Freedom in the World Report 2020

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Freedom in the World Report 2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 1 of 16 KosovoFREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2020 56 PARTLY FREE /100 Political Rights 25 Civil Liberties 31 54 Partly Free Global freedom statuses are calculated on a weighted scale. See the methodology. TOP Overview https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 2 of 16 Kosovo holds credible and relatively well-administered elections, but its institutions remain weak, and rampant corruption has given rise to deep public distrust in the government. Journalists face serious pressure, and risk being attacked in connection with their reporting. The rule of law is inhibited by executive interference in the judiciary. Key Developments in 2019 • Kosovo held a snap election in October, after Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned to answer a war crimes tribunal summons in July and the parliament dissolved itself in August. Nationalist party Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) emerged as the two largest parties, and were holding talks on forming a government at year’s end. • In August, the border police allowed visitors from Serbia to travel into Kosovo using identity cards, in line with a European Union (EU)-backed agreement that was originally finalized in 2011. Travelers were previously required to present passports. • In April, the parliament amended a law governing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), allowing foreigners to found NGOs in Kosovo and shortening the registration process for new organizations. Political Rights A. Electoral Process A1 0-4 pts Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? TOP3 Kosovo’s prime minister, who serves as head of government, is indirectly elected for a four-year term by at least a two-thirds majority of the unicameral https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 3 of 16 Assembly. Prime Minister Haradinaj, a former guerrilla fighter and leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), resigned in July 2019 to answer a summons from the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), a tribunal investigating war crimes committed during Kosovo’s 1998–99 war for independence. The parliament dissolved itself in August, and a snap election was held in October. The Central Election Commission (CEC) verified the results, which showed no party winning a majority, in November; talks to form a new government between the top two parties, Vetëvendosje and the LDK, were underway at year’s end. The president, who serves as head of state, is elected to a five-year term by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. President Hashim Thaçi was elected in 2016. A2 0-4 pts Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 3 The unicameral Assembly contains 120 seats and members are elected to four-year terms; 100 are directly elected by proportional representation, while 10 seats are reserved for Serbs and another 10 are reserved for members of other ethnic communities. The October 2019 election was marked by a relatively high turnout of 44.6 percent. Vetëvendosje won 31 seats, the LDK won 30, and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won 25 seats. The AAK and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) won 14 seats in an electoral alliance. The Serb List won 10. Other parties won the remaining 10 seats. While the election was considered credible by local and EU observers, vote-counting issues were noted, along with incidents of voter intimidation in Serb areas. TOP A3 0-4 pts Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented 3 impartially by the relevant election management bodies? https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 4 of 16 The CEC, which administers elections, is generally transparent and fair. The CEC was largely successful in organizing the October 2019 snap election, and was able to provide real-time electoral updates on its website. However, the CEC was unable to fully update voter rolls, which contained some deceased voters. Some postal ballots from voters residing in Serbia did not arrive by mail, as required, but were delivered by Serbian officials instead; the CEC declared over 3,700 ballots invalid for this reason. In addition, 26 CEC officials had allergic reactions after opening ballot envelopes from Serbia; staff wore protective clothing to count the remaining votes. B. Political Pluralism and Participation B1 0-4 pts Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these 3 competing parties or groupings? A proliferation of parties competes in Kosovo. However, political parties sometimes face intimidation and harassment that can negatively impact their ability to operate. The Serb List has been accused of harassing rival parties and creating an environment where voters fear supporting alternatives. In 2018, Oliver Ivanović, a moderate Serb politician in northern Kosovo and leader of the Freedom, Democracy, Justice Party, was assassinated inTOP North Mitrovica. Milan Radoičić, the vice president of the Serb List, was named as a suspect and fled to Serbia to escape prosecution that year. In December https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 5 of 16 2019, prosecutors indicted six individuals in Ivanović’s murder, who were identified only by their initials; three were already in custody. B2 0-4 pts Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 4 Opposition parties have a reasonable chance of gaining power through elections. Vetëvendosje and the LDK appeared to defeat the governing PANA coalition, which included the AAK, PDK, and Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA), in the October 2019 snap election. However, they did not form a government by year’s end. Candidates competing in Serb areas from parties other than the Serb List encountered intimidation during the 2019 election campaign. Three ethnic Serb parties and alliances that competed against the Serb List did not win enough votes to enter the parliament. Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 because two opposition parties won a majority of seats in the October 2019 snap election, demonstrating a lack of political or administrative obstacles for opposition movements. B3 0-4 pts Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that 2 employ extrapolitical means? Serbia continues to exert influence on the platform of the Serb List, as well as the political choices of ethnic Serbs generally. EU election monitors TOPnoted that the Serbian government and Serb List officials explicitly directed ethnic Serbs in Kosovo to vote for the party during the 2019 election campaign. https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 6 of 16 Major political figures in Kosovo, including President Thaçi and former premier Haradinaj, have links to organized crime, which plays a powerful role in politics and influences the positions of key leaders. B4 0-4 pts Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights 2 and electoral opportunities? While several political parties compete for the votes of ethnic Serbs, the population is not fully integrated into the electoral process or Kosovo’s institutions. Seven minority groups are officially recognized and politically represented through parliamentary quotas. Kosovo has the largest participation of women in its parliament among western Balkan countries, thanks to gender quotas enshrined in the constitution. One of Kosovo’s largest parties, the LDK, nominated a woman, Vjosa Osmani, as its prime ministerial candidate in 2019. However, women have historically been underrepresented in politics. Many women in rural areas have been disenfranchised through the practice of family voting, in which the male head of a household casts ballots for the entire family. Kosovar political parties are also legally required to abide by a 50 percent gender quota for their candidate lists, but no party met the requirement in 2019. The LGBT+ community is politically marginalized, and its interests are not represented in Kosovar politics. C. Functioning of Government TOP C1 0-4 pts Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? 2 https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/freedom-world/2020 7/24/2020 Kosovo | Freedom House Page 7 of 16 The lengthy deadlock before the formation of a coalition government in 2017 highlighted the dysfunction and instability that troubles the political system, and Haradinaj lacked influence over cabinet ministers from coalition parties once it was formed. Kosovo was again without a new government at the end of 2019, as the two largest parties were negotiating to form a coalition after the October election. Serbia still maintains influence in northern Kosovo, where Kosovar institutions do not have a strong presence. In recent years, the government has advanced the decentralization process, granting self-rule to Serb enclaves in the southern part of Kosovo; this weakened parallel structures run by the Serbian government in those areas. A 2015 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia laid the groundwork for the Community of Serb Municipalities, a body intended to promote the interests of Serbs, which includes a proposed legislature for the Serb community. The establishment of the community remains at an impasse, however; parties including Vetëvendosje consider it a threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty. Turkey has also exerted influence in Kosovo; it reportedly pressured the government to arrest and extradite six Turkish nationals who taught at local schools linked to the Gulenist movement in 2018.
Recommended publications
  • RESOLVING DISPUTES and BUILDING RELATIONS Challenges of Normalization Between Kosovo and Serbia
    Council CIG for Inclusive Governance RESOLVING DISPUTES AND BUILDING RELATIONS Challenges of Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia Contents 2 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5 SUPPORTING THE BRUSSELS DIALOGUE 16 ESTABLISHING THE ASSOCIATION / COMMUNITY OF SERB-MAJORITY MUNICIPALITIES 24 KOSOVO’S NORTH INTEGRATION AND SERB POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 32 PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION 39 COOPERATION ON EU INTEGRATION 41 PARTICIPANTS Albanian and Serbian translations of this publication are available on CIG’s website at cigonline.net. CIG Resolving Disputes anD BuilDing Relations Challenges of normalization between Kosovo and serbia Council for Inclusive Governance New York, 2015 PrefaCe anD AcknowleDgments Relations between Kosovo and Serbia are difficult. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, all contacts between officials of Kosovo and Serbia ceased. Belgrade rejected any direct interaction with Pristina preferring to deal through the EU Rule of Law Mission and the UN Mission in Kosovo. However, encouraged by the EU and the US, senior officials of both governments met in March 2011 for direct talks in Brussels. These talks were followed in Brussels in October 2012 by a meeting between the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia. These EU-mediated dialogues resulted in a number of agreements between Serbia and Kosovo including the April 2013 Brussels Agreement. The Agreement’s main goal is to conclude the integration of the Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo’s north into Kosovo’s system of laws and governance, including the establishment of the Association/Community of the Serb-Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. The sides also pledged not to block each other’s accession processes into the EU.
    [Show full text]
  • Georgia's 2008 Presidential Election
    Election Observation Report: Georgia’s 2008 Presidential Elections Election Observation Report: Georgia’s saarCevno sadamkvirveblo misiis saboloo angariSi angariSi saboloo misiis sadamkvirveblo saarCevno THE IN T ERN at ION A L REPUBLIC A N INS T I T U T E 2008 wlis 5 ianvari 5 wlis 2008 saqarTvelos saprezidento arCevnebi saprezidento saqarTvelos ADV A NCING DEMOCR A CY WORLD W IDE demokratiis ganviTarebisTvis mTel msoflioSi mTel ganviTarebisTvis demokratiis GEORGI A PRESIDEN T I A L ELEC T ION JA NU A RY 5, 2008 International Republican Institute saerTaSoriso respublikuri instituti respublikuri saerTaSoriso ELEC T ION OBSERV at ION MISSION FIN A L REPOR T Georgia Presidential Election January 5, 2008 Election Observation Mission Final Report The International Republican Institute 1225 Eye Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005 www.iri.org TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 3 II. Pre-Election Period 5 A. Political Situation November 2007 – January 2008 B. Presidential Candidates in the January 5, 2008 Presidential Election C. Campaign Period III. Election Period 11 A. Pre-Election Meetings B. Election Day IV. Findings and Recommendations 15 V. Appendix 19 A. IRI Preliminary Statement on the Georgian Presidential Election B. Election Observation Delegation Members C. IRI in Georgia 2008 Georgia Presidential Election 3 I. Introduction The January 2008 election cycle marked the second presidential election conducted in Georgia since the Rose Revolution. This snap election was called by President Mikheil Saakashvili who made a decision to resign after a violent crackdown on opposition street protests in November 2007. Pursuant to the Georgian Constitution, he relinquished power to Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze who became Acting President.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo: Background and U.S
    Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy Updated March 11, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46175 SUMMARY R46175 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy March 11, 2021 Kosovo, a country in the Western Balkans with a predominantly Albanian-speaking population, declared independence from Serbia in 2008, less than a decade after a brief but lethal war. It has Sarah E. Garding since been recognized by about 100 countries. The United States and most European Union (EU) Analyst in European Affairs member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, China, and various other countries (including five EU member states) do not. Key issues for Kosovo include the following: New Leadership. Albin Kurti is poised to become prime minister for the second time after his left-leaning Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje) won a landslide victory in early parliamentary elections in February 2021. The poll was Kosovo’s second snap parliamentary election in less than two years. Once of the new parliament’s initial responsibilities is to elect the country’s next president. Acting President Vjosa Osmani, whose candidacy is backed by Vetëvendosje, is heavily favored to win. Parliament’s failure to elect a president could trigger early parliamentary elections, however. Dialogue with Serbia. The unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the main threats to regional stability in the Western Balkans. Since 2011, the EU has facilitated a dialogue aimed at normalizing their relations. In July 2020, Kosovo and Serbia returned to EU-led talks after a 20-month suspension. Shortly thereafter, the two parties agreed to new measures on economic cooperation at talks hosted by the White House.
    [Show full text]
  • Print This Article
    Fixing What Ain’t Broke The New Norm of Fixed-Date Elections in Canada GRIFFYN G. CHEZENKO, Memorial University of Newfoundland Abstract. Since 2001, legislation implementing fixed dates for general elections has been passed by the federal government, and most provincial and territorial governments. The notion that general election dates are now fixed, however, is flawed. In my submission to Changing Political Landscapes, I will explore the fledgling norm of fixed date elections in Canada and examine the aspects of the legislation which call into doubt the fixedness of these elections. With a review of the literature on the subject, I begin by inquiring into the emergence of this foreign phenomenon into Canadian electoral politics and the justification for its extensive adoption. Comparing the legislation across jurisdictions, I analyze the basic construct of fixed date election legislation in Canada, survey similarities and differences, and discover how fixed dates for elections are ultimately avoidable. As a result, I find that election dates are not truly fixed in Canadian jurisdictions where fixed date election legislation has been enacted. Introduction Since the dawn of the 21st century, fixed dates for general elections in Canada have become a widely adopted norm. Bernard Lord, the former New Brunswick premier, once opined that folks “like to know when the elections are going to be” (as cited in Desserud, 2007: 204). This is a familiar concept to Canadian voters because we are inundated with information about what goes on with our southern neighbours. It is rather comforting, as Premier Lord knows, knowing when an election will be, and that there is nothing those rascally politicians can do about it.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Parties of Kosovo Serbs in the Political System of Kosovo: from Pluralism to Monism JOVANA RADOSAVLJEVIĆ & BUDIMIR NIČIĆ 3
    1 NEW SOCIALINITIATIVE Political parties of Kosovo Serbs April in the political 2021 system of Kosovo: From pluralism to monism 2 Political parties of Kosovo Serbs in the political system of Kosovo: from pluralism to monism JOVANA RADOSAVLJEVIĆ & BUDIMIR NIČIĆ 3 Characteristics of the open society within Serb community in Kosovo Political Civil society parties of organizations in the Kosovo Serbs in Openness of Serbian Serbian community in the political system media in Kosovo Kosovo – Beteween of Kosovo: From perceptions and pluralism to presentation monism Attitudes of Kosovo Openness of institutions Community Rights in Serbs of security to the citizens of Kosovo Kosovo institutions Analysis of the Kosovo Serbs in the economic situation in dialogue process the Serb-populated areas in Kosovo Research title: Political parties of Kosovo Serbs in the political system of Kosovo: From pluralism to monism Published by: KFOS Prepared by: Nova društvena inicijativa (New Social Initiative) i Medija Centar (Media Center) Authors: Jovana Radosavljević, Budimir Ničić The original writing language of the analysis is Serbian language. Translated by: Biljana Simurdić Design: tedel Printed by (No. of copies): tedel (100) This paper is published within OPEN, a project carried out by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) in cooperation with the organizations Nova društvena inicijativa (New Social Initiative) and Medija Centar (Media Center). Views expressed in this publication are exclusively those of the research authors and are not necessarily the views of KFOS. Year of publishing: 2021 CONTENT 05. WHO ARE 16 03. IMPORTANT PLAYERS AND POLITICAL PARTIES 9 WHAT ARE THEIR OF KOSOVO SERBS, ROLES FROM PLURALISM TO MONISM 01.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia – Was Formed in 1918, One of I
    Introduction When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia – was formed in 1918, one of its most important tasks was to forge a common collective identity. Intellectual elites in the young state with great optimism agreed that education would play a crucial role in this process. It should come as no surprise, then, that a relatively rich tradition of scholarly research into the representation of collective identities in Yugoslav education has originated, precisely to account for the failure of the Yugoslav project in the long term. Recently, a growing body of scholarly research has established textbooks as one of the more rewarding sources for studying collective identity in education, focusing on ‘what knowledge is included and rejected in ... textbooks, and how the transmission of this selected knowledge often attempts to shape a particular form of national memory, national identity and national consciousness’.1 For the Yugoslav case this emerging research field so far has primarily examined textbooks which were used in the period directly preceding, during and following the disintegration of Yugoslavia.2 However, as the present article hopes to illustrate, textbook analysis can also provide the historian with interesting new elements for the study of collective identities in Yugoslavia’s more distant past. With its focus on national identity in Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian textbooks before the First World War, and later also in interwar Yugoslavia, the work of Charles Jelavich still occupies a somewhat
    [Show full text]
  • Election in Greece
    CRS INSIGHT Election in Greece September 14, 2015 (IN10356) | | Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs ([email protected], 7-0220) Fourth Election in Three Years Reflects Ongoing Political Instability Greece will hold a snap legislative election on September 20, only eight months after the country's last election. The new election comes as Greece continues to struggle with the negative repercussions of a sovereign debt and financial crisis that began in 2009. Over the past six years, Greece's economy has contracted by 25% and unemployment has tripled to above 25%. Economic challenges have in turn shaken the political system. This will be Greece's fourth parliamentary election since May 2012. Since 2009, the country has had six different governments (including two caretaker governments). Each has struggled—and three have collapsed—in the face of growing public and political pressure to halt the spending cuts, tax increases, and economic reforms that have been implemented in exchange for financial assistance from other European governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For more information on the Greek debt crisis and the European response, see CRS Report R41167, Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications; and CRS Insight IN10303, Crisis in Greece: Political Implications. Why the Snap Election? Incumbent Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras took office in January 2015 following a campaign in which his far-left Syriza party pledged to reverse austerity measures and secure debt relief from creditors, but remain in the European Union's (EU) common currency, the Eurozone. This position ultimately proved untenable—Greece's creditors insisted that the government continue fiscal and structural reforms in exchange for the financial assistance Greece needed to stay in the Eurozone.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosovo Political Economy Analysis Final Report
    KOSOVO POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT DECEMBER 26, 2017 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International, A Tetra Tech Company. KOSOVO POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT December 26, 2017 IDIQ No. AID-167-I-17-00002 Award No: AID-167-TO-17-00009 Prepared by Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company 200 12th St South, Suite 1200 Arlington, VA, USA 22202 DISCLAIMER This report is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of the Management Systems International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. CONTENTS Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 6 II. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 7 A. Foundational Factors ........................................................................................................................................... 7 B. Rules
    [Show full text]
  • Belgrade and the Remains of the NATO Bombing Drew Adamek Freelance, [email protected]
    Landscapes of Violence Volume 4 Article 6 Number 1 Heritage of Violence November 2016 Zasto: Belgrade and the remains of the NATO bombing Drew Adamek freelance, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov Recommended Citation Adamek, Drew (2016) "Zasto: Belgrade and the remains of the NATO bombing," Landscapes of Violence: Vol. 4 : No. 1 , Article 6. Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol4/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Landscapes of Violence by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Zasto: Belgrade and the remains of the NATO bombing Abstract The 1999 NATO bombings are an omnipresent specter in Belgrade. Nearly seventeen years after the bombings, all the buildings in the city center hit by air strikes still stand as stark daily reminders of the injury Serbs feel. Keywords Belgrade, nato, RTS, bombing, memorial, serbs Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License Author Biography Drew is a writer and researcher with a background in public corruption investigative journalism, feature writing, and television production. Drew lives in Belgrade, Serbia and is the managing editor of Belgrade Insight, a publication of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network. This article is available in Landscapes of Violence: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol4/iss1/6 Adamek: Zasto: Belgrade and the remains of the NATO bombing The 1999 NATO bombings are an omnipresent specter in Belgrade.
    [Show full text]
  • Teacher Information Sheet Genocide in Bosnia
    Teacher information sheet Genocide in Bosnia The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (referred to as ‘Bosnia’ here) consists of: • Bosniaks – Bosnian Muslims • Bosnian Serbs – Serb Orthodox Christians who have close cultural ties with neighbouring Serbia • Bosnian Croats – Roman Catholics who have close cultural ties with neighbouring Croatia Bosnia’s history Flag of Bosnia, adopted in 1998 Between 1991-1994 Yugoslavia disintegrated into five states – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later known as Serbia and Montenegro). Bosnia declared independence in 1992. This was resisted by the Bosnian Serb population who saw their future as part of ‘Greater Serbia’, sparking a civil war over land. The Bosnian War Bosnia became the victim of the Bosnian Serbs’ wish for political domination, which they were prepared to achieve by isolating ethnic groups and, if necessary, exterminating them. A campaign of war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide was perpetrated by Bosnian Serb troops under the orders of Slobodan Milošević. Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia, was under siege for nearly four years - the longest siege in modern warfare. The Serb-controlled army surrounded the city, bombing it, killing more than 10,000 people and destroying cultural monuments. Persecution From 1991, in Prijedor, north-west Bosnia, non-Serbs were forced to wear white armbands and certain newspapers, radio stations and television stations began to broadcast anti-Croat and anti- Bosniak propaganda. Non-Serbs were sent to concentration camps which had been set up in mid-1992. Women were taken to Trnopolje camp where systematic rape took place on a regular basis.
    [Show full text]
  • Rule of Law Programme South East Europe July 2021
    Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e.V. Rule of Law Programme South East Europe July 2021 www.kas.de/rlpsee Rule of Law - South East Europe Press Review July 2021 Disclaimer: This Press Review is issued for general information purpose only and is based on open media sources and those available through subscription. Articles selected for this review are shortened from the original or are reproduced as originally published. Inclusion of articles in this Press Review does not imply accuracy of the content or endorsement by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e.V. (KAS) or its regional programme “KAS Rule of Law Programme South East Europe” Content • Albania ...................................................................................................................... 3 Court Repeals Law Article Granting Government Unchecked Surveillance Powers3 160 Citizens File Complaint Against Albania’s Ruling Party for Missuse of Personal Data .................................................................................................................................. 4 EU Gives Another EUR 9 Million for Albanian Justice Reform .................................... 6 • Bosnia and Herzegovina .......................................................................................... 7 Outgoing High Representative Inzko introduces legal amendments sanctioning genocide denial ............................................................................................................... 7 Bosnia Chief Prosecutor Gordana Tadić Axed for ‘Negligence’ .................................
    [Show full text]
  • Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining Challenges
    SETTING KOSOVO FREE: REMAINING CHALLENGES Europe Report N°218 – 10 September 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SERBS AND THE AHTISAARI PLAN .......................................................................... 4 A. SERBS IN CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................................ 4 B. SERBS IN POLITICAL PARTIES ....................................................................................................... 7 C. SERB CULTURE AND MEDIA ......................................................................................................... 8 1. Cultural and religious heritage ..................................................................................................... 8 2. Television ..................................................................................................................................... 9 III. DECENTRALISATION AND THE SOUTHERN SERBS ......................................... 11 A. DECENTRALISATION THROUGHOUT KOSOVO ............................................................................. 11 B. MINORITY MUNICIPALITIES ....................................................................................................... 13 1. A success story in Gračanica ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]