. 3 Before the reforms of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.), the four tribes c6ntained three phratriae or clans each, and these in turn were divided into thirty y£vn. Even after Cleisthenes, the phratriae and yfvn retained a position of religious, if not political, significance. Cf. W.S. Ferguson, "The Athenian Phratries," CP, V (1910), 257-84; F.B. Tarbell, "The Decrees of the Demotionidai. A Study of the Attic Phratry," AJA, V (1889), 135-53; and H.T. Wade-Gery, "Eupatridai, Archons, and Areopagus," Cg., XXV (1931), pp. Iff. ^*Cf. Fairchild, pp. 108-12,for discussion of this speech. 70 were citizens; for if Euxitheus and his father had sought the testimony of only one or two witnesses, there would have been reason to suspect that these witnesses had been bribed. However, if Euxitheus and his father, when he was alive, belonged to all the usual political and religious groups (24: Afyw The use of the argument from probability continues in 25. If his father had been wealthy and had bribed witnesses to say that they were his relatives, "it would have been reasonable for anyone to suspect that he was not a citizen." But his father was poor and despite this, he not only had produced relatives as witnesses in his lifetime, but also had proved that they had given him a share in their property. Thus, it is very probable that he was related to them. The argument is emphatically expressed by a question which is followed by a contrary to fact condition giving the reason for the etxds in negative terms: "For doubtless, if he were not related to anyone of them they would not have admitted him as a member of the gens, and given him money besides." After the deposition to the above, the third eixds argument follows. His father had held various,elective offices and.passed the probationary test (25). Yet, he never had been prosecuted nor had a charge preferred against him for disqualifi cation in office on the ground that he was an alien (26). However, if he had been a foreigner, it is likely that the demesmen would not have allowed him to hold office, but would have prosecuted him for 71 his Illegal act. The case for Guxltheus' father Is further strengthened by the fact that the demesmen had to vote a second tine when the voting register was "lost."^ Although some were expelled at this time, no charges were brought against Thucritus. Surely since the latter*s lineage was never questioned at this time (or at any other time)» Guxltheus should be regarded as an Athenian with regard to his father. After the witness statements, the final argument of this section comes (28). His father's four sons had been buried in the ancestral tomb which was the joint property of all the members of 2 the gens. However, none of his relatives at any time protested the burials, sought to prevent them, or brought suit. Surely, no one would allow other than family members to be buried in an ancestral tomb. Here, the absurd question implies etxds (hciCt o i t Cs eoxiv o c t is civ . . . Tid£vai edaou;). Although factual testimony and argumentation are predominant in 18-28, these sections are not without their rhetorical flashes. Particularly effective are the emotional commonplace (27: xaCxoi 3 xaoCv eoxiv avdpwitois t €Ao s t o o Bfoo ddvaxos)» the pathetic n£vns wv (25),* and the use of rhetorical questions to express various levels ^This of course is a subtle attack on Gubulides' father. See sec. 60 for details. ^ ' For evidence of relationship drawn from the possession of a common burial ground, cf. Bonner, Gvid., p. 23; also, Dem. XLIII 79. O The same phrase occurs in Dem. XVXII 97 with itfpas for x£Aos. 4 For the effect that poverty had on a jury, cf. James F. Cronin, "The Athenian Juror and Gmotional Pleas," CJ, XXIV (1939), 471-79. 72 of emotion and to fix the jury's attention on what Euxltheus Is about to say. One notes especially the pathetic appeal (26) and the assertive tone to strengthen his argument (24, 27). The rhetorical answer (25: aAX’ ?iv) also serves the same purpose. The speaker constantly Involves the jury in what he is saying (20, 22, 24: axnxdorre; 24: oaoiaitep exaaxos uySv). Clearness is achieved by use of the particle t o Cv u v (22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28) to mark the introduction of an Important statement. Finally, the asyndetic sequence, strengthened by anaphora (28), conveys the effect of rapidity and brings this section to a close. The succinct recapitulation (29) is bolstered by. the additional information (30) that his father would have been entitled to Athenian citizenship, even if only one of his parents had been Athenian.* The evidence of these sections is most convincing and leaves no doubt that Euxltheus' father was really an Athenian citizen. The appellant now comes to the first charge against his mother, viz., that she sold ribbons in the market place (30-34). He cleverly capitalizes on this charge by showing that his opponent has violated the laws by making such an accusation. Therefore, he is 2 liable to the penalties for evil-speaking. The speaker makes full *Thucritus had been born before 403 B.C. when the citizenship laws were more relaxed. Cf. Wagner, pp. 14-17, for a discussion of citizenship requirements from the time of Solon to 403 B.C. For the laws concerning xuxnyopCo and certain "forbidden" (omdppnxa) expressions, cf. Lipsius, II, 647-51 and Plutarch Solon 21. A person was not to be reproached for poverty. For an example of Athenian women selling in the market place, cf. Arlst. Lysistrata 457ff. 73 use of pathos before the reading of this law and the law regarding the citizenship revision. After an exhortation to the jury, he launches into a counter-attack on Eubulides. For, far from engaging in any lawful trade, his opponent has transgressed the law concerning idleness (apyCa).^ This, of course, is a reference to Eubulides* dissipation and also an indication of his wealth. Since the purpose of this law was the protection of the rights of the family, particularly of children, the prejudice of the less wealthy jurors would surely be aroused against a rich idler. In fact most of the jurors were in court merely to get their three obols a day. The abusive attack continues when the speaker says that Eubulides has made slanderous statements which have nothing to do with the case and has done every thing to impede justice (33). The innuendo about Eubulides' "trade" is most discriminatory, but the speaker immediately checks himself and falls back on insinuation (33: a y&p upels Tate). This nervous anxiety and fear of venturing too far contribute to the ethopoiia of Euxltheus. By the subtle reminder that Eubulides' charges are based on hearsay (34), he once again weakens his opponent's accusations at a strategic point in the case, for he is coming to the charge of ribbon-selling. Not only does Euxltheus not deny this, but he even seems proud of it. Moreover, as far as he is concerned, this is the strongest proof that his mother is. a citizen. If she were an alien, ^Lysias wrote two speeches for ypoHpal apyCas. Cf. Frags. XVII and C in the Teubner edition. He says that Draco laid down the death penalty for it but that Solon substituted 1,000 drachmas for the first conviction and < m p C a for the third. Cf. Diogenes Laertius I 35 and Eberhard Ruschenbusch, "ZOAflNOS N0M0I," Historia, Heft 9, p. 54. 74 there would be a record of her having paid the alien’s tax; if she were a slave, witnesses should have testified to this fact. But there is no such evidence. At this point (34) the vague form given to the accusation of sycophancy in 32 is made more definite and brings out the fact that Eubulides1 charges are without foundation: "For this is what a blackmailer is; he makes all manner of charges, but proves nothing." In addition to the rhetorical techniques already mentioned, imperatives, direct address, and a rhetorical question enliven this section (31-34). The brief apostrophes (31, 32) convey a note of sarcasm whereas the sophistic argument: "I shall prove to you the very opposite, that it is not permitted to any alien to do business in the market," (31) reinforces the speaker's position for the moment.^ The second charge against Euxitheus' mother is that she nursed Cleinias. This is admitted. She was forced to do this when times were hard for everyone (35). Again the appellant begs the jury not to hold their poverty against them. In fact, he says that many 2 Athenian women are still serving as nurses. Especially moving is the appealing humility of 36, "Pray, men of Athens, do not scorn the needy (their poverty is misfortune enough) . . . ." The rhetorical question and answers (35, 36) impart liveliness to these more than *He clarifies this point later (34) when he mentions the alien's tax. 2 Although he offers to mention them, he never does. However, any such reference gives the passage in which it occurs a slightly extemporaneous tinge. Cf. Dorjahn, p. 290. 75 ample proofs. His mother's relatives deny the calumnious charges and testify under oath* that she Is an Athenian citizen. In the Intervening 2 sections the speaker establishes their worthiness by naming them and mentioning their service to the state (37, 38). More witnesses are summoned and the depositions from his mother's clan and deme are read. Although he has already offered exhaustive proof for his claims that both his parents were Athenians, In 40-43 he takes care 3 to show that his mother was really married by to his father. This fact, plus the fact that his mother had been previously married to another Athenian citizen, Protomachus, although not essential to his case, was Important contributory evidence that she was a citizen, and it is this which Euxltheus stresses in 43. The reason was 4 perfectly legitimate and in accordance with Athenian inheritance laws. However, since the charge of adultery suggests itself, the appellant is at pains to dispel any suspicion that might be aroused. Although *For a discussion of this witness oath which also is referred to in 22, 36, 39, 44, 56, cf. Bonner and Smith, II, 174. 2 Although some may suspect that Euxltheus is merely "pulling the wool" over the jurors' eyes in these sections, the genealogy actually takes up a very small space, due to Demosthenes' skill. For a long, confusing genealogy, see the speech falsely attributed to him, Against Makartatos 21ff. 3 For marriage laws, cf. supra, p. 18, n. 1. Euxltheus estab lishes his legitimacy here as he does in 46 when he mentions his entry into the phratry. For a well-documented discussion of the rights and disabilities of vddoi cf. Harrison, pp. 61-68. ^Cf. supra, p. 13, n. 1. 76 the wedding feast mentioned in 43 was not essential for the validity of the marriage, it was customary. Therefore, it was often used as one means of establishing the existence of a marriage. The fact that his mother's daughter by Protomachus was married according to Athenian law^ is the final proof of her citizenship: os xat xexeXeoxnxuis oyuis papxupet tots epyois aaxfiv x* auxfiv xat roXtxiv clvat. Substantial testimony is offered to the above. From 42 on he also keeps his promise made in 35 to explain why his mother'had to become a nurse: his father was away on military service; she had two children to support and virtually no money. This is substantiated by Cleinias* relatives. Moreover, her case is not unique, for many other Athenian women were driven to similar occupations (45). Pathos and emotional commonplaces are prevalent in 42, 44, and 45, although at times the speaker's tone becomes almost conversational (42: pa xov Ai'). Es pecially moving is: "Many are the servile acts which free men are compelled by poverty to perform, and for these they should be pitied. . . ." . (45) The emotion of the rhetorical question (44) succeeds in once again focusing the jury's attention on the falseness of Eubulides' charges. In contrast to this, Euxitheus is represented as such an honest individual that he must tell the truth no matter what (45: xat yhp et xareiv&v n xtxSfi, xfiv dArfteiav ou (pedyw). After the brief recapitulation, Euxitheus finally comes to speak of himself (46). Two groups of facts are in contrast here. *For the punishment for violating the marriage laws, cf. Dem. LIX 52. 77 The facts of the first group are those which Euxitheus himself considers necessary and sufficient to prove his case: (1) he was born of an Athenian mother and father; (2) he has shared by inheritance both the property and the family. Therefore, he is a citizen (46: pe . . . elvai roXCrnv). The same conclusion is more clearly evident from 50, 51, 53, 54, and 69. In 50 and 51 it is his parentage that he emphasizes: "For my own part . . . I hold myself to be an Athenian on the same grounds on which each of you holds himself to be one, having from the first regarded as my mother her whom I represent as such to you, and not pretending to be hers while really belonging to another; and in regard to my father the case is the same." In 51 he says, "... holding fast to those who are my real parents, I claim Athenian citizenship." In 53, on the other hand, he stresses his right to inherit property, "It surely would have been their right, if I had been illegitimate or an alien, to inherit all my property." In 54 I one finds, ". . . m y father . . . introduced me to the clansmen, knowing that I was an Athenian, born of an Athenian mother, lawfully betrothed to himself. . . All of these major proofs come together in 69. After he has vividly repeated by an imaginary dialogue that his father and mother were Athenian citizens (67, 68), he adds, "Of what, then, could you have further need?" This is answered by, "... that my father married my mother according to the laws, and that he gave a marriage-feast to the members of the clan, has been proved by testimony." This of course means that Euxitheus is legitimate and can therefore inherit property. This is why he constantly emphasizes 78 his parents' valid marriage. The right to inherit was normally refused to bastards.^ These, then, are the proofs necessary to his defense. The supplementary proofs are now mentioned, "And besides all this, I have shown that 1 myself have shared in all the privileges which befit free men." (69) These words allude to the same facts that are enumerated in 46 after ou vifiv a \\d and are merely subsidiary argu mentation. However, they show that he has been considered a citizen his entire life. The enumeration includes: ' (1) introduction into 2 3 the phratry; (2) enrollment in the deme; (3) candidacy for the priest hood of Heracles; (4) successful passage of the dokimasla; (5) service as office-holder. With regard to the first of these, in the fourth century membership in a phratry was not an indispensable condition for citizenship. Why, then, does Euxitheus mention it here? The reason is that such membership was restricted not only to those born from citizens on both sides, but to those born from citizens married Cf. Ph.E. Legrand, "L1argumentation d* Euxithdos dans le discours Contre Euboulides,11 REA, IX (1907), 231. Whether a man whose parents were Athenian but not married had any citizen rights is, as a matter of fact, disputed. The dispute arises from the inter pretation of eXeOdepds t o n nal y£yove xaxot t o O s vdpoug (Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.1). Gomme, "Two Problems," p. 130, believes that he did not, and cites Muller (Jahrb. fur klass. Phil., XXV (1899), 722ff. and Wyse, Speeches, pp. 280-82 in support. This view has been refuted by Lipsius, II, 475, 506, and Harrison, pp. 63ff. 2Cf. Busolt-Swoboda, II, 960ff. ' ^A full account of enrollment in the deme is given in Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.1, At eighteen the Athenian boy was examined by the demcsmen under oath. They voted to accept him if he had reached the required age, was a freeman, and legally born. See further, Bonner and Smith, II, 157. 79 by way of eyytin or erufiixotoCa. Hence, legitimate birth could not be proved in any better way than by phratry membership.^ Since, then, the claim of legitimacy is necessary to one of his major proofs, i.e., that he is a citizen because he can inherit property, Euxitheus takes care to stress this point over and over during the speech. After the witness testimony, Euxitheus becomes more rhetorical and retaliates in kind for the character-assassination which he had suffered. The eixds argument is effectively'used in 47 and 48. Inasmuch as Euxitheus has held public office and has been a nominee with Eubulides for the priesthood, there has been ample opportunity to question his status as a citizen. It is not likely that Eubulides would have permitted this if Euxitheus were a resident alien or a foreigner. The oO yap av 6tftou (48) adds a sarcastic tone to the whole argument. Further, since Eubulides was an enemy of Euxitheus of long standing, it is improbable that he would have waited until the present opportunity, which was unforeseeable, to bring an accusation against him, if he had known formerly as facts what he now alleges (48). The emphatic aXX’ ou auv$6 ei (49) strengthens his argument. The language of 49 is reminiscent of the beginning of the speech, with its references to the turmoil in the deme and the intrigue and plots of Eubulides. Such actions befit an enemy and a sycophant. The speaker uses another eixds argument in 51 to bolster his position. People who claim false parents are considered aliens. In his case the reverse procedure should prove that he is a citizen; for surely in ^He emphasizes this again in sec. 54. 80 trying to prove his Athenian citizenship, Euxltheus would not have claimed foreigners as his parents. The speaker next comes to the charge that he bribed his witnesses (52). This would have been impossible for several reasons: (1) he is poor; (2 ) if he really was illegitimate or an alien, his relatives could have inherited all his property without endangering themselves by committing perjury;^ (3) as is fitting, his relatives have always looked out for his welfare, even when he was a child. This is followed by the sarcastic sneer, "And yet I presume that as a child I did not induce these men to do this by giving them money." (54) The ridiculousness of this whole charge is shown by the contrast in 52, "Again I was left an orphan; and yet they say that I am rich . . . . They taunt me with my poverty and make my birth a reproach, but at the same time they assert that I am rich enough to buy anything." Euxltheus makes full use of rhetorical techniques in the last part of his speech. Amid emotional appeals to the gods and the jury, he hammers away at the strong points of his claim. The six rhetorical questions and the repetition of noO in 55 convey an effect of instant lucidity while constantly focusing the jury's attention on what is being said. He heaps praise and blessings on the jurors and tells them that their courts are most just. Moreover, in allowing his appeal to be heard, they have "exposed the scoundrels and those who were maliciously scheming against others." (57) From the account of other *Cf. Bonner, Evid., pp. 88-93 for an account of perjury and its various penalties. 81 outrageous Injustices and inconsistencies that have been perpetrated by the Halimusians, he turns his attack once more to Eubulides and 1 his club. With repeated guarantees that he is not introducing irrelevant material, he tells how Eubulides and his clique acted together for money to get aliens on the citizen lists. According to the speaker, there were many men whom his opponents destroyed or saved for money. (However, he names only two.) This account provides a transition to a similar story with regard to the intrigues of 2 Antiphilus, Eubulides' father. When he was demarch, he pretended 3 that he had lost the public register in order to bring about a revision of the. citizen list. Moreover, at that time, Euxitheus' father was not barred from citizenship, despite the fact that Antiphilus was a personal enemy of his. In fact, no one voted against him. The eixds argument reinforces this point. For it was unlikely that the demesmen would have retained any on the list who were not Athenians, since they had contrived to expel even genuine citizens, whom the court later restored. Further, when Euxitheus was entered on the deme list, no one voted against him, not even Eubulides. The appellant completely refutes his opponents' accusations by the recapitulation (62) where *The intrigues related in 59 refer just to Eubulides' permanent club and not to the "Interested" men (63, 64) who had joined in the conspiracy to oust Euxitheus. This is shown by Eu6ouX(6 ns . . . o£ per’ auxoO (59) and o£ pet’ EufJouXC6oo ouveotSTes (60). 2 Cf. supra, p. 71. 3 t6 xoivdv Ypapparetov usually refers to the archives of the phratry and xd An€iapxixdv ypappaTctov, to the archives of the deme. In this speech they are used interchangeably to refer to the deme list. Cf. J.J.E. Hondius, "Quid sit x6 xoivbv ypappaieiov," Mn., L (1922), 87-90. 82 he very carefully repeats the four Instances In which his citizenship was upheld. In 63 Euxitheus finally comes to speak of his demarchy. He introduces this digression apologetically and reluctantly. The fact that it is mentioned so late in the speech and then treated in such a brief manner has been considered a weak point in his case.'*’ However, because of the unpopularity that resulted from his tern of office, Euxitheus was certainly wise to minimize this point. As demarch he had required many of his demesmen to pay the rents they owed for sacred lands and to refund what they had embezzled from the public funds. As a direct result of this, the demesmen sought revenge. They 2 struck out of their oath the clause that they would vote according to their unbiased judgment and joined a conspiracy (with Eubulides' club) against Euxitheus. Then they stole the shields that Euxitheus had dedicated to Athena and chiseled out the decree that the demesmen had passed in his honor (64). Horst of all they went about the city circulating a report that he, himself, had done this in order to put the blame on his opponents and arouse prejudice against them. The Ironic tone of the rhetorical question shows the unreasonableness of their schemes. Finally, as soon as Euxitheus had been removed from ^Cf. Gomme, "Two Problems," pp. 133-34. ^For the demesmen's oath, cf. Bonner and Smith, II, 157. It was similar in many respects to the heliastic oath. J.F. Cronin, The Athenian Juror and His Oath (University of Chicago, 1936), pp. 18ff., accepts M. Frankel's reconstruction and gives a detailed discussion of the Athenian jurors' attitude toward their oath. For Frankel, cf. "Der attische Heliasteneid," Hermes, XIII (1878), pp. 452-66. 83 the citizenship list, they tried to rob his house. The details add to the pathos: they went immediately (cudOs)» by night (vdxxwp), to plunder his cottage (oixC6 iov). The diminutive here reminds the jury of Euxitheus' poverty. The scornful, "so utter was their contempt for you and for your laws" (65) completes the damning picture. The peroration (66-70), full of exaggeration and sentimentality, is very artistic. Euxitheus arouses the suspicion of the jury when he says there is much more that could be told but this would not be germane. The essential and subsidiary arguments have already been discussed in conjunction with 46. The speaker reviews his proofs by 1 cross-examining himself just as the jury examines the Thesmothetae. This imaginary dialogue provides a brilliant climax to the whole speech. In traditional fashion, the jury is exhorted to act in accordance with its oath and thus acquit him. He represents himself as a dutiful son who has lost his father and is now pleading to have his mother buried in the ancestral tomb. The repetition of the negatives (70: ufi . . . pn6 ’. . . un6€) intensifies his impassioned plea to remain a member of the state and not to be cut off from his i relatives. The speech ends with the moving threat that rather than lose all this he will commit suicide. Superficially, this speech could be dismissed as a case of "small town politics," one faction against another. But it is more than this, for a man's Athenian citizenship was at stake and this, perhaps, is one reason why Demosthenes took the case Initially. He, ^Arist. Ath. Pol. 55*3, 4. himself, had suffered from the derogatory epithet "Scythian"*’ and would be most sensitive to Euxitheus' predicament. The speech also gives us a vivid account of deme administration, the potency of clubs 2 in deme elections, the collusion of public officials and the ability of such to perpetrate frauds. Rhetorically, it is a masterpiece. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dem. 13) thought it worthy of the Conon which he equates with the work of Lysias. The narrative (8ff.) and the imaginary dialogue (67ff.) are especially artistic. Euxitheus comes across as a forthright, courageous man who has been caught completely off guard by Eubulides* intrigues. His indignation and boldness, tempered at times by nervous anxiety, are also part of his ethos. The distribution and organization of the individual sections 3 are masterful. The appellant inserts the vivid and prejudicial account of the voting in the deme before discussing the question at issue, i.e., whether his parents were in fact Athenian citizens. Then, after offering exhaustive proof of their citizenship and his own, he includes the brief account of his demarchy which was unfavorable to him. The latter fact is completely overshadowed by the imaginary dialogue that provides an emotional recapitulation of his strong points. To be sure, Eubulides was counting on his "paid gang" to support him in his attempt to disfranchise Euxltheus permanently. ^Cf. Aeschines III 172. 2 Eubulides ' club worked to get him nominated as a candidate for the demarchy. Had there been any irregularity in the actual drawing of lots, Euxltheus would not have omitted it. 3 Blass, III, 431. 85 There is little doubt, however, that Demosthenes' skill in employing the techniques of persuasion, in particular, ethopoiia, character- assassination, and the eixds argument, convinced the jury of Euxitheus' innocence. CHAPTER IV AGAINST CONON (LIV) This oration is the plea of the plaintiff, Ariston, in an action for assault and battery (6 Cxn ouxeCas)1 against the defendant, 2 Conon. The authenticity of the work has never been doubted. The 3 year 341 B.C. is the best date of composition. Ariston frequently alludes to the fact that he could have brought a public indictment » 4 against Conon (YP<* Cf. Lipsius, II, 643-45; Thalheim's article aixCas 6Cxn, in RE, I (1894), 1006f.; Harpocration, caxCas: clfios 6Cxns £6iu>Tixfis ext rAryyms Aayxovoydvns ?is xd tCpnpa ev rots vdyots oux eottv upiou€vov, aAA’ o y£v xaxfiYOpos xCunya emYP^ 2Blass, III, 399. 3 Cf. Appendix. ^In Dem. XXI 47 the actual law is given which shows that any citizen could bring such an action, but if he did not get one-fifth of the votes of the jurors, he had to pay a fine of 1,000 drachmas. Carolus Zink, Adnotationes ad Demosthenis orationem in Cononem (Diss. Inaug. Erlangen, 1883), pp. 12-17 discusses the YPO'pi') ugpeus in detail and gives full references to the orators. See further, Lipsius, II, 420-29 and Gernet, Dem., III, pp. 98-100. Sandys, II, 186, quotes Lysias, fr. 44 to show that sometimes the death penalty was inflicted. ^Cf. Lipsius, II, 320ff.; Gernet, Dem.. Ill, 98; Arist. Ath. Pol. 52.1 . . . xat t o D s axaYoy€vous xA^mas xat xoOs av6pano6 iaxas» xat t o O s Aa»xo6CJxas, av yfev [oyoAoYwjoi, Qavdrif cnpttfoovxas. See further, 86 87 summary arrest depended on catching the offender In the act. The penalty for this crime was death. Since Conon and his friends did, In fact, steal Ariston's cloak (8 : e£€6uoav;9: dotydnovXaBdvxes you), technically this was possible. However, according to the plain tiff, following the advice of his friends (1) and because of his own moderate behavior (24), he decided to bring a 6Cxn cuxeCasinstead. This was a private suit for assault and its penalty was light— a pecuniary fine paid to the state. The uBpews ypaipfl,on the other hand, was a public indictment for malicious outrage. The penalty consisted in either a fine paid to the state, or, in extreme cases, death. If the prosecutor failed to get one-fifth of the votes, he • was fined 1,000 drachmas. The former charge implied that the plaintiff had been simply assaulted and struck; the latter, that he had been subjected to wanton and brutal indignities. Obviously greater skill and experience were needed to sustain the charge of v>@pt s • Since the plaintiff knows that this is beyond him, he cleverly keeps the more serious theme before the jury by using some form of the word uBpiS more than twenty times throughout the speech, while rarely referring to alxeia. The case was heard before the Forty.^ Lysias X 10; XIII 6 8 ; Aeschines I 91; and Dem. XXII 26. *That this type of suit came under the Forty is stated in Dem. XXXVII 33, a speech delivered c. 346/5 B.C. By the time of Aristotle it had evidently become one of the monthly suits; cf. Ath. Pol. 52.2. Bonner and Smith, II, 115 note this; see chap. 5 for discussion of the Forty; also I, last chap. Barrel discusses this Institution in relation to arbitration, chap. 1. Cf. further, Lipsius, I, 81ff.; Bonner, Jurisdiction, pp. 407-18; and Arist. Ath. Pol. 5 3 .If. 88 The theme of the whole speech is struck In the opening words (1: *Ygpto§eCs, 5 av6pes 6 ixaoTaC, xat xab&v urd Kdvwvos toutovI roiaOTa).^ According to Ariston his injuries were so severe that neither his friends nor his doctors thought he would survive. The four participles— VgpioSeCs, taduiv, uyudvas, and outbeCs— effectively emphasize this life-death struggle. When he finally recovered, he brought a 6 Cxq aixeCas against Conon. He is quick to add that, although he could have brought a ypa Indication of his reasonableness and caution (24: nycts ytv arpdyyoves xat yfTpioi (patvoCyed*). Be that as it may, he is not so non-violent ^For similar openings, cf. Dem. XXI 1: Tfiv y£v aofXyetav . . . xat Thv ugptv and XLV 1: KaTa<|>eu6 oyapTUpnbcCs • . . xat uabulv unb topyCuvog ugpiatixa xat 6eivd. . . . Hermogenes xept xabapdTnTos 204 quotes this as an example of directness of expression. 2 There actually was disfavor connected with such an act as the youthful speaker in Lysias XVI 20 indicates: . . . xat 6 i6t toOto axboyfvwv yoi, o n vewiepos uv cnexeCpnaa Afyeiv cv t (1 : fator’ av . . . BavdTou xpCvas t o u t o v C).*’ After this "slip" he quickly recovers his composure and says he knows the jury will understand his sentiments when it hears what further harm Conon has done to him. This allusion to the obstructive tactics deliberately adopted by Conon at the arbitration proceedings arouses the prejudice of the jury. Thus far the plaintiff has represented himself as a cautious, docile, "much sinned against" young man who heeds the advice 2 of his elders. The prooemium closes with the traditional plea for good will, assistance in gaining his rights, and the promise of brevity. 3 The transition to the "pre-narrative" (3-6) is clearly delineated (2 : e£ apxhs 6 ’ us exaota ufupaxtai 6 tryyYioopai up5s upas). The speaker says that his feud with Conon and his sons began while they were on military service^ at Panactum. One can almost hear Also cf. sec. S. Kirk, p. 24, points out that the plaintiff has enforced the idea of ufJpis on the judges from the start and justi fied it by xat raduv . . . Kcpi ^This part of the speech is preliminary to the narrative on which the suit is really founded. Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1414^. However, Bonner.Evid., p. 17 correctly points out that it is not actually irrelevant because Ariston can use it to disprove Conon's protests that the whole matter was a trifling affair (14). ^Zink, pp. 18-19 cites references to show that Ariston was serving as a regular soldier, not as an ephebe. He further infers this from sec. 5 where the axpaTdxefiov, oxpaxnyds and xa£Capxoi are mentioned. In addition he notes that the strict discipline usual in the case of ephcbes is absent. Moreover, the services mentioned by 90 the music fade into the background as he begins (3: fcSfiXdov, exos t o u t I t p Ct o v t l s IldvaxTov). Conon's sons, who were encamped near Ariston, began drinking early in the day. The graphic picture1 of their habitual drinking and dissoluteness is brought out by the use of the imperfects emvov, 6 iex£Xouv noioOvxes, coupled with the modifiers exdoTod’, xftv nyfpav . . . oXnv. Cleverly juxtaposed to this unseemly behavior is the portrayal of Ariston and his friends as perfect gentlemen (3: nyets 6 ’ uoxep evddd’ etwdeuyev, ouxw dtffyoyev). At first the drunken rogues played every vile trick imaginable on the slaves, alleging that the latter bothered them with smoke when they were cooking. Ariston*s deep indignation is shown when he says xat daeAyeCas xat uBpews ou6 ’ oxioOv dnfXeinov (4). Furthermore, when Ariston and his friends showed their annoyance, Ctesias and his brothers made fun of them. Finally, the whole mess, to which Ariston belonged, reported the affair to the general. The speaker is careful to emphasize that he was not alone in A this "unsportsmanlike" conduct (4: oux eyul xwv aXXwv e£u>). He Ariston in sec. 44 (xptnpapX°0VTes xat axpaxeudyevoi xat x6 xpooxaTxdyevov roiouvxes) seem to indicate that he was beyond the age of an ephebe. Sandys, II, 188 and Gernet, Dem., Ill, p. 104, n. 1 agree. For the op posite view, cf. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs, p. 29 and Mark P.O. Morford, "Ethopoiia and Character-Assassination in the Conon of Demosthenes," Mn., XIX (1966), 243. ^ h e minute details add to the evdpycia. ^Ariston and his otiooiToi, as well as Conon's sons, no doubt belonged to rival clubs. This would help to explain the street fight which took place later. Cf. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs, p. 29 and Morford, pp. 243-44. 91 cleverly seizes the opportunity for further Innuendo with regard to his opponents' behavior when he says that the strategos reprimanded Ctesias and his friends not only for their maltreatment of Ariston but also for their conduct in general (5: aXAa xat Kept 2>v oXus c k o Co u v ev OTpaTOKffiip) • However, Ctesias and'his gang were not subdued by this "dressing down". Far from it. In fact, their immediate reaction was revenge. Therefore, as soon as it grew dark, they burst into Ariston's tent, swore at him, and attacked him so violently that the general and the tribal officer came to quell the riot. The plaintiff candidly admits that only the appearance of the authorities prevented him from doing serious injury to the attackers (5). Hatred and enmity resulted from this fracas and when they finally returned home, Ariston resolved not to have anything to do with "people of that sort" (6 : xat qiuXfiTTeodai KXnaifiCEiv tots totodxots). His ethos as ah overly respectable snob comes through in this last statement. The only reason Ariston did not bring an action against Ctesias was that he did not have a pase.^ His oath to the gods, however, (6 : \ih. robs beobs ou yhv iy u y ’) is an attempt to represent this as a magnanimous gesture on his part. Realizing that he has not actually said anything about Conon so far, he cleverly connects him with this part of the ex&pa by promising to show his negligence in not disciplining his sons and his brashness in committing far worse acts (6: o St o s auxbs itpdxepos k o XA$ Scivdtcp’ eCpyoiOTai). *Indeed such injuries were an accepted and expected part of club rivalries. Cf. sec. 14. 92 If one considers the care and deliberateness with which the "pre-narrative" has been told, the casual statement providing the transition to the narrative proper is certainly mere rhetoric (7: Tftv lifev toCvuv oo6£v' (Jpnv 6elv X6yov noietoSai, xaOr’ eoxCv). However, the device has been successful in arousing the prejudices of the jury and depicting Conon's sons as a bunch of rogues. The events of the crucial evening now follow (7-9). Sometime later Ariston and Phanostratos^ were taking their customary evening stroll in the agora. 2 Near the Leocorion, Ctesias, drunk, passed by (7: napfpxeTcu). According to Ariston, the son of Conon let out a yell, muttered some- 3 thing unintelligible, and continued on toward Melite. Ctesias found his father and friends (four of whom are named) drinking at Pamphilus' house. Ariston says he found this out later but does not say how. 4 Ctesias made them get up and led them back to the agora. There, he and his reinforcements met Ariston and Phanostratos. According to ^Probably a member of his club because he is described as tuv nXixiujTuiv t i s . Cf. Aeschines II 184 and Calhoun, Athenian Clubs, pp. 27ff. 2 For a discussion of the location of Ariston's walk, cf. B.H. Fowler, "Demosthenes 54; A Topographical Note," CP., LIII (1958), 174-75. Cf. Morford's reconstruction, pp. 244f. A plausible recon struction of Ariston's tactics is also given by U.G. Paoli, La Brutta Notte di Aristone (full reference in Morford, p. 243). See further E. Mensching, "Zu Demosthenes' 54 Rede," Rh. Mus., CVI (1963), 307-12. The latter thinks that Ctesias' remark could have angered Ariston and Phanostratos and therefore they attacked him. ^Sandys, II, 194, points out that in his character as a soldier the speaker describes the incident in military language: e^avooT/idas (7), sometimes used of starting troops from ambush and dvepeCx&nuev (8), "when we closed with one another." 93 Ariston, someone attacked Phanostratos and held him. It Is Important to note that he does not know who did this (8 : els yfev outCv , ayvifis t i s ). However, In direct contrast to this indefiniteness, he says that Conon, his son, and the son of Andromenes attacked him (8 : Kfivuiv 6 ’ o u t o o i xat o ui6 s autoD xat o *Av6poy€vous uibs eyot itpooreodvTes). This is the most important statement in the whole testimony and if he could have proved it, he would have won his case.*" To bolster this statement he should have called the witnesses immediately. But it is exactly at this crucial point that the case is weak. Instead of calling the witnesses he makes full use of pathos (8-9) in recounting the events that followed the beginning of the fight. Thus, when he finally summons the witnesses, they are testifying to all the events that followed the dealing of the first blow which no doubt were true, but really irrelevant. Moreover, considering the darkness (7: eoxfpas) and the crowd, it would be most unlikely that "witnesses" could have been near enough to see the actual start of the fight. Another weak point— at no time does he .call Phanostratos, whose testimony would have been Invaluable if Conon had started the fight. Ariston no doubt resorts to this confusion to cover for the fact that he started the fight. In any event his failure to capitalize on the witness testimony at such a crucial point weakens his whole case. His colorful account of the fight and his effective use of pathos perhaps minimized the loose structure in the eyes of the jury. The plaintiff says that ^The first blow constituted assault. Dem. XLVII 40, n 6£ aixeia t o Ot ’ e o t i v , av ap£ij xetpwv a6 Cxwv. . . . Also cf. Dem. XXIII 50 and Lipsius, II, 644f. 94 they took his cloak, pushed him into the mud, beat him so hard that his lip was split, his eyes were closed, and he could not speak. The participles xpoaxeofivxes* uxooxeXCoavxes, p fellow comes through when he says he heard them use such bad language that he would be embarrassed to repeat it in the presence of the jury (9). Sandys^ notes that such a statement has a threefold effect: (1 ) the court is left to imagine that the language was more offensive than it actually was; (2) Ariston is accredited with being too decent a fellow to repeat it; (3) the jurors are flattered by the compliment that the language was too indecent to be repeated in their presence. The credibility gap between his statement that his eyes had been 2 closed by the beating and his vivid description of Conon's "cock-fight" dance also make him suspect. Indeed, he never lost consciousness and 3 the doctor himself said the bruises were not too bad (11: x£3v y£v otfinutfTwv xwv ev x$ xpoowxip xat xwv eXxwv ou6£v e taxpds). Sometime later (after the fight and after Conon and his 4 friends had left) "passers-by" carried him home to his mother who 1 a Sandys, II, 195. Arist. Rhet. 1408 urges such discreetness, xaOnTixTt 6£, . . . cav 6i aaefJrj xat aioxpa* duaxepaCvovxos xat euXa(3ouy£vou xat X£yci>v. 2 To be sure, the picture of a fifty year old man flapping his arms and crowing would make the jury laugh. This may have been a club ritual since cock-fighting was a popular amusement among club members. Cf. Aeschines I 59ff. and Calhoun, Athenian Clubs, p. 61, n. 3. 3 * • He contradicts this testimony in sec. 13: oil yfev xoCvuv o u lietpCas Tivds xat ipadXas XaB&v xXnyds. . . . 4 Cf. Morford's suggestion, p. 245. 95 shrieked and cried when she saw him. The juxtaposition of the words here adds to the pathos of this scene (9: xpauyh xat Boh xhs m h t p &s ). Finally, he was brought to the bath and shown to the doctors. The witness statement— all too late— now comes. Supposedly these are the witnesses he names in 32. The testimony of the "passers-by" is not reported. After this, Ariston continues to make full use of pathos by dwelling on-the seriousness of his condition (10). He was so weak that he was brought to the house of Meidias.^ The depositions to these facts and also the deposition of the surgeon are again relatively unimportant, since they also attest to the result of the fight. He 2 uses an eixds argument based on what the surgeon said to prove that he would have died if he had not hemorrhaged. With the elaborate recapitulation in sec. 13, Ariston shifts to the counter-arguments that Conon will use. He, of course, would 3 know these from the arbitration proceedings that preceded this case. The fact that he has dealt with his own witness testimony only briefly and then proceeds to spend the greater part of the speech (13-40) on the refutation of Conon's charges is another indication that his own case is weak. His inclusion of the jurors in his remarks (13: oCouai ^Probably the same as the subject of Dem. XXI. o Fairchild discusses this case, pp. 97-101. 3 Since one of the duties of club members was to create sentiment favorable to their fellow members when they were involved in legal proceedings, most likely Ariston also knew what Conon would say from the stories these men had circulated. Cf. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs, pp. 56-57. 96 6 ' upwv evCous dauyd^ctv) and his use of the word toAyffaei to describe Conon's attempted defense rather than that of a neutral word keeps the Idea of the defendant's brashness before their eyes. According to Ariston, Conon considers the whole affair a "storm in a teapot" (13: eis Y^uiTa xal axuSppax’) and treats it from a "boys will be boys" point of view (14: ot raCcovxes ol* avdputoi v£oi . . . xat xaOx’ elvai v£uv av6punuv). In his attempt to minimize his sons' behavior, Conon dwells on the high spirits that are common to young men who 1 2 belong to such clubs as Ithyphalli or Autolecythi. In fact, Conon indirectly pays himself a compliment when he says that such boys are often the sons of respectable persons (14: xaAuv xayaSwv avfipSv uieis). As far as his own son is concerned, he has often fought over some girl. Therefore, Conon does not attach any special importance to the fight in question despite Ariston's previous attempt (3-6) to depict it as the result of a long-standing feud. Conon further charges that Ariston and his friends are not only drunkards and insolent lads s (14: rapoCvous p£v xivas xat ufJptoxds) but what is even worse, they ^The clubs suggest gross licentiousness and riotous behavior. Zink, pp. 21-23, cites the ingenious explanations of the lexicographers and discusses the obscene meanings in these words. Sandys, II, 293ff. has an Excursus on the meaning of auxoAtfxudos. He concludes that it means one who carried his own oil-flask (Afixudos) and mentions two advantages to this: (1) the customary slave would not be able to witness his master's escapades; (2 ) a lower grade of respectability than was warranted by birth was assumed. The latter is no doubt right. He suggests the translations, "gentleman beggars," or "amateur tramps." Actually Ariston is speaking but he is reporting Conon's anticipated defense. 97 are unfeeling and vindictive* (14: ayvwyovas xat nxpods). Ar is ton's deep indignation at such charges is shown in 15 when he apologizes for using the harsh CBpCodai to express the sense of outrage he will feel if the jury believes the mere word of Conon without taking into con sideration his (Ariston's) exemplary life. Here again he represents himself as "respectable" (15: yo6 ’ o t i o u v eoxai xois yexpCois oipeXos). Now he becomes more impassioned and the accumulation of negatives effectively emphasizes his refutation of thebe charges (16: nyels yap o u t c napoivouvxesou$' ufJpCtovxes ux* ou6 evbs avdpunuv ewpdye^a, ou6 ’ ayvuyov ou6lv nyouyeda notetv . . .). Instead of letting the spot light play on himself, the plaintiff quickly returns to the wanton activities of Conon's sons and employs the same device that he used in 9 when he says that decent people (17: dvdpuitovs yexpCous) cannot even speak of such acts let alone perform them. The lively question, dXXfc xC t o u t ’ eyoC; (17) introduces Ariston's grave reminder of the danger to the laws if violence, even verbal, is allowed to pass unpunished. He hammers away on this theme of law and order: "The laws take a far different view ..." (17); ". . . in the laws . . ." (19); and, "This, then, is what is ordained in the laws." (20) By juxtaposing this last statement with Conon's views (2 0 : av 6 ’ Kdvtav), he subtly sets up a polarization between Conon and the laws. The intervening sections contain a discussion of ^Sandys, II, 201 points out that the first two epithets are consistent with such youthful pranks, but the last two are completely inconsistent with the forgiving nature and good temper which Conon would no doubt associate with those who are xapoCvous xal u$plords. crimes and their relevant penalties, ranging from that of evil speaking to that of murder. Realizing that this is not in keeping with his character as a soldier and in order that he not be considered a litigious man, he apologizes for his technical knowledge when he says that it was the result of study and investigation forced upon him by his present predicament. The use of Ithyphalli, and in our love affairs we strike and throttle whom we please.' are you, then, going to let him off with a laugh? I think not. No one of you would have been seized with a fit of laughter. . . . ^Demosthenes uses almost the same escalation of crimes in XX111 50. For the xaxnyopCas 6 Cxn, cf. Lipsius, II, 646ff. The fine was 500 drachmas. See further, Isocrates Against Lochites 3; see supra, p. 8 6 , n. 1 for the aixeCas 6 Cxn. Lipsius discusses the TpaOpaTos ypaipfi, pp. 123, 605; Lysias VI 15 gives the essence of the law. His fourth oration is a defense in a case of malicious wounding. Bonner and Smith, I, llOff. and II, chap. 8 , discuss homicide procedures in detail. All of Antiphon's six speeches and Lysias I, XII, XIII are concerned with homicide. 99 Such expressions as e£eitexn6nxei gg pcTo TaOd’ n pfltnp and waitepavet t e S v e u >t 6 s t ivos (20), which he uses to describe his mother's wailing when she saw what had happened to him, add to the vividness of this passage. Despite his "encomium" on the laws he knows full well that the jury would be indulgent^- toward young men who. take part in drunken pranks (21). Therefore, he gives in on this point, but is quick to emphasize the fact that Conon, on the other hand, over fifty years old, a father, not only does not discipline his sons, but is the ringleader of their escapades. The denunciatory aXX* auxbs nyep&v xat xpSxos xat xdvxuv $6eXup£>TaTos yeY^voTai (22) brings out the scorn Ariston feels toward Conon. In fact he hates the defendant so much that "even death would be too mild." The jurors' attention is fixed on this character-assassination by the interspersing of rhetorical questions throughout. Ariston appeals to their sense of decency and imposes his own bias on them when he says that, even if Conon had merely witnessed Ctesias' actions, the jury would justly hate him (22: t o O t o v c p i o e i t ’ av 6 ixaCus). An etxfis argument showing that Conon is such an unsavory individual that he had no respect for his own father concludes this attack. Once Ariston has succeeded in arousing the jury's prejudice, he provides the logical conclusion to the legal exposition. The laws about u$pis and o£ XwxofiuxaC are read (24). Conon is liable to both, but Ariston is only bringing a 6 txn aixeCas which shows how peaceful and decent a man he is in contrast ^This of course is the real reason why Ariston attacks Conon instead of Ctesias. 100 to the wicked Conon (24: nyels uev awpfiyyoves xat uftpioi (patvoCyeS’ av c l x 6t u s )> It is obvious here that Ariston purposely digressed (20-23) in order to bolster his weak case. The transition to the account of the arbitration proceedings contains a story about a man who was banished by the Areopagus for being a bystander to a murder even though he did not take an active part in it.^ Ariston then dwells at length (26-29) on the obstructive (but legal) tactics employed by Conon to prolong the arbitration proceedings. Clearly, this is another attempt to put Conon in an unfavorable light. Therefore, he assures himself of the jurors' attention by addressing them directly (26: BodAoycu np&s opas eiitetv). According to Ariston, Conon and his friends protracted the proceedings beyond midnight by: (1) refusing to read the depositions or to put in copies; (2) leading Ariston's witnesses to the altar one at a time and putting them on oath; (3) writing irrelevant depositions, one of which was that Ctesias was illegitimate (and so not Conon's responsibility). Finally, when everything else had failed, he put in a challenge 2 offering his slaves for torture. Ariston is clever enough to realize ^The action referred to here is a YPa (28: t 6t ' av eu$£u>s fixev . . . t 6t ' av t o O s oixfxas xape6 C6ou . . . ). The second etx6s argument is a continuation and amplification of the previous one. Even if at the time of the fight, Conon did not realize the seriousness of the situation, it is likely that, if he were really sincere, he would have been willing to submit his slaves to torture at the very beginning of the arbitration. Since he did not do this, his offer arouses suspicion. Ariston then calls for the deposition that Bdoavov in Attic Law," CR, VII (1893), 1-5; C.V. Thompson, "Slave Torture in Athens," CR, VIII (1894), 136; and Bonner, Evid., pp. 67-74. Cf. further Aristophanes Frogs 628f. where Dionysus, disguised as a slave, claims exemption from examination under torture because he is really an Immortal god. 102 states that the challenge was made merely to gain time. During this account In which Ariston has been arousing further prejudice against Cononhe never once alludes to the one argument that would be damaging to his own position— he refused the challenge. If he really felt he had a case against Conon, he would have accepted this challenge, no matter when it was offered. After the elaborate recapitulation (30), he shifts his attention to a vicious attack upon Conon's witnesses. ‘ Since he cannot actually discredit anything they say, he creates suspicion by blackening their 2 characters. Conon can name three witnesses (all of whose patronymics 3 and demes are given) who say that "they were returning from a dinner i with Conon, and came upon Ariston and the son of Conon fighting in the agora, and that Conon did not strike Ariston." (31) No doubt these i witnesses were members of Conon's club (33: ouvik6 t (U 6 ’ ovxes t o O t o u xat xolluv t o i o CStcov epyuv xoivuivot) and would therefore be biased. Moreover, it was a well-known fact that one of the duties of club members was to provide help for one another in court by giving false 4 testimony. He uses two eixfis arguments to discredit their testimony. ^Mensching, p. 312, points out that Conon's attempts to pre vent a court case were understandable since so many disagreeable things would have to come out (perhaps having no direct bearing on the case). 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 308, n. 4 for a convincing argument that Diotimus (31) and Theotimus (7) are the same person. 3 Sandys, II, 216 cites this as an authentic deposition which serves as a standard for testing other supposed depositions. Bonner, Evid., p. 55, concurs. 4 Calhoun, Ath. Clubs, pp. 78-79. Demosthenes speaks of the club relation as one of three causes which lead men to perjure 103 The first argument discredits Conon's deposition on the basis of the friendship of the witnesses with him. The plaintiff presupposes that these witnesses, because of their disreputable characters, would probably not hesitate to conspire with Conon. That their testimony is false is Implied when he says, "as though you would believe them off-hand, and would have no regard to the truth of the matter." (32) In contrast to this, since the plaintiff did not know his witnesses (no demes or patronymics are given, surely a subtly contrived illusion) and they just came on the scene by accident, he implies that they would never have given false testimony. His witnesses said they saw Ariston being beaten by Conon, but they did not say who started the fight.^ The eixds is derived from the contrasted relationship of the witnesses to the litigants, for it is likely that witnesses who were disinterested would tell the truth rather than friends. He next cites further evidence that the testimonials of Conon's witnesses were false. Conon's witnesses testified that a group of men, apart from Conon, struck Ariston. Naturally, if this were true, Ariston certainly would have brought a suit against them and not against one who allegedly never took part in the assault. The indicative with av, strengthened by o u 6£ k o t c , denotes the eCx6 s. The short question, tC y&p av; (33) reinforces the im probability by appealing to common sense. His burning indignation and themselves in XXIX 22-23. For other examples, cf. Dem. XXXIX 2; XL 9; XXXVII 39, 48; XXI 139; and LVIII 42. ^See supra, p. 93 for a discussion of Ariston's poor use of witness testimony. It is strange that he waited so late in the case to name them. 104 hatred for Conon is effectively brought out by: toOti^ xat 6 ix From 33-37 he heaps scornful abuse upon them and resorts to several rhetorical devices in his attempt to arouse the prejudice of the jury. He knows it is his word against theirs (34: aXAS vh AC' oux clot t o i o Ot o i and all he can do is to try to establish their bad character and dishonest intentions. He levels charge after charge at them. They are liars (33, 35), drunkards (33), hypocrites, who by day assume an austere demeanor^ (34: oi yed* nu£pav yfcv coxuOpuxdxaoiv ' xat AaxuvCCeiv The depositions in 36 attest to the latter accusations. The rhetorical question (37) fixes the jurors* attention on the fact that such men would not scruple to swear falsely on a mere scrap of paper (YpawyaTCifiCtj)). The contrast of this diminutive with the enormity (xooauTns xal xotadxns) of their crimes is effective. Ariston heaps up words of denunciation to characterize their evil deeds (37: qpiAaxexSnPOOUvns xal xovnpCas xal avai6eCas xal uSpeus) and concludes the invective ^For an example of a "sullen face" as a mark of misanthropy, rather than sobriety, cf. Dem. XLV 6 8 ; for the general idea, cf. Isaeus V 11. Sandys, II, 220 cites further references to the Spartan severity in dress and manners. 105 with a sweeping (but unsubstantiated) condemnation (37: xat t o O t u v ctcp' early JtexpaYP^va to<3tois fieivdrepa). Especially noteworthy during this character-assassinatlon Is the Imaginary dialogue, Intro duced by the sarcastic xat ratha t o Aaynpot xat veavixd e o n v aOruv, which contains the witnesses' rebuttal. Six rhetorical questions, coupled with answers, Impart liveliness and rapidity to this dialogue. In order to lend support to his own witness testimony, Ariston reminds the jury of the surgeons' depositions. However, this is really without value (despite his triumphal tone) because no one has disputed the fact that he was injured. Indeed, these injuries are included in Conon's testimony (35). Thus, despite this vicious' attack on the witnesses themselves, he still has not been able to discredit their actual testimony. Finally, Ariston shifts his attention to Conon (38-40) in an attempt to nullify the climax of the defendant's expected speech, viz., an oath he will swear on the heads of his children* and various other strange imprecations. The plaintiff almost seems embarrassed to recount the impious deeds of Conon and his friends and is careful to note that he does not have personal knowledge of such sacrileges (38: axotfw, (paoC, axnxodSs tis 6auydoas antfYYeXXcv nyiv; 39: n£ituayai Y&p ££ av&rxns. axotiw). At times his tone toward the jury is 3-The practice of exciting the compassion of the jury by bringing children into court is common, but in this case a more sensational effect is to be produced by Conon's laying his hands on his children's heads and praying that dreadful curses may come upon them, if he is lying. Cf. Dem. XXI 99 and Hyperides III 41. For a parody of the custom, cf. Aristophanes Wasps 568-74. 106 condescending; at times It Is filled with flattery (38: oi . . . • 8£At i o t o i xat nxiox* av aixoC t i Conon's contempt (x/jv . . . oAiywpCav) for sacred things began when he was a boy. At that time, he and his disreputable friends (two are named) belonged to a club called the "Triballi."* The members held 2 sacrilegious feasts at which they devoured the "feast of Hecate" and 3 the testicles of the pigs slain for sacrifice at the opening of the ecdesia. Perjury meant nothing to them. The purpose of this "mud-slinging" technique becomes clear in AO. Naturally, an oath by such a person is worthless. After discrediting Conon's oath, Ariston proceeds to describe the character of someone who has a solemn regard for sacred obligations and is cautious in taking oaths. To be sure such an individual is more trustworthy than one who is willing to take any oath at all. The characters contrasted are those of Ariston and Conon, but this is only implied until he comes to the next sentence (AO: eyu xoCvuv o 6 ixac6 xcpdv oou moxeuBets &v xaxil xdvx’, u> Kdvuv, nOflno' opdoai xauxC)- The apostrophe (in fact the only one in this ^One wonders if the jury would actually hold Conon accountable for his actions some thirty-five years before. For the Triballi, cf. Appendix and Isocrates Panathenaicus 227. Aristocrates is probably the person condemned in Dem. XXXVIII 27: xQv atoxpwv c a n . . . x& pfev ovxa xaxeodCovxas xat napoivoOvxas pex* 'Apioxoxpdxous. . . . Bacchios was condemned to death in the same court. At the time of the new moon portions of victims which had served for purification were set out for her at the cross roads. The food was sometimes eaten by the poor, but for others to do so was an act of impiety. Cf. Arist. Plutus 59A-97; Athenaeus VII 325. 3 These were used in a purification ceremony. Cf. Aeschines I 23; Schol. on Arist. Achamlans AA; Harpocration: xaddpoiov. 107 oration) Is like a defiance flung In Conon's face. Moreover, Conon takes oaths for an evil purpose, but Ariston, in the interest of truth. Ariston subtly gets the content of his customary oath before the jury twice— by asking the clerk to read the challenge^- and by swearing it again in 41. However, despite his "rhetoric" to the contrary, it is clear that his oath and that of the defendant are 2 the same in essence. That is why he had to resort to such a vicious attack against Conon to win the jury to his side. The brief recapitulation (supported by the oath) begins the epilogue (41-44) containing the conventional appeals to the jury's pity and sense of decency. Ariston concludes the oath in the usual, manner by asking for many blessings if he is telling the truth; the opposite, if he is lying. However, his confident, aAA* oux emopxuj, followed by the indignant, ou6 ’ av Kdvuiv fiiappayi), shows how self- assured he really is. He begs the jurors to feel the same resentment toward Conon that he does and warns that even in this private suit, public interests are at stake (42-43). They are exhorted to hate the "bold and reckless . . . and those caring nothing for reputation or ^Slnce Conon refused the challenge, Ariston would be able to point to this refusal as an argument in his favor, just as Conon would be able to capitalize on the fact that Ariston refused the challenge to torture his slaves (27). For the importance that oaths played in Attic oratory, cf. Bonner and Smith, II, pp. 148ff. Cf. Antiphon V 11 for the customary formula, xat’ e£u»AeCas auroO xat xat otxfas; Lysias II 10 substitutes t o i s naioCv for yfvos; also cf. Dem. XXIV 151. Actually Conon's oath was not that "uncustomary." In fact Demosthenes' mother and witnesses employed it four times in one speech. Cf. Dem. XXIX 26, 33, 54, 56. 108 character or anything else."*- The ludicrous picture of Conon as he 2 tearfully begs the jury for mercy adds a slight touch of humor to the 3 conclusion. Moreover, Conon's guilt Is already assumed as fact (43). Therefore, It Is to the Interests of all the jurors that such a scoundrel be convicted; for otherwise, the whole Athenian law system will be undermined (43: av y£v oupufixe, eoovxai koAAoC, e&v 61 xoXdcnxe, eAdxxous). Ariston just briefly mentions his own services to the state,^ while accusing Conon's family of a lack of such service. The speech Is concluded simply and quietly"* but not without first reminding the jurors that no matter how worthless they might think Ariston and his family are, that Is no reason why they should be assaulted and brutally outraged, ou xunxnxfoi, ou6 ' u(3piox£oi 6 fjuou eoyfv. The Conon has always been regarded, both by the Greeks themselves and by modern critics,** as a model of all that a speech of this kind ^It is noteworthy that one of the characteristics of Ariston's ethos is his overly keen sense of his own respectability. For other examples of men "weeping for mercy," cf. Dem. XXX 32, Cxexetiuiv . . . 6 ■*For the closing formula, cf. Dem. XXXVI, XXXVIII; Isaeus VII, VIII. 6Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus Dem. 11-13; Hermogenes, supra, p. 8 8 , n. 1; Sandys, II, lxiv who states that the orator Deinarchus is said to have plagiarized from it; Blass, III, 402f., Schaefer, III B, 109 should be. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dem. 12) quotes the vivid narrative (3-9) and says it is equal to Lysias, "in conciseness and terseness, in unadorned simplicity and in truthfulness of detail." He also (Ibid. 13) praises its ethopolia, winning persuasiveness, and charming grace (. . . mdavS xat ev ndei XeYfipevd tivi xat t 6 itpfuov . . . (puXdtTOVTa; nSovfjs • • • xat net Sous xat xopfrwv). Ariston comes across as an overly respectable prude of incorruptible integrity, lacking in a sense of humor, anxious to seem calm but not completely able to repress his indignation. Indeed, he seems staid and stuffy in contrast to the flippant and fun-loving Conon (a case of the "generation gap" in reverse). There is a timeless quality about the speech that gives it a universal appeal. Street brawls in the Athens of Demosthenes' day were not much different from those of today. With regard to the actual case, it was not very serious; even the assault was not extraordinary. Actually, there was really only one point essential to the proof: that Conon struck the first blow and was not acting in self-defense. This Ariston fails to prove. Indeed, his witness testimony, dealt with all too briefly, is without significance. He never calls the key witness, Phanostratos, whose testimony no doubt would have gone against him. The fact that he devotes the greater part of the speech to a refutation of Conon's defense, instead of 251f.; Pickard-Cambridge, pp. 32-33; E.S. Forster, "Guilty or Not Guilty? Four Athenian Trials," Greece and Rome, XII (1943), 26; S.H. Butcher, Demosthenes (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1882), p. 134. For a detailed discussion of the artistic merits of this speech, cf. George Perrot, "DSmosth&ne et ses contemporains," Revue des Deux Mondes, 2nd Per., CV (1873), 946-53. 110 providing a more complete explanation of his own position, is another weak point. On the other hand, Demosthenes knew that Conon would ridicule his client's story. Therefore, by anticipating it, he hoped to make it less effective. The way in which he exploits Conon's part in the fracas, while minimizing the part that Ctesias played, is masterful. To be sure Ariston's opponents were also at fault. They I provide biased witnesses. No doubt they tried to capitalize on the fact that Ariston refused the challenge to submit the slaves to torture. Be that as it may, the speech has no equal for the vivid pictures of camp life, street fights, and club rivalries- in fourth- century Athens. Demosthenes' effective use of persuasive^ techniques, especially ethopoiia and character-assassination, certainly must have been influential in convincing the jury of Ariston's innocence. *Cf. infra, p.119 for the use of narrative as a persuasive technique in this speech. CONCLUSION Adams' criticism of Demosthenes' ability to employ the techniques of ethopoiia successfully may now be reconsidered. The first thing that our studies have shown is that Demosthenes not only could but did create characters who act and speak according to their own ethos. The low-keyed plaintiff in the Spudias, rustic and frank defendant in the Callicles, indignant Euxitheus, and overly respectable Ariston speak to us as vividly as Lysias' patriotic Mantitheus (XVI), lowly born Euphiletus (I) or affected cripple (XXIV).* To be sure, the attention given to the political speeches of Demosthenes has eclipsed this Lysianic quality of his work as a logographer. This is under standable when one considers the superior achievement of Demosthenes in his political speeches and also the fact that Lysias wrote primarily forensic speeches. Secondly, a study of Demosthenes' private speeches shows that he possessed an expert knowledge of law. He knew where the law would support him and where it would not. This is especially shown in the Conon where he has Ariston bring Conon into court on the lesser charge, 6 Cxn oixeCas, rather than on a 6 Cxn u8pews. And yet he never gets bogged down in legal details in his private speeches as he does in the earlier forensic speech of a public nature, Against Aristocrates. where he launches into an exhaustive study of the *For a discussion of Lysias' use of ethopoiia, cf. DeVries, pp. 9-48. 112 homicide laws.^ This delicate balance between law and rhetorical techniques leads to a third conclusion, that in addition to providing an intimate picture of Athenian life in the fourth century B.C., the private speeches of Demosthenes have a literary and aesthetic quality in their own right. One has only to compare Demosthenes LVII with Isaeus XII to see how far Demosthenes has advanced over the plainness of his former teacher. Both speeches deal with the problem of disfran chisement brought about after the Decree of Demophilus in 346 B.C. Isaeus* speech is found in a fragment quoted by Dionysius of 2 Halicarnassus (Isaeus 17). Euphlletus, the appellant, had been struck off the list of his deme on the grounds that he was not a citizen. His half-brother acted as advocate. In the sections preserved, he attempts to confirm the witness testimony previously presented (1-9), insists on the readiness of relatives to swear to the paternity of Euphlletus (9, 10) and lastly, (11, 12) points out that two arbitrators have heard the case and that both have passed sentence against the deme. Possibly another piece of narrative followed. The fragment then ends with a formula of transition. In contrast to the Demosthenic speech, there is no vivid narrative concerning the shifty manner in which the voting in the deme took place, no appeals to pathos such as Euxitheus' story about his mother being forced by poverty to sell ribbons in the market-place ^Dem. XXIII 66-82. 2 For a discussion of this speech, cf. Wyse, Speeches. pp. 714-17. 113 and nurse other children, and no brilliant Imaginary dialogue providing a climax to the speech. What is a straightforward, factual account in Isaeus becomes an emotionally charged drama in the hands of Demosthenes.^* This is not to say that Demosthenes is not indebted to his master, for Isaeus' expertise in inheritance cases was invalu able in enabling Demosthenes to win his guardianship suits. Further, scholars are agreed that Demosthenes resembles Isaeus in the arrangement of his subject matter so as to produce the greatest effect, in his love of systematic and exhaustive proof, and in his method 2 of grappling (rb evayuviov) with his opponent. There are examples of the latter technique in the Isaean fragment quoted in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Isae. 12, and the third Olynthiac, secs. 34-35. Another peculiarity of Isaeus adopted by Demosthenes in his early speeches was the inclusion of arguments in the epilogue instead of 3 the customary appeals to pity. For an excellent discussion of the literary and dramatic qualities of Demosthenes' private speeches, cf. Bruna Veneroni, "Demosthbnes Logographe," REG, LXXIX (1966), 640-54. Werner Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), p. 35, points out that the published forensic speeches provided a wholly new type of light dramatic literature. These were as popular with the Athenians as the news paper and magazine reports of trials are today. 2 Dionys. Hal. Isaeus 20 says that the oratorical power of Demosthenes took its seeds and its beginnings from Isaeus— ta ordpyaTa not Tbs apx^S* For a comparison between the styles of Isaeus and Demosthenes, cf. R.C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, II (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1893), 304-10. See further, Butcher, p. 29 and Isaeus, Loeb Classical Library (New York, 1927), p. xii. 3Cf. Isaeus VI 62-65; Dem. XXX 37-39; XXXI 10-14. 114 A fourth conclusion Is that Demosthenes' work as a logographer had a considerable Influence on the great political speeches of his later years.^ The success of his earliest speeches against his guardians was a stimulus to his later work in the courts, and even at 2 this early date signs of his future genius can be seen. The rigorous 3 training program he embarked on in an effort to overcome his physical handicaps and the years of solitary study spent in preparation for his speeches against his guardians are indicative of the tenacity of purpose and indomitable courage that were to be so characteristic of his later career. However, he still had a long way to go before 4 becoming Athens' greatest orator; and Plutarch says that his early speeches before the assembly were criticized for "smelling of the lampwick." Nevertheless, this love of study, acquired early, coupled with his zeal for perfection, are, perhaps, the chief reasons why he continued his work as a logographer even after he began to speak before the assembly.^ Thus, one side of his career acted as a stimulus to the other. In fact, critics agree that the early speeches of *The exact interrelationship of these two sides of Demosthenes' career is difficult to assess because: (1 ) the impassioned rhetoric of the political speeches was out of place in the law courts; (2 ) Demosthenes as a logographer skillfully concealed his own personality. ^For a favorable evaluation of the guardianship speeches, cf. G. Kennedy, pp. 209-12. Veneroni, pp. 641-42, discusses the tender ness and pathos of the scenes in which Demosthenes speaks of his own mother and father; cf. XXVIII 15, 21. 3 Cf. Plutarch Demosthenes 3-11. Jaeger, The Origin, p. 31, mentions autodidacticism as characteristic of Demosthenes. ^Dem. 8 : eXXoxvCwv ecpnoev oceiv ^Aside from the obvious financial reason. 115 Demosthenes In the assembly lack the £orce and clarity of his later more famous speeches, and further, that the three earliest of them, (XIV, XV, XVI), are Inferior in persuasive power to the forensic speeches, public and private, during the same period (355-351 B.C.)* Indeed his first real success in the assembly does not come until the first Philippic (350 B.C.)* where there is evidence of a difference in rhetorical techniques, more in keeping with his early forensic 2 speeches rather than with his speeches before the assembly. Specifically these techniques concern the tone of the prooemium, the arrangement of narrative and argument, and the use of the narrative 3 itself as a means of persuasion. As previously shown, it was customary for the speaker in a court case to adopt an apologetic tone at the beginning and to make it clear that he was not a professional \ litigant. This was done in order to win the good will of his audience before attempting to explain and persuade. In direct contrast l Demosthenes' earliest speeches before the assembly lack this apologetic quality. The speech On the Symmories (XIV) opens with a criticism of other orators, followed by Demosthenes' own proposals, offered in an almost arrogant fashion. The same critical tone is present in For *Cf. J.R. Ellis, "The Date of Demosthenes' First Philippic," REG, LXXIX (1966), 639. 2 This is the thesis of Lionel Pearson, whom I am following closely here. Cf. his excellent article, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," Phoenix, XVIII (1964), 95-109. 3 Supra, p. 14. ^Thls may have been a deliberate attempt on the part of Demosthenes to get away from the format of the courts. Cf. Pearson, p. 100. the Liberty of the Rhodians (XV); and in For the Megalopolitans (XVI) one £inds, "All the same, if that is to be my fate, I will choose rather to be charged with talking nonsense than allow you to be misled by certain speakers contrary to what I judge to be best for the city." With the first Philippic, however, there is a return to the modest tone,^ characteristic of the courts: If the question before us were a new one, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had delivered their opinions, and if satisfied with any of their proposals, I should have remained silent, but if not satisfied, I should then have tried to express my own views. Since, however, it is our fortune to be still debating a point on which they have often spoken before, I can safely claim your indulgence if I am the first to rise and address you. For if in the past their advice had been sound, there would be no need for delib eration today. Once he has established rapport with the assembly, he then proceeds to explain the political situation. Secondly, he does not offer any solution until, as in a forensic speech, narrative and argument have paved the way. This arrangement of narrative, argument, and solution is the second technique that Demosthenes adopted from his court speeches. It is the kind of thing that he did so well in the speech Against Callicles (LV 2) when he begged the jury to listen in order to learn from the facts themselves. This plea was immediately followed by the picturesque narrative in section 3: "My father built the wall around this land almost before I was born . . .;" this in turn was ^Demosthenes did not follow this rule rigidly as the opening of the third Philippic shows. However, his art was so developed by this time that the impression of the whole speech was narrative, and this, in itself, would win the favor of the assembly. 117 followed by the proofs. In contrast to this, In XIV 3, he anticipated the final conclusion before any narrative and argument, "I think that we must beware of taking the initiative on our own, but make due preparations. This must be the basis of our policy." As Pearson^ points out, Demosthenes has not yet learned that if a political speech is to be effective, it must, no less than a forensic speech, contain some description of the situation or the problem that calls for a solution. By the time of the first Philippic, the order is changed to narrative, argument, and then solution. The people are first shown the advantages of adopting the right attitude against Philip and of accepting personal responsibility; then come? the conclusion: the Athenians can and must build an army. This skill in arrangement,learned early in his forensic career, is one of the keys to the greatness of the De Corona. There his adroit use of narrative and argument enabled him to change the order of argument requested by Aeschines in the first speech. In this way he put off handling the weak arguments concerning the technical charges until after he had gained the assembly's sympathy. Then, after dealing with these only briefly, he launched into a strong attack 2 against Aeschines. As Kennedy points out, "... what Aeschines wished to be the main issue of the trial becomes a kind of overlooked ^Cf. Pearson, p. 104. 2 G. Kennedy, p. 231. The cleverness with which Demosthenes handles this dilemma has long been recognized. Cf. Demosthenes On the Crown, ed. W.W. Goodwin (Cambridge: University Press, 1904), p. 239, and Demosthenes' On the Crown, ed. J.J. Murphy, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 164. 118 valley of detail, lost between the enormous cliffs of Demosthenes' statesmanship and Aeschines' crimes." Libanius points out this skillful technique in his Hypothesis, section 6 : o 6£ pnxuip xat and ThS noAtxeCas xrjv apx?lv exotfiaaxo xat xdliv eis xatfxqv t 6v Adyov xax£oxpe The third technique Demosthenes adopted from his forensic speeches was the use of narrative itself as a means of persuasion. Demosthenes realized, even early in his career, that popular methods were necessary for the mob jury of an Athenian court. Long trains of argument were beyond them.^ The ecclesia, no less than the jury, was composed of mixed elements; not all were clever; the majority were 2 farmers, merchants, and artisans. Therefore, after his less success- 3 ful attempts in the assembly, Demosthenes begins to employ the technique of vivid narrative in his political speeches. Indeed the main body of the third Philippic is a narrative consisting of a rapid enumeration of Philip's aggressive behavior, coupled with historical examples, followed, at the conclusion, by Demosthenes' call to arms ^"Let any one examine the kind of topics upon which those orators dwell, and he will be convinced that close reasoning was not their object. ..." Henry Lord Brougham, Works VII (Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1872), 50. 2 Cf. Dionys. Hal. Dem. 15. 3 Plutarch Dem. 6 : "And yet when he first addressed the people he was Interrupted by their clamours and laughed at for his inexperience, since his discourse seemed to them confused by long periods and too harshly and immoderately tortured by formal arguments." 119 and proposal to form a national league. The highest point In the development of this technique Is reached In the famous description of the panic in Athens when the news of the seizure of Elatea arrived, and of the meeting of the Assembly which was suddenly called to con sider the alarming situation: ’Eondpa pfcv ydip fiv, fae 6 * ayy^XXuv tis us toOs Kpuxdveis us ’EXdieta xaxeCXniftaiThe tension of the scene is conveyed by a cinematographic sequence depicting what happened from the time the news was first heard until the meeting of the assembly: evening, the messenger's report of the disaster, the interrupted meal of the prytanes, preparations, city-wide confusion, the hastily convened assembly, the long silence and tragic pause until 2 Demosthenes rose and gave his counsel. This is Demosthenic art at its greatest and one is reminded of the less exalted but no less artistic narrative in the Conon (3-8): garrison duty at Panactum, carousing soldiers, smoky fires, scurrilous abuse of slaves, brawl in camp, the blow-by-blow street fight some time later, unseemly 3 behavior of Conon until some kindly "passers-by" brought help. Just as the De Corona is the greatest of Demosthenes' political speeches, so too the Conon is the greatest of his private speeches. He has come a long way from the school form of the Against Spudias and one is *Cf. De Corona 169ff. 2 Cf. G. Kennedy's appreciation of this dramatic narrative, pp. 234-35. 3 The seeds of New Comedy can be seen here, especially in the vivid pictures of cooking, abuse of slaves, and drunken soldiers. Veneroni, p. 648, develops this point further and cites examples from Menander's Dyscolos, Plautus' Menaechmi, and Terence's Adelphoe. 120 not surprised to find in the Conon a compendium of his best rhetorical techniques. Writing a speech is a technical and artistic challenge. Whether it be for a jury or a public assembly the end is the same: to convince the hearer. The foregoing studies have demonstrated Demosthenes' art and techniques in a side of his career that up to this time has often been overlooked, that is, as a writer of private forensic speeches. APPENDIX ON THE DATE OF. THE CONON From sec. 3 it is known that the speech was delivered two years after orders were given at Athens for a military force to go out on garrison duty to Panactum, a fort on the Boeotian frontier. Demosthenes (XIX 326) speaks of such an expedition in 343 B.C. Thus the year of this trial would be 341 B.C. An earlier date (355) was suggested by Schaefer, III B, 251, who believes that there was regular military service on the Boeotian frontier in 357 B.C. The following epigraphical evidence is relevant to the period in question: IG, II2 , 124, 357/6 B.C. IG, II2 , 149, 342 B.C. ,IG, II2 , 230, 357/6 B.C. The dates of the last two inscriptions are those given by G.L. Cawkwell on p. 212, n. 7 of his article, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates," C£, New Series XIII (1963), Part I, pp. 120-38; Part II, pp. 200-13. Part II contains an Appendix "Euboean Affairs 343-340." From Dem. VIII 74 it is known that the Athenians did help the Euboean cities in 557/6 before they returned to the Second Athenian Confederacy which in fact (as IG, II2 , 124 shows) they rejoined separately. n», II2 , 149 concerns an alliance between Athens and the Euboeans. Koehler assigned it to the 350's because of the style of lettering and Arthur M. Woodward in JHS XXVIII (1908), 307 related it 121 122 to the settlement of Euboea In 357 despite the fact that IG, 11^, 124 showed that the Euboean cities made separate alliances. Cawkwell suggests that the inscription records the alliance between Athens and 2 the Euboean League in 342 (not 357) and that conversely IG, II , 230 should be connected with the settlement of 357 when Eretria rejoined the Athenian alliance (cf. 11. 12-16 of IG, 11^, 230 with 11. 4-7 of IG, II , 124). Unfortunately the article and the inscriptions reaffirm what we already know— that there was trouble in the north at both times. However, the later date seems to be dearly confirmed by Sandys (Sandys and Paley, II, lxiii, 242). He points out that Conon and his companions, as boys* belonged to a disorderly club called the Triballi. The name was derived from a lawless Thracian tribe which in 376 B.C. harassed the Thracian coast until the Athenian commander Chabrias forced them to retreat. 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