Abstract: The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty caused significant ratification problems for a series of national governments. The product of a new intergovernmental conference, namely the Amsterdam Treaty, has caused fewer problems, as the successful national ratifications have demonstrated. Employing the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of these successful ratifications. Drawing on datasets covering the positions of the negotiating national governments and the national political parties we highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in all fifteen European Union members states. This analysis allows us to characterize the varying ratification difficulties in each state from a comparative perspective. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestics interests, since member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at Intergovernmental Conferences. 1 Simon Hug, Department of Government ; University of Texas at Austin ; Burdine 564 ; Austin TX 78712-1087; USA; Fax: ++ 1 512 471 1067; Phone: ++ 1 512 232 7273; email:
[email protected] Thomas König, Department of Politics and Management; University of Konstanz; Universitätsstrasse 10; D-78457 Konstanz; Fax: ++ 49 (0) 7531 88-4103; Phone: ++ (0) 7531 88-2611; email:
[email protected]. 2 (First version: August 2, 1999, this version: December 4, 2000) Number of words: 13086 3 An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999.