DOCSLIB.ORG

Qualified Website Authentication Certificates Promoting Consumer Trust in the Website Authentication Market

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Qualified Website Authentication Certificates Promoting Consumer Trust in the Website Authentication Market Qualified Website Authentication Certificates Promoting consumer trust in the website authentication market DECEMBER 2015 www.enisa.europa.eu European Union Agency For Network And Information Security Qualified Website Authentication Certificates December 2015 About ENISA The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA seeks to enhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting the development of cross-border communities committed to improving network and information security throughout the EU. More information about ENISA and its work can be found at www.enisa.europa.eu. Author(s) This report was elaborated by a group of experts: Arno Fiedler (Nimbus Technologieberatung), Jon Shamah (EJ Consultants), Inigo Barreira (Izenpe), Wanko Clemens (TÜViT), Arthur Miękina (PWPW), Slawomir Gorniak (ENISA), Clara Galan Manso (ENISA). Editor(s) European Union Agency for Network and Information Security ENISA responsible officer: Clara Galan Manso. For contacting the authors please use [email protected]. For media enquiries about this paper, please use [email protected]. Acknowledgements We would like to express our gratitude to the following individuals for providing valuable comments as external reviewers of the report: Marco Fernandez Gonzalez (European Commission), Ben Wilson (Digicert), Lionel Antunes (Centre des technologies de l’information de l’État, Luxembourg), Marcin Fijalkowski (Ministry of Economy, Poland), Herbert Leitold (Secure Information Technology Centre, Austria) and Tanel Kuusk (Certification Centre, Estonia). Acknowledgement should also be given to ENISA colleagues who helped in this project, in particular: Prokopios Drogkaris and Evangelos Rekleitis. 02 Qualified Website Authentication Certificates December 2015 Legal notice Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the authors and editors, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a legal action of ENISA or the ENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the Regulation (EU) No 526/2013. This publication does not necessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the external sources including external websites referenced in this publication. This publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge. Neither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this publication. Copyright Notice © European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 2015 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. ISBN 978-92-9204-152-6, DOI 10.2824/464966 03 Qualified Website Authentication Certificates December 2015 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 1. WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES .......................................................................................................... 11 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MARKET FOR WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES .......................................................................... 12 EXISTING TYPES OF WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES IN THE MARKET ........................................................................... 14 EXISTING INDUSTRY LED HARMONIZATION ACTIVITIES ......................................................................................................... 16 2. TRUST SERVICES IN THE EIDAS REGULATION ....................................................................................................... 17 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 17 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TRUST SERVICE PROVIDERS ................................................................................................... 19 REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED TRUST SERVICE PROVIDERS ................................................................................................. 20 3. QUALIFIED WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES ........................................................................................ 22 QWAC CERTIFICATES IN THE EIDAS REGULATION ............................................................................................................ 22 QWAC CERTIFICATES IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING TYPES OF CERTIFICATES ............................................................................. 23 4. THE CURRENT MARKET OF WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES................................................................ 26 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 26 NOTEWORTHY MARKET FEATURES ................................................................................................................................ 26 RISKS AND BARRIERS WITHIN THE MARKET ...................................................................................................................... 29 OUTLOOK ON HOW TO HANDLE RISKS AND OVERCOME BARRIERS .......................................................................................... 31 5. THE MARKET OF QUALIFIED PROVIDERS ............................................................................................................. 32 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 32 PRESENCE IN THE WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION MARKET ........................................................................................................ 33 6. SWOT ANALYSIS FOR THE INTRODUCTION IN THE MARKET OF QWAC CERTIFICATES ......................................... 35 ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHS & OPPORTUNITIES .................................................................................................................... 37 6.1.1 Strengths ............................................................................................................................................................. 37 6.1.2 Opportunities ...................................................................................................................................................... 38 ANALYSIS OF WEAKNESSES & THREATS ........................................................................................................................... 39 6.2.1 Weaknesses ......................................................................................................................................................... 39 6.2.2 Threats ................................................................................................................................................................ 40 7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL INTRODUCTION IN THE MARKET OF QUALIFIED WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATES ................................................................................................................................. 42 7.1.1 Short-term Strategies .......................................................................................................................................... 43 7.1.2 Medium-term Strategies ...................................................................................................................................... 46 7.1.3 Long-term Strategy .............................................................................................................................................. 49 ANNEX A: ANALYSIS OF THE WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE MARKET .......................................................... 50 SIZE OF THE GLOBAL WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE MARKET .................................................................................... 50 DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARKET BASED ON TYPES OF CERTIFICATES ......................................................................................... 51 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION ........................................................................................................................................ 53 04 Qualified Website Authentication Certificates December 2015 List of tables Table 1 Requirements in the eIDAS Regulation for QTPs and non-QTSPs ............................................................ 20 Table 2 Current approx. (2015) SSL/TLS market leaders ..................................................................................... 27 Table 3 Distribution of active TSPs in the Trusted List issuing qualified certificates per MS ................................. 32 Table 4 Internet-wide scan results on port 443, collection of website authentication
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Certified Malware: Measuring Breaches of Trust in the Windows Code-Signing PKI
    Certified Malware: Measuring Breaches of Trust in the Windows Code-Signing PKI Doowon Kim Bum Jun Kwon Tudor Dumitras, University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Maryland College Park, MD College Park, MD College Park, MD [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT To establish trust in third-party software, we currently rely on Digitally signed malware can bypass system protection mechanisms the code-signing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This infrastruc- that install or launch only programs with valid signatures. It can ture includes Certification Authorities (CAs) that issue certificates also evade anti-virus programs, which often forego scanning signed to software publishers, vouching for their identity. Publishers use binaries. Known from advanced threats such as Stuxnet and Flame, these certificates to sign the software they release, and users rely this type of abuse has not been measured systematically in the on these signatures to decide which software packages to trust broader malware landscape. In particular, the methods, effective- (rather than maintaining a list of trusted packages). If adversaries ness window, and security implications of code-signing PKI abuse can compromise code signing certificates, this has severe impli- are not well understood. We propose a threat model that highlights cations for end-host security. Signed malware can bypass system three types of weaknesses in the code-signing PKI. We overcome protection mechanisms that install or launch only programs with challenges specific to code-signing measurements by introducing valid signatures, and it can evade anti-virus programs, which often techniques for prioritizing the collection of code-signing certificates neglect to scan signed binaries.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Cryptography
    Mag. iur. Dr. techn. Michael Sonntag Introduction to Cryptography Institute of Networks and Security Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria E-Mail: [email protected] Thanks to Rudolf Hörmanseder for some slides (esp. drawings!) Why cryptography? Security is a very important aspect, especially if money (or equivalents) are affected by transactions Not every information should be available to everyone Note: Data is sent in the Internet over numerous "open systems", where anyone can listen it! Security is needed! The technical aspect of security is cryptography Encrypting data against disclosure and modifications Signing data against modifications and repudiation Note: Cryptography does not solve all security problems! Example: Communication analysis (who talks to whom when) Other aspects of security are also needed » E.g.: Do you know what your employees actually do with data? Solutions: DRM, deactivation codes, anonymizers, … Michael Sonntag Introduction to Cryptography 2 Application areas Storing data in encrypted form Even access will not lead to disclosure (stolen laptops!) Example: File/-system encryption, password storage Transmitting data securely Enc. transmission prevents eavesdropping and tampering Example: TLS Identifying your partner Preventing man-in-the-middle attacks Example: TLS with uni-/bidirectional certificates Proof of identity & authority Avoiding impersonation Example: GPG E-Mail signatures, digital signatures (Austria: "Bürgerkarte“ – “citizen card”) Michael Sonntag Introduction to
    [Show full text]
  • Trustedx Eidas Platform Remote Signing for Individuals
    TrustedX eIDAS Platform Remote signing for individuals eIDAS-compliant digital signatures from any device TrustedX eIDAS is an on-premises solution for the deployment of a legally-compliant cloud-based signing service, easily accessible through a Web API. Signing keys are centrally protected within an HSM, and document signatures are approved remotely by users from their device, without the need for a hardware or software token. BENEFITS Provide advanced and qualified signatures as defined by eIDAS TrustedX eIDAS performs signing operations on a Qualified Signature Creation Device (QSCD). When managed by a Qualified Trust Service Provider (QTSP) issuing qualified digital signing certificates, the service can provide advanced and qualified signatures compliant with the eIDAS regulation. Globally accepted signing standards TrustedX eIDAS is based on the ETSI and CEN standards, which guarantee a very high level of trust and broad interoperability with the industry products that require digital signatures, regardless of whether your organization operates in Europe or not. Remove the key management burden from your users The TrustedX eIDAS service was built with user experience in mind. The onboarding and signing process is transparent, does not require specific knowledge, and can be done from any device. The signing service operates in your premises with keys securely stored in an HSM, and users authorize each signature request from their computer or device. Ensure adequate authentication for each type of digital signature User authentication can be done with your existing service, ensuring that access is managed via an Identity Provider (IdP) that you control. When a signature is required, TrustedX can raise the authentication assurance level by sending an additional challenge such as an SMS/email OTP, or via TrustedX Mobile ID app notifications.
    [Show full text]
  • Measuring Breaches of Trust in the Windows Code-Signing PKI
    Session F5: Understanding Security Fails CCS’17, October 30-November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA Certified Malware: Measuring Breaches of Trust in the Windows Code-Signing PKI Doowon Kim Bum Jun Kwon Tudor Dumitras, University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Maryland College Park, MD College Park, MD College Park, MD [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT To establish trust in third-party software, we currently rely on Digitally signed malware can bypass system protection mechanisms the code-signing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This infrastruc- that install or launch only programs with valid signatures. It can ture includes Certification Authorities (CAs) that issue certificates also evade anti-virus programs, which often forego scanning signed to software publishers, vouching for their identity. Publishers use binaries. Known from advanced threats such as Stuxnet and Flame, these certificates to sign the software they release, and users rely this type of abuse has not been measured systematically in the on these signatures to decide which software packages to trust broader malware landscape. In particular, the methods, effective- (rather than maintaining a list of trusted packages). If adversaries ness window, and security implications of code-signing PKI abuse can compromise code signing certificates, this has severe impli- are not well understood. We propose a threat model that highlights cations for end-host security. Signed malware can bypass system three types of weaknesses in the code-signing PKI. We overcome protection mechanisms that install or launch only programs with challenges specific to code-signing measurements by introducing valid signatures, and it can evade anti-virus programs, which often techniques for prioritizing the collection of code-signing certificates neglect to scan signed binaries.
    [Show full text]
  • A Guide on Eidas 910/2014 Namirial DTM Solution for Legally Compliant E-Signatures
    A guide on eIDAS 910/2014 Namirial DTM solution for legally compliant e-signatures NAMIRIAL GmbH Legal Office: Seilerstätte 16, 1010 Wien, Austria Main Office: Haider Straße 23, 4025 Ansfelden | Phone: +43-7229-88060 | www.xyzmo.com Fiscalnumber 09 258/9720 | VAT-ID: ATU70125036 Table of Contents 1 What is eIDAS? ............................................................................................................. 3 2 Electronic identification .................................................................................................. 3 3 Electronic signatures and seals ..................................................................................... 4 3.1 Advanced Electronic Signature ............................................................................... 4 3.2 Qualified Electronic Signature................................................................................. 5 4 Time stamping ............................................................................................................... 6 5 Electronic registered delivery service ............................................................................ 7 6 Qualified preservation service ....................................................................................... 7 7 Technologies to implement e-signatures ....................................................................... 7 7.1 PAdES Standard ..................................................................................................... 8 7.1.1 Basic Profile (based on ISO 32000-1)
    [Show full text]
  • Security Economics in the HTTPS Value Chain
    Security Economics in the HTTPS Value Chain Hadi Asghari*, Michel J.G. van Eeten*, Axel M. Arnbak+ & Nico A.N.M. van Eijk+1 * [email protected], [email protected] Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management + [email protected], [email protected] University van Amsterdam, Faculty of Law, Institute for Information Law Abstract. Even though we increasingly rely on HTTPS to secure Internet communications, several landmark incidents in recent years have illustrated that its security is deeply flawed. We present an extensive multi-disciplinary analysis that examines how the systemic vulnerabilities of the HTTPS authentication model could be addressed. We conceptualize the security issues from the perspective of the HTTPS value chain. We then discuss the breaches at several Certificate Authorities (CAs). Next, we explore the security incentives of CAs via the empirical analysis of the market for SSL certificates, based on the SSL Observatory dataset. This uncovers a surprising pattern: there is no race to the bottom. Rather, we find a highly concentrated market with very large price differences among suppliers and limited price competition. We explain this pattern and explore what it tells us about the security incentives of CAs, including how market leaders seem to benefit from the status quo. In light of these findings, we look at regulatory and technical proposals to address the systemic vulnerabilities in the HTTPS value chain, in particular the EU eSignatures proposal that seeks to strictly regulate HTTPS communications. Keywords: HTTPS, Cybersecurity, Internet Governance, Constitutional Values, E-Commerce, Value Chain Analysis, Security Economics, eSignatures Regulation, SSL, TLS, Digital Certificates, Certificate Authorities.
    [Show full text]
  • E-Szignó Certificate Authority Eidas Conform Qualified Long-Term
    e-Szignó Certificate Authority eIDAS conform Qualified Long-Term Preservation Service Preservation Disclosure Statement ver. 2.19 Date of effect: 2020-12-28 AK-MIN-EN 2.19 OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.198.2.19 Version 2.19 First version date of effect 2016-07-01 Security classification PUBLIC Approved by Gergely Vanczák Date of approval 2020-12-11 Date of effect 2020-12-28 Microsec Micro Software Engineering & Consulting Private Company Limited by Shares Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13. 2 AK-MIN-EN 2.19 Version Effect date Description 2.0 2016-07-01 New, eIDAS conform preservation policy. 2.1 2016-09-05 Changes according to the NMHH comments. 2.2 2016-10-30 Changes according to the auditor comments. 2.3 2017-04-30 Changes according to the NMHH comments. 2.4 2017-09-30 Yearly revision. 2.6 2018-03-24 Global revision. Smaller improvements. 2.7 2018-09-15 Yearly revision. 2.8 2018-12-14 Changes based on the suggestions of the auditor. 2.11 2019-09-25 Yearly revision. 2.13 2020-03-05 Effect. HSM requirements. Smaller improvements of wording. 2.14 2020-05-26 Smaller improvements. 2.17 2020-10-28 Rewriting according to the requirements of ETSI TS 119 511. | Improvements according to the auditor’s and the supervisory body’s findings. | Smaller improvements. 2.19 2020-12-28 Smaller improvements. c 2020, Microsec ltd. All rights reserved. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS AK-MIN-EN 2.19 Table of Contents 1 Introduction 5 1.1 DocumentNameandIdentification .
    [Show full text]
  • Eidas and E-SIGNATURE a LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES in the EUROPEAN UNION
    eIDAS AND E-SIGNATURE A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION WHITE PAPER TABLE OF CONTENTS Part 1: Introduction 3 Key Highlights of the eIDAS Regulation 4 Legal Effect of Different Types of Signatures 6 Regulation of Trust Services 7 Legal Best Practices 8 Part 2: Compliance With the Regulation 9 Advanced Electronic Signatures 9 Qualified Electronic Signatures 10 Format Standards 12 Additional Evidence 12 Conclusion 13 E-Signature Solution Checklist 14 About the Authors This paper is a collaboration between Lorna Brazell of Osborne Clarke LLP and OneSpan. In part one, Osborne Clarke provides a legal opinion on the legal validity of electronic signature in the European Union. Part two has been prepared by OneSpan, and summarizes best practices recommendations for legal compliance when implementing e-signatures. eIDAS & E-SIGNATURE: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE FOLLOW US 2 PART 1 Introduction The 2014 Regulation on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transaction in the Internal Market1 (“eIDAS”) went into effect throughout the European Union (“EU”) on 1 July 2016, replacing the 1999 Directive on electronic signatures2 (“the Directive”). Although the Directive had not been the subject of any disputes in its 16-year history, neither had it been a success. Its objective, to enable the widespread use of electronic signatures to conduct business across borders within the EU, was not met. There Are Three Key Reasons for This: I. Most EU Member States’ laws do not specify any form of signature for commercial contracts other than guarantees or contracts assigning real property. II. Many people mistakenly believed that the Directive mandated the use of advanced electronic signatures supported by a qualified certificate3 in order for an electronic signature to be legally effective.
    [Show full text]
  • Eidas Regulation Questions & Answers
    eIDAS Regulation Questions & Answers on rules applicable to Trust Services as of 1 July 2016 The eIDAS Regulation (Regulation (EU) N°910/2014) on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation) adopted by the co-legislators on 23 July 2014 is a milestone as it provides a predictable regulatory environment for electronic identification and trust services, including electronic signatures, seals, time stamps, registered delivery and website authentication. As of 1 July 2016, the provisions applicable to trust services apply directly in the 28 Member States. This means that trust services under eIDAS are no longer regulated by national laws. As a result, the qualified trust services are recognised independently of the Member State where the Qualified Trust Service Provider is established or where the specific qualified trust service is offered. What’s new? What changes with regard to the former eSignature Directive? What must be done at national level? How does it impact market operators? How does it benefit the users (citizens, businesses and public administrations)? What has the Commission done to facilitate the switchover? These questions and many others have been asked along the road since the adoption. We have compiled this Q&A document to help those of you who need to fully understand the new legal framework in order to implement it or reap the benefits of electronic transactions, as well as those of you who are curious about the Regulation’s various implications. I. What is new? How will the legal effect of electronic signature change under eIDAS (compared to the regime under the eSignature Directive) as from 1 July 2016? Since 1 July 2016, when the trust services’ provisions under the eIDAS Regulation entered into application, an electronic signature can only be used by a natural person to “sign”, i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • Managed QES Service with Internationally Recognized Legal and Privacy Assurances Selected Signing Service - Powered by Cryptomathic and Swisscom Trust Services
    Solution Brief Managed QES Service with Internationally Recognized Legal and Privacy Assurances Selected Signing Service - Powered by Cryptomathic and Swisscom Trust Services Qualified remote signing and Solution benefits WYSIWYS service The best way to deliver Qualified Electronic Signature ü Offer Advanced or Qualified Electronic (QES) services across different channels is to use Signatures compliant with the Swiss remote signing technology. It integrates smoothly signature law, ZertES, and the EU eIDAS with any web application and does not require any regulation on trust services. software install, plug in or additional components and ü Extend the use of Qualified Electronic can be used anywhere, at any time, from any device Signatures outside EU and Switzerland with browsing capacity. Qualified remote signing by using a Third Party CA. The private provides the highest legal value and international signature keys are kept securely in acceptance, while What You See Is What You Sign Switzerland and signing is done in Swiss (WYSIWYS) technology delivers a seamless user Data Centers on behalf of Third Party experience with strong non-repudiation. Combining Certificates. QES with WYSIWYS is a strong enabler for businesses ü to provide ultimate security, trust and convenience Improve the users’ signing experience with online transactions. This is exactly what the joint for all channels including web portals, Selected Signing Service offers, namely the possibility desktop applications, mobile & tablet to offer Advanced or Qualified Electronic Signatures platforms. using a zero-footprint remote signing hosted service, ü Demonstrate unrivalled non- featuring WYSIWYS functionality. repudiation with WYSIWYS funcionality. ü Solve data privacy problems as the Non-repudiation and convenience document remains in the domain of the Non-repudiation is critical for maintaining security application provider.
    [Show full text]
  • Blockchain-Based Certificate Transparency and Revocation
    Blockchain-based Certificate Transparency and Revocation Transparency? Ze Wang1;2;3, Jingqiang Lin1;2;3??, Quanwei Cai1;2, Qiongxiao Wang1;2;3, Jiwu Jing1;2;3, and Daren Zha1;2 1 State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China. 2 Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China. 3 School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China. {wangze,linjingqiang,caiquanwei,wangqiongxiao}@iie.ac.cn Abstract. Traditional X.509 public key infrastructures (PKIs) depend on certification authorities (CAs) to sign certificates, used in SSL/TLS to authenticate web servers and establish secure channels. However, recent security incidents indicate that CAs may (be compromised to) sign fraud- ulent certificates. In this paper, we propose blockchain-based certificate transparency and revocation transparency. Our scheme is compatible with X.509 PKIs but significantly reinforces the security guarantees of a certificate. The CA-signed certificates and their revocation status in- formation of an SSL/TLS web server are published by the subject (i.e., the web server) as a transaction, and miners of the community append it to the global certificate blockchain after verifying the transaction and mining a block. The certificate blockchain acts as append-only public logs to monitor CAs' certificate signing and revocation operations, and an SSL/TLS web server is granted with the cooperative control on its certificates to balance the absolute authority of CAs in traditional PKIs. We implement the prototype system with Firefox and Nginx, and the experimental results show that it introduces reasonable overheads.
    [Show full text]
  • Mission Accomplished? HTTPS Security After Diginotar
    Mission Accomplished? HTTPS Security after DigiNotar Johanna Amann* ICSI / LBL / Corelight Oliver Gasser* Technical University of Munich Quirin Scheitle* Technical University of Munich Lexi Brent The University of Sydney Georg Carle Technical University of Munich Ralph Holz The University of Sydney * Joint First Authorship Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) 2017 TLS/HTTPS Security Extensions • Certificate Transparency • HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) • HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning) • SCSV (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value) • CAA (Certificate Authority Authorization) • DANE-TLSA (DNS Based Authentication of Named Entities) Methodology • Active & passive scans • Shared pipeline where possible • Active measurements from 2 continents • Largest Domain-based TLS scan so far • More than 192 Million domains • Passive measurements on 3 continents • More than 2.4 Billion observed TLS connections Certificate Transparency CA Issues Certificates Provides publicly auditable, append-only Log of certificates CT Log Also provides proof of inclusion Browser Verifies Proof of Inclusion Certificate Transparency CT Log CA Webserver Browser Certificate Transparency CT Log CA Certificate Webserver Browser Certificate Transparency CT Log CA Certificate Certificate Webserver Browser Certificate Transparency CT Log CA SCT Certificate Certificate Webserver Browser Certificate Transparency CT Log CA SCT Certificate Certificate Webserver Browser Certificate, SCT in TLS Ext. Certificate Transparency CT Log CA Webserver Browser Certificate Transparency Precertificate
    [Show full text]