Policy and Operations Evaluation Department EVALUATION of THE

iob

policy and operations evaluation department EVALUATION OF THE

JOINT INTEGRATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

COUNTRY REPORTS OF BURKINA FASO AND TANZANIA

PIET LANSER AND PAUL WIJMENGA (ECORYS/NEI ROTTERDAM) & PAULO MWAZYUNGA (INTERMAECOS LIMITED)

IOB Working Document | June 2004 ii PREFACE

A major objective of Netherlands’ foreign policy is the integration of developing countries in the world trading system. Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) is considered one of the key instruments to contribute to this integration, next to removal of trade barriers to developing countries. TRTA is a collective term for different types of technical assistance aimed at strengthening the trade-related knowledge base, trade-related negotiation capacity, national trade policy and/or capacity to trade of developing countries.

Whereas many donors and agencies have strongly committed themselves at ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to the provision of TRTA, little is known about the results of such assistance. Though the percentage of Official Development Assistance spent on TRTA has been declared an indicator of the Millennium Development Objective of ‘further developing an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory’, very few question actual effects.

To assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and relevance of various types of TRTA as supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOB started an evaluation of this instrument in June 2003. A major element of this evaluation is the assessment of results of seven selected programmes: four multilateral programmes and three international NGOs or intergovernmental organisations. Each of them is considered to be exemplary of the strategic principle of the Netherlands of providing support through multilateral channels and international organisations.

This document contains the results of the evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) in Burkina Faso (Part A) and Tanzania (Part B). In three separate IOB-working documents the results have been published of the evaluations of the Integrated Framework (IF) in Ethiopia and Yemen, two major TRTA-programmes of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and three Geneva-based international NGOs or intergovernmental organisations (ACWL, AITIC and QUNO). IOB publishes such documents to make (interim and data-rich) products of IOB evaluations accessible to stakeholders, specialists and a wider public interested in results of development aid (see www.euforic.org/iob for electronic versions).

A team of consultants of ECORYS-NEI has conducted the measurements of results of the seven selected programmes, following the general terms of reference for the IOB-evaluation and specifying these in a design for the measurement of results of the selected programmes. The team consisted of Mr. Paul Wijmenga (lead consultant), Mr. Piet Lanser, Mr. Richard Liebrechts and Mrs. Nora Plaisier. The evaluation research of JITAP in Tanzania was done by Mr. Paul Wijmenga from November 19th till December 6th of 2003. After completion of his field work, he de-briefed Mr. Piet Lanser, who subsequently conducted the evaluation research of JITAP in Burkina

iii Faso from January 12th till 26th of 2004. On behalf of IOB the team was supervised by Dr. Otto Hospes, who as evaluator of IOB also takes responsibility for the overall evaluation of TRTA.

Rob D. van den Berg Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) June 2004

iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several rounds of comments authors – including a workshop – were organised to discuss the draft evaluation reports of the ECORYS-NEI consultants. These rounds involved Netherlands embassies, executive directors of organisations targeted in the IOB-evaluation, two IOB-readers and six external readers.

Special and sincere thanks go to Mr. Leendert F. Noort (Netherlands Embassy, Ouagadougou) and Mr. Jacob Wiersma (Netherlands Embassy, Dar es Salaam) for collecting and providing comments on an earlier draft of the evaluation report. Mr. Robert Malin was very helpful as language editor. Hélène de Jong and Ingeborg Ponne, supporting staff of IOB, skilfully upgraded the format of the working document to match IOB standards. The authors accept responsibility for any error or lack of clarity that may be left.

Finally, the authors – together with IOB – hope that the series of working documents on TRTA will contribute to the international debate on the role and results of the selected providers of TRTA and can be helpful for the methodological design of new evaluations meant to assess results of TRTA.

v vi ACRONYMS

ACP African Caribbean Pacific AGOA African Growth Opportunity Act AoA Agreement on Agriculture BEST Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania BET Board of External Trade CB Capacity Building CBE College for Business Education CBI Centre for Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries CCIA-B Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie et d’Artisanat du Burkina Faso CDF Communication and Discussion Facility CEDEAO French acronym of ECOWAS CESAO Centre d’Etudes Économiques et Sociales pour L’Afrique de l’Ouest CNPB Conseil National du Patronat Burkinabé CNSC/OMC Cellule nationals de Suivi et de Coordination des Accords de l’OMC COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CTF Common Trust Fund DDE Directorate for Sustainable Economic Development DTIS Diagnostic Trade Integration Study EAC East African Co-operation EC European Commission ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EPA Economic Partnership Agreement EU European Union FASONORM Burkinabé Bureau of Standards GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services IIC Inter Institutional Committee IF Integrated Framework IFM Institute of Finance Management IIC Inter-Institutional Committee IITC Inter-Institutional Technical Committee IMTS Institute on Multilateral Trade System IOB Policy and Operations Evaluation Department ITC International Trade Centre JITAP Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme LDC Least Developed Country MCPEA Ministère du Commerce, de la Promotion de l’Entreprise et de l’Artisanat MIT Ministry of Industry & Trade MOL Minst Ontwikkelde Landen MTR Mid Term Review MTS Multilateral Trading System NEP National Enquiry Point NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NTA National Technical Advisor NSC National Steering Committee OHADA Organization for Harmonization of Business Law in Africa OMC French acronym of WTO ONAC Office National du Commerce Extérieur PESP Programme of Economic Cooperation Projects vii PRS(P) Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper) PS Permanent Secretary PSI Pre-shipment Inspection PUM Retiring Managers Programme RNE Royal Netherlands Embassy RoO Rules of Origin RTA Regional Trade Agreements SADC South African Development Community S&D Special and Differential treatment SME Small and Medium Enterprise SPCPSA Secrétariat Permanent de la Coordination des Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures TA Technical Assistance TBS Tanzanian Bureau of Standards TBT Technical Barriers to Trade TCCIA Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture TIC Tanzania Investment Centre TRIMS Trade-Related Investment Measures TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Structure TSHS Tanzanian Shillings TTPP Tanzania Trade and Poverty Programme TRA Tanzania Revenue Authority TRTA Trade-Related Technical Assistance UEMOA French acronym of WAEMU UK United Kingdom UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation USD United States Dollar WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WTO World Trade Organisation

viii CONTENTS

Preface iii Acknowledgements v Acronyms vii

PART A: JITAP IN BURKINA FASO

1INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background information on JITAP 1 1.2 Trade Policy Regime of Burkina Faso 2 1.3 Trade Performance of Burkina Faso 5 1.4 Presence of JITAP agencies in Burkina Faso 10 1.4.1 WTO 10 1.4.2 ITC 10 1.4.3 UNCTAD 10 1.4.4 UNDP 10 1.5 Donor coordination and trade related programmes of main donors 10 1.5.1 JITAP donor partners 10 1.5.2 Canada 11 1.5.3 French cooperation 11 1.5.4 Finland 12 1.5.5 World Bank 12 1.5.6 European Commission 12 1.5.7 Netherlands 13

2 JITAP SITUATION IN BURKINA FASO 15 2.1 Preparatory phase of JITAP I 15 2.2 Implementation of JITAP I 15 2.3 Consolidation phase of JITAP I 16 2.4 Preparatory phase of JITAP II 16

3MEASURING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN BURKINA FASO 17 3.1 Input 17 3.2 Output 18 3.3 Outcome 21 3.4 Impact 26

4ASSESSING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN BURKINA FASO 31 4.1 Efficiency 31 4.2 Effectiveness 33 4.3 Relevance 34 4.4 Specific issues 36 4.4.1 Ownership 36 4.4.2 Coordination 36 4.4.3 Beneficiaries 38 4.4.4 Follow-up of earlier evaluations 38 4.4.5 Future performance 39 4.5 Conclusion and policy issues 41

ix PART B: JITAP IN TANZANIA

1INTRODUCTION 45 1.1 Background information on JITAP 45 1.2 Trade Policy Regime of Tanzania 46 1.3 Trade Performance of Tanzania 49 1.4 Presence of JITAP agencies in Tanzania 54 1.4.1 WTO 54 1.4.2 ITC 54 1.4.3 UNCTAD 55 1.4.4 Integrated Framework 55 1.5 Existing trade-related programmes of main bilateral donors 55 1.5.1 SIDA 55 1.5.2 DANIDA 56 1.5.3 United Kingdom 56 1.5.4 Netherlands 57

2 JITAP SITUATION IN TANZANIA 59 2.1 Preparatory phase of JITAP I 59 2.2 Implementation of JITAP I 59 2.3 Consolidation phase of JITAP I 60 2.4 Preparatory phase of JITAP II 60

3MEASURING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA 63 3.1 Input 63 3.2 Output 64 3.3 Outcome 66 3.4 Impact 73

4ASSESSING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA 79 4.1 Efficiency 79 4.2 Effectiveness 81 4.3 Relevance 82 4.4 Specific issues 85 4.4.1 Ownership 85 4.4.2 Coordination 85 4.4.3 Beneficiaries 86 4.4.4 Follow-up of earlier evaluations 87 4.4.5 Future performance 87 4.5 Conclusion and policy issues 88

REFERENCES 93 PERSONS INTERVIEWED 97

ANNEXES 1 Design of the Evaluation Research for the Joint Integrated 101 Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) 2 Rating Methodology 109 3 Interview results of (ex)participants in JITAP training events in 115 Burkina Faso

x 4 Interview results of (ex)participants in JITAP training events in 119 Tanzania 5 Résumé de l’Évaluation JITAP au Burkina Faso 125

xi xii PART A

JITAP IN BURKINA FASO

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background information on JITAP

African Trade Ministers meeting in Tunis in October 1994 brought up the need for support for integrating their countries into the new Multilateral Trade System. Following the meeting in Tunis, the WTO Director General and the ITC Executive Director visited African countries to discuss trade challenges and trade-related technical assistance needs.

In May 1996 the heads of WTO, UNCTAD and ITC announced their commitment to develop a joint programme to help meet the need for support expressed by the African countries. The three organisations carried out joint fact-finding missions and needs assessments during 1996-1997. Critical needs seemed to be similar in all countries, which led to generic programme activities to address them.

In March 1998, together with donors the three organisations set up a Common Trust Fund to initiate the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Uganda and Tanzania.

The objectives of JITAP were to: Build national capacity to understand the evolving MTS and its implications for external trade; Adapt the national trading system to the obligations and disciplines of the new MTS; Seek maximum advantage from the new MTS by enhancing the readiness of exporters.

National Steering Committees were charged with the coordination among participating institutions at national level. A national JITAP focal point was assigned in the ministry responsible for international trade. In Geneva, a steering group comprising representatives from the three agencies, the donors and partner countries provided guidance to the JITAP programme. Designated focal point officers handled day-to-day management for the three agencies out of Geneva. A Programme Coordinator operating from Geneva facilitated the interaction between Geneva and the participating countries.

In order to optimise resources, JITAP organised its generic activities into clusters and adapted them to the individual needs of each country. There were clusters: to strengthen the capacity to understand the MTS and its implications; to address the need for conforming to the MTS; to provide strategies for export development at sector level; and to set up reference centres and a network of trainers and experts on the MTS.

The first phase of JITAP came to an end in December 2002. At the same time JITAP II was endorsed, extending the programme for four years (2003-2006) and expanding it to eight new countries.

More background information can be found in a brief profile of the JITAP programme taken up in Section 1.1 of Annex 1. This annex, in addition, presents the design of the evaluation research that has been applied in this country report.

1 1.2 Trade Policy Regime of Burkina Faso

WTO Trade Policy Review

The last WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) of Burkina Faso dates from September 1998. The information in this review is now outdated, at least partly. A new TPR is being prepared and scheduled for June 2004.

Burkina Faso is one of the founding members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The establishment of a customs union started in July 1998 and was fully put in place in January 2000, including a common external tariff structure. The application of the other provisions of the WAEMU treaty also included a revision of some of the laws and regulations governing trade and investment in Burkina Faso, bringing them more into line with Burkina's commitments under the WTO Agreements.

Burkina Faso started a programme of commercial reforms in 1991 in the context of the Structural Adjustment Programmes. The implementation of these programmes has resulted in a liberalised economic environment, especially with regard to imports. According to the TPR of 1998, export restrictions still existed for raw sheep and goat hides and skins, while the exports of shea nuts and cereals were subject to special authorisation. Today these restrictions have been lifted as well. Following liberalisation, the trade policy of Burkina Faso is essentially based on duties and taxes. Burkina has been applying the Harmonised System of Nomenclature since 1992. Its system of duties and taxes was amongst the highest of the WAEMU members but has since been largely harmonised with the establishment of the customs union.

According to the TPR, Burkina Faso does not have comprehensive legislation on rules of origin. It does not have any domestic legislation either on anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures.

Although not all WTO regulations have been incorporated in national laws or regional treaties, WTO agreements are nevertheless applicable in Burkina Faso since international agreements, once ratified, take precedence over domestic legislation. Intellectual property rights are protected through the Bangui Agreement on Industrial Property signed by around 15 African countries. Work is in hand to bring the provisions of the Bangui Agreement into line with the obligations of WTO. Notwithstanding this legislation, Burkina Faso lacks the means to effectively apply the adopted measures.

Burkina Faso has signed the Fourth Lomé Convention and thus benefits from preferential trading arrangements with the members of the European Union (EU). Burkina’s products also enjoy preferential access to markets in developed countries outside the EU under the Generalised System of Preferences.

In agriculture the government is pursuing a policy of liberalisation of prices and trade, product diversification, intensification of crops cultivation and animal husbandry, increase of cotton production and promotion of exportable surpluses. However, the favourable conditions for cotton production have hampered the development of other

2 crops for a long time, whilst export restrictions still exist for raw goat and sheep hides and skins and slaughtered meat.

The mineral sector is the most liberalised one and has the lowest tariff protection. The significance is limited since mineral exports mainly concern the production of gold, which has been diminishing since 1990 due to the depletion of existing mines and high costs of extraction.

The manufacturing sector enjoys the highest tariff protection. However, the structure of import duties is not favourable for the development of this sector, which is equally hampered by the high costs of a number of input because of high energy prices, including electricity and petrol, and high transport costs.

In the field of services, Burkina Faso’s commitments under the General Agreement on Trade and Services are restricted to certain aspects of the supply of services and do not cover services unilaterally liberalised by Burkina Faso under the structural adjustment programmes. In this sector Burkina Faso still runs a number of state owned enterprises, the privatisation of which is impeded by their so-called strategic interest.

Burkina Faso is presently not involved in any dispute settlement proceeding under the WTO. Besides the procedures provided for under GATT, WTO and other multilateral agreement, special arrangements have been made in the treaties of WAEMU and ECOWAS.

In its response on the TPR, the government of Burkina Faso acknowledges the importance of the WTO agreements for developing countries. At the same time the government asks for more assistance in this domain in order to be able to benefit fully from the agreements. The implementation of JITAP is one of the activities to be carried out mentioned in the report.

General Trade Policy Objectives

Burkina Faso does not have a specific trade policy, but considers trade policy as one of the components of the economic reform programmes started in 1991. These programmes aim at the withdrawal of the state from competitive sectors and the liberalisation of the economy. The broad objectives of this programme with regard to trade policy as mentioned in the government’s response to the TPR are:

S To liberalise trade; S To improve the regulatory framework for the creation and exercise of private enterprise by both nationals and foreign investors; S To enable business to develop within a dependable legal framework in line with international standards; S To put in place measures for rapid adaptation to the rules of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and WTO; S To facilitate speedy adjustment to economic trends by making employment laws more flexible; S To enhance the productivity and efficiency of private-sector support institutions, especially those run directly by the State; S To combat fraud and corruption;

3 S To institute permanent and fruitful dialogue with the private sector; S To reduce the cost and/or improve the quality of Government-run public services; S To provide better conditions of corporate financing in general and for small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular; S To lighten the tax burden on the formal sector; S To ease customs duties on input; S To strive to provide enterprises with more modern and efficient services; S To foment the technical upgrading of the local workforce; S To step up the creation and restoration of serviced industrial zones; S To continue to develop serviced zones for different activities; S To encourage the reduction of some transport costs; S To improve the efficiency and fluidity of Burkina Faso’s roadways.

Short-term activities planned to arrive at these goals included:

S The drafting of a Community Investment Code; S The effective harmonisation of public financial statistics; S The application of the West African Accounting System (SYSCOA) and the Treaty of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA); S The application of the Common External Tariff; S Multilateral surveillance and the accompanying penalties; S Implementation of the actions under the integrated ITC/UNCTAD/WTO programme; S The inauguration of a Centre for Business Formalities (single window); S Streamlining administrative procedures, improving the Institutional Code, adapting laws and regulations to the new, highly liberal economic environment; S The sound management of a liberal economy calling for more entrenched democracy, better governance and the furtherance of structural reforms.

Other Trade Related Programmes and Policy Documents

There are few explicitly trade related programmes. Besides JITAP, there is support from ITC for the trade point, which also hosts the Reference Centres created under JITAP.

However, there are several programmes to improve the enabling environment, especially through private sector support. Important donors are the World Bank, the European Commission and France.

As part of the WAEMU, Burkina Faso is engaged in the process of economic integration. As such, it benefits from several EC programmes of support to this process.

At the national level, trade is indirectly concerned in the Policy Letter for Private Sector Development. This document addresses amongst others issues of ongoing economic liberalisation and measures of cost reduction. Transport and public utility costs in Burkina Faso are amongst the highest in the WAEMU and considerably reduce the competitiveness of Burkina Faso’s products.

The themes of enhancing competitiveness and the reduction of factor costs are also treated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This document recognises

4 that, in the short term, growth has to come from the agricultural sector. Therefore, the paper advocates the diversification of products and enhancing the sector of exportable products. Important sub-sectors treated in the PRSP are cotton, fruit and vegetables, oleaginous products and animal husbandry. In this sense a connection is made between trade and economic growth, which is expected to lead to reduced poverty, although in the list of priority actions no specific trade related activity is mentioned.

1.3 Trade Performance of Burkina Faso

Data sources

In Burkina Faso recent statistics are not readily available. The most recent statistical annual yearbook dates from 2000 with figures until 1998. Consecutive measures of structural adjustment may have improved the government budget, but proved to have the reverse effect on non-priority services such as the bureau of statistics, which has suffered from a ban on recruitment.

Other sources are the Personal Computer Trade Analysis System (PC-TAS) of the International Trade Centre (ITC/UN, Feb. 2003) and the International Monetary Funds (IMF, June 2003) that in the Statistical Annex paper for Burkina Faso includes data on international trade. The IMF trade figures are, in turn, based on data from the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO).

Trade figures differ significantly between the two sources, especially merchandise export figures, which are twice as high (or more) with IMF/BCEAO compared to PC- TAS. Export of live animals, reportedly the second export product of Burkina Faso, accounts for less than 0.5 percent in PC-TAS against 10 percent with IMFBCEAO. Trade exchanges with neighbouring countries appear very small with PC-TAS but account for over 20 percent according to IMF/BCEAO. In fact, Burkina Faso does not appear in the lists of countries reporting to PC-TAS. Therefore, this section is based on IMF/BCEAO data, which are considered more accurate although the level of aggregation is higher and permits less detailed analysis.

Merchandise exports

Burkina Faso has a structural deficit on its trade balance. Merchandise exports account for almost half of the value of merchandise imports only. Total trade declined from over one third to nearly one quarter of GDP during the period 1998-2002.

Table 1.1 Trends in total trade of Burkina Faso, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Merchandise exports (mln. USD) 323.1 254.0 206.2 223.6 236.3 Merchandise imports (mln. USD) 634.2 581.2 519.2 509.7 549.4 Total trade (mln. USD) 957.3 835.3 725.4 733.3 785.7 Trade balance (mln. USD) -311.2 -327.2 -313.0 -286.0 -313.0 Total trade/GDP (%) 34.3 29.7 27.8 26.3 25.1 Total trade per capita (mln. USD) 89.4 76.0 64.4 63.5 66.4 Source: IMF/BCEAO

5 Export of goods declined strongly between 1998 and 2000 and only recovered slightly since then. The main export product is raw cotton, which counts for over half of total exports of Burkina Faso. Therefore, export revenues are sensitive to fluctuations in world market prices, which fell by 24 percent between 1998 and 2000. Since falling export prices make cotton growing less profitable, farmers reduce the cultivated area. Thus, export revenues diminish as a consequence of a combination of lower prices and less production. Cotton prices recovered in 2001 and so did exports revenues.

Table 1.2 Trends in merchandise exports of Burkina Faso, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Merchandise exports (mln. USD) 323.1 254.0 206.2 223.6 236.3 Annual growth rate (%) -21.0 -19.0 8.0 6.0 Exports/GDP (%) 11.6 9.0 7.9 8.0 7.5 Exports per capita (mln. USD) 30.2 23.1 18.3 19.4 20.0 Source: IMF/BCEAO

Raw cotton is by far the main export product. Livestock products are the second group of products, which accounts for 15 to 20 percent of exports. About half of it consists of live animals that are exported to the neighbouring countries, mainly on foot. Roughly 40 percent concerns leather and raw skins, while the remaining is meat and slaughtered animals.

The third export product is gold, but volume is relatively small. Falling prices led to decreased production and subsequently lower export revenues.

Table 1.3 Composition of Burkina Faso’s merchandise exports, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. % USD USD USD USD USD Cotton 204.9 63.4 136.0 53.5 101.7 49.3 131.1 58.6 127.8 54.1 Livestock products 46.1 14.3 47.7 18.8 45.2 21.9 42.3 18.9 49.5 21.0 Live animals 24.9 7.7 25.7 10.1 23.2 11.3 22.5 10.1 20.7 8.8 Meat and slaughtered animals 2.7 0.8 2.8 1.1 2.5 1.2 4.1 1.8 2.9 1.2 Leather and hides 18.5 5.7 19.0 7.5 19.4 9.4 15.6 7.0 25.9 11.0 Gold 16.1 5.0 15.0 5.9 8.7 4.2 3.0 1.3 5.6 2.4 Other 55.9 17.3 55.5 21.8 50.6 24.5 47.4 21.2 53.4 22.6 Total exports 323.1 100.0 254.0 100.0 206.2 100.0 223.8 100.0 236.3 100.0 Note: subtotals do not always add up because of rounding. Source: IMF/BCEAO

The IMF Statistical Annex paper provides figures for on average about 80 percent of exports. Main destination is Europe, which receives about 2/3 of exports. Some 60 percent of exports to Europe go to countries of the European Union, the remaining 40 percent to other countries in Europe. The main bilateral trade partner is France, which receives over one fifth of all Burkina Faso’s exports.

The second largest group are African countries, especially the member countries of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). Interregional trade accounts for about one fifth of all exports and illustrates the importance of this union. The main trading partner among these countries is Côte d’Ivoire.

6 Exports to other countries in the western hemisphere, including USA, Canada and Latin America, and to Asian countries are relatively small at some 10 percent on average.

Table 1.4 Direction of Burkina Faso’s recorded exports, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Mln. %Mln.%Mln.%Mln.%Mln. % USD USD USD USD USD Europe 170.7 72.0 122.3 61.0 120.8 68.6 116.1 67.3 108.8 65.5 European Community 88.0 37.1 65.4 32.6 68.9 39.1 63.9 37.1 104.6 63.0 France 54.7 23.1 46.3 23.1 38.0 21.6 39.2 22.7 77.3 46.5 Belgium/Luxembourg 25.8 10.9 11.2 5.6 14.8 8.4 7.0 4.0 2.3 1.4 Italy 0.5 0.2 3.9 1.9 7.0 4.0 8.2 4.8 3.3 2.0 United Kingdom 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.7 1.5 5.5 3.2 2.4 1.5 Other 82.7 34.9 57.1 28.5 52.0 29.5 55.0 31.9 4.2 2.5

Africa 45.8 19.3 68.3 34.1 41.8 23.8 40.3 23.4 40.0 24.1 WAMU 38.1 16.1 61.8 30.8 38.5 21.8 34.1 19.8 34.1 20.5 Côte d’Ivoire 23.2 9.8 53.3 26.6 19.7 11.2 12.8 7.4 15.7 9.4 Niger 2.4 1.0 1.0 0.5 6.1 3.4 8.9 5.1 3.7 2.3 Togo 3.6 1.5 1.3 0.6 2.8 1.6 2.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 Mali 4.1 1.7 5.7 2.8 8.9 5.0 7.0 4.0 6.9 4.2 Benin 4.4 1.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.4 Ghana 5.1 2.1 3.1 1.5 2.7 1.5 4.1 2.4 3.7 2.3 Nigeria 1.9 0.8 2.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.0 Other 0.7 0.3 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.9 1.1 0.4 0.3

Western Hemisphere 6.8 2.9 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.6 1.5 0.9 1.7 1.0

Asia 13.9 5.9 9.6 4.8 12.4 7.0 14.6 8.5 15.5 9.4 China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 3.0 1.8 Japan 0.7 0.3 1.5 0.7 2.4 1.4 2.6 1.5 5.0 3.0 Singapore 13.2 5.6 5.7 2.8 9.9 5.6 11.1 6.4 8.6 5.2

Total exports (USD) 237.1 100.0 200.5 100.0 176.1 100.0 172.4 100.0 166.1 100.0 Note: subtotals do not always add up because of rounding. Source: IMF/BCEAO

Merchandise imports

Merchandise imports are over twice as high as merchandise exports. While the value of exports fell considerably in both local currency and USD, the value of imports fluctuated only slightly, expressed in local currency, but declined between 1998 and 2001 in USD terms before recovering in 2002. The Franc CFA was formerly pegged to the French Franc and is pegged to the EURO since 2002. As a consequence the local currency shows the same trend against the USD as the EURO.

Table 1.5 Trends in merchandise imports of Burkina Faso, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Merchandise imports (mln. USD) 634.2 581.2 519.2 509.7 549.4 Annual growth rate (%) -8.4 -10.7 -1.8 7.8 Imports/GDP (%) 22.7 20.6 19.9 18.3 17.5 Imports per capita (mln. USD) 59.2 52.9 46.1 44.1 46.4 Source: IMF/BCEAO

7 The main group of products concerns capital equipment, which accounts for about a third of all imports. The second group are petroleum products, which represent over 15 percent of all imports. Burkina Faso does not have reserves of mineral fuel while almost all electricity is generated with fossil fuel.

Food products account for some 12.5 percent on average, except for 1998, which followed a year of bad harvests.

The category "miscellaneous and unclassified imports" includes IMF staff adjustments for unrecorded imports.

Table 1.6 Composition of Burkina Faso’s merchandise imports, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. % USD USD USD USD USD Food products 142.0 22.4 74.0 12.7 63.4 12.2 73.2 14.4 69.8 12.7 Petroleum products 71.2 11.2 101.5 17.5 91.5 17.6 92.7 18.2 102.2 18.6 Capital equipment 194.1 30.6 203.3 35.0 173.0 33.3 157.7 30.9 179.2 32.6 Raw materials 67.8 10.7 56.9 9.8 46.9 9.0 49.8 9.8 55.7 10.1 Miscellaneous and unclassified 159.3 25.1 145.6 25.0 144.5 27.8 136.4 26.8 142.5 25.9 Total imports 634.4 100.0 581.2 100.0 519.3 100.0 509.8 100.0 549.4 100.0 Note: subtotals do not always add up because of rounding. Source: IMF/BCEAO

The origin of imports is more widely spread than the destination of exports. The largest share of imports comes from Europe, almost exclusively from the European Union. The European share of imports declined from about 49 percent in 1998 and 1999 to an estimated 32 percent in 2002. The main bilateral trade partner for imports is France.

Trade with other countries in the western hemisphere, mainly the USA and some Latin America countries, is relatively modest, rarely exceeding 5 percent.

A large share of imports comes from other African countries and from Asian countries. The share of these groups is increasing. The share of interregional trade in the context of WAMU increased from 21 percent in 1998 to about 27 percent in 2000 and following years, thus marking the effective start of the WAMU customs union in June 2000.

8 Table 1.7 Origin of Burkina Faso’s recorded imports, 1998-2002 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.) Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. %Mln. % USD USD USD USD USD Europe 330.0 48.7 266.2 49.7 232.3 44.7 229.1 41.5 204.7 32.1 European Community 308.6 45.5 249.5 46.5 220.0 42.3 212.0 38.4 203.7 31.9 France 195.3 28.8 149.1 27.8 116.5 22.4 115.8 21.0 125.1 19.6 Germany 18.8 2.8 19.8 3.7 18.7 3.6 18.4 3.3 38.4 6.0 Netherlands 19.3 2.8 13.7 2.5 11.0 2.1 10.5 1.9 15.0 2.3 Belgium/ Luxembourg 15.1 2.2 14.1 2.6 14.8 2.8 10.8 2.0 17.7 2.8 United Kingdom 9.0 1.3 11.9 2.2 13.7 2.6 11.7 2.1 10.4 1.6 Italy 21.7 3.2 12.8 2.4 16.2 3.1 14.7 2.7 12.1 1.9 Other 21.4 3.1 16.8 3.1 12.1 2.3 17.1 3.1 1.0 0.2

Africa 167.8 24.7 145.9 27.2 183.8 35.4 180.5 32.7 196.2 30.8 WAMU 144.1 21.2 128.6 24.0 141.7 27.3 148.3 26.8 167.2 26.2 Côte d’Ivoire 113.6 16.7 108.6 20.3 118.0 22.7 122.2 22.1 119.6 18.8 Senegal 7.1 1.0 7.2 1.3 8.0 1.5 4.5 0.8 3.3 0.5 Togo 9.0 1.3 11.1 2.1 13.8 2.7 18.4 3.3 18.0 2.8 Mali 2.7 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 Ghana 5.9 0.9 4.9 0.9 6.8 1.3 7.0 1.3 4.3 0.7 Nigeria 6.3 0.9 4.1 0.8 9.2 1.8 7.0 1.3 5.5 0.9 Other 11.5 1.7 8.1 1.5 26.2 5.0 18.4 3.3 19.1 3.0

Western Hemisphere 23.9 3.5 30.7 5.7 19.3 3.7 27.2 4.9 33.5 5.3 USA n.a. n.a. 19.4 3.6 14.2 2.7 21.8 4.0 20.9 3.3

Asia 109.0 16.1 91.6 17.1 83.9 16.2 114.3 20.7 136.0 21.3 Japan 35.1 5.2 37.2 6.9 29.3 5.6 29.1 5.3 59.2 9.3 China 10.0 1.5 11.2 2.1 21.1 4.1 25.8 4.7 17.8 2.8 Thailand 8.6 1.3 6.2 1.2 3.7 0.7 4.4 0.8 3.6 0.6 Taiwan 1.5 0.2 2.3 0.4 2.1 0.4 1.4 0.2 1.3 0.2 Pakistan 8.5 1.2 6.2 1.2 1.3 0.2 6.4 1.2 1.4 0.2 India 16.6 2.4 6.2 1.2 3.1 0.6 6.8 1.2 10.8 1.7 Vietnam 10.8 1.6 n.a. n.a. 1.8 0.4 1.6 0.3 4.7 0.7

Other countries 47.5 7.0 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.2 67.5 10.6

Total exports 678.1 100.0 536.2 100.0 519.6 100.0 552.3 100.0 637.9 100.0 Note: subtotals do not always add up because of rounding. Source: IMF/BCEAO

9 1.4 Presence of JITAP agencies in Burkina Faso

1.4.1 WTO

WTO has no resident office in Burkina Faso. As well as JITAP, WTO provides technical assistance to WAEMU, which has its headquarters in Ouagadougou.

1.4.2 ITC

ITC is not represented in Burkina Faso and carries out its activities from Geneva. Outside JITAP, it has given support to the organisation of a trade information system with ONAC and to a study on textiles.

1.4.3 UNCTAD

Like the other two organisations, UNCTAD has no office in Burkina Faso, but unlike the others it is formally represented by the UNDP Representative Office. It has assisted ONAC in creating the Trade Point, which is part of the worldwide network of trade points, the World Trade Point Federation with 144 members. UNCTAD also gives support to the regional UEMOA that has its headquarters in Burkina Faso.

1.4.4 UNDP

The UNDP is closely involved in the implementation of JITAP. Most funds for the financing of JITAP activities pass by the UNDP and are paid according to UN procedures. Several officers are involved in the execution of the programme. However, the UNDP is not part of the National Steering Committee and does not participate in the planning of activities.

1.5 Donor coordination and trade related programmes of main donors

1.5.1 JITAP donor partners

JITAP I was started and implemented by three Geneva based agencies, WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, and co-financed by 14 donor countries. Pledges were made either unearmarked, under Window 1, or earmarked under Window 2. The Burkina programme benefited from earmarked contributions from seven donors: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The programme is driven by donors’ headquarters. Direct links between JITAP and the activities carried out by the embassies or donor cooperation offices in the country are rare. The largest contributor to the JITAP I programme in Burkina Faso, Norway, does not have any representation in the country. Most representations hardly knew about the existence of the programme and none are directly associated to it.

International trade is not a specific issue for the donors, but rather considered a possible component of the wider private sector support. Coordination takes place

10 through a donor group of private sector support. However, the group did not meet since France took over the presidency from Canada nearly one year ago.

There is no coordination from the recipient side.

1.5.2 Canada

Canada contributed USD 223,527 to JITAP I, of which USD 218,527 was earmarked for Burkina Faso, the remaining amount going to Tanzania (source: ITC-JITAP coordination). In 2003, Canada started its programme ‘New Canadian Initiative for Africa’. JITAP II has been incorporated in this programme and benefits of an unearmarked financial contribution of CAD 7 million (over USD 5.2 million), making Canada the largest donor of the programme.

From the donor side JITAP I was mainly managed by the Canadian representation in Geneva. Given the much higher contribution to JITAP II, headquarters will take a more active role with support from the representation. The Canadian embassy in Burkina Faso is not actively involved in the programme.

Canada ran a private sector support programme until 2001 when it changed its policy. Today the two main lines of intervention are basic education and development of local economies. Some international trade may emerge from it, but that is not its primary goal.

Besides the development programme, the Canadian embassy has a commercial section to promote bilateral commercial exchanges. To take full benefits from these contacts basic knowledge of commercial principles is required. To this JITAP could be instrumental although there is not a formal link with it.

1.5.3 French cooperation

JITAP is not known to French bilateral cooperation.

France gives direct support to the private sector. It finances a project named ‘support to the institutional environment and the development of the private sector’ at a rate of € 1.2 million over a period of three years. It envisages the reinforcement of the chamber of commerce and six sector wise organised groups of entrepreneurs.

The programme does not directly promote the development of international trade, but this might well be a by-product of it. There is certainly a possible link with JITAP, since the project includes the dissemination of information concerning the rules put in place by the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).

France currently holds the presidency of a donor group concerning the development of the private sector. The group includes the World Bank and several bilateral donors like Canada, Denmark and the European Commission. The Netherlands only participates on an ad hoc basis.

11 1.5.4 Finland

Finland has no embassy in Burkina Faso. It started two pilot programmes of development cooperation in the environmental sector and in good governance. The local office managing these two programmes is not informed about JITAP.

1.5.5 World Bank

The World Bank is financing a large programme of support to privatisation and business support, the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development project. The programme, which started in 2003, has a duration of five years with a total budget of about USD 34 million. It has three components: privatisation and utility reform, enterprise development and project coordination.

There are no explicit links between the World Bank programme and JITAP. However, the establishment and strengthening of competition authorities can certainly be related to WTO rules on competition. The enterprise development component consists of the establishment of an Entrepreneurship centre (“maison de l’entrepreneur”), the provision of business development services and micro-finance support to commodity supply chains in the form of a matching grant. The entrepreneurship centre will serve as a reference centre of information, which can direct interested entrepreneurs to JITAP structures like the JITAP reference centres and the network of trainers. The matching grant funds could be used for the financing or co-financing of sector studies as initiated by JITAP.

1.5.6 European Commission

The JITAP programme is known at the European Commission (EC) but mainly because of personal relationships. Otherwise, the EC is not involved in the programme.

The EC has several programmes, most multilateral, which directly touch subjects treated by JITAP as well. With regard to norms and standards, UNIDO implements a programme establishing a system for certification, normalisation and quality promotion in the eight WAEMU member states financed by the European Development Fund by an amount of € 12.5 million. Fasonorm, Burkina Faso’s bureau of standards, is amongst the benefiting institutions.

The EC equally co-finances the World Bank Competitiveness and Enterprise Development, especially the matching grant funds with a contribution of € 6 million through the Private Sector Support Programme.

On trade and negotiations, three ACP-wide programmes were brought to the attention of the evaluation mission. The first concerned the € 10 million “Intra-ACP facility for WTO negotiations.” The programme is open for financing requests from ACP countries. Burkina Faso did not benefit from the programme until now.

The second programme concerns the project “Capacity building in support of the preparation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)” with a budget of € 20 million. For Burkina Faso, a project of € 149,620 has been approved for an EPA

12 impact assessment study and the organisation of two seminars to discuss the conclusions of this study.

Finally, a new programme was launched in July 2003 entitled “Trade.com” with a budget of € 50 million. The programme focuses on creating the necessary capacities in ACP countries to benefit from increased trade opportunities. It has three main components:

I. Strengthening of local capacities to formulate trade policies, while encouraging the participation of all stakeholders in the process; II. Assistance for ongoing trade negotiations by establishing a unique network of ACP trade experts; III. Funding of pilot projects to address urgent institutional and supply side constraints.

1.5.7 Netherlands

Prior to the evaluation mission, the Netherlands Embassy did not know the JITAP programme and was not involved in it.

The Dutch international cooperation in Burkina Faso concentrates on four main issues: macro-economic support, education, health and local development. Private sector support is not a priority. The opinion of the embassy is that other donors already provide considerable assistance to this sector and that there is no value added for Dutch support.

The embassy mediates on request between Dutch and Burkinabé enterprises that are looking for potential ways to cooperate. Further, there is a small programme of technical assistance on management issues by retired managers, which might be helpful to potential exporting firms as well.

At a regional level, the Netherlands Embassy is involved in the joint cotton initiative of four Western African countries. Support is given through the Swiss NGO IDEAS and through political dialogue. This assistance had no links with JITAP.

13 14 2 JITAP SITUATION IN BURKINA FASO

2.1 Preparatory phase of JITAP I

After the decision to start an Integrated Technical Assistance Programme in a number of Less Developed Countries (LDC) and other African Countries, a joint fact finding mission of ITC, UNCTAD and WTO visited Burkina Faso in July 1996, immediately followed by a needs assessment mission carried out by ITC in September 1996. The work resulted in a project document titled Follow-up of WTO Agreements and assessment of international markets for Burkinabé enterprises. The document was finalised in January 1998 taking on board the results of a needs assessment of technical assistance by the government of Burkina Faso itself, presented at a high level meeting of LDCs in October 1997 in Geneva, and the comments made by the Ministry Trade, Industry and Handicrafts in December of the same year.

The project was scheduled to start in March 1998 for a period of 2.5 year with an estimated budget of USD 1,376,000.

2.2 Implementation of JITAP I

A JITAP National Steering Committee was set up in 1998 but was officially established in 2000 by a ministerial decree. The decree provides for nine members: the Ministry of Trade, the National Office for Foreign Trade, the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts, the General Direction of Customs, the JITAP regional programme coordinator, a representative of the donor community, UNDP, World Bank, Ministry of Economy and Finances and other institutions if need be. The presidency lies in the hands of the Ministry of Trade.

There was a Regional Coordinator, a National Focal Point and a National Facilitator. The Regional Coordinator was to represent the three agencies for West Africa. He was based in Abidjan. The Mid-term Review judged the function of regional coordinator contra-productive resulting in a de facto scission of the programme between West and East Africa. The Regional Coordinator was subsequently abandoned.

Local coordination of the programme is done by the Focal Point in the Ministry of Trade. Within the Ministry of Trade, the Director General of Trade assumes the role of Focal point. He is the official communication point between the implementing agencies and the national institutions. Work by the Focal Point is considered to be part of the counterpart contribution.

The role of National Facilitator was attributed to the National Office for Foreign Trade. Unlike the Focal Point, the Facilitator has a contract with the programme providing for remuneration for its services.

15 2.3 Consolidation phase of JITAP I

JITAP I was scheduled to end in June 2001, but was subsequently extended to December 2002 to permit the finishing of ongoing activities and the preparation of a second phase. According to the JITAP final report "all planned activities in the country were completed by December 2002."

2.4 Preparatory phase of JITAP II

The second phase of JITAP was launched in February 2003. The objectives of JITAP I have remained unchanged under JITAP II. The eight countries under JITAP I, including Burkina Faso, are offered an extended consolidation period of two years. The cluster activities have been regrouped and are now called programme modules.

The budget under JITAP II for the eight countries that were involved in JITAP I amounts to USD 4 million, or USD 500,000 per country. The programme document of JITAP Phase II says that JITAP II has been designed to ensure the sustainability of national capacities in the eight original JITAP countries. This implies inter alia that the CDF will be revamped, that extensive use will be made by videoconferencing for boosting the MTS knowledge of network members and that networking will take place both inside and outside the region, e.g. among business organisations. For the main programme components, an Advanced Track is foreseen for the eight countries that were engaged in JITAP I.

Based on the programme document, the individual countries should prepare their own specific country project document. The progress report on JITAP II as of 31 October 2003 states that the programme was launched in February 2003. In May 2003, a Common Trust Fund (CTF) steering group meeting was held to guide the simultaneous launch of the Programme in the countries. To this end, the coordinating agencies provided a methodology for designing the individual country project documents, a working document dated 25 June 2003. To start the activities in Burkina Faso the programme coordinator visited the country during the month of July. This visit was followed by a letter dated 9 September, which invited Burkina Faso to submit a work plan and three CVs of possible consultants to carry out the work. The consultant was selected and approval to engage financing given by a communication dated 23 October 2003. The consultant was ready to start the work by the end of November/beginning of December 2003. At the moment the evaluation mission visited the country in January 2004, the draft consultant report was due to be submitted to the National Coordinator. The National Steering Committee will discuss it before it will be forwarded to the programme coordinator.

The preparation of the JITAP II country programme document coincided with the preparation of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003, in which the Inter-Institutional Committee was heavily involved. In fact, the cotton dossier, which not just reflected the national negotiation position but for the first time a common position of a number of West-African cotton growing countries, became one of the key issues of Cancún.

16 3 MEASURING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN BURKINA FASO

This chapter deals with the indicators that have been developed for the input, output, outcome and impact of the TRTA activities that are subject to this IOB evaluation. The specific set of indicators selected for the JITAP programme in Burkina Faso (and Tanzania) can be found in the evaluation matrix in Annex 1. The indicators of impact have been derived from two objectives of the Netherlands in supporting providers of TRTA.

3.1 Input

Funding of JITAP in Burkina Faso

Total budget of JITAP I amounted at USD 10,439,214 of which USD 1,376,000 was allocated to Burkina Faso. The real expenditures made by the agencies may have been higher since all three Geneva based organisations claim to have given backstopping support in excess of the regular foreseen overhead.

From the donor side, all financial contributions to Burkina Faso took place under the so-called window 2; either as funds earmarked directly to Burkina Faso or more broadly to the four least developed countries, as was the case for the Netherlands.

JITAP I has had a slow start as can be seen from the figures given in the JITAP I Final report. This was equally the case for Burkina Faso. Overall, implementation lagged behind schedule with only 53 percent of available funds being spent at the end of 2000. The Burkina Faso programme performed slightly better with 57 percent of total allocated funds spent.

Total funds allocated to Burkina Faso were slightly lower than budgeted. Although the JITAP I Final Report states that all planned activities were completed by the end of December 2002, expenditures, according to the report foreseen on the 2002 budget, still continued in 2003.

Table 3.1 Budget and expenditures for Burkina Faso during JITAP I Year Budget Expenditure USD USD 1998 536,000 87,124 1999 650,000 369,941 2000 190,000 312,305 2001 - - 237,245 2002 - - 286,838 2003 - - 46,912 Total 1,376,000 1,340,365 Source: JITAP I Project document and JITAP I Final Report. Expenditures based on recalculation of percentages

The pace of expenditures was sometimes slower than expected because of budgetary constraints of the implementing agencies. Especially the 2001 annual plan encountered long delays because of liquidity problems.

17 Most input in staff time was supplied by the ITC in Geneva, as both the coordinator and the administrator of the CTF. In all three agencies, specified people have been charged with the implementation of the programme, but not a single agency has a full time officer for a specific country. In ITC, two officers are responsible for West Africa, both covering several countries.

In Burkina Faso, the UNDP is in charge of the financial administration of JITAP. Several officers are involved in the management of the programme.

Local management

In Burkina Faso, the programme is managed by a national steering committee (NSC, in French Comité National de Pilotage) as envisaged above (see 2.2). After the start of the programme in 1998, the NSC sought official recognition. It was officially established by a ministerial order in September 2000. The order provides for nine members under the presidency of the Director General of Trade.

In reality, the NSC never met in this composition. Since the NSC was created by a ministerial order alone, the Director General of Trade, who assumes the presidency, did not feel authorised to invite donors to the meetings. In fact, the NSC reduced itself to four members; the Director General of Trade, the National Office for External Trade (ONAC), the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts (CCIA-B) and the Director General of Customs.

Although the members of the Chamber of Commerce are elected by private sector operators, the Chamber itself is still considered as a government controlled organisation by many. The NSC does not have members from professional organisations or civil society.

Meetings of the NSC were planned to be held quarterly and in addition as often as necessary according to issues coming up. In reality, the quarterly meetings were not held regularly and meetings are organised according to needs. The NSC seems not to have fully functioned as intended. One of the main reasons has been that it is partly eclipsed by the CNSC/OMC (see 3.2).

3.2 Output

Information and training courses

Number and type of training courses. A large number of training courses were held under the project. They can be divided in three groups:

The first group concerned the training of trainers. Three people received training over three months. Seven other people received a three-week training course in Geneva. Together they form the group of generalists. A large number of people were trained as trainers on specific projects. The list of trainers totals about 70 names but several of them received training on more than one subject.

18 The second group concerned technical officers and members of the CNSC/OMC who all received training under the programme. Refreshment courses were organised in summer 2003 as part of the preparation of the WTO negotiations in Cancún.

The third group concerned the private sector. A large number of training sessions, mostly in the form of workshops and seminars, have been organised.

Assistance to Customs. Information on multilateral trade agreements has been provided and several officers were trained as trainers on matters related to customs.

A study tour to the technical centre of customs in Lomé was organised with the participation of six officers. The tour is reported as JITAP activity, but was financed from the national budget.

In fact, on customs little was done. Customs face important challenges due to integration into the WAEMU. This requires means that largely exceed the funds available in JITAP. Therefore customs benefit from large projects financed in the framework of WAEMU and from support given by the World Customs Organisation. JITAP only provides some complementary support through the training cluster.

Inter-Institutional Committees, Reference Centres and National Enquiry Point set up

Inter-Institutional Committee. The Inter-Institutional Committee (IIC) in Burkina Faso was not newly created by JITAP. There existed already a WTO Cell to follow WTO- issues, which was governed by a ministerial order. Under JITAP this Cell was upgraded. It was renamed the “Cellule Nationale de Suivi et de Coordination de la Mise en Oeuvre des Accords de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce CNSC/OMC” and officially established by presidential decree in September 2000. It has 45 members, 37 from the public service, five from the private sector, two from civil society and one from the university.

The CNSC/OMC had some fifteen sessions between December 1999 and the end of 2002. In 2003 several more meetings were organised in the framework of the preparation of the ministerial conference in Cancún.

The CNSC/OMC has three committees:

I. Committee 1 on Market Access; II. Committee 2 on Trade in Services; III. Committee 3 on TRIPS.

The first committee has been subdivided in three subcommittees:

I. Sub-committee 1: Agriculture; II. Sub-committee 2: Customs Valuation; III. Sub-committee 3: Trade Disputes.

19 The CNSC/OMC is a technical committee, which coordinates the different layers of society and prepares governmental decisions. The CNSC/OMC reports to a Ministerial Committee under the presidency of the Minister of Trade. This committee was created by presidential decree on 23 May 2003 to conduct the negotiation processes in order to reinforce the position of Burkina Faso in the multilateral trade system. It reinforces the organisational structure by completing the inter-institutional committee, which is mainly of a consultative character, with a decision making layer. The budget of this committee is funded through the state budget.

JITAP reference centres. Two reference centres on matters regarding the multilateral trade system were set up. There is one centre in the Ministry of Trade that targets users from public services. The second centre is with ONAC. It is integrated in the ONAC Tradepoint. This centre is open to the public. It primarily targets businessmen, but students frequent it as well. A centre at the university was not envisaged.

National Enquiry Point on standards. A National Enquiry Point (NEP) on technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and packaging for exportation was established. It has been integrated into the national bureau of standards, Fasonorm, which in turn is hosted within ONAC. The NEP was equipped with a computer, photocopier and a database.

The responsible officer did not receive training in how to run a NEP. A study tour on NEPs was organised. The participant was a high level officer from ONAC, who left ONAC for another project.

Awareness training courses on packaging for exports were held in November and December 2003.

Tools and publications developed by JITAP

Trade information system. A feasibility study for the development of a trade information system was made in September 2000 including an action plan.

Basic documentation like PCTAS on CD-ROM was provided.

The documentation centres, which are part of the reference centres, are operational.

The librarians received a one-week training course.

20 Assessment tool of export and market potentials / export development strategies. A matrix of export products and markets was made in 1999 by ITC in collaboration with ONAC. The preliminary results were presented at a national symposium and seminar for high-level officials and traders in November 1999. Based on the preliminary report and the discussion held during the seminar, a final report was produced entitled: “Burkina Faso: Matrice des produits et marchés d’exportation” in June 2000.

A similar survey on the export potential for services was not done.

According to the project document of 1998 five export sector strategies were planned. One was eventually realised within the framework of JITAP. The strategy concerned the sector of oleaginous products, especially sesame, shea nuts, peanuts and cashew nuts. The work was done under the responsibility of a sector counterpart group of 13 members from the public and private sector and prepared by two national consultants with the help of an international consultant from ITC. The study was officially presented at a national symposium in Ouagadougou in January 2003 for an audience of over 100 participants from the public and private sector, civil society and academic circles.

A national strategy of export development was not formulated.

Trade secrets, the export answer book for SMEs. The publication of the book on trade secrets, in Burkina Faso titled “Les clés de l’exportation”, has not been published yet. The publication is the responsibility of ONAC, the national facilitator. The text seems to have been ready for quite some time and was sent to the printer, but it is still awaiting printing. The money was not sent through UNDP channels but to the Treasury to be put at the disposition of ONAC. However, payment has been retained until now, since ONAC did not respect the local procedures in selecting the printer. A solution to the problem seems underway but as a consequence the document is not yet available.

Export financing book. This book, titled “Comment approcher les banques?” has not been published either. Like the trade secrets book, ONAC is responsible for this book as well and the printing of it encounters the same problems as the former.

3.3 Outcome

Understanding of multilateral trade issues by individual officers who participated in training

Understanding of multilateral trade issues has certainly been enhanced by JITAP. Before JITAP, there was little knowledge of these issues and people were not aware of their importance. JITAP has raised this awareness, but the great break-through in awareness on international trade issues has been the Cotton Initiative taken by four West and Central African countries in Cancún. Today WTO issues are known to a broad public including large numbers of farmers who depend upon cotton growing. JITAP has helped to raise the necessary awareness and knowledge amongst public servants and traders.

Training was focused on public civil servants. Information needs of government administrators and private sector operators differ. This was hardly taken into account

21 in the training courses and in the selection of trainers to train. For the public service, general knowledge and negotiation capacities are central while operators often ask for more practical know-how. The CNSC/OMC confirms this observation and will address it under JITAP II. During this phase, more emphasis will be put on other actors while the training course will have a more pragmatic character.

One of the groups that JITAP did not reach was the parliament, which is responsible for approval of legislation. A special training is now being planned for members of parliament in anticipation of future harmonisation of national legislation.

As mentioned above, University courses were outdated and based on GATT agreements. An update of the curriculum has taken place following the training followed by university staff. Trainers, trained by JITAP, equally provided courses to the regional West African Economic and Social Studies Centre (CESAO), which also intends to modernise its training courses related to multilateral trade.

Number of IIC meetings

According to the JITAP I final report for Burkina Faso, the CNSC/OMC met 15 times in the period between December 1999 and November 2002 without counting the meetings of the (sub-) committees.

According to the decree the CNSC/OMC should meet quarterly and as required. Exact figures on the number of meetings in 2003 were not provided. However, several meetings were held since the CNSC/OMC and its committees were heavily involved in the preparation of the WTO negotiations in Cancún. In April 2003, the members of the CNSC/OMC received a special three-day training from a WTO-expert to strengthen the negotiation capacities.

The CNSC/OMC produced several documents. In order to update the knowledge of the members of the CNSC/OMC a document was published titled “Comprendre l’OMC avant Cancún.” The document was used in the above-mentioned training session. During the preparations of the negotiations the CNSC composed a comprehensive compendium of the negotiation positions of Burkina Faso and the main negotiating groups and partners.

The CNSC/OMC is also informed on the ongoing TPR and coordination of activities takes place through this committee. Draft texts were distributed for comment amongst the members during a CNSC meeting on 26 January 2004.

Number and type of multilateral trade system impact studies completed

One impact study was realised under JITAP: Nancy, G. et al: L’impact du Cycle de l’Uruguay sur l’économie du Burkina Faso. The report, prepared in November 1999, was officially discussed at a high level symposium/seminar in December of the same year together with the matrix of export products and markets (see 3.2).

The study did not result in legislative actions to harmonise Burkina Faso’s legislation with WTO rules. In fact, the study concluded that WTO agreement did not lead to urgent constraints with regard to the national legislation. Rather, the real constraints following the process of external liberalisation of the economies lay in the internal

22 operation of these economies, demanding adaptation of legislation with regard to investments, competition, and fiscal and social policy.

Number of cases in which national legislation has been checked on WTO rules

No actions were taken in this respect since this was not considered a priority. In fact, the impact study (see above) concluded that WTO agreements imply little constraints with regard to the national legislation. Further, WTO agreements apply anyhow since they take precedence over domestic legislation (see 1.1). It was only towards the end of JITAP I in December 2002 that the CNSC/OMC prepared the terms of reference of an inventory study of national legislation in relation to WTO agreements.

JITAP II activities in this domain might be reconsidered in the light of the WTO Trade Policy Review that is being prepared and scheduled for June 2004.

Number and types of priority sector strategies developed

The matrix of export products and markets identified five products and tourist services as potentially promising sectors. Delayed implementation and budgetary constraints resulted in only one study of the sector of oleaginous products. The study presents a comprehensive analysis of internal and external supply and demand for peanuts, shea nuts, cashew nuts and sesame seeds.

After finalisation of this study, the permanent secretary of the agriculture sector policies coordination (SPCPSA), an inter-ministerial institution under the presidency of the Ministry of Agriculture, took over and carried out two supplementary studies, one on the diagnostics of the sector, the other for the formulation of a plan of actions to be implemented. Both complementary studies were financed from other donor funds.

From the private sector side, the study was followed by new initiatives as well. One of the exporters of shea nuts found a possible Dutch partner for the transformation of the nuts into shea nut butter and a feasibility study is underway with financing from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs through the so-called PESP-programme.

Another sector of possible interest concerned the sector of fruits and vegetables. Taking the JITAP financed oleaginous sector strategy study as an example, the SPCPSA ordered a study of the sector of fruits and vegetables and financed it from the ongoing World Bank Agricultural Sector program. The results of this study were discussed on a workshop at the end of January and should result in the formulation of a plan of action.

Under JITAP II a study of the leather and skin is sector is proposed.

Priority ranking of the sectors is not clear. Although all studies are certainly relevant, it might be more challenging for JITAP II to choose a relatively underdeveloped sector like tourism. Development of this sector might result in interesting side effects like more air traffic with increased opportunities for export of products for many other sectors.

23 The planned national sector strategy of export development was not formulated. Such a strategy appears highly relevant, as shown in the impact study that concludes that the main constraint do not as much come from external requirements but rather concern the internal functioning of the economy. Essential elements that are mentioned are modern property legislation, adaptation of fiscal and social measures and administrative and judiciary reforms. Such a study should also provide clear criteria for selecting priority sectors. This might be done by carrying out a SWOT1 analysis for each of the sectors of potential interest.

Discussions with the CNSC/OMC showed that the issue of a comprehensive national strategy is part of a debate within the implementing agencies: The WTO, ITC and UNCTAD. Some defend a top down approach starting with a national strategy; others prefer a bottom-up approach building on a series of sector studies. With regards to Burkina Faso, the second school seems to prevail.

Use of network facilities, tools and publications developed under JITAP

Use of reference centres. The reference centre within the Ministry of Trade is little used. The centre occupies two rooms: One office with the donor-provided equipment and one room with the documentation. The computer is operational but the photocopier was in need of repair. The documentation room could not be visited since the last visitor took the key with him. The librarian left some time ago and was not replaced. Since then the Director of External Trade took over the responsibility, which is hardly compatible with her other tasks.

The reference centre in ONAC is located in the Trade Point. It is used by the business sector and by students. In fact, students are the majority, the more so since there is no reference centre at the University. They not only use the centre for their own study purposes but they often act on the requests of businessmen, many of whom are illiterate and not able to consult the centre themselves. A register is held showing the use of the centre. The equipment provided is operational.

There is no reference centre at the University, but this is planned under JITAP II. There is a great demand for such a centre. As a result of the knowledge acquired under JITAP, University staff profoundly revised the curriculum of business education, which, before JITAP, was still based on GATT. The new curriculum is meant to incite increasing numbers of staff and students to frequent the reference centre, in excess of its current capacity.

Another option might have been to establish the third centre in Bobo Dioulasso, the second city of the country, which counts an important number of businessmen and has a University as well. However, the CNSC/OMC prefers the third centre to be established in Ouagadougou given the number of possible users, which is much larger than in Bobo Dioulasso. The possibility has been studied of creating some secondary centre in that town linking it directly by Internet to the main centre at the University.

1 SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.

24 Use of Communication and Discussion Facility. The Communication and Discussion Facility (CDF), set up with a view to enable networking with programme partners, is hardly used and unknown to many people. In January 2004, fourteen people from Burkina Faso were inscribed, most of them during a training course. Only person confirmed to have tried to use it but found it of little use. From the four main members of the NSC, the staff of only two of them has registered. At customs, the existence was known but they did not use the facility. Its existence appeared unknown to the Chamber of Commerce.

Membership and use of networks of trainers and national MTS experts. According to the founders, some 40 people who were trained as trainers on WTO issues under the programme organised themselves as an association named “Expertise commerce multilateral”. The association has not yet been active, awaiting official recognition. Once recognised, which is expected in January 2004, the association will meet to plan further activities.

The information on the number of adherents was not confirmed through the questionnaires, which were sent out to a selected number of JITAP training course participants (see Annex 2). Of a total of fifteen persons who answered the questionnaires, only three were members of the association and two intended to become a member. Five persons declared not to be informed about the association.

While a large number of people were trained as trainers, few of them were involved in training activities later. Two out of three generalist trainers that answered the questionnaire declared to have given training but these training sessions exclusively concerned members of the CNSC/OMC. Of the twelve specialist trainers, only three effectively gave training courses to a significant number of participants.

The large number of high-ranking civil servants among the JITAP trainees indicates that enhancing professional performance, besides possible material benefits, has been an important goal as well and this is confirmed by the survey as well. The training did increase know-how and awareness in society but created less effective teaching capacity than expected.

Selection criteria were not elaborated. Many candidates confirm not to have had pedagogic training or experience before and this aspect was not part of the JITAP training courses. Further, some capacity went lost by transfer of officers to other posts and some trainees died. More surprising, however, is that some people left the civil service because they reached the legal age for retirement or will do so shortly. In this case the selection of younger people could have been more efficient and effective.

Use of export answer book and financing guide. Neither book has been used because they have not been published yet. Given the fact that the texts are ready and the necessary money has been transferred quite long time ago, this is unacceptable.

Use of the National Enquiry Point. Fasonorm, the national bureau of standards, has only recently been created. It started its activity during the year 2003 by the establishment of a number of sector committees and a work plan. Priority sectors for the development of certificates and standards are leather and skins and handicraft

25 products. The first certificates and standards are planned to be produced within the coming two years.

JITAP contributed to awareness raising and expertise in this field and several staff members have been trained under the programme as well. The NEP is operational but not very much visited since it is still relatively unknown to the public. The NEP is in a different room than the reference centre and is little visible. A position closer to the reference centre and open to the general public might be advisable.

Besides from JITAP Fasonorm receives support from the “programme qualité”, a WAEMU programme, implemented by UNIDO and financed by the EC.

3.4 Impact

Increase of budget of MCPEA for trade policy making

For the moment the CNSC/OMC is still functioning on funds coming from JITAP. In autumn 2003, the functioning of JITAP structures was included in the budget proposal of the Ministry of Trade, but budget preparations were still underway at the moment of this mission.

After JITAP, the CNSC/OMC hopes that other donors can be found to take over it’s financing. Nevertheless, the government is well aware of the need for funding since the decree explicitly states the need to elaborate an annual budget of which “funding will be assured by the State budget or any other source.”

The Ministerial Committee, which is the upper layer of the CNSC/OMC (see 3.2), is financed through the state budget.

Counterpart contributions from government and private sector

Counterpart contributions are in the form of office space, human resources and operation costs for the reference centres and the NEP. On several occasions the number of participants in training courses was increased in excess of the budget at the expense of the government or one of the participating institutions. For example, seven persons were trained as generalists in Geneva while only six were provided for in the JITAP budget, the seventh being paid by ONAC.

In other cases, additional courses were provided by own funds or the funds of other projects, as was the case of the librarian of the ONAC reference centre. In the case of the sector strategy study of oleaginous products, a study tour was made to Europe. Participants from the private sector paid their own subsistence costs, while JITAP only funded the air tickets.

Number of cases in which national legislation has been adapted to comply with WTO rules

None (see 3.3).

26 New trade policy papers

The programme did not lead to the formulation of national trade policy papers as explained above (see 3.3). However, the government did adopt a policy letter for private sector development. This document gives an analysis of the current situation in this sector and proposes a strategy of structural reforms and adjustment of the economy in order to enhance the competitiveness of the enterprises. This is in line with the above-mentioned impact study that put the emphasis on internal constraints.

The main lines of intervention proposed in the private sector development paper are:

S Improvement of the legal environment for business; S Continuation of divesting the state from productive and competitive sectors; S Enhancement of enterprise capacities; S Development of private sector support institutions; S Development of the potential of the agricultural, agro-industrial and animal husbandry sectors; S Financing of the private sector; S Development of infrastructure; S Job promotion and protection; S Development of the mining sector.

International trade does not get explicit attention in this letter but is implicitly present throughout the different proposed strategic lines of intervention.

Bilateral and regional trade agreements negotiated by Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is one of the founding members of WAEMU. In 2000 a full customs union became effective. Regional trade agreements are negotiated within WAEMU. Many WTO issues are not handled bilaterally but within the framework of WAEMU. The Bangui agreement on property rights is an example of this.

The WAEMU has one common external tariff. Implementation of the customs union implied an important reorganisation of the customs organisation. This is being implemented with the help of large donors as the World Bank and the EC.

WAEMU, composed of French speaking countries, is part of the larger ECOWAS, which also includes English speaking countries like Ghana. Negotiations are ongoing to extend the customs union to ECOWAS, or otherwise to study the possibility of admitting Ghana to the WAEMU.

Multilateral trade negotiation positions developed by Burkina Faso

At the closure of the ministerial conference in Doha, 2001, the ministers adopted a declaration in which they promised to start global negotiations to “ reduce all kinds of export subsidies” and to “considerably reduce internal support that distorts exchanges.” However, during the preparations for the ministerial conference in Cancún, 2003, the group of developing countries concluded that little progress had been made so far in the field of agriculture.

27 In this light, Burkina Faso launched a proposal to abolish internal support to cotton growing, raw cotton being the main export product of the country. To defend this position, it formed an alliance with three other cotton exporting countries from the region, Benin, Mali and Chad. Their common action became known as the “cotton initiative.” Active support was sought and found from the large majority of other developing countries. The initiative encountered strong opposition from the USA and less so from the EC, who only would consider the question within the context of a not yet concluded overall agreement on agriculture, whilst the developing countries wanted to see some of the promised progress, albeit for one crop only. No compromise could be found and the conference ended with a breakdown without the usual common declaration.

In Burkina Faso, the CNSC/OMC has been heavily involved in the preparations of the conference. A special request to finance the preparation under JITAP was introduced and agreed upon. The members of the CNSC/OMC received a special training course to enhance their knowledge. Subsequently, the CNSC/OMC elaborated a comprehensive overview of the main negotiation positions (see also 3.3 above). Further support during preparations and negotiations was received by IDEAS, a Swiss ONG, funded by a group of donors supporting the “emergency project 2003.”

At previous conferences, Burkina Faso was generally represented by a small delegation of three persons, the costs of which were covered by WTO. This time, Burkina Faso decided to send a large delegation, not only composed of members of the civil service, but also representatives of the private sector, civil society, the parliament and the cotton farmers’ associations. Pubic opinion was mobilised as well. A petition denouncing the negative effects of the cotton growing subsidies by developed countries on the revenues of the peasants was signed by 80,000 cotton growers and formally presented to the president of the conference. A side effect of these actions is that nowadays a large public in Burkina Faso is well aware of the significance and impact of WTO issues on the national economy.

Multilateral trade issues in which Burkina Faso is actively engaged

The main issues in which Burkina Faso is actively engaged is the Agreement on Agriculture through the cotton initiative as described in 3.4. During the preparations and negotiations of the ministerial conference in Cancún, Burkina Faso and the other three initiators of this initiative denounced western subsidies on cotton growing. They gained important support from most of the developing countries, but encountered strong resistance from the western bloc, especially the USA. A compromise was not found and the conference broke down.

Since the problem was not solved, negotiations will continue during the coming months, or years. This will require a considerable effort from the four initiators, who have little experience in this kind of negotiating. Ongoing support in this respect from JITAP and others will therefore be most welcome.

There are no other main issues in which Burkina Faso is bilaterally engaged. Most trade related issues are treated on the regional level in the framework of WAEMU, ECOWAS or the Cotonou agreements. Such is the case on TRIPS, which is treated by the African Organisation of Intellectual Property created by the Agreement of Bangui.

28 Expanded export capacities

JITAP did not result in expanded export capacities. The sector strategy for oleaginous products was only developed towards the end of JITAP I. Following this study a plan of action was adopted but not yet fully implemented.

Following this study, the SPCPSA organised a similar study of the fruits and vegetables sector. This sector was flourishing in the beginning of the 1980s but then started to decline. The government now seeks to re-launch this sector.

Although JITAP did not directly contribute to higher exports, it helped to reshape thinking in terms of awareness to export opportunities.

29 30 4 ASSESSING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN BURKINA FASO

This chapter presents the scores on the JITAP performance in Burkina Faso. The scores on the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance follow from a uniform scoring methodology developed for all TRTA activities that are subject of this IOB evaluation. For the ranking, a five-point scale is applied: Poor (P), Weak (W), Fair (F), Good (G), and Excellent (E). An explanation of the rating methodology can be found in Annex 2.

4.1 Efficiency

Output delivered according to plan, budget and schedule (Score: P)

JITAP I was planned for two and a half years from March 1998 to the third quarter of 2000. Eventually JITAP I lasted nearly twice as long, until December 2002. While the programme remained mainly unchanged, the delays were due to long and slow procedures and to untimely funding from the donor side. JITAP II did not (yet) solve this problem. While the programme was officially launched in February 2003, thanks to lengthy procedures that concerned especially the recruitment of consultants, the national programme of Burkina Faso for JITAP II was still not finalised at the end of January 2004. On the donor side, several donors, including the Dutch, had not yet released their pledges towards the end of 2003.

The final report of JITAP I states, with regard to Burkina Faso, that “ All planned activities in the country were completed by December 2002.” (JITAP I Final Report, p.8) This was certainly not the case. While some activities were cancelled for good reasons, others were carried out and paid for but not finalised at the time of the final report and even not at the time of this evaluation mission. This concerns especially the two publications “Les clés d’exportation” and “Comment approcher les banques?”

Project management was not always functioning properly. Tasks were divided between several institutions, but a final coordinating body with decisive powers was lacking. During implementation responsibilities gradually changed form the focal point and the NSC to the CNSC/OMC. This move is seen as positive, but tasks and responsibilities should be more clearly defined with the possibility of ministerial intervention if needed.

Overall, the programme was too ambitious. Assistance to customs, both by content and budget, was far below real needs given the tremendous change stemming from the requirements of the full customs union, which became effective in 2000 between the members of WAEMU. In this sense, JITAP could only provide some minor complementary assistance.

It is the same with regard to the sector strategies. According to the project document, five strategies should be made for four product groups and for one group of services. Only one strategy was made towards the end of the project. Given the eventual result of this study one may conclude that either the study is much more elaborate than intended or there has been a mismatch between budget and activities right from the beginning.

31 Relationship between input and output (Score: W)

An overall assessment of the relation between input and output is difficult to make since the judgement between the different items strongly differs. With regard to institution building and training courses, the output is good while on other items assessment is poor either because nothing was achieved or less was done because of a mismatch between the budget and planned activities. Overall, the input-output relationship obtains a rating of weak.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of different sub-scores on efficiency.

Table 4.1 Input-output relationship of JITAP in Burkina Faso Input Output Score on efficiency Realised expenditures USD Overall IIC. In Burkina Faso G 1.34 million CNC/OMC, with three sub- Additional funds were provided committees officially created by by the state budget, from other law with annual budgets to be donor funds and from financial included in the regular state contribution from participants budget on study tours Staff time: Assistance to the Customs P ITC about 22 days a month; Department marginal and only complementary to other ongoing large projects Meetings of JITAP national WTO impact study realised F steering committee according to needs Two JITAP reference centres, W one of which is working good, the other one is less active Ten generalists trained (one E above budget) ; Nine training workshops held Assessment report of potential F export products and export markets One export development P strategies for oleaginous products out of five No export financing book and P export answer book National Enquiry Point on TBT F and SPS established Communication and Discussion P Facility not functioning E=excellent; G=good; F=fair; W=weak; P=poor

Overall score on efficiency: Weak (W)

32 4.2 Effectiveness

An overall assessment of effectiveness is difficult to make because of the wide variety of activities. Whilst a good number of activities show good results others completely failed. Some activities were not carried out for good reasons.

A sort of IIC already existed before JITAP in the form of the WTO cell. JITAP built on this cell, which resulted in the legal establishment of the CNSC/OMC. The CNSC/OMC has been very active in the preparations for Cancún. It meets regularly and is involved in the WTO Trade Policy Review that is currently being carried out.

Knowledge sharing and dissemination through the multiple training courses has been successful and has proved useful during the preparations for Cancún. A network of trainers is being established, although is not yet very active. Biased attention towards the civil service will be addressed under JITAP II.

Assistance to customs was mainly dealt with under other international cooperation programmes. JITAP only made minor, but well appreciated contributions.

JITAP did not induce a change of trade legislation following the main finding of the WTO impact study that WTO agreements did not constitute major obstacles in relation to national legislation.

On export enhancing activities, part of the work was done. Two reference centres were set up, one of which is much frequented. It is not only used for business purposes, but also by students and university staff, who express an increasing need for information.

The books on export promotion and financing have not yet been published and so there can be no effectiveness.

A national trade strategy was not developed. This was partly the result of internal discussions within the executing agencies regarding the choice between a bottom-up or top-down approach.

Out of the five planned export sector strategy studies, only one was produced. This is hardly efficient, but the effectiveness of the one that was produced is considered as good because a follow-up was devoted to the study and it was used as an example to produce a further one on the initiative of the Ministry of Agriculture.

In the general context of Burkina Faso, awareness raising could be considered as the key element of the programme. Since much progress has been achieved here, the general assessment is good taking into account that the elements still lacking will be addressed during the consolidation phase.

33 Table 4.2 Output-outcome relationship of JITAP in Burkina Faso Output Outcome Effectiveness IIC and subcommittees Regular meetings; heavily G involved in Cancún preparations; Workshops Customs Only one workshop, other W technical assistance needs addressed under other programmes (WCO, EC) MTS Impact studies No legal adjustments made in F line with conclusions Reference Centres One Centre functions well, the W other does not function properly Training courses Courses sensitised participants; F proven useful in Cancún preparations; several courses dispatched to other groups; biased to civil services Network of trainers Trainers association exists on paper only, CDF is not utilised P Trade Secrets Guide and Trade secrets guide and export P Export financing book financing book have not been published Export development One strategy formulated, F strategies understood and validated. Implementation yet to follow under JITAP II; plan of action developed and one other strategy started with other funds Standards National Enquiry Point installed. W Fasonorm at its very beginning E=excellent; G=good; F=fair; W=weak; P=poor

In this evaluation, every sub-score has been given the same weight. As the sub- scores include two P, three W, three F and one G, the overall score for effectiveness is just under the average of weak and fair. Though the good score on effectiveness of the ICC is worth mentioning, this is not enough to qualify the overall score as fair. Taking all sub-scores into account, the overall score for effectiveness is weak.

Overall score on effectiveness: Weak (W)

4.3 Relevance

For the relevance of JITAP in Burkina Faso, an assessment has been made of the contribution of the activities under this programme to the achievement of the three Dutch policy objectives for support to TRTA. The following questions were identified for this assessment:

S To what extent has the outcome of the programme contributed to the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development? S To what extent has the outcome of the programme contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

34 S To what extent has the outcome of the programme contributed to the capacity of the developing country to improve its trade performance?

Table 4.3 indicates whether or not these Dutch policy objectives fall within the domain of the JITAP programme in Burkina Faso.

Contribution of JITAP to national policy at the interface of trade and development in Burkina Faso (Score: W)

A comprehensive national trade policy was not developed under JITAP. In fact, this was not actively pursued by the implementing agencies.

With regard to national legislation, the WTO impact study did not detect major obstacles. It recommended action on the internal functioning of the economy. This problem was addressed in the Policy Letter for Private Sector Development.

Contribution of JITAP I to capacity in Burkina Faso to negotiate and implement multilateral agreements (Score: G)

Burkina Faso developed a strong position in the negotiations on agricultural agreements with regard to raw cotton through the cotton initiative. It has streamlined and coordinated the activities around this issue. The IIC, which was reinforced under JITAP, proved a welcome instrument in the preparations and a ministerial committee was created for the final coordination. JITAP has undoubtedly contributed positively to this process by raising awareness and knowledge at an important moment and assisting in the creation of necessary structures and expertise.

JITAP I contributed to the formulation of the negotiating position mainly by providing well in advance the necessary knowledge and by raising awareness. However, both outsiders and Burkina Faso’s officials participating in the negotiations see their overall negotiating capacity as weak. In fact, enhancing negotiating capacity was not a direct objective of JITAP I. Since Cancún it has become a priority.

The cotton initiative has raised awareness of multilateral trade issues in a broader sense. Therefore the CNSC/OMC shows itself capable of handling other issues. The CNSC/OMC is well aware of the need to involve wider society in the process as well.

JITAP is one element of a broader structure. Many multilateral issues are not dealt with at the national level, but at the regional level of the WAEMU, with important assistance from other donor parties as well. Knowledge acquired under JITAP has made the participation of participants from Burkina Faso more effective according to the interviewees.

Contribution of JITAP I to the trade performance of Burkina Faso (Score: W)

Under JITAP I only one sector strategy was finalised, while a second one was undertaken with other funds. Implementation of the action plans has just started. Chances of positive results are good as the development of export capacities has become a policy issue and funds are available independently from JITAP. However, at this moment it is still too early to draw a conclusion with regard to the final outcome.

35 Table 4.3 Relevance JITAP-Burkina Faso Indicator Indicator within the scope of the Score TRTA programme Contribution to national policy at Yes W the interface of trade and development Increased capacity to negotiate Yes G and implement multilateral trade agreements Contribution to improved trade Yes W performance

Overall score on relevance: Fair (F)

4.4 Specific issues

4.4.1 Ownership

Although the eventual outcome of the cotton initiative is still unclear, people in Burkina Faso are proud of it. The initiative was a major breakthrough in the thinking of multilateral agreements. For the first time it was realised that those agreements were not just a dictate from the outside but the results of negotiations in which the country plays a role as well. Within this development, JITAP plays a minor but useful role.

As a result, JITAP can be considered as being owned by Burkina Faso. Through the CNSC/OMC, the activities of JITAP are well integrated in larger governmental programmes and actions, often finding synergies with other donor activities.

The National University is involved as well. JITAP is positively appraised for having contributed to the modernising of the business education curriculum. Plans are developed to use JITAP II to further elaborate and implement the renewed curriculum. A reference centre is seen as an important complement to the traditional libraries.

The private sector is only partly involved in JITAP. In fact, there is some dichotomy in the class of entrepreneurs. One group of traders and entrepreneurs is closely involved in employers’ organisations, professional associations and institutions like the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts. Others see these organisations as too closely linked to the administration and prefer a more independent stance. JITAP hardly reaches the latter group, the more so since they expect little from the government, which, until recently, had relatively little to offer.

4.4.2 Coordination

Agency coordination

Contacts for the programme lie with the programme coordinator within ITC. There is regular and direct contact between the coordinator and the focal point. Locally missions are coordinated through contacts with the NSC from the recipient side and through the UNDP office in Ouagadougou.

36 Donor coordination

There is no donor coordination on trade related issues. In fact, there are no important bilateral trade programmes. Large trade programmes of the EC and World Bank operate in the first place at regional level with WAEMU.

There is a private sector coordination donor group, in which the Netherlands participates on an ad hoc basis. Indirectly, private sector development programmes can touch trade as well, although it is not their primary goal. Over the last year this group has not been very active.

JITAP was not or hardly known among local donor representatives. Concerning JITAP, no coordination on the ground between local donor representatives and their respective headquarters was found. All JITAP donor coordination is supposed to take place in Geneva and between Geneva representatives and their respective headquarters without involving their local representatives.

Donors could have been involved in JITAP coordination through the NSC in which in principle a place is reserved for them. However, the presidency of the NSC has been reluctant to invite donors for reasons of protocol as explained before.

Coordination between JITAP and IF

This does not apply. Although Burkina Faso is eligible for IF, the programme did not yet start.

Dialogue between The Hague and RNE at country level on JITAP and coherence

Before the evaluation mission JITAP was hardly known to the embassy staff. As a consequence there has been no monitoring and reporting and the embassy did not refer to JITAP activities in its facilitation of contacts between Dutch and Burkinabé traders and in its contacts with Dutch organisations like the Centre for Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI). Further to the export strategy study, a feasibility study on the transformation of cashew nuts is being made under the Programme of Economic Cooperation Projects (PESP) and support is given under the Retiring Managers Programme (PUM), both initiated by the private sector.

Private sector development is not one of the four pillars of the country programme, which are macro-economic budget support, education, health and local development. RNE considers that private sector development is already sufficiently covered by other donors and that the Netherlands does not have a comparative advantage in this field. As such, trade activities of RNE mainly consist of facilitating contacts between traders from Burkina Faso and the Netherlands. There exist regular contacts with CBI.

At the political level, Burkina Faso, together with the other initiators, receives full policy support from the Dutch minister for development cooperation as well as from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Agriculture with regard to the cotton initiative. During the preparations of Cancún, several European countries were visited by a delegation of the four countries. In the Netherlands, the delegation met with the ministries of trade, agriculture and international cooperation. In Germany, the

37 Minister of International Cooperation committed himself, supported by his Dutch colleague, to study the possibility of a compensation fund with their European colleagues and discuss this at the general meetings of World Bank and IMF.

At European level, which regards the Netherlands as well, there is no full coherence. Whilst DG Development, like the Dutch minister of international cooperation, supports the cotton initiative, DG Trade is more inclined to the American position. This resulted in an ambiguous position of Europe during the ministerial conference in Cancún.

4.4.3 Beneficiaries

The main export products of Burkina Faso are raw agricultural products. By far the most important one is raw cotton, which amounts to 60 percent of all exports. Main short-term export prospects lay in raw agricultural products like fruit and vegetables, nuts and live animal husbandry, followed by processed products such as hides and skins, dried fruits and vegetable oil and handicraft.

JITAP I mainly benefited government services and public bodies and, to a lesser extent, private sector and (university) education. There are also positive indirect effects of JITAP through improved services. Besides the private sector, farmers are an important group of indirect beneficiaries of improvements in trade conditions. Many thousands of small farmers cultivate cotton, which is all exported. Improvement in world market prices directly benefits this group. This explains the great importance that the government attaches to this subject and the large response from the population.

Fruits, vegetables and nuts also concerns primary production or collected products. An increase in exports improves the marketing of products that now remain often wasted. Here, again, small farmers will directly benefit from improved market conditions.

The next group are private enterprises involved in exports. The number of those enterprises is relatively small. They concern in the first place traders involved in the marketing and export of primary products. Transformed products mainly concern tannery and handicrafts. Attempts are made to diversify production, amongst others by creating a vegetable oil industry.

4.4.4 Follow-up of earlier evaluations

During the lifetime of JITAP I two evaluations were carried out: a mid-term evaluation in October 2000 and a summative evaluation in June 2002.

The mid-term review recommendations included:

S The purpose and mandate of the IICs should be reviewed, with subcommittees focusing on the Agreement on Agriculture and GATS. This was done by the adoption of the decree establishing the CNSC/OMC, including three subcommittees; S Revitalisation of the ICC, stronger commitments of the ministries concerned and more open to the private sector. This was done through a larger involvement of

38 CNSC/OMC in trade issues, especially cotton, the adding of a ministerial committee and extending the IIC to private sector participants; S Development of human resources for strengthening capacity in regard to MTS including high level official and IIC members. This was done; S Use a more realistic timetable given the initial low absorption capacity. This was implicitly done by putting more emphasis on awareness raising and less effort on strategy development; S Strengthening national enquiry points in the area of standards and strengthening of national JITAP networks. Not much progress was made. Functioning of NEP partly depends on the bureau of standards Fasonorm, which started activities only recently.

Some of the main recommendations of the summative evaluation concerned:

S Greater emphasis should be put on trade and poverty issues. This was not done; S Concentration of JITAP on three substantive areas: IIC, HRD capacities and development of export strategies. This was done; S More focusing on supply-side issues in developing export strategies. The export strategy study includes a volume with an analysis of the national production; S Bridging the gap between trade negotiators in Geneva and the recipient country at field level should be studied. This is pursued by the opening of a representation office of Burkina Faso in Geneva. A link with JITAP, however, appears only indirectly; S Given the high management and overhead costs, greater attention should be given to cost-effectiveness. However, JITAP II has a similar budget structure to JITAP I as far as management and overhead costs and expenditures for consultants are concerned. In practice, it seems to encounter the same constraints in implementation as JITAP I (slow decision making, late transfers by donors); S Strengthening the role of the private sector and civil society and engaging local universities, business schools and similar bodies in building up HRD capacity instead of focusing largely on government institutions. This process started under JITAP I and will be further addressed under JITAP II.

The overall conclusion of both evaluations was positive, notwithstanding a large number of critical observations. The uniqueness and pilot character of the programme probably played a role in taking an indulgent approach. Using a results-oriented methodology, the present evaluation has qualified efficiency and effectiveness of JITAP I in Burkina Faso as weak. The evaluation mission also did not register noticeable improvements since both previous evaluation reports. Therefore, the donors should pursue JITAP more critically in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

4.4.5 Future performance

In Burkina Faso, JITAP has contributed to significantly increased awareness in regard to multilateral trade issues. People realise that international agreements are not a dictate from the outside but the results of a process in which the country can take part actively.

39 In the field of international trade and export capacity, authorities and exporters become more and more conscious of lost export opportunities and there is a strong drive to recapture lost markets, like French beans and mango's.

At this moment in time there is a strong will to continue. JITAP coincides with the WAEMU integration process. The country is well aware of multilateral trade issues and ready to address their legislative implications. The focus of JITAP will be extended to other groups, like members of parliament, and will have a more practical approach to be better understandable to private sector operators.

JITAP I focused on awareness-raising and knowledge. With the cotton initiative, the country entered a new phase in which negotiation capacity become crucial. It is important that JITAP, possibly together with others like IDEAS, take this aspect on board. This might even take longer than the two years scheduled for the exit phase.

There is the need to continue export strategies as well. However, it might be advisable that JITAP concentrates more on strengthening capacity for national policy making than on sector studies, which might well be financed through other funds.

Financial sustainability is not arranged for in detail. However, the legal texts governing formal institutions foresee financing from the state budget. Specific activities and follow-up of JITAP activities have been or are being funded from own funds or other donor programmes on several occasions. This situation can be expected to continue after JITAP.

To what extent do the plans of JITAP II concur with Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA (building national trade policy process; increasing capacity of negotiate and implement trade agreements; improving developing countries’ trade performance)?

As stated above, JITAP I helped to raise awareness and knowledge on multilateral trade issues. This was a necessary condition before other steps could be taken. The country is now ripe to progress on the way to increasing negotiation capacity and to implement trade agreements, including the harmonisation of national legislation, which only got low priority under JITAP I.

The JITAP II programme for Burkina Faso was being drafted at time of this evaluation mission. According to the spokesmen, it will put more emphasis on including interest groups from outside the civil services. Equally, the need for training in negotiation techniques needed to pursue the cotton initiative will be addressed.

JITAP II in Burkina Faso is expected to concur with the second Dutch policy objective and indirectly with the third one. Concurrence with the first objective could not be stated by the evaluation mission.

What is the probability that the future outcome of JITAP II interventions will contribute to the Dutch TRTA policy objectives?

Burkina Faso has taken the lead in several domains. As a partner in the cotton initiative, it has made an impressive entrance into multilateral trade negotiations. In the next period, these countries have to strengthen their negotiating capacities in order to reap the maximum benefits of this intervention. JITAP II, together with other interventions, can be instrumental to this process.

40 Sector strategies are undertaken according to national priorities, with funding other than JITAP if needed. JITAP II can contribute by enhancing the quality of those studies and reinforcing national capacities to carry them out.

Legal texts contain articles specifying future funding under the state budget and thus assuring the financial sustainability of the JITAP institutions after the termination of the programme.

Given the high involvement and interest of Burkina Faso in the current trade negotiations, the chances are good that JITAP II will contribute to Dutch policy objectives. This concerns especially the increased capacity to negotiate trade agreements and the improvement of the trade performance of Burkina Faso, which is actively pursued and embedded in the PRSP.

4.5 Conclusion and policy issues

General conclusion

JITAP I had three main objectives. The first one, building national capacity to understand WTO agreements and their implications for Burkina Faso, has been realised in the main. There is not yet a perfect understanding of them and more needs to be done to translate the general understanding into practical messages understandable for private sector operators. Nevertheless, good progress has been made.

The second objective, conforming policy and regulatory framework to the agreements, was not realised. In fact, it was hardly pursued. The study on the impact of the Uruguay Round on the economy of Burkina Faso concluded that harmonisation of regulation was not a major obstacle for the integration of the economy of Burkina Faso in the MTS. As a consequence this objective was not given priority.

The third objective, enhancing of the capacity to take advantage of the agreements through export readiness, was only partly achieved; too little was done in this field.

The programme was too complex and, in some respects, over ambitious. Therefore, many specific objectives could not be realised or even pursued. Nevertheless, the achievements, which were made, are highly appreciated.

The efficiency of JITAP I has been poor. Especially the timely delivery of output has proved a problem and internal management was weak.

Generally speaking, the effectiveness of JITAP I has been weak. This is due to the poor or weak performance of JITAP I as regards workshops on customs, the use of the reference centre, membership and use of networks of trainers, and use of tools and enquiry points. The inter-institutional committee had an exceptionally good score in terms of effectiveness.

All in all, relevance can be considered as fair. Although an explicit national trade policy was not developed and there is not (yet) a noticeable improvement in trade, JITAP has been instrumental in enhancing the negotiating capacity of Burkina Faso.

41 Sustainability of JITAP has not yet been assured. It will depend on the political willingness to continue after the closure of the project. Nevertheless the main bodies like the CNSC/OMC and the Ministerial Committee have been officially recognised by law, assuring equally their funding through the state budget.

Policy issues for the Netherlands

The central agency of JITAP in Burkina Faso has been the inter-institutional committee (ICC). It has been critical in coordinating the participation of different layers of society and in preparing government decisions. The ICC was not set up as a new committee parallel to others, but built on an existing WTO cell. A ministerial committee was created to act upon the preparatory work of the ICC in multilateral trade talks on cotton. The case of JITAP-I in Burkina Faso suggests that political backing and commitment, as well as concerted efforts of technical and political bodies, are important pre-conditions for a programme to be instrumental in contributing to the negotiation capacity of a country during multilateral trade talks.

The other side of the coin should, however, also be mentioned. JITAP I was biased towards the civil service and closely related to state-controlled institutions. Training was rather theoretical and demanded relatively high cognitive skills. The donors should pay attention to the effective inclusion of other groups in the programme and adaptation of training and information to the needs and capacities of these groups. This concerns both the exit phase for JITAP I countries as new countries under JITAP II.

Generally speaking, JITAP I was too complex, over-ambitious and the budget did not match planned activities. In programming JITAP II, more attention should be given to the relationship between a country’s real needs, the absorption capacity of the country and the available budget.

In Burkina Faso there is a total lack of communication and insight between donor representatives in Geneva and their headquarters on the one hand and local donor representatives in Burkina Faso on the other, including the Netherlands. Local donor representatives should be more actively involved in the monitoring of the programme. The situation in Burkina Faso indicates good potential synergies between several programmes dealing with or touching on the domain of international trade. To realise such synergies, local donor representatives need to be regularly informed about the progress of the programme by both their headquarters and the national focal point.

There should be regular feedback between the embassy and DDE and between the embassy and the focal point. Although the Netherlands embassy in Burkina Faso does not have an active trade related programme, the cotton initiative has political implications, which concern the embassy as well. Further, the Netherlands embassy has the mandate to promote partnership between Dutch enterprises and entrepreneurs from Burkina Faso. The export strategy implemented and planned under JITAP deals with subjects, which do present opportunities for such partnerships.

42 PART B

JITAP IN TANZANIA

43 44 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background information on JITAP

African Trade Ministers meeting in Tunis in October 1994 brought up the need for support for integrating their countries into the new Multilateral Trade System. Following the meeting, the WTO Director General and the ITC Executive Director visited a number of African countries to discuss trade challenges and trade-related technical assistance needs.

In May 1996, the heads of WTO, UNCTAD and ITC announced their commitment to develop a joint programme to help meet the need for support expressed by the African countries. The three organisations carried out joint fact-finding missions and need assessments during 1996-1997. Critical needs seemed to be similar in all countries, which led to generic programme activities to address them.

In March 1998 the three organisations set up with donors a Common Trust Fund to initiate the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Uganda and Tanzania.

National Steering Committees were charged with the coordination among participating institutions at national level. A national JITAP focal point was assigned in the ministry responsible for international trade. In Geneva, a steering group comprised of representatives from the three agencies, the donors and partner countries provided guidance to the JITAP programme. Designated focal point officers handled day-to-day management for the three agencies out of Geneva. A Programme Coordinator operating from Geneva facilitated the interaction between Geneva and the participating countries.

The first phase of JITAP came to an end in December 2002. At the same time JITAP II was endorsed, extending the programme for four years (2003-2006) and expanding it to eight new countries.

45 1.2 Trade policy regime of Tanzania

WTO Trade Policy Review (2000)

The report by the WTO Secretariat in the WTO Trade Policy Review (2000) for Tanzania mentions the following on the country’s trade policy regime:

The reforms in Tanzania have resulted in a trade policy framework that has been significantly liberalised and that is essentially based on tariffs. Export restrictions have been eliminated, as have foreign exchange controls.

Customs duties have a five-tier structure with tariff rates of 0 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent and 25 percent. The simple average of applied import duties is 16.2 percent. Since many processed products face the higher tariff rates, there is still substantial import protection to higher-level processing activities. In 1999, 42 percent of the duties were not collected on the mainland due to exemptions granted despite the fact that the Government is highly dependent on revenues from tariffs and VAT.

The Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA) does not comply with the Agreement on Customs, Article VII, that is customs valuation on the basis of the transaction value. Also Tanzania has no national legislation regarding anti-dumping, countervailing, or safeguard measures.

The Tanzanian Bureau of Standards (TBS) has been notified to be the contact point for issues related to the Agreement on Technical Barriers. The Bureau is charged with the administration of standards, which include 572 published standards. Sanitary and phytosanitary standards are the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Tanzania has been amending its legislation to conform to WTO requirements, among which the Copyright Act of 1999. Tanzania intends to meet its obligations in other areas by 2006.

Tanzania lacks enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property infringement and also on competition policy enforcement has been informal.

Due to limited export capacity, Tanzania reaps limited benefits from preferential trading arrangements, such as under Lome IV and through the Generalized System of Preferences.

Tanzania is pursuing a regional integration strategy as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and through moving forward with the strengthening of the East African Co-operation (EAC) agreement with neighbouring Kenya and Uganda.

In Agriculture, the Government has withdrawn from direct involvement in production, processing, and marketing activities. The Government emphasises that liberalisation of international agriculture must lead to improved access to world markets for all Tanzania’s

46 agricultural exports (primary and processed). The mineral sector, focused primarily on gold production, offers one of the best opportunities for growth. The manufacturing sector has been hampered by high input costs, due to tariffs and high-energy prices. In services, Tanzania intends to underline its commitment to telecommunications liberalisation by making specific bindings under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

Tanzania faces many challenges and obstacles to its trade and economic development. Despite its involvement in the Integrated Framework (IF), Tanzania is in need of substantial ongoing technical assistance in a wide range of trade-related areas.

Tanzania is not involved in any dispute settlement proceeding under the WTO. The Government’s report under this first WTO Trade Policy Review for Tanzania mentions that Tanzania’s participation in the multilateral trade negotiations was severely constrained by its limited capacity, both technically and financially. The resources of Tanzania’s Permanent Mission in Geneva were overstretched. Difficulties were also faced in complying with the obligations in the WTO Agreements in terms of notifications and other requirements. In this respect, reference is made to JITAP activities aimed at enhancing the understanding of the Agreements. […] "The primary purpose of JITAP to Tanzania is to help the country in building national capacity for the understanding and thus servicing her obligation arising from being a Member of WTO. […] an Inter- Institutional Technical Committee in WTO has been established but needs to be strengthened […]."

New Trade Policy Paper

In the Government report attached to the first WTO Trade Policy Review (Part III and IV), it was noted that Tanzania did not have a comprehensive trade policy document. But in February 2003, the Government released its National Trade Policy document for the period 2003-2007 with the goal "to facilitate smooth integration into the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) and roll back the gradual descent towards marginalisation". The National Trade Policy Document and Background Papers are the output of a consultative process involving the public and private sectors, civil society and academia.

The five specific objectives of the Government’s new National Trade Policy are:

I. To stimulate trade development for triggering higher performance and capacity to withstand competition; II. To be able to participate effectively in the MTS; III. To encourage value-adding activities on primary exports; IV. To stimulate investment flows into export-oriented areas; V. To attain long-term current account balance.

The National Trade Policy mentions trade policy challenges amongst others for:

S The legal and regulatory framework. Reducing unnecessary bureaucratic procedures but expediting the establishment of market-supporting institutions in the area of regulatory reforms;

47 S Capacity development. Besides human skills development (business education and training in entrepreneurship), institutional capacity building in the Ministry of Industry & Trade (MIT) and its supporting agencies and in business sector associations that serve the private sector.

Trade policy statements are made in the National Trade Policy amongst others on:

S Pre-shipment inspection (PSI). Taking the view of reducing the incidence of mandatory PSI, while encouraging the option of voluntary PSI amongst importers. The success of alternative measures for enhancing conformity to consumer protection and taxation measures, combined with the successful implementation of customs valuation as an independent instrument, will facilitate the gradual elimination of the expensive mandatory PSI; S Customs valuation. Currently the responsibility for mandatory PSI and customs valuation is contracted to private firms. In January 2001, Tanzania introduced a WTO-compatible customs valuation definition. The Government will expedite measures to restore the function of customs valuation under the TRA; S Standards. Initiatives will focus on building public and private sector capacity for conformity to prevailing standards as part of entry strategies in accessing new markets. Also membership, accreditation and participation in international standard setting organisations will be sought as well as building international accreditation capacity on standards at the national level and in collaboration with regional economic partners; S Anti-dumping. Measures will be taken for the enactment of anti-dumping legislation and opportunities emerging from international programmes that aim at capacity building for investigating the existence of dumping and initiating anti-dumping actions. S Rules of origin (RoO). Measures will be taken to observe the RoO preferences requirements and priority will be accorded to building national capacity for utilising this instrument. S Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and MTS. Recognising the benefits from RTAs and the MTS, the government will imply a gradual shift from bilateral arrangements towards trade expansion within the framework of regional and multilateral cooperation. Capacity building is mentioned for private and public sectors for proactive participation in the negotiation and implementation processes of these cooperation arrangements. Specifically on the multilateral trade negotiations, the targets include: ensuring the use of the rules-based system in enhancing national interests and securing the opportunities under the Special and Different (S&D) treatment. The Government aims to include its advocacy initiatives in MTS negotiations in regional schemes such as EAC, SADC and African Group and in political groupings such as the LDCs group. To ensure the success of these measures the Government will strengthen the negotiating capacity of institutions involved.

The National Trade Policy document mentions that the efficiency of a market economy depends upon the establishment of well-functioning market supporting institutions and warns that the reversal of trade liberalisation may be attributable to the failure to establish those market-supporting institutions.

48 Other trade-related programmes and policy documents

A number of bilateral and multilateral support programmes for enhancing the enabling environment including the programme for Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) have been brought under the IF. BEST is a sector wide programme focussing on legal and regulatory reforms and enhanced commercial justice delivery. It also includes components for development of private sector advocacy, strengthening the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and changing the culture of government. BEST is supported by DANIDA, DFID, SIDA and the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE).

MIT (2003) reports that there are about 700,000 new entrants to the labour force annually. About 500,000 of these are school leavers with few marketable skills. The public sector takes up 40,000 of the new entrants, leaving 660,000 to join the unemployed or the informal sector. The National Employment Policy recognises that the private sector, including SMEs, is the major source of employment in Tanzania and outlines policies that will contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector enterprises.

Finally, the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 seeks to transform a low productivity agricultural economy into a semi-industrialised one led by modernised and highly productive agricultural activities, buttressed by supportive industrial and services activities.

1.3 Trade performance of Tanzania

Trends in total trade

PC-TAS trade data for Tanzania are complete until 2001. Hence, for the years 2001 and 2002 trade data have been obtained from the Customs and Excise Department in Tanzania.

The total trade makes up about one fifth of GDP of the country. Imports outnumber exports by a factor of two; consequently, the merchandise trade balance shows a considerable deficit in the recent past.

49 Table 1.1 Trends in total trade of Tanzania, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Merchandise Exports (mln. USD) 635.7 651.3 583.8 625.9 Merchandise Imports (mln. USD) 1,371.7 1,332.3 1,283.9 1,175.0 Total Trade (mln. USD) 2,007.5 1,983.6 1,867.7 1,800.9 Trade Balance (mln. USD) -736.0 -681.0 -700.1 -549.0 Total trade/GDP (%) 26.1 23.7 21.6 19.9 Total trade per capita (USD) 61.7 59.4 54.7 51.7 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003; United Nations, GDP and population data

Table 1.2 Domestic exports and direct imports of Tanzania 2000-2002 (in million Tshs) 2000 2001 2002 Domestic exports 532,863 673,241 864,759 Direct imports 1,217,533 1,517,151 1,617,072 Trade balance -684,670 -843,910 -752,313 Source: Customs and Excise Department, Tanzania Revenue Authority

Domestic export of goods roughly totalled some USD 800 million in 2002, according to data from the Customs and Excise Department. The export of goods has been growing annually, except for the year 1999, and amounts on a per capita basis to around USD 17-19 (See Table 1.3). Important export items are the traditional goods such as coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, sisal, and sugar. Emerging non-traditional export items include, fish, cut flowers, and precious stones (See Table 1.4).

Table 1.3 Merchandise exports of Tanzania, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Merchandise Exports (mln. USD) 635.7 651.3 583.8 625.9 Annual export growth rate (%) 2.4 -10.4 7.2 Exports/GDP (%) 8.3 7.8 6.8 6.9 Exports per capita (USD) 19.5 19.5 17.1 18.0 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003; United Nations, GDP and population data

Table 1.4 Composition of Tanzania’s merchandise exports, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mln. Mln. Mln. Mln. USD % USD % USD % USD % Coffee, tea 136.7 21.5 125.6 19.3 117.9 20.2 100.7 16.1 Fish 77.8 12.2 106.7 16.4 65.9 11.3 152.8 24.4 Tobacco 64.2 10.1 56.2 8.6 71.9 12.3 50.1 8.0 Pearls, precious stones 30.1 4.7 29.0 4.5 38.6 6.6 67.7 10.8 Cotton 111.1 17.5 64.4 9.9 27.3 4.7 34.6 5.5 Ores 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.8 2.9 0.5 Other 215.8 33.9 269.4 41.4 257.8 44.2 217.2 34.7 Total 635.7 100.0 651.3 100.0 583.8 100.0 625.9 100.0 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003

50 In 2002, based on the trade data of the Customs and Excise Department, about half of the merchandise exports went to the EU, with shares in total exports for the UK being 18 percent, France 17 percent, Netherlands 6 percent, Germany 3 percent, Italy 3 percent and Belgium 2 percent. Japan and India accounted for, respectively, 10 percent and 7 percent of the total export of goods. The export shares to Kenya and Uganda were, respectively, 4 percent and 1 percent. The merchandise exports of Tanzania by destination for the period 1997-2000 can be seen in Table 1.5.

Table 1.5 Destination of Tanzania’s merchandise exports, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mln. Mln. Mln. Mln. USD % USD % USD % USD % Japan 59.0 9.2 67.5 10.3 67.3 11.4 45.5 7.2 Germany 74.9 11.7 62.3 9.5 57.5 9.8 59.5 9.4 United Kingdom 54.3 8.5 48.2 7.4 29.8 5.1 45.3 7.2 Netherlands 44.1 6.9 38.6 5.9 42.4 7.2 54.7 8.7 USA 28.2 4.4 33.5 5.1 37.4 6.4 35.2 5.6 France 12.4 1.9 14.7 2.2 10.9 1.9 15.4 2.4 Singapore 10.1 1.6 5.5 0.8 10.0 1.7 7.0 1.1 Spain 6.5 1.0 15.7 2.4 13.8 2.4 13.2 2.1 Hong Kong 15.6 2.4 6.6 1.0 7.4 1.3 16.1 2.5 Indonesia 40.6 6.4 20.5 3.1 13.9 2.4 15.9 2.5 Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 3.5 21.1 3.3 Italy 9.8 1.5 8.9 1.4 7.7 1.3 12.2 1.9 Belgium 27.0 4.2 47.3 7.2 18.6 3.2 86.7 13.7 Thailand 20.2 3.2 11.5 1.8 5.0 0.9 8.1 1.3 Uganda 18.2 2.8 23.3 3.6 11.1 1.9 8.8 1.4 Kenya 14.9 2.3 9.9 1.5 6.9 1.2 12.1 1.9 Other 203.3 31.8 240.9 36.8 227.6 38.7 175.1 27.7 Total 639.0 100.0 654.8 100.0 588.0 100.0 632.0 100.0 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003

Merchandise imports

Import of goods added up to about USD 1.5 billion in 2002. In the 1997-2000 period imports declined each year (see Table 1.6), but from the year 2000 onwards imports have been growing annually (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.6 Merchandise imports of Tanzania, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Merchandise Imports (mln.USD) 1,371.7 1,332.3 1,283.9 1,175.0 Annual import growth rate (%) -2.9 -3.6 -8.5 Imports/GDP (%) 17.9 15.9 14.9 13.0 Imports per capita (USD) 42.1 39.9 37.6 33.7 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003; United Nations, GDP and population data

51 The three major product groups imported by Tanzania are machinery, vehicles and equipment (see Table 1.7).

In 2002, based on trade data of the Customs and Excise Department, the merchandise imports are mainly coming in from South Africa (11 percent), Japan (8 percent), India (6 percent), U.A.E. (6 percent), Kenya (6 percent) and UK (6 percent). The import shares of Kenya and Uganda were, respectively, 6 percent and 0.16 percent. The sources of merchandise imports of Tanzania for the period 1997-2000 can be seen in Table 1.8.

Regional trade of Tanzania with neighbouring countries Kenya and Uganda thus appears rather limited. Information on the extent of informal border trade is not available.

52 Table 1.7 Composition of Tanzania’s merchandise imports, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mln. Mln. Mln. Mln. USD % USD % USD % USD % Machinery 211.6 15.4 182.5 13.7 157.8 12.3 163.1 13.9 Vehicles 192.3 14.0 195.8 14.7 187.1 14.6 139.9 11.9 Electrical & electronic equipment 97.0 7.1 127.7 9.6 123.4 9.6 91.7 7.8 Fuel, oil 34.0 2.5 38.7 2.9 54.5 4.2 63.6 5.4 Animal & vegetable fats and oils 96.9 7.1 102.1 7.7 77.7 6.0 51.5 4.4 Articles of iron or steel 38.8 2.8 38.0 2.9 38.6 3.0 42.7 3.6 Plastics and plastic articles 42.4 3.1 42.0 3.2 37.4 2.9 45.6 3.9 Pharmaceutical products 36.9 2.7 38.0 2.9 29.5 2.3 36.1 3.1 Textile articles, sets, worn clothing, etc 48.1 3.5 40.9 3.1 69.2 5.4 39.5 3.4 Iron and steel 59.9 4.4 42.8 3.2 36.3 2.8 33.6 2.9 Other 513.8 37.5 483.7 36.3 472.4 36.8 467.6 39.8 Total 1,371.7 100.0 1,332.3 100.0 1,283.9 100.0 1,175.0 100.0 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003

53 Table 1.8 Sources of Tanzania’s merchandise imports, 1997-2000 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mln. Mln. Mln. Mln. USD % USD % USD % USD % S.Afr.Cus.Un 110.9 7.9 132.7 9.8 171.7 13.3 198.9 16.3 China 84.9 6.1 70.0 5.2 64.0 4.9 85.8 7.0 United Kingdom 126.1 9.0 106.0 7.9 102.7 7.9 83.3 6.8 Japan 78.8 5.6 77.7 5.8 111.8 8.6 66.2 5.4 Australia 28.4 2.0 30.8 2.3 23.5 1.8 55.0 4.5 USA 63.5 4.5 66.6 4.9 60.7 4.7 44.5 3.6 France 27.7 2.0 18.1 1.3 23.7 1.8 23.0 1.9 Germany 50.5 3.6 58.9 4.4 42.7 3.3 53.2 4.3 Oman 68.0 4.9 63.2 4.7 77.2 6.0 57.2 4.7 Italy 57.1 4.1 54.8 4.1 35.5 2.7 39.0 3.2 Indonesia 15.2 1.1 11.3 0.8 15.4 1.2 16.8 1.4 Thailand 30.3 2.2 37.1 2.7 21.5 1.7 22.8 1.9 Netherlands 89.9 6.4 30.8 2.3 30.7 2.4 34.9 2.9 Belgium 35.1 2.5 18.6 1.4 21.4 1.7 18.4 1.5 Malaysia 30.3 2.2 33.9 2.5 16.7 1.3 13.4 1.1 Kenya 238.6 17.0 228.7 16.9 163.0 12.6 114.6 9.4 Uganda 5.6 0.4 8.6 0.6 5.9 0.5 5.5 0.5 Other 259.1 18.5 302.2 22.4 305.1 23.6 291.5 23.8 Total 1,400.0 100.0 1,349.8 100.0 1,293.2 100.0 1,223.9 100.0 Source: UNCTAD, PC-TAS, 2003

1.4 Presence of JITAP agencies in Tanzania

1.4.1 WTO

The WTO has no resident office in Tanzania. According to the Doha Development Agenda TRTA/CB Database, in Tanzania during 2001 the WTO organised a national retreat on tariff negotiations for non-agricultural market access, a consultative meeting for discussions on the IF, and a LDC Ministerial Conference in anticipation of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha.

1.4.2 ITC

The ITC has no resident office in Tanzania. It has been assisting the Board of External Trade in export promotion activities. Also at the College of Business Education there is an ITC project that facilitated the establishment of another institution, which -according to JITAP’s Summative Evaluation report- is largely a private sector institution engaged in business education.

54 1.4.3 UNCTAD

UNCTAD has no resident office but is represented by the UNDP Representative Office. The UNDP is closely involved in JITAP. They channel funds to the local institutions, using UN procedures. They participate in the JITAP National Steering Committee (NSC) and provide technical input.

1.4.4 Integrated Framework

The WTO, ITC and UNCTAD are also agencies that implement the IF. The first consultative workshop under the IF was held in October 1999, during which a programme was discussed to address constraints mitigating against trade development in Tanzania. This programme drew on an Export Development Strategy report of 1996 done by the Government with the assistance of the World Bank.

Under the IF programme, a Consultative Meeting with the multilateral and bilateral donor community was held in May 2000. During this meeting, donor commitment was indicated for the programme for strengthening the business environment in Tanzania. The IF NSC with the support of DFID, SIDA and the RNE started to work out this programme.

The Government did propose in 2001 to utilise resources from the IF Trust Fund for strengthening the JITAP programme for preparing sectoral export development strategies and enhancing the work of the Inter-Institutional Technical Committees and Sub- Committees on compliance, implementation and negotiation of WTO Agreements.

In 2003, a new Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) has been commissioned under the IF. The DTIS focuses on the identification of high potential sub-sectors and how these can contribute to exports. The DTIS is financed by the Swiss Government and was implemented at the time of the fieldwork for this IOB evaluation by an international consultant and three national consultants.

1.5 Existing trade-related programmes of main bilateral donors

1.5.1 SIDA

SIDA has financially supported the formulation of the new National Trade Policy document. There have been consultants involved in drafting the National Trade Policy, but MIT has been in the driver’s seat. There will be a popular version of the document that will be translated into Swahili and there are awareness raising workshops planned around the country.

55 SIDA also provides support to the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) and to the Fair Competition Commission. For a long time SIDA has assisted TBS.

SIDA-Tanzania has trade high on its agenda and is willing to finance TRTA through basket funding, but so far MIT has given no clear indication on the type of TRTA that has priority. SIDA-Tanzania has not been involved in JITAP and is disappointed in the IF. There are rarely meetings and when there are meetings these tend to be very big and general meetings; these meetings are seldom focused on how to work with trade. All donors go in different directions and IF has not played the role of coordinating the donors and using existing knowledge. Mapping should be done under the IF before SIDA will put its money into a basket.

1.5.2 DANIDA

DANIDA supports market access issues –in the second component- under its Business Sector Programme Support II for Tanzania; the latter programme has a budget of USD 32 million over a five-year period.

The main objective of the market access component is to increase non-traditional exports. This component aims at four major outputs: i) capacity building in trade policy analysis and formulation at the trade division of MIT; ii) establishing a cadre of trade negotiation specialists drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, the University in Dar es Salaam and Business Associations; iii) facilitating the trade negotiation specialists in utilising the expertise gained in trade negotiations; iv) and, reviving the debate on trade policy issues.

In addition, DANIDA supports TBS in getting food laboratories internationally accredited in order to be able to certify food products in Tanzania. Also DANIDA is planning to financially support an SME Quality Improvement Fund.

In private sector development, DANIDA is financially contributing 25 percent to the budget of the BEST programme.

Given its own large business sector programme, DANIDA said it had no time for JITAP.

1.5.3 United Kingdom

DFID is supporting the Tanzania Trade and Poverty Programme (TTPP) that has the objectives of:

S Identifying links between trade and poverty and the mainstreaming of trade development issues into the national planning processes; S Reviewing the institutional capacities for trade policy implementation; S Carrying forward the process of capacity building for participation in the international trade agenda through enhancing the awareness of stakeholders of WTO agreements

56 with respect to analysis, negotiations and implementation, including the government, private sector and civil society.

The TPP for Tanzania started in August 2002 as a component of DFID’s Africa TPP funded by the Africa Policy Division of DFID-HQ. For Tanzania the TPP has a budget of 950,000 British Pounds over three years.

The third objective of the TTPP overlaps with the activities of JITAP. DFID-Tanzania finds that not much has been achieved by JITAP on the ground; they only hear from JITAP out of Geneva. According to DFID-Tanzania JITAP should stop implementing workshops where only a few civil servants attend, since the knowledge gained in these workshops seems not to be used strategically by the participants.

DFID-Tanzania decided not to fund JITAP anymore since JITAP I was not achieving its objectives. Also for bringing trade into the national plan, DFID-Tanzania assessed that this would not happen under JITAP II or under the IF. DFID-HQ nevertheless chose to remain engaged in JITAP II, while understanding that at country level Tanzania was not successful.

1.5.4 Netherlands

The RNE is active in private sector development, and chairs the private sector development group of the DAC.

The RNE has in the past supported a trade promotion project at the Board of External Trade (BET). At present the RNE runs no projects in trade; the RNE is member of the IF National Steering Group.

57 58 2 JITAP SITUATION IN TANZANIA

The general goal of JITAP is to enhance development through more effective participation in the multilateral trade system (MTS). JITAP’s common objectives are building a national understanding of MTS, conforming to MTS obligations and disciplines, and enhancing readiness of country’s exporters.

2.1 Preparatory phase of JITAP I

A joint fact finding mission of ITC, UNCTAD and WTO visited Dar es Salaam in July 1996, which was immediately followed by a needs assessment carried out by ITC. This ITC needs assessment envisaged strengthening Tanzania’s export supply capacities and promoting exports. In July-August 1997 an additional programming and coordination mission was fielded that finished the groundwork for the Project Document of 3 February 1998 entitled "Follow-up to the WTO Agreements and exploitation of business opportunities by Tanzanian enterprises".

According to this project document, the views that the Tanzanian Government had on the needs assessment were taken into consideration.

The project document of 3 February 1998 included a project duration of 2.5 years with an estimated start date of March 1998. Based on that schedule, the project would finish by the end of the third quarter of 2000.

2.2 Implementation phase of JITAP I

A JITAP NSC was set up in 1998. The NSC consisted of 21 persons, mainly civil servants, five donor representatives and one representative of the private sector. Instead of the Director of Trade, the Permanent Secretary (PS) of MIT sat in during various JITAP meetings.

There were a Regional Coordinator, two National Facilitators and a JITAP desk officer in MIT. The task of the Regional Coordinator was to represent the three agencies for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The Regional Coordinator was based in Kampala. The Regional Coordinator was to brief the NSCs and the counterpart institutions on the clusters and the missions of visiting experts from Geneva to the three countries. After the Mid Term Review, the function of Regional Coordinator disappeared.

Two National Facilitators were appointed with the task of supporting and complementing the activities of the JITAP Desk Officer at the Focal Point. Their tasks were among other things providing support with logistics and helping to put up budgets. Also, the function of National Facilitator was terminated –in April 2002- and by mid 2002 taken over by a National Technical Advisor, who was paid by JITAP resources.

59 The JITAP desk officer in MIT functioned as the official communication point of JITAP in the MIT. From this desk, coordination with the other ministries took place. The JITAP desk officer reported to the assistant Director of External Trade in the Department of Trade within MIT. He was not paid by JITAP resources and also had other duties.

Within MIT, the PS is the Chief Executive Officer. Under the PS falls the Director of Trade, amongst others. The Director of Trade has three Assistant Directors, one for External Trade, the other two for Internal Trade and Policy respectively. There are plans to restructure the Department of Trade into the following four sections: i) Multilateral Trade Section; ii) Trade Facilitation; iii) Bilateral Trade; and iv) Regional Economic Cooperation.

2.3 Consolidation phase of JITAP I

The consolidation phase ran from the fourth quarter of 2000 until December 2002, when the first phase of JITAP in Tanzania was closed.

In June 2002, the National Technical Advisor (NTA) replaced the National Facilitators. The NTA had specific terms of reference. His task was to carry forward the JITAP activities while being located in MIT. The NTA reported directly to the PS of MIT and thus functioned as a parallel director in the Department of Trade.

The NTA’s contract ended in December 2002. After that, the NTA was active as a National Consultant in preparing the final report for JITAP I.

2.4 Preparatory phase of JITAP II

The second phase of JITAP was launched in February 2003. The objectives of JITAP I remained unchanged under JITAP II. The eight countries under JITAP I, including Tanzania, are offered an extended consolidation period of two years. The cluster activities have been regrouped and are now called programme modules.

The budget under JITAP II for the eight countries that were involved in JITAP I amounts to USD 4 million, that is USD 500,000 per country. The JITAP Phase II programme document says that it has been designed to ensure the sustainability of the national capacities in the eight original JITAP countries. This implies inter alia that the Communication and Discussion Facility (CDF) will be revamped, that extensive use will be made of videoconferencing for boosting the MTS knowledge of network members and that networking will take place both inside and outside the region, e.g. among business organisations. For the main programme components an "advanced track" is foreseen for the eight countries that were engaged in JITAP I.

Based on a generic programme document, the individual countries should themselves prepare their own specific country project document.

The progress report on JITAP II as of 31 October 2003 mentions that the MIT, in collaboration with the Economic and Social Research Foundation, organised a WTO Pre-

60 Cancun Sensitisation Workshop on August 12, 2003. Another meeting on September 4, 2003, chaired by the PS of MIT, was held to brief the Tanzania Delegation to Cancun. The Tanzania delegation was led by the Minister for Industry and Trade and included officials from MIT, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Ministry of Trade, Industry, Marketing and Tourism of Zanzibar, TCCIA, Confederation of Tanzania Industries, Geneva Embassy Officials, the Zanzibar Chamber of Commerce, and three members of Parliament.

61 62 3 MEASURING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA

This chapter deals with the indicators that have been developed for the input, output, outcome and impact of the TRTA activities that are subject of this IOB evaluation. The specific set of indicators selected for the JITAP programme in Tanzania (and Burkina Faso) can be found in the evaluation matrix in Annex 1. The indicators of impact have been derived from two objectives of the Netherlands in supporting providers of TRTA.

3.1 Input

Funding of JITAP in Tanzania

Financially, the agencies budgeted to contribute USD 1,391,000 for JITAP I in Tanzania. The real expenditures made by the agencies have been higher, although the full costs for the agencies on JITAP were said to be difficult to give. For example, the coordination role of ITC had cost more than the 13 percent that was included in the budget for support cost of the agencies. All three agencies are said to have been backstopping JITAP I without charging costs to the programme.

Figures on JITAP expenditures in Tanzania provided by ITC to the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva as of 31 December 2001 confirm that there was a slow start in 1998 and furthermore reveal a slight under utilisation of funds over the 1998-2001 period.

Table 3.1 Budget and expenditures for Tanzania during JITAP I Year Budget Expenditure (USD) (USD)

1998 527,100 75,532 1999 592,500 486,499 2000 271,400 311,190 2001 - - 239,772 Total 1,391,000 1,112,994 Source: JITAP I Project document and JITAP I Final Report. Expenditures based on recalculation of percentages

The IF Focal Point in Tanzania mentioned to the mission that in 2000 when there was USD 300,000 available under the IF it was decided to spend this on JITAP. Activities that had been funded included activities on the Agreement on Agriculture and GATS, reviving the IIC, and developing export strategies.

The Netherlands has co-financed JITAP I with an earmarked contribution of 1 million Dutch Guilders for the period 1 April 1998 until 31 March 2001. This contribution was to Window 2 of the CTF and earmarked for the four least developed countries (MOL’s) that took part in JITAP I, one of which is Tanzania.

63 Staff time to start and organise JITAP in Tanzania

Most input in staff time was supplied by ITC in Geneva as the coordinator of JITAP I and the administrator of JITAP’s Common Trust Fund (CTF). During the first phase, the JITAP agencies had no full time staff working on the programme. At ITC Geneva there is one country desk for Tanzania that coordinates all ITC activities for that country.1 At UNCTAD in Geneva, JITAP is handled and coordinated by the Trade Division. In the WTO three different persons are working on JITAP but all have additional responsibilities.

Time of ITC for management, coordination, administration in Geneva:

S About 22 days per month (Consultant’s estimate)

Time of DGIS staff on JITAP:

S DDE: about 0.5 day per month (Consultant’s estimate) S PV Geneva: about 0.5 day per month as member of the CTF Steering Group in Geneva (Consultant estimate) S RNE Tanzania: No time spent on JITAP I.

Number of meetings of national JITAP Steering Committee in Tanzania

Five NSC meetings have been held (6 January 1999; 5 March 1999; 25 August 1999; 9 November 1999; 18 August 2000) to review the implementation and to present guidance on the project. The NSC has not met since its last meeting in August 2000, with the exception of a quick arrangement to receive a briefing by a mission from Geneva on JITAP II.

3.2 Output

Information and training courses

Number and type of training courses. (Under Cluster two: Technical Support to MTS Institutions)

S A capacity building three-day Workshop on WTO issues in Dar Es Salaam in mid October 2001, facilitated by the WTO; S A national seminar on post Doha results and services/ tourism in Tanzania organised jointly between UNCTAD and MIT in collaboration with the Ministry of Communications

1 The ITC was, in addition to JITAP, executing an export promotion project in Tanzania jointly financed by UNDP, and the Governments of Switzerland and the Netherlands.

64 and Transport as the Chair institution of sub-committee IV (Trade in Services) of the IITC.

(Under Cluster eight: Human resources development and improvement of MTS knowledge)

S Sub-regional workshop on SPS/TBT, Arusha 2-4 March 1999; S Sub-regional specialised workshop on customs valuation, rules of origin and pre- shipment inspection, Kampala, Uganda, 21-23 September 1999; S Sub-regional workshop on textiles and clothing, Mombasa, Kenya, 12-14 October 1999; S Sub-regional specialised workshop on agriculture, Entebbe, Uganda, 19-21 October 1999; S Sub-regional Workshop on Services and International Transport, 21-24 March 2000 in Entebbe, Uganda; S Sub-regional Workshop on Tariffs and Non-tariff Measures, Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement, 17-24 April 2000 in Dar Es Salaam; S Sub-regional Workshop on Trade Remedies, Subsidies and State Trading, 9-12 May 2000 in Kampala; S Sub-regional Workshop in Intellectual Property, 6-9 June in Nairobi; S Sub-regional Workshop on Regional Integration and Public Procurement, 4-7 July 2000 in Arusha.

In total some 40 persons in Tanzania received training under Cluster eight.

Assistance to Customs. A sub-regional workshop on customs valuation, Rules of Origin and PSI in Kampala, Uganda, September 1999, was attended by two officials from the Customs Department.

A second workshop on tariffs and non-tariff measures was held in Dar es Salaam, April 2000, and attended by one official of the Customs Department.

Inter-Institutional Committees, Reference Centres, National Enquiry Point set up

Inter-Institutional Committees. An overall IIC was set up that had 73 members, each person also being a member of a sub-committee of the IIC. Five out of 73 members of the IIC represented the private sector.

Five sub-committees meetings were established:

I. Sub-committee 1 on Agreements on Agriculture and SPS; II. Sub-committee 2 on Agreements on PSI, Customs Valuation, Rules of Origin and Import Licensing; III. Sub-committee 3 on Agreements on TRIPS, TRIMS, and New Issues; IV. Sub-committee 4 on Agreement on Trade in Services; Sub-committee 5 on Agreements on Textile and Clothing, TBTs; V. Subsidies/Countervailing duties, Anti-dumping and Safe-guard measures.

65 JITAP reference centres. Reference centres on matters regarding the MTS were set up at MIT for official use, at BET for the business sector, and at the College for Business Education (CBE) for academia.

Standards. A National Enquiry Point (NEP) on TBT and SPS was established and equipped at TBS. Training was provided on how to run a NEP. Awareness/training courses were held on TBT/SPS requirements in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, financed by JITAP and attended mainly by industrialists.

Publications and tools developed by JITAP

Assessment of Export and Market Potentials / Export Development Strategies. A matrix of tradable products and export markets of interest to Tanzania was made. A report was produced, bearing the title "Assessment of Export and Market Potential, Matrix of Export Products and Markets", URT/C2/06, Geneva, 9 November 1999. This report follows the standard methodology applied by ICT/UNCTAD for assessing the export and market potential of developing countries.

A similar survey on the export potential for services was not done. The JITAP project document for Tanzania of 3 February 1998 had planned to determine Tanzania’s potential for export in the services sector as an earlier survey of UNCTAD on this needed updating.

Export development strategies were developed for textiles & clothing and spices. Export strategy documents were released by BET and ITC for both sectors in November 2002, based on work done by groups of private sector actors and relevant public sector officials representing the sectors involved.

Trade Secret, the Export Answer Book for SMEs. This book was not delivered.

Export financing book. The guide "How to approach banks" was delivered.

3.3 Outcome

Understanding of multilateral trade issues by individual officers who participated in training

35 Generalist and 43 specialist trainers have been trained during JITAP I, against the planned 15-20 generalist and 5-10 specialised trainers/presenters. Apparently, the training sessions were rather popular. Almost all trainers have come from Government related institutions and departments. Private sector- and civil society organisations were poorly represented and their trainers largely came from TCCIA, Tanzania Exporters Association (TANEXA) and an unknown Afritex Limited.

66 An effort has been made by the evaluation team to interview officers who had participated in the JITAP training events. It should be noted that these officers received their training almost six years ago. This has made it difficult for several interviewees to recall what went on, and even to recollect whether their performance in their current work places has been affected by the knowledge gained during the JITAP trainings. The answers that have been given by the trainers selected for interview2 have been looked at with some caution, as in some cases it appeared the interviewees just wanted to give an answer to satisfy the interviewer. Enthusiasm displayed by the interviewees was low. In addition, the contact addresses of several of the selected trainers were outdated, which made it difficult to trace their location. This is a further indication of the lack of contact with the JITAP focal point.

According to the interviewees, up-to-date training modules developed by the agencies should be made available and accessible. Any training on MTS can only be meaningful if the latest expertise from WTO/ITC/UNCTAD is included.

Out of six selected generalist trainers, four could be located and interviewed. The remaining two persons could not be traced due to changes in email addresses and telephone numbers or relocations to other places, including abroad. In one case, a generalist trainer appearing in the Annex List of the final report of JITAP I – Tanzania had never been invited for any training; it appeared that someone else had been trained instead (See Annex 3 for detailed interview results).

Not a single interviewee indicated in the interviews that there were initiatives by Tanzanian institutions to hold workshops, seminars and meetings on MTS with local funding. Dissemination activities have not been held due to lack of funds. MIT and the private sector have not taken the initiative to hold workshops, which reflects a weak ownership of the whole process.

According to the bilateral donors with a presence in Tanzania, there is still very little knowledge of WTO issues across the Government. Often officials get training but move to other positions, e.g. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. JITAP’s training is considered by these bilateral donors as too short to obtain visible effects on the ground, a view that is also reflected in the poor response rate to the questionnaire for the general and specialist trainers. Hence, for example, DANIDA has planned a more comprehensive training programme on MTS under its Business Sector Programme Support II for Tanzania.

Workshop for Customs

The JITAP assistance comprised funding the attendance of two customs officials at a three- day regional workshop on customs valuation, RoO and PSI, in Uganda. There has been no outcome due to this JITAP assistance for the Customs Department. The Customs Department received technical assistance from other programmes than JITAP among others for WTO customs valuation from the World Customs Organisation and USAID. The World Bank and IMF funded a Tax Administration Project that is to facilitate the PSI to shift

2 The trainers were selected on the basis of a reasonable coverage of the various government departments and institutions involved.

67 to inspection at the local level. The World Bank also funded upgrading of the UNCTAD ASYCUDA system in Tanzania from the second version to a more versatile version that will be installed in January 2004.

The Customs Department suggested to the evaluator that the JITAP assistance to Customs be directly coordinated by the Customs Department itself and not by the JITAP focal point in MIT. The Customs Department welcomes JITAP assistance for technical/legal matters relating to tariffs, RoO, anti-dumping, and contingency measures.

The Customs Department has had enough technical assistance for applying the customs valuation on the basis of transaction value. There has been no shortfall of tariff revenues following from the shift of reference prices to actual prices. The Customs Department has in place a PSI programme for the preparation of import documents and the verification of export prices. From January 2004 the Department will phase out PSI and start up destination inspection locally. The same agent that the Department used for the PSI won the tender to assist them with the inspection locally. JITAP has had no contribution to this.

Networking Programme Partners and National Networks of Trainers and MTS Experts

According to the interviewees, the degree of networking achieved, at national level, for discussion of needs, sharing of tasks and coordination of programmes is poor. The interviewee representing the CBE claimed that an Institute of Multilateral Trade Systems was formed but is not operational and cannot therefore promote networking.

Some general trainers reported that networking had initially started, but that it has not continued. There is obviously no leadership either to initiate the networking or to institutionalise it. Some beneficiaries seem not to look at networking as an essential element in building the capacity and awareness of MTS in the country; they went only to a workshop without undertaking any follow-up activity.

The utilisation of the CDF is low. According to the NTA, a large percentage of the members of the IITC are not conversant or knowledgeable with the CDF and need further training. The CDF has not paid a strong contribution to strengthening the national network of trainers either.

In November 2003, the TCCIA requested MIT for assistance in activating the CDF facility, mentioning that this has never worked at its headquarters despite repeated promises of assistance. At BET and CBE the interviewer was told that the CDF had never been heard of.

Efforts to start an Institute on Multilateral Trade System (IMTS), to become an active training wing of the IIC, have not materialised. The IMTS only exists on paper.

The IMTS has been registered as an NGO in May 2003. The IMTS intended to use members of the network as trainers. There is neither an organisational set up, nor officials in place to make it operational and undertake the tasks for which it is being established. The IMTS is not operational due to funding which has been requested from the focal point at MIT and WTO/Geneva. There are plans to launch officially the IMTS after appointing the office

68 bearers; however, it is unclear as to when this can be done in view of the unavailability of funds for related activities.

Reinforcement of the national training capacity on MTS issues is also hindered by the poor degree of self-reliance of the Tanzanian institutions on local resources and input to seek advice on WTO related matters, and to manage the country’s participation in the WTO. There is too much dependence on external resources even for MTS awareness raising, which could be funded internally by stakeholders. Many dissemination events are not implemented for what is said as lack of funds and sometimes the amount of funds being sought is very small to wait for external support.

According to the JITAP project document for Tanzania version 3 February 1998, there would be MTS-related matters included in the syllabus of at least one training institution in the country. The JITAP final report phase I for Tanzania, Annex 8, mentions that this has already started with the Institute of Finance Management (IFM). The IFM is running two Postgraduate courses on Multilateral Trade Systems (MTS) in collaboration with the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in New Delhi, India. The courses lead to Masters of Business Administration (MBA International Business) and Executive Masters in International Business qualifications. The courses were developed on their own initiative, after learning from BET that Tanzania’s business community is not conversant with international trade issues. At first started as short course, IFM then expanded the courses to postgraduate level. The IFM has in total 70 students for these courses and in 2003, twenty students graduated of which five were women. IFM has not had contact with WTO, ITC or UNCTAD on the courses run by the Institute. Contact with the MIT has been only recently when a lecturer was requested to make a comment to a document in preparation of JITAP phase II. The IFM has no training modules from WTO, ITC or UNCTAD. There is no input of the MTS trainers in the syllabus used for training MTS subjects. The following subjects relevant to MTS are taught at IFM:

S International Trade Operations and Documentation. S International Business Ethics. S International shipping and Transport. S WTO and International Trade Policies. S International Business Negotiations. S International Business Law and Taxation.

While the above confirms that multilateral trade issues are at least taught in a recognised national institution, there is concern over the process of preparing the syllabus. In the preparation of the syllabus there should be input from WTO, ITC and UNCTAD; institutions which are daily working on the MTS. This will make it possible to avail IFM of up-to-date training modules that have been developed on certain subjects. Other input in the syllabus could come from the MTS trainers (who already have had access to available sources of information), the IMTS, and TCCIA.

69 Number of Inter-Institutional Committee meetings

There was one IIC main plenary during the JITAP I project period, on 13 December 2000. Thereafter, three IIC main plenaries have been held (in May 2001; 11-12 June 2002; and 2 July 2002).

Of the IIC sub-committees, only the sub-committees 1 and 4 have met, though mainly during the consolidation phase.

The overall IIC did not meet after the last meeting on July 2, 2002. The flow of TA and logistical support for the IIC from Geneva to the IIC has been provided but follow-up by the IIC in Tanzania was weak in terms of implementation of annual plans, managing the trade policy, and its sub-committees were not meeting as appropriate.

Reference centres

The reference centre at MIT is not effectively utilised. Although there are WTO documents, the materials are not used outside MIT and no efforts are made to attract officials from other ministries to use the reference centre at MIT. Three persons of MIT were trained to manage the reference centre but none of these persons have taken on the responsibility of running it. (One left MIT, the second left to study abroad, the third one is in charge of computers within MIT).

The reference centre at the CBE may have been better located elsewhere. The access to the location is difficult and the space in this reference centre is too small; there is, for example, no place for reading in the centre. The Internet connection was disconnected because CBE had not paid its bills. There were only some general ITC and UNCTAD publications, one UNCTAD report done under JITAP I, and some forty CD-ROMS with WTO- and trade-related information. The centre is hardly used by students and lecturers of CBE.

The reference centre at BET is located in the Trade Point and is used by the business sector. Mostly SMEs visit this reference centre. Hard copies of ITC publications were in BET’s library. The computer equipment provided by JITAP was said to be slow. Furthermore BET said to be in need of data on prices of export products. A register of exporters requesting information from BET was shown to the evaluator that was kept on a daily basis. For example, on November 18, 2003 three companies had been supplied with trade information.

BET considers itself as the APEX body for trade related information. TCCIA may use the information of the reference centre of BET but it is up to TCCIA to disseminate this trade information to their members.

The TCCIA mentioned to the evaluator that it was supposed to have a Reference Centre under JITAP I but the programme had not delivered on this.

70 Standards

The TBS wants to do more awareness training in the regions, for example in Mwanza and in Zanzibar. But, according to TBS, this cannot be realised due to lack of funds. The participation to such awareness training courses is planned to be free of charge. Companies that are already exporting and potential exporters will be invited to participate. The TBS thinks that once the business community is aware of TBT, they will come to TBS and will pay for information that can solve TBT issues.

The TBS does have an Internet connection with the three JITAP agencies but often they have problems with their server. CDF is unknown at TBS. The DIN Global Database for getting international standards supplied by JITAP was still used. The photocopying machine supplied by JITAP was not working because there were no funds for maintenance and toners.

Tanzania has 572 published standards, of which 105 are adopted from international standards and approximately 400 are voluntary. The information on international standards in countries of export destination is sold to persons that come to the NEP. This, however, covers much less than 20 percent of the operational costs of the NEP. In the months of July, August, September 2003, there had been nine requests for technical requirements. The operational costs of the NEP include one staff member (who had participated in the training course on running the NEP), subscription fees of the databases, marketing expenses of the NEP, maintenance costs of mainly the photocopying machine and refresher courses on TBT.

The TBS wants to enforce the culture of observing the standards of Tanzania’s main international trading partners in major export products and to build capacity for scientific analysis and risk assessment, matching the requirements of international markets for national exports.

Accreditation of TBS is necessary to enable Tanzanian exporters to meet standard requirements in destination markets. TBS is focusing on horticulture. They want to establish organic certification, which is critical for the export of horticultural crops, including vegetables and flowers.

When asked on their work in the area of textiles & clothing and spices, the two sectors for which JITAP I has done export development strategies, TBS said to have been involved in a seminar on textiles in Dar es Salaam for AGOA but that accreditation is a new area for them. On spices where the JITAP export development strategy proposed to establish an accredited local organic certification agency, TBS appeared interested, although they were not aware of this proposal. Proving that spices are organically grown in Tanzania would pay off in terms of higher export prices. TBS were interested in the idea of building up international recognition of and gaining accreditation for their technical competence for organic certification.

71 Number of multilateral trade system impact studies

Three MTS studies were shown to the evaluation mission:

I. Abugattas, L. et.al. (2001), Negotiation Objectives and Institutional Support for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report prepared for JITAP under the supervision of UNCTAD, June; II. Atkinson, K.C. et. al. (2002), Multilateral Trading System Impact on National Economy and External Trade Policy Adaptation, Tanzania, Report prepared by UNCTAD, October; III. Matambalya, F. (2003), Position for facilitating Tanzania commitments in Agricultural negotiations, Faculty of Commerce and Management, University of Dar es Salaam, June.

Number of cases in which national legislation has been checked on WTO rules

A Tanzanian Law Reform Commission has the mandate to examine the WTO compatibility of the existing legislation but so far MIT seems to address the implementation of the WTO Agreements (Abuggattas, (2001, pp. 9-10)).

The Government report in the WTO Trade Policy Review (2000) of Tanzania mentions that the country is lacking in terms of complying with the obligations in the WTO Agreements, notifications and other requirements.

Abugattas (2001) presents (in Section 1.2, Table 1) an overview of the status of the notifications of Tanzania as required by the different agreements.

Atkinson (2002) provides (in Chapter 5) details of specific trade policy reforms required by WTO obligations and indicates what Tanzania has done or needs to do.

Number of strategies developed for priority sectors

Besides export strategy reports for textiles & clothing and spices, BET has independently prepared similar strategy reports for horticulture & mushrooms and fishery. For the export development strategy on textiles & clothing, TCCIA is said to have a keen interest, since TCCIA is the national coordinator on AGOA. Notwithstanding this, the Textile Development Committee, which had a deadline of July 2003 to overcome the constraints identified in the Textile Strategy Report, was still in the making according to TCCIA. The same applies to the Spices Development Committee.

The BET is said to function as the secretariat for the Technical Development Committees for both textiles and spices but that policy oriented changes cannot be realised overnight. The BET also informed the mission that they were in need of resources to move towards the implementation of the strategies.

72 Export Answer Book and Export Financing Guide

There are very limited effects to report on these publications. The export answer book for SMEs has so far not been published due to printing mistakes and an improper layout.

The Export Financing Guide was said to have limited new information for Tanzania’s international traders. Banks such as Stanbic and Akiba Commercial Bank were reported to have their own financial courses for SMEs. The BET was said to have not held a seminar for the business community on this. Although the Export Financing Guide’s selling price was set at 8 USD, BET apparently gave away all the copies for nothing.

3.4 Impact

Increase of budget of MIT for trade policy making

Abugattas (2001) mentions that one of the reasons that the Inter-Institutional Committee, in charge of coordination and management of trade policy mechanisms, does not function effectively is that they cannot utilise budgetary resources from the entity that acts as the secretariat of the IIC, which is the MIT. The IIC does not appear as a budget line in Tanzania. Neither for the IIC nor its Secretariat are regular outlays included in the government’s budget.

The same applies to NSC meetings, for which there were said to be no financial resources available for photocopying documents.

The PS of the MIT informed the evaluation team that a budget line has been created for WTO related activities and that JITAP counterpart funds may come under this line.

Counterpart contributions from government and private sector

Donors have mentioned that they do not see a commitment from MIT, TBS and BET to commit funds too. According to the IF focal point, MIT hopes to get counterpart funding for JITAP from bilateral donors when under the Integrated Framework. The under resourced JITAP focal point in MIT was part of the non-performance of JITAP I in its first year. Without the facilities of telephones, computer equipment, etc. this focal point did not have the muscle to operate.

The BET also is struggling with financial sustainability. The BET reported to have an annual budget of USD 0.9 million; 20 percent of this budget was said to be contributed by the Government for salaries and 80 percent had to come from other sources. Without obtaining additional provisions, BET said to the evaluation team that the follow-up work of the Technical Development Committees for Textiles & Clothing and Spices would collapse.

The private sector provided counterpart contributions to JITAP I in financial terms neither. Since the start of JITAP I, the TCCIA has, however, provided the time of one of its members in most of JITAP’s functions.

73 Number of cases in which national legislation has been adapted to comply with WTO rules

The obstacles to adapting national legislation in accordance with WTO commitments include knowledge, financial and personal constraints. Tanzania has implemented the adaptations below but still has a long "to-do list" (see below).

Done:

S Copyrights Law enacted in 1999 is in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement; S Customs Law was revised in January 2001 and is in compliance with the WTO Customs Valuation procedures.

To do:

S International agreements such as the WTO Agreements should be incorporated into Tanzania’s domestic legislation; S Legislation regarding the implementation of protection in categories of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) other than copyrights should be drawn up; S PSI is used to verify quality, quantity, price, exchange rate, and customs classification in order to facilitate efficient revenue collection in a situation where capacity for customs valuation is weak. Conventional policy direction is to replace PSI with customs valuation as capacity building in the revenue collection authorities becomes effective. Though PSI will be phased out as of January 2004, Tanzania should notify its PSI to be transparent and non-discriminatory; S WTO compatible legislation on anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards should be prepared; S WTO compatible non-preferential Rules of Origin should be developed; S Notification requirements of the WTO Agreements on Agriculture, Textiles and Clothing, Subsidies, Anti-dumping, Safeguards, PSI, Import Licensing Procedures, Rules of Origin, TRIMS, State Trade Enterprises, GATS, and TRIPS should be kept.

The NTA explained to the evaluation mission that due to the large number of reforms the Law Reform Commission is overwhelmed with work and is unable to make the legal adjustments for WTO compliance. TA was requested but under JITAP I money came in at the end. It was then decided to concentrate on the built-in agenda (Agriculture and Services) and to give no priority to adaptation of national legislation. JITAP II is expected to do not much either on this according to the NTA as assistance for adaptation will be requested outside JTAP.

New trade policy papers produced

In February 2003 MIT released the National Trade Policy Document with the subtitle "Trade Policy for a competitive economy and export-led growth." Tanzania has bound its agricultural products tariff and some others (including silk and woven fabrics, hydraulic water turbines) at 120 percent. Kenya and Uganda bound more of their tariffs and at lower levels. According to Atkinson (2002, p.112), Tanzania may be under pressure to reduce the level of differentiation of their tariffs. What tariff reform has MIT announced in its new trade policy paper?

74 Further reduction of tariff rates and narrowing of tariff bands to increase competitiveness and raise consumer welfare (National Trade Policy, p. 39)

Atkinson (2002) also recommended actions within the context of the multilateral trade system including:

S Making an assessment of the status of assistance to industry in the context of WTO rules on non-tariff barriers and subsidies; S Assistance in designing fiscal reform to meet the cost of changes in customs valuation or any import requirement not to be in compliance; S Assistance in developing national and regional standards; S In services Tanzania has made an offer in tourism only, therefore assistance is needed how to manage the integration of other services sectors into the multilateral system; S Assistance to measure/determine dumping and the extent of injury to local industry especially regarding (1) garments, (2) footwear and (3) electronic consumer products; S Government should improve border controls and PSI techniques to avoid dumping and improve revenue collection.

The Government has taken over these points 3 and 5 in its National Trade Policy Document.3 The other points are not mentioned in this document.

According to the NTA, there is no linkage between the JITAP programme and the new National Trade Policy Document. These two should rather be seen as simultaneous movements.

The National Trade Policy makes clear that there are various other Ministries involved in trade, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and TRA. There will be a need to coordinate all these ministries with respect to trade-related matters, which will not be an easy task in the absence of clear ministerial mandates on trade. What is also clear is that in Agriculture, the Sectoral Strategy Documents that were prepared in 2001 do not give much direction as to trade and international market access. The emphasis is on increasing productivity. These documents need therefore to be overhauled. In the past, export promotion has concentrated on traditional products such as coffee, sisal, cashew

3 Point 3 has been taken over: The government recognises that lack of adequate technical and financial capacities in local standard organisations is an impediment to market access. It will explore opportunities emerging in the MTS, regional groupings and bilateral arrangements regarding the provision of technical assistance on standards and SPS and utilise them to build the requisite capacity (p.46).

Point 5 has been taken over: The government will take measures for the enactment of anti-dumping legislation and utilise opportunities emerging from international programmes […] to build the requisite public and private sector capacity for investigation and analysis involved in the course of establishing the existence of dumping and initiation of anti- dumping action (p.50).

75 nuts, tea, cotton, and tobacco. But in the future, new non-traditional products need to be developed for export markets. This should be taken up in the Sectoral Policy Papers for Agricultural and Rural Development.

In Agriculture, there are problems concerning high EU standards on inspection, toxic levels, and tracing final goods back to the farmer. For example, there is no system in Tanzania to trace products from the consumer table back to the small farmers. For meeting such stringent requirements imposed by the EU, there is a need to implement awareness training and organise farmers groups.

Bilateral and regional trade agreements negotiated by Tanzania

During the mission in Tanzania, negotiations took place on a Customs Union protocol for the East African Community. Signing of the protocol was expected to take place in mid- January 2004. Negotiations on the protocol had started in November 1999. Tanzanian manufacturers fear competition from Kenya when tariffs will be removed and therefore the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries recommends prolonging the current protection levels for the time being. Between Tanzania and Uganda, the tariffs will be zero as of January 2004 whereas between Kenya and Tanzania the tariffs for Tanzanian exports to Kenya will be zero as of January 2004, whilst the tariffs for Kenyan exports to Tanzania will be only gradually reduced to zero over a five-year period.

The Government is also engaged in SADC. The Government seems not to be interested in COMESA, although the private sector may have another view on this. The Government may be too occupied with the EAC and SADC to become involved in COMESA. Also COMESA may duplicate the countries that are in SADC and in the EAC. Economic studies on the net benefits for Tanzania of acceding to regional trade blocs should advise the Tanzanian policy-makers.

Customs is in need of technical assistance on Rules of Origin (RoO). They have preferential rules for COMESA and draft rules for SADC. Currently, they work on the RoO for the EAC. The Customs Department reported to have difficulties in assessing the degree of processing for certain products that come from neighbouring countries, which is necessary to determine the origin of the goods.

Multilateral trade negotiation positions developed by Tanzania

The IIC has been engaged in preparing Tanzania’s position towards the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha in November 2001.

Abugattas (2001) gives an overview of the negotiating agenda that the EAC countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, are facing in the WTO. This report is a good example of obtaining economies of scale in researching issues that may be of use in trade negotiations to all the three countries and for which a regional negotiation strategy could be developed.

Abugattas (2001, pp. 47-48) describes how the quality and effectiveness of participation in the negotiations depend on the national institutional organisation. With regard to the

76 agricultural negotiations, it is illustrated that these institutions would be: i) the MIT, which is responsible for the definition of the national position and strategy; ii) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that through the National Representation in Geneva should act on a daily basis in the negotiation process and carry out the instructions received from the capital; iii) the Ministry of Agriculture that should undertake the technical studies and elaborate the proposals on negotiation positions; and iv) the private sector, which should provide the necessary input to complete the interests of the national agricultural sector and ensure national consensus.

In the above ideal institutional set-up, the IIC in Tanzania has not yet developed into a body that manages the coordination of the three public sector agencies and the input from the private agricultural sector. The participation and representation of the private agricultural sector is furthermore hindered by a low level of institutionalisation and scarce knowledge of WTO issues in the private sector associations.

The organisational set up in multilateral trade negotiations is weak also because of the poor functioning of the IIC that operates without a legal mandate and work plan. The IIC members and the institutions that they represent have insufficient knowledge of negotiations and trade related issues. The sporadic workshops in the EAC countries, though useful, have not produced any impact in this regard.

Under the IIC sub-committee 1 on Agriculture / SPS a paper on Tanzania’s positions and commitments in agriculture negotiations was produced by the Faculty of Commerce and Management of the University of Dar es Salaam. This paper was discussed during a workshop in June 2003 by the three Ministries that are the closest stakeholders in agricultural development. The three Ministries will on the basis of this workshop finalise Tanzania’s negotiation position on the agriculture negotiations.

There is a lack of follow-up and implementation of the JITAP studies prepared by UNCTAD. Working out possible scenarios for offering a reduction in bound tariffs in exchange of eliminating export subsidies in the agricultural negotiations is shifted on towards JITAP II.

Under the IIC sub-committee 4 on GATS initial bilateral request to Tanzania on trade in services by the USA, Australia, China, Japan and the EU were analysed. This was followed by a review of the existing laws and regulations in selected service sectors, after which this sub-committee recommended initial draft commitments for further discussion with stakeholders in the selected service sectors. This work was done in August 2002 and January-February 2003. During the last meeting of the sub-committee in July 2003, advice from UNCTAD on the subject was discussed. According to the NTA, UNCTAD will provide further support on this topic during JITAP II.

Multilateral trade issues in which Tanzania is actively engaged

Abugattas (2001) gives guidelines on negotiation positions for the EAC countries, including Tanzania, for the agricultural negotiations (e.g. to safeguard the degrees of freedom to define and autonomously apply national agricultural development, to safeguard the SDT for developing countries, to achieve the binding of current market access conditions in the developed countries markets for export products of particular interest, to ensure that the SPS and TBT measures are not utilised to restrict imports with protectionist purposes, and

77 to convert agriculture related best endeavour clauses in binding and mandatory commitments). According to the Permanent Mission of Tanzania in Geneva, they have been active in following the negotiations of the AoA.

Tanzania endorsed the proposals put forward by the Africa Group in Geneva with regard to future work in the area of Intellectual Property. Tanzania supported a decision to extend the moratorium on the application of the non-violation provision under Article 64.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, which expired in January 2000. (Source: WTO Trade Policy Review of Tanzania, p. 22)

Tanzania was involved in the legal case in early 2001 presented against the South African Government by the pharmaceutical industry with respect to access to essential drugs to fight AIDS.

After the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun, the President of Tanzania wrote a letter to European Heads of State in which he made a plea for market access.

Expanded export capacities

In textiles & clothing and spices, the implementation of the export development strategies should still start. Expansion of export capacities of enterprises can therefore not be linked to efforts undertaken under JITAP I.

78 4 ASSESSING JITAP PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA

This chapter presents the scores on the JITAP performance in Tanzania. The scores on the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance follow a uniform scoring methodology developed for all TRTA activities that are subject to this IOB evaluation. For the ranking, a five-point scale is applied: Poor (P), Weak (W), Fair (F), Good (G), and Excellent (E). An explanation of the rating methodology can be found in Annex 2.

4.1 Efficiency

Output delivered according to plan, budget and schedule (Score: P)

Project management planned under JITAP I for Tanzania has been far from stable. The regional coordinator seems to have had very limited power; the feeling in Tanzania was that still everything had to go through Geneva before a decision could be made. Also, the national facilitators were said to have listened more to the Geneva agencies than to MIT. The NTA had a different boss than the JITAP desk officer within MIT, which was sometimes confusing.

At the JITAP desk office within MIT, project papers produced during JITAP I have not been systematically stored. Papers produced for technical support to MTS institutions and MTS impact on national economy and external policy adaptation could not be easily traced back, -"Will be somewhere within this Ministry". The export finance book (the guide "How to approach banks") was readily available neither in MIT, nor in TCCIA.

Financially, the agencies budgeted a total amount of USD 1,391,000 for JITAP I in the project document version 3 February 1998, of which USD 92,000 for WTO, USD 760,000 for ITC and USD 539,000 for UNCTAD. The materialisation of expenditures was much behind schedule in the first two years. Excluding additional financial resources from IF, the initial budget for JITAP I was in the end overrun by 12 percent.

The output delivered by JITAP I was not on time. The original project document of 3 February 1998 gave an estimated starting date of March 1998 and a duration of 2.5 years (up until the third quarter of 2000).

The signing of the project document of 28 February 1998 took more time than was expected. According to the JITAP desk officer in MIT, the delay in start up was due to a number of reasons. Tanzania did not have the financial and human resources in place to have JITAP I functioning right from the start. There was a time lag between understanding and implementing the programme. The procedures for procurement of equipment took too long and the appointments of the regional coordinator and national facilitators also took longer than expected.

79 The final report of Tanzania on JITAP I mentions furthermore that "A considerable number of JITAP I activities could not be implemented in time mainly because the committed funds could not be deployed as planned" (see Annex 8).

Relationship between input and output (Score: W)

The relation between input and output is assessed as weak based on the poor quality of output for the IIC and its subcommittees, the few ad hoc workshops for officials of the Customs Department, and the unsatisfactory delivery of the export financing and export answer book and the CDF. On the other hand, output that was delivered as planned is the assessment of export and market potential and the installation of a NEP on TBT/SPS.

Table 4.1 summarises the efficiency score for the input-output relationship of the JITAP programme in Tanzania. Together with the poor score for the output delivered according to plan, budget and schedule, the overall score on efficiency becomes poor.

Table 4.1 Input-output relationship of JITAP in Tanzania Input Output Efficiency Realised expenditures USD 1.6 Overall IIC with five sub- P million plus USD 300,000 from committees set up but without the IF budget and not legalised Staff time: ITC about 22 days a month; DDE 0.5 day per month; Two workshops for officials of P Netherlands Permanent the Customs Department Mission in Geneva 0.5 day per month. Five meetings of JITAP Three JITAP reference centres, W national steering committee two of which are not working Nine training workshops W Assessment report of potential F export products and export markets Two export development F strategies textiles & clothing and spices One export financing book. No P export answer book National Enquiry Point on TBT F and SPS established Communication and Discussion P Facility not functioning E=excellent; G=good; F=fair; W=weak; P=poor

Overall score efficiency: Poor (P)

80 4.2 Effectiveness

The IIC has had few meetings and only two out of its five subcommittees have been active.

The JITAP assistance to customs in the form of two workshops has not helped to move the Customs Department in any further strategic direction. The final report of JITAP Phase I shows that only 1 out of 4 relevant activities has been implemented for the assistance to customs (Cluster 3). The Customs Department regrets not to have had assistance on technical matters relating to tariffs and to legal matters regarding regional integration.

On the poor results regarding the legal adjustment and improvement of the business environment –Cluster 4-, the JITAP desk officer was very open. The view of the Law Reform Commission was that they wanted MIT to tell them what had to be done in the laws. But MIT did not go further. Consequently, no serious work was achieved and so this cluster was left quietly.

Two of the three Reference Centres do not function effectively. The reference libraries at MIT and CBE have not served the intended purpose as they have always been under lock. A better place for such reference documents is in BET.

Manpower and expertise for handling foreign trade issues is lacking according to Atkinson (2002, p.145). His recommendation is to increase human resources training efforts by JITAP, which could then provide in-country training on a continuous basis. An Institute on Multilateral Trade System, meant to become the active training wing of the IIC, only exists on paper. The CDF is not used effectively and is not known at institutions engaged in JITAP except at MIT.

JITAP’s training programme has included workshops that have been too short and too little to create any meaningful results in Tanzania after JITAP I. For example, TRA is responsible for the implementation of fiscal policy. The Department of Customs falls under TRA and has the mandate to administer and manage the tariff regime. The Department of Customs needs to build capacity on a number of technical tariff issues. The two JITAP workshops to assist customs have not provided any significant results in this respect.

The organisational and managerial deficiencies in the handling of WTO issues are brought up by Atkinson (2002, p.146). He recommends the Government re-doubles its efforts in the coordination of sectoral ministries and departments, independent institutions and the private sector to focus toward the implementation of the WTO agreements.

The output of JITAP increased the knowledge of BET how to put together an export development strategy. After ITC had helped them with textiles & clothing and spices, BET has independently drawn up similar strategies for horticulture and fishery.

JITAP has no funding for assisting in practical implementation neither for customs nor for the implementation of export development strategies or for the bureau of standards for installing laboratories. JITAP is too small for that, although there is a large need for assistance with implementation. JITAP has done one or two workshops on issues of SPS for policy makers and officials to understand. JITAP has told them what the problem is and

81 gives an approach how to deal with it. In the case of the export development strategies, this was done in a practical way by putting together public and private sector people. But follow up and implementation of the strategies by the Sectoral Development Committees for both textiles & clothing and spices are lacking.

The overall relationship between the indicators of output and outcome is weak, as can be seen in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Output-outcome relationship of JITAP in Tanzania Output Outcome Effectiveness IIC and subcommittees Few meetings W Workshops Customs Only two workshops, other P technical assistance needs not addressed at Customs MTS Impact studies No legal adjustments made P Reference Centres Two out of three Centres are not P functioning properly Training courses Courses only sensitised W participants, did not create measurable effects Network of trainers IMTS exists on paper, CDF is not utilised P Trade Secrets Guide and Export Trade secrets guide was not P financing book released. Export financing book has not been sold Export development strategies Strategies formulated, G understood and validated. Implementation yet to follow under JITAP II Standards National Enquiry Point installed. W Problem with operating costs of equipment in NEP E=excellent; G=good; F=fair; W=weak; P=poor

Overall score effectiveness: Weak (W)

4.3 Relevance

For the relevance of JITAP in Tanzania, an assessment has been made of the contribution of the activities under this programme to the realisation of the three Dutch policy objectives for support to TRTA. The following questions were identified for this assessment:

82 Table 4.3 indicates whether or not these Dutch policy objectives fall within the domain of the JITAP programme in Tanzania.

Contribution of JITAP I to national policy formulation at the interface of trade and development in Tanzania (Score: W)

The contribution of JITAP to national trade policy formulation has been minimal since JITAP has neither contributed directly to the National Trade Policy Document nor to the issues below that are seen as key issues by the government in the implementation of its trade policy:4

S Broad stakeholder participation with clearly defined roles and functions; S Putting in place the right institutional framework in terms of organisations, habits and norms; S Effective sectoral coordination and active participation; S Correctly sequencing of projects and activities in chosen programmes; S Monitoring systems and having a well-defined evaluation system.

No clear answers were provided by MIT on questions regarding MIT’s budget for trade policy making as well as counterpart contributions for JITAP II.

Generally speaking, JITAP has come at an opportune time to Tanzania with trade becoming so important in an era of globalisation. But the work of JITAP has only helped the understanding of some of the issues that are relevant for Tanzania in the context of WTO negotiation and implementation. The limited depth of the contributions of the JITAP I programme is illustrated by two examples below.

I. Example 1: One of the workshops of JITAP I was used for explaining WTO prescriptions on how to take action against dumping. Today Tanzania still has no anti-dumping legislation. Moreover, the industry and trade sector in Tanzania does not have the capacity to establish the margin of dumping, the material injury to the domestic industry and the causal link between the dumping and the injury. Tanzania’s move towards liberalisation will increase the incidence of dumping. But JITAP has neither made a contribution to moving towards the enactment of anti- dumping legislation nor to creating the capacity for implementing this legislation.

II. Example 2: The same applies to Rules of Origin. A JITAP workshop paid attention to the objective of the Agreement of RoO under the WTO. The rules need to be clear and predictable and their applications should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. The practical application of RoO is a complex matter, however. For Tanzania an additional constraint is the implementation of different RoO resulting from its participation in SADC and EAC and its relationship with the EU. JITAP has not set into motion capacity building on RoO within the responsible institution.

4 National Trade Policy Document (2003), Implementation framework and action plan, Chapter 6.

83 The UNCTAD MTS studies made under JITAP I are of good quality but the extent to which the recommendations of these UNCTAD studies have been worked out in the National Trade Policy Document is limited.

Contribution of JITAP I to capacity in Tanzania to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements (Score: W)

There is a communications gap between MIT, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Mission of Tanzania in Geneva. Only modest results and progress were booked on the built-in agenda for Agriculture and Services. Follow-up work is done by two IIC subcommittees, namely the sub-committees on Agriculture/SPS and on Trade in Services. Besides this, there has been no contribution of JITAP I to capacity building in multilateral trade negotiation or implementation. On the contrary, Tanzania has not developed analytical skills to quickly assess multilateral trade negotiation positions. The country has missed the opportunity to connect with the West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad) that came up with a proposal at Cancun to phase out export and production support for cotton. On bilateral trade agreements, Tanzania does not take the opportunities of the Economic Partnership Agreements from the EU and of AGOA from the USA.

Contribution of JITAP I to Tanzania’s trade performance (Score: W)

Although MIT learned to think about international competitiveness of sectors as a result of the export strategy studies for textiles & clothing and spices, the implementation of these sectoral export strategies are awaiting resources from JITAP II. Without these resources there will be no follow-up from sectoral technical development committees. In other words, the export development strategies recommended by JITAP I are expected at MIT to get further stimulus and impact from input of bilateral donors under IF. No export expansion has taken place by enterprises due to JITAP I activities under the export development strategy work.

Table 4.3 Relevance of JITAP I in Tanzania Indicator Indicator within the scope of the Score TRTA programme Contribution to national policy at Yes W the interface of trade and development Increased capacity to negotiate Yes W and implement multilateral trade agreements Contribution to improved trade Yes W performance E=excellent; G=good; F=fair; W=weak; P=poor

Overall score relevance: Weak (W)

84 4.4 Specific issues

4.4.1 Ownership

At MIT and MoA the evaluator was told that JITAP is seen as helpful. The BET mentioned that it has learned of the JITAP programme to formulate export development strategies. According to the NTA, ownership of JITAP lies mostly in the sub-committees on agriculture and services. Despite these positive words, ownership is not demonstrated by adequate budgets for co-financing from the above Government agencies.

The MIT has developed interest in MTS, so that ownership of the JITAP programme is seen to lie more with the Ministry than with the private sector. The JITAP focal point is in MIT and many activities seem to depend on what the Ministry says or does. The private sector through TCCIA cannot take any initiative, but has to rely on the Ministry.

Atkinson (2002) writes that private sector participation has been almost non-existent in MTS issues and recommends that internal private sector capacity should be developed to benefit from market access openings of WTO Agreements. JITAP is recommended by Atkinson to use the inter-ministerial committee as an interface with the private sector.

According to TCCIA, the private sector feels that JITAP I has been dominated by the public sector and that the project benefits did not trickle down to the business community. TCCIA wrote this to the PS of MIT by letter –of 13th November 2003- and made suggestions to have more interaction and outreach to the business community under JITAP II on WTO agreements and MTS issues. The UNDP office in Tanzania confirmed to the evaluator that the trade sector has not been much involved in JITAP.

4.4.2 Coordination

Agency coordination

ITC has been the leading agency in Tanzania and has done most of the work. The coordination between the Geneva agencies and the regional coordinator for West Africa has not worked out for Tanzania. Coordination of the agencies locally is facilitated through the UNDP office in Tanzania.

Donor coordination

Donor coordination in Tanzania in the area of TRTA is poor. The bilateral donors generally have a negative opinion on JITAP in Tanzania and go their own way in the area of trade. There has been no interest in taking up TA projects as a follow-up of JITAP I. There is a willingness to coordinate TRTA by bilateral donors under the new IF initiative. Provided a prioritised TRTA matrix will be produced, one bilateral donor (SIDA) was willing to provide basket funding under IF.

85 Coordination between JITAP and IF

A consultant of ITC is drafting a new DTIS under the IF in Tanzania. There are good opportunities for cooperation between JITAP and IF, for example, in the area of helping the TRA with anti-dumping and RoO legislation. Under JITAP I IF financial resources have been used to boost activities of the IIC’s and the export strategies.

Dialogue between The Hague and RNE at country level on JITAP and coherence

From the side of the RNE there is no monitoring of and no reporting on JITAP. The Netherlands is not represented in the NSC for JITAP, although the RNE has a seat in the NSC for IF. The RNE briefs DDE on the implementation of the BEST programme in which the RNE is participating.

During the evaluation mission, the Centre for Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) was conducting an export promotion seminar in Dar es Salaam; in Tanzania CBI is looking at the possibilities for exporting organic food to the EU. The Programme for Cooperation with Emerging Markets (PSOM) is ongoing (and in its second phase), studies under the Programme Economic Cooperation Projects (PESP) are made and the last applications under the Development Related Export Transaction Programme (ORET) were dealt with.

In the bilateral relationship of The Netherlands with Tanzania, private sector development is a focal sector. Within the PSD agenda there is little attention paid to international trade, the exception being the approach of market linkages applied by SNV-FAIDA-SEP. In the Annual Report of 2002, and the Annual Plan of 2003 of the RNE no word is mentioned on either JITAP or IF. These programmes are clearly beyond the scope of RNE’s present fields of work. Operational cooperation with multilateral donors is mentioned in the Annual Plan of 2003 under activities that will be considered when the workload permits.

4.4.3 Beneficiaries

In Tanzania, micro enterprises are defined as engaging up to 4 people (or employing capital amounting to Tshs. 5 million), small enterprises are mostly formal undertakings with between 5-49 employees (or with capital investment from above Tshs. 5 million to 200 million). Medium enterprises employ between 50-99 people (or use capital investment from above Tshs. 200 million to 800 million). There are no recent data available on the number of SMEs in Tanzania; the latest estimate on micro enterprises goes back to 1991: 1.7 Million micro enterprises engaging 3 million persons taking up 20 percent of the labour force.

The export development strategy for textiles has been mainly for a small group of large enterprises of which only a handful are exporting.

The export development strategy for spices recognises the potential to link smallholder production with large export-oriented companies through the concept of market linkages.

86 The companies that visit BET for trade information are mainly SMEs.

4.4.4 Follow-up of earlier evaluations

Have recommendations made by the Mid Term Review (MTR) in 2000 and the Summative evaluation of JITAP in 2002 been followed up in Tanzania?

The MTR recommendations included:

S Some activities should be selected for a consolidation phase. Subcommittees of IIC should be focused on the Agreement on Agriculture and GATS. This was done; S Revitalisation of the Inter-Institutional Committees should be strengthened at national level as well as the actors involved in the MTS. Revitalisation has not materialised; S Development of Human Resources for strengthening capacity in regard to the MTS. This is not noticeable; S Development of sector strategies / action plans with the private sector to strengthen exports. This was done; S Strengthening national enquiry points in the area of standards and strengthening national JITAP networks. Weak to poor follow-up.

The recommendations by the Summative evaluation included:

S The links between trade and poverty need to be explored. No explorative work on this was released; S Current methodologies to assist in the development of export-sector strategies require review since in low-income countries the major constraint is the supply-side. No review of methodology was released; S There is an urgent need for trade-related institutions to be equipped appropriately, particularly in IT. All reference centres and the NEP for standards had problems with their computer hardware; S Bridging the gap between trade negotiators in Geneva and the recipient country at the field level should be studied. The gap between the Permanent Mission of Tanzania and Dar es Salaam is still a big problem, which DANIDA intends to take up; S Given the high management and overhead costs, there has to be greater attention to the issue of cost-effectiveness. JITAP II has a similar structure of the budget as JITAP I as far as management and overhead cost and expenditures for consultants is concerned.

4.4.5 Future performance

There is not much evidence that the current performance of JITAP in Tanzania will change drastically. The pace of trade reforms will not speed up given the institutional weaknesses of the organisations in charge. The MIT is using the National Trade Policy as its strategy. Outside MIT, the other ministries have not shown that they are serious in working together with MIT and accelerating the implementation of the trade reforms. Also, the donor community has not yet acted together by responding in a coordinated way to the National

87 Trade Policy Document. Under JITAP II, it is not yet clear to the evaluator what the focus will be in Tanzania.

At MIT, work on the JITAP II project document for Tanzania is still far from completed. Internal communication problems and an organisational restructuring in the Department of Trade hinder the work. It will not be before February 2004 that the Tanzania project document will be finalised and approved by the appropriate authorities.

According to the generic programming document made by the three agencies, the intention under JITAP II is to facilitate more self-implementation of the individual modules by the countries themselves. Toolkits are defined to include a minimum number of tools and aim to provide stronger self-help guidance. It is doubtful whether the increased national capacity building at institutional and system level will take off, also given the past performance of the JITAP Focal Point at MIT. The assessment of a senior economist at MIT is that after JITAP II, Tanzania will still not be able to stand on its own in coping with Multilateral Trade issues.

JITAP has made no direct contribution to the new trade policy of Tanzania, it has sensitised officials but not increased capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements. It has only provided a strategy on how the export of textiles and spices could be developed; in other words, JITAP provided a tool but whether this tool will be applied will depend on further JITAP support.

Given the present attitude to counterpart funding and the current set up of the National JITAP Focal Point in MIT, the likelihood that the future outcome of JITAP II will contribute to Dutch policy objectives is slim.

The scope of JITAP II in Tanzania will need to be more concrete and narrow according to the NTA/National Consultant, a view that is shared by the evaluator. Emphasis will need to be on getting more notifications done, obtaining a systematic road map for making existing laws and regulations WTO compatible, implementing two sectoral export strategies, and incorporating MTS in the syllabi of institutes for higher learning. The IF Focal Point sees JITAP II as an initiating programme, an eye-opener that works as a catalyst for getting more bilateral donor support for TRTA through IF. In this process JITAP has helped to identify the trade obstacles by taking a practical approach through training and bringing together public and private sector agents, according to the IF Focal Point.

4.5 Conclusion and policy issues

General conclusion

The scores on the performance of JITAP I in Tanzania in terms of efficiency and effectiveness are, respectively, poor and weak. JITAP I has also been weak in terms of relevance, that is its contribution to Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA.

The three objectives of JITAP I were not reached in Tanzania (Objective 1: Building national capacity to understand WTO agreements and their implications for Tanzania; Objective 2:

88 Conforming policy and regulatory framework to the Agreements; Objective 3: Enhancing Tanzania’s capacity to take advantage of the Agreements through export readiness).

Ownership of JITAP lies mainly in the MIT. Ownership of JITAP with the implementing agencies of MTS issues like CBE, TBS and Customs as well as with the private sector organisation TCCIA is minimal. The sustainability of JITAP I is poor. The lack of counterpart contributions from the Government and private sector hold up the implementation of follow- up activities.

Coordination between the Geneva agencies and the regional coordinator for West Africa did not work out for Tanzania. Bilateral donors with a presence in Tanzania are negative about JITAP and are predominantly occupied with their own trade support programmes. Coordination between JITAP and the Integrated Framework has thus far not been worked out either in Tanzania.

Policy issues

Despite the non-performance of JITAP I, the Tanzanian authorities are in favour of extending the programme. Politically, JITAP is supported because the programme is seen by the authorities as a means to obtain funding from bilateral donors for the implementation of larger trade development programmes.

As a co-funder of JITAP I and II, the Netherlands is advised to critically follow the future performance of JITAP II in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. A more critical stance from the Netherlands is needed on monitoring the exit phase of the programme in Tanzania. Based on the experience of JITAP I in Tanzania, a sharp review of the selection criteria for admission of new countries to the programme is warranted.

The latter selection criteria should consider:

S An appropriate place of the JITAP desk/focal point within the institutional structure of the Ministry of Trade, equipped with good facilities (phone, computer hardware, photocopiers, a vehicle). Moreover, the JITAP national focal point must be manned by a full-time high-level official. This person should be knowledgeable of MTS issues and able to move the JITAP activities forward; S The scope for cooperation between (semi-) public organisations, such as BET, and private sector organisations, such as TCCIA. This should exclude situations in which, for example, BET provides the business sector with trade information only in Dar es Salaam and surroundings while information dissemination through the provincial outlets of TCCIA is not realised; S Locations of reference centres and training of prospective managers for these centres should be more carefully programmed with a view towards the sustainability of these centres after the JITAP programme. It should be known in advance what the institutions want to do with the Reference Centre and how they can financially sustain it; S More participation from outside the Government in the structure of organising and implementing JITAP in the country. It may be considered to have the workload of the JITAP focal point reduced by entrusting it with the coordination of activities only

89 under the second JITAP objective (Conforming policy and regulatory framework to the Agreements). Institutions outside the Ministry of Trade might coordinate the activities under the first and third JITAP objectives more efficiently (respectively, Building national capacity of understanding WTO Agreements and Export readiness). Consequently, more support for the private sector institutions should be offered in terms of Reference Centres, CDF, other facilities for MTS information, and implementing export development strategies; S A guarantee that there will be counterpart funding for the running costs of the NSC, the IIC and its subcommittees, the JITAP Focal Point, the Reference Centres, and the secretarial follow-up work of export development strategies. The Ministry of Trade should include JITAP counterpart funds in its budget. For the institutions outside the government, such as the BET, TBS, and TCCIA, the same applies. These institutions should make clear how the future recurrent costs of the JITAP activities they would like to have will be financed. For TCCIA, for example, this would mean making clear how they would finance the dissemination of MTS information to the business community;

Communication on JITAP II between Post and DDE

If regular feedback from the Post on JITAP to DDE is not possible due to staff constraints, then more emphasis should be put on the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the JITAP programme itself. Monitoring will probably be done by national consultants on the basis of a general framework as included in the programme document for JITAP II. These national consultants should be independent and not be engaged in any work of the three agencies.

The three agencies should also not be engaged in the organisation and set-up of the evaluations planned for JITAP II. This means, among other things, that the international consultants will not be selected by the three agencies, nor should the national consultants be selected by ITC on behalf of the three agencies. In addition, there should be consultants in the evaluation team, representing the main bilateral donors, who function as full team members and not as observers. This will make the evaluations more independent and less biased towards extending and expanding JITAP.

Communication gap in trade negotiations

The linkage between the Permanent Mission of Tanzania in Geneva and MIT is hindered by a communication gap. All communication should go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and fast direct electronic communication with the Permanent Mission is not possible according to the NTA. The communication between Dar es Salaam and the Permanent Mission will be addressed in the market access programme supported by DANIDA. This type of capacity building for trade negotiations has not been done under JITAP. JITAP has sensitised through workshops the issues but that did not create internal capacity according to a senior economist at MIT.

The negotiations on agriculture are important for Tanzania and require a pro-active strategy. The national interest would need to be defined and included in negotiating objectives,

90 priorities should be formulated, and proposals framed. The negotiation team in Geneva would need to have some room to negotiate during the actual meetings and there should be a continuous process of feedback from the capital. The Permanent Mission of Tanzania in Geneva feels that the response they receive during the negotiation processes is not optimal.

Tanzania recognises that taking national positions does not make a difference in multilateral trade negotiations. Therefore Tanzania joins regional positions such as taken by the LDC Group, the African Union, and the ACP countries. Nonetheless, Tanzania should still make its own assessment of which group is representing Tanzania’s interests best. It is therefore that the country’s trade negotiation capacity should be further strengthened.

More practical coordination and role for JITAP

The roles of MIT and the private sector must be clear in implementing MTS issues. The MIT should have a facilitating role in the process. The MIT should coordinate the activities with the WTO/ITC/UNCTAD. At protocol level MIT should work with these three agencies, but when it comes to actual implementation, the process could be left to the private sector either through the IMTS or TCCIA. The implementing agencies of MTS issues, like CBE, TBS, Customs, and BET, should be the ones to handle the relevant JITAP activities while the Ministry should monitor this. Things will start moving faster when the roles are defined in the manner proposed. The MIT will be in a good position to monitor the process, which can be outsourced as well.

Although the benefits of regional economic integration are clear, the official trade between Tanzania and neighbouring African countries is low. To a certain extent this may be explained by the similarity these countries have in their traditional exports. Apart from liberalising the regional markets, by removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers at the borders, it may be that media and cultural institutions need to further promote the advantages of regional economic cooperation. Here could be a role for JITAP II to develop and promote regional trade at the enterprise level. This is the more so as the five-year period of tariff asymmetry in Kenyan-Tanzanian trade will be fully needed by Tanzania’s industries to modernise and become competitive against Kenyan imports.

Also there should be interaction between the Customs Union for East Africa and the WTO. Regional trade liberalisation would permit the phased exposure of Tanzania to global competition. Inefficient national production would be replaced by more efficient regional imports while efficient national producers would be able to sell their products to an enlarged regional market. Notwithstanding this, WTO rules preclude that the regional trade preferences would lead to trade diversion from third parties. It will therefore be important to attract FDI to Tanzania to ensure further increases in manufacturing efficiency.

JITAP’s relation with Integrated Framework

The ideal picture for the relationship between the Integrated Framework and JITAP is planned as follows: Stemming from the integration of trade into the Poverty Reduction Strategy, there would be the National Trade Policy under which in turn would fall the Integrated Framework. Under the IF there would be JITAP II activities, the TTPP of DFID,

91 the DANIDA Market Access Programme, the SIDA TRTA activities, etc. Whether this ideal picture will be realised in practice depends upon the integration of trade into the new PRSP and on the willingness of the donors on the ground to coordinate. DFID-Tanzania is willing to put the TTPP under the IF.

The National IF Steering Group will be the overall Steering Group. There will be a subcommittee under this overall Steering Group that will deal with all the TRTA, among which are JITAP II, TTPP and the Danish Market Access programme.

The formulation of the National Trade Policy Document has taken a number of years. Meanwhile, trade is still not mainstreamed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Tanzania. Not long from now there will be a new PRSP. Trade should therefore become integrated in the work of the PRS Technical Committee of the Vice President’s Office. Outside MIT, other ministries should buy into the National Trade Policy; e.g. trade should be mainstreamed in important sectoral policy documents such as in the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy approved in October 2001 and the Rural Development Strategy of December 2001 in which the connection with international trade is hardly mentioned. Also in the SME policy paper of 2003, trade is absent. In the latter policy paper more explicit reference could have been made to the National Trade Policy Document in which SMEs and rural farmers are connected to the concept of market linkages.

Under JITAP and IF, needs assessments have been separately organised. Similarly, specialised agencies or programmes, like CBI, PSOM, PESP and ORET, have conducted feasibility studies to address marketing opportunities and investment needs. To further coherence between Dutch bilateral business cooperation programmes and JITAP in Tanzania, exchanges and working relationships could be established with CBI.

92 REFERENCES

Burkina Faso

Annuaire statitistique du Burkina Faso 1999. Ouagadougou: INSD, December 2000 Beoordelingsmemorandum JITAP II. Draft. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), November 2003

Beoordelingsmemorandum JITAP consolidation phase. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), October 2001

Beoordelingsmemorandum JITAP. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands): August 1998

Burkina Faso: Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté. Burkina Faso: Ministère de l’économie et des finances. 2000

Burkina Faso: Matrice des produits et des marchés d’exportation, Geneva, ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, Juin 2000

Burkina Faso : Statistical Annex. IMF Country Report No. 03/198. Washington D.C. : IMF, June 2003

Document de projet pour le suivi et la mise en oeuvre des accords de l’OMC: Burkina Faso. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, January 1998

HÄFLIGER H, M. KAUR GREWAL, H.-B, SOLIGNAC LECOMTE and L. DE SILVA: Report of the mid-term evaluation of the joint integrated technical assistance programme (JITAP). Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, October 2000

Imboden, N.: WTO/Doha Round Support for the continued participation in the negotiations of the four West and Central African countries behind the WTO Cotton Initiative. Issues’ Paper for Donors. Geneva: IDEAS, December 2003.

JITAP: A Partnership for Trade Development in Africa. Geneva, ITC/UNCTAD/WTO undated

JITAP: Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (Phase II) JITAP II 2003-2006. Programme Document. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, December 2002

JITAP II. Needs Assessment and Programming Exercise. Working document. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, June 2003 JITAP I Final Report. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, May 2003

JITAP I Final Report. Annex 4: Burkina Faso. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, May 2003

93 Lettre de politique de développement du secteur privé. Burkina Faso: Ministère du commerce de la promotion de l’entreprise et de l’artisanat. November 2002 Faso

Liondjo, F. and A. Sawadogo : Négociations commerciales multilatérales et mise en œuvre des accords de l’OMC. Burkina Faso. JITAP Cluster 2 study. Geneva : ITC/UNCTAD.WTO, August 2010 Nancy, Gilles, Jerôme Joubert et Anne Penicaud:L’impact du Cycle de l’Uruguay sur l’économie du Burkina Faso. Rapport intermédiaire à soumettre lors du symposium national et du séminaire haut niveau. Ouagadougou: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, November 1999

PC-TAS, Trade Analysis System on personal computer, Harmonized System Rev.0, 1997- 2001. Geneva: ITC/UN statistics division, February 2003

SILVA, L. de and A. WESTON: Report of the summative evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme JITAP. Geneva: ITC/UNCTAD/WTO, June 2002

Trade Policy Review – Burkina Faso. Report by the Secretariat. WTO, Geneva, 1998, WT/TPR/S/46

Trade Policy Review – Burkina Faso. Report by the Government. WTO, Geneva, 1998, WT/TPR/G/46

Tanzania

Abugattas, L. et.al. (2001), Negotiation Objectives and Institutional Support for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report prepared for JITAP under the supervision of UNCTAD, June

Atkinson, K.C. et. al. (2002), Multilateral Trading System Impact on National Economy and External Trade Policy Adaptation, Tanzania, Report prepared by UNCTAD, October

De Silva, L. and A. Weston (2002), Report of the summative evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP), June

Haefliger, H. et. Al. (2000), Report of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP), October

JITAP (2003), United Republic of Tanzania, Final Report (Phase I, 1998-2002), Annex 8, April

Matambalya, F. (2003), Position for facilitating Tanzania commitments in Agricultural negotiations, Faculty of Commerce and Management, University of Dar es Salaam, June

MIT (2003), Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy, April

MIT (2003a), National Trade Policy Document, February

94 PC-TAS, Trade Analysis System on personal computer, Harmonized System Rev.0, 1997- 2001, ITC/UN statistics division

WTO Trade Policy Review (2000), Tanzania, Reports by the WTO Secretariat and the Government

95 96 PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Burkina Faso

Name Organisation, Position

Mme. Irène Abba Chef Division III, Direction Générale des Douanes Mr. Sékou Ba Executive Director National Office for Foreign Trade ONAC, JITAP National Facilitator Mr. Benjamin I. Baguian Trade Point Director, ONAC Mr. Ambroise Balima General Director of Trade, JITAP Focal Point Mr. B. Jean Claude Bicaba Secrétaire Général, Ministère du Commerce, de la Promotion de l’Entreprise et de l’Artisanat Mr. Toussaint Caradec Team leader, Project d’appui à l’environnement institutionnel et au développement du secteur privé Mr. Siaka Coulibaly Economist. World Bank Burkina Faso

CNSC/OMC Plenary session of the inter-institutional committee, the CNSC/OMC Mr. Abdoul Aziz Diallo Consultant Section Trade & private Investments, Canadian Embassy M. Thierry Ferré Conseiller Technique Agro-Alimentaire, Project d’appui à l’environnement institutionnel et au développement du secteur privé Mr. Jacques Gérard Chef du service de coopération et d’action culturelle, Ambassade de France au Burkina Faso Mr. Huub Hendrix Head Development Cooperation, Royal Netherlands Embassy Mr. Jean Noël Kaboré Chargé de la communication, la formation et l’assistance, CNPB M. Jean-Martin Kambiré Secrétaire Permanent de la Coordination des Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles M. Vincent Kinda Manager K & F Mr. Bonaventura Kyelem Chargé de programme gouvernance économique, UNDP Mme Françoise Lelosq Programme Officer, Delegation of the European Commission in Burkina Faso Mr. D. Hubert Millogo Premier Secrétaire, Syndicat des Commerçants Importateurs et Exportateurs Mr. Biharima Nacoulma Vice-Président du Conseil National du Patronat Burkinabé CNPB Mr. Hamadé Ouedraogo Director General Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts M. Jean Pierre Ouedraogo Consultant of JITAP I evaluation & JITAP II programme. Mrs. Albertine Sawadogo Director of External Trade Mr. Abdoulaye Sidibé Assistant d’études, Chamber of Commerce

97 M. Souleymane Soulama Professor in Economics and Management, University of Ouagadougou Mme. Cécile Tassin Economist, Delegation of the European Commission in Burkina Faso Mr. Baya Toé Director of Training and Assistance to Enterprises, ONAC Mr. Seydou Tou Chief of Personnel Chamber of Commerce; in charge of WTO issues Mme. Caecilia Wijgers First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy Mr. Prosper Yaméogo Conseiller, Député, Conseiller à’l’entreprise Velegda Mme. Adama Zagré Chef Service chémie, environnement, textile et cuir, Fasonorm, responsable PNI Mr. Antoine Zoungrana Directeur Général des Douanes

Geneva

Staff of Multilateral Agencies

Mr. Ali WTO Mr. Chatsika WTO Mr. Rana WTO Mr. Yeboah WTO Mr. B. Fadhl ITC and overall JITAP coordinator ITC Mrs. Naas ITC, responsible for Burkina Faso and Benin Mr. H. Roelofsen ITC Mr. Shah ITC, responsible for Tanzania Mr. A. Vijay ITC

Staff of Bilateral Agencies

Mr. Murigande UNCTAD Mrs. Fuller Permanent Mission of United Kingdom Mrs. A. Heuchan Permanent Mission of Canada Mr. Irumba Permanent Mission of Uganda Mrs. Kadege Permanent Mission of Tanzania Mr. M.J. Kassaja Permanent Mission of Tanzania Mr. Laourou Permanent Mission of Benin Mr. Ndoboli Permanent Mission of Uganda Mrs. B. Rietveld Permanent Mission of the Netherlands Mr. Von Schubert German representative (by phone) Mr. P.J. Sciarone Permanent Mission of the Netherlands

Tanzania

Name Organisation, Position

Mr. Willem Bronkhorst Royal Netherlands Embassy

98 Mrs. Kathleen Charles International Consultant conducting DTIS Tanzania Mr. I. Dalushi Member of TCCIA Mr. Ernst C. Elias Senior Trade Officer and JITAP Focal Point Mr. C. Gama Lecturer of College of Business Education Mrs. Ewa Hagwal Embassy of Sweden Mr. Ian Jones DFID Tanzania Mr. George P.E. Lauwo Commissioner for Customs and Excise, TRA Mr. Bede Lyimo Senior Economist MIT and IF Focal Point Mrs. Dr Roseane Mohamed Principal Agricultural Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security Mr. Lasse Moller Royal Danish Embassy Mrs. Beatrice M. Mutabazi Deputy Director Tanzania Bureau of Standards Mrs. Wilma Mwaikambo WTO Desk Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security Mr. K.S. Mwasha Director of Research and Planning Board of External Trade Mr. A. Ngemera Permanent Secretary MIT Mr. A.T. Pallangyo National Consultant, previously National Technical Advisor Mr. Ernest Salla Assistant Resident Representative UNDP Mr. Kalua Simba Blanket Manufacturers Mr. Gert Jan Tempelman Royal Netherlands Embassy Mr. Jacob Wiersma Royal Netherlands Embassy

Geneva

Staff of Multilateral Agencies

Staff of Bilateral Agencies

Mr. Fuller Permanent Mission of United Kingdom Mrs. A. Heuchan Permanent Mission of Canada Mrs. Irumba Permanent Mission of Uganda Mr. Kadege Permanent Mission of Tanzania

99 Mrs. M.J. Kassaja Permanent Mission of Tanzania Mr. Ndoboli Permanent Mission of Uganda Mr. B. Rietveld Permanent Mission of the Netherlands Mrs. Von Schubert German representative (by phone)

100 ANNEX 1

DESIGN OF THE EVALUATION RESEARCH FOR THE JOINT INTEGRATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME (JITAP)

A.1.1 Profile

Mission and objectives of the organisation or programme

ITC, UNCTAD and WTO started JITAP in mid 1998 to provide TRTA through an integrated approach to eight African countries. The goal of JITAP is to enhance development through more effective participation in the multilateral trade system (MTS). JITAP’s common objectives are: building national understanding of MTS, conforming to MTS obligations and disciplines, and enhancing readiness of country’s exporters.

Activities and country coverage

The JITAP activities started with needs assessments in the African countries that looked at weak areas in their supply-side geared to trade. The three agencies indicated what kind of TRTA could be extended. UNCTAD would focus on the impact of the multilateral trade system and the trade policy adaptation. WTO would deal with the adjustments to trade laws and regulations; and ITC would work on sector/product strategy and export supply & market potential. Programme elements were organised in fifteen clusters. Through donations in a common trust fund (CTF) the activities could start. The programme covered 8 countries of which 4 LDCs.

After a Mid-Term Review, the CTF Steering Group decided in December 2000 to consolidate the JITAP activities in four areas: i) Revitalising Inter Institutional Committees, ii) development of human resources for strengthening the participation at national level of actors who are engaged in the Multilateral Trade System, iii) Development of sector strategies / action plans with the private sector to enhance exports, iv) Strengthening of National Enquiry Points on standards.

The programme expired at the end of 2002 and was followed by a second phase that started in the beginning of 2003 for another period of four years. The programme is extended with 8 new countries, 6 of which are LDCs. The 8 countries of the first phase are still included in the new programme benefiting from an exit strategy to terminate and consolidate the activities started during the first phase.

101 Budget of the programme/organisation

Besides the Netherlands other European bilateral donors have contributed to JITAP. The original budget for JITAP was USD 10 million. The total budget for the consolidation phase was USD 1.5 million. The budget for JITAP II amounts to USD 12.6 million.

Financial relationship with the Netherlands

The JITAP activities that were financially supported by the Netherlands were earmarked for four LDCs: Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Tanzania. The commitment of the Netherlands for the first period of JITAP was NLG 1 million. The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands in Geneva has been a member of the CTF Steering Group. The contribution of the Netherlands for the consolidation phase of JITAP amounted to EUR 122,360. For JITAP II a BEMO is being approved at an amount of EUR 800,000 over four years as an unearmarked contribution to the CTF.

Earlier evaluations

Mid-term evaluation in October 2000 and a summative evaluation in June 2002. The main conclusion of the mid-term evaluation was that there had been considerable progress in building capacities to enhance the understanding of WTO processes, that the objective of adapting national trading systems to the obligations of the MTS was far from achieved and that activities to enhance export readiness at the country level had to be further consolidated. The summative evaluation concluded that JITAP has been an important instrument in familiarising and developing capacities on MTS issues in the eight countries in which it has been implemented. The summative evaluation contained a general part and a part with country experiences. During this evaluation country case studies were made in each of the participating countries.

A.1.2 Design for evaluation research

Selection and focus

The Netherlands has earmarked its financial support in JITAP I to four of the eight JITAP countries, being four LDCs. The evaluation research will focus on the latter four countries, conducting field research in two of them: one Anglophone (Tanzania), one Francophone country (Burkina Faso).

The evaluation concerns JITAP I. Elements of JITAP II will only be taken into consideration when they could shed light on the implementation and results of the first programme.

102 Main questions (to be addressed at the JITAP country level):

1. Efficiency: a. Was output delivered according to plan, budget and schedule? b. What has been the relationship between the input and the output?

2. Effectiveness: a. Did the output of JITAP contribute to knowledge and capacities of individual public officers of the developing country in the field of trade and development?

3. Relevance: a. To what extent has the outcome of JITAP contributed to the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development? b. To what extent has the outcome of JITAP contributed to the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements?

103 Evaluation matrix:

Types of Indicators Sources of data Research methods Of input For 1-2: For 1-2: 1. Total funding of JITAP in Tanzania and BF ITC, programme administrators, JITAP Focal Points, JITAP Dossier study and inter-institutional committees, DDE, RNE Embassies, Interviews 2. Number of staff and working days spent to start and organise JITAP in Tanzania and BF Of output: For 1-3: 1. Number and type of training courses per theme or subject 1. JITAP Focal Points, Customs Interviews, desk study (incl. evaluation reports), inspection organised List of presence; course evaluation forms visits

2. National Steering Committees (NSC), Reference Centres 2. Ministry of Industry and Commerce, academic centres, (RC), Inter-Institutional Committees (ICC), National Enquiry other relevant organisation Points (NEP) set up Implementation plans made and adopted, inspections visits, number of users, minutes of meetings

3. Number and types of tools developed by JITAP (incl., 3. Board of External Trade, National Export Association, trade secrets, export financing, National Enquiry Point Bureau of Standards Standards, communication and discussion facility) Number of users, number of copies sold, number of selling points Of outcome: For 1-4: 1. Understanding of the multilateral trade system by 1. Participants of national symposia, courses, Interviews, desk study individual officers videoconferences and technical workshops.

2. Number of meetings of NSC and IIC, involvement of 2. Local participants, minutes of meetings private sector and NGOs 3. Number and type of multilateral trade system impact 3. Agency officials in Geneva, project reports, local officials studies completed

104 Types of Indicators Sources of data Research methods 4. Number of cases in which national legislation (trade 4. Inter Institutional Committee (chairpersons and regulatory framework) has been checked on conformity with functionaries on the WTO); WTO Review Reports, WTO rules Compliance with WTO Agreements, Tanzania Legal Reform Commission

Number and types of strategies developed for priority 5. National Export Association, Chamber of Commerce & sectors/products (incl. Identification of supply constraints Industry and matrices of exportable products)

Of impact: (in terms of national trade policy formulation and ownership) For 1-2: For 1-8: 1. Increase of budget for Ministry of Commerce for trade- Trade policy makers, National Steering Committee, National Interviews and desk-study policy making Focal Point in Tanzania and BF, ICC

2. Counterpart contributions from the government and private sector

3. Number of cases in which national legislation (trade 3. IIC, national legislator regulatory framework) has been adapted to comply with WTO rules

4. Number of national trade policy papers produced 4. Ministry of Trade (in terms of negotiation capacity) For 5-7: 5. Number of bilateral or regional trade agreements Trade negotiators of Tanzania or BF; Instructions for trade negotiated by Tanzania and BF negotiators of Tanzania or BF; Inter-Institutional Committee; Ministry of Industry & Commerce 6. Multilateral trade negotiation strategy developed by

105 Types of Indicators Sources of data Research methods Tanzania and Burkina Faso

7. Number of multilateral trade issues in which Tanzania and BF are actively engaged

(in terms of export capacity) 8. Expanded export capacities: supply constraints of For 8: identified priority sectors and exportable products are Chamber of Commerce & Industry; export-oriented removed; (more) enterprises are ready to export companies, National exporters association

106 Specific questions:

Ownership:

1. What is the ownership of JITAP by the government and private sector in Tanzania and BF?

Coordination:

2. Is there any relationship between JITAP and IF? Are their activities complementary or not? 3. To what extent do WTO, UNCTAD and ITC coordinate and integrate their activities through JITAP? 4. To what extent are JITAP activities coordinated with TRTA provided by other multilateral agencies? 5. Is there coordination and interaction between JITAP and the trade related activities that bilateral donors implement in the selected African countries?

Beneficiaries:

6. Is there any evidence on what type of companies in the selected African countries did benefit from the JITAP activities: larger companies or SMEs?

7. Follow-up of earlier evaluation:

8. Have the recommendations made by the evaluations been followed up in Tanzania and in Burkina Faso?

Future performance:

9. What have been the criteria for selecting the eight JITAP I countries and what for the new countries? If the criteria have been changed, was this on the basis of lessons learned from JITAP I and if so, which ones? Would other developing countries with more potential not be better candidates for trade capacity development? 10. What indications do exist that the performance of JITAP in Tanzania and BF in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance will drastically change in the coming 2-4 years? Will the JITAP II exit strategy be adequate to achieve sustainability? 11. Is it likely that there is no or a special role for JITAP when IF would come on stream? 12. To what extent do the future plans of JITAP II for Tanzania and Burkina Faso in the field of TRTA concur with the Dutch policy objectives for financial support to TRTA? 13. What is the probability that the future outcome of JITAP II interventions in Tanzania and Burkina Faso will contribute to the Dutch policy objectives in the field of TRTA?

107 108 ANNEX 2

RATING METHODOLOGY

The performance of the TRTA activities subject to this IOB evaluation is assessed on the basis of a uniform scoring methodology. A five-point scale - Poor (P), Weak (W), Fair (F), Good (G), and Excellent (E) - is used for the scores on the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the six selected programmes/organisations.

This explanatory note illustrates how the scores on the above three performance indicators were made.

Generic performance indicators

Generic performance indicators for all six programmes were defined as follows:

S Efficiency is the relationship between output and input taking into account the delivery of output according to plan, budget and schedule. S Effectiveness is the relationship between outcome and output with emphasis on the contribution of the programmes to increased knowledge and capacities of individual public officers of developing countries in the field of trade and development. S Relevance is the relationship between impact and outcome with emphasis on the contribution of the programmes to: a) the formulation of a national policy of the developing country at the interface of trade and development; and b) the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements.

Under relevance the emphasis on trade policy formulation and trade negotiation capacity reflects two of the objectives that the Netherlands has for support to TRTA. In the relevance tables a separate column – with the heading "Indicator within the scope of the TRTA programme" - shows whether a programme/organisation does or does not have among its own objectives the contribution to these Netherlands objectives. This allows taking into account a difference between the objectives of the Netherlands and those of a programme/organisation when reading the scores on relevance.

Programme specific indicators

Specific evaluation matrices were designed for the individual six programmes, which can be found in a separate annex in each evaluation report. The more detailed performance indicators therein aim to reflect the specific features of each programme. The breakdown of the indicators into sub-indicators and sub-sub-indicators in each of the specific evaluation matrices are to avoid subjective assessments of results.

Below three examples are given of how the overall scores on efficiency (for IF-Yemen), effectiveness (for JITAP-Tanzania) and relevance (for QUNO) have been determined.

109 Efficiency IF-Yemen

For efficiency of IF there are two sub-indicators: 1) The input-output relationship of the IF process; and 2) The time span for delivering the DTIS.

For the first sub-indicator the evaluator looked at the input side at the sub-sub indicators: the amount of financial support allocated to the IF, the time input of agency staff involved in the DTIS, and the number of meetings of the national IF steering committee. As for the output the evaluator looked at the following sub-sub indicators: the national workshop, overview and analysis of existing TRTA, the draft or completed diagnostic trade integration study, and an overview of prioritised TRTA/CB projects.

The sub-sub indicators at the input side were looked at in relation to the quantity of the output produced. In addition, the quality of the sub-sub indicators at the output side were assessed and scored accordingly:

S Was the national workshop a one-off event only? Was there a broad participation from the private sector and civil society? The national workshop in Yemen did not have a broad participation; there had not been much follow-up realised between the time of the national workshop in June 2003 and the evaluation mission in November 2003. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-sub indicator. S Has the DTIS produced an overview and analysis of existing TRTA? The technical assistance matrix in the DTIS for Yemen has the following shortcomings: i) it is unclear which type of action is implemented and which ones are proposed; ii) there is no analysis of the experience with the existing type of actions; iii) there is no connection between the type of actions and the main body of the DTIS report. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-sub indicator. S Does the draft DTIS comply with the broad terms of reference for integration studies? Are the pro-poor aspects covered in the trade integration study? Linkages between poverty and trade were insufficiently paid attention to in the DTIS for Yemen; According the World Bank Sana’a Office the study was for about 70 percent based on input of the World Bank, making use of data and material from earlier World Bank reports. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-sub indicator. S Is there an overview of TRTA/CB priorities for submission to Window II? Four months after the national workshop there was not yet a list finalised with TRTA/CB projects ready to submit to Window II. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-sub indicator.

The unweighted average for the above sub-sub indicators gives a score of weak - (2+2+2+1)/4= 1.750 for the first sub-indicator.

For the second sub-indicator the evaluator looked at the time between the first preparatory mission and the approval of the DTIS by the authorities of the country, for which a benchmark of one year was taken. In the case of Yemen this time span was in November 2003 already more than 22 months, hence a score of poor on this sub-indicator.

The unweighted average score for the two sub-indicators gives the overall score of poor for the efficiency of IF in Yemen, (1.75+1)/2= 1.375.

110 Effectiveness of JITAP-Tanzania

For the output-outcome relationship of JITAP-Tanzania nine sub-indicators were distinguished: 1. Were the Inter-Institutional Committees (IIC) functioning demonstrated by regular meetings? Only two out of five subcommittees have functioned in this way. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-indicator. 2. Have the workshops organised for Customs Officials increased the knowledge of the participants? The Customs Department in Tanzania was not satisfied with the results of the two ad hoc workshops. This Department expressed the need for more activities on technical and legal customs matters, which the JITAP workshops had not provided. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-indicator. 3. Number and type of completed Multilateral Trade System impact studies. Under the first phase of JITAP-Tanzania external consultants delivered two MTS studies. While Tanzania is lacking in terms of complying with WTO commitments, for instance on notifications, the responsible officials did not achieve any results with the impact studies regarding conformity checks and legal adjustments. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-indicator. 4. Are the reference centres, containing WTO and multilateral trade documentation, used by individuals? Two out of three reference centres were not functioning as such. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-indicator. 5. Have the training courses increased the knowledge and capacities of the participants? The participants of the training courses saw them as too short and not comprehensive enough. Little dissemination activities were found. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-indicator. 6. Network of trainers and MTS experts maintained? The degree of networking among trainers and MTS experts is minimal. An Institute of Multilateral Trade Systems was formed but is not operational. The utilisation of the Communication Discussion Facility is low and this facility has not contributed to strengthening the national network of trainers. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-indicator. 7. Are the Trade Secrets Guide and Export Financing Book found useful? The Trade Secrets Guide had not been brought out by JITAP. The Export Financing Book was given away for free by the BET. Hence, a score of poor on this sub-indicator. 8. Number and types of strategies developed for priority sectors/products. Two export development strategies for textiles & clothing and spices were developed with assistance of JITAP. The Board of External Trade prepared independently similar strategy reports for horticulture & mushrooms and fishery. Hence, a score of good on this sub-indicator. 9. Is the national enquiry point on standards functioning? The Bureau of Standards often has difficulties with their Internet connections. The photocopying machine supplied by JITAP to the Bureau of Standards was not operational as there were no funds for maintenance and toners. Hence, a score of weak on this sub-indicator.

The unweighted average for the above sub-indicators gives a score of weak for the effectiveness of JITAP in Tanzania, (2+1+1+1+2+1+1+4+2)/9= 1.667.

111 Relevance of QUNO

For the relevance of QUNO, two sub-indicators were used: 1) the capacity of the developing country to negotiate and implement multilateral trade agreements; 2) the formulation of a national trade policy at the interface of trade and development.

For the first sub-indicator, the evaluator looked at the following sub-sub indicators:

1. Has the increased knowledge of the beneficiaries led to an active participation in the TRIPS negotiations, in the form of participation in discussions in the TRIPS Council and of putting forward proposals? The beneficiaries of QUNO have been very active, both in the discussions and in putting forward proposals. Hence, a score of good. (A score of excellent was not given because QUNO’s beneficiaries are mainly from developing countries that already have always been quite active in the negotiations.) 2. Has the increased knowledge of beneficiaries and the joint meetings of developing countries at the QUNO office led to strategies and alliances between developing countries? It is difficult to analyse the strategies of developing countries because a strategy is not always visible, but it is very clear that the developing countries have adopted a common coordinated approach, especially by submitting joint proposals and making joint statements. Only on the par. 6 issue, there has been some differences in approach, but not on substance. Hence, a score of good/excellent. 3. Has the increased knowledge of the beneficiaries (through the two indicators above) led to positive negotiation results for developing countries? The Doha Declaration has been very important for developing countries, because it contained a number of important achievements for developing countries, e.g. that countries have the right to protect public health, not only in cases of health crises. The Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health is far from perfect, but the developing countries have been defending their rights actively, without their active participation, the agreement would definitely have been worse. On the other hand, external factors have also influenced the outcome of the negotiations, e.g. pressure from public opinion, and therefore the result cannot only be attributed to developing countries negotiators. Hence, a score of good. 4. Has the increased knowledge of QUNO’s beneficiaries led to an increased capacity of developing countries to implement multilateral agreements? QUNO does not focus on the implementation of agreements. The capacity of countries to implement trade agreements will therefore not be increased as a result of QUNO’s activities. Hence, a score of weak. (A score of poor was not given because the outcome of the negotiations may help developing countries to implement trade agreements: there is now much more information available regarding the flexibility's the TRIPS Agreement provides regarding health and there is less uncertainty.)

The unweighted average for the first sub-indicator on the basis of these four sub-sub indicators is (4+4.5+4+2)/4= 3.625.

For the second sub-indicator, we looked at the following sub-sub-indicators:

1. To which extent has QUNO focused on stakeholders in the national trade policy process. QUNO has had a number of activities in developing countries (regional seminars), where different stakeholders were brought together, and different

112 stakeholders have sometimes also been invited to Geneva. Also publications are sent to a wide audience in developing countries. This only leads to more awareness in developing countries about the issues at stake, but leaves the effects on national trade policy uncertain. Hence, the score is weak. 2. To which extent does QUNO look at the relation between trade and development in national policy. QUNO has analysed what options developing countries have in the negotiations, and how these options relate to their development. This information has also been used for national policy, at least for determining a national position in the negotiations. Hence, a score of fair.

The unweighted average for the second sub-indicator on the basis of these two sub-sub indicators is (2+3)/2= 2.500.

The unweighted average score for the two sub-indicators gives the overall score of fair for the relevance of QUNO is (3.625+2.5)/2= 3.063.

113 114 ANNEX 3

INTERVIEW RESULTS OF (EX)PARTICIPANTS IN JITAP TRAINING EVENTS IN BURKINA FASO

During the evaluation a survey was held through a questionnaire with participants in JITAP training events. The addressees were selected from the list of trainers included in Annex 8 of the JITAP final report phase I for Burkina Faso. At first 20 participants were selected, while later on five others were added.

The addressees concerned 6 generalist trainers, most of whom did also participate in specialist training courses, and 19 specialist trainers. Of the 25 questionnaires fifteen were returned, three from generalist trainers and 12 from specialist trainers.

Generalist trainers

Three generalists did not respond. One person, who did retire in the meantime, refused, one is currently stationed in Cameroon and could not be reached and the last one has passed away.

Three generalist trainers answered the questionnaire. Two followed the three-week training courses organised under JITAP in Geneva while the third received a training of three months in Geneva on commercial policy finance by the Islamic Development Bank and WTO. One trainer participated in one specialist training, another in three and the third person in four.

All three persons currently occupy another function than at the time they received the training. The training was in relation to their initial function. In one case the training does not directly serve anymore.

In all cases the training enhanced personal functioning. However, although these persons were trained as trainer, few training courses were given. One did not give any training at all, the other two did so only once and in both cases exclusively to the members of the CNSC/OMC.

Only one of the generalist trainers is member of the trainers’ association.

Specialist trainers

Twelve questionnaires were returned out of the nineteen distributed, while one more was received from a person who was not on the list but apparently has participated in JITAP training session. Two persons died. Three persons retired and could not be traced within the available time and two persons are stationed outside Ouagadougou and could not be contacted.

115 One form was not filled because the respondent, who is stationed outside Ouagadougou, was reported ill.

In one case the respondent answered not to remember the course anymore.

The ten plus one respondents who filled out the form participated on average in 2.5 training courses.

Table A.1 Number of training courses per participant Number of respondent JITAP training courses Other training courses Total 12-2 2213 3112 4224 51-1 61-1 7112 8415 9213 10 1 - 1 11 1 3 4 Total 18 10 28

All persons still are in the same organisation but several made promotion within the same service or to another direction in the same ministry or organisation. In one case the new function is not in relation anymore with training related activities.

The objective sought by the participants was different. Eight intended to become trainer themselves, while seven participated in the courses to improve their performance. Five persons thought to become focal point for OMC related matters within their institution or service.

Table A.2 Objective of training courses according to the participants Number of respondent Personal functioning To become focal point of To become organisation/service trainer 1-XX 2X-X 3-XX 4X-X 5X-- 6--X 7X-- 8XXX 9-XX 10 X - - 11 X X X Total 7 5 8

116 Although eight people thought to become trainer, only three did so. One moved to another function and stopped giving training

Only two of the specialist trainers are member of the trainers’ association, which is being established, while a third one intends to become a member. Five persons declared not to be informed about the association. The other three were not interested (2) or did not agree with the procedures (1).

117 118 ANNEX 4

INTERVIEW RESULTS OF (EX)PARTICIPANTS IN JITAP TRAINING EVENTS IN TANZANIA

A.4.1 Interview results of six generalist trainers

Six generalist trainers were selected for interviews from the list of trainers included in the JITAP final report phase I for Tanzania, Annex 8. Two generalist trainers could not be interviewed because one was not found, while the other never had been invited to attend any training. The response of the four remaining generalist trainers is presented below.

Questions Name of generalist trainer E. Elias A. Nangawe M. Mfaume Gama 1. Did you attend the Geneva Yes No attended in Dar es Salaam No No, attended in Dar es Salaam Trainers Training from Tanzania 2.How many trainers on MTS About 60 plus. Do not know Not aware About 60 trainers on MTS 1999- are there in Tanzania 2000 3. What is your opinion on the Time is limited in Geneva; more Did not attend the Geneva Has no basis for comparison as Not a beneficiary of MTS cost effectiveness of the training interaction in Tanzania Course, thus unable to make the did not attend the Geneva training in Geneva. Has no courses in Geneva versus comparison. training. experience. For obvious reason training on MTS rules in would be economic in Tanzania. Tanzania 4. Were the sub regional No answer No comment as has never Very helpful on textile and Not attended any regional workshops helpful in getting attended one. For the one clothing and intellectual lines. workshop exchange of experiences among organised for Tanzanians only it Good sharing of experience and professionals? was professional and helpful. exposure on WTO and experience on the clothing industry. 5. Are you confident to give a Yes. Involved in national Very confident and I am familiar Yes, have conducted workshops Yes, on WTO agreements, course as local trainer on MTS coordination demonstrate skills with the subject. on market access in BET market access and trade learnt, position developed. development. 6.Do you have regular contact On return agreed to form Yes, meet with other trainers. Not frequent. More on demand IITC meets regularly. Planned after the workshop for network with Elias as not formalised. every after 3 months. Training networking with other generalist Coordinator. The team has needs discussed in February

119 Questions Name of generalist trainer E. Elias A. Nangawe M. Mfaume Gama trainers; e.g. discussing training dispersed with only 2 out of 6 2003. Introduced MTS in needs? members. training institutions- UDSM, CBE. Write own syllabus relevant to each institution. 7.Did you receive training Yes. Not as an individual, but CBE as Not aware Yes, 10 modules in CDs. Not modules for 10 MTS subjects? a reference centre. aware if others know. Are trainers aware of the modules? 8. Is a network of MTS trainers Not formal, weak. Networking is Yes it is in place Not in place, but it should be Yes, 60 people. Trainers in Tanzania in place? very weak. there depend on IITC meetings as a tool. Go through focal point. Undertaken training in Mwanza, Zanzibar and Dar. Lack of funds to carry out further training; in 2003 no training. 9. Is the Institute for MTS active Involved in all processes, Not yet active Not active. Not active though formed. represented in workshops Submitted budget requirement, no reply from Focal point and Geneva. 10. Have the private sector, Civil No answer It still requires a bigger effort to Some are aware, but very few Very small sector. No follow up society become more familiar make the private sector familiar become proactive. Training on for lack of funds. and pro-active on MTS issues and become proactive on MTS awareness needed. due to JITAP? issues.

120 A.4.2 Interview results of eighteen specialist trainers

Eighteen specialist trainers were selected from the list of trainers included in the JITAP Final Report Phase I for Tanzania, Annex 8. For the following eleven specialist trainers no opinion on the training could be reported:

A. Kabumbire, could not be traced at the Ministry; M. Matiko, had travelled out of Dar; R. Saidi, could not be traced; D. Msangi, was met and sent email, but no response; D. Mshana, was on long sick leave; J. Mbogoma, left the corporation, could not find new contact; M. Kisiri, moved to Tanzania Embassy in Geneva; L. Kachele, travelled out of the country; H. Lumambo, did not attended, though is reported to have attended; P. Magazi, transferred to Kilimanjaro region. S. Faraji, no contact.

The response of the seven remaining specialist trainers is presented below.

121 Questions Name of specialist trainer: D. Elias M. Munisi A. Accaro I. Dallushi L. Kishebuka S. Mvingira S. Ngaga 1. Was any fee No, fully covered. No No No No, was sponsored No paid by sponsor No fee charged, charged for instead organiser participating in the paid Full Board training event? accommodation 2.If yes, what was No No No No No No No fee charged the cost per participant? 3. Did you increase Yes, increased Can not recollect, Yes, its outcome is Yes. Had new Yes Yes Sharpened your knowledge knowledge. was a long time ago the revival of the knowledge on knowledge on trade from the training? textile sector. Government Sensitisation of procurement and members to revive integration in textile mills. relation to WTO, Govt compliance to WTO regulations. 4. Was the Yes, useful for daily Yes, in terms of Yes, made Yes. Helpful in day- Yes. Use regularly Yes, use it often in Has been helpful in workshop/training work. identifying problems coordination to-day activities. particularly on day-to-day activities. Tanzania situation helpful for your in trade, possible, helped TRIPS one has to work? subsidisation by revive textile be conversant LDC as against association developed. TEXMAT. 5. Have you Not very much to During participation Yes, disseminated Not disseminated No, but have kept in Yes, not directly. Have not done any disseminated the specific by MIT. in stakeholders the material learnt to due to lack of funds. the library. Some training workshop. No workshop material to Under JITAP workshop and textile manufacturing material deposited in designed the respective dissemination done members of companies the Library. programme to organisation? covered several exporters disseminate/train regions except Lake community. others was Zone, Mbeya and expected. Zanzibar. Dissemination in agriculture.

122 Questions Name of specialist trainer: D. Elias M. Munisi A. Accaro I. Dallushi L. Kishebuka S. Mvingira S. Ngaga 6.Have you made Made presentation Yes, to members of Wrote report to Not made Made a Workshop Presented Made a 2 page presentation to your several times on the association. management presentation, but report to the Workshop Training written report, not organisation on trade policy, on advised to revive submitted a Registrar. Report to BET. workshop. knowledge gained Integrated textile sector, Workshop Report to Holding workshop from the workshop? Framework for national institutions TCCIA President. would require trade- related research on short Need training money. issues. and long staple materials. cotton. 7.Have you Yes No, need funding for Under AGOA trained No, due to lack of No No No training executed any the training which is JITAP subjects. funds. undertaken due to training event after unavailable. lack of funds. Has your training on not been used to subjects dealt with in train others as was the workshop? intended. 8. Do you still hold Yes, in different Yes, Executive No, was Yes, Chairman of No No. When went for Remained in the same position in levels since 1988 Director. Development the Dar es Salaam training had just same position. your organisation as Officer, now Region TCCIA been promoted before you went for promoted to Senior Branch. workshop? Development Officer. 9. What is your Training modules Useful on various Useful, request for Very useful, but only They were useful Very useful. Generally training opinion on the good, need to be subjects. more updated. Used old ones available. Exposed to only few was good. usefulness of the updated, at least in training AGOA. topics and still Impressed by anti training modules for every after two remain ignorant in dumping modules. specific MTS years, many things others which are Knowledge gained subjects? change. considered useful. not utilised. Would prefer being exposed to complete related sets to broaden understanding. 10. Do you have any No answer Need adjustment to Need to retain the Useful tool has full It is a good Effective. Helping Need to be

123 Questions Name of specialist trainer: D. Elias M. Munisi A. Accaro I. Dallushi L. Kishebuka S. Mvingira S. Ngaga comment on MTS MTS to benefit quota for Tanzania support of TCCIA programme for less BET to understand understood by the generally LDC’s also. E.g. to be able to export. good instrument to developing some important business issue of subsidy disseminate countries. issues with other community. information to less developing business countries. community.

124 ANNEX 5

RÉSUMÉ DE L’ÉVALUATION JITAP AU BURKINA FASO

En 1996 l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC), la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED) et le Centre du Commerce International (CCI) ont entamé le Programme Intégré Conjoint d’Assistance Technique aux pays moins avancés et autres pays africains (JITAP). Le programme a commencé en 1998 pour une durée de deux ans et demi dans huit pays africains. Le programme est financé par un groupe de quatorze pays donateurs.

Le programme a trois objectifs principaux, à savoir la mise en place d’une capacité nationale de connaissance du système de commerce multilatéral (SCM) basé sur les changements intervenus à la suite des accords du Cycle de l’Uruguay ; la mise en conformité de la législation nationale avec les règles du SCM ; et l’amélioration de la connaissance des marchés d’exportation du Burkina Faso et le renforcement de la position compétitive de ses entreprises exportatrices. Afin de réaliser ces objectives le programme a entrepris un grand nombre d’activités regroupées dans quinze sous- ensembles.

Ce rapport présente les résultats de l’évaluation du JITAP au Burkina Faso. L’évaluation fait partie d’une évaluation de la politique néerlandaise de coopération internationale en matière d’assistance technique liée au commerce (ATLC) mandaté par la Direction de l'Évaluation de la politique et des Opérations (IOB) du ministère des Affaires étrangères des Pays Bas. L’objectif de l’évaluation est de mieux comprendre l’efficacité, l’efficience et la relevance des différents types d' ATLC (co)financés par les Pays-Bas. Le JITAP est un des éléments de l'ATLC.

L’évaluation prend en considération le fait que le premier objectif a été atteint: la sensibilisation et l’amélioration de la connaissance du SCM. Le programme a réalisé la mise en place d'une structure institutionnelle fonctionnelle. Une meilleure compréhension du SCM a contribué à un rôle actif du Burkina Faso pendant les négociations ministérielles de Cancún.

Quant au deuxième objectif, peu a été réalisé. La conclusion de l'étude sur l'impact du Cycle d'Uruguay sur l'économie et l'export du Burkina Faso, est que les règles et règlements externes ont moins d'impact sur l'économie du Burkina Faso que le fonctionnement interne. L'harmonisation de la législation n'est donc pas considéré comme une priorité.

Les résultats du troisième objectif sont mixtes. Quoique la qualité des activités réalisées est positive, peu d'activités ont été exécutées. Et ceux qui l'ont été, l'étaient trop tard pour pouvoir en mesurer l'impact L’efficience du programme était pauvre. Sa mise en place était retardée et a pris deux fois plus de temps que le temps prévu a l'avance. Des bâtiments de formation ont été effectues, deux centres de référence et un point national d'information ont été établis, tout comme l'étude de l'impact de SCM et de la matrice des produits et des marchés d'exportation ont été réalisées. Les publications ‘Les clés de l’exportation’ et ‘Comment approcher les banques?’ n’ont pas été publiés; les facilités de communication et de discussion n'ont pas été utilisées; la matrice des services

125 exportables n’a pas été faite et seulement l'une des cinq stratégies sectorielles prévues a été réalisé. Peu de support était fourni aux douanes, qui bénéficient d’une assistance importante autre que JITAP, parce que le budget de JITAP n’était pas équipé aux besoins de ce secteur. En conclusion , le programme est trop ambitieux avec un budget qui ne correspond pas aux activités prévues.

Le score total de l’efficacité du programme est bas. Malgré ceci, bon nombre de réalisations fonctionnent bien, tel que le comité inter- institutionnel au Burkina Faso, appelé Cellule Nationale de Suivi et de Coordination des Accords de l’OMC CNSC/OMC, qui est enraciné dans la législation . Ce comité se réunit régulièrement. Les personnes rencontrées témoignent d’une plus grande connaissance du SCM et les études de stratégies sectorielles ont été poursuivies et utilisées comme un modèle pour d’autres études organisées à partir des fonds propres ou d’autres programmes.

La relevance est jugé conforme. Une politique nationale n’avait pas été formulée et il n’y a pas d'amélioration notable du commerce attribuable au programme. Par contre, JITAP a été utilisé pour renforcer la capacité institutionnelle du Burkina Faso. Le Burkina a joué un rôle important dans 'l’Initiative coton' entamée par quatre pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest pendant la préparation du Cycle de l’Uruguay et les négociations de Cancún.

L’appropriation du programme est bonne et il y a un processus de réflexion actif par rapport à la continuation des activités mises en marche par le programme.

Il n’y a pas de coordination entre donateurs sur place en matière de JITAP. En effet, le programme n’était guère connu auprès les représentants des donateurs au moment où ils étaient contactés par la mission d’évaluation. Quant au dialogue entre La Haye et l’Ambassade des Pays Bas, il est pratiquement absent en ce qui concerne JITAP,. Les bénéfices du programme ne se limitent pas aux exportateurs, mais s’étendent indirectement au monde rural où un grand nombre de paysans profitera d’un éventuel compromis sur la diminution ou l’abolition des subventions sur la culture de coton dans le monde occidental.

JITAP I correspondait avec les objectives de la politique néerlandaise en matière de l'ATLAS, à savoir la mise en place d'une politique nationale de commerce, le renforcement de la capacité de négociation et la mise en œuvre des accords sur le commerce; l'amélioration de l'exécution commerciale. Les résultats les plus prononcés ont surtout été réalisés par rapport au deuxième objectif. Selon la mission d’évaluation, JITAP II pourra encore mieux mettre en relief cet aspect, et par là, étendre les bons résultats aux deux autres objectifs.

126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs | P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 eb The Hague | The Netherlands

Policy and Operations Evaluation Department

issn 15166-3000 ordercode: OSDR0533/E